Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Julian Huppert Excerpts

Wednesday 30th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Vernon Coaker]

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has cleared up the issue—there is one council in favour of the proposed changed across the country. However, I disagree absolutely with what he said about the electorate voting for this measure. The model in the Bill was not voted for by the majority of people. As he said, the model in the Liberal Democrat manifesto was completely different from the one in the Bill. He gave the game away when he said, “Of course, in the coalition agreement, there was a compromise”. Well, if there was a compromise, it obviously happened after the election, not during the election, so I do not think that anybody actually voted for this model.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the key issue is about having elected people looking after policing? That was the common ground between our two parties. The outcome was not exactly as we would have liked, but it was a balance between the two options. Does he further agree that there is a problem at the moment, in that police authorities do not represent those on district councils? District councils do not have a direct input. In fact, does he think that police authorities, as they currently are, work well at all?

[Vernon Coaker]

I do not think that police authorities are as bad as they are portrayed. There is some variation among them, but many do a reasonable job. Perhaps they are not as visible as they might be, and perhaps people do not understand exactly what they do, but people such as the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless), who sits on the Kent police authority, do a good job.

As for elections, let us say this. We can come forward with different models for this election or that election. However, as the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) will have heard me say in Committee, whatever the arguments about direct elections, the Government’s model is at totally the wrong level of accountability. I do not get people queuing up at my surgeries to say, “Do you know what, Mr Coaker? Nottinghamshire police’s counter-terrorism strategy”—or its fraud strategy or trafficking policy—“is wrong.” People come to my surgery to say, “Mr Coaker, we’re absolutely fed up with the kids at the end of our street,” or, “We’re totally fed up with the drug dealing going on from cars in a car park down the road.” I am sure that that is true for most hon. Members.

That neighbourhood, street-level accountability is what people want, which is why, to be fair to the hon. Member for Cambridge, his party proposed elections at a very local level. Whether that was the right model or the wrong model, if we are looking at where we need to strengthen accountability arrangements, it is precisely at that neighbourhood and street level where we need to do so. We can have neighbourhood policing, community meetings, beat meetings, and so on—all the things that have happened in a calm and measured way, and which have made such a difference to confidence at that level.

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Gentleman will be aware that we have discussed that idea in another venue, along with how important ultra-local policing is and how it is different from governance at a higher level. However, I am trying to understand where he is heading. In Committee he proposed directly elected chairs of police authorities, so I am glad that he now prefers the Lib Dem model—I do not remember him saying that before the election, but it is nice to hear that he is moving our way. Why does he think that having a directly elected chair of a panel would be so different from having a single directly elected person who would also act across a whole area?

[Vernon Coaker]

We are opposed to directly elected police and crime commissioners as set out in the Bill. Having said that, the Bill will presumably go through—unless Government Members vote against their own Whip—so then what should we do? The proper and responsible thing to do is to acknowledge that fact and propose another model—the hon. Gentleman will have seen our amendments. If we are to have a directly elected individual, then as well as saying that we are opposed to that in principle, what we as a responsible Opposition should do is say how we would improve it. The amendment that we moved in Committee—the hon. Gentleman knows this, but I am repeating it for the benefit of other Members—would have made that directly elected individual the chair of the police and crime panel, and thereby would have introduced proper checks and balances in the system.

The proposal that we are putting before the House today offers another way forward. What we are saying is, “Keep them as two distinct entities”—that is, have a police and crime commissioner as a figurehead, but also have a police and crime panel with significantly enhanced powers. These are all things that, with a proper inquiry and proper research, we could check to see whether they might be more appropriate, but I will tell the hon. Gentleman this. If he was stood where I am and he was opposed to something that the Government of the day were doing, he would say that he was opposed to it, but he would also seek to improve and adapt it, to take some of the edge off. That is what we did in Committee and that is what we are doing now.

It is not just the Opposition; hon. Members will no doubt have read Lord Imbert, the former chief constable of Thames Valley police and a former commissioner, setting out his opposition in The Times today. He will not be alone, although it is easier for him, as a non-serving police officer and a noble Lord, to say why he is opposed. He says:

“If passed unamended, this Bill will undermine”

the policing model that we have had in this country for years,

“threatening the crucial political independence and non-partisanship of the police and the Rule of Law itself.”

Yesterday, Liberty published the results of a survey conducted on its behalf by YouGov, which showed the lack of public trust in elected police commissioners. In answer to the question “Who would you trust more to protect your family from crime?”, 65% chose “A Chief Constable reporting to a Police Authority, as now” as their preferred option. “A Chief Constable reporting to an individual politician elected as a Police and Crime Commissioner” was the preferred option of just 15%. Just to show that that goes across the length and breadth of the country, I found out that a survey had been conducted in Hampshire showing that only 5% of the public there support having a single elected police and crime commissioner.

That is just the sort of evidence that any inquiry would have to look at. However, the Government’s response is simply to stand back and pretend that those people are all dinosaurs who would inevitably say that, because they are looking to protect their own interests, when in fact they are trying to say to the Government, “You need to slow down a bit and look at the consequences of what you’re trying to do.” All the Minister says is, “We believe it’s the right thing to do.” I have said to him before that, with respect, simply asserting that something is the case is not the same as arguing the case. Where is the evidence for this change to policing, which will make such a fundamental difference to governance arrangements?

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[Vernon Coaker]

First, if the system in London was working so well, why would the Government want to change it? Secondly, the change that the Government are making is to a completely different system from that which operates at the moment. The Metropolitan Police Authority is being abolished. The person who, through primary legislation, is going to be put in charge of policing in London through the Mayor’s office for policing and crime will be an unelected individual appointed by the Mayor of London. They will not be a directly elected individual as per the rest of the country, but an appointee of the Mayor following the abolition of the Metropolitan Police Authority. The hon. Gentleman asked why, if the system works so well, we should not expand it to the rest of the country. If the system in London is working so well, why are the Government changing it? Why not just leave it as it is? We are not changing the system in London to that in the rest of the country—we are completely changing the system in London to another system.

The inquiry would also need to look at the arrangements between a police and crime commissioner and the local democratic framework. One of the great successes of the current policing arrangements has been the introduction of the neighbourhood policing model, with the development of community safety partnerships in Wales and crime and disorder reduction partnerships in other parts of the country. Those arrangements have brought together all the various partners at a local level in order to try to tackle crime and improve confidence. The police and crime commissioner is not a responsible authority under the terms of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

What, then, is the relationship of the police and crime commissioner with the police and crime panel? Again, we do not understand that, and the Bill is unclear about it. I have referred to the complete lack of power that a police and crime panel has, leaving an omnipotent individual in charge of policing. Police and crime panels will have one person from each local authority—if there are not 10 authorities, we can make up the number with another couple—and a couple of independent members. If there are more than 10 local authorities, we can have a few more so that we stick to the basis of one person per authority. There is no reference to how many people might be in that local authority area or to its size—the reference is just to one person per authority, so it could be a tiny district council and a massive local authority area. My hon. Friend the Member for Houghton and Sunderland South (Bridget Phillipson) mentioned Northumbria, which is a huge area covered by one council and a very small, highly populated area covered by another.

[Dr Huppert]

Does the hon. Gentleman think it is right that under the current system district councils such as Cambridge city council have no representation on the police authority at all?

[Vernon Coaker]

That is a fair point. We can, of course, make changes and improvements to the current system. However, the point is that we are introducing police and crime panels when we have not had a proper debate about what their constitution should be; we have merely said there should be one member per authority. The size of the district council area in terms of population is not mentioned. These are clearly things that we need to understand.

We have had numerous representations from people saying that they are concerned about this. Cumbria and Surrey police have expressed their reservations. Cheshire—I do not know if there is anyone here from Cheshire, but I might as well go round the country—says that the police and crime commissioner

“must be able to influence relevant partners if their Police and Crime Plan is to be effective in delivering improvements in community safety and crime reduction. However, if the PCC is not a ‘responsible authority’ they have no statutory role and could, therefore, be ignored.”

That is a serious flaw in the Bill that the Minister needs to address.

Another aspect that members of the Committee reflected on, as would many others, is the cost of the introduction of police and crime commissioners. That will be a particularly important area for HMIC to look at. Different police authorities across the country tell us that there will be a significant cost involved. A police and crime commissioner will have people supporting them—a chief finance officer, a chief executive and other staff. A police and crime panel will presumably need resources to be able to carry out its function properly. A chief constable will become a corporation sole—in other words, a legal entity—and able, unless the Bill is amended as the Liberals tried to do, not only to control staff but own property and assets and so will presumably need more staff to be able to do that.

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[Dr Huppert]

rose—

[Paul Murphy (Torfaen) (Lab)]

rose—

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[Dr Huppert]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I apologise for being confusing; I was trying to be helpful.

It is a pleasure in many ways to continue the work that we did on the Bill Committee with many right hon. and hon. Members whom I see around the Chamber. These are slightly larger, grander surroundings than those in which we had our last, rather extensive, discussions.

[Michael Ellis]

But about the same number of people.

[Dr Huppert]

Indeed. We have had a fair discussion in Committee, and I am glad that we are continuing it.

The shadow Minister spoke about a desire for delay, and I can understand why he sees that as his role. I am sure that the Minister will respond to the detailed points that he made. I was rather touched by the shadow Minister’s comment about how I would behave if I were in his position. He did not make it clear whether that was in a scenario where the Labour party had completely collapsed and was now a minor party, whether that had happened to the Conservatives, or whether there was a Labour-Conservative coalition. I am sure he can comment on that later.

I want in particular to speak about Government amendment 14, which deals with a rather detailed point raised in Committee by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West (Mike Crockart). It is a great pleasure to see him in his place. He spotted that lines 4 and 16 on page 22, in clause 30, did not quite fit together—that there was a drafting error. That led to an interesting discussion in which we genuinely explored some ideas—I think we all learned a lot—about what should be the process for suspending a police and crime commissioner, the standards and thresholds and the effects of such a suspension. There is an interesting balance to be struck as regards what should happen. The amendment corrects the drafting error and leaves the provision that a commissioner may be suspended by the panel—I emphasise that the term used is “may” rather than “must”—if charged with an offence that could lead to a term in prison of greater than two years.

Is the balance right? First, the position of police and crime commissioner is very responsible and we would not want to see a holder of it being seriously investigated for a major crime, which would put them in a position that would simply be untenable in the public eye. On the one hand, one could suggest that we should bring the threshold lower and lower until, if we want to be absolutely sure, they would be suspended if they were accused of anything. I think that would be going too far, and I shall come up with a suggestion on that point a bit later.

The flip side of the argument, however, is that such a commissioner has been charged, not convicted. There is a clear difference and a clear principle. Members on both sides of the House mentioned in Committee that we should not punish people excessively based on the fact that they have been charged. There is the principle of innocent until proven guilty that still applies to most public law—I shall avoid talking about terrorist offences on this occasion. Clause 30(3) says that during a suspension period, a commissioner does not draw their salary, their pensions or their allowances. That is a punishment, in effect.

We had a number of discussions in Committee and the Liberal Democrats have had some discussions about our proposals on the way forward. We have also discussed that with the Minister. There is the question of what offences we wish to catch. My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West gave a number of examples of offences that would not be covered by the rules for the possible suspension in the context of offences with sentences greater than two years. I shall not go through every example, but they included racially or religiously aggravated assault or harassment, and I think we would have concerns about a police and crime commissioner who was charged with that. Other similar offences include aggravated vehicle taking, causing damage to property and causing injury. Vehicle taking without consent has a sentence of six months, as does assault on a police constable, as my hon. Friend pointed out. One would have great concerns if a police and crime commissioner was being charged with assaulting police constables, particularly on a regular basis. That would suggest that the relationship was not working

We must work out what to do. Our proposal—I hope that the Government will respond to it and will consider it as a way forward, and I look forward to hearing any other contributions—is that the period should be brought down from two years to six months, as suggested in the amendment originally proposed by my hon. Friend. It should be specified that the charge should be carried out by the Crown Prosecution Service—by a prosecutor—rather than a police officer, as they have powers to charge in some circumstances. We do not want police constables to be able to get at a commissioner with whom they disagree over some issue.

The flip side of bringing the threshold down to give greater public certainty is that there should be no loss of pay, no loss of pension and no loss of other allowances that would be incurred in the job—the person might not be doing that job during that period, but there might be some ongoing costs. That would avoid excessive punishment while providing public certainty that a prominent figure in such an area was not under a cloud and could not get out from under it.

There should also be a provision, regardless of the threshold, for the commissioner to be able effectively to suspend themselves and to say that there is an allegation against—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. May I remind the hon. Gentleman that we are discussing quite a narrow set of amendments? I am not sure that he is on the point of what we are discussing now—that is, the new clause and the amendments that are being debated and have been selected.

[Dr Huppert]

I was speaking about Government amendment 14, which I think is in this group.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. The hon. Gentleman said at the beginning—and this is my understanding—that that is a drafting amendment and a correction, yet he seems to be making rather a substantial point of debate. If the Government have accepted a change by tabling their own drafting amendment, it normally follows that it is quite minor. That was why I asked him.

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[Dr Huppert]

I had almost finished, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I shall do shortly. There was an interesting debate in Committee about whether we wanted just to correct the drafting order or to go further—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. With respect, people can read the Hansard report of the Committee. I have given the hon. Gentleman a great deal of latitude. I think he has come to the main point of what he wants to say, so if he could now conclude on that point it would be helpful.

[Dr Huppert]

I am happy to do so. I hope that the Government will consider what I have said as well as the self-suspension ideas.

[Paul Murphy]

I support new clause 4, the case for which was so powerfully made, characteristically, by my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker). I hope that the House will divide on it.

I support the idea of deferring the commencement of part 1. Later, there might be the opportunity to debate my amendment, which would exempt Wales from part 1, but this is an opportunity to reflect on a less drastic course of action—that is, the deferral of the commencement of the Bill. There are one or two reasons for that and I hope that the House will bear with me as I set them out.

Not very long ago, the National Assembly for Wales took the unprecedented decision not to give legislative consent to part 1. That, in my experience—which goes back a few years in such matters—is entirely unprecedented. It has never happened before. As a consequence, the Communities and Culture Committee of the National Assembly has asked for the deferment of part 1. Its headline recommendation reads:

“We recommend that the Welsh Government has dialogue with the UK Government to persuade it to defer introducing those aspects of the bill related to the abolition of Police Authorities, and establishment of Police Commissioners and Police Crime Panels in Wales, at least until the effectiveness of their impact in England has been assessed.”

That is not a million miles away from new clause 4, which asks for the deferral of the commencement until such an assessment has been made by HMIC. That is why I support the new clause.

Policing, as the Minister will know, is not devolved in Wales, although it is in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but it is different in Wales from in England. I cannot see any evidence that there has been any sort of negotiation, discussion or proper Government-to-Government relationship on the issue of policing in Wales in so far as part 1 is concerned. There might have been, and doubtless the Minister will let us know when he winds up.

In Wales, there is a rather different relationship between the Welsh Local Government Association—to which my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling has already referred and which, incidentally, is not in Labour’s hands but is controlled by independents and non-Labour Members—police authorities in Wales, of which there are four, and the Welsh Assembly Government. That relationship is very special because it touches on a working partnership arrangement between the police authorities in Wales and the National Assembly that is unique in the United Kingdom. It seems proper to me to repeat the arguments used in Wales by local government, by the police authorities, by the National Assembly and by the Welsh Assembly Government to ask for the commencement of part 1 to be deferred. One chief reason those bodies ask for the deferment is the fact that there are rather different financial arrangements in Wales for policing. Half of Welsh police forces get their money from the Welsh Assembly.

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[Dr Huppert]

This issue is effectively about the principle of capping, which causes real problems. Is my hon. Friend aware, in the local government context, of councils in Cambridgeshire that used to charge zero council tax and were prevented by capping from charging any at all? We do not want the same sort of ridiculous problems happening with police precepts.

[Mark Reckless]

Yes, I am aware of that issue. The predecessor council to mine in Medway, Rochester upon Medway council, similarly had no council tax and when Medway took over as a unitary authority, we had one of the lowest council taxes in the country—virtually the lowest except for the Scilly Isles at one point. However, we had the same percentage limit as everyone else, so when central Government put a new burden on local government and we had to fund it as a fixed cost, we were less well-placed to do that because the amount we could get through a percentage increase was less than other councils that had previously had higher taxes could get.

A similar regime to that for local councils has applied to police authorities, but to an extent it has been less controversial than that for councils because police authorities have not had the same democratic mandate as local government. There are only nine elected councillors on my police authority among 17. It is true that the majority of those nine must approve the precept as well as a majority of the 17, but it is certainly less of a democratic mandate than that for local councils in which all the local councillors are elected. I have understood, previously, that when the Communities Secretary, rather than the Home Secretary, has capped an authority, that has not been popular with the authority, but I have understood why it happened. However, I can see the attraction of moving from that to a referendum power as we are doing with local government.

I think there is a potential problem or issue, which I hope can be resolved through the Bill or its application, with bringing in the new body—the local police and crime panel. The panel will have a representative from every council in the police area, and I particularly welcome the involvement of district councils, which have been so important in developing crime and disorder reduction partnerships and community safety partnerships. Their involvement on the ground will be a real advantage: it will bring real insight to the commissioner and the force and it will pull local government more generally into the new arrangements. We hear a lot about the Local Government Association or police authorities not liking the new arrangements, and people who have a particular stake in the existing process might say that, but the districts coming in is going to be a real gain.

There is dispute about how strong the panel will be, and its powers are characterised in various ways, but one of its key powers will be its oversight and scrutiny of the budget. It is proposed that, in extremis, if three quarters of the panel agree, the panel can exercise what is described as a veto in the Bill, and paragraphs 7 and 8 of schedule 5 prescribe that the Secretary of State can make further regulations on that. In Committee, the Minister described some of his intentions for the regulations, but I am a little unclear about that because the regulations referred to in the Bill seem to be about how that veto process will work, whereas quite a lot of the detail that the Minister gave to the Committee seemed to refer to when or where there would be a referendum and the Secretary of State’s involvement. That is one of the issues, because it is envisaged in the Localism Bill that the Secretary of State will have referendum-calling powers and will presumably use regulations to determine how that happens. It is envisaged in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill that the panel will have a veto and that there will be regulations on that. The crossover is not clear. There will be a directly elected individual who will come to office with a great mandate. One of his responsibilities is to set the budget and the precept, yet there are two other bodies—the panel and the Secretary of State; it is not clear whether it is the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government or the Home Secretary—who have at least some locus standi in setting the budget.

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Does the phrase “have regard to” mean that the commissioner has to do what the panel wants or, at the other extreme, is it envisaged that he can just come back with something marginally different, and that is his decision as the commissioner? Are we saying that we cannot really make up our mind and that the courts have to decide all this and there will be litigation? That does not strike me as ideal, so I hope that, perhaps in the other place, we will reach agreement on this issue.

[Dr Huppert]

I am interested in the point that the hon. Gentleman made about having to use litigation. There is serious concern about what would happen if, when a budget was set, there was uncertainty and we had to use court orders. I am sure that he is aware of the cost of rebilling, and there is an important principle that we want to set all the amounts of council tax, while we still have council tax, at the same time, rather than send out multiple letters, which would just add to the cost of that process.

[Mark Reckless]

In my reference to litigation, I was alluding to the fact that the prospect of dispute, at least on the first occasion, given the narrow time scales and the costs of rebilling, would not be a positive thing. I have worked closely with my hon. Friend on the Home Affairs Committee on the issue—his hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) is strongly involved in these issues too— and I feel that there is a significant measure of agreement between us. In the coalition, it is important that we decide what we want to do, and state that clearly in the Bill and subsequent regulations so that we do not face the prospect of litigation.

Some Liberal Democrats may like the idea of a complete veto for the panel, but I am not sure that many of my Conservative colleagues would necessarily agree, given that the commissioner has a directly elected mandate and the members of the panel are appointed. However, I am convinced that a measure of financial oversight by the panel and by the councillors from every council who serve on it would be valuable. It will keep the commissioner linked in to local government, which is extremely important. The Minister has a criminal justice portfolio, and there is extraordinary scope for the elected commissioners to act in the wider criminal justice area. However, we do not want a great division to open up between local government and the work of the elected commissioner in criminal justice, so that knitting together is important.

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[Steve McCabe]

That democratic element cannot be fundamentally unique in relation to setting the precept but absolutely different in relation to any other aspect of the work of the commissioner. It is my contention that the people who support the amendment fear what will happen when the precept has to be ratcheted up to compensate for the cuts. They know that there will be massive electoral consequences and so are seeking to insert a device to denude the commissioner of the one power that they fear more than any other.

[Dr Huppert]

I am not sure that I agree with everything the hon. Gentleman is saying. Does he not agree that the precept is in some sense absolutely key to what is happening, because it sets the total envelope of resource available to a chief constable to do their job? It is one of the most fundamental decisions that could be made by the commissioner.

[Steve McCabe]

If I was to stand as a candidate for police commissioner and was setting out my stall for the kind of police force I would want to see, I would not have to put on my election material the caveat, “By the way, I’ll have no power over the fundamental decision about funding.” With the greatest respect, I think that the hon. Gentleman has missed the point. The Government are trying to have it both ways: they want to create political commissars to run the police, but they also want to retain the power to mitigate the risk that the commissioner might come up with a precept that is unacceptable to the electorate. That is classically what is wrong with the Bill. It is designed to give the commissioner power in the areas that suit the Government, but at the heart of the Conservative party there is a doubt about that. The Government are trying to back the proposal while simultaneously watering down its key element because they fear that the course of action that they have embarked on will have electoral consequences for them.

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I have doubts about the intention behind the new clause. I admire the dedication that the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood shows on these issues. I wonder why, however, some Government Members are happy to swallow all the other elements, but on the key element of finance, want the power to water down the powers and take hold of the commissioner.

[Dr Huppert]

I am still unclear. If the hon. Gentleman does not support the alternative in the new clause, is he saying that he prefers the existing mechanism, which involves the Secretary of State? Which is he arguing for, or is he arguing against both?

[Steve McCabe]

I am saying quite simply that the nature of the existing powers, as I understand them, would give the Secretary of State the right to intervene. If the Government do not have faith in their own system, it seems right that they should have the power to intervene. However, what I do not want is a scheme that says, “We’re in favour of police commissioners, but by the way we’re going to limit their power when it comes to the area where we think there could be electoral disadvantage for us.”

[Dr Huppert]

It is a pleasure, as ever, to follow the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe). We have spent much time together on the Bill Committee, on a previous Bill Committee and in the Home Affairs Select Committee crossing swords on some of these issues. I am encouraged by the new clause in the name of the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless), because it would do some useful things for which I argued in Committee. It talks about strengthening the panel. We talked earlier about the Liberal Democrats’ initial manifesto commitment to having a strong panel, and there have been negotiations among the different sides about how to fit the two models together. However, the new clause moves in the direction I tend to prefer, so as ever it is a pleasure to work with him.

The new clause also leans more towards local accountability, which to me is very important. I have always been a localist—not only since the formation of the coalition Government—and I think that this policy should be about local determination. That was what was wrong with capping council taxes. We had councils that could not make sensible decisions owing to capping powers and because the Secretary of State was too remote from what was going on locally. Those councils could not make sensible decisions whether on tiny increases in very low council taxes, because those increases went above a certain percentage, or on moving from a council tax of zero, which was possible in a few rather unusual places, because any increase broke the percentage rule.

What the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak said was interesting. First, there is the issue of the precept. Why is the precept different from all other areas? We could adjust a whole lot of different premises, but the precept is the key. As I said in my intervention, it is what determines how much money is available to the chief constable. If only one decision could be made by a commissioner each year, the total amount of cash is surely the one for which we would want to provide the most control. It is also the one on which there would not be advice and policy guidance from other bodies on how to operate and what the constraints might be. It is properly a decision to be taken locally.

There are questions about what one does if a commissioner makes a decision that is held to be unreasonable by other people locally. This applies whether to a commissioner or a council leader. Whatever the structure, there will always be situations in which there is disagreement about whether something is being done appropriately. The question is: how do we resolve that disagreement? I was interested in the response that the hon. Gentleman gave to my question. He seemed to be arguing for the Secretary of State to have that power, but that is precisely the opposite of the localist agenda that I would like put in place. The Secretary of State should not be interfering in how the precept is set. They should do their utmost not to have anything to do with it, if possible. They should have a role in setting the framework, but they should not have the power to say, “That is too much. I’m the Secretary of State and I say so.”

[Steve McCabe]

Perhaps I can clarify matters a fraction for the hon. Gentleman. My point is that the police Minister and the Secretary of State inevitably have some responsibilities for the police that go beyond localism, as was discussed extensively in Committee. In fact, if I recall rightly, we discussed what would happen if the budget was set too low and therefore did not enable the police force to fulfil its obligations. The argument that the Minister advanced at the time was that the Secretary of State should have the power to step in. The hon. Gentleman seems to arguing for a pure form of localism that completely ignores that—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Interventions are becoming increasingly lengthy, and they need to be rather shorter.

[Dr Huppert]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, although this is a matter of great interest, so I have sympathy for the hon. Gentleman, having made my own mistakes earlier this afternoon. I lean towards pure localism. Let us remember that the people on the panel making the decision will be councillors appointed by their local authorities. In Cambridgeshire, for example, I find it hard to see how, say, the representative from Cambridge city council could look at a budget that was insufficient to provide the basic policing and say, “Yeah, that’s fine. I can’t be bothered to interfere with this one.” I do not have that lack of faith in our local councils or our local democratic system. I have concerns, although I prefer the new clause to the original proposals, under which the Secretary of State would have had a strong role. However, I do not entirely agree with everything in the new clause. In particular, I am not comfortable with the idea of having to have a three-quarters majority, which we discussed in Committee, as Members will know. I tend towards a somewhat lower figure.

[Michael Ellis]

My hon. Friend has misgivings about having a 75% majority, but does he not feel that it ought to be that high, because that is what would be required to overrule a democratically elected figure, which ought to be a severe circumstance and rare happening?

[Dr Huppert]

It is important to remember that, with the exception of the two independents—another example of how I would not have designed the system—the majority of panel members will be democratically elected, representing their councils in their system. They are not directly democratically elected, but they are indirectly democratically elected. As I am sure the hon. Gentleman will know, the model in London is a two-thirds majority for scrutiny of a democratically elected individual, so I am more comfortable with two thirds. That does not make a huge difference for a typically sized panel, which will have 12 people. We said in Committee that the difference will be between nine votes and eight votes, but it is more useful to look at it the other way. In order to stop the veto, the commission would have to get four or five people either to vote with him or not to be there. That makes a bigger difference as the panel gets bigger.

The structure of the new clause is more positive than has been described, because it leans towards trying to have sensible discussions and negotiations. It starts with a commissioner making a proposal. Then the panel looks at the proposal and comments on it, before the commissioner works out what he will do. Unless it is vetoed, the precept is set, but if it is vetoed, it does not go to a referendum straight away. Ultimately, that is something that we are all trying to avoid, because of the associated costs of running unnecessary referendums and the risk of re-billing, which is a particular problem with this issue and capping. There is then another opportunity, over 14 days, for the two sides to negotiate and see whether they can come to a more sensible arrangement that works for both of them. Only if that is not possible is a further step taken.

That step is not about saying, “Secretary of State, tell us what to do. It’s up to you.” It is about saying that what should be done is up to local people. It is up to the commissioner to set one option and the panel to set another, and then the public will decide which they prefer. That is a much more appropriate way of doing things. The panel would act responsibly when it came to cost, with the exception of the independents, who do not have that responsibility and are a piece of undemocratic grit in the system. However, it will be local decision making that makes a difference. Local people should have a say in how their precept should be set and how their policing should be run. That is what I would like to see. I am delighted that the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) has moved the new clause for discussion, and I hope that the Government will consider it carefully.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

It feels as though I have entered a meeting of the Home Affairs Committee, which is where I was yesterday, but I am not going to talk about the Metropolitan police in quite the same way today.

I sympathise with some of the arguments about localism which have been advanced by the hon. Members for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) and for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), who spoke in favour of the new clause, but I say to them that, although there may be a natural constituency in some police authorities, in many there is not. In the South Wales police area, for instance, it is not easy to conceive of a single constituency of interest. The area does not exist in any other denomination, as it were, and it crosses local authority boundaries, brings together Swansea and Cardiff, which is something extraordinary in itself, and brings the valleys together with two of the three big cities of south Wales, so it would be very difficult to come to a really local idea.

The new clause is primarily about money, however, so I want to ask the Minister a few questions. I realise that he may not be able to answer this evening, but I hope that he will write to me on some of these matters, because they are—in relation to chapter 6, in particular—quite important.

The Bill partially determines the way in which somebody is elected, but there is a great deal more work to be done on exactly how the electoral system will work—for precisely the reason that I mentioned: the constituencies do not exist. New constituencies are being created, and we need to ensure that, in terms of how elections are managed, there is some consistency within the constituency that we create. I just wonder whether—

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[Dr Huppert]

Will the Minister give way?

[Nick Herbert]

I do not have time, I am afraid.

As we envisage the situation, the public will be able to decide whether to go with the police and crime commissioner’s precept, but only when a precept is excessive. Under the changes that my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) proposes, however, the public would decide every time a panel vetoed a precept, unless the commissioner and the panel were able to reach an agreement within two weeks of the vote. We have not gone down that route, despite considering it very carefully, because referendums are very expensive and the police and crime commissioner would have to pay for them on each occasion. If the commissioner’s amended precept is not excessive within the Localism Bill definition, regulations will require the proposal to go again before the panel. Following that, the police and crime commissioner will be able to set the precept without a referendum. He or she must consider the panel’s recommendations. Where the panel has voted again to reject that precept, he or she must publish the panel’s alternative precept and its reasons and must set out in the same document why he or she did not implement the panel’s proposals.

I accept that the public must have a role in deciding what precept they pay, and under our policy they will have one, or potentially two, opportunities to do this—once when they elect their police and crime commissioner, and again when a police and crime commissioner sets an excessive precept.

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[Ann Clwyd]

My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head as usual, and I shall develop that argument in a few minutes.

We still have obligations under the Geneva conventions —they are obligations, and not discretions or permissions —to bring before a court persons suspected of committing the gravest crimes against humanity when we are able to do so. This change in the law will undermine our commitment to those Geneva convention obligations.

Why, then, are the Government seeking to change the law? The Justice Secretary, yesterday, and the Foreign Secretary, last Thursday, set out clearly in replies to questions in the Chamber the reasons why the Government are seeking to do so. The first reason that they gave was that it is too easy to obtain an arrest warrant. They suggested that anyone could turn up on a frivolous pretext, spin a yarn to the court and walk away with an arrest warrant—put a penny in the slot and out comes a warrant! I cannot believe that that argument has carried any weight with anyone at all.

[Dr Huppert]

I share the right hon. Lady’s deep interest in human rights and I absolutely accept her point. May I, however, go back to what she was saying earlier about the arrest process? Does not she accept that a prosecution is more important than an arrest, and that whether or not the clause is passed, the Attorney-General’s consent will still be required for a prosecution, making the issue a political one? Are we not having the wrong debate? Should not we be debating the Attorney-General’s role in private prosecutions?

[Ann Clwyd]

That is certainly a subject for future debate. I agree with the hon. Gentleman when he said in Committee:

“I am not persuaded that there is a need for change…I do not think that a sufficiently strong case has been made about why the current system is not working.”––[Official Report, Police Reform and Social Responsibility Public Bill Committee, 17 February 2011; c. 684.]

I hope that he still holds that view.

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[Dr Huppert]

I had much experience of disagreeing with the hon. Gentleman on this matter when the Bill was in Committee. I am now trying to understand how he squares what he is saying with what is actually happening. As we have heard, eight of the mere 10 applications that have been made in 10 years were rejected by the district judge, so the threshold is clearly higher than he is suggesting. Moreover, the clause does nothing about the process of applying for an arrest warrant. People could still apply for one; there would just be a delay before it could be granted.

[Michael Ellis]

I have a feeling that any Member of Parliament who was subject to the arrest warrant would not be so cavalier as to consider that one or two instances were nothing to worry about. We ought to have a system that applies fairly across the board.

According to a case study, in March last year the former Vice-President of Bosnia, Ejup Ganic, was arrested at Heathrow airport after Serbian judicial authorities issued an extradition warrant. He was accused of conspiracy to murder 40 Yugoslav People’s Army soldiers in an attack in May 1992. He was subsequently released on bail when the judge remarked that the arrest warrant issued by Serbia had been politically motivated. It was reported that Serbia had yet to produce any real evidence, and that most of its supposed evidence consisted of news articles about the incident. City of Westminster magistrates court blocked Ganic’s extradition in July last year. The presiding judge—who, as was pointed out by the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman), had considerable experience—said that he had been led to believe that the extradition proceedings were

“brought and being used for political purposes, and as such amount to an abuse of the process of this court”

Having worked in the criminal justice system for 17 years, I am concerned about the way in which the English legal system is perceived abroad, and the ramifications of some of the incidents that have occurred. For generations, the United Kingdom has been at the forefront of peace conferences and other such meetings. The very recent meeting to discuss Libya is a classic example. Circumstances in which people were fearful of entering this country because an extremely low threshold might result in their arrest would be injurious not only to the reputation of the United Kingdom’s legal system, but to the UK’s overall reputation for being a place where peace can be sought and arrangements can be made across the negotiating table. It is not in the interests of world order and international peace for obstructions to be placed in the way of people wishing to enter this country in the way that they have been doing. That does not, of course, apply to only one country; there are several other examples.

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[Michael Ellis]

There seems to be a fear, including in apparently authoritative newspapers, that the provision will grant immunity from prosecution, but all it does is raise the test to the same level as for prosecutions that occur by the thousands per week in this country. Whenever there is an allegation against an individual—whether for murder, shoplifting or anything in between—the Crown Prosecution Service has to consider two tests: whether it is in the public interest to proceed, and whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction. No one suggests that the need to consider whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction in those contexts in effect means immunity from prosecution for everybody, and that is all that will be applying here.

[Dr Huppert]

This brings us on to what I consider to be an important point. Shortly after an arrest, the Attorney-General has to engage with deciding whether to continue with the private prosecution; that is one of the weaknesses of the private prosecution system. Does the hon. Gentleman think that one way in which this clause might help with prosecutions is that it would be hard for the Attorney-General to overturn a decision by the Director of Public Prosecutions, because he could not come up with the claim about the relevant person being just a magistrate? In fact the Attorney-General might find that he was in a weaker position, and it would be easier to proceed with a prosecution.

[Michael Ellis]

I am not concerned, as my hon. Friend appears to be, about the Attorney-General, because safeguards are built into our system in this country. The Attorney-General has been in a position similar to that envisaged in the Bill for decades, and there is no evidence whatever that that has been a problem in other areas. There are prosecutions in this country that can take place only with the consent of the Attorney-General, and there are other prosecutions that can take place only with the consent of the DPP—I myself have been involved in one or two of them—but no one is suggesting that those cases involve political interference. The reality is that we have to have safeguards against the misuse of a process that has increasingly been employed in highly controversial circumstances and has deeply injurious effects on international relations and British relations. As I have already enunciated, my primary concern is to maintain the good standing of the English legal system.

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[Vernon Coaker]

That is one reason why I said that if the DPP is to take decisions he will need to do so swiftly. As I have said, justice must not be denied by being delayed. We believe that the Crown Prosecution Service and the Metropolitan police should play a strong role, as they have in the past, and must not be hit by the cuts. That is why we tabled amendment 154—to ensure that there is no delay and that wherever possible things are dealt with as speedily as possible so that the arrest warrant is granted where appropriate, and we can secure a prosecution.

[Dr Huppert]

I shall try to be brief because a number of hon. Members wish to speak. I have written an article today for “Liberal Democrat Voice” if anyone wants my comments in full—I am sure that hon. Members read it frequently. [Interruption.] There is only one version—unlike what happens with the Labour party, whose members seem to give different messages from the back, the front and the side.

I want to talk about how the system would work, and I urge hon. Members to look at the transcript of the DPP’s evidence to the Public Bill Committee, which was very detailed and very reassuring for those of us who want to make sure that prosecutions go ahead. He made it clear that a team was available, as has just been mentioned, and that it would be ready to act. He understood the issue of timeliness and advanced the idea of using a lower threshold test when there is not enough time to gather evidence. Importantly, he also offered to look in advance at evidence about people who we know should be prosecuted, so as to be ready to go at very short notice—to update what would be required and to be able to go ahead. I was very encouraged by that.

[Mr Michael McCann (East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow) (Lab)]

I am the chair of the all-party group for the prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) has made the point that there are more than 400 war criminals in Britain, but is the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) aware that only 29 of them are being pursued by SO15? Does that not demonstrate that we have to separate the wheat from the chaff? Clause 152 will do that: it will get right to the heart of the matter and ensure that we have the evidence base to ensure that war criminals are prosecuted.

[Dr Huppert]

The role of the police is important. Private prosecutions are the wrong way to go about dealing with such people. If a private prosecution has to be used the state has failed to go ahead—but I would like to see it do so. Private prosecutions are an essential safeguard where the state has failed.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

rose—

[Dr Huppert]

I shall give way once more, but then I want to conclude and allow other hon. Members to speak.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that the provision has been introduced because of the arrest of one individual? We are changing centuries of our law and tradition for the sake of one person.

[Dr Huppert]

My position was well summarised by an Opposition Member who spoke earlier. It is a shame that there has been a conflation of two separate issues—one about Israel-Palestine and the whole sordid tale there, and the other a legal debate about what the system ought to be. I wish it were possible to have that discussion.

The DPP made it clear that he would talk to the Attorney-General, but he said five or six times that there would have to be a very powerful weight in favour of prosecuting, because the crime is one of universal jurisdiction. The public interest would have to be overwhelming. I take comfort from that, because I am concerned that at present the Attorney-General can stop any process going ahead. We do not have a functioning private prosecution system in this country, because the Attorney-General can stop any such prosecutions at any stage. Including the DPP in the provision would make it harder for the Attorney-General to do that, because straight after the DPP—a recognised independent person—said, “Yes, there is a case. This person can be prosecuted,” the Attorney-General would be faced with the prospect of saying, “Actually the DPP is wrong. He doesn’t understand this,” and trying to end it.

The provision makes prosecutions easier, and it is prosecutions that I am concerned about. I should like to hear more about how the Government will make sure that the police take stronger action. I should like to hear whether they agree with recommendations from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I serve, that would weaken the role of Attorney-General in terminating private prosecutions. My remaining concern is about the fact that the DPP may decide not to go ahead because the evidence is too weak. If that is genuinely the case, I do not think that any of us would have a problem with it. However, what worries me are cases in which the DPP does not get round to making a decision because there is a pocket veto. I should like an assurance from the Minister that the Government will report on such cases. If there are a large number of them in which a pocket veto is exercised and no proper decision is made, I hope that the Government will look at the matter again and make sure that there is due process.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

There are two minutes remaining, as I will call the Minister at 6.54 pm.

[Sir Gerald Kaufman]

We heard one Liberal Democrat voice. May I, in the remaining two minutes, quote the Liberal Democrat document which I have already quoted with regard to Tzipi Livni, who has been mentioned? It says:

“Tzipi Livni, as Israeli Foreign Minister, was one of those responsible for authorising these attacks”—

on Gaza, which deliberately targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure—

“and made public statements that appeared to encourage the Israeli military to use disproportionate force and engage in deliberate destruction with no legitimate military objective.”

[Dr Huppert]

rose—

[Sir Gerald Kaufman]

I will not give way, because I have only two minutes.

That is the person whom this lot are trying to acquit of the right even to be prosecuted, and even the issuing of a warrant against her. Her parents were terrorists who murdered great numbers of people. She was an Israeli spy in Paris when the Israelis were murdering people all over Europe and were changing the law to suit this war criminal.