Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I thank the Attorney-General for that intervention. No doubt Scotland will be drummed out of the convention for what it has done.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green) on her powerful speech, which I think she made extremely well. I only wish that she had been given more time to go through all the detailed objections, which the British Humanist Association has answered at length, but of course there is not always time in debates to answer every question. I assure hon. Members that the BHA has dealt with all the objections it has heard so far. [Interruption.]

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. There are too many private conversations going on and I am struggling to hear—[Interruption.] Mr Blunt, order, please.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

In conclusion, I want to put it on the record that I strongly support new clause 15 and very much hope that it will eventually lead to humanists being allowed to marry in the way they wish and not to be required to get married in any other way.

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[Stephen Williams]

I originally proposed a version of new clause 10 in Committee. I did not see it as an attempt to wreck the Bill; I genuinely felt it was an opportunity to close that loophole.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We are obviously not going to reopen yesterday’s debate. We are discussing other amendments today.

[Simon Hughes]

The proposals appear to be linked, Mr Deputy Speaker. I thank my hon. Friend for that proposal and many others he has made, and for his much-respected work. We do not agree on every single item, but his record is one of which the Liberal Democrats and Parliament should be proud.

Let me put my position on the record. I believe, have believed and was brought up to believe that marriage is ordained by God. I believe that marriage is traditionally ordained by God to be between one man and one woman. I believe that marriage was set up by God for the creation of children. I believe that it was to link the biological needs of children with their biological parents. I believe that it was for biological complementarity. I believe that it was for gender complementarity, and that it was a gift of God in creation. That is why I have taken a traditional Christian and other-faith view on how marriage has traditionally been—for one man and one woman—which was the case long before we legislated for such things in this country and made them the law of the land.

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[Ms Abbott]

On the question of children, is the right hon. Gentleman arguing that couples who are infertile or couples who marry when the female partner is past the age of childbearing—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We are not talking about infertile couples. Unfortunately, we are on the humanist part of the Bill, and that is what we will discuss. Fortunately or unfortunately—depending on which way we look at it—we must try to speak to the amendments if we can. I hope, Mr Hughes, that you are not going to tempt many others down another track.

[Simon Hughes]

I will not, but with respect I want to say a word about humanism and speak to my new clause 18, which is in this group, on the difference between the church and the state.

Let me say to the hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) that of course marriage is never only for the production of children. Many people get married without that intention, and it might be impossible for some. That is not the argument. In the theological tradition, one purpose of marriage is to have children, and that is not possible, biologically, between two men or between two women. Some churches believe that marriage is a sacrament or holds another special position.

We move from that position of faith to one where we legislate. My right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) intervened earlier to make it clear that Methodists, Quakers, Jews and the Free Churches had to fight for the right to perform marriages in their churches. Now, places that have nothing to do with churches or faiths are licensed to carry out marriages—civil marriages became possible. The position of registrar was set up and people are able to have entirely civil marriages in a registry office. That is still the case. Marriages can be held in a place that is entirely civil—in a state-authorised location—or in a place of worship, which can also include the legislative provisions that the state requires.

In all my time in the House, I have argued that we should try to separate those two things. New clause 18 suggests a way of doing that, just as new clause 14, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds North West (Greg Mulholland), does. I believe in the disestablishment of the Church of England. I am a member of the Church, but I believe in its disestablishment. Just as the Church in Wales has been disestablished, I have always believed that in England we should separate as much as possible the activities of the Church and the activities of the state. Marriage, therefore, between a man and a woman in a Christian or religious sense is different from marriages, partnerships or unions that are secular, or between people of the same sex.

I pray in aid the view, which has been quoted already, of the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant). It was referred to in the Public Bill Committee and goes back to what he said in 2004. When he was asked whether he agreed with the proposition about same-sex marriage, which is at the heart of the Bill, he answered:

“I do not support that; I believe that marriage is an institution that is ordained of God and should be celebrated between a man and a woman. However, I also believe that two men or two women can have a relationship that in many ways mirrors that between a man and a woman but is not identical. Therefore, I believe that we should have in law separate institutions that reflect that reality.”—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 21 October 2004; c. 68-70.]

That has always been my position too. We should give equal rights to gay and straight couples to form partnerships, unions or relationships that give the same pension rights and status, but are not the same as the traditional marriage between a man and a woman.

Colloquially, people talk of equal marriage, and I understand that. People who are in civil partnerships talk of being married, and of their husbands and wives. We are not going to be able to put the clock back, which is why new clause 18 talks about “civil marriage” and not civil union. Many of my Christian friends say that that is an unacceptable compromise, because the Christian view of marriage cannot be changed by calling it civil marriage. We have to wrestle with that issue and sort it out, because we could have civil marriage that is different from faith, Christian or religious marriage, and I think that people would reasonably understand the difference.

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[Jim Shannon]

I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak to amendments 27 and 28. It will not be a surprise to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, to hear that I am deeply unhappy about the Bill. I have said that in Public Bill Committee and in this Chamber in the earlier debate, I said it yesterday and I will reiterate it today.

I want to thank the Government for at least listening to me and my party on one issue. The Bill proposes that same-sex marriages formed in England and Wales should be recognised as civil partnerships in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That is consistent with the way in which overseas same-sex marriages are currently recognised in the House.

I was a member of the Committee that scrutinised the Bill. When I say “scrutinised”, I mean that the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) and for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) scrutinised it very thoroughly. Most of the Committee’s members, however, sat in silence throughout the five days of our debates on the clauses, and most of them tabled precious few amendments. They seemed to see themselves as cheerleaders for the Bill, rather than the scrutinisers that they should have been. Never before, during my short time in the House of Commons, have I known members of the official Opposition to abdicate their responsibility to hold the Government to account quite so thoroughly.

Some of us did table amendments, and took the time and the trouble to speak. I pointed out to the Committee that Scottish Ministers were to be asked to give their consent to legal changes allowing recognition of English same-sex marriages, whereas Northern Ireland Ministers were merely to be consulted. Amendments 27 and 28 give us an opportunity to align the law with that in Scotland, which is good news.

As I said in Committee and have said in the Chamber, the Bill has generated the biggest single postbag I have received on any issue in all my years as an elected representative—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. I am trying to be as tolerant as possible, but we are discussing this group of amendments, not previous amendments and what happened in Committee. I am trying to be fair, but we are in danger of not remaining where we should be.

[Jim Shannon]

Amendments 27 and 28 provide for “consent”, Mr Deputy Speaker, and remove the reference to consultation. Why is that important? It is important to the people whom I represent in Northern Ireland because it introduces accountability to the process. Some 1,700 of my constituents have contacted me about the issue: members of the Church of Ireland, Presbyterians, Methodists, members of the Elim Pentacostal Church, Baptist Brethren, evangelical groups, Roman Catholics, Sikhs and Muslims. Members of faith groups throughout Northern Ireland have asked us, as Members of Parliament, to push for consent rather than consultation, and we have done so.

I believe that when we convey opinions about the importance of faith and religious persuasions, as we have in the House today and as we did in Committee, those opinions cannot be ignored. It has grieved me when some members of the Committee, and perhaps some Members in the House, have brushed aside the opinions of those with hard-held religious views.

Several of my fellow Northern Ireland Members have received similar amounts of correspondence from constituents, all of them pushing for consent rather than consultation. Only 17 of my constituents who contacted me were in favour of the changes. Theirs was very much a minority view, but it is one that we must respect and take on board.

The Northern Ireland Assembly will make the final decision on the issue, which is why amendments 27 and 28 are important. The Assembly has rejected same-sex marriage on two occasions under the consultation process. The first occasion was on 1 October 2012, when it was rejected by 50 votes to 45. Then, on 29 April this year, it was rejected by 53 votes to 42.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Order. I have been generous, and have allowed what I thought was a kind of preamble, but we are actually discussing a group of amendments entitled “Gender, benefits and miscellaneous”. That is the problem that I am facing. I thought that the hon. Gentleman must be getting there. I am sure that he is, and will confine himself to the subjects under discussion from now on.

[Jim Shannon]

I may have been a wee bit over-ambitious in trying to express some of my points of view, Mr Deputy Speaker, but I appreciate your generosity. I will return to the issues directly.

The Minister of State, Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the right hon. Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Hugh Robertson), confirmed to me, in a letter that I received yesterday, that

“Amendments 27 and 28 to clause 15(6) of the Bill make all orders and regulations made under the Bill subject to the consent of the Department of Finance and Personnel if those amendments would otherwise fall within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly.”

The amendments have clearly given the Assembly the authority to make a final decision on the issue. That is very significant, and I thank both Ministers for what they have done.

This issue is immensely important to us in Northern Ireland, and has given rise to a massive postbag. I thank Ministers again for enabling consent rather than consultation to be enshrined in legislation.

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[Lady Hermon]

I am listening intently to the Minister and am sorry to interrupt her at this stage, but I must bring her back to Northern Ireland. I really want an assurance from the Government that we in Northern Ireland will not see legal challenges on the grounds of breaches of the European convention on human rights by those who, if the Bill becomes law, avail of same-sex marriage in England and Wales. It is specifically paragraph 2 of schedule 2 that concerns me. It states:

“Under the law of Northern Ireland, a marriage of a same sex couple under the law of England and Wales is to be treated as a civil partnership… (and accordingly, the spouses are to be treated as civil partners).”

I just need reassurance from the Minister.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We are getting to Third Reading points and I would not want the hon. Lady to use up the points that would be better made then.

[Mrs Grant]

I am afraid that, as this is a devolved matter, it is impossible for me to give the assurance that the hon. Lady is asking for. Northern Ireland, rightly, has to look at the issue itself.

Government amendments 40 to 47 deal with pension entitlements. They amend part 6 of schedule 4, which provides for same-sex married couples to be treated in the same manner and to be entitled to the same survivor benefits as civil partners. As drafted, that includes couples in same-sex marriages who have preserved their marriage following the change of legal gender of one of the spouses, and it is designed to ensure that all same-sex couples are treated alike for this purpose. We recognise that our policy of treating same-sex marriages in the same way as civil partnerships for occupational pension survivor benefits may create a problem in relation to survivor benefits for a very small group of individuals whose spouses change gender during their marriage. We understand that this could deter a transsexual person from seeking to change their legal gender because of the financial impact on their husband or wife. If the amendments are made, widows of marriages that become same-sex as a result of the husband’s change of legal gender during the marriage will still be treated as widows for the purpose of calculating survivor benefits in a contracted-out occupational pension scheme; and for schemes that are not contracted out, in calculating any entitlement to survivor benefits, the marriage will continue to be treated as opposite-sex marriage.

Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Friday 1st March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

For the record, I think that the Deputy Speaker is so many leagues above me that I am not sure my hon. Friend is right. If one takes my hon. Friend’s point about the equality of humanity—the equality before God that I believe as a matter of faith—that does not mean that rights are always applied equally. Even in this Bill, the right to life—that most essential right—is qualified in the case of self-defence, so rights immediately become relative.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Just for the record, I think we are all equal unless there is a long intervention, when I might show a little more power.

[Rory Stewart]

Rights are indeed qualified, but that does not mean that they are relative. This is an important distinction. The clause that my hon. Friend mentioned does indeed establish the right but says that under certain specific circumstances it may be qualified or overruled. That is not a statement that the right is relative. It is not a statement that the right to life contained in the European convention on human rights is purely relative. It is not a statement that, below the threshold of the qualification, in other words, the specific circumstances in which a right may be suspended—this is what makes rights quite different from any other form of moral law—one’s possession of a right is not relative to the costs or benefits of upholding it in a particular case.

One’s right to life may be suspended at a certain threshold. The thresholds described in the European convention include those relating to civil disorder and military law. However, below those thresholds one’s right to life cannot simply be looked at in terms of the costs or benefits of upholding it in any particular case.

European Union (Approvals) Bill [Lords]

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Monday 4th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Geoffrey Clifton-Brown]

To whom will the FRA be accountable? Who will set its agenda and control its budget?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. The hon. Gentleman has been here a long time and normally addresses the Chair. This is not a private conversation between two Back Benchers. We have allowed the debate to drift, but I hope we will come back to having it through the Chair rather than having a private conversation.

[Geoffrey Clifton-Brown]

Apologies, Mr Deputy Speaker.

[Mr Chope]

I am sorry, Mr Deputy Speaker, but I am sitting so close to my hon. Friend that it seems as if we are having a private conversation.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Order. We could always continue the debate in the Tea Room if we are getting frustrated with the rest of the Chamber. I am sure that is not the case.

[Mr Chope]

In that case, Mr Deputy Speaker, I shall raise my voice to make it obvious that this is not a private conversation. My hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) would like to have this conversation on the record—it certainly would not be on the record if it took place in the Tea Room. The short answer to his question is that we have a great opportunity, because the FRA has its multi-annual framework approved every five years. If we believe it has the wrong priorities, this is the moment to change it. The Bill could be amended to reflect the concerns of this Parliament.

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[Mr Cash]

I assure my hon. Friend 100% that, if this House, in its sovereign right, decides to repeal the European Communities Act 1972—we entered on a voluntary basis in that year—or any provision that emanates from section 2, by, for example, using the “notwithstanding” formula, we are entitled to do so. Nobody can do anything to stop us doing so. Whether the Whips would allow it is another thing.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Order. I have been very generous in allowing hon. Members to drift all over, but I am not going back to 1972. I want us to stick to Second Reading. We have a bit of time and a bit of latitude has been given, but I do not want to go to the complete ends of it.

[Mr Chope]

As you know, Mr Deputy Speaker, the fact that time is available does not mean we have to use it all. Other hon. Members may wish to participate in the debate. Some might regret that they missed the opportunity to participate when they look at the record. Some of us hope we will catch Mr Speaker’s eye in tomorrow’s debate, and might do our prospects some damage if we speak in extenso this evening.

This is a worthwhile debate and it is fantastic that we have the opportunity to discuss the Bill. I disagree with the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood), who is no longer in his place. He said that the relatively low attendance shows a lack of interest, but many hon. Members have looked at the issue and we are discussing it, and we look forward to the Minister’s response.

Obviously, most Europe debates from now on—for the next several years—will be preparatory to that great referendum. I would like the Government to start work on drawing up an audit of the costs and benefits of our EU membership. In the context of the Bill, they could do a lot worse than draw up an audit of the costs and benefits to this country of the work of the FRA compared with the work that is already being done in the Council of Europe—the Council of Europe’s work is being duplicated by the FRA.

I will not vote against the Bill, but I hope that, in due course, we have the opportunity to discuss amendments to it.

Police (Complaints and Conduct) Bill

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Wednesday 5th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Damian Green]

On the first point, I know that the IPCC is extremely aware of the desire for things not to appear to be unduly delayed. Indeed, that is one reason why we are here today—to put a Bill through all its stages in one day, which shows that the House and the Government are trying to speed the process up as much as we can.

On the application to the High Court, I know that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General is proceeding as fast as he can, and I think a decision will be made public very shortly. I can go no further than that, but the hon. Gentleman’s wider point is well made, and I absolutely take it. I am very conscious that people want to see that this process, having started after the report, is not unduly delayed at any stage. I am very keen, as I know are many other people who have been involved from the start, that that should happen.

That explains why the House should not today consider the wider reform of the IPCC, although we will examine whether there are other gaps in its powers. We have asked it what tools it needs to progress its investigations into Hillsborough, and this short Bill will ensure that it has the two additional powers for which it asked. The Bill thus represents an important step on the road from truth to justice for Hillsborough. All who support that aim will, I hope, support this Bill. I commend it to the House.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

I must now announce the result of the deferred Division on the draft order amending schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. The Ayes were 288 and the Noes were 213, so the Question was agreed to.

I must also announce the result of the deferred Division on the draft Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2012. The Ayes were 287 and the Noes were 213, so the Question was agreed to.

Leveson Inquiry

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Whittingdale]

I have very little time left. I could probably spend another hour discussing the whole issue of privacy law, but I shall merely tell my hon. and learned Friend that I hear what he says.

I am absolutely at one with those in the Chamber who believe that we need to establish—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order.

[Mr Whittingdale]

— an independent regulatory body—

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Order. The hon. Gentleman must not test the patience of the Chair. A great many other Members wish to speak.

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[Sir Edward Garnier]

rose—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. Shorter interventions would be helpful. I know that two knights want to exchange views, but I worry about the costs that might be charged.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I agree with the premise of my hon. Friend’s point but think that we perhaps draw different conclusions from it. Lord Justice Leveson has stated, as did our right hon. Friend the Secretary of State at the beginning of this debate, that the status quo is not an option, so if we learn nothing else from Leveson, we should learn that what went before cannot go on. It seems to me to be uncontroversial that the PCC is dead, for example. We need some other form of disciplinary body or regulatory system that matches public concern but also has parliamentary approval. We could approve through parliamentary procedure a body that is not statutory, but we could also approve a regulatory body that is not the creature of Parliament but that would be recognised and saluted by statute. There are plenty of other bodies that discipline the professions or other public bodies but that are not controlled by the Government.

Voting Eligibility (Prisoners)

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Thursday 22nd November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. I want to get everybody in and do not want to disappoint anyone, so we need short questions and speedy answers.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

Many members of the public will believe that this decision is because of the Human Rights Act. As the Lord Chancellor has said very clearly that it is not, will he confirm whether he supports repealing that Act?

Defamation Bill

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Wednesday 12th September 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jeremy Wright)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 7, page 3, line 22, leave out clause 5.

Government amendments 5 and 6.

[Jeremy Wright]

New clause 1 deals with an issue raised in Committee by the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly). He was concerned that circumstances could arise in which a claimant who had successfully brought an action against the author of defamatory material online could be left unable to secure the removal of the material. That situation might arise as a result of the fact that an author might not always be in a position to remove material that had been found to be defamatory from a website, while the new defence in clause 5 might prevent the website operator from being required to do so. The Government indicated in Committee that we would consider whether anything further was needed to address such situations.

We have concluded that although such situations are likely to be rare, it would be appropriate to include a provision in the Bill to ensure that claimants in such cases do not experience any difficulty in securing the removal of material that has been found to be defamatory. New clause 1 therefore provides that where a court gives a judgment for the claimant in a defamation action, it may order the operator of a website on which the defamatory statement is posted to remove that statement. Such an order could be made either during proceedings or on a separate application. New clause 1(2) ensures that the provision does not have any wider effect on the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.

In speaking to new clause 1, it may be helpful if I speak also to Government amendments 5 and 6, and to amendment 7, which has been tabled by the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello). Government amendment 5 relates to the circumstances in which a claimant might defeat the defence set out in clause 5. Such circumstances are set out in clause 5(3), paragraphs (b) and (c) of which require a claimant to show that he gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation to the statement in question and that the operator failed to respond to it in accordance with provisions to be set out in regulations. In addition, paragraph (a) requires that a claimant must show that it was not possible for him to identify the person who posted the statement. Amendment 5 clarifies what is meant in paragraph (a) by the word “identify”. Again, concerns were raised in Committee by the hon. Members for Newcastle-under-Lyme and for Stoke-on-Trent South that the meaning of the word “identify” was unclear and that possible difficulties in obtaining the true identity of the author—for example, when he was using a pseudonym—might mean that the claimant was left without a remedy. In the light of those concerns, we undertook to consider the position further.

Amendment 5 clarifies that, for the purposes of subsection 3(a), it is possible for a claimant to “identify” a person only if they have sufficient information to bring proceedings against that person. The amendment will ensure that claimants are not left in limbo, unable to bring proceedings against an author because they lack information that would enable them to do so, but also unable to defeat the defence of the website operator if the operator failed to take steps to assist. We consider that that will ensure that the new process operates fairly and effectively and strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of claimants and those of website operators.

Amendment 6 makes it clear that if the website operator moderates material posted by third-party users on his site, that fact alone will not defeat the defence that is available under clause 5 to a website operator who can show that he did not post the statement complained about on his website. We share the view, expressed by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and Members of this House, that responsible moderation of content should be encouraged. We have listened to the concerns raised in Committee and consider that it would be helpful to include a provision giving reassurance on that point. Amendment 6 therefore provides that the defence under clause 5 is not defeated by reason only of the fact that the website operator moderates the statements posted on the site by others.

There might of course be situations when an operator goes too far. They might, for example, moderate content on the website so much as to change the meaning of what the author had posted in a way that makes it defamatory or increases the seriousness of the defamation. In such cases, the courts will have to consider whether the operator’s actions were sufficient for them to be regarded as having posted the material.

We have considered carefully the merits of seeking to prescribe the particular circumstances in which moderation might or might not lead to the operator being regarded as having posted the material. Precisely when an operator should become responsible for a statement they moderate will depend heavily on the individual circumstances of the case. On balance, we think it is right that the courts should have flexibility in making that assessment. We consider that these are sensible and helpful amendments that will aid the effective operation of the new process under clause 5.

Amendment 7, by contrast, would remove clause 5 from the Bill. I will of course listen carefully to what the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) has to say on the matter, but I am sorry to say that we do not consider removing the clause to be an appropriate move. The current law in this area is unsatisfactory and has created a situation in which website operators, to avoid any risk of being sued, choose to remove material from sites they host on receipt of a complaint, whether or not the material is actually defamatory. That chills free speech.

However, we recognise that when people are defamed online they need to be able to take prompt and effective action to protect their reputation. Including clause 5 in the Bill will mean that the author of a statement is given an opportunity to defend it, rather than it simply being taken down on receipt of a complaint. Should the need arise, complainants will be able to bring proceedings against those truly responsible for statements.

Defamation Bill

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Tuesday 12th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lammy]

The hon. Gentleman makes that point well. This is about the prominence given to the decision, and the fact that it is often nothing like as prominent as the original story. I do not think that the Bill has cracked that problem, but I hope that, as it passes through the Committee and goes to the other place, the matter will receive further scrutiny.

Much has been said about the internet, and I shall not add to it except to say that I am truly concerned about the position of young people, and young adults, in this regard. Many of us will be aware of Facebook bullying, for example, and I remain concerned that much of what is said about young people and young adults in such forums remains out there. The ability to fail, to make mistakes and to grow up in a private arena seems to have disappeared from our society. All of that now seems to be done in public. A lot of what used to be said by young people in the pub at the age of 17 or 18 would just disappear. Now, nothing disappears. It is visible for all to see. Many of us might have exercised this when employing a researcher. It is all there, and that is a matter of huge concern. Kicking this matter into secondary legislation is a concern, because it merits hard discussion. This relates to some of the issues being raised in Leveson, and those being raised in relation to privacy. The Joint Committee conducted its deliberations against the backdrop of super-injunctions and the issues that had arisen on the Twitter network just a few months ago.

The Bill is obviously needed, and it is good, but there are elements missing. Those elements were highlighted in the work of the Joint Committee and of Lord Lester, and I hope that they will garner greater scrutiny in the weeks and months ahead.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Stephen Phillips.

[Hon. Members]

Hear, hear.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Glenda Jackson (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport has announced on Radio 4 within the last hour that he will make a statement to the House this afternoon, presumably arising from the contributions made to the Leveson inquiry. Has he made that request to you, has it been granted, and if so when will the House hear the statement?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

No message has been conveyed to me, and I know nothing of it.

Before Clause 43

Resolved,

That this House insists on its disagreement with Lords amendment 31 and proposes its amendment (a) in lieu.—(Mr Djanogly.)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83H), That a Committee be appointed to draw up Reasons to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing to their amendments 1B, 2B and 196B;

That Mr Jonathan Djanogly, Mr Shailesh Vara, Mr Andy Slaughter, Yvonne Fovargue and Tom Brake be members of the Committee;

That Mr Jonathan Djanogly be the Chair of the Committee;

That three be the quorum of the Committee.

That the Committee do withdraw immediately.—(Jeremy Wright.)

Question agreed to.

Committee to withdraw immediately; reasons to be reported and communicated to the Lords.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Glenda Jackson]

The Lord Chancellor referred to a majority of cases. Citizens Advice says that the proportion of appeals that are upheld in work capability assessment cases, for example, rises from 40% to 90% when a legal adviser is involved. I am not saying that it will necessarily be about a point of law, to pick up the point made by the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland), but there are occasions when a legal mind can clarify the situation. I do not think that the Lord Chancellor understands who the people are who go to appeal. He said that in domestic violence cases, they go to a solicitor. None of my constituents in that situation has a solicitor; they go to the CAB or to a law centre, many of which, in my constituency, are in grave danger of having their ability to provide those services reduced—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. The hon. Lady has had a good go at intervening three times. Could interventions please be shorter, because we have to get in a lot of other speakers who want to make points?

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[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. A lot of people want to get in and I want to get them all in as quickly as possible, so if Members can try to keep their speeches short, that would be great.

[Mrs Helen Grant (Maidstone and The Weald) (Con)]

I declare an interest as a legal aid family lawyer who specialises in domestic violence. I shall speak to amendments that deal with the widening of the evidence gateway for victims of domestic violence and the time limits applied to that gateway. However, at the outset I pay tribute to the Government’s wide strategy of combating the scourge of domestic violence. During the course of this Bill’s progress, they have clearly demonstrated their commitment to the legal needs of victims of domestic violence and their related family law issues. The Government have my support, but I would have liked them to go a little further on the time limits.

Let me turn first to the evidence gateway. Domestic violence is so often a hidden crime. It is committed behind closed doors, where the victim’s primal need to preserve a relationship or family unit can overwhelm their fear of continued abuse. There are often no witnesses, save for the sad exception of children, and it is one person’s word against another’s if the police arrive on the scene. The vast majority of victims are women. They find help, support and guidance in the face of adversity through their GPs, hospitals, social services and DV support organisations. The Government are absolutely right to ensure that the gateway criteria reflect and accommodate the alternative routes that women—and some men—take to address the pain and suffering that they are experiencing. Evidence, in the form of medical reports and letters from health professionals, social services and refuges, is successfully relied on every day in the courts. Judges use it all the time to justify the making of non-molestation orders and occupation orders, under the Family Law Act 1996. If such evidence is acceptable to the courts in establishing violence, it should surely be acceptable to the Executive agency of the Ministry of Justice in making its funding decisions.

Some who suffer abuse have even heavier armoury to prevent the disclosure and reporting of domestic violence. Be it a matter of duty, shame or honour, there is often huge familial and cultural pressure in black and ethnic minority communities to avoid the police, lawyers and other statutory bodies. Women also often feel compelled to use alternative but unacceptable community mechanisms for dispute resolution, which can often expose them to increased risk of harm and injustice. A widening of the gateway will especially help those women and girls, many of whom also have practical problems in reporting violence owing to language barriers, unawareness of services and fear of deportation.

There is also a need to maintain consistency across Departments in our treatment of domestic violence. Since 2004, in dealing with applications for leave to remain on the grounds of domestic violence, the UK Border Agency has used similar criteria to those advocated today by the Government. Although I appreciate that the list of criteria is now used as indicative guidance rather than compulsory evidence, it should be accepted that during the last eight years it has worked effectively, and without opening the fearsome floodgates to the outside world.

Having given reasons to support the widening of the gateway, let me now deal with one of the principal objections that has been raised against it. During earlier Government consultations, evidence was submitted by the Law Society and other bodies which suggested that a domestic violence gateway for family legal aid could lead to false allegations. However, having worked as a legal aid family lawyer for more than 20 years, I can tell the House that the overwhelming majority of my clients would not have deliberately recruited social services into their affairs, inviting all the risks that go with such involvement, nor would they have left the family to place themselves and their children in a hostel or women’s refuge, or deliberately inflict injury on themselves or their children and then falsely report the injury to a GP or hospital. Such acts require a high degree of wanton and malicious forethought. Yes, dishonesty exists across every section of society, but we need to weigh up the quantum of potential abuse and balance it against the harm that would persist if we fail to provide essential legal services for the most vulnerable people in society.

On the time limit applied to the criteria, I do not believe that the gateway should remain open in perpetuity, but there are strong reasons for extending it beyond 12 months. Such a limit does not recognise the dynamic of domestic violence or the genuine potential for post-separation violence. Research published by Women’s Aid found that 76% of those who have experienced violence also experience post-separation violence. Also, many non-molestation injunction orders are granted for just six months or a year. It is a sad fact that on expiry a significant number of respondents return and bring to bear a threatening presence, albeit one that is perhaps not sufficient to merit the making of a further injunction order. For many women, especially those who have suffered years of abuse before taking any action, 12 months is simply not sufficient to reach a state of physical, emotional and financial readiness to commence divorce or other legal proceedings. Indeed, a short, 12-month limit could encourage women to take action too early or miss out altogether on the help they need.

In the fullness of time, however, things settle down. Acrimony reduces, people move on, people remarry, children grow up, and old wounds start to heal. We therefore have to question the equity of bleeding the scars of old battles simply to obtain legal aid ad infinitum. All this suggests that at some stage a statutory line has to be drawn under the issues of the past. My personal view is that three years, rather than one, would be more appropriate for the majority of cases, but I of course leave that open for debate.