Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateMark Reckless
Main Page: Mark Reckless (UK Independence Party - Rochester and Strood)Department Debates - View all Mark Reckless's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy right hon. Friend, who is Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee, makes a reasonable point. Of course, there would be a resources issue for HMIC that the Government would need to consider, but given the importance of the reform that the Government are seeking to introduce, and given that the police themselves say that this would be the biggest change to the policing model in this country for centuries, I suggest to my right hon. Friend that it is incumbent on us to say to HMIC that we will ensure that it has the necessary resources.
The Local Government Association—I do not know whether the Minister has a higher regard for it than for police authorities—is also totally opposed to the reform. It is difficult to find a single council that supports it. Surrey county council sometimes edges towards it, but it is difficult to find many others. I would have thought that if this were a great reform, the police would be coming forward and saying, “This will make a huge difference”, but of course they are not. The challenge, therefore, is to find the demand for the change. Local people are not demanding it, so who actually is? The Minister seems to be driven by a belief that he knows best. He accused others of being elitist, but if everybody is saying that the Government have got it wrong, there might be an element of truth in it.
The hon. Gentleman asked for an example of a council that supports the reform. My council—Medway council—of which my hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham and Rainham (Rehman Chishti) is also a member, has supported the reforms, and our council leader, Rodney Chambers, has been a strong proponent, with me, of direct election for those who oversee our police. Surely the key thing, however, is that the electorate voted for it. The Lib Dems stood on a platform of direct election for police authorities, and we stood on one of directly elected commissioners. We now have this compromise involving a panel. The APA commissioned an opinion poll that showed that most people wanted direct election for those who oversaw the police.
I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has cleared up the issue—there is one council in favour of the proposed changed across the country. However, I disagree absolutely with what he said about the electorate voting for this measure. The model in the Bill was not voted for by the majority of people. As he said, the model in the Liberal Democrat manifesto was completely different from the one in the Bill. He gave the game away when he said, “Of course, in the coalition agreement, there was a compromise”. Well, if there was a compromise, it obviously happened after the election, not during the election, so I do not think that anybody actually voted for this model.
ACPO, the hon. Gentleman tells us, has suggested that there are issues with checks and balances in the new system, but is not the real issue in the current system, with the lack of checks and balances on both the Home Office and the chief constable, and with the weakness of the police authority leg of the tripartite process? Is it not right that we do something, such as introduce direct elections as proposed in the Bill, to bolster the power of that third, local, democratic pillar?
Nobody has said that the existing system is absolutely flawless or does not need improving. I said to the hon. Member for Cambridge that it is important for police authorities to improve their visibility, but I suggest to the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood that we are discussing the Government’s proposals for the future. If ACPO tells us that the Bill’s checks and balances are simply too weak, should we not then say, “We need to look at this, think about it and try to understand what we should do to further improve the system that we want”?
The Minister gets very upset when I say this, but I am going to say it again. The police and crime panels are one way in which the police and crime commissioner is supposed to be held to account, but the panel is a completely toothless watchdog with no real power. It has two vetoes: one on appointments, as the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood knows, but only with a three-quarters majority; and the other on the precept, in respect of which the hon. Gentleman has tabled an amendment, but again with a three-quarters majority. That is it.
The Minister will say, “The panel has to be consulted, referred to and involved,” but how can it be right that there will be a police and crime commissioner, without anybody able to do anything about what he does, providing obviously that what he does is within the law?
Then we come to the huge number of representations about the size of the area that that one person will have to cover. Again, the Government do not think this is a problem. They say, “Oh, there’s no problem with this; it’s fine,” but there is no evidence to support that, and that is why the House should adopt the new clause so that we may have an inquiry and the HMIC can look into the matter.
The Welsh Local Government Association points out that the system in Wales works very well, and it does not believe that replacing between 17 and 19 members of the individual police authorities in Wales
“with a single elected commissioner will…improve public accountability of the police”.
The association does not believe that one individual can properly reflect all
“the divergent communities that exist in police force areas”,
and it cites the huge area of Dyfed Powys, where one individual will cover the whole area.
We can cite other examples. The Avon and Somerset area covers 1,855 square miles, from Thornbury to Yeovil to Minehead. It has a population of 1.6 million and large rural areas such as Exmoor, major urban areas such as Bristol and Bath and significant market towns. One individual will represent all those areas. That police authority area and one or two others that I will mention across the country all point out the difficulty, and we should listen to them.
That might be a good debating point, but as a Bill goes through the House we need to debate its principles and the right legislative approach. We do not have the Queen’s counsel support that is available to the Minister, so the odd drafting error might occur, but that does not alter the thrust of what we are trying to do through the new clause. If the right hon. Gentleman had been here for the earlier debate he would know that the Minister, even with his bank of lawyers, supporters and helpers, has had to propose a number of amendments to correct drafting errors. So it is not only me who makes the odd drafting error, but I am doing it on my computer. Notwithstanding any drafting error, if we regard as right the principle that a protocol or memorandum of understanding should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure of the House, we should support it.
In its evidence and the report it issued yesterday, ACPO said that
“there are three broad areas where we believe improved safeguards are required”.
I shall deal with only the first of those three, as it relates to the new clause. ACPO said of the first area:
“Clarity on the responsibilities of the PCC”—
the police and crime commissioner—
“and Chief Constable. The proposed ‘protocol’ is still early in its development. We believe such a key document will need to be specific and legally binding—such as through a Code of Practice founded in law.”
That was ACPO’s advice yesterday. It continued, at paragraph 50:
“ACPO has real concerns that the Bill does not fully recognise the uniqueness of the tripartite system between the Home Secretary, Chief Constables and local democratic governance. It is considered that the Bill places too much emphasis on local considerations giving disproportionate power to the PCC to the detriment of the necessary national and legal responsibilities placed upon the Home Secretary and Chief Constables. Our concern is to ensure that Chief Constables have sufficient operational independence safeguarding their impartiality to balance the various duties and accountabilities they face. Currently, it is at best uncertain that the safeguards under development in parallel with the progress of the Bill will achieve that aim.”
I think ACPO is clearly telling the Minister that he needs to amend the Bill in a similar way to that suggested in my new clause.
The hon. Gentleman is telling us what ACPO said yesterday, but it is not easy for the Minister because ACPO has previously taken an entirely different line. Sir Hugh Orde told the Home Affairs Committee that he did not want anything entrenched in legislation.
No doubt members of ACPO, including Sir Hugh Orde, its hugely respected president, will have considered the discussions on the Bill and will have continued to discuss it with colleagues in deciding on the most appropriate advice and guidance to give the Government. ACPO has regularly said that it is for the Government to determine the governance structure, but it will do its best, whatever structure is finally decided, to implement it and deliver the policing that we would all wish to see. However, it also has a responsibility to point out to the Government where there are problems, and it has done so in guidance. There is a serious need for clarity from the Government regarding the memorandum of understanding, code of practice or protocol.
It is not acceptable for this issue not to be subject to a legislative process, and I should be interested to learn whether the Minister agrees. He has agreed that there should be a protocol, and a draft is in the throes of production—no doubt, a group is working on it and discussions are under way. I suspect that there are disagreements, which is why it has not been issued yet—it is proving more problematic than the Minister expected.
We need a protocol, because we need to clarify the role of the police and crime commissioner vis-à-vis the chief constable. In Committee, we debated at length what their respective roles should be. The police and crime commissioner is elected on a local mandate and will make certain promises, but what is their mandate vis-à-vis the chief constable? Where is the line drawn between what the commissioner would wish to do and the chief constable’s operational responsibilities?
It is interesting that an amendment has been tabled by some of the Minister’s colleagues, who are as concerned as I am. Indeed, the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), has added his name to amendment 149. The hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) is the lead Member for the amendment, and he is clearly concerned. The amendment has a great deal of merit, and it tries to deal with the issue. The hon. Gentleman is trying to clarify whether a police and crime commissioner has the opportunity to tell a chief constable to investigate a crime. Is it any crime, or no crime? Is that just a matter for the chief constable? Does the commissioner have any power over that?
What about the funding of units? Can the commissioner tell the chief constable what units they should have? On the apportioning of resources, the Minister looked very upset when I quoted the report by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary, which showed that only 5% of police and community support officers were not in the back office. What about the commissioner’s ability to say what the correct mix of staff is? They might not want to see as many people doing a particular job, and may want to civilianise. The Minister’s favourite thing at the moment is looking at outsourcing. What if a commissioner does not believe in that? Whose responsibility would it be?
What about the reorganisation of policing? Who has a say on that? What equipment can or cannot be used? It may be an operational decision to use horses or dogs in a public order situation, but does the commissioner have any jurisdiction or say in whether the police have a police or horse section? Is that an operational responsibility? If we had a draft protocol, we could begin to understand the differences in those areas.
We have just seen the police do a very good job overall at the weekend, and I praised the Metropolitan Police Commissioner for it. However, when I recently saw him we discussed containment. What right does a police and crime commissioner or someone else have to tell a chief constable that they had dealt with such a situation wrongly? Does the police and crime commissioner have the right to do more than express an opinion? Police and crime commissioners are directly elected. We are not talking about a police authority. Police and crime commissioners will not be appointed by the Mayor and unelected, as in London. Who has the responsibility for making such decisions? These are hugely serious issues that worry many people across the country.
The Minister’s response is, “It won’t be a problem. Don’t worry about it. Good sense will prevail. Why should the doomsday scenario presented by the shadow Minister happen?” That is a pretty poor way to legislate when we are dealing with such a serious matter. It is not enough to say, “Don’t worry. It won’t happen. Everybody’s good sense will prevail.” The amendments before us are important. Clearly, I am not the only one who is worried.
That is another interesting dilemma that might arise. No doubt there are many other such examples in which we could point out the dangers.
I cannot stress enough how important the police feel this is and how important I think it is. I am sure that we will all listen to the Minister when he responds not only to the lead new clause but to the amendment tabled by his hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood.
I should first declare an interest as a member of the Kent police authority. I thank the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) for his testimonial to my work in that role, which—who knows?—might find its way into one of my election leaflets.
We have heard about the protocol—let us call it that, so that we use common language—and I note that the shadow Minister refers to operational responsibility in the new clause. It would be great to have a clearly agreed definition for operational independence or responsibility as it is, but it is enormously difficult to do that. ACPO’s position has changed on that, which does not necessarily assist us. The Home Affairs Committee visited ACPO two days ago, and it seems that the draft protocol is bouncing between it and the Home Office. ACPO had no objection to the draft being shared with the Committee when we asked for it. Will the Minister give the Committee sight of the protocol, even if it is still an early draft?
Amendment 149 is a probing amendment, because it is very important to get the views of the House and of the Minister on the record. I have tried to emphasise a point that arose from the 1962 royal commission, which is that there is an important distinction, as I put it in the amendment, that the elected commissioner
“shall have no involvement in decisions with respect to individual investigations and arrests.”
That is an important constitutional protection. The Minister spoke quite strongly on that both on Second Reading and in evidence to the Home Affairs Committee. I am slightly concerned that one remark he made in the Committee, regarding the potential for too strict an interpretation of what Lord Denning said in 1968, should not be taken out of context. The context, as the Home Secretary said on Monday, is that we anticipate that it will be the elected commissioner who is in charge, as with the Mayor of London.
The Minister was very clear on Second Reading and when he gave evidence to the Committee on the role and importance of the elected commissioners and that what we are doing is rebalancing the tripartite system, moving from a police authority leg that has traditionally been too weak and bolstering the role of the democratic and local element with the directly elected commissioner.
I raised that point with the Minister in the Committee on 27 July last year, and asked whether there was any possibility of an incompatibility between what we intended with the legislation and what Lord Denning said in ex parte Blackburn in 1968. The Minister’s reply was important. He said:
“It is often stated, quoting Lord Denning's dictum that the police should be answerable to the law and the law alone. I think that is right in the sense of when they are exercising their powers of arrest and so on that that should not be subject to any kind of political interference. We would all agree about that but, clearly, somebody has to set the police budget and the strategic direction of the police, so there has to be accountability to someone, and our premise is that that should no longer be to the centre, to a faceless bureaucrat, to the Home Secretary; it should instead be to local people through the election of the police and crime commissioner.”
That is what we intend to achieve with the Bill, and it is a distinction that is consistent with what we saw back in the 1962 royal commission.
As the hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick) knows, the Select Committee received some helpful legal advice on this matter that read:
“This part of Lord Denning’s judgment is not strictly binding as it went beyond the range of issues that had to be decided in that case, and is therefore obiter.”
We then had an assessment from our legal advisers on a leading academic text in this area by Richard Clayton QC and Hugh Tomlinson QC, whose conclusion on Lord Denning’s judgment was:
“The doctrine is an exorbitant one and its legal foundations are very slight”.
I had a look at that leading text and some of the academic debate on the difficulty of defining operational independence and what it was considered to mean. Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson referred to section 6(1) of the Police Act 1996, which the Bill carries over, and wrote that it
“appears to create a specific sphere of responsibility for the police authority”.
They go on to state that section 10(1), which deals with the direction and control of the chief constable, is subject to that provision, and
“only covers immediate operational direction and control but does not bear on the question of the extent to which the chief constable is under supervision of the police authority.”
The Committee went into the academic literature in more detail. We heard from Rick Muir, from the Institute for Public Policy Research, who has done much work—from the left—on this key issue. He agreed with me when I asked whether there was a distinction
“between the individual cases, where clearly the police should have independence in terms of arrest and investigation in those individual cases, and the broader spectrum of setting priorities, determining where budgets are spent and setting policy in general, which is properly the field of elected politicians”.
He observed that unfortunately confusion had arisen because wrongly there had been a
“tendency of chief constables to take Denning to mean that they are in charge of strategy”.
We do not have before us this protocol that the hon. Member for Gedling referred to, but the Committee was able to draw out some of the key issues.
My amendment emphasises the position in 1962. Unfortunately, when Denning made his judgment, he did not have the advantage of being able to refer to proceedings in the House. Judges have been able to do that only since Pepper v. Hart in, I think, 1994. The key 1962 royal commission, which set the consensus on operational independence, was summarised by the legal advisers in a report to the Committee. They wrote:
“The Royal Commission on Police emphasised the need for impartiality and operational independence of the police in relation to ‘quasi-judicial’ decisions”.
The royal commission included in those quasi-judicial decisions
“inquiries with regard to suspected offences, the arrest of persons and the decision to prosecute,”
adding:
“In matters of this kind it is clearly in the public interest that a police officer should be answerable only to his superiors in the force and, to the extent that a matter may come before them, to the courts. His impartiality would be jeopardised, and public confidence in it shaken, if in this field he were to be made the servant of too local a body.”
The commission said in respect of other duties:
“It cannot in our view be said that”
they
“require the complete immunity from external influence that is generally acknowledged to be necessary in regard to the enforcement of the law in particular cases.”
As our legal advisers point out, those other duties include
“general policies in regard to law enforcement…the disposition of his force, the concentration of his resources on any particular type of crime or area, the manner in which he handles political demonstrations or processions”
or
“his policy in enforcing the traffic laws and…dealing with parked vehicles”.
That clear distinction has therefore run all the way through, from the royal commission in 1962 to the evidence that the Home Affairs Committee has taken. That is what I am trying to emphasise with my amendment 149; indeed, it is also what the Minister emphasised when he appeared before the Committee. I would therefore be grateful if he confirmed that he does not resile from any of those remarks.
The other important point to make about Denning’s judgment in 1968 is that it related not to what a police authority could do in terms of a chief constable, but to what a single individual, Mr Blackburn, who as a publicly spirited gentleman came to court with a judicial review, could do. The question was about the extent to which he as an individual could require the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to implement policing in a particular operational manner. That distinction is made clear by further material, including the 1988 case of Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, in which it was clearly drawn. In that case, Lord Templeman said:
“The question for determination in this appeal is whether an action for damages is an appropriate vehicle for investigating the efficiency of a police force.”
He concluded:
“A police force serves the public, and the elected representatives of the public must ensure that the public get the police force they deserve.”
It is clearly right that there can be no interference in individual investigations or arrests, but it is important to look at the issue from both sides.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for bringing to the House’s attention what I think is a dilemma that the Minister has created. As I have been listening to the hon. Gentleman, I have been reflecting on what would have happened if we had had police and crime commissioners at the time of the Stephen Lawrence murder and the subsequent inquiry. Does he think that it would have been possible for the police and crime commissioner to fulfil the requirements of both clause 1(8)(g) and his amendment 149?
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman could cite that provision, which I do not have to hand.
I apologise. Clause 1(8)(g) places a responsibility on the police and crime commissioner to
“hold the chief constable to account”
for
“the exercise of duties relating to equality and diversity that are imposed on the chief constable by any enactment.”
In particular, I am thinking of what came out of the Lawrence inquiry.
Yes, absolutely. What we saw in that instance was a failure in the operational direction of the Metropolitan police. Rather than waiting years and years for an inquiry to make the Metropolitan police have appropriate respect for diversity and follow up on such crimes in the way it should, a directly elected commissioner with sufficient authority could have pressed for that much more quickly. Indeed, that is one area where we would be looking for clear, elected oversight and guidance for the police.
On the point that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) just made, I note that my hon. Friend’s amendment states that
“the police and crime commissioner shall have no involvement in decisions with respect to individual investigations”.
If there were a high-profile murder, would my hon. Friend think it appropriate for the commissioner to say to a chief constable, “I think you should put more resource into that investigation. What you are doing now is not sufficient and there is real community concern”? Or is my hon. Friend saying that that would be inappropriate?
That is a very good example, which helps to elucidate the point. It would not be appropriate for the elected commissioner to say, “On this particular individual investigation I would like fewer”—or more—“police”, or, “You should investigate it in this way rather than that.” We do not look to the elected commissioners to do that, but I see a strong role for them in ensuring that justice is colour blind and that the police do not make assumptions about a witness or potential suspect on the basis of ethnicity or any other inappropriate basis. We have seen strong progress by the police in that area, but, with the Macpherson inquiry and the way in which some measures have been rolled out, there has not necessarily been the sensitivity that there might have been. The elected commissioner will have a relationship with the wider electorate, however, so they will sometimes be in a position to lead the police in particular areas regarding social attitudes.
I have huge respect for the police, given my work with them in Kent, but there are particular traditions in policing and the work force are made up in a particular way. Those things have changed, with a very welcome and greater number of women now working as police officers, and there has been a significant improvement in black and minority ethnic representation. In Kent, we had the first black chief constable in Mike Fuller, who did an extraordinary job of engaging with the public and involving them closely with the work of Kent police. The police have a significantly smaller proportion of graduates, although it is higher than it was, and the elected commissioner will be able to lead in those areas. I look to him to do so.
I emphasise to the House that the distinction I draw, going back to the 1962 royal commission at least, works both ways, and I am very concerned about budget setting, priorities and some of the management of public protest. My hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Mr Burley) asked some probing questions of various witnesses, but the question of whether there should be a presumption that police officers will travel in pairs, and the extent to which officers might be on bicycles, on foot or in cars, are very properly areas for elected oversight, and inevitably political decisions. If we do draw that distinction, the Bill will help chief constables.
May I be clear about what the hon. Gentleman just said? Did he say that an elected individual should be able to try to influence the chief constable in terms of patrolling in pairs, individually or whatever, and in terms of the other examples he used? Or did he say that he thought it should be open to the police and crime commissioner to direct the chief constable on those matters?
In almost all those areas, there will invariably be agreement. There is give and take, and that has been my experience on a police authority. I am sure that in most instances it will apply to the elected commissioner and to the chief constable. I am not convinced that “direct” is the right word, but there might be public concern, as there was a few years ago in my area, about the police spending too much time in cars and not being available on the beat. Indeed, I have often heard it said that two officers who go out on the beat together will naturally tend to talk and enter into exchanges with each other, whereas one police officer on patrol might have a greater tendency to engage with the public.
I think that we would look to elected commissioners to reflect the public view, although I would not necessarily be comfortable with that in individual instances. It would be right for the elected commissioner to say, “Previously we’ve had this presumption that officers should patrol in pairs, but I think in future the presumption should be that where possible officers patrol individually,” and I would expect the chief constable to give effect to that. However, if there were issues regarding safety, I would look to the chief constable to have those considered appropriately within the discussion.
I do not agree with the view of ACPO, nor do Conservative Members or members of the Committee necessarily accept it, that police officers operate in a sort of political vacuum where they can, without reference to the elected authority, make the decision themselves. I think that people will campaign on these issues to become the elected police and crime commissioner. In many respects, it is entirely proper that the chief constable should then implement proposals with a democratic mandate behind them, as in the case of the Metropolitan police service following what Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, said about a stronger emphasis on knife crime and having more officers on public transport, particularly buses. The Metropolitan police did then implement that, and that is perfectly proper.
I should emphasise that this point goes both ways. We need to ensure that chief constables recognise the appropriate and entirely proper role of the elected commissioner in making such decisions, but there is also the other side of the coin. My experience on a police authority is that I often get asked about operational matters. A sergeant may ask me whether I thought that a particular police community support officer should be deployed from one area to another, or a constable may ask me whether I am happy about how they have dealt with a particular offence, or whether I think that a particular individual should be charged or dealt with in a certain way. It has then been incumbent on me, as a member of the police authority, to say, “Hang on a minute, this is not a proper area for an elected politician to be determining what happens within the police.” I have always been very clear about that, and when there has been an issue that is a shade of grey I have referred it to our excellent area commander in Medway, Steve Corbishley. Such sensitive issues need to be dealt with at that higher level. One cannot necessarily expect every constable, sergeant or even inspector to be totally au fait with where this line should be drawn. I am echoing the emphasis that the royal commission, and the Minister in Committee, put on this complete protection in relation to individual investigation and arrest. That is an important safeguard, and it should work both ways.
The Bill uses the phrase “have regard to” in relation to the police panel as against the commissioner for the budget, the commissioner in respect of a strategic policing objective, and the chief constable’s need to have regard to the policing plan determined by the Minister. We may be firing the starting gun for litigation, but if so, I hope that Members, particularly the Minister, have given a clear steer to the courts as to the role that we see elected commissioners having and the need to rebalance the tripartite relationship. Lord Hoffmann, in the case of Regina v. Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte International Trader’s Ferry Ltd, said that, even under the current arrangements, where regard must be had to the policing plan, the chief constable’s discretion was therefore “subject” to the statutory plan. Together with the roles of the chief constable and the Home Office, we have a rebalancing of the tripartite system. We are bolstering the democratic local element by having direct election, and that should provide a far stronger voice for the public in setting policing policy and priorities.
First, I confirm again to the House something that has been confirmed on a number of occasions: the Bill does not change the legal position that the direction and control of forces remains with the chief constable. Therefore, the basis of the legal relationship between police authorities and chief constables is maintained in the direction of control in the Bill.
Nevertheless, there is concern about ensuring the fundamental principle of the operational independence of chief constables, which we debated at considerable length in Committee. As we discussed at some length, there is no statutory definition of operational independence, and indeed, there is general agreement that it would be unwise to attempt such a definition. The matter has been considered on a number of occasions by the courts—my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) spoke of one key case. However, ACPO, which is concerned to ensure that the operational independence of chief officers is not in any way threatened, has said that it does not wish us to try to define it in law.
The debate on the proper role of the chief constable and the proper role of the local body that holds them to account will continue—as it does between police authorities and chief officers and others, with the matter sometimes ending up in court. That is part of what Sir Hugh Orde, the ACPO president, described—not pejoratively—as the tension that should exist in the relationship. However, as I said in Committee, to some extent, we are talking about shades of grey.
Is not one limitation of existing case law that an individual litigant—or a company such as International Trader’s Ferry—trying to get the chief constable to do something is different from the relationship that the Minister describes between the police authority and its statutory powers and the chief constable? The Home Affairs Committee heard from witnesses who felt that there is significant scope within the existing regime for police authorities to be more assertive in setting policy—it just happens that they have not done so.
My hon. Friend’s point is well made. However, the police and crime commissioner, who will have a mandate, could be more assertive. That is the basis and thrust of the chief constables’ concerns. I cited the example of London. The Mayor of London stood on a manifesto of placing uniformed officers on public transport and tackling knife crime. Whether that cut across the operational independence of the Met has been debated but not resolved, but it is significant that those things have happened, and the Metropolitan police have willingly implemented them. We must accept that, to some extent, there are areas of negotiation and shades of grey, which is why all parties agree that it would be a mistake to try to define in statute the notion of operational independence.
However, equally, we are all agreed—as I indicated on Second Reading, the Government were already minded to do this—on drawing up a protocol, as the Home Affairs Committee recommended, to try to set out the precise roles of the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable in the new arrangements, and to broaden the protocol to cover the role of the police and crime panel, given that that is new, and the role of the Home Secretary. It is worth stating that the Government’s intention in introducing that reform is not to abandon the tripartite, but to rebalance it, because we feel that it has been too distorted in the past, particularly in relation to the accrual of power by the centre and the Home Secretary.
I repeat that we do not envisage this being a statutory document. It was originally called a memorandum of understanding by the Select Committee, and I do not think that the Committee’s recommendation envisaged it being a statutory document. Its purpose is to clarify the roles and responsibilities in law. In other words, it will be seeking not to set law but to explain what the law is. The danger is that we will be drawn into a means of setting law, when all the parties involved have so far said that we should not seek to define operational independence by statute. They have said that we should leave the matter to the understanding of the courts and the existing case law.
Will the Minister agree to supply the document, at least in draft form, to the Home Affairs Committee as well as to the House of Lords? The Association of Chief Police Officers and the Home Office are negotiating, but should not the negotiations be for the tripartite system, although we do not yet have the elected commissioners in place?
First, the Association of Police Authorities is certainly involved in the drafting; it is part of the group discussing the matter. I agree that negotiations must reflect the tripartite system, and I want to reassure my hon. Friend about that. As to supplying the draft to the Home Affairs Committee, I am happy to agree. Furthermore, if my hon. Friend would like to meet me and officials to discuss it further, I think it would assist our deliberations. I would like to organise that as soon as possible, bearing in mind the considerable experience that my hon. Friend brings as a member of a police authority with a particular view.
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s purpose in proposing amendment 149, according to which
“the police and crime commissioner shall have no involvement”
in deciding whether a person is investigated or directed. In fact, that is the existing common law principle and the courts have consistently stated that the Executive must not interfere in operational law enforcement decisions, so there is no need for that to be written expressly in the Bill.
I hope that the hon. Member for Gedling will accept the good faith with which I agreed with the recommendation of the Home Affairs Select Committee. I hope he will acknowledge that I have listened to the Association of Chief Police Officers and others who have expressed concern about operational independence; restated that we do not seek to cut across that principle; and confirmed that we will bring the draft document before Parliament at the earliest possible opportunity. I appreciate that he would have liked to see it sooner, but I hope he acknowledges the very considerable steps we have taken in this regard.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 151, in clause 28, page 21, line 9, leave out ‘5 or’.
Amendment 152, page 112, line 15, leave out Schedule 5.
New clause 6 deals with the police and crime panel and, specifically, the powers that it may or may not have in respect of assessing and setting the precept. Ever since I first considered the issue of elected commissioners and their proper role, I have found the issue of budget setting particularly knotty and difficult. As a strong proponent of elected commissioners, I see a good argument for giving them the power to set the precept and the budget, and just letting them get on with that. I can see the argument that they have the mandate, so surely they should make the decision.
However, I have at least a slight concern about giving such significant budget-setting power over a whole electoral term to one individual. That is why I am attracted to some of the ideas we have heard, including from colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches, about the police and crime panel. There has been a very positive, highest common factor rather than a lowest common denominator approach, and the Bill has been improved through the interchange of ideas between Conservative and Liberal Democrat Members.
We have heard about the capping arrangements of the Labour party in recent years. There was capping under previous Conservative Governments but it seemed to become almost standard in Labour’s 13 years in government for Ministers to set a number—it was never quite clear how they determined that number—over which anything, regardless of the circumstances and however low the council tax base, was capped by central Government. That approach seems wrong to me and we have a proposal to deal with it in relation to local government: instead of having a Secretary of State—I assume for Communities and Local Government—capping a council above a certain level, that Secretary of State would have reserve powers to require a local referendum in an area where he considered an increase to be excessive. That strikes me as a reasonably sensible balance, and certainly an improvement on the status quo and the current capping power.
This issue is effectively about the principle of capping, which causes real problems. Is my hon. Friend aware, in the local government context, of councils in Cambridgeshire that used to charge zero council tax and were prevented by capping from charging any at all? We do not want the same sort of ridiculous problems happening with police precepts.
Yes, I am aware of that issue. The predecessor council to mine in Medway, Rochester upon Medway council, similarly had no council tax and when Medway took over as a unitary authority, we had one of the lowest council taxes in the country—virtually the lowest except for the Scilly Isles at one point. However, we had the same percentage limit as everyone else, so when central Government put a new burden on local government and we had to fund it as a fixed cost, we were less well-placed to do that because the amount we could get through a percentage increase was less than other councils that had previously had higher taxes could get.
A similar regime to that for local councils has applied to police authorities, but to an extent it has been less controversial than that for councils because police authorities have not had the same democratic mandate as local government. There are only nine elected councillors on my police authority among 17. It is true that the majority of those nine must approve the precept as well as a majority of the 17, but it is certainly less of a democratic mandate than that for local councils in which all the local councillors are elected. I have understood, previously, that when the Communities Secretary, rather than the Home Secretary, has capped an authority, that has not been popular with the authority, but I have understood why it happened. However, I can see the attraction of moving from that to a referendum power as we are doing with local government.
I think there is a potential problem or issue, which I hope can be resolved through the Bill or its application, with bringing in the new body—the local police and crime panel. The panel will have a representative from every council in the police area, and I particularly welcome the involvement of district councils, which have been so important in developing crime and disorder reduction partnerships and community safety partnerships. Their involvement on the ground will be a real advantage: it will bring real insight to the commissioner and the force and it will pull local government more generally into the new arrangements. We hear a lot about the Local Government Association or police authorities not liking the new arrangements, and people who have a particular stake in the existing process might say that, but the districts coming in is going to be a real gain.
There is dispute about how strong the panel will be, and its powers are characterised in various ways, but one of its key powers will be its oversight and scrutiny of the budget. It is proposed that, in extremis, if three quarters of the panel agree, the panel can exercise what is described as a veto in the Bill, and paragraphs 7 and 8 of schedule 5 prescribe that the Secretary of State can make further regulations on that. In Committee, the Minister described some of his intentions for the regulations, but I am a little unclear about that because the regulations referred to in the Bill seem to be about how that veto process will work, whereas quite a lot of the detail that the Minister gave to the Committee seemed to refer to when or where there would be a referendum and the Secretary of State’s involvement. That is one of the issues, because it is envisaged in the Localism Bill that the Secretary of State will have referendum-calling powers and will presumably use regulations to determine how that happens. It is envisaged in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill that the panel will have a veto and that there will be regulations on that. The crossover is not clear. There will be a directly elected individual who will come to office with a great mandate. One of his responsibilities is to set the budget and the precept, yet there are two other bodies—the panel and the Secretary of State; it is not clear whether it is the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government or the Home Secretary—who have at least some locus standi in setting the budget.
I am interested in the point that the hon. Gentleman made about having to use litigation. There is serious concern about what would happen if, when a budget was set, there was uncertainty and we had to use court orders. I am sure that he is aware of the cost of rebilling, and there is an important principle that we want to set all the amounts of council tax, while we still have council tax, at the same time, rather than send out multiple letters, which would just add to the cost of that process.
In my reference to litigation, I was alluding to the fact that the prospect of dispute, at least on the first occasion, given the narrow time scales and the costs of rebilling, would not be a positive thing. I have worked closely with my hon. Friend on the Home Affairs Committee on the issue—his hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) is strongly involved in these issues too— and I feel that there is a significant measure of agreement between us. In the coalition, it is important that we decide what we want to do, and state that clearly in the Bill and subsequent regulations so that we do not face the prospect of litigation.
Some Liberal Democrats may like the idea of a complete veto for the panel, but I am not sure that many of my Conservative colleagues would necessarily agree, given that the commissioner has a directly elected mandate and the members of the panel are appointed. However, I am convinced that a measure of financial oversight by the panel and by the councillors from every council who serve on it would be valuable. It will keep the commissioner linked in to local government, which is extremely important. The Minister has a criminal justice portfolio, and there is extraordinary scope for the elected commissioners to act in the wider criminal justice area. However, we do not want a great division to open up between local government and the work of the elected commissioner in criminal justice, so that knitting together is important.
I recognise that the hon. Gentleman feels strongly about this element, but if it is valid to argue that the commissioner must be virtually in a negotiation position with the panel so that they arrive at the right decision on the precept, I do not understand why, in every other respect, the commissioner should be able to arrive at his decision independently, with the role of the panel being simply to scrutinise it. Why does the hon. Gentleman make an exception in relation to the precept? Surely the logic of his argument is that the panel should have a different set of powers in relation to the commissioner.
The power over the precept is an extraordinarily important one, particularly over the whole elected term of the commissioner. Even I, as a strong supporter of directly elected commissioners, would be slightly nervous about one individual on his own taking those budgetary decisions for a number of years. I welcome the involvement of the panel in that, but I do not envisage a constant negotiation—[Interruption.] I apologise to the House.
A three quarters majority will be required. What is needed is almost a reserve power, so that if the commissioner wants to slash the budget massively against the will of the local area, or put through really hefty increases, there is some oversight and some way that that can be mitigated. The panel is a sensible body to do that, but we need to be clear what it would then do. Would it veto the plans and would the commissioner be obliged to accept that, or would it just say, “Go away and think again”?
The present wording, “have regard to”, represents an intended compromise, but leads to considerable uncertainty. As none of us wants to see litigation on this aspect, I am proposing instead that we bolster the local crime panel with a clear power. That will not necessarily be a veto as, if it is, it will be a soft veto. If the panel was seriously worried about the precept, there could be a referendum in the local area. The members of the panel would be appointed by the councils in that area, so those councils would bear the cost of a referendum. They would think long and hard before calling a referendum if they were paying for it.
That arrangement would provide some protection. If the commissioner went off in one direction, away from others, it would give some possibility of pulling him back, but it would not make him subject to the panel, because the commissioner would have the directly elected mandate, whereas the panel would be appointed. Giving the panel the power to require a referendum would be a sensible way forward.
We may be envisaging a referendum power, but it seems that we are expecting to import parts of the Localism Bill into the policing environment, when we already have a separate police and crime panel as a check on the elected commissioner, whereas we do not have a similar check in local government. I propose that the two should be distinct and that the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government should have the power of referendum for local councils, but in the policing universe where we are setting up a panel that will be representative, that panel should be responsible. In extremis, it would have the power to call a referendum on the local precept. We therefore would not need the central oversight and dictation of the Secretary of State in this area.
The new clause would bring greater clarity and provide the local and democratic arrangements that we need. I commend it to the House.
I shall be brief. I am intrigued that the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) has tabled the new clause. It is a matter of great regret that he was not a member of the Committee that scrutinised the Bill. What we are beginning to hear in his contributions is how much doubt exists in the hearts of Conservative Back Benchers about some of the key elements of the Bill. That was evident in some of his earlier amendments, but it is extremely evident in this group. He is prepared to tolerate a single elected individual having enormous power over the shape and influence of an area police force over a four-year cycle. He is prepared to tolerate a police and crime plan that might change the shape and direction of the force beyond all recognition. Despite being a loyal and active member of a police authority that has massive experience and whose benefits he regularly tells us about, he is prepared to put up with all those measures.
The hon. Gentleman realises in his heart the fundamental danger that, if the Government persist with their present approach to cuts in police funding, at some stage authorities in parts of the country of the kind he represents will be on a collision course with the Government. The police commissioner will be forced to look at the question of the precept as a means of off-setting the budget cuts that the force is facing. The hon. Gentleman does not want to be in that position when a single elected police commissioner is able to bring forward a proposal for a hugely increased precept, because he fears what the electors in his area will say about that and the repercussions for himself and his party followers.
I must say that that really is not the case and has not been my experience. In Kent we have been able to find significant savings in our budget while protecting the front line and, in the words of our chief constable, have an opportunity to have a more efficient and effective force. As an elected Member, I looked to constituents in the private sector who are suffering and wanted to see some savings made in the police budget. My colleagues did not agree this year—they perhaps did not have the same direct election focus—but then they did come to realise this and we found significant savings. It is because we have that democratic element that we are able to find the savings and get the police to operate more efficiently, and the elected commissioners should be able to do that even better.
That democratic element cannot be fundamentally unique in relation to setting the precept but absolutely different in relation to any other aspect of the work of the commissioner. It is my contention that the people who support the amendment fear what will happen when the precept has to be ratcheted up to compensate for the cuts. They know that there will be massive electoral consequences and so are seeking to insert a device to denude the commissioner of the one power that they fear more than any other.