Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Elfyn Llwyd Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Elfyn Llwyd (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

The hon. Gentleman said at the commencement of his remarks that this measure was about targeting resources a bit better. The Government’s impact assessment says that they might save between £1 million and £2 million under this unfortunate scheme. However, the cost will be three times that amount, in terms of people being let down, losing their homes, not being able to receive assistance, and so on, along with all the other problems that will flow from this. The cost will be far more than £1 million to £2 million.

[Mr Djanogly]

The right hon. Gentleman’s points go more to scope, which is not the subject of this debate, than the telephone service.

Some in the other place raised concerns about the gateway being mandatory and what that means for access by particular categories of vulnerable callers. However, that is precisely why we are applying the gateway in a limited number of areas—debt, discrimination and special educational needs—but not community care, which we have agreed should not be available initially. It is also why we are building in strong safeguards. Not only will there be an exemption for emergency cases, those in detention and under-18s, but even where a case is in scope and not in those groups, face-to-face advice will always be available where deemed to be required. Although those seeking advice in the three areas of law will be required initially to contact the helpline to apply for legal aid, callers eligible for legal aid who cannot give instructions or act on advice given over the telephone will be referred to face-to-face advice. I should also emphasise that, in response to concerns raised in another place, a review of the implementation of the mandatory gateway, including the operation of the gateway in the three areas of law, will be undertaken, and the report of that review will be published.

In all those areas—a duty to provide legal aid, the independence of the exceptional funding scheme and the operation of the gateway—the Government’s priority is to protect access to justice while modernising the service and ensuring that it is affordable. We agree with the need to underline the independence of a funding decision in an individual case. However, we cannot accept measures that would create legal confusion about what services the scheme provides, nor can we agree that it is unreasonable to ask claimants in three areas of law to access the service by the simple expedient of ringing a phone line—a modernisation entirely familiar from other walks of life.

I ask hon. Members to support the Government on all these amendments.

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[Simon Hughes]

I was grateful for the Minister’s reassurance, but I have to say that I am not persuaded. Like any MP with a constituency containing people from many different races and backgrounds, with many different first languages, and with all the disabilities that any mixed community has, I simply do not believe that a telephone route into deciding eligibility for legal aid is right for everybody. It may be right for many people, and I understand that it will be a good service, but if we ask constituents such as mine whether they have always been satisfied with the council response line—whether under Labour now, or with us running it, as previously—the answer is always no. That does not change, irrespective of who is running the show. I understand the Government’s position, and I hear what they say about a review, although I add a request for the review to be regional as well as general, but I believe that the Lords who pressed for amendment 24 have a well-made case. I shall support the Lords in respect of amendment 24.

[Mr Llwyd]

I have just one or two brief remarks. I am pleased that the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) said what he did, because Liberal Democrat Members in Committee did not make those points at any stage. In any case, I am glad that he said it, and I am sure he is sincere in doing so.

By definition, the people whom we are dealing with are likely to be the most vulnerable in society. Our system of justice is based on the equality of arms. Unless we have equality of arms, we will prevent certain individuals from having access to justice. I do not want to be part of any legislature that will do that. I come back to my intervention on the Minister. The Government’s own figures suggest savings of £1 million to £2 million. How many savings will be made when people are not allowed to be given basic advice about debts, housing, welfare and all the other problems they face? We should remember that people often face not just one problem but five or six, as the right hon. Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan) said.

[Sadiq Khan]

Has the right hon. Gentleman had a chance to read the Citizens Advice report published today? The final paragraph on the first page states:

“A key message from this report is that early intervention in casework funded by legal aid works. In the absence of free legal advice, the risk is that these individuals will not only be out of scope, but out of mind.”

[Mr Llwyd]

That is absolutely right, and I am concerned about it. I understand the need for the Government to look for some savings, but they are going after what they perceive to be a soft target. It is the wrong target. Even at the eleventh hour, I hope that they will think long and hard about it. Members in the other place argued long and hard; we were not allowed to argue sufficiently long in Committee or indeed on the Floor of the House, which is a disgrace in itself. Those who took time to go through all the available evidence concluded with an alternative view, and those people are right. If we have a vote, I will encourage all my hon. Friends, and any Member who has a conscience, to vote in favour of the Lords amendment and not to accept this mealy-mouthed excuse from the Government.

[Sir Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)]

I encountered a Member of the House of Lords yesterday. She said, “I hope you will agree that we have done a good job on this Bill.” I said, “You have done a brilliant job, but it is all going to be overturned by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in the House of Commons tomorrow.”

The fact is that this Government, who do not need finance for their own legal aid, are forcing people to obtain legal advice by telephone operator. If they hold constituency surgeries, they will know that people cannot present a concise account of their problems. They have to discuss them, and when they have discussed them, it is possible to get to the core of what they need and help them—but these people do not care about that. I will say this, Mr Deputy Speaker. It is out of order in this House of Commons to accuse anyone of hypocrisy, so I—

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[Mr Clarke]

Such women will not get an injunction if it turns out that there is no reasonable ground for giving it and they are not in imminent fear of domestic violence. We will give them legal aid because we think it is important that these issues are tested in cases where legal advice is available. If women do not get the injunction, they will not get the legal aid later.

[Mr Llwyd]

What is being missed here is that the evidential gateway is being closed down. I am not saying that the right hon. and learned Gentleman wants to deprive every person of assistance in a domestic violence situation. I would never allege that; I know him to be a better person than that. What I am saying is that 46% of those who would be eligible will no longer be eligible under these so-called reforms, according to recent reports from Rights of Women and Welsh Women’s Aid. People who would genuinely qualify will no longer qualify, and that is the issue that we are now discussing.

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[Mr Clarke]

But women will get legal aid for seeking the injunction. The hon. Lady is falling into what has happened throughout these debates. The definition that we are talking about as the gateway to legal aid for all other private family law cases goes far beyond injunctions.

If I may move on, I will remind hon. Members how far we have gone since we started the Bill—far beyond where the Opposition were first urging us to go—and we will go further in response to the debate in the House of Lords. The first issue is reflected in Lords amendment 192—whether or not we should use the definition used by the Association of Chief Police Officers, which we resisted in this House. The Government’s intent is to have a broad and inclusive definition and one that commands widespread agreement. To cut all the pressure, we are happy to support the spirit of the amendment and we are therefore adopting the ACPO definition. I half suspect that if we had offered that when the Bill was in the House of Commons—it was my mistake that we did not—we would have closed the discussion down in the House because that is what everybody was then pressing for.

In their amendment their lordships in their wisdom add words which are not in the ACPO definition. That rather goes against the arguments that have been put forward for one, single, cross-Government definition of domestic violence. We have therefore tabled further Government amendments in lieu of Lords amendment 192 which would define domestic violence in the same way as the ACPO definition as

“any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between individuals who are associated with each other.”

We think this should satisfy the concerns that have been expressed in both Houses on this point, so I shall ask the House to agree to this Government amendment in lieu of Lords amendment 192.

Amendments 194 and 196 concern the accepted forms of evidence of domestic violence. I have already said that when litigation is about domestic violence, the victims will always have legal aid. The issue is one of balance. Lords amendment 194, led by the learned Baroness Scotland and supported by a number of her colleagues in the other place, has prompted us to look again at other kinds of objective evidence to ensure that the test is as widely drawn as possible.

I have discussed that with colleagues in the House, and I am grateful to the colleagues with whom I had meetings, particularly to my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant), who is in her place, for advice on the subject because she knows far more about family law than I do, as I have never practised in this field, and in particular for making the point that we need to take care that the range of evidence does not force victims to take formal court action where it may not be suitable in individual circumstances. We do not want to force people to go to court who would not otherwise do so.

Therefore, in response to this House and the debate in the other House, we intend to accept as evidence—we will reflect this in regulations—the following matters: an undertaking given to a court by the other party in lieu of a protective order or injunction against that party for the protection of the applicant, where there is no equivalent undertaking given by the applicant; a police caution for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant; appropriate evidence of admission to a domestic violence refuge; appropriate evidence from a social services department confirming provision of services to the victim in relation to alleged domestic violence; and appropriate evidence from GPs or other medical professionals.

We are prepared to accept those matters and ask the House to accept them this evening. They are in addition to those forms of evidence that the Government already accepted in our earlier debates. Those are: that a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction against the other party for the protection of the applicant is either in place or has been made in the previous 12 months; that a criminal conviction for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant is still in place; that there are ongoing criminal proceedings for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant; that there is evidence from a multi-agency risk assessment conference of the applicant having been referred as being at risk of domestic violence from the other party and action has been recommended; and that there is a finding of fact by the courts of domestic violence by the other party against the applicant.

For the best part of 12 months we have reviewed this rather narrow point in one piece of litigation, and that is a fairly formidable list of things we are prepared to accept as evidence of domestic violence. If their lordships consult the people who have been sending them all the e-mails for the past few weeks, I am sure that they will be able to add to the list, as will Members of this House, but if we are not careful we will forget what the objective is: we want more of these cases not to be conducted by lawyers, financed by the taxpayer, who are engaged in adversarial litigation about where the children will live, what maintenance should be paid by one party or the other or what share of the matrimonial home should be owned by one party or the other. The Government have responded pretty generously because of our concern about domestic violence and, as I have already indicated, in key areas we have moved beyond where we were. This evening we have to insist that that is where it will end.

I should also point out that, on the time limits, where I do not think any history of domestic violence can be remembered and invoked, it is a question of ensuring that victims of recent or ongoing violence are protected, drawing a line so that Government regulations do not result in a permanent opening of access to legal aid. We will double the time limit we originally proposed from 12 months to two years, except in respect of a conviction for a domestic violence offence, where the only limit is that the conviction should not be a spent one.

Having moved on all those issues, the Government do not agree that the evidential requirements for those cases should be set out on the face of the Bill; the evidence I have described will instead be set out in regulations. The benefit is that that will allow greater flexibility to amend the scheme if required in the light of experience. If we set it all out in primary legislation, we would find that we had set things in stone for our successors.

[Mr Llwyd]

Can the Secretary of State assist us by telling us how the list he read out, which I must say is welcome, differs from Lords amendment 194, because they seem almost identical? Is he saying that, rather than putting them on the face of the Bill, they will be set out in cast-iron regulations?

[Mr Clarke]

I think that I am right in saying that what their lordships tried to do was put one form of definition used by the UK Border Agency on the face of the Bill. That is far too wide, and it is for a different purpose—[Interruption.] Well, that is an indication of the sorts of things it will take as evidence; it is not a qualification for anything. We need something that is the basis for making a clear decision on whether or not people are eligible for money, and we have opted for ACPO-plus. The other difference, as I have said, is that we do not think that we should spell it out and draft each of these forms—I of course bind myself by the words I read out earlier, which are what we are committed to. The advantage of regulating along the lines that the Government are committed to is that, if in the light of experience there is some mistake, it is much easier to make a change. It is always a mistake to fix everything in too much detail in primary legislation, because a future Minister or Government might have to try to find the parliamentary time to make the necessary changes to improve it.

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[Mr Clarke]

My right hon. Friend anticipates the concession that I was going to explain; it is in the documents before us, and he has spotted it. Legal aid issues are usually, as everybody knows, about the factual basis of the claim or the proper application of this country’s extremely convoluted social security regulations, which I hope the current Government’s reforms, when we eventually get to a universal benefit, will greatly simplify, but most such issues are not legal. We have a tribunal system that was deliberately designed so that ordinary citizens might access it and argue their case, and when we invented all those tribunals, we went out of our way to say, “They are not courts and you don’t require lawyers, as these are places where people will argue,” but, as my right hon. Friend says, sometimes legal issues are raised in them.

The Government, in response to these debates, have tabled an amendment, which is a concession. It is Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendments 169 and 240, and it would make legal aid and assistance available for welfare benefits appeals on a point of law in the upper tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. It would also include funding for applications for permission made to the upper tribunal, and it would also make legal representation available for welfare benefits appeals to the Court of Appeal and to the Supreme Court.

Most surprisingly, that Government amendment in lieu was put forward in response to the argument. We did not wish to argue that in such cases, when the whole thing is a point of law, the applicant himself or herself should be expected to represent themselves without legal assistance, so we have tried to define those cases in which legal advice should certainly be available.

My right hon. Friend’s amendment, on the face of it, goes back to the whole of business of whether we should apply legal aid for legal advice in every welfare claim, but the question that concerns him most is, “What about the ones that involve legal issues?”, and I can conceive of cases in the lower tribunals in which what is raised really is a point of law. He wants me to find some equivalent to the upper tribunal, asking, “Is there some situation in which somebody, preferably the tribunal judge, certifies that there is a point of law involved where legal aid should be available?” We do not have such a situation at the moment, and we will have to try to devise one, as there is no system for it: just as we have accepted the argument about legal issues in the upper tribunal, we could of course do so if the same thing arises in the lower.

We will go away and work on the matter. We already have discussions under way with the Department for Work and Pensions, whose help we will also require, to see whether we could have some equivalent—whereby somebody other than the claimant or their lawyer certifies that a point of law is involved—and provide legal aid. I suspect that at this stage of the Bill’s passage through Parliament it is far too late to start introducing primary legislation in the House of Lords, but we have retained for ourselves powers to amend the scoping through regulation, so if we could solve the problem, we could bring something forward through statutory instruments. We are quite open to the argument for ensuring that we have legal representation when there is a legal issue that we cannot expect a lay person ordinarily to argue.

[Mr Llwyd]

I follow the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s logic on that, but surely if the point of law is a good one in the upper tribunal and all the way up to the Supreme Court, it is equally good in the first tier, but if the case is unrepresented in the first tier, it is not going to go anywhere else.

[Mr Clarke]

I should like to see whether we can devise, with the help of the DWP, my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington and anybody else, a system whereby we identify in the lower tribunal such issues that involve a legal issue. We think that the number is comparatively small, because it is not the business of lower tribunals normally to find themselves arguing points of law, as they normally argue points of fact and of regulatory interpretation, but we will work on the matter, and if we can devise such a system, we undertake to respond as my right hon. Friend asks me to.

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[Tom Brake]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that intervention and for putting on the record the fact that the Justice Secretary has made that point clear, which is welcome.

Finally, with respect to our Liberal Democrat amendment, I am satisfied with the undertakings that the Justice Secretary has given to look at points of law relating to lower tribunals, so it is not my intention to press it to the vote.

[Mr Llwyd]

That last comment winded me, because I fully expected the Liberals to vote on their amendment, particularly given the right hon. Gentleman’s performance in Committee—where he said absolutely nothing during the entire Committee stage.

I must say to the Lord Chancellor that I accept and am grateful for how he has moved on the definition of domestic violence, which is most welcome. On the gateway, things have greatly improved, too. The hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant), who is greatly experienced in these matters, has made her speech, so I can curtail what I had intended to say. Suffice it to say that I think three years might be better than the two-year limit, but two years is still an improvement. In any event, this represents a great improvement on where we were just a few weeks ago—certainly a vast improvement on where we were in Committee. I hope that this will be a far fairer regime on domestic violence and on assisting the most needy in society.

As to the welfare benefit cases, the Government have now accepted the relevant amendment. Again, it is an improvement, but there is a lack of logic in saying that a second tier would be covered in respect of points of law for the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Let us just face the fact that the number going to those two courts will be a handful in any year, if even that. The truth is that it would be far better to extend downward to ensure that where a genuine point of law is at stake —I am not sure how exactly we are going to measure it—it is only right that something should be done at the very lowest level. Again, the cases will be few and far between.

Since becoming a Member of Parliament, I have seen 200 or 300 benefit cases of various kinds before the tribunal—gratis, I have to say. It is necessary to put your ducks in a row and prove that the medical officer has been less than honest in assessing the needs of the individual. We heard one glaring example from the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North (Catherine McKinnell) earlier and I could provide many more. As I have said in this place before, the system is wrong because the people who do the tests are most keen on getting them through in 25 minutes and picking up their cheque—and that is that. I have seen some abominable cases. I remember one case in which a young lad was invalided out of the Air Force, having lost a leg and badly damaged a shoulder. He was alleged to be able to walk 100 metres in the given short space of time. That was absolute nonsense. He went to appeal, and in 10 minutes the tribunal said yes.

There are some cases where points of law are relevant. They are few and far between. The Justice Secretary said this evening that he will look to provide some cover there, and it is particularly important to include any points of law that arise lower down, as it were.

I shall curtail my comments this evening, as others wish to speak, but I think that amendment 171, which deals with young people, remains a matter of grave concern to many Opposition Members. The scope of the amendment is fairly wide. If passed, it would retain the provision of legal aid for children who are party to a number of specified legal proceedings. According to the organisation JustRights, it would retain legal aid in civil cases for children who need that aid in their own right in order to deal with their problems independently from the needs or support of their parents or carers, if they exist.

Most of the children affected are likely to be teenagers who have little or no contact with their parents. If they are not eligible for legal aid, they will be left to steer through an adult-orientated legal system involving tribunals and court hearings with no specialist support or advice. Most of the children whom the amendment seeks to protect would not be represented by a litigation friend, as most would be bringing cases as a direct result of having no parental support in the first place.

I remind the House that the present Government, like their predecessors, are bound by the United Nations convention on the rights of the child and the Council of Europe guidelines to secure a justice system that is considerate towards children. Last year, 41,000 children gained access to legal aid as the primary applicants. If the Bill is passed unchecked, 6,000 of them—14%—will lose that entitlement. Not only will it be distressing for children to attempt to navigate the legal and quasi-legal systems without support, but it will take longer for cases to be resolved owing to the increase in the number of inexperienced litigants in person.

The Local Government Association has estimated that removing legal aid for unaccompanied child asylum seekers in immigration cases alone will cost local authorities an extra £10 million a year. Given the additional costs that will be incurred by the national health service and the welfare system, we can only surmise that cutting legal aid for the most vulnerable group will do no more than shift costs from one department to another. It is only right for children to be protected by our justice system, and leaving that vulnerable group to travel alone into a quagmire of legal niceties will not be palatable to any civilised society.

The Justice Secretary has moved a long way on several points of contention, and I ask him, even at this eleventh hour, to look again at this one.

[Dr Wollaston]

I welcome the significant improvements that have been made in respect of domestic violence, so I shall concentrate on Lords amendment 168.

The Secretary of State says that because welfare appeals often involve arguments about points of fact rather than points of law, welfare appellants should not qualify for legal aid. However, justice is about facts. Many of the people whom we meet in our surgeries have fallen through the gaps in Atos assessments. They may not have ticked the right boxes, but within five minutes it is abundantly clear that the wrong decision has been made. In my experience, the expert and professional advice marshalled by the citizens advice bureaux makes all the difference to whether our constituents receive justice. Cost-shifting might be reasonable, but only if the £20 million per year went far enough to fill the gap that has been created.

Historically, South Hams CAB in my area has received 60% of its funding through legal aid. It was not a question of local authority cuts; the authority had not funded the CAB in the first place. Although some of that £20 million has gone to my local CAB and will make a significant difference, the CAB has nevertheless had to cut staff, and has lost 45 hours per week of high-quality professional time. Of course we all pay tribute to the volunteers, but it is mostly the detailed and specific marshalling of facts by specialists that determines whether the right decision is made at a tribunal.

I believe that the employment of more decision-makers would make a big difference, but I also believe that the work done by CABs saves us a great deal of money in the long term. I ask the Secretary of State to think again about how much more we can do to fill the gap so that our CABs can maintain the incredibly high-quality professional service that they provide for all our constituents.

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[Ian Lucas]

I shall be brief, Madam Deputy Speaker. I have read an excellent letter from my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) to the Lord Chancellor, which set out an unanswerable case against this proposal. It is wrong, in principle, that the Government are proposing this evening to reduce the damages of a successful mesothelioma claimant. I am a solicitor, and I did not go into the law to take damages away from a dying person, pending the outcome of a claim.

I have been very much strengthened in my conviction by the words of my constituent Marie Hughes, whose husband, Phil, a massively respected head teacher in Wrexham, died from mesothelioma, having worked for four years at the Brymbo steelworks in his youth. She has written to me explaining, in her own words, why she thinks this proposal is wrong, and I am going to read this out to the Minister, whom I respect. I hope that he will listen. She says:

“Had we had to undergo the further anxiety of financial implications we would not have attempted to claim. The thought of ‘shopping around’ for deals on success fees like other claimants as the Government suggests would be an unimaginable burden. Any monies available were needed to sustain our day to day costs, my inability to go to work while my husband was ill, and the need for travelling/sustenance funding when receiving treatment away from home, also supporting our family in further education. If there was a chance of treatment, we could not gamble with our savings as the stakes were too high. By the final 3 months of Phil’s life, tumours had also developed on his spine resulting in paralysis from the chest down—and all this while he was fighting to breathe.

My husband was not there to proudly escort his daughter down the aisle, though he had spoken of this dream several times during our precious time together. He never saw grandchildren. He bravely bore his condition and battled to the end but Mesothelioma takes no prisoners.”

I appeal to Government Members to reconsider their position. They should listen to the Lords and accept the amendment. To take damages away from these victims would be an appalling act of which the Government should be ashamed.

[Mr Llwyd]

I agreed with everything the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) said. His views are shared by many Members on the Opposition Benches—and one or two on the Government Benches as well, I am sure.

I want to speak briefly to amendments 31 and 32. I am sure I am not the only MP who has received many representations on the important issue in question. Lawyers should not skin people who are dying. I was a lawyer—both a solicitor and a barrister—and I would be ashamed of taking back as much as possible from the damages claims of people who may not have long to live. That is disgusting, but there is a very real worry that the Government are creating that problem in attempting to address what they call the compensation culture. Many of us do not recognise that such a culture exists, but even if it does, it involves petty claims such as whiplash injuries and people tripping up, or pretending to trip up, on pavements. In trying to sort out that problem, the Government are creating a problem for industrial injuries cases.

Under clause 43, a success fee under a conditional fee arrangement will not be recoverable from a losing party in all proceedings. Instead, it will be paid out of the damages of the injured person, meaning they may lose 25% of their damages.

[Mr Djanogly]

I should address this point as it has been raised about half a dozen times. The 25% is a maximum. Because under the current system people will always pay the lawyers the maximum, Members seem to be assuming that under the new system the maximum will still be claimed, but under the new system people will be encouraged to pay their lawyers less, not the maximum.

[Mr Llwyd]

Well, that is what a person such as the Minister thinks will happen, as he believes in the market ideology. He was a commercial lawyer, and never got his hands dirty as some of us have had to do over the years.

Clause 45 removes the recoverability of the after-the-event—ATE—insurance premium from the losing defendant. Therefore, that premium will in many instances be taken out of the damages awarded to the injured party. The amendments passed in another place would exclude industrial disease claims from these provisions, thus allowing the claimants to keep 100% of their compensation. We must uphold those changes and exempt such individuals and therefore prevent what would be a glaring miscarriage of justice.

Industrial disease cases are utterly different from road traffic claims. Cases centring on diseases such as asbestosis and mesothelioma are complex and require intensive research before liability is admitted. As a result, fraudulent industrial disease claims are almost an impossibility. Because of their complexity, such claims cannot be dealt with by inexperienced litigators, but if there is neither the uplift required to allow a solicitor to take a case on a CFA nor a recoverable ATE premium, many experienced solicitors will be unable to take on cases where the chance of recovering their costs is low without the client having to pay them from their damages. That is particularly true of low-value cases in which the additional liabilities may dwarf the amount of damages awarded, leaving the claimant worse off than when they started.

The potential for injustice, I am afraid, is huge. The defendant in such cases is often a multi-million pound organisation with access to teams of lawyers. It is also worth noting that after-the-event insurance also pays for additional expenses such as medical reports, without which industrial disease claims would fall at the first hurdle. Thus, without expert reports, which are necessary to prove liability, and the support of experienced solicitors who know this area of law thoroughly, claimants will simply be unable to proceed with their cases.