Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Lord Herbert of South Downs Excerpts

Wednesday 30th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice (Nick Herbert)]

First, I apologise to the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), for exhausting him. I look forward, of course, to his inquiry. I very much hope that he will invite me to give oral evidence, but that is entirely a matter for him and his Committee. I am sure that the Home Office will submit written evidence, but of course I welcome the inquiry, as I have welcomed all his reports since he assumed the chairmanship.

It seems to me that the purpose of new clause 4 is to delay the enactment of the important part of the Bill that will create directly elected police and crime commissioners. That has been expressed pretty openly. The right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) was explicit about the fact that he sought that for Wales, so I will seek to address that point.

As I argued in my speech to the Institute for Public Policy Research on Monday, which is on my website and which I am happy to send to any hon. Member—I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Leicester East for quoting it—I do not believe that there is time for delay, because the changes that we need to make to policing are urgent. The democratic deficit must be addressed, and there is a need to drive savings at local level more strongly than they have been driven before. We therefore need to undertake this reform.

Furthermore, if the Government signal any kind of delay now, which the Government emphatically do not wish to do, we would create uncertainty, at a time when, subject to the further deliberations of the House and the other place, others outside are preparing in the expectation that the Bill will become law—the House gave a Second Reading to the Bill—and that the first elections for police and crime commissioners will take place in 2012.

The Home Office has a transition board, which I chair, which includes all parties, including ACPO and the Association of Police Authorities. Those parties may not have proposed the Government’s measure, and they may not be wholly happy with it, but they nevertheless sensibly recognise that it makes sense to sit down and discuss how the changes should be put into place.

I want to emphasise that although the Government are determined to proceed with the Bill and its reform, we have listened. I hope the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) accepts that we listened in Committee, when I believe we had a constructive debate. We also listened to those outside—important views have been put to us—and to the Home Affairs Committee. We will come to debate what the Committee describes as the memorandum of understanding to protect operational independence—we call it a protocol—but we agree that it is a good idea.

We also listened to ACPO’s concerns on ensuring that strategic policing is addressed despite the greater localisation expressed in the Bill. As a consequence, the Bill provides for the strategic policing requirement. We have also strengthened the powers of police and crime panels. The Government have listened and sought to address concerns, but we nevertheless remain committed to the introduction of police and crime commissioners, with the first elections in May 2012, although we could move sooner in London, which already has a Mayor.

The right hon. Member for Torfaen referred to the National Assembly for Wales Communities and Culture Committee request for a deferment of the provisions and asked whether the Government have held discussions with the Welsh Assembly Government. I must reassure him that, right from the beginning, we have sought such discussions and to respect the devolved arrangements in Wales. I have met the Minister responsible, as has the Home Secretary, and our officials have had a great deal of discussion.

The Assembly Government have made it clear that they do not favour police and crime commissioners, but of course, policing is a reserved matter, and the House of Commons has decided that police and crime commissioners should apply in England and Wales—that is what the Bill says. The question is whether we can find arrangements that respect those aspects of the devolution settlement that are within the competence of the Welsh Assembly. We sought to do that through the legislative consent motion that we tabled, which we will shortly debate further.

I very much regret that the Welsh Assembly did not pass that motion, but I repeat that we have at all times sought to address the Welsh Assembly Government’s proper concern, while recognising that it is equally proper that the House of Commons decides on that reserved matter. Saying that we must always follow a request from the devolved Parliament or one of the Assemblies for a deferment is tantamount to saying that the matter is no longer reserved. For so long as the matter is reserved, I believe that the right decisions have been taken.

[Paul Murphy]

I remind the Minister that things are not quite as simple as saying that policing is reserved. Policing is of course reserved, but aspects of the Bill touch on matters that are not reserved. Local government, which is wholly resolved in Wales, has a huge role to play on the panels, so it is not quite as simple as he says it is. There is more room for negotiation with the Welsh Assembly Government on those very important matters.

[Nick Herbert]

I absolutely accept what the right hon. Gentleman says. Local government matters are not reserved and local government touches on the panels, but that is precisely why we negotiated the legislative consent motion. It is deeply unfortunate that despite the fact that I negotiated that motion with the Minister responsible, Carl Sargeant, and he agreed it, he did not vote for it. As I said at the time, I regret that, because it was self-defeating. The motion sought to put in place the special arrangements for police and crime panels in Wales, on which the Welsh Assembly Government would have representation. I emphasise to the right hon. Gentleman that we really tried to reach an arrangement and to respect the devolution settlement.

[Mark Tami (Alyn and Deeside) (Lab)]

The point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) makes is that the mechanism for election to police panels is a devolved matter, meaning that the Assembly is responsible. How does the Minister square that circle?

[Nick Herbert]

If I may, I will come to that matter when we reach that specific group of amendments, because the Government have tabled amendments to address it. We must find a way to ensure that the Bill is consistent with the wishes of the Welsh Assembly, which it expressed in rejecting the legislative consent motion. I shall address that question at the appropriate time, but I wanted to respond specifically to the right hon. Member for Torfaen.

When moving new clause 4, the hon. Member for Gedling made a number of wider points in which he attempted to open up once again the arguments for and against police and crime commissioners. I shall not dwell on those other than to say that he has expressed support in the past for the concept of a direct component in police authorities, as was ably pointed out by my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton North (Michael Ellis).

In addition, in Committee, the hon. Member for Gedling moved an amendment for directly elected chairs of police authorities, and the previous Government twice proposed a democratic element. I accept that there is a difference between that Government and this one, but the difference is not that this Government do not believe in democratic reform of police authorities—it appears that all parties do. Rather, the difference is that the previous Government backed down twice, but we have no intention of doing so, because there was a Conservative party manifesto commitment, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) pointed out, because having directly elected police authorities was separately a Liberal Democrat manifesto commitment.

We now know that the latest proposal from the hon. Member for Gedling is for directly elected chairs of police authorities. In moving and voting for that amendment, the hon. Gentleman wholly undermined his argument on cost, because implementation of directly elected chairs of police authorities would cost not the same as police and crime commissioners, but more. Therefore, the most expensive proposal for democratic reform of police authorities in the House of Commons is from the Opposition spokesman.

What is wrong with proposed new clause 4—I agree with the right hon. Member for Leicester East on this —is that it would put in the hands of the inspectorate of constabulary the power to hold an inquiry, and thereby to delay implementation of the Bill. Constitutionally, that would be very difficult. It would place the inspectorate in an invidious position. Parliament should decide reforms of this kind, after taking into account the views of both Houses and consulting widely. The idea that we can somehow park these matters into an inquiry by an independent body that is meant to look at the effectiveness and efficiency of policing is wrong. It would be very wrong for that organisation to do that, as it would effectively set up the inspectorate as judge and jury on a decision that Parliament had made. We therefore believe that these measures are the right thing to do, and we intend to proceed with them. Nevertheless, we are listening and will continue to do so.

In conclusion, on new clause 4, I would like to point out that, when the previous Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside and Hillsborough (Mr Blunkett) was proposing democratic reform of police authorities, he said that those who claimed to have the power, and who wished to hold the power, should therefore be accountable for the power. That is the right principle, and the basis on which we should proceed.

[Keith Vaz]

I do not wish to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman’s peroration, but I want to make a point about the timing of the election. During the course of the inquiry, the Select Committee picked up some concern about the election taking place in May next year, just before the Olympics, when people ought to be concentrating on security measures and related issues. Is the Minister quite satisfied that this is the right timing?

[Nick Herbert]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a genuine point. There are two answers. First, I have said that the Government wish to move sooner in relation to London. The transition in London could therefore be made before the elections in 2012. Secondly, the measures relate to a change in the governance of policing. The Bill will not affect the police forces themselves. There are important changes being made, but this is principally a change to the governance of policing. There should be proper discussion, to ensure that in the run-up to the transition the police authorities do not lose sight of such important matters and that the forces that they hold to account do not do so either.

The remaining group of Government amendments will not, I hope, be controversial. They are all of a minor and technical nature, and I will summarise them briefly now. Amendments 6 and 8 will clarify the wording of the Bill so that a commissioner—or, in London, the Mayor’s office for policing and crime—will be obliged to consult a chief officer of a force on a new or revised plan only to the extent that its content is actually new. At present, the wording of the Bill includes two repetitious obligations to consult on the plan—for example, in clause 5, subsections (6)(b) and (8). It would make no sense legally to compel such individuals to consult again on material that had already been discussed. I would expect such discussion to occur naturally and when necessary between a commissioner and his chief officer, so this new wording merely puts a duty on the commissioner to ensure that new content is drawn to the chief constable’s attention. Any more burdensome requirements would be needlessly bureaucratic and prescriptive.

Amendment 9 will bring the police and crime plan issued by the Mayor’s office for policing and crime into line with other mayoral strategies, in regard to some of the matters that the Mayor has to bear in mind when drafting the plan. It is right that there should be a consistent and joined-up approach to the plan and the other strategies. Amendment 10 will clarify the scope of the duty on commissioners and criminal justice bodies to co-operate with each other. On the purpose of the co-operation, it replaces the word “in” with the word “for” in the phrase

“so as to provide an efficient and effective criminal justice system in the police area”

in relation to a commissioner’s responsibilities for criminal justice “for their force area”. This reflects the fact that elements of the system such as a court or a prison that are outside the geographical area of the force may still contribute to the criminal justice system inside the area.

Amendment 12 makes it clear that the general bar on a commissioner delegating the discharge of his functions to another commissioner or a chief constable does not prevent the delegation of functions in the context of a formal collaboration agreement. Amendment 13 will correct a reference to the wrong subsection in the provisions dealing with the delegation of the functions of the Mayor’s office for policing and crime to the Deputy Mayor for policing and crime.

Amendment 14 will correct an internal inconsistency in clause 30, which deals with the suspension of a commissioner. We noted the inconsistency in Committee. Clause 30(1) makes it clear that the threshold for suspension is that the commissioner has been charged with an offence carrying a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding two years, but clause 30(4) incorrectly refers to the limit as a maximum sentence of two years or more. The amendment ensures that those references are consistent. I have noted the suggestions of my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) for a better way to proceed on suspensions. We had a debate about that in Committee, and I suspect that the other place will return to the matter. The Government will pay attention to the concerns that are expressed. However, we are clear that the current threshold is proportionate, striking the correct balance between protecting the public from criminals and not suspending the public’s representative for trivial offences.

Amendment 15 will correct an inconsistent use of language in the amendments that the Bill makes to the Police Act 1996, reflecting the fact that a commissioner will have the same function of maintaining the police force in his police area as a police authority has now under the 1996 Act. Amendment 20 will ensure that, while members of a commissioner’s staff may be compelled to answer questions and provide documents to a police and crime panel, they will not be required to divulge advice that may have been provided to the police and crime commissioner. That brings the provisions on commissioners into line with the existing arrangements for the Mayor of London, which we are retaining while replacing the Metropolitan Police Authority with the Mayor’s office for policing and crime. Not doing so would weaken a commissioner’s decision making power, as all discussions could potentially be subjected to criticism, which would discourage the free and frank flow of ideas.

I apologise to the House for going into such detail, but I think that it is important to give the public clarity on the amendments. Amendments 31, 32, 38 and 39 concern the appointment of a commissioner’s chief executive. The current wording refers to a “qualified” person. However, the Bill does not impose any qualifications in respect of candidates for appointment as chief executive—in contrast to the position of the chief finance officer, who must be financially qualified in accordance with local government legislation—so there is no need to include the word “qualified”.

Amendments 33 and 40 correct a drafting error in which references to the chief constable in amendment 33 and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner in amendment 40 should have been references to the police and crime commissioner and the Mayor’s office for policing and crime, respectively. Amendments 34 to 37 and 135 to 138 are included to make references to police staff consistent with the rest of the Bill, which refers to them as “police civilian staff”. Amendment 42 is included simply to clarify the Bill. In its present wording, it is unclear what paragraph (2)5 of schedule 7 is referring to when it uses the phrase “for these purposes”. The amendment makes it clear that this means the purposes of sub-paragraph 6.

Amendment 50 will correct a minor drafting error in relation to the replacement of the strategic policing priorities with the Home Secretary’s new strategic policing requirement. It amends the section of the Police Act 1996 that deals with policing objectives, which in future will apply only to the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a police authority, with the effect that the Common Council will frame its objectives so as to be consistent with the strategic policing requirement, rather than strategic priorities. This will bring the Common Council into line with other policing bodies. It was our intention to achieve that outcome, but the Bill as drafted did not do so.

Finally, amendment 51 changes a reference to “authorities” in respect of arrangements for the police negotiating board to “persons and bodies”. This is simply to reflect the fact that police and crime commissioners are replacing the word “authorities” and it will no longer be applicable in this context.

[Vernon Coaker]

I thought the ending of that was brilliant.

Let me say in all seriousness to the Minister that he is introducing a change to the model of policing in this country—the biggest change for centuries—without one shred of evidence that it is the right thing to do. In his response, we heard not one study cited, not one chief police officer quoted, not one police authority quoted, not one council quoted—as I say, not one shred of evidence in support. All the Minister did was repeat what he has done before—stand at the Dispatch Box and assert that he knows best. He accuses me of elitism, but I can see where the elitism lies when it comes to someone saying that they know best. This is no way to reform the police service; it should be done on the basis of evidence.

I have a couple of quick points. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), the Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee, that Governments sometimes need to pause and look at what they are doing. That is the purpose of the new clause. It invites us to reflect on the evidence and on what people are saying and then to legislate and reform on the basis of that evidence, not ideological commitment. My right hon. Friend may well think that there is an alternative to Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary when it comes to who is best placed to carry out the report. Perhaps his Select Committee or other bodies should be involved, but it does not alter the fact that, as he says, we sometimes need to take stock and reflect on how best to move forward and make change.

I also want to deal with what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) and the hon. Member for Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire (Simon Hart). When the hon. Gentleman goes back to his constituency, he should tell the people he has been talking to in his local authority and others that, as my right hon. Friend said, proposals in the Bill mean that if local authorities do not nominate members for the police and crime panels, the Home Secretary will take upon herself the power to impose individuals on those panels. That is why my right hon. Friend and others from Wales are so upset by the proposals, which effectively drive a coach and horses through the devolution settlement. Yes, police and crime commissioners are a reserved matter, but local authorities are a responsibility of the Welsh Assembly. That explains why there is such upset and disquiet about the proposals in Wales.

This is a hugely important issue. As I said, the Association of Police Authorities, the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Local Government Association, council after council and ordinary police officer after ordinary police officer all oppose this measure. We have heard not a shred of evidence from the Government. That is why we say there should be an inquiry so that we can take stock, reflect and reform on the basis of evidence, not ideology. I therefore press the new clause to the vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Brake]

I think that the Minister and I would probably agree that in an ideal world it would have been useful to have a draft, but I do not think it is essential. I am sure that the House of Lords will deal with the matter in the professional way that we would expect.

It is interesting to note that initially senior officers had strong reservations about whether they wanted a protocol, so a degree of flexibility will be needed. I have some sympathy with amendment 149, but I suspect that the Minister will make it clear that there is every expectation that the police and crime commissioners will have no involvement in decisions on individual investigations and arrests. That will be a clear requirement.

The one point that may require clarification is what would happen in a case that actually involved the police and crime commissioner. For instance, if they had been assaulted, would the amendment prevent them from taking a decision about whether charges should be pressed? I do not know whether the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) considered that in tabling the amendment, and if he has a response I would be very happy for him to intervene on me at this point. If he is not going to, the Minister might want to pick up on that point when he responds.

In an ideal world we would have been considering a draft protocol, but clearly a lot of work on it is still going on. I am sure that means that when it is put into the public domain, it will be strong and satisfy Members. As I said, I understand where the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood is coming from on amendment 149, but it is clear that there will be no expectation whatever that the commissioners will get involved in individual decisions. One would expect that the police and crime panels would have forceful things to say if they did so.

[Nick Herbert]

First, I confirm again to the House something that has been confirmed on a number of occasions: the Bill does not change the legal position that the direction and control of forces remains with the chief constable. Therefore, the basis of the legal relationship between police authorities and chief constables is maintained in the direction of control in the Bill.

Nevertheless, there is concern about ensuring the fundamental principle of the operational independence of chief constables, which we debated at considerable length in Committee. As we discussed at some length, there is no statutory definition of operational independence, and indeed, there is general agreement that it would be unwise to attempt such a definition. The matter has been considered on a number of occasions by the courts—my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) spoke of one key case. However, ACPO, which is concerned to ensure that the operational independence of chief officers is not in any way threatened, has said that it does not wish us to try to define it in law.

The debate on the proper role of the chief constable and the proper role of the local body that holds them to account will continue—as it does between police authorities and chief officers and others, with the matter sometimes ending up in court. That is part of what Sir Hugh Orde, the ACPO president, described—not pejoratively—as the tension that should exist in the relationship. However, as I said in Committee, to some extent, we are talking about shades of grey.

[Mark Reckless]

Is not one limitation of existing case law that an individual litigant—or a company such as International Trader’s Ferry—trying to get the chief constable to do something is different from the relationship that the Minister describes between the police authority and its statutory powers and the chief constable? The Home Affairs Committee heard from witnesses who felt that there is significant scope within the existing regime for police authorities to be more assertive in setting policy—it just happens that they have not done so.

[Nick Herbert]

My hon. Friend’s point is well made. However, the police and crime commissioner, who will have a mandate, could be more assertive. That is the basis and thrust of the chief constables’ concerns. I cited the example of London. The Mayor of London stood on a manifesto of placing uniformed officers on public transport and tackling knife crime. Whether that cut across the operational independence of the Met has been debated but not resolved, but it is significant that those things have happened, and the Metropolitan police have willingly implemented them. We must accept that, to some extent, there are areas of negotiation and shades of grey, which is why all parties agree that it would be a mistake to try to define in statute the notion of operational independence.

However, equally, we are all agreed—as I indicated on Second Reading, the Government were already minded to do this—on drawing up a protocol, as the Home Affairs Committee recommended, to try to set out the precise roles of the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable in the new arrangements, and to broaden the protocol to cover the role of the police and crime panel, given that that is new, and the role of the Home Secretary. It is worth stating that the Government’s intention in introducing that reform is not to abandon the tripartite, but to rebalance it, because we feel that it has been too distorted in the past, particularly in relation to the accrual of power by the centre and the Home Secretary.

[Mr Elfyn Llwyd (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

Can the Minister enlighten us as to what would happen if someone breached the protocol?

[Nick Herbert]

May I come to that in a moment? I will address the status of the document shortly.

As I mentioned earlier, the Home Office has set up a transition board to discuss how the present system will migrate to the new one. One of the issues that we are discussing is the protocol; that work has begun. ACPO has nominated Chief Constable Adrian Lee of Northamptonshire police to be its representative. He will sit on a working party, alongside Home Office officials and representatives from other organisations including the Association of Police Authorities and the Association of Police Authority Chief Executives, to discuss the issue. Work is therefore ongoing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Llwyd]

I thank the Minister for replying to my question in such short order, and in as much detail as he could muster. If he is saying that some form of legislative vehicle might encompass the protocol, would not regulation by statutory instrument be the obvious answer?

[Nick Herbert]

I repeat that we do not envisage this being a statutory document. It was originally called a memorandum of understanding by the Select Committee, and I do not think that the Committee’s recommendation envisaged it being a statutory document. Its purpose is to clarify the roles and responsibilities in law. In other words, it will be seeking not to set law but to explain what the law is. The danger is that we will be drawn into a means of setting law, when all the parties involved have so far said that we should not seek to define operational independence by statute. They have said that we should leave the matter to the understanding of the courts and the existing case law.

[Mark Reckless]

Will the Minister agree to supply the document, at least in draft form, to the Home Affairs Committee as well as to the House of Lords? The Association of Chief Police Officers and the Home Office are negotiating, but should not the negotiations be for the tripartite system, although we do not yet have the elected commissioners in place?

[Nick Herbert]

First, the Association of Police Authorities is certainly involved in the drafting; it is part of the group discussing the matter. I agree that negotiations must reflect the tripartite system, and I want to reassure my hon. Friend about that. As to supplying the draft to the Home Affairs Committee, I am happy to agree. Furthermore, if my hon. Friend would like to meet me and officials to discuss it further, I think it would assist our deliberations. I would like to organise that as soon as possible, bearing in mind the considerable experience that my hon. Friend brings as a member of a police authority with a particular view.

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s purpose in proposing amendment 149, according to which

“the police and crime commissioner shall have no involvement”

in deciding whether a person is investigated or directed. In fact, that is the existing common law principle and the courts have consistently stated that the Executive must not interfere in operational law enforcement decisions, so there is no need for that to be written expressly in the Bill.

I hope that the hon. Member for Gedling will accept the good faith with which I agreed with the recommendation of the Home Affairs Select Committee. I hope he will acknowledge that I have listened to the Association of Chief Police Officers and others who have expressed concern about operational independence; restated that we do not seek to cut across that principle; and confirmed that we will bring the draft document before Parliament at the earliest possible opportunity. I appreciate that he would have liked to see it sooner, but I hope he acknowledges the very considerable steps we have taken in this regard.

[Vernon Coaker]

Before I comment on the Minister’s remarks, I would like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) for his support on the issue of the necessity for this memorandum of understanding. It was interesting that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) commented on what was said by the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless)—that there was an expectation of no involvement. That is part of the problem. The Minister is right to say that the common law position precludes interference, but I am trying to deal with what will happen when the new model comes into effect, particularly the concern that it will change the parameters within which the policing model works.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

Mr Speaker, I do not know whether you really want me to dilate at any point.

I was merely trying to say that, on the matter of money, which is the point at hand, there is a question about how any commissioner would be able to make sure that in advance of future elections there was enough money to be able to pay for the process of explaining to the electorate the supplementary voting system, which will not have been used in many other parts of the country. I would be grateful if the Minister were able to expand on how he will achieve that, on the precise powers that will be available to the Electoral Commission and on when he will bring forward supplementary powers in relation to that.

Having chanced my arm as far as I think you will allow, Mr Speaker, I surrender to the rest of the debate.

[Nick Herbert]

In the three minutes that are now available to me, I will have to try to explain why my hon. Friend’s approach is interesting but wrong in relation to how the precept is dealt with.

I explained in Committee the process following a veto, and the Home Secretary will set that out in regulations. They will require, as the amendment would, that the police and crime commissioner considers the panel’s recommendations and then proposes an amended precept, which must take the panel’s recommendations into account.

This is where the Bill diverges from the proposed changes, however. Under the regulations that we propose, we say that, if the amended precept is “excessive” under the definition in the Localism Bill, the police and crime commissioner will set the precept but a referendum will be triggered. The panel will not be able to prevent that, but it will be able to propose an alternative precept with accompanying reasons that will have to be published. The public will then have to decide—having both sides of the story.

[Dr Huppert]

Will the Minister give way?

[Nick Herbert]

I do not have time, I am afraid.

As we envisage the situation, the public will be able to decide whether to go with the police and crime commissioner’s precept, but only when a precept is excessive. Under the changes that my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) proposes, however, the public would decide every time a panel vetoed a precept, unless the commissioner and the panel were able to reach an agreement within two weeks of the vote. We have not gone down that route, despite considering it very carefully, because referendums are very expensive and the police and crime commissioner would have to pay for them on each occasion. If the commissioner’s amended precept is not excessive within the Localism Bill definition, regulations will require the proposal to go again before the panel. Following that, the police and crime commissioner will be able to set the precept without a referendum. He or she must consider the panel’s recommendations. Where the panel has voted again to reject that precept, he or she must publish the panel’s alternative precept and its reasons and must set out in the same document why he or she did not implement the panel’s proposals.

I accept that the public must have a role in deciding what precept they pay, and under our policy they will have one, or potentially two, opportunities to do this—once when they elect their police and crime commissioner, and again when a police and crime commissioner sets an excessive precept.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Herbert]

The purpose of clause 152 is to require the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions before an arrest warrant for war crimes under the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, and for the few other offences over which the United Kingdom has asserted universal jurisdiction, can be issued on the application of a private prosecutor.

Much of the criticism directed at this provision seems to assume that it will end the right of private prosecution for universal jurisdiction cases—a point that appeared to be made by the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman) in his brief speech—and, by extension, that it will damage the principle of universal jurisdiction itself. I emphasise that this is simply not the case. Of course the provision has no effect at all on the ability of the police to investigate, and of the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute, alleged offences of universal jurisdiction, but we think it is right that citizens should be able to prosecute these cases, grave as they are. That is why, under our proposal, anyone will still be able to apply to a court to initiate a private prosecution of universal jurisdiction offences by issuing an arrest warrant, where appropriate.

Our approach, therefore, differs from that proposed by the previous Government, which removed the right to private prosecution of offences alleged to have been committed by a foreign national on foreign soil.

[Mr McCann]

Does the Minister agree that that will prevent the silliness of people like two arch-atheists trying to bring charges against Pope Benedict when he was making an official state visit to this country?

[Nick Herbert]

I will deal with some of these points as I go on.

All that the provision will do is prevent a warrant being issued in cases where there is no realistic prospect of a viable prosecution taking place. It would not, as the right hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) claimed when she moved her amendment, give immunity to war criminals. That is not the case.

It has been argued that the consent requirement will lead to delay and allow someone who ought to be prosecuted to leave the country. That is the force of amendment 154. That is a serious point, which the Director of Public Prosecutions addressed when he gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee. I urge those hon. Members who are concerned about the provision to read, if they have not done so already, the DPP’s evidence to the Public Bill Committee, which I believe will give them a great deal of reassurance as to how he would approach the matter.

The DPP is well aware that speed is important in dealing with such applications. He explained that the Crown Prosecution Service has suitably trained staff available around the clock, and they stand ready to act immediately in emergency cases. He also had helpful advice for anyone who wants to pursue a crime of universal jurisdiction, which is that they should not wait until the suspect has arrived here, but should engage early with the CPS. He said that they

“should come to us”—

that is, the CPS—

“with whatever evidence they have, and we will undertake to look at it and to advise.”

It has also been argued, and we have heard this evening, that there is a risk of political interference, given the likelihood that the DPP would consult the Attorney-General.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

rose—

[Nick Herbert]

If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I will not give way; time is short.

I raised such a risk in questioning the DPP, but he made it clear in his evidence that

“the decision is the decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions, taken independently.”

He added that consultation between the DPP and the Attorney-General, which is regular,

“acts as no inhibition on the independence that I would bring to the decision. At the end of the day, the decision is mine, it is independent and it is reviewable.”––[Official Report, Police Reform and Social Responsibility Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2011; c. 124-130.]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) pointed out, the DPP also said that there are powerful public interest reasons to prosecute in a case that has satisfied the evidential threshold.

The necessity for the provision has been questioned on two grounds. It is said that the sort of people whom it is designed to safeguard are already covered by immunity. Although this is true of some of the visitors against whom arrest warrants have been sought in the past, it is not true of all. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction applies to certain Ministers, and warrants have been sought against Ministers not covered and those who are not Ministers at all.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Nick Herbert]

I am sorry. I do not have time.

It is said, too, that few warrants have been issued in universal jurisdiction cases, but the problem lies in the perception that a person who is not a British citizen, does not live here, and indeed has no connection with this country apart from being present here, might be at risk of arrest for a very grave crime where there is no prospect of a viable prosecution. That such an occurrence is rare misses the point. The fact is that people who are, or have been, in leading positions in their countries, with whom the Government would wish to engage in discussions, may be discouraged from coming here. That is our concern. That, in turn, creates a risk of damaging our ability to help in conflict resolution or interfere with foreign policy.

Amendment 154 would require special units to be set up in the police and the CPS. The responsibility for investigating universal jurisdiction cases lies with a specialist unit of the Metropolitan police. That unit has the specialist skills and expertise required to conduct those cases, or to decide that an investigation in this jurisdiction is not warranted or feasible. The unit is best placed to evaluate the prospects of being able to protect witnesses or secure their evidence at any trial, identify an individual responsible for the particular conduct to the criminal standard, and deal—