Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Lords amendments 3 and 4, Government motions to disagree, and Government amendments (a) and (b) in lieu.
Lords amendment 5.
Lords amendment 24, and Government motion to disagree.
Mr Djanogly
Lords amendments 1 and 24 impinge on the financial privilege of this House. I ask the House to disagree to them and will ask the Reasons Committee to ascribe financial privilege as the reason for doing so. Notwithstanding that, the House now has the opportunity to debate the substance and effect of the amendments, and shortly I will state the Government’s full reasons for rejecting them. Before I start, I remind the House of the statement that I made on Report on 31 October 2011 relating to my declaration of interests. It can be found at column 626 of Hansard, and I confirm today that it remains accurate. I ask the House to agree to the Government amendments in lieu of Lords amendments 3 and 4, which relate to the director of legal aid casework.
I turn to the Lords amendments. Access to justice is of fundamental importance to our legal system and to this Government, but our legal aid system is by any measure extremely expensive and sometimes prone to aggravating disputes unnecessarily by pushing them into the courtroom. The question for the Government has never been whether to reform it but how, and our approach is one with a principled basis of focusing scarce resources on the most urgent and serious cases while seeking a broader shift to earlier resolution of disputes. We have always been happy to accept amendments that deliver on those principles, so it should come as no surprise that the Bill is much revised. The Government have listened and made significant concessions, and I am grateful to the other place for its concern to improve the Bill.
In another place, Lords amendment 1, tabled by Lord Pannick, was said to identify the aims of the legal aid system in our society. It would place a duty on the Lord Chancellor, reflecting the provision in section 4(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, to secure within the resources made available and in accordance with part 1 of the Bill that individuals have access to legal services that meet their needs effectively. However, clause 1(1) already sets out a clear duty on the Lord Chancellor to ensure that legal aid is made available in accordance with part 1 of the Bill, so the Government are concerned that the amendment replicates what is already in place.
Worse than mere duplication, technical problems with the amendment risk muddying the waters, creating legal uncertainty and undermining the Bill’s clear purpose. Unlike the clear duty in clause 1(1), which relates to legal aid made available under part 1 of the Bill, with legal aid being defined in clause 1(2), Lords amendment 1 would impose a duty in relation to legal services. Despite the purported qualifications in the words in brackets, it can be read as imposing a wider duty on the Lord Chancellor than that intended under the Bill, in that it risks imposing a duty on him to fund legal services beyond the realm of legal aid provision.
We believe that there are potential additional costs attached to the amendment, which would create uncertainty. It runs contrary to the policy intention of creating certainty through the unambiguous description of services in schedule 1 and the clearly defined circumstances in which exceptional funding is available. Both the uncertainty that would be created and the possible costs are undesirable outcomes.
The problem with the amendment is that it conflates the two important but separate principles of access to justice and the provision of publicly funded legal advice. It could be understood in the context of the 1999 Act, which, because it was drafted on an exclusionary basis, specifies what services cannot be funded under civil legal aid but leaves rather vague exactly what the Lord Chancellor is responsible for funding. However, the Bill is carefully drafted on an inclusionary basis, which means that it is explicitly clear about what services can be funded, thereby representing Parliament’s view on services that should be provided under legal aid to meet people’s needs.
Lords amendment 1 risks providing the basis for myriad new legal challenges seeking to widen the scope of the Bill. The central purpose of our legal aid reforms is targeting resources where they really matter, not providing work for lawyers. We cannot accept an amendment that might prompt endless legal dispute and judicial review.
Lords amendments 3 and 4, which were tabled by Lord Pannick, and the Government’s Lords amendment 5 all concern the director of legal aid casework. Lords amendments 3 and 4 are born out of concern that the director’s decisions will be subject to political interference from Ministers. I reassure the House that the Government absolutely agree with Members of the other place that the Lord Chancellor should have absolutely no involvement in a decision about legal aid funding in an individual case. However, we ask the House to reject Lords amendments 3 and 4, because they would have the unwelcome effect of preventing the director from being appointed as a civil servant.
I must remind the House that we are abolishing the Legal Services Commission to improve the administration of legal aid, not to create greater fragmentation of responsibility and accountability.
Clause 4 provides protection to the director by creating, in clause 4(4), a statutory bar on the Lord Chancellor’s involvement in funding decisions by the director in individual cases. The Lord Chancellor may not give directions or guidance to the director about the carrying out of the director’s functions in relation to an individual case. In addition to that protection, the Bill imposes a duty on the Lord Chancellor to publish any guidance and directions that he issues to the director.
Lords amendment 5, which is a Government amendment, goes further by requiring the director to produce an annual report for the preceding financial year on the exercise of their functions during that period. That annual report will be laid before Parliament and published. We consider that further offer of transparency to be an important safeguard.
I am aware that the question of directorial independence was one that exercised the other place considerably. It is because we agree that that is a vital issue that we are happy to put the matter beyond doubt. That is why I am asking the House to agree to the Government amendment in lieu of Lords amendments 3 and 4. That will reinforce the protections already set out in clause 4(4) by requiring the Lord Chancellor to ensure that the director acts independently of the Lord Chancellor when applying directions and guidance given under clause 4(3) in relation to an individual case. That provides additional assurance on the director’s independence without compromising common-sense administrative arrangements designed to improve control and accountability.
Finally, Lords amendment 24 concerns the provision of advice over the telephone, on which I am afraid I cannot agree with many of the sentiments of the other place. The effect of amendment 24 would be to weaken a key measure to modernise the system and bring it up to date. The aim of the telephone gateway is to route access to legal aid, in the first instance, by the phone. That is not only much more efficient, enabling calls to be properly triaged, but simpler to access and generally of higher quality.
Fiona Mactaggart (Slough) (Lab)
Has the Minister done any studies on the effectiveness of telephone advice lines for people whose first language is not English?
Mr Djanogly
We have, and if one were to call the telephone hotline, one would be able to speak in any of 170 different languages, which is more languages than one would find used in a high street solicitor’s office.
Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)
It is fine for hon. Members to use telephone hotlines, but what about those with mental illness, special educational needs, learning difficulties or no English? What will happen to ensure they get legal advice and do not give up before they can get anywhere?
Mr Djanogly
I confirm to my right hon. Friend that it will be possible for all such people to have face-to-face advice. If the people who take the call, who are expert in finding out whether a person needs face-to-face advice, feel that people need face-to-face advice, they will get it. I am not just speculating. We know that that is the case because a modern, phone-based service currently exists, namely the Ministry of Justice community legal advice helpline. Its record is one of excellent public service. In 2010-11, more than half a million calls were made to it. More than 90% of respondents to the last survey who subsequently received advice from the specialist service found it very helpful.
Concerns have been raised about accessibility. However, contrary to the claims of those opposed to the reforms, phone-based advice has been shown often to be more convenient and accessible than face-to-face advice, particularly benefiting those living in remote areas or those who have a physical disability.
Yvonne Fovargue (Makerfield) (Lab)
Will the Minister accept that currently, the CLS gateway is a choice—people can choose to use the phone system or to have face-to-face advice? For people under stress, who cannot bring themselves even to open an envelope with their bills in, face-to-face advice is often the most appropriate route.
Mr Djanogly
I simply disagree that face-to-face advice will be appropriate in all cases of disability—quite the opposite. In many cases, people with disability would prefer to use telephone advice.
Such advice is also high quality. Contrary to the assumption that face-to-face advice is always better, specialist telephone advice providers are currently required to meet higher standards than their face-to-face counterparts. That will continue under the new contracts required to implement the Bill.
Under our plans, an individual seeking advice will simply need to ring the community legal advice helpline. They will be greeted by a trained operator who will assess whether they are eligible for legal aid or not. Their goal will be to ensure that people get a high quality, accessible service that delivers the right help, either by transferring them to specialist telephone advice providers or face-to-face providers if telephone advice is not appropriate, or by signposting them to other possible support if their issue does not fall within the scope of the legal aid scheme.
Mr Adrian Sanders (Torbay) (LD)
We know from our own experience as Members of Parliament that many of our constituents insist on coming to see us in our offices and working face to face, because that is how they can best get across their grievances. Why are the Government insisting on denying people the right to see somebody face to face?
Mr Djanogly
In many cases the support that my hon. Friend’s constituents receive will be better received over the telephone than face to face. Crucially, the staff concerned will be trained not just to help the caller identify the nature of their problem, whether it is in scope and whether they qualify financially, but to assist with the prior issue of whether they need support in accessing the service. That could include the operator calling them back to reduce the cost of the call, a third party, such as an available family member, assisting the caller with the call, or a very good telephone translation service, if a person has limited or no spoken English. With 170 languages available, a better service will be delivered than someone could possibly get in a law firm’s offices.
Mr Elfyn Llwyd (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
The hon. Gentleman said at the commencement of his remarks that this measure was about targeting resources a bit better. The Government’s impact assessment says that they might save between £1 million and £2 million under this unfortunate scheme. However, the cost will be three times that amount, in terms of people being let down, losing their homes, not being able to receive assistance, and so on, along with all the other problems that will flow from this. The cost will be far more than £1 million to £2 million.
Mr Djanogly
The right hon. Gentleman’s points go more to scope, which is not the subject of this debate, than the telephone service.
Some in the other place raised concerns about the gateway being mandatory and what that means for access by particular categories of vulnerable callers. However, that is precisely why we are applying the gateway in a limited number of areas—debt, discrimination and special educational needs—but not community care, which we have agreed should not be available initially. It is also why we are building in strong safeguards. Not only will there be an exemption for emergency cases, those in detention and under-18s, but even where a case is in scope and not in those groups, face-to-face advice will always be available where deemed to be required. Although those seeking advice in the three areas of law will be required initially to contact the helpline to apply for legal aid, callers eligible for legal aid who cannot give instructions or act on advice given over the telephone will be referred to face-to-face advice. I should also emphasise that, in response to concerns raised in another place, a review of the implementation of the mandatory gateway, including the operation of the gateway in the three areas of law, will be undertaken, and the report of that review will be published.
In all those areas—a duty to provide legal aid, the independence of the exceptional funding scheme and the operation of the gateway—the Government’s priority is to protect access to justice while modernising the service and ensuring that it is affordable. We agree with the need to underline the independence of a funding decision in an individual case. However, we cannot accept measures that would create legal confusion about what services the scheme provides, nor can we agree that it is unreasonable to ask claimants in three areas of law to access the service by the simple expedient of ringing a phone line—a modernisation entirely familiar from other walks of life.
I ask hon. Members to support the Government on all these amendments.
Sadiq Khan (Tooting) (Lab)
We have the first set of knives at 5.30 pm, so we will have had less than 26 minutes to discuss the four amendments from the House of Lords in this group, and we will have less than five hours in total to discuss the 11 amendments passed in the other place—the 11 defeats for the Government.
Let me deal first with Lords amendment 1. This 23-word amendment was supported by a number of prestigious Members of the other House, for whom I have a great deal of respect. Some are Cross Benchers, some are members of the Justice Secretary’s party and some are members of my party. Many Government peers voted with Lord Pannick in the other place when he pressed the amendment to a Division, which was won with a majority of 45. The amendment was carefully drafted; indeed, I should point out that none of the technical deficiencies pointed out today was raised by Lord McNally when he responded in the other place.
The speakers in the debate in the other place included the former Leader of the House of Commons and former Cabinet colleague of the Justice Secretary, Lord Newton of Braintree, who sadly recently passed away. His last contribution in Parliament was on this Bill, and he spoke powerfully against many bits of part 1. I would like to echo the tremendous tributes that have been paid to him in the other place recently, as I am sure would all Members of all parties in the Chamber.
The Bill, as drafted, contains no duty on the Lord Chancellor to provide the services that the Bill permits. Lords amendment 1 would ensure that he had to meet the needs of citizens within “the resources available” and the scope of legal aid, as defined by the Bill. It would quite simply be a statement of legislative purpose at the outset of the Bill. The wording in the amendment has been included in legal aid statutes since the first Act in 1949. Even given the understandable budgetary constraints on the Government, a clause such as this would show that the Government recognised that legal aid was regarded as an essential element of access to justice. It would be modest and sensible, and it would not cost the taxpayer anything, but it would enshrine an important constitutional principle in part 1 of the Bill.
In fact, the amendment does not go as far as the House of Lords Constitution Committee wanted to go. Lord McNally stated:
“I also accept that the duty that the amendment would place on the Lord Chancellor would be qualified by the reference to the duty being subject both to the resources available and to the provisions of Part 1.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 5 March 2012; Vol. 735, c. 1569.]
It is therefore unclear how on earth the Government can claim financial privilege in relation to this amendment, or, more pertinently, why they are so unwilling to accept it. We shall oppose their attempt to overturn Lords amendment 1.
Lords amendment 24 seeks to ensure that the telephone gateway that the Government intend to create will not be mandatory, as proposed in the original Bill. This is important for many vulnerable groups, such as those with mental health issues or communication problems. The other place voted by a majority of 28 to support the amendment tabled by Baroness Grey-Thompson to remove the provision of a mandatory telephone gateway and the delivery of legal aid services exclusively by telephone. It is particularly disappointing that the Government are seeking to overturn this amendment as well. Without it, the Bill will give the Government wide powers to make legal aid services available exclusively by phone or other electronic means. For the avoidance of doubt, we accept that telephone advice might suit many people; we are not against its use. We are, however, against it being the only way of getting initial advice. This goes to the matter of access to justice, and the Government just do not get it.
It has been emphasised many times in our debates on social welfare law that it is often the most vulnerable in society who rely most on the support of social welfare—for example, those with learning difficulties, mental health issues or communication problems. Some in those groups already suffer from chaotic lives and find it hard to communicate complex, multi-faceted, challenging problems. I wonder how many of the Ministers on the Front Bench conduct their surgeries exclusively by telephone. Those people’s problems can be further compounded by having to explain them and seek advice over the telephone. Many do not have a landline, and others cannot afford the cost of using their mobile, with waiting time eating into their scarce credit.
The Government appear to agree with that. In response to a question about the impact assessment from my hon. Friend the Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart), the Minister did not give the entire information. The Government’s own impact assessment highlighted the fact that the disabled, and those whose first language is not English, would find this a particularly hard way of engaging with the legal aid system. I fear that the result will be that many vulnerable people are deterred from seeking support.
The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Kenneth Clarke)
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 2.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Lords amendments 189 to 191.
Lords amendment 192, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (c) in lieu.
Lords amendment 193.
Lords amendments 194 and 196, and Government motions to disagree.
Lords amendments 217 to 220 and 243.
Lords amendment 168 and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 169 and 240, Government motions to disagree, Government amendments (a) and (b) in lieu, and amendment (i) to Government amendment (a).
Lords amendments 170 to 172, and Government motions to disagree.
Lords amendments 177 to 181, and 206 to 216.
Mr Clarke
Lords amendment 2 impinges on the financial privileges of the House. I ask the House to disagree to the amendment and I will ask the Reasons Committee to ascribe financial privilege as the reason for doing so—and so too with amendments 168, 170 and 171. In addressing the very wide selection that you have just announced, Mr Deputy Speaker, I shall begin by looking at the principles that the Government are adopting on the various amendments and the reform as a whole, and at what principles we are inviting the House to adopt.
The scope of legal aid goes to the heart of our attempts to reform and improve the justice system, because targeting funding where it really counts is fundamental, first to the savings the Government are having to try to make in this area as in any other. There is no doubt that the present level of legal aid provision is on any measure unaffordably expensive. I shall not dwell on this issue but it is bound to recur during our debates. Even after our reforms have been carried, if Parliament eventually approves the Bill and it becomes an Act as we intend, we will still have by far the most costly legal aid system in the world. It is almost twice as expensive as that in any other country per head of population. In no other democratic jurisdiction would it be possible to get up and argue seriously that the taxpayer should spend money on the scale that we do on legal representation and advice.
The changes to the scope of legal aid that we are proposing are also part of a broader shift. We are trying to reduce the amount of unnecessarily adversarial litigation. The very broad provision of legal aid has encouraged people to bring their problems before the courts, but sometimes their basic problem is not a legal one and the best way of resolving the dispute or tackling the problem would be not to take a litigious approach. Such an approach imposes costs and does not always resolve problems. Before I move on from the tricky matter of cost let me say that with legal aid the cost is not just to the public purse and our Department. One has to think of the costs imposed on all the other people who are parties to litigation, such as businesses—small and medium-sized enterprises—and the national health service, as this selection includes clinical negligence claims. Everything we agree to do in relation to clinical negligence comes out of the budget that is otherwise available for public services. The growth of the clinical negligence industry is having an impact on national health services at the present time. There is also a cost to individuals, because for an ordinary citizen of ordinary means to be in the appalling situation of being engaged in litigation when the other party has legal aid is not an experience that most people would enjoy. We should bear all that in mind as the background to what we are doing.
Glenda Jackson (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)
Is the Secretary of State actually arguing that the best way of getting a level playing field is to deny everyone any kind of legal aid? That seems to be the thrust of his argument.
Mr Clarke
I am not arguing that. I am saying there should be hesitation before the very powerful and quite legitimate lobbies that have descended on the House since we proposed the changes just sweep everybody into believing that ever-wider provision of legal aid is necessary. There are downsides. In addition to the cost to the public purse, which we cannot ignore because no other democratically elected Government spends this amount of public money on funding litigation and legal advice, if we have a litigious society it imposes costs on all other branches of our life. That is an essential background that we cannot forget as we consider these amendments.
We have applied other tests, but the whole point of having legal aid—and the reason why we are keeping a legal aid system that will still be the most generous in the world even when we have cut it back a bit—is to deal with the needs of justice and those who are vulnerable in society. The other principle that applies is the need to focus taxpayer funding on the most serious and important cases that genuinely require specialist legal advice. Our principled stance is that legal aid should routinely be available in cases where people’s life and liberty are at stake, where they are at risk of serious physical harm or immediate loss of their home, or where their children may be taken into care. It should not routinely be available where other funding is available, where litigants can present their own case, or where the taxpayer is at risk of paying for litigation that any person paying from their own pocket would not finance and participate in. That is the basis on which we look at all the amendments that have come from the other place.
I am grateful to the other place for the time and the detailed debate and scrutiny it has dedicated to the Bill, genuinely improving it in places. I went and listened to parts of the debates myself and I have great faith in the power of the other place to revise a Bill without altering it fundamentally. Wherever possible I have sought to incorporate my noble Friends’ amendments or intentions, and as a result of the scrutiny of both Houses the overall package has moved very significantly from our initial position when we introduced the Bill, and it is all the better for it. Before people press me to agree to more than we are proposing to agree to in this important group of amendments perhaps I should remind the House of the changes we have made since we started this whole process quite a long time ago. They include removing the power to means-test suspects receiving advice and assistance at the police station, adopting the Association of Chief Police Officers’ definition of domestic violence and extending the time limit and range of evidence accepted when it comes to accessing the domestic violence gateway. We agreed to that a long time ago. People got very excited about the ACPO amendment so we gave them that, and then a whole list of fresh demands were immediately made by the Law Society and other groups that have lobbied us. I shall address those issues in a few moments.
Other changes include retaining legal aid for cases involving human trafficking and domestic child abduction—another concession; ensuring that funding covers special educational needs for 16 to 24-year-olds; and putting it beyond doubt that we are retaining legal aid for parents to bring clinical negligence cases in the most serious and complex neurological injury negligence cases for small children, which we always intended to do. Beyond the legislation, we announced at the Budget a further £20 million to go to the not-for-profit sector in each of the next two financial years.
How do the further Lords amendments in the group measure up against the principles I have outlined? I regret that the broad thrust of some of them is still to be rather free with taxpayers’ money. In our opinion, they certainly go way beyond ensuring that the Bill is focusing funding on high priorities.
Tony Lloyd (Manchester Central) (Lab)
The Secretary of State made great play of the ACPO definition of domestic violence, but if the test is about protecting the vulnerable I must say that the definition is very legalistic. The experience of lots of women—the 230 women who leave home every week because of violence—is not always packaged in the way allowed for in the proposed legislation. Does he accept that many women will fall outside the definition and will not be able to get legal aid?
Mr Clarke
Let me begin with the domestic violence gateway. The ACPO definition is what the Labour Front-Bench team was originally concentrating on. We have to have a definition because we are talking about qualifying for the public funding of legal aid in certain cases. We have moved a lot on domestic violence and we are moving again in response to the Lords’ debate, as I shall explain in a moment. First, though, let me make it clear, because I do not think it has always been clear to people in either House, exactly what we are talking about. It was never in doubt that there would be legal aid for the protection of victims of domestic violence. Domestic violence is an issue that this Government, like any Government, including the previous one, take extremely seriously. As now, it was always intended that legal aid would remain available for victims of domestic violence who were trying, for example, to obtain protective injunctions to defend themselves in such cases. In domestic violence cases there is no means test so even the super-rich can obtain legal aid if they are seeking an injunction for reasons of domestic violence, although I hope that not too many of them will.
We are doing quite a lot of other things. The Home Office is for the first time providing more than £28 million of stable funding until 2015 for specialist local domestic and sexual violence support services, and £900,000 each year to support national domestic violence helplines and a stalking helpline. Our Department is now contributing towards the funding of independent advisers attached to specialist domestic violence courts. We are giving a total of £9 million for that purpose up to the end of 2012-13. We are allocating £3 million a year to 65 rape crisis centres and opening new ones. Domestic violence protection orders are being piloted in three police force areas. We have announced a one-year pilot which will take place from this summer to test out a domestic violence disclosure scheme, known as Clare’s law.
I mention those things so that we can have a debate which, with great respect to their lordships, is not on the same basis as the part of the Lords debate that I listened to—that people did not realise the seriousness of domestic violence as a social issue in our society. We all do. The Bill never challenged that. It is all part of a pattern of services being provided by this Government, through which we think we are strengthening the support for victims of domestic violence.
What we are discussing here is the special provision that we are also making to provide legal aid to people who have been recent victims of domestic violence, so that when they are dealing with their abuser in court on other issues—ownership of the former matrimonial home, maintenance, access to property—they have access to legal aid. In such cases, particularly the private family law cases and the children’s cases, we are trying to shift away from so much adversarial litigation. Having lawyers on both sides arguing about custody and access to children does not always lighten the tensions or resolve the dispute, as most Members of Parliament are only too well aware from their constituency surgeries, so we are moving towards mediation, which is cheaper. That is why some of the lobbyists do not like it, with the result that in cases where it does not work, they are arguing for legal aid to continue to be available.
We have conceded the case that after a recent episode of domestic violence, the victim on her own may not want to deal, even through mediation, with her abuser. How do we define domestic violence for that purpose? That is an important but secondary purpose, as the case will not be about domestic violence. In such a case, what definition of domestic violence should be used for the person to qualify for legal aid? That is what the argument about the definition in both Houses has been about all the way through.
Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)
The Lord Chancellor mentioned that it will still be possible to obtain legal aid to get an injunction when there is domestic violence. Will this not be a cost-accumulating measure, as women will first go to get an injunction in order to have evidence to be legally aided for the case of domestic violence?
Mr Clarke
Such women will not get an injunction if it turns out that there is no reasonable ground for giving it and they are not in imminent fear of domestic violence. We will give them legal aid because we think it is important that these issues are tested in cases where legal advice is available. If women do not get the injunction, they will not get the legal aid later.
Mr Llwyd
What is being missed here is that the evidential gateway is being closed down. I am not saying that the right hon. and learned Gentleman wants to deprive every person of assistance in a domestic violence situation. I would never allege that; I know him to be a better person than that. What I am saying is that 46% of those who would be eligible will no longer be eligible under these so-called reforms, according to recent reports from Rights of Women and Welsh Women’s Aid. People who would genuinely qualify will no longer qualify, and that is the issue that we are now discussing.
Mr Clarke
I refute the idea that people will be given an injunction at some hearing in order to enable them to get legal aid, but people might apply. If the evidentiary tests are made too lax, there will be a tendency to fabricate claims or to bring in claims that are old and irrelevant, because it is worth thousands of pounds to the lawyer advising that person if legal aid is granted on that basis.
Far from trying to narrow the scope, let me remind the right hon. Gentleman and others where we have got to and where we are going this evening, by the time we have finished. We have a clear, wide definition trying to catch the variety of circumstances that will evidence recent domestic violence so that the argument that the victim should not have to face her abuser without having legal representation can be countered. But we do not want to shift the vast majority of private family law cases away from mediation into publicly funded adversarial litigation.
Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)
Does the Lord Chancellor not accept that the legalistic approach that he is adopting ignores the reality of domestic violence, which is that many women do not report it, sometimes for years on end, and do not go to court to get injunctions, or if they do, are often persuaded to withdraw the proceedings before they come to a conclusion? It is only when the whole situation explodes and they leave the home that the reality of that domestic violence is noted.
Mr Clarke
But women will get legal aid for seeking the injunction. The hon. Lady is falling into what has happened throughout these debates. The definition that we are talking about as the gateway to legal aid for all other private family law cases goes far beyond injunctions.
If I may move on, I will remind hon. Members how far we have gone since we started the Bill—far beyond where the Opposition were first urging us to go—and we will go further in response to the debate in the House of Lords. The first issue is reflected in Lords amendment 192—whether or not we should use the definition used by the Association of Chief Police Officers, which we resisted in this House. The Government’s intent is to have a broad and inclusive definition and one that commands widespread agreement. To cut all the pressure, we are happy to support the spirit of the amendment and we are therefore adopting the ACPO definition. I half suspect that if we had offered that when the Bill was in the House of Commons—it was my mistake that we did not—we would have closed the discussion down in the House because that is what everybody was then pressing for.
In their amendment their lordships in their wisdom add words which are not in the ACPO definition. That rather goes against the arguments that have been put forward for one, single, cross-Government definition of domestic violence. We have therefore tabled further Government amendments in lieu of Lords amendment 192 which would define domestic violence in the same way as the ACPO definition as
“any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between individuals who are associated with each other.”
We think this should satisfy the concerns that have been expressed in both Houses on this point, so I shall ask the House to agree to this Government amendment in lieu of Lords amendment 192.
Amendments 194 and 196 concern the accepted forms of evidence of domestic violence. I have already said that when litigation is about domestic violence, the victims will always have legal aid. The issue is one of balance. Lords amendment 194, led by the learned Baroness Scotland and supported by a number of her colleagues in the other place, has prompted us to look again at other kinds of objective evidence to ensure that the test is as widely drawn as possible.
I have discussed that with colleagues in the House, and I am grateful to the colleagues with whom I had meetings, particularly to my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant), who is in her place, for advice on the subject because she knows far more about family law than I do, as I have never practised in this field, and in particular for making the point that we need to take care that the range of evidence does not force victims to take formal court action where it may not be suitable in individual circumstances. We do not want to force people to go to court who would not otherwise do so.
Therefore, in response to this House and the debate in the other House, we intend to accept as evidence—we will reflect this in regulations—the following matters: an undertaking given to a court by the other party in lieu of a protective order or injunction against that party for the protection of the applicant, where there is no equivalent undertaking given by the applicant; a police caution for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant; appropriate evidence of admission to a domestic violence refuge; appropriate evidence from a social services department confirming provision of services to the victim in relation to alleged domestic violence; and appropriate evidence from GPs or other medical professionals.
We are prepared to accept those matters and ask the House to accept them this evening. They are in addition to those forms of evidence that the Government already accepted in our earlier debates. Those are: that a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction against the other party for the protection of the applicant is either in place or has been made in the previous 12 months; that a criminal conviction for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant is still in place; that there are ongoing criminal proceedings for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant; that there is evidence from a multi-agency risk assessment conference of the applicant having been referred as being at risk of domestic violence from the other party and action has been recommended; and that there is a finding of fact by the courts of domestic violence by the other party against the applicant.
For the best part of 12 months we have reviewed this rather narrow point in one piece of litigation, and that is a fairly formidable list of things we are prepared to accept as evidence of domestic violence. If their lordships consult the people who have been sending them all the e-mails for the past few weeks, I am sure that they will be able to add to the list, as will Members of this House, but if we are not careful we will forget what the objective is: we want more of these cases not to be conducted by lawyers, financed by the taxpayer, who are engaged in adversarial litigation about where the children will live, what maintenance should be paid by one party or the other or what share of the matrimonial home should be owned by one party or the other. The Government have responded pretty generously because of our concern about domestic violence and, as I have already indicated, in key areas we have moved beyond where we were. This evening we have to insist that that is where it will end.
I should also point out that, on the time limits, where I do not think any history of domestic violence can be remembered and invoked, it is a question of ensuring that victims of recent or ongoing violence are protected, drawing a line so that Government regulations do not result in a permanent opening of access to legal aid. We will double the time limit we originally proposed from 12 months to two years, except in respect of a conviction for a domestic violence offence, where the only limit is that the conviction should not be a spent one.
Having moved on all those issues, the Government do not agree that the evidential requirements for those cases should be set out on the face of the Bill; the evidence I have described will instead be set out in regulations. The benefit is that that will allow greater flexibility to amend the scheme if required in the light of experience. If we set it all out in primary legislation, we would find that we had set things in stone for our successors.
Mr Llwyd
Can the Secretary of State assist us by telling us how the list he read out, which I must say is welcome, differs from Lords amendment 194, because they seem almost identical? Is he saying that, rather than putting them on the face of the Bill, they will be set out in cast-iron regulations?
Mr Clarke
I think that I am right in saying that what their lordships tried to do was put one form of definition used by the UK Border Agency on the face of the Bill. That is far too wide, and it is for a different purpose—[Interruption.] Well, that is an indication of the sorts of things it will take as evidence; it is not a qualification for anything. We need something that is the basis for making a clear decision on whether or not people are eligible for money, and we have opted for ACPO-plus. The other difference, as I have said, is that we do not think that we should spell it out and draft each of these forms—I of course bind myself by the words I read out earlier, which are what we are committed to. The advantage of regulating along the lines that the Government are committed to is that, if in the light of experience there is some mistake, it is much easier to make a change. It is always a mistake to fix everything in too much detail in primary legislation, because a future Minister or Government might have to try to find the parliamentary time to make the necessary changes to improve it.
Glenda Jackson
I, too, welcome the list that the Lord Chancellor read out with regard to domestic violence. Looking at my constituency, I am concerned about where those women will go to obtain that advice, because we are seeing reductions in the services currently provided by citizens advice bureaux and law centres, for example, as a result of the changes to legal aid. There is a gap between the one who suffers the harm and the obtaining of the advice.
Mr Clarke
People can approach their solicitors for advice on family law, as they do now. In an increasing proportion of cases, through the services offered to them, they will be put in touch with the mediation service, with or without the assistance of their lawyers—that is a matter for them—and the case will be mediated rather than both sides being represented in an adversarial manner. That works successfully where it has been introduced and we think it should be extended much further.
Lords amendment 168 seeks to bring the majority of welfare benefits matters into the scope of legal aid funding. Lords amendment 169, along with Lords amendment 240 and amendment (i), tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) to our amendments in lieu, would have similar effects, so I will discuss them together shortly.
The first point to make about Lords amendment 168 is a financial one. Even bringing advice and assistance into scope for reviews and appeals concerning all welfare benefits, which is the intention behind the amendments, could cost as much as £25 million, and we cannot afford provision in an area of relatively low priority. As I said, we will ask the House to disagree with Lords amendment 168, and we will ask the Reasons Committee to ascribe financial privilege as the reason for doing so. In particular, this is because, in line with the principles I have set out, welfare benefits matters should not generally require specialist legal advice.
Before discussing the other issues, let us consider legal aid for advice on welfare benefits. Every Member sitting in the Chamber is used to giving advice on social security benefits, because we do it all the time, and there are other voluntary bodies that give advice, but we do not get legal aid. I suspect that in an ordinary case, where there is no issue of law and it is a matter of fact, because of the huge complexity of social security regulations, the advice given by MPs and some members of their staff can be superior to that which is available from a large number of general family solicitors, but those solicitors get legal aid. No one else gets legal aid. Legal aid should be for those cases where legal advice and expertise are required, and it should be financed by the taxpayer on legitimate grounds.
Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)
In cases, of which there are many, where people seek advice from citizens advice bureaux to help them prepare a review or an initial appeal, is it not in everybody’s interests, including the Government’s, that they should be able to get some advice before going forward with their review request?
Mr Clarke
I value citizens advice bureaux as highly as the right hon. Gentleman, and ever since the Bill was introduced we have said that we will come forward with proposals to improve the support given by the Treasury. As I have said, at the time of the Budget there was an announcement, which was not much noticed at the time, of £20 million a year to be made available for voluntary advice.
For most citizens advice bureaux, legal aid is not the biggest source of their funding, and some do not get any legal aid funding at all. Their advice is very valuable general advice to people with a combination of debt, housing and every other problem; it is not specifically legal advice in most cases. Our Department is not the biggest Department that contributes to such bureaux; the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has the biggest budget, for debt advice and other forms, and I think that it has ring-fenced its budget and still provides funding.
Most citizens advice bureaux have lost a lot of money because local government funding has been cut quite severely, and the Government are producing money from the Treasury to compensate in part for that, so we—not my Department; the Cabinet Office—are now distributing that £20 million to ensure that such valuable general advice is still available. What we cannot do is start inventing legal aid scope, or fail to narrow legal aid scope, as a roundabout way of maintaining funding for citizens advice bureaux, many of which do not receive legal aid funding now—giving them funding that is spent on general advice as much as on legal advice. Of course, the more we extend the scope to help the citizens advice bureaux, which are busy lobbying the House, the more we also help professional lawyers, who also qualify for all the legal aid scope that we are happily enlarging.
Yvonne Fovargue
The citizens advice bureaux that are so busy lobbying are actually lobbying on behalf of their clients. Some 77% of the funding being removed from the scope of legal aid is going not from solicitors’ firms, but from citizens advice bureaux and law centres—and from specialist legal advice. The Legal Services Commission will not provide the money, which I remind the Secretary of State is £160 for a legal aid case at the early stage of a welfare and benefits case, but it prevents the case from becoming much more expensive later.
Mr Clarke
The hon. Lady’s experience of citizens advice bureaux greatly exceeds my own, but I am pretty certain that fewer than half of such bureaux receive any legal aid funding at all. I have not sought to deny the financial problems of citizens advice bureaux, but we cannot solve them by being so generous in scope with legal aid when the issues involved in most welfare cases are not legal problems. What people require in these difficult times is general advice on a general combination of problems from which they suffer.
Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)
On points of law, I welcome the concession in relation to upper tribunals and welfare benefits, but can the Justice Secretary confirm that the Government intend to ensure that all cases in which points of law are in contention, whether in the upper or lower tribunals, are funded through legal aid? If that is his intention, what will he put in place, either in the Bill or in some other way, to ensure that it happens?
Mr Clarke
My right hon. Friend anticipates the concession that I was going to explain; it is in the documents before us, and he has spotted it. Legal aid issues are usually, as everybody knows, about the factual basis of the claim or the proper application of this country’s extremely convoluted social security regulations, which I hope the current Government’s reforms, when we eventually get to a universal benefit, will greatly simplify, but most such issues are not legal. We have a tribunal system that was deliberately designed so that ordinary citizens might access it and argue their case, and when we invented all those tribunals, we went out of our way to say, “They are not courts and you don’t require lawyers, as these are places where people will argue,” but, as my right hon. Friend says, sometimes legal issues are raised in them.
The Government, in response to these debates, have tabled an amendment, which is a concession. It is Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendments 169 and 240, and it would make legal aid and assistance available for welfare benefits appeals on a point of law in the upper tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. It would also include funding for applications for permission made to the upper tribunal, and it would also make legal representation available for welfare benefits appeals to the Court of Appeal and to the Supreme Court.
Most surprisingly, that Government amendment in lieu was put forward in response to the argument. We did not wish to argue that in such cases, when the whole thing is a point of law, the applicant himself or herself should be expected to represent themselves without legal assistance, so we have tried to define those cases in which legal advice should certainly be available.
My right hon. Friend’s amendment, on the face of it, goes back to the whole of business of whether we should apply legal aid for legal advice in every welfare claim, but the question that concerns him most is, “What about the ones that involve legal issues?”, and I can conceive of cases in the lower tribunals in which what is raised really is a point of law. He wants me to find some equivalent to the upper tribunal, asking, “Is there some situation in which somebody, preferably the tribunal judge, certifies that there is a point of law involved where legal aid should be available?” We do not have such a situation at the moment, and we will have to try to devise one, as there is no system for it: just as we have accepted the argument about legal issues in the upper tribunal, we could of course do so if the same thing arises in the lower.
We will go away and work on the matter. We already have discussions under way with the Department for Work and Pensions, whose help we will also require, to see whether we could have some equivalent—whereby somebody other than the claimant or their lawyer certifies that a point of law is involved—and provide legal aid. I suspect that at this stage of the Bill’s passage through Parliament it is far too late to start introducing primary legislation in the House of Lords, but we have retained for ourselves powers to amend the scoping through regulation, so if we could solve the problem, we could bring something forward through statutory instruments. We are quite open to the argument for ensuring that we have legal representation when there is a legal issue that we cannot expect a lay person ordinarily to argue.
Mr Llwyd
I follow the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s logic on that, but surely if the point of law is a good one in the upper tribunal and all the way up to the Supreme Court, it is equally good in the first tier, but if the case is unrepresented in the first tier, it is not going to go anywhere else.
Mr Clarke
I should like to see whether we can devise, with the help of the DWP, my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington and anybody else, a system whereby we identify in the lower tribunal such issues that involve a legal issue. We think that the number is comparatively small, because it is not the business of lower tribunals normally to find themselves arguing points of law, as they normally argue points of fact and of regulatory interpretation, but we will work on the matter, and if we can devise such a system, we undertake to respond as my right hon. Friend asks me to.
Simon Hughes
The Secretary of State is being very helpful, and my constituents are absolutely not bothered whether this is a primary or secondary legislation matter, as they just want to know that they will have the support that he talks about. May I, however, clarify two things? Will any such measure apply to a matter of law and to judicial review when there is a proper matter of law—and, in those cases, not just to social security but throughout the tribunals service? When the agency turns down somebody’s application and that person wins their appeal to the tribunal, there absolutely has to be a parity of arms at a further stage of appeal if the state appeals again. The applicant is there not because they want to be there, but because the state or the agency has sent them there.
Mr Clarke
On the right hon. Gentleman’s first point, I can assure him that we are continuing legal aid in all cases involving judicial review, so legal aid is available to someone who is trying to have a welfare decision judicially reviewed. That applies to every kind of judicial review, because we do not think that the Government or a public body should be resisting a claim about abuse of their powers from a litigant who cannot get legal advice. This is not an easy concession to make, because quite a lot of people who seek judicial review are not instantly popular with all sections of society, but we still give them legal aid.
On the other matter involving situations in which the state is busily arguing against a successful appellant that some kind of law is involved, I will add that to the list of things that we are studying with the DWP to try to identify whether, in cases where the state thinks that it is worth arguing about the interpretation of something, the litigant should be able to do so as well.
Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)
I am listening to my right hon. and learned Friend’s arguments with great care, but I am still puzzled about the unavoidable problem of the ability to work out what is a legal issue as opposed to a merely factual one. Fact management and legal issues often come hand in hand, and they are often best handled by a lawyer. I worry that we are making an artificial distinction, and that if, as he is suggesting, we are to rethink a number of issues raised by Members of the House, we should rethink this one too.
Mr Clarke
Of course there can be borderline cases, but, with great respect to my hon. Friend, in the vast majority of cases it is fairly obvious whether one is arguing a point of fact or a point of law. In an ordinary welfare case, the question will be whether someone is fit for work or not fit for work, or living or not living at a particular address. When a point of law arises whereby it is not a question of the complexity of the regulations but of the actual meaning of the regulations, somebody like a tribunal judge will know that instantly and think, “That is quite an interesting point of law that I’ve not had before; this will go to the upper tribunal and I will certify that it would be rather nice to have some guidance.” In the end, we have to leave it to tribunals themselves to decide on the facts. Some may be blurred, but by and large, in the vast majority of cases, they will be reasonably clear.
Andrew George
Further to the points made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), does the scope of the Secretary of State’s amendment exclude lower-tier tribunals, or can it be interpreted in such a manner that lower-tier tribunal appeals that are brought forward on the basis of evidence relating to a matter of law and then taken to an upper-tier tribunal might be included without the need for further regulations?
Mr Clarke
I have obviously failed to make myself completely clear, so I will try again. As it stands, the Government’s amendment in lieu applies only to upper tribunals. The right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington and others argue that something similar should be available in lower tribunals and in other cases. I have undertaken to explore whether we can find an alternative method of identifying those limited numbers of cases and getting them certified when they involve a legal principle. As the matter has been raised at this stage of the debate, we have to fall back on saying that we would use our regulation-making powers through a statutory instrument, because we could not possibly draft primary legislation to cover it in the few days that we have left.
Tim Farron (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)
Before the Secretary of State moves on, may I ask him to give us a time scale?
Mr Clarke
The amendment was tabled only at 6 o’clock yesterday evening, so we have moved quite quickly to get to where we are now. I suspect that the relevant officials at the DWP have not yet even been involved in discussing this. I cannot give a time scale, but we will move as rapidly as possible.
Glenda Jackson
The Lord Chancellor referred to a majority of cases. Citizens Advice says that the proportion of appeals that are upheld in work capability assessment cases, for example, rises from 40% to 90% when a legal adviser is involved. I am not saying that it will necessarily be about a point of law, to pick up the point made by the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland), but there are occasions when a legal mind can clarify the situation. I do not think that the Lord Chancellor understands who the people are who go to appeal. He said that in domestic violence cases, they go to a solicitor. None of my constituents in that situation has a solicitor; they go to the CAB or to a law centre, many of which, in my constituency, are in grave danger of having their ability to provide those services reduced—
Mr Clarke
The cases that the hon. Lady mentions do not depend on a lawyer. When the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman) was sitting behind her in the previous debate, he said that in his experience as an MP, when one discusses the matter with somebody, one gets clarity on what the real point is and how they should present it. A general adviser can help to sort somebody out in going along to argue their case by telling them what is relevant and what is not and giving them some guidance on what they should get evidence of in order to pursue their claim. That is not the same as legal aid. That is why we are producing the money for Citizens Advice and other voluntary bodies to give general advice. It is no good claiming that it is all about legal aid. Some lawyers are better at this than others. Just a friend who is a good advocate can be adequate in marshalling a case that is being argued on appeal about a question of fact as to whether, say, somebody is able to go back to work.
Helen Goodman
It would help the House if the Secretary of State could tell us what he means by a point of law. Does he mean that it is a disagreement about the proper interpretation of the rules, or does he accept that it might be about whether the rules have been properly interpreted, which is not a dispute about facts?
Mr Clarke
It would be reckless of me to try off the cuff to make a tight definition of a point of law. It is about a situation where a particular question arises out of the interpretation of a regulation and there is no clear and binding precedent for exactly what the law should be when it comes to applying it to the set of facts involved, and it is then up to the tribunal judge to decide. Following the concessions that I have introduced about upper tribunal and Court of Appeal cases, the judge will certify that a point of law is involved in a case because he thinks that it is one in which the guidance of the upper tribunal or the Court of Appeal is required on what exactly the law will say that it means. That is what is meant by a point of law. We have made considerable concessions. No one is arguing about the vulnerability of groups of people who are arguing about their welfare benefits. The Bill is about how much money the taxpayer pays to how many lawyers. We are trying to concentrate on spending that money on paying lawyers for cases in which a lawyer is required to sort out a welfare benefit dispute. That is the basis on which our amendments were produced.
Let me turn finally, and as briefly as I can, to clinical negligence and legal services for children. That has been debated throughout the passage of the Bill in this House and in another place. We have listened carefully to the concerns that have been raised about the impacts of these reforms on children. I can again assure the House that the provisions in the Bill will safeguard the vast majority of the spend on cases involving children, because we have covered all the most serious cases of clinical negligence—about 96%.
I remind people that the underlying problem in the tricky area of clinical negligence cases is that all the money that we spend on compensation, legal advice, expert witnesses and so on comes out of the budget of the national health service. That now takes up a proportion of the NHS budget of a kind that I would never have contemplated all those years ago when I was a Health Minister struggling with what I thought were difficult budgets. The more one allows to be taken out of the budget for lawyers and expert witnesses in claims for compensation, the more one cannot ignore the impact that that is having on what is available for patient spend. There is no doubt that this has been a bit of a growth industry in recent years, particularly since the changes to the no win, no fee arrangements about 10 years ago. There has been an increase of 50% or so in the number of claims in the past five or six years. The last annual report of the NHS Litigation Authority estimated that the unfunded liabilities for clinical negligence claims totalled £16.8 billion, which is a cool doubling of the figure since 2006.
The bills paid to the lawyers of criminal negligence claimants more than doubled from £83 million in 2006-07 to £195 million in 2010-11. The damages paid to claimants have gone up somewhat more slowly, but the lawyers’ bills have increased substantially. One reason for that is that the fees paid to and costs incurred by the lawyers and expert witnesses acting for the plaintiffs are about three or four times as much as the Litigation Authority, as the defendant, pays for its lawyers and expert witnesses. The costs and the claims are rising exponentially. Although this is an area that we should approach with care, the clinical negligence industry has been doing well over recent years, and that has been funded entirely by budgets that would otherwise be available for patient care.
Having given that somewhat stark background, I will turn to Lords amendment 171, which seeks to bring all such cases back into the scope of legal aid when a child is a party. In our opinion, that would be unnecessary and wasteful. As I have said, under our plans, the overwhelming majority of the existing support for children will continue. For the record, that includes child protection cases, civil cases concerning the abuse of a child, special educational needs cases, and legal aid for children who are made parties to private family proceedings.
In addition, we have made funding available in the final set of amendments under consideration in this group for cases of clinical negligence involving claims for babies who suffer brain injury at or around the point of birth. I state categorically that as a result of the Government’s Lords amendment 216, any baby who, through clinical negligence, suffers brain damage during childbirth, resulting in severe disability, will receive legal aid. The amendment provides legal aid for clinical negligence claims for babies who suffer brain injury during pregnancy, at birth or in the immediate post-natal period, leading to a lifetime of care needs. I also make it clear that if a baby were to be injured in an operation, say at six months, legal aid would be available through the exceptional funding scheme, where necessary, to ensure the protection of the individual’s right to legal aid under the European convention on human rights.
When we introduced the Bill, we believed that we had covered all those cases through the exceptional funding scheme. Doubts were expressed continually in this House and in another place about that, so we now have this set of amendments to put it beyond doubt in the Bill.
By contrast, we cannot support Lords amendment 172, as I have said. That amendment would provide public funding for the remaining minority of medical negligence claims with child claimants, despite the fact that many of them are relatively simple, do not involve lengthy and detailed investigations of the kind that we are trying to catch in Lords amendment 216, and are suitable for funding through a conditional fee agreement in exactly the same way as for adults. In line with the principles that underpin the Bill, the state should not fund cases that can be provided for by alternative means.
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
The Justice Secretary has moved on from Lords amendment 171. I am concerned about children in care and care leavers, who are among the most vulnerable children in our society and whose life chances are badly affected by their situation. There is a grave risk that children in care and care leavers will be massively over-represented in the relatively small number of people who will be excluded under the Government’s proposals. If that happens, it will seriously affect the life chances of a group of children who are already very vulnerable and who often do not have adults to advocate for them.
Mr Clarke
Babies, yes, although exceptional funding rules will apply to other serious cases involving children. Under the European convention on human rights, one must plainly provide someone with access to funding to have a fair resolution of a dispute. We therefore think that we are covering most cases. The amendments that I am suggesting that the House should disagree with cover all kinds of routine cases. They state that simply because a person is under a particular age, they should get legal aid in cases for which an adult would not receive it.
Mr Clarke
Let me move on, because I am giving way far too much and taking a great deal of time.
Lords amendment 170 sounds like an innocuous measure, but it would open up legal aid to cover the costs of expert reports in all the cases that currently are funded by CFAs or no win, no fee arrangements. It would allow lawyers to apply for legal aid to cover the expert report in any case where a client, of any age, was financially eligible, and to still get their success fee in respect of their other legal costs. That would transfer all the risk in a no win, no fee case from the solicitors and insurers to the legal aid fund and the taxpayer. That would be unfair to the taxpayer and would result in a significant expansion of the legal aid scheme.
I have covered with as much care as I can these particularly sensitive areas—
John McDonnell
I would not have sought to intervene if I had not been here from the beginning of the debate. I have been here the whole time.
I want to get clarity on one point in relation to children. The Children’s Society and the Refugee Children’s Consortium estimate that there are about 2,500 under-18s who will not gain support in relation to immigration matters. My borough deals with more unaccompanied child immigrants than any other in the country. When this matter was raised before, the Secretary of State said that those are uncomplicated cases and that such children can receive advice elsewhere. That has been interpreted as meaning that social workers are able to give that advice. However, social workers are not registered in that way under existing legislation, so there is a conflict between the proposals and the existing legislation that needs to be resolved; otherwise local authorities will be in not only financial difficulties but legal difficulties.
Mr Clarke
No, not all of them, but the vast majority. Once such a case becomes an application for asylum, legal aid is available. I am surprised by the figures that have been given for the cases that do not eventually wind up getting legal aid in that way. The problems posed by such cases, when a child gets off an aeroplane unescorted, go far beyond the legal ones. The Home Office is discussing with local authorities how to improve the response to such children. However, I am not satisfied that that category of children can be given access to legal aid for other claims of a legal kind, which I cannot visualise straight away, that might arise. The vast majority of those cases quickly turn into asylum applications and will therefore get legal aid.
I hope that the House is persuaded that the Government have taken a consistent and principled approach to reforming the scope of legal aid. No one looks to touch this area of the justice system lightly, but change is unavoidable if we are to protect access to justice and ensure that the system is affordable. On domestic violence, children, clinical negligence and welfare benefits we have sought to ensure that scarce resources are targeted where they matter most and where alternative funding or representation are unavailable. It is not easy to get that balance right. In the light of the principles that I set out at the start of my speech, I think that we have got the balance about right with the amendments that we have accepted and those that we oppose.
I believe the Government have been particularly responsive on all the issues. We knew perfectly well that when cutting back on this country’s legal aid expenditure, we ran the risk of damaging our system of justice if we got it wrong. We have made the countless moves that I have listed since we first produced the Bill however many months ago, in response to debate in both Houses. I am grateful to the Commons and the Lords for what they have done, and I hope that I have eventually put forward clearly the Government’s thoughts on the Lords amendments and on our amendments in lieu. I commend our position to the House.
Mr Djanogly
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 31.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)
With this it will be convenient to consider Lords amendment 32, and Government motion to disagree.
Mr Djanogly
The Government recognise that mesothelioma is a truly terrible disease—a terminal illness that has a devastating impact on the families of its victims—and we are wholly committed to doing everything we can to help its victims to achieve justice and get the support that they deserve. The Lords amendments seeking to exempt mesothelioma and industrial disease cases from our reforms to no win, no fee agreements in part 2 of the Bill are not the right way to advance the cause of sufferers.
Mr Djanogly
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will give me a chance to put forward our opposition to the amendments.
First, the amendments are unnecessary. The legal climate in which mesothelioma cases can be brought has wholly changed in recent years, and nothing in our proposals should prevent cases from being taken or those affected from receiving appropriate damages. Secondly, in making an exception to our change to the no win, no fee conditional fee arrangements regime, the amendments would create inconsistency and damage the wider goal of our reforms—to restore sense to the costs of litigation, which have been substantially increased by the way in which no win, no fee cases operate, largely to the detriment of defendants.
Mr Djanogly
This is not a question of whether mesothelioma sufferers receive adequate legal support but of how much their lawyers get paid for providing it. We are saying that that must be more reasonably assessed, and that is the point of our reforms.
Let me remind hon. Members that the current regime of no win, no fee conditional fee agreements was meant to promote access to justice but has frequently ended up as something of a racket allowing risk-free litigation for claimants, inflated profits for legal firms, and punitive additional costs for defendants.
Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)
Can the Minister tell us of one case in which a mesothelioma sufferer has taken something to court that did not deserve to go there—one case in which a sufferer from this horrible disease, which leaves them dying in a horribly painful way, has in any way abused the system?
Mr Djanogly
Let me repeat what I said: this is not a question of whether the person making a claim has a valid claim but of how much his lawyer gets paid. That is what we are looking at, and that is where the system needs reform. To be clear—I say that because I have heard that some hon. Members are not clear about this specific point—I emphasise that under our proposals the client’s lawyer’s costs will still be recoverable from the losing other side.
However, clauses 46 and 48 abolish the recoverability of the success fees and insurance premiums that have pushed up prices for everyone.
Helen Jones
Is the Minister aware that the lead asbestos case was very complicated and took six years to get to the Supreme Court? Does he really think that lawyers will take those kinds of cases without an assurance that their costs will be met?
Mr Djanogly
As I have just said, lawyers’ costs will be met in the usual way. What we are talking about is the success fee. That is where the problem has come into the system.
Mr Djanogly
No; if the hon. Lady listens, I will answer the question.
Our reforms are intended to redress the unfairness that exists in our civil litigation system between claimants and defendants. They will move conditional fee agreements back to the position that they were in before the Opposition’s disastrous reforms in the Access to Justice Act 1999. Our proposals are premised on the similar treatment of classes of cases, based on the costs or difficulty of bringing a claim. The Lords amendments would introduce a new unfairness between claimants, based only on the type of disease or illness, and essentially dependent on whether it was caused in the workplace.
Andrew Percy (Brigg and Goole) (Con)
A number of my constituents who worked on the docks in Goole and in power stations have been affected by this illness. There seems to be a lot of confusion in this debate. For simplicity’s sake, will the Minister say whether my constituents who worked at the docks and who are suffering from this awful disease will receive more or less money in compensation under the Government’s proposals than they receive at the moment?
Mr Djanogly
That will depend on the arrangements that they make with their lawyers. Under the new system, for the first time since the Opposition’s reforms which did so much to create a compensation culture in our country, the client will have an interest in what their lawyer is being paid. Until we get back to that situation, there will be an ongoing ratcheting of costs, which is not in the interests of such claims.
The Opposition’s Lords amendments rate one sort of claim above another. Somehow, a mesothelioma claim is automatically more worthy than a personal injury claim. The Government simply do not accept that. I acknowledge the concern in the other place, which underpinned Lords amendments 31 and 32, that the new arrangements will prevent lawyers from being willing to take mesothelioma cases and leave claimants out of pocket, but I believe it to be mistaken.
Toby Perkins (Chesterfield) (Lab)
The Minister says that a mesothelioma claim is not, by definition, more serious than a personal injury claim. That obviously depends on the personal injury claim. However, every single mesothelioma claim is a serious matter. Will he at least acknowledge that there is a difference between all mesothelioma claims and some personal injury claims?
Mr Djanogly
All non-clinical negligence personal injury cases, including respiratory disease claims, have been out of the scope of legal aid since 2000—let us acknowledge that—under changes introduced by the last Government. Although some expert reports may be required in respiratory disease cases, the Government are not persuaded that they differ substantially from other personal injury cases in a way that merits the retention of the recoverability of after-the-event insurance premiums.
John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)
The Minister may be aware that Barrow is the constituency with the second highest number of mesothelioma suffers in the country. Does he not understand how insulting and potentially distressing it is to those sufferers to be branded as part of a compensation culture?
Mr Djanogly
As I said, this is a question of what lawyers get paid. I am in no way assessing the vulnerability of the individuals whom the hon. Gentleman mentioned.
I point out to the hon. Gentleman that significant steps have been taken in recent years to lower the barriers to bringing compensation claims for these disastrous diseases. A fast-track procedure for mesothelioma cases has been introduced in the High Court. Over the past few years, various legal changes, including primary legislation such as the Compensation Act 2006 and judgments of the Supreme Court, have removed many of the hurdles for sufferers of respiratory diseases in bringing claims.
The legal climate in which such cases are brought has been transformed in recent years. Judgments of the Supreme Court have removed many hurdles, and a judgment only last month means that victims of this dreadful disease who are able to trace an insurer will now be paid and not miss out on compensation. As I said, a fast-track procedure has been introduced to ensure that claims are dealt with as quickly as possible.
A key outstanding barrier is identifying the employer’s liability insurer when an employer no longer exists, and the Department for Work and Pensions continues to work with stakeholders to see what more can be done to address that. Overall, however, cases are much less difficult to undertake than in the past, and there is no reason to believe that legal firms will stop bringing them, even under the new arrangements, or that they will be particularly expensive.
Kate Green
Does the Minister not accept, though, that some cases will now simply go unrepresented and unpursued, and that victims will instead have to rely on the Government’s own compensation scheme, in which the average payment is £16,000? This change will be an expensive choice for the Government, because it will lock people out of access through the courts.
Mr Djanogly
Decisions are made about such cases now, and even under the existing system, if there are large sums involved, ATE insurance companies want to know the likelihood of losing. A lawyer also has to make such an assessment. As things stand, the balance is not right, and we want to rebalance the situation.
Partly as a consequence of what I have said, I do not believe we should accept the view that critics sometimes advance that our reforms will leave victims of this terrible disease out of pocket. It is true that under our plans individuals will pay legal costs out of their general damages. Crucially, though, damages for future care and losses are protected, and general damages are being increased by 10% to offset a success fee capped at 25%. It is of course entirely up to the lawyer whether any success fee is taken from a claimant’s damages at all.
Mr Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)
Even if damages for future care and losses are protected, the average life expectancy for advanced mesothelioma has been disclosed as being about nine to 12 months—so that is a great comfort. How can the Minister seriously tell the House that there will be no loss of damages given that the 10% uplift, which is very indistinct, is compensated for by a 25% loss of damages? We should not blame the lawyers, we should blame the Government, who are taking damages away from mesothelioma and asbestosis victims.
Mr Djanogly
I am actually saying quite the opposite. I am saying that damages are going to be increased, not decreased.
The aim of our reforms is to end the current situation whereby legal firms can get away with charging what they want because the claimants do not have a stake in keeping an eye on the bill. At a time when the cases in question are becoming easier to bring, we should not accept amendments that would reduce pressure on legal firms to cut their fees. Instead, our focus should be on cutting inflated margins, not making exemptions for one type of disease.
I understand claimants’ fear of being left liable for high defendant’s costs should they lose, but under our reforms, we are protecting personal injury claimants from the risk of paying such costs, including in industrial disease cases, by introducing qualified one-way costs shifting.
Helen Jones
Even if I accepted the Minister’s argument about plaintiffs keeping an eye on fees, which I do not, how would someone with no legal training who was dying of mesothelioma be supposed to keep monitoring their lawyers’ fees?
Mr Djanogly
People entering into a conditional fee agreement have a relationship with their lawyer, and it is quite right that someone who employs a lawyer has some idea of what is on that lawyer’s clock and what they are charging. That is very important. If someone is sick, they will have family who can help them through their sickness.
The Government are determined to see more proportionate costs in civil litigation, with greater fairness in the risks borne by parties. Without our reforms, high and disproportionate costs in civil litigation would continue. Moreover, if the Lords amendments were accepted, claimants in mesothelioma cases would have an advantage over others who may be suffering from equally debilitating conditions. That cannot be justified.
Mr Slaughter
I will be as brief as I can, because a number of my hon. Friends also wish to speak to the two amendments on industrial diseases. If appropriate, Madam Deputy Speaker, I shall say a brief word about the Lords amendment on metal theft as this is the only opportunity to do so—[Interruption.] In that case, I shall deal with it later.
The first amendment ensures that victims of respiratory industrial diseases—for the main part asbestos-induced diseases such as mesothelioma—will not have their damages taken away by lawyers and insurers. The second ensures that victims of industrial diseases as a whole are treated in the same way.
The Government plan to allow claimants’ lawyers to take up to 25% of industrial disease victims’ damages and for the victims’ insurers to take an uncapped additional amount. The current system says that the losing defendant or their insurer should pay the costs of bringing that case. They are still highly contentious and contended cases. Some 60,000 people in Britain will develop mesothelioma over the next decades because of past exposure, and almost 40,000 have died thus far—the highest levels in the world. The Association of British Insurers continues to obstruct victims of asbestosis in high-profile, Supreme Court cases to try to absolve insurers from paying out. After a recent ruling in favour of victims, the Insurance Times headline read, “Disappointment at pleural plaques ruling”.
Asbestosis is not the only problem, which is why the other place made two amendments. One amendment was specific to respiratory disease and the other encompasses serious industrial diseases. These are not slips and trips, minor accidents at work or road traffic whiplash cases; they are diagnosable medical conditions that can, with difficulty, be proved to have resulted from a breach of duty by an employer. Symptoms include deafness, blindness, spinal degradation, leukaemia, cirrhosis of the liver caused by exposure to chemicals, organ damage, loss of limbs and more.
The diseases are the by-product of hard and often manual work over decades. They are inflicted on people who have spent their lives contributing to the economy of this country in heavy industry, manufacturing and public services. Many of the diseases do not manifest for years—they are the legacy of our heavy industries and of our proud traditions of manufacturing. In time, modern industries will cause diseases as yet undiagnosed.
The Minister has repeatedly said in debates on the Bill that the aim of part 2 is to fix the “compensation culture” or to lower motor insurance premiums, but whose car insurance is affected by mesothelioma sufferers getting their full and just compensation?
Eighteen noble lords from all parties and none signed a letter supporting the amendment. I shall not name them all, but I should mention Lord Alton and Lord Bach, who moved the amendments in the House of Lords, Lord Avebury, and the late Lord Newton, who spoke so powerfully to the amendments. They demonstrated the depth of feeling that the Government should be so crass as to treat mesothelioma sufferers in the same manner as those affected by whiplash. As the noble Lord Avebury said:
“Unscrupulous claimants may be able to fake road traffic injuries, but not mesothelioma or asbestosis. It is impossible for the victims of these horrible diseases to launch a frivolous or fraudulent claim, and it is unconscionable that people on their deathbeds should be mulcted of thousands of pounds out of the damages that they are awarded by the courts.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 14 March 2012; Vol. 736, c. 313.]
The Government contend that that is not relevant and that they are trying to get people to shop around for the best rates, but who, diagnosed with mesothelioma, with perhaps months to live, will shop around for the lawyer that takes the least damages from him—the so-called skin in the game so beloved of the Minister? On average, cancer caused by asbestos exposure kills in about 12 months. General damages are, on average, about £65,000. The victim’s lawyer will now receive up to 25% of that sum. The after-the-event insurer, who insures the claimant in case his action fails, will take an unlimited sum for the premium. Because insurance companies fight mesothelioma cases to the end—often until after the victim dies—such cases are inherently risky to bring, and the cost of insuring the claim can be huge.
John Woodcock
It is an honour to follow such a powerful and brave speech from the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Tracey Crouch). She spoke incredibly well on the subject.
I wish to speak briefly in support of Lords amendment 31, and I hope that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) will listen carefully. I also hope against hope that he will reconsider his decision, because the sight of him sitting there laughing while this subject is being discussed, and labelling victims in my constituency and across the country who suffer horribly as being part of a compensation culture and a racket, does a gross disservice to those people, and ultimately to the Government he represents.
Let us be clear—as the Bill stands, individuals who have contracted horrific and rapidly life-shortening diseases could now be required to pay the cost of bringing their case out of the damages they receive rather than have the defendant meet the costs. This represents a major change to the underlying principles of criminal damages cases in the UK, creating the potential for unlimited costs to be borne by successful claimants. In extremis, it could lead to a defendant, having successfully proven that their employer’s negligence has left them with an almost certainly fatal disease, being left with a bill to pick up for bringing the case.
Mr Djanogly
It is important to get this right. The particular disease falls within the Government’s proposals to introduce one-way cost shifting, which will mean that losing claimants will not pay defendants’ costs.
John Woodcock
As the shadow Minister has made clear, it does not cover disbursements. The Minister has not been able to set out a proper case. He has tried to claim that compensation will go up as a result of these reforms. Frankly, all the people looking at this—I see the Minister nodding his head now—do not agree. Given the level of concern and alarm expressed by victims who contract the disease incredibly quickly, many thousands of people are left wondering when they are going to be struck, and the families left behind cannot understand the Government’s attitude towards this incredibly difficult subject.
On average, those who successfully pursue claims for mesothelioma see compensation in the order of £65,000. Under the unamended Bill, their lawyer could receive 25% of that. On top of that, their after-the-event insurer could take an increased premium, and because mesothelioma claims are risky, those premiums can be very high indeed.
From my own constituency, I have seen the appalling impact of mesothelioma on the lives of those who suffer and their families. The industrial tradition of Barrow and Furness means that shipyard workers are particularly affected because of the historic use of asbestos in ship construction. This has left the town, as I said in my intervention, with the second-highest mortality rate from this disease among males anywhere in the country—topped only by West Dunbartonshire, which is, of course, another shipbuilding area. These people served their country through the fine ships they built to defend our shores. They were failed by successive Governments, and this Government now have a duty to address that wrong. That is why sufferers have pushed and pushed for better compensation, and that is why it would be a travesty for this House to vote today to reduce the payments they can get.
Mr Llwyd
I agreed with everything the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) said. His views are shared by many Members on the Opposition Benches—and one or two on the Government Benches as well, I am sure.
I want to speak briefly to amendments 31 and 32. I am sure I am not the only MP who has received many representations on the important issue in question. Lawyers should not skin people who are dying. I was a lawyer—both a solicitor and a barrister—and I would be ashamed of taking back as much as possible from the damages claims of people who may not have long to live. That is disgusting, but there is a very real worry that the Government are creating that problem in attempting to address what they call the compensation culture. Many of us do not recognise that such a culture exists, but even if it does, it involves petty claims such as whiplash injuries and people tripping up, or pretending to trip up, on pavements. In trying to sort out that problem, the Government are creating a problem for industrial injuries cases.
Under clause 43, a success fee under a conditional fee arrangement will not be recoverable from a losing party in all proceedings. Instead, it will be paid out of the damages of the injured person, meaning they may lose 25% of their damages.
Mr Djanogly
I should address this point as it has been raised about half a dozen times. The 25% is a maximum. Because under the current system people will always pay the lawyers the maximum, Members seem to be assuming that under the new system the maximum will still be claimed, but under the new system people will be encouraged to pay their lawyers less, not the maximum.
Mr Llwyd
Well, that is what a person such as the Minister thinks will happen, as he believes in the market ideology. He was a commercial lawyer, and never got his hands dirty as some of us have had to do over the years.
Clause 45 removes the recoverability of the after-the-event—ATE—insurance premium from the losing defendant. Therefore, that premium will in many instances be taken out of the damages awarded to the injured party. The amendments passed in another place would exclude industrial disease claims from these provisions, thus allowing the claimants to keep 100% of their compensation. We must uphold those changes and exempt such individuals and therefore prevent what would be a glaring miscarriage of justice.
Industrial disease cases are utterly different from road traffic claims. Cases centring on diseases such as asbestosis and mesothelioma are complex and require intensive research before liability is admitted. As a result, fraudulent industrial disease claims are almost an impossibility. Because of their complexity, such claims cannot be dealt with by inexperienced litigators, but if there is neither the uplift required to allow a solicitor to take a case on a CFA nor a recoverable ATE premium, many experienced solicitors will be unable to take on cases where the chance of recovering their costs is low without the client having to pay them from their damages. That is particularly true of low-value cases in which the additional liabilities may dwarf the amount of damages awarded, leaving the claimant worse off than when they started.
The potential for injustice, I am afraid, is huge. The defendant in such cases is often a multi-million pound organisation with access to teams of lawyers. It is also worth noting that after-the-event insurance also pays for additional expenses such as medical reports, without which industrial disease claims would fall at the first hurdle. Thus, without expert reports, which are necessary to prove liability, and the support of experienced solicitors who know this area of law thoroughly, claimants will simply be unable to proceed with their cases.
Mr Speaker
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her point of order. The Minister is welcome to respond if he wishes, but he is not under any obligation to do so.
Mr Speaker
No, he is not going to respond.
The hon. Member for Warrington North (Helen Jones) will know that I came into the proceedings relatively late, and in those circumstances it is not for me to act as umpire on the matter, which would be wrong. However, her observations, sincerely expressed, have been noted, and all I would say is that each and every one of us in this place is responsible for his or her own behaviour and for the impression that we give in the conduct of debate. Let us leave it there for tonight.