Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have an amendment in this group. I repeat a declaration of interest I made at Second Reading: that I have appeared as a barrister in a number of the leading cases about limitation of the law of tort. The purpose of limitation periods is to give a claimant a fair chance to decide whether to bring a claim, but also to place some sort of time limit on claims. Limitation periods vary according to the cause of action—for example, defamation claims have to be brought within one year. Personal injury claims have always been in a special category. The normal limit is three years or, in the case of a young person, three years after attaining the age of majority. But because some personal injuries manifest themselves only some time after they have been caused, particularly those relating to disease claims, the law has responded by postponing the starting date to reflect something called the “date of knowledge”.

What constituted knowledge was difficult to encapsulate in statute and gave rise to a lot of litigation, particularly in the context of what are generally known as historic claims for child sexual abuse. But these difficulties were largely overcome by Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, which gave the court a complete discretion to disapply the limitation period. Although the section gave various sensible guidelines as to matters to be taken into consideration, the discretion was expressed to be entirely unfettered.

One difficulty of the law remained. In claims for deliberate acts of assault, there was a finite six-year limitation period, rather than a three-year extendable limit for claims in negligence, so some claimants did not have the advantage of Section 33. This problem was overcome by the decision of A v Hoare in 2008— I was one of the unsuccessful defendants in that case—when the House of Lords decided that, whether the claim was in negligence or in assault, there was still a discretion to disapply the limitation period.

The only question that remained was whether it would ever be too late to bring a claim in the light of Section 33. Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, a much-missed Member of your Lordships’ House, made this observation:

“If a complaint has been made and recorded, and more obviously still if the accused has been convicted of the abuse complained of, that will be one thing; if, however, a complaint comes out of the blue with no apparent support for it (other perhaps than that the alleged abuser has been accused or even convicted of similar abuse in the past), that would be quite another thing. By no means everyone who brings a late claim for damages for sexual abuse, however genuine his complaint may in fact be, can reasonably expect the court to exercise the section 33 discretion in his favour. On the contrary, a fair trial (which must surely include a fair opportunity for the defendant to investigate the allegations …) is in many cases likely to be found quite simply impossible”.


That passage was in fact referred to in the conclusions of IICSA, which decided that the three-year period should be removed, but that there should be

“express protection of the right to a fair trial, with the burden falling on defendants to show a fair trial is not possible”.

The Government responded to IICSA’s report and did not support getting rid of limitations. The Government acknowledged the importance of Section 33 and made this point:

“A limitation period also encourages disputes to be resolved timeously thus promoting finality and certainty. Both are key cornerstones of the legal system. As such, the Government’s opening position, ahead of consultation, is that it does not support this option”.


Nor did they support a special limit for claims arising from sexual abuse. I remind the Committee that, in 2017, in the case of Carroll v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, the Court of Appeal emphasised the unfettered nature of the Section 33 discretion.

My question to the Government at Second Reading was essentially this: what cases do they envisage would now be allowed to proceed which would not have done under the current law? I do not expect an immediate answer, but the Government have now had plenty of time to consider their response. There was a consultation following the Government’s response that I referred to, but it was not particularly large and did not contain consistent answers.

Changing the law of limitation is best an exercise following the careful balancing of respective interests, perhaps by the Law Commission. What appears to have happened here is that the Government, notwithstanding the initial view that I referred to, have decided to come up with some sort of compromise. In doing so, I fear they have produced in Clause 82 a real dog’s dinner of a provision.

Clause 82 is headed:

“Removal of limitation period in child sexual abuse cases”,


but it does not do that. It specifically provides that sexual abuse is in a separate category from, for example, physical abuse, although this was precisely what the Government did not want when they responded to the original recommendations. It contains a rather unclear provision that, when a dispute has been settled, it will no longer be subject to these new provisions. It probably does not include discontinued claims or claims settled otherwise than by way of a formal agreement.

New Section 11ZB contains some very unclear provisions as to the circumstances in which the court can dismiss an action, while at the same time containing in new subsection (2) the provision:

“The court must dismiss the action if the defendant satisfies the court that it is not possible for a fair hearing to take place”.


The interrelationship of new subsections (2) and (3) is incoherent and will inevitably result in litigation. The lack of clarity on what is and is not sexual abuse, and what is and is not settlement, will, I fear, also give rise to litigation.

I agree with the Opposition Front Bench’s probing amendment that we should get rid of new Section 11ZB(3), but that would leave a repetition of what the law is anyway and would not deal with the points about what constitutes sexual abuse or settlement via agreement. My conclusion is that there is absolutely nothing wrong with the law as it is. This rather messy compromise will give rise to unnecessary litigation and I am unsure it will provide remedies where remedies are not already available.

Sexual abuse, particularly of children, is abhorrent, and we now know there has been far more of it than was originally perceived. It is, however, important to point out that claims are not usually made against individual perpetrators; one can understand why there would not be much sympathy for a claim being brought, however late, against such a perpetrator. The usual defendant is, for example, a school, religious organisation, local authority or even central government. They may or may not have any knowledge of what happened but, because of the expanded doctrine of vicarious liability, will be deemed in law to be responsible for what occurred. They may or may not be covered by insurance.

As Lord Brown pointed out, there will come a time when it is quite simply inappropriate, many years later, for claims to be brought before the court. However sympathetic one is to the victims of sexual abuse, the law currently caters adequately for the balance between the interests of claimants and defendants. If we include Clause 82 in the Bill, I fear we will make bad law. The clause should not stand part.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have signed Amendment 289. This is the first opportunity I have had to speak in Committee because of family illness, and it is good to be back.

In a previous group of amendments last week, the Committee heard the concerns of a number of Peers worried that the Government’s proposals might not ensure a fair route to reporting child sexual abuse. This amendment is just as important, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling it. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for his helpful exposition of the legal details. I come to this as a champion for victims, rather than from the legal perspective.

Despite the many concerns about those accused of child sexual abuse being able to escape from the accountability provided by the courts, the Bill, in Clause 82, lines 3 to 11, lays out a specific route for those accused who the courts “must”—a strong word; we note that it does not say “consider”—cease action against if the defendant in question claims

“there would be substantial prejudice to the defendant”

if the proceedings were to proceed. To put it bluntly, this is a gift to any defence lawyer. Much of the evidence heard by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse was scenario after scenario where senior people—clergy, politicians, police officers, magistrates and so on—were able to cover up what had happened because they were in a position of power over the victim, and, quite often, over potential witnesses too.

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Moved by

[Baroness Brinton]

293: After Clause 82, insert the following new Clause—
“Removal of limitation period for historical child sexual offences(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) In section 9 (sexual activity with a child), after subsection (3), insert—“(4) An offence is committed under this section regardless of when the offending activity was committed.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause ensures there is no limitation period for offences under section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 293 in my name is very straightforward and necessary. Victims of child sexual abuse and other offences often do not come forward themselves at the time of the offences. Research has shown that, on average, it takes around three decades for a survivor to get the courage to come forward—and then even longer to get to court. As a result, almost all abuse claims are brought outside the statutory time limit. The problem is that, if the survivor cannot convince the court that a fair trial is possible, the claim falls and the victim can never get justice.

All the various strands of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, which were referred to earlier—including the Westminster report, the Anglican Church report, the Catholic Church report and the children in custodial sentences report—said that it was usually decades after the offences that victims reported what had happened. Frequently, this then gave other victims the confidence to come forward too, in exactly the way that happened after the BBC presenter Nicky Campbell spoke up in 2022 about the abuse at his school, the Edinburgh Academy, decades before. The abuse there involved arbitrary violence on boys under 11, including choking, throwing them down stairs and various other disgusting forms of abuse.

In September 2023 an ex-teacher, Russell Tillson, was jailed for sexually abusing boys. Beginning in the 1980s, it continued for 20 years, but allegations were first made only in 2018, nearly a further two decades after the teacher had retired. Both cases are absolutely typical of the behaviour of perpetrators and, indeed, of victims.

Earlier this year the Government said they were minded to consider removing the limitation period, but we believe that it needs to happen now and be in the Bill. The amendment seeks to remove any limitation period for historical child sex offences. It just must not be possible for a perpetrator to escape justice because the victims were too traumatised to come forward until years later. I beg to move Amendment 293.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I need not take very long, because she has explained her very straightforward amendment impeccably. After the brilliant previous group led by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, and her team, perhaps there is no need to go into all the quite serious sexual contact included in Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act that need not necessarily be tried in the Crown Court.

I support the amendment for two simple but important reasons. First, there is some very serious sexual activity with children that could be tried in the magistrates’ courts—there is not necessarily a problem with that. Secondly, there is the obvious reason of historic child abuse and victims coming forward sometimes only many years after the fact. Those are very good reasons to depart from the norm of the six-month time limit and, indeed, to have no time limits at all.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord has explained it rather better than I did.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to everyone who has spoken. I am probably the only non-lawyer in this debate, and as it is my amendment I feel something of a duffer.

I am very grateful for the advice. I came to this amendment after reading the recommendations of IICSA, and what concerned me particularly was picking up that people who had come forward years afterwards were told that things were timed out—that might have been a decision by the CPS to say that it felt that it would not be effective going to trial. However, I very much appreciate the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, because I have experience of the issue of which court deals with issues through my interests in stalking and other domestic abuse cases, where often that is the place that things happen. All the description that has been given for “no time limits” has not been for the magistrates’ court, excepting the detail that the noble Baroness provided, which is way beyond my knowledge.

There is the difficulty that Professor Jay reported. In two cases where I was heavily involved with the victims, decisions were made initially by the CPS and the victims were told that they had timed out. That may not have been the case, but that is what they were told. In another case, when there were three pupils from the same school all giving evidence, none of them knowing each other, the first victim was told by the judge, “Yours is over 20 years ago; you can’t possibly remember what happened and therefore it’s timed out”. That is what is happening in the practice of the courts. Professor Jay’s report spoke to the experience of the victims. We have gone into extraordinary technical detail that many victims would be completely oblivious to. I would be very grateful for a letter. If there is an easy solution, it may just be that it needs to be clarified with the police and the CPS. There are a lot of unhappy victims out there. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 293 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Brinton]

315: After Clause 86, insert the following new Clause—
“Commencement of the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act(1) Section 4 of the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 is amended as follows.(2) Leave out subsection (3) and insert—“(3) Sections 1, 2 and 3 come into force on the day that the Crime and Policing Act 2025 receives Royal Assent.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause automatically commences the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 when the Crime and Policing Bill receives Royal Assent, removing the need for regulations to bring the Act into force. The Act criminalises the public harassment of individuals where that harassment is based on an individual’s sex.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 315 seeks to do something very simple but long overdue: automatically commence the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 when the Crime and Policing Bill receives Royal Assent. The Act requires the Government to pass a statutory instrument to commence its provisions. We have been waiting two years now for this SI, so the Act is not in force. Of the four sections in the Act, the only one in force is Section 4, on the extent, commencement and Short Title of the Act.

As with other groups this evening, this amendment has a cross-party background. It is worth noting and giving credit to Greg Clark, the former MP for Tunbridge Wells, because this was his Private Member’s Bill, sponsored by him and given time by the then Conservative Government. Greg said he had heard some harrowing experiences of school students in his constituency. It is really shocking that one in three girls reports being sexually harassed while wearing a school uniform. In our society in 2025, that is unacceptable. The 2023 Act creates a new specific offence of harassment on account of an individual’s sex.

The amendment to this Bill was tabled in the Commons by my honourable friend Mike Martin MP, who is now the MP for Tunbridge Wells. Like Greg Clark, Mike Martin believes that the Government need to create the statutory instrument to bring it into effect, but there has been nothing other than warm words from Ministers—no action has happened. The Act criminalises harassing, following, shouting degrading words or making obscene gestures at women and girls in public places with the deliberate intention of causing them harm or distress. This offence will carry a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment and under the Government’s new proposal would clearly still come under the magistrates’ courts, whereas in the past it would have not been able to, but would have had to go to a Crown Court. As Mike Martin MP said in the Commons debate, sexual harassment is a blot on our society.

The statistics are damning. Some 71% of women in the UK have experienced sexual harassment in public; this rises to 86% among women aged 18 to 24. The lack of action from this Government on ending the sexual harassment of women, especially young women, is not good. Mike Martin MP tabled a Written Question on this back in the spring, and the Government said then that they would publish their next steps. However, more recently, the Government said that it will be done in due course. To be honest, this sounds as though it is further away than the next-steps offer made earlier this year. The amendment says that now is the time.

Greg Clark’s Private Member’s Bill had cross-party support and this amendment also had cross-party support when the Bill was debated in the Commons. I worry that this Government cannot deliver on their manifesto commitment to halve violence against women and girls when they will not take this straightforward first step to challenge and prevent the appalling sex-based harassment that continues to be so evident everywhere in the UK. I look forward to the Minister’s reply but, above all, I urge that now is the time for action on this matter. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness’s amendment for the reasons she gives and for a further reason, which is that I deprecate the practice of Ministers of all Governments of not bringing into force legislation which has been enacted by Parliament. Parliament intends legislation to come into effect; otherwise, we are wasting our time debating and approving it. Parliament enacts legislation to address a mischief, as, in this case, the mischief that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has identified. Of course, I understand that sometimes time is needed to prepare for the effects of legislation, perhaps because implementing regulations are needed, but after two years, it is high time for this legislation to come into force.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for raising the important issue of public sexual harassment. As has been discussed, Amendment 315 seeks to automatically commence the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 when the Crime and Policing Bill receives Royal Assent. I remind the Committee that this Government have been responsible for periods of activity since July 2024, not for two years. As members of the Committee will know, tackling public sexual harassment is an important part of the Government’s mission to halve the levels of violence against women and girls in a decade.

As the Committee knows, and as I have said on numerous occasions, including today, the new violence against women and girls strategy is to be produced as soon as possible. It will include a range of actions to tackle sexual harassment. I reassure the noble Baroness, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, that the measures we are developing within this to address sex-based harassment include options for commencement of the 2023 Act.

I echo fully the sentiments of the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and agree that timely implementation of legislation is an important principle to follow. I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that, if we pass legislation, we must look to introduce it. The Government have heard what noble Lords have said: namely, that we need to set a timeline for the commencement of the 2023 Act. It is important to fully consider the issues of implementation of the new offence, including engagement with the police and operational partners. We want to ensure that, when the offence comes into force, it is used often and well.

I assure all noble Lords who have spoken today that the Government intend to commence this offence as soon as is reasonably practicable. By bringing the provisions of the 2023 Act into force through the usual commencement regulations, we can ensure that this can be timed so that the police and others are ready. Accordingly, I suggest that the amendment is unnecessary. I ask the noble Baroness to be patient and wait for our violence against women and girls strategy, which will appear in short order. In the meantime, I hope she is content to withdraw the amendment.

I say that because we are looking at options to commence the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023. We believe that it will tackle this issue and ensure that women feel safer on our streets. On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as with all primary legislation, we need a preparatory period, but my officials in the Home Office, along with my ministerial colleagues, are working through the next steps. We are taking the time to get this right. I assure noble Lords that we will provide an update in due course and that they will not have too long to wait.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am struggling to get what I have just heard right. Earlier this evening, we discussed a number of amendments in which we were not supported because we expect to see the strategy on violence against women and girls. This is completely different. There is legislation that is on the books but has not been commenced. Can the Minister explain why it cannot be commenced now? It is a completely different issue from what is going to be in the strategy, where there may be surprises. The Minister has told us that it will be commenced. What is the delay?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We are looking with police and other partners at the stage at which we wish to commence the legislation. We have been in office since July last year; my honourable friend Jess Phillips, the Minister for Safeguarding, is undertaking a considerable amount of work to pull together the strategy, which we expect to be able to announce in very short order. As part of that strategy, we are looking at a range of measures, including harassment. I accept that that is on the statute book now, but it is important that we produce a package of measures that is whole and includes a range of things, which I am not at liberty to talk about today but are in genesis for the violence against women and girls strategy that we will publish shortly.

We are now in Committee. Report will happen at a later stage in this Session. I very much expect that by then we will have published our violence against women and girls strategy, and I hope that at that stage the noble Baroness will not need to look at pressing this amendment further. For the time being, I ask her to give us time to consult further, make sure we implement this correctly and allow the violence against women and girls strategy to be published. I would be grateful if she would not push her amendment at this stage but reflect on what I have said. If not, we will return to this in due course.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for his response, even if I am still somewhat bemused about the hierarchy of decisions going on in relation to this Bill when there is actually something on the books. However, I will hold him to his word. If we do not have clear indications of the VAWG strategy and when things will happen by, I will bring back an amendment on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 315 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch. Both amendments have been spoken to very well and very strongly.

I want talk about one particular case, of a sex offender called Clive Bundy, who was in prison for some years for sexually abusing and raping his daughter, Ceri-Lee Galvin, from a young age. It was incestuous sexual abuse and rape. He went to prison in 2016 and before he was released, he declared he was a woman. Bundy then changed his name via deed poll, very generously helped and abetted by the prison authorities, to aid his release.

I have spoken about this issue in this House before, and there are a number of reasons why it has been brought to my attention. One reason is that Clive Bundy changed his name to Claire Fox—consequently, I know about it. Claire Fox now wanders freely. However, the most important reason is that I was contacted by his daughter, Ceri-Lee Galvin. Before we had the Supreme Court ruling, I raised this a number of times in a number of Bills to note that Ceri-Lee Galvin as a victim had been badly betrayed by this story. She was never told that her incestuous, rapist father was being released, because he was not—Claire Fox was. And of course, guess what? If you google Claire Fox, you will get horror stories, but they are about me and not him.

In all seriousness, it was a deed poll change. Therefore, Clive Bundy might well be on the sex offenders register, but Clive Bundy does not exist. Claire Fox exists, but Claire Fox is Clive Bundy the rapist and is therefore free to live in the same town as his daughter, which he has done, and he has harassed her. I will not go into the details, but Ceri-Lee Galvin has been incredibly brave in giving up her anonymity to talk about this story to the press various times. As she says, she cannot get anywhere when she tries to lobby on this point.

Therefore, in theory, Claire Fox—Clive Bundy—is not on the sex offenders register and can apply to work with young children in the local area, where her daughter goes to nursery, and nobody knows that this person is a child rapist. There must be something that the Government can do to strengthen the safeguarding, which I know is their intention in this group of amendments. Therefore, the two non-government amendments should be seriously taken up by them. They would not contradict their aims but would ensure that their aims are more than just written on paper but actually protect victims and future victims.

It is not a question of making a moral judgment. I do not care whether Clive Bundy thinks that he is a woman; that is irrelevant to me. I do not even care that he has taken my name—which, by the way, is a fashionable thing to do; to use a gender critical name is apparently a form of trolling which happens in America quite a lot. But that is irrelevant. The point is how we protect people when have a sex offenders register that does not reflect reality.

By the way, special privacy measures are given, meaning that when I have asked questions in the past, I have been told that because this person has chosen to change gender and is therefore now Claire Fox, they cannot investigate Clive Bundy. If Clive Bundy as Claire Fox turns up for a meeting to volunteer with the Girl Guides, no one can even ask whether they are the same person. We cannot even go there. This is ridiculous and it is not what the Government want. Therefore, I hope the Government are open to these two very important amendments on deed poll and gender recognition certificates.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I want first to pick up on the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, and both her comments and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and ask the Minister a question. Am I right in thinking that given that the Prison Service—and I think also the Probation Service—must do a full assessment of risk on any transgender prisoner, the protections they seek are already there?

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, for raising the case of Karen White. The Scottish Prison Service apologised because it did not do what it should have done: a full risk assessment. Had it done that, she would not have been placed on a women’s wing. I therefore hope the Minister can confirm that the protections for the public, particularly for victims, remain, because now, following the Karen White case in particular, real care is taken to make sure the law is followed. I would find it extraordinary if crimes were just dropped off the list because somebody had a transgender recognition certificate—so could the Minister confirm that this is not the case?

Turning now to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones’s amendment, we on these Benches also welcome Clause 87, but it needs strengthening. My noble friend’s amendment is very clear: we have to be able to stop offenders changing their names without the knowledge of the police. That also plays into the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean. Research from the Safeguarding Alliance has shown that key legislation is being made redundant because of a loophole that people can use to get through the cracks. This is not just about transgender issues; it is about people just changing their name regardless of their gender. Frankly, this makes Sarah’s law and Clare’s law utterly useless. I hope the Minister is prepared to consider this.

The remaining amendments in this group, from the Government, look as though they are sensible adjustments to the arrangements regarding sex offenders obtaining driving licences in Northern Ireland. We look forward to hearing from the Minister in more detail on those.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I was not going to participate in this debate until I heard about the Scottish case and the Scottish Prison Service admitting that it got it wrong and that it did not carry out what they should have done.

I recall Julia Hartley-Brewer interviewing the SNP Scottish Justice Secretary. The Justice Secretary was saying that it was terribly difficult to reach an assessment, make a judgment and try to get it right. Julia Hartley-Brewer said, I believe, “What is the problem? Just look down his trousers and you will find the answer”. I commend that as the best answer I have ever heard.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It may help the Committee if I say that both the original name and the new name would be recorded. For clarity, where a DBS check applicant has changed their names, they are required to state all names that they have been previously known by on the application form. In submitting that form, applicants sign a legal declaration declaring that they have not knowingly provided false information. Failure to disclose previous names and deliberately avoiding detection of previous convictions would lead to an individual being liable for prosecution. I hope that helps to clarify the position with regard to the amendments. I invite the noble Lords not to press them at this stage.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am on the “how to change your name” government website, which says that if you are a sex offender, violent offender or terrorist offender, you must go to your local prescribed police station where you are known within three days of changing your name. It is a criminal offence if you do not tell the police straightaway. There will be probation and other things going on in the background as well.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

It is worth clarifying that this group of people are not necessarily the kind of people I trust. This idea that a local sex offender—or terrorist, since we have been talking about Bondi Beach—thinks, “God, it would be against the law if I didn’t declare that I’ve changed my name”, and would be frightened by the possibility that they would be breaking the law, seems a tad naive.

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I support Amendments 330AA and 330AB in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the government amendments in this group. I understand the rationale for Amendments 331 and 332 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Brinton, but I do not support them, as an independent review of stalking led by Richard Wright KC is already under way. It is currently expected to conclude by March 2026, but I say to my noble friend the Minister that ideally the timing should be brought forward so that key recommendations could be considered while the Bill is on Report. I wonder whether this might be possible. Perhaps my noble friend, in light of the new strategy, will tell us that we might expect another Bill in the next Session of Parliament. Who knows? I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 330AA, 330AB and 330C. I have also signed Amendments 331 and 332 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I support the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, which start at Amendment 330A. She and I have been involved in strengthening the law for victims of stalking since the stalking law inquiry in 2011, which led to the first stalking laws, enacted 13 years ago on 25 November 2012.

Two decades ago, I was stalked for three years by my Conservative political opponent when I stood for Parliament in Watford. After he was caught in 2008, even though he pleaded guilty to over 60 crimes, including criminal damage to property and criminal damage using a knife, there was no separate crime of stalking from harassment. So the abusive and some sexual literature that was circulated widely on the streets, the anonymous letters to residents, the silent calls late at night when I was on my own in my flat and the feeling of always being watched just did not count in the court—other than as the same as an argument between neighbours over the height of a hedge.

The police came and advised us on security and precautions for our house, and my then teenage foster son had to learn from the police how to always put on plastic gloves before picking up any post. I never knew which of my supporters the stalker would target next. Now, we recognise that this is a tried and tested formula for stalkers—going for their friends, their family and, in this case, my political supporters.

When the stalking law came in it was much welcomed. However, after it was implemented, the practicalities became clear. Often, neither the police nor the CPS would use a charge of stalking until that case was proven beyond all possible doubt. So there was no mechanism to provide protection to victims of stalking earlier in the perpetrator’s fixation. That is why the stalking protection orders, introduced in 2019 by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, were thought to be a really helpful tool to help dissuade perpetrators and give reassurance to victims that they would be safe. But we have to consider now whether they are fully effective.

This group of amendments seeks to address the weaker points of SPOs, the result of which is causing considerable distress to victims of stalking, both domestic and non-domestic. My Amendment 330AA seeks to better protect victims from offenders who try falsely to use educational or religious reasons to gain proximity to their victims. The Bill currently states that the prohibitions or requirements in an SPO should

“avoid … any conflict with … religious beliefs”,

and with attending work and educational establishments. Although that is not inherently objectionable in itself, it should be a matter for guidance and probably not in the legislation, as this clause would give priority to an offender’s right to freedom over the safeguarding of the victim. We know that stalking perpetrators already use religious beliefs in attempts to contact their victims, in defiance of protective orders. There are examples of offenders claiming to attend the same religious institution as their victim in an attempt to be allowed into the area. The problem is that the inclusion of the clause in the Bill risks these claims becoming more commonplace. Thus, it should be dealt with in the form of guidance.

My Amendment 330AB would ensure consultation with victims when SPOs are varied, renewed or discharged. Currently, there is no requirement to hear the views of the victim—if they wish them to be heard—despite the fact that the victim is the individual being protected by the SPO and thus may have relevant information that the court should hear prior to making a decision. It is unreasonable to expect the police or other authorities to know all the details of a victim’s activities, so it is important that a victim’s views are sought prior to an application being decided upon.

This amendment would require police to consult with a victim following an application to change an SPO. As an illustration, Lisa is a victim of stalking, and her offender made an application to vary certain terms of a restraining order. The proposed changes—allowing the offender to travel down certain arterial roads on the pretence that it was their route in and out of London—seemed inherently reasonable. However, it was only when Lisa’s views were sought that it became evident that the road included a petrol station she frequented and cut through a park in which her children walked regularly. This information would not have been readily available if the victim was not consulted. In this case, the information provided by the victim enabled the CPS to mount an effective defence. The application to vary the terms of the restraining order was then denied.

Amendment 330C would create a requirement to issue guidance on SPOs. Currently, the Bill says that the Secretary of State “may” issue guidance in relation to stalking. A briefing, along with many other significant pieces of work, such as the stalking super-complaint and the HMICFRS reports, made clear the confusion and inconsistency when it comes to the response to stalking. The need for guidance is clear. The Domestic Abuse Act’s section on guidance states that the Secretary of State “must” issue guidance. This amendment proposes similar wording to support future clarity and consistency.

Amendment 331 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to which I have added my name, is important. It would ensure that stalking is part of the VAWG strategy, which is due to be published this week, while also ensuring that the terms of reference for the Wright review cover non-domestic stalking; too often, the police do not take that seriously. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, that the review is under way. We did not withdraw the amendment because we wanted to make sure that some of the details discussed today will be covered.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful again to my noble friend for referring to the LinkedIn experience. My assessment, having discussed this with officials and with my colleague Ministers, is that the statutory guidance for police includes prohibitions on contacting the victim by any means, including social media. If my noble friend will let me, I will reflect on what she has said today, and I will discuss again with officials whether the guidance in its current format is sufficient to cover that point. That is my understanding, and I think it is a reasonable understanding to put before the Committee today.

Amendment 330C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, would replace the power for the Secretary of State to issue multi-agency statutory guidance on stalking with a duty to do so. This would align the provision on guidance with the Stalking Protection Act 2019 and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, supported the general direction of travel that the noble Baroness brought forward in her amendment. I agree that it is important, where appropriate, to ensure that legislative provisions tackling violence against women and girls are consistent. Accordingly, this is an amendment that I am happy to take away for further consideration and to discuss with officials.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I think the key question is why it is acceptable that there are different rules for “may” and “must” between this and domestic abuse protection orders.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

If the noble Baroness will allow me, we have agreed that we will take Amendment 330C away and have a look at it. That is not a guarantee that we will do something with it, but it is an opportunity to reflect on it. She can examine what, if anything, the Government do, and she can determine whether to table it again on Report.

Amendment 330B, again tabled by my noble friend Lady Royall, would introduce a stalking protection notice that could be imposed by a police superintendent. I think my noble friend’s motivation is to ensure that swift action can be taken. However, on reflection we view that introducing such a notice would potentially put further complexity into the legislative framework without significantly improving protection for victims. We also need to consider the proportionality of a police-issued notice backed by a criminal offence of breach that denies the respondent the opportunity to argue their case before an independent judicial tribunal. Failure to comply with a police-issued domestic abuse protection notice is not a criminal offence for this reason.

The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, tabled Amendment 331, which would provide a statutory review of the effectiveness of two stalking offences, and Amendment 332, which seeks to provide a statutory review of stalking awareness guidance. I hope the noble Baroness can accept—this goes to points that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and my noble friend have also mentioned—that work is currently being undertaken on both these issues. In December 2024 we announced six new measures to tackle stalking, including a commitment to review the criminal law on stalking contained in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. As a number of speakers have referenced, we have already appointed Richard Wright KC to lead the review. It is intended to be completed by the end of March 2026. We have given a timetable. I do not think it is right and proper that we change that timetable now, as a number of noble Lords suggested. The review will consider measures to achieve clarity in the legislation. On completion of the review, the Home Secretary will consider the findings and recommendations before determining next steps, potentially including further legislation. I hope that helps the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.

There are a number of government amendments to the provisions in Clause 99. We have done this with guidance from stakeholders in the criminal justice system. Government Amendments 330AZB to 330AZE and 330AE clarify the process for appealing the making of a stalking order. Our Amendments 330AC and 330AD provide for applications to vary, renew or discharge a stalking protection order and avoid applications having to be heard by a higher court. Amendments 330BA, 330D, 522A and 547A extend the provisions in Clauses 97, 98 and 100 to Northern Ireland to allow the courts in Northern Ireland to make stalking protection orders. They have been introduced in conjunction with the Department of Justice and allow it to issue guidance to the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The changes have been brought forward in amendment form at the request of the Minister of Justice in Northern Ireland.

I hope I have been able to assist in part my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton—supported by the noble Lord, Lord Russell—and Lady Doocey. I undertake to examine Amendments 330A and 330C further ahead of the next stage. On that basis, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Brinton]

335A: Clause 104, page 133, line 39, at end insert—
“(1B) A person does not commit an offence under subsection (1A) where—(a) the person is a victim of domestic abuse within the meaning of section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and(b) the act of detaining the child outside the United Kingdom was attributable wholly or mainly to safeguarding themselves or the child from domestic abuse.(1C) In determining whether subsection (1B) applies, the court must have particular regard to—(a) any evidence of domestic abuse directed towards the parent or the child, and(b) any risk that return of the child would expose the parent or child to further abuse.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and another in the name of Baroness Brinton, is intended to probe the effect of Clause 104 on victims of domestic abuse.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendments 335A and 335B, which relate specifically to child abduction across the United Kingdom. Government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549 relate specifically to the abduction, detaining and retention of children abroad who came from Northern Ireland—I was about to say “in Northern Ireland”, but that would be a tautology.

I am very grateful to all the organisations that have written to a number of Peers regarding child abduction. My two amendments are probing amendments, in which we seek to understand how Clause 104 will work and what the effect will be on a person who is a victim of domestic abuse, within the meaning of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and who takes their child outside the UK to safeguard themselves or the child from domestic abuse, or who gets abroad and then decides to remain abroad to continue to safeguard themselves or their child.

Clause 104 arises from a recommendation from the Law Commission following the case of Nicolaou in 2012. That case focused on whether a parent commits an offence under Section 1 of the Child Abduction Act 1984 if they initially have the appropriate consent to take a child outside the UK, for a defined period, but then fail to return the child after that period expires. The background is this: a father took his son to Cyprus for an agreed contact visit but did not return him to the UK at the end of the specified time, despite court orders from both Cypriot and English courts for the child’s return. An arrest warrant was issued for the child abduction.

In June 2012, the High Court ruled that an offence had not been committed under Section 1 of that Act in this specific scenario. The section, as written at the time, applied to the act of taking or sending a child out of the UK without consent, not the failure to return them after a period of consented absence. This case, along with another, R v Kayani 2011, highlighted a significant loophole in the Child Abduction Act 1984, which the Law Commission subsequently made recommendations to address. Its recommendation in its report Simplification of Criminal Law: Kidnapping and Related Offences is very legalistic in its approach. It makes no reference to having considered domestic abuse as a defence, for example, or even a contributory factor.

Article 12 of the 1980 Hague convention on abduction provides that, where a year has elapsed after a child has been wrongfully removed to or retained in another contracting state, the court has a discretion not to require the child’s return if the child is

“settled in its new environment”.

Clause 104 makes it a criminal offence to retain a child outside the UK “at any time” after the child is taken or sent outside the UK without the appropriate consent. It therefore criminalises conduct in a situation where a court may decide not to order the return of the child to the UK. Clearly, this is not in keeping with either the spirit or the letter of the Hague convention.

Additionally, it could significantly hamper efforts to enable the safe return of children and their taking parents—the parents who removed them—and could increase the number of cases where children are compelled to return alone, without their mothers, possibly to the care of an abusive father or to state care. My question to the Minister is: what is the position of someone who uses a defence of being a victim of domestic abuse as the reason why they have not returned to the UK with the child? If a court were asked to adjudicate on such an issue, would it demand evidence of abuse? I ask that because your Lordships’ House knows that in such cases, often the victim mother—it usually is a mother—will have been living in the UK with the perpetrator of domestic abuse and coercive control, but not many would have been to the courts. On that basis, what protection is there for that victim and their child in this position?

The real problem is that the Law Commission report, which has informed Clause 104, does not cover this difficult territory at all—nor do the Explanatory Notes for the Bill. My amendments are genuinely to probe the Government’s intention on how they would manage a case that involved domestic abuse and coercive control. While we agree that Clause 104 is important, letting it pass without taking account of the complex issues relating to those parents who are fleeing domestic abuse will be problematic and could even lead to miscarriages of justice. I beg to move.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, we should be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her probing Amendments 335A and 335B, raising the problem of wrongful retention of children in the context of the criminal law and, in particular, the Child Abduction Act 1984. Essentially, that Act criminalised the wrongful taking of children, but not their wrongful retention after the end of a permitted period of contact.

In 1984, when the omission of unlawful retention was pointed out in debate on the Child Abduction Bill, as it then was, in another place, it was not addressed by the then Government. Indeed, the opposition spokesman at the time, now the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, said that it must be “for another day”. Moving on to 2012, the continuing discrepancy was highlighted by the decision of the High Court in the case of Nicolaou, referred to by the noble Baroness, which was indeed a classic case of unilateral retention of a child abroad in the face of court orders. In 2014, a Law Commission report speculated about the rationale for the difference between removal and retention cases and recommended what the Bill now seeks to do in Clause 104.

So, 41 years after the noble Lord, Lord Dubbs, spoke of “another day”, it now seems to have arrived. Unjustified retention of a child can be both irresponsible and very harmful. Whether the decision to retain the child is planned or is more spontaneous, it can have a considerable emotional and practical consequence for all concerned, not least the child. I suspect that, with a little more analysis and resolve back in 1984, we would not be where we are today. However, there have been significant developments in the intervening period to make us think about what, if anything, is currently required in legislative terms.

First, as the noble Baroness has mentioned, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is now well established as a successful measure that deals with most cases of this sort, providing for the immediate protection and swift return of children to their home country when justified. In most cases, the use of the Hague convention, coupled with any necessary consequential proceedings in the home country, means that the wrongful retention of children is adequately and firmly dealt with in the family courts without recourse to criminal proceedings.

Secondly, there is now a far wider understanding of the nature and effects of abusive and alienating behaviour and attitudes as experienced by mothers and children, and, to some extent, by fathers. This is the sort of behaviour covered by the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. In reality, the retention of children by one parent occurs within a very wide range of scenarios. These are fact-sensitive cases. At one end of the range is the spiteful and vindictive parent who wants to remove the child from the other parent’s life. At the other end of the range are the cases of fearful and protective parents who realise that the child is at risk if returned to the other parent. In between those extremes are any number of variable situations and motivations.

The Law Commission report noted:

“The general policy of the law is that parental disputes about the care of children should be pursued in civil rather than criminal proceedings”.


If that is the general policy, criminalisation should be reserved to a limited number of cases of this sort, and criminal prosecution should be seen as a last resort to mark disapproval of plainly wrongful and harmful retention of a child. Moreover, overlapping criminal and family court proceedings should be avoided wherever possible, and the use of, or threats of, criminal prosecution should remain well out of the armoury of most warring parents. That is why, when resolving Hague proceedings, many parents often formally agree not to instigate or support criminal proceedings against each other. Such agreements remove one source of control and recrimination, and they serve to keep the focus on the children rather than on the parents’ grievances against each other.

I therefore hope that the Government will accept the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, or at least undertake some further analysis of what is needed for cases where the parent concerned is seeking to safeguard themselves or the child from harm. If not, will the Government confirm that any prosecution of these offences will continue to require the consent of the DPP under Section 4(2) of the 1984 Act? Will they confirm that there will be a restrictive approach to the prosecution, and that the guidance on prosecution will be reviewed and updated to cover the important points raised by the amendment?

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling Amendments 335A and 335B. Her amendments have been grouped with the modest collection of government amendments—336, 496, 521 and 549—tabled in my name, which extend the provisions contained in Clause 104 to Northern Ireland.

I note the concern raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Davies, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that Clause 104 will criminalise parents who are fleeing domestic abuse where the detention of the child is primarily motivated by the intention of keeping themselves and/or the child safe. I reassure your Lordships that this absolutely is not the intention of the existing Clause 104. Indeed, in developing the provisions, very careful consideration was given to the implications of potentially criminalising a parent who has detained their child abroad.

Before I turn to the reasons why the Government will not be supporting these amendments today, I want to explain a little more about the purpose of Clause 104’s inclusion in the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her clear and even-handed explanation of her understanding of the reason why the Government included it in the first place. The clause seeks to implement the Law Commission’s 2014 recommendation that the Government should close a small gap in the law by making it a criminal offence for a parent, or person with similar responsibility to a parent, to detain a child abroad without appropriate consent, once the original consent has expired.

I am sure that I do not need to explain to anyone that the abduction of a child by a parent is an extremely distressing experience for everyone involved. For any Government, the aim is to safeguard children from abduction by preventing the unlawful removal of a child, ensuring their swift and safe return when they have been taken and upholding custody rights through international co-operation and legal enforcement. The new measure is intended to be consistent with the existing criminal framework, to stand as a deterrent and a backstop where we know that a gap in the law is being exploited, even if by very few people. Some of those who have not returned a child are themselves abusers; they are abusive parents seeking to evade the law. We cannot leave that gap unclosed.

However, I have listened very carefully to the concerns raised by your Lordships this evening, and to some sent to me by organisations with an interest in this area. I remain satisfied that there is no risk of vulnerable parents who have been victims of domestic abuse being criminalised. I hope I shall be forgiven for setting out my reasons in a little more detail; I alluded to them earlier in relation to an amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, but that was in a slightly different context, and I think I need to give more detail.

Many of your Lordships will be aware that there is a two-stage test for the Crown Prosecution Service to apply when deciding whether a prosecution should be brought. The first is an “evidential sufficiency” test but, even if that stage is passed and it is felt that there is sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution, that is not the end of the matter. The second stage is the “public interest” test, which asks whether the public interest requires a prosecution to be brought. It is this stage of the test that is often applied in, for example, assisted dying cases. This is important, including in a domestic abuse context, because it means that prosecutors must consider the background, including whether the alleged offender was acting from benign motives or was themselves a victim of domestic abuse, before deciding whether a prosecution is required in the public interest. Additionally, and importantly, a third test applies for the new offence in Clause 104 which adds an additional safeguard: that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is required for a case to proceed.

Prosecutorial discretion remains a key safeguard, and evidence of domestic abuse would be a highly relevant factor in any decision to prosecute, or in whether the Director of Public Prosecutions would give his consent in addition. Factors that are relevant to the public interest do not require proof to the criminal standard. It is a much more “in the round” assessment than would be required if bringing some kind of criminal proceedings.

To be clear, in answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, the Government continue to believe that the civil courts remain best placed to deal with child abduction cases. That is why we support international co-operation and recourse to the 1980 Hague convention as a civil mechanism for facilitating the safe return of children. The UK continues to work with other state parties and the Hague Conference, especially in cases involving domestic abuse, to ensure that the convention operates effectively. The noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in effect agreed, that this prosecution should be the act of last resort. We agree. We are conscious, however, that criminal proceedings may be needed in some cases. It has been suggested that some parents see detaining a child abroad following any earlier consent as an easier route to keeping their child permanently outside the UK with no criminal charges or police involvement. That clearly circumvents the law. This change to the criminal law is intended to sit alongside and supplement existing civil remedies, rather than filling the courts with people who have retained their child abroad.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asks whether the Government would be prepared to add a domestic abuse defence, in effect. The law on defences, including those relevant to domestic abuse, is highly complex. It requires definitions and decisions about where the burden of proof lies and what the standard of proof will be. It is precisely because of this complexity that the Law Commission is currently reviewing defences in domestic abuse cases as part of its wider project on homicide and sentencing. While the primary focus of its review is on homicide, the findings are likely to have broader implications for how defences operate in domestic abuse contexts and could be relevant across a broader range of offences. A bespoke defence of domestic abuse in the offence created by Clause 104 could have implications far beyond the child abduction framework.

I hope that the noble Baroness will accept from me that the Law Commission’s findings will be carefully reviewed before any changes to the law are considered, in order to ensure that any legislative changes are informed by evidence. In the meantime, we are exploring ways to strengthen our understanding of how defences operate in non-homicide cases by gathering more robust data. For these reasons, it would be premature to legislate before the Law Commission has completed its work, but I take the point about the equality impact assessment and the gendered nature of some of these offences. I will, if I may, write to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and, obviously, to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, as well.

I turn very briefly to government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549. Until now, the provisions in Clause 104 extended to England and Wales only. However, at the request of the Northern Ireland Executive, these provisions will now also apply to Northern Ireland. I note the concerns raised by the two amendments brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but I hope that, for the reasons I have set out, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment at this stage. I hope your Lordships will join me in supporting the government amendments in this group.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to all those who have spoken. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hacking and Lord Davies, for their implied support. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for their detailed responses to the amendment and the debate we are having. They rightly confirmed that criminal proceedings must be a last resort, and that we should always aim for these cases to be settled via the family court and through the Hague process.

I am particularly grateful to the Minister for her detailed response on the two-stage test, especially the public interest test. If that is where domestic abuse issues can be assessed, that is good. I am also grateful that she has repeated that the consent of the DPP must be obtained, and that this is not up to the criminal standard. That is very reassuring.

It is always difficult when the Law Commission is working on something, because one cannot say “When is it going to be done?” I hope that it will not be too long. If issues remain after the Law Commission reports, I hope that the Government, or a future Government, will be prepared to discuss this at that point. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 335A withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, on his courage in raising these issues. I am going to say little more than that, other than that I was instrumental in getting a sentence added to the code of conduct for members of the Liberal Democrats, which says that no one has the right to not be offended.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, set out the principles that he believes are important to secure freedom of speech by removing the words “abusive or insulting” from a number of pieces of legislation. From these Benches, we absolutely accept freedom of speech. But I want to pick up on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Young, made when he quoted John Stuart Mill. There is a second half to the sentence about the right to free speech. Mill says that

“the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”.

It is on preventing harm to others that this entire debate is balanced.

I am sure that there are many justifications for feeling that freedom of speech is being curtailed for people who just want to express their opinion. But the reason that we have the laws we do at the moment, particularly since the 1950s, is due to the harm that has been done to others. I think there was reference made earlier to the Race Relations Act of 60 years ago; that was in the consequence of very overt racial harm done to entire communities in our society. John Stuart Mill would have absolutely supported that legislation to protect. That is what the balance is between our freedom of speech and our responsibility as parliamentarians to protect those, particularly the most vulnerable, in our society.

That is why I want to go back briefly—not quite as far back as the Race Relations Act 1965—to when the original provisions on hate crimes were first introduced by the Blair Government in 1998. There is no doubt that this was partly in response to growing concerns relating to the ineffective policing of and legal responses to racist violence, which, again, was then very evident on our streets. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, and her family had campaigned for this more robust legislative framework, and not just because it was much clearer that, as a society, we did not and should not accept hate-motivated crimes, especially towards particular communities and those with protected characteristics.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I will ask this very briefly, then. Is there a problem that young people and the police do not appear to be able to distinguish between microaggressions and genocide? Is it one line?

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention and her questions. I say, with great courtesy to the Government Whip, that her first question does not relate to the amendment because it is not about an offence. She was talking about the pre-banning of people and asking whether harm is so broad. However, that is a debate we need to have as society.

That leads into the noble Baroness’s second question about whether young people can distinguish. I think young people can distinguish. Part of the issue is that we as an older generation do not understand that a lot of them take a great deal of care about their colleagues because they have been brought up in a society with the rules, as opposed to having to introduce them, and they have seen exactly the concerns that I was raising. We need to continue to debate this but, bringing it back to this amendment, the point is that none of those issues is about offences.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for this interesting debate. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for moving Amendment 382F, which I support. Although it ranges across several statutes, it is in truth a coherent proposal with a clear constitutional purpose: to restore the proper limits of the criminal law so that freedom of speech is protected, while of course ensuring that genuinely threatening conduct remains criminal.

At the outset, I recognise the political sensitivity of this area. Any proposal to amend or repeal so-called hate speech provisions risks being misrepresented as indifference to racism, misogyny, homophobia or other forms of discrimination. Let me be absolutely clear: that is not the motivation behind this amendment. As my noble friend said, we on this side of the House oppose racism and discrimination in all their forms. The case for this amendment is not moral indifference but legal realism. The current framework has proved incoherent, ineffective and, in some respects, actively counterproductive.

As my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea most ably set out, the current legislative framework dealing with offensive language, hate speech and the like is a messy, tangled web of patchwork offences. We have the Malicious Communications Act 1988, Sections 4A and 5 and Parts III and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986, and Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. These provisions criminalise speech not because it threatens direct harm but because it is deemed “abusive” or “insulting” or said to cause a person “needless anxiety”.

I am not ignorant to the fact that we have had laws in this country prohibiting the usage of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour for almost a century. Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, now repealed, stated:

“Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence”.


But there are two crucial differences between that legislation and this. The 1936 Act was set against the background of rising fascist paramilitaries, first in Italy and then in Germany and, indeed, in Britain. Secondly, use of the language

“with intent to provoke a breach of the peace”

is very different from outlawing insulting language likely to cause a person “needless anxiety”. I think even a child could understand the difference between inciting a riot and causing a person mild offence.

Yet this is where we are. A person can claim to have been caused “annoyance” or even “inconvenience”, complain to the police and have another individual investigated and potentially arrested. That is not hyperbole; it is the truth. There is a litany of recent examples that we could trawl through, but many have been mentioned by noble Lords today so I will mention only a few, as briefly as I can.

As we have heard, the Malicious Communications Act 1988 was used to arrest Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, the two parents who have been referred to. The same Act was used to arrest a 17 year-old boy for comments he posted on Tom Daley’s Twitter account:

“You let your dad down i hope you know that”.


While this is obviously poor behaviour, to claim it should be a matter for the law and constitutes criminality is deeply concerning. Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 was used to prosecute a person who posted a picture online with a phallus drawn on it; Jordan Barrack was ordered to pay £400 in compensation for a post that did not cause any harm to anyone. Again, how this case ended up as a matter for the authorities is beyond me.

Of fundamental importance is the fact that the terms we are dealing with here are not precise legal concepts. They are elastic, subjective and dependent on perception rather than consequence. The result is uncertainty for the public, inconsistency in enforcement and an unhealthy transfer of quasi-judicial discretion to individual police officers who have recently taken to very liberal and, indeed, unequal enforcement of these laws.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The issue we are trying to get to is where the boundary is between free speech and abusive behaviour. The police would have had problems saying that it was threatening if she said, “Oh, I was just dancing around the chair”. This is what they explained to me at the time. The issue that protected me was that she was abusive and insulting, and they could record it. Had they been able to find her, they could have checked to see whether it had happened elsewhere, which they thought would have been likely. That moves into the area of the next group, so I will not talk any further, but I am very grateful to the noble Lord for raising that.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that explanation. She clearly demarcated our difference in view as to where the line should be drawn. I suggest to noble Lords that it is important to draw the line at the threat of imminent violence. That has been a principle in the past, but it has been breached by recent laws and actions by the police.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, kindly supported this amendment—

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[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment of my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I also declare my interest as a director of the Free Speech Union. I will make three arguments against the statutory hate crime regime, and against embedding the concept of hate crime in British law. As we have heard, and as we are all aware, the concept of hate crime is inextricably bound up with protected characteristics. A hate crime is either the stirring up of hatred against the bearers of certain protected characteristics, or it is a crime that becomes a hate crime because the perpetrator is motivated by hostility towards one or more of the protected characteristics of the victim.

The number of protected characteristics in this statutory framework, however, varies from law to law. Hate crime law, on the face of it, is for that reason slightly confusing and incoherent. There are three protected characteristics in the stirring-up offences in the Public Order Act, five are referenced in the aggravated offences regime, seven in the Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act, and nine in the Equality Act. How can we rationalise this anomaly? The solution of successive Governments has been constantly to add new protected characteristics to the statute book. I dare say it is possible that, in due course, amendments will be made to the Crime and Policing Bill to add yet more protected characteristics to the criminal law.

The direction of travel is clear: the number of protected characteristics is constantly expanding, and various lobby groups are constantly petitioning parliamentarians to add ever more protected characteristics to the statute book. The end point of this process will be that every characteristic is protected; but if every characteristic is protected, then no particular characteristic will enjoy special protection and we will, in effect, be back to where we started pre-1965, before the concept of hate crime raised its head in British law.

My first argument is that, in the interests of saving us all a great deal of time and effort, can we not just short-circuit the process of getting to the point where every characteristic is protected by stripping out the concept of hate crime and protected characteristics from British law and returning to the pre-1965 status quo?

My second argument has been touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, which is that the concept of hate crime is at odds with the sacrosanct principle of equality before the law. Why should bearers of protected characteristics enjoy more robust legal protections than non-bearers? Why is a criminal offence motivated by hostility towards a victim’s transgender identity punished more severely than exactly the same crime motivated by the victim’s sex? Sex is not a protected characteristic, apart from in the Equality Act. This two-tier justice—this sense that some people, because they happen to belong to protected groups, enjoy additional legal protections—fosters grievance, breeds resentment and undermines public trust in the law and in the police in particular. In 1981, around 87% of Britons reported having confidence in the police. By 2022, that had fallen to about 67%, a substantial long-term decline. I would suggest that one of the reasons for declining public trust in the police is this sense that some groups are better protected than others because of the hate crime, protected characteristic regime.

My third argument, which is probably the strongest argument, is that the aggravated offences regime introduces the concept of thought crime into British law. We need to distinguish between mens rea and the particular thought someone is having towards the victim while committing a particular crime. I do not think, when assessing the seriousness of an offence, you could exclude motive. It would be absurd not to take motive into account, but that is different from punishing a crime more severely if a person is experiencing a particular emotion—hostility, hatred—towards a particular group that the victim of the crime belongs to. Mens rea is universal and does not discriminate, but hate crime does. It says that if you are having particular thoughts about the victim when you commit the crime—importantly, not hatred in general, but hatred based on their possession of one or more protected characteristics—you should be punished more severely.

Not only is this criminalisation of certain thoughts a hallmark of a totalitarian society, but, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan pointed out, it is very hard to prove. It is very hard for a court to determine whether the person accused of the crime had the verboten thoughts while committing the crime. To paraphrase Queen Elizabeth I, we cannot open a window and see into men’s souls.

I am perfectly aware that an amendment stripping the concept of hate crime from British law has little chance of winning a Division in this House, so let me close with some more modest proposals. Do not add any more protected characteristics to the list of aggravators. Extend Section 29J of the Public Order Act, which protects various forms of criticism of religion and makes it more difficult for people to be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred. You can criticise a religion, even quite robustly, thanks to Section 29J and not be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred.

One useful improvement to the hate crime statutory regime would be to extend Section 29J to the other stirring-up offences. For example, the Free Speech Union paid for the legal defence of a former Royal Marine called Jamie Michael. He robustly criticised illegal immigrants in a Facebook video and, as a consequence, he was prosecuted for intending to stir up racial hatred. It took a jury in Merthyr Tydfil all of 17 minutes to unanimously acquit him of that offence. He should never have been prosecuted. We need a protection in the Public Order Act whereby, if you make robust criticisms, even of legal migration, you should not be vulnerable to a charge of stirring up racial hatred.

Finally, an anomaly in the stirring-up offences is that you can be prosecuted for stirring up racial hatred if the effect of your words or behaviour is likely to stir up racial hatred, even if that is not your intention—whereas you can be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred or hatred on the basis of sexual orientation only if you intended to do that. That is an anomaly, and my recommendation would be that a two-limb test has to be satisfied before one of the stirring-up offences can be made out. To successfully prosecute someone, it should be incumbent on the Crown to show not only that what they said or did was likely to stir up hatred against the protected group in question but that they intended to as well. That would bring British law to a certain extent into line with the Brandenburg test in the US first amendment, whereby you can be prosecuted only if your words or actions are not only likely to but were intended to cause imminent lawless action.

So, accepting that this controversial proposal that my two colleagues have bravely made is unlikely to ever win enough support in this House as presently constituted to win a Division, I urge the Committee to consider those more modest reforms.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for setting out his arguments for abolishing hate crimes. He started with the issue of freedom of speech again—I absolutely understand that that is where he and those supporting him are coming from—and, interestingly, he cited the case of Lucy Connolly. I thought it might be helpful to remind the Committee of part of Article 10 in our Human Rights Act 1998, which says:

“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression”—


we are shorthanding that to “speech”—but it goes on to say:

“The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”.


I have carefully quoted all of it, but I will focus on the part that relates to what she was convicted for.

Coming back to our debate on the previous group, the problem is that there is a lot of concern about big figurehead cases when, actually, the law, the judge and the jury—actually there was no jury because Connolly pleaded guilty—were clear that she was inciting racial hatred. She pleaded guilty of saying threatening and abusive material, which is interesting given what we debated on the last group. She said:

“set fire to all the”—

effing—

“hotels full of the bastards”.

She said that at exactly the time that people were on the streets, some of whom were trying to set fire to the hotels. The tweet was viewed 310,000 times before it was deleted, and the judge specifically cited that in his summary at the end of the case.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for accepting my intervention. I just wanted to point out that the noble Baroness did not quote Lucy Connolly’s tweet in full. She added the caveat “for all I care”, which suggested not that she was intending to encourage people to burn down asylum hotels but that she was indifferent as to whether they did so.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

Fortunately, the judge took a different view. I think that we have to accept—and I was not the judge and do not know what his thoughts were—that the tweet was clearly seen enough times by the public at the moment when a small number of people were causing real concern outside hotels that had asylum seekers in them who had absolutely nothing to do with the Southport stabbing. That was the issue. Therefore, I believe that this is exactly where the balance lies between rights and responsibility, to go back to John Stuart Mill, where we started in the previous group.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for letting me intervene. Will she agree that it is unfortunate that there is a general perception that this lady—on whose case I do not rest any of my argument, or place any reliance, as I discussed in my 40-page submission to the Macdonald review—was inveigled into pleading guilty by being kept on remand in a case where it would not have been usual to keep such a person with such an alleged crime on remand? She pled guilty because she thought that she would be released early—more fool her, it turns out—and as a result of her pleading guilty, the matter referred to by my noble friend Lord Young, that she said “for all I care”, which may have turned out to be an excuse that led to her exoneration in front of a jury, much like that 17-minute jury decision that he mentioned, was never litigated, so that we could have discovered what the law said as to whether her tweet reached the standards for criminal conviction. Does the noble Baroness not think that unfortunate?

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I do not think that it is unfortunate given that the judge said that 310,000 views of that tweet happened at a time when there was discord on the streets. My argument is not about Connolly’s case; it goes back to Article 10 in the Human Rights Act, which says that along with freedom of expression or freedom of speech there are rights and responsibilities, and it is the role of the state to have laws to protect people. It cannot have been right to think that even one person seeing that tweet could have started one of the arsons in the bins outside one of the asylum seeker hotels. I do not know whether that happened; the point is that 310,000 people saw it, and that is the difference with her last phrase, which probably most people did not see or did not take in the way that the noble Lord has indicated—he has raised his eyebrows at me, but there are different ways of taking it. I do not want to get into the detail of that; I am trying to make the argument that, for every instance of freedom of speech by an individual, there are quite often consequences that may or may not end up as a crime as well. That brings me back to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, raised earlier—that the level of hate crimes is increasing. We also know that hate crimes are seriously underreported.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

I apologise for intervening again, but does the noble Baroness not accept that had that matter been litigated it would not have been before the judge? It would not have been for the judge to rule; it would have been before a jury, which is something that we in this country enjoy and that unfortunately there are moves to suppress. It would have been in front of a jury, and a jury would have been able to decide whether that final point justified her exoneration.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The noble Lord said that he did not rely on Lucy Connolly in his earlier argument; he is now trying to rely on that case here. I am trying to make the point that it is more complex than he made out in his earlier contribution. I would like to make some progress, if I may.

The previous Government’s LGBT survey in 2018 showed that fewer than one in 10 LGBT people reported hate crimes or incidents. The noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, has explained one of the reasons for that. The other reason, I know from friends who have also experienced this sort of hate crime, is they do not believe that the police will do anything. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Young, that that is one of the reasons why there is concern about the police: too often, people who are targeted in this way feel that they do not get the help that they need.

As has been described, there is no single piece of hate crime legislation. It includes aggravated assault, which the noble Lord, Lord Young, was particularly concerned about. The point about hate crime is that it is not just the individual; the protected characteristic means that they and their community are also affected by it. We have spent many hours on previous groups on this Bill discussing the absolute abhorrence of antisemitism. If actions in Israel can cause people in the UK to start attacking members of our Jewish community, either verbally or against a person or their property, then that is absolutely unacceptable. That is one of the reasons why I would never want hate crimes to be removed.

Research by Professor Mark Walters of Sussex University shows that hate crimes do not affect just those individuals targeted; he describes them as having a “ripple effect” through their wider communities. Some people will avoid certain routes and places, and others will not leave home at all, particularly in our Jewish communities at the moment, but the same is true in certain areas for our Muslim communities. If laws about hate crime are weakened or repealed, it would send an appalling message to these communities of faith, as well as to LGBT and disabled people. Do the supporters of the amendment really no longer regard it as important that the state recognises the communities that have protected characteristics—their vulnerability—as warranting distinct legal recognition and criminalisation?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, once again, this has been a very interesting debate and I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for tabling Amendment 382G. This amendment contains a line of argument that the Committee began to consider in the previous group: namely, whether the criminal law should concern itself with what people do or whether it should also punish what people are thought to feel or believe.

The provisions targeted by this amendment fall broadly into two categories. First, there are ordinary criminal offences—assault, criminal damage, harassment and public order offences—where existing penalties are increased if the court concludes that the offender was motivated by hostility towards a protected characteristic. Secondly, there are freestanding offences, particularly under the Public Order Act 1986 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which criminalised the stirring up of hatred, even where no violence or other recognised criminal harm has occurred.

The crux of the debate comes down to this: two identical acts can result in radically different sentences depending not on the harm caused but on an inferred state of mind. That inference might be drawn from sparse or ambiguous evidence, yet it carries profound consequences for liberty. This could make prosecutions more complex, investigations longer and outcomes less predictable—hardly a recipe for clarity or fairness. These laws have grown incrementally and unevenly; they overlap, diverge, and sometimes contradict one another. The result is a body of legislation that is difficult to understand, inconsistently applied and increasingly divorced from public confidence.

This amendment offers the Committee an opportunity to step back and ask whether this approach has genuinely improved justice or whether it has instead distracted our criminal justice system from its core task of tackling real and harmful crime. This is a point that I would particularly like to emphasise. As a former police officer myself, I understand the difficulties in enforcing laws that are passed by a well-meaning Parliament but are incoherent and ill thought through. Part of this problem does indeed lie with us, the lawmakers. Successive Governments and Parliaments have not taken a coherent approach to public order and speech legislation. They have passed statute after statute, simply adding to the already long list of different defences, not thinking to consolidate or repeal existing laws.

When the Public Order Act 1986 passed, it contained seven offences of this nature. The previous Labour Government passed the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Sections 28 to 33 of which created racially aggravated offences. They then passed the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which added a new Part 3A to the 1986 Act, and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 added hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation to the list of hate crimes. The Sentencing Act 2020 also permits for any offence to be aggravated by hostility expressed towards any of five characteristics.

This Government are going down the same path, as we have already discussed in Committee. Clauses 107 and 108 of this very Bill contain further provisions criminalising the use of offensive language based on racial hatred aimed towards an emergency worker. If the Government think it is coherent to simply bolt new offences on to the already vast array of legislation, then I respectfully suggest that they are somewhat misguided.

Furthermore, far from promoting cohesion, these provisions have too often deepened division. They have encouraged grievance politics and fostered public mistrust. They have also placed the police in an impossible position, asking them to arbitrate not just behaviour but belief and expression.

There is a further concern about effectiveness. These laws, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea mentioned, are clogging the justice system with cases that pose no real threat to public safety, while doing little to address genuine hatred or violence. At the same time, they have fed a broader culture in which accusations of hate are used to silence debate, discourage inquiry and deter people—artists, teachers, academics and ordinary citizens—from speaking openly.

Freedom of speech is not an abstract luxury; it is a defining feature of our national character and a cornerstone of democratic legitimacy. I thank my noble friend for enabling this fruitful debate and hope that the Government will consider it carefully.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness: I read that quote as well and was very worried about it, and the idea that we should all aspire to total surveillance and living in a panopticon. When I saw that—it has been doing the rounds on social media—I assumed it was fake news. I cannot believe that from a Labour Cabinet Minister, even from a Home Secretary—we know funny things happen to people when they go in the Home Office; I was there myself for a bit. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will assure us when he responds that there is no question of building a total surveillance state or, indeed, Bentham’s panopticon. I share the noble Baroness’s concerns, and I am grateful to her for raising them.

I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for, I think, answering the question that I put to him in the previous group, which is that his objection is to a single compulsory identifier. I share his concerns if that is the problem. I would not want us all to have to carry a single compulsory identifier, digital or otherwise, which becomes a licence to live that you can have demanded of you at any time. The compulsory element was always the problem, not having an optional identifier —for instance, if you choose to have your passport or driving licence on your phone instead of as a physical document. I understand that even lots of noble Lords now pay for their refreshments with their mobile phone; this is the world that we live in. The problem is with a single compulsory identifier, not with the option of having a digital ID, as opposed to a paper ID. I hope he will nod and indicate that we are in the same place on that.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I also support Amendment 415 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which seeks to introduce a new safeguard for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 regarding the potential future use of digital identification by law enforcement. I too am grateful for his explanation about the single identifier. I remind your Lordships that there were a number of amendments in some Home Office Bills about three years ago when the Home Office was trying to get access to DVLA data and, indeed, to personal medical data for anyone who might have been present at the scene of a possible crime—not the victim or the possible perpetrator, but anyone who was literally just present. I am glad that, in opposition, his party has decided to change its approach on this. It is very welcome.

I also echo the good news that the amendment is, I hope, fully redundant because of the Government’s announcement, but I look forward to making sure that some of the very minor concerns being expressed are recognised by the Government.

This amendment would provide the protection to individuals, should the Government introduce a digital identity document scheme, that a constable would be expressly prohibited from requiring a person to produce such a document on request or asking for it to be produced for inspection. Crucially, it would also prevent the police using

“any information contained within, or obtained from, a digital identity card for the purposes of investigating a criminal offence”.

That echoes the amendments that our Benches tabled to earlier Home Office Bills.

We on these Benches are fundamentally opposed to any form of compulsory digital ID. We must ensure that a digital identity scheme does not become a tool for “papers, please” policing in a digital format. As organisations such as Big Brother Watch have warned, the expansion of digital identification, such as the proposed access to the DVLA database for facial recognition, risks creating a huge and disproportionate surveillance power that, in effect, places the majority of law-abiding citizens in a permanent digital police line-up without their consent. Can the Minister confirm that it is the case that surveillance will not be used?

The Government have previously suggested that digital ID could serve as an alternative form of ID for specific purposes such as age verification for online sales. However, without the explicit prohibition contained in Amendment 415, there is a significant risk of mission creep. If we allow the police routinely to use digital ID as part of their investigative toolkit, we fundamentally shift the relationship between the individual and the state. This amendment is not about obstructing modern policing; it is about ensuring that privacy rights and civil liberties remain the default. We must codify these protections now to ensure that any future digital identity framework cannot be weaponised into a widespread surveillance system.

From these Benches we are glad about the Government U-turn, but we need more detail to ensure that those protections remain. It is for Parliament and not for operational police discretion to set the boundaries for how the state identifies its citizens. I urge the Committee to support this amendment and hope that the Ministers will give us an encouragement that it is not needed.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for setting out the case for Amendment 415. He says a week is a long time in politics, but I am going to take him all the way back to the announcement on 26 September from the Prime Minister that the Government were intending to introduce a national digital ID scheme for all British and Irish citizens and those with permission to be in the United Kingdom.

The national digital ID will empower people in their lives and their interactions with the state. It will make it easier to access public services, cut back on bureaucratic processes and support fairness across society. The national digital ID scheme will be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny in due course. In the short term, we will examine options for appropriate oversight and safeguards of the digital ID, with a public consultation set to launch soon.

As has already been said publicly, the digital ID will not be required when a person is stopped by the police using stop and search powers. This was picked up in this debate and the debate on the previous amendment by, among others, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. It will not be mandatory for those eligible to obtain the digital ID and, as such, there will be no penalty for not having one.

Law enforcement use of data is governed by Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018. This places a range of obligations on law enforcement, including requirements that law enforcement processing of data must be necessary and proportionate, for a specific purpose and not excessive. All three noble Baronesses who spoke raised concerns over a move towards a surveillance state—certainly, that was the theme of the speeches by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. To be clear, the new digital ID will not be used for mass surveillance of the population and will be designed in accordance with high standards of security and privacy. We will ensure safeguards are in place to make sure that any access to data is both necessary and proportionate.

As I said, the public consultation will be launched in the coming weeks. This will ensure that any legislation includes appropriate safeguards. I am sure that, without much prompting, my noble friend and the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Fox of Buckley, will be first in the queue to contribute to that public consultation.

--- Later in debate ---

The main thing is that, without her knowledge and behind the scenes, over a period of time there were some arguments about whether or not that deserved an NCHI. Instead, in her file is written, “Crime: harassment motivated by transphobia because of misgendering. No action”. That was not a non-crime hate incident but it was generated in relation to a non-crime hate incident. So can the Minister assure us that the habit of recording non-crime will not merely be replaced by the word “crime” and that the creation of a shadow Orwellian crime-recording procedure with no due process will not replace getting rid of non-crime hate incidents? I want to see the back of them, but I fear that the ideology that has informed them is well and truly alive and kicking, and that needs to be tackled too.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, for his contribution because he set out the balance between non-crime hate incidents and non-crime incidents and the difference between the two. One of our concerns on these Benches is that—I am going to use the phrase he used, for which I apologise, but I had already written it down—in looking at this amendment, we must not throw the baby out with the bathwater. That is really important, and I will explain why in some detail later.

I remind the Committee that, in considering our two amendments about hate crime last week, I referred to the recommendation Combating Hate Crime by the Council of Europe, which says that

“hate can be manifested with different degrees of severity, ranging from everyday stigmatisation and discrimination, microaggressions and verbal abuse, to violence, terrorism, war crimes and genocide”,

which is an enormous spectrum. The reason why non-crime incidents, whether hate-related or not, need to be recorded is that often, the perpetrators go on to escalate their behaviour.

I have referred before in this House to being stalked by a political opponent for three years. Before we could get the police to take it seriously, we had recorded some 75 incidents, probably half of which were crimes but half were not. As things escalated, it went from minor crimes to the perpetrator using a very large knife on tyres. The police psychologist said, “If we don’t get him now, it will be people next”. It is that entire spectrum of behaviour, with some incidents ending up being part of a crime, that means we cannot just throw out all non-crime incidents.

I am afraid that the same is also true for non-crime hate incidents. I am grateful that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, referred to the appalling case of the antisemitic attacks, because those would go as well if this amendment were accepted, since there would be no capacity for the police to start monitoring and recording such things until they tipped the balance into a crime, even though the damage was done in those earlier incidents, repeatedly to the same group of people. I think of friends of mine who go to synagogue in one town, and of young Muslim friends in my home town of Watford who are shouted at on their way to worship every single week by the same small group of people. Probably neither of those would even get to the first bar of being recorded as a non-crime hate incident; but, if their behaviour follows the typical course and escalates, and the police have not recorded anything, they have nothing to go back over. So I beg the movers of this amendment to—

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

What the noble Baroness has described is a crime. Those people shouting racist abuse at Jewish people or Muslims on the way to a mosque are committing a crime under the existing legislation that has been in place for many years. It has nothing to do with the recording of police intelligence, which is unfettered by this amendment, and it is certainly the case that what she has described is de facto a criminal offence.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I referred to the comments made by previous speakers on this group who talked about police wasting their time recording. The two groups of people I have just referred to have tried to report these incidents and have not been able to get them taken particularly seriously. Therein lies the problem. I absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, that there has to be new, revised, clear guidance about how the police need to process these things. It may be that there will be many that are not now processed, but we cannot just say that we should get rid of non-crime hate incidents in their entirety.

A lot of the other speeches during this debate have talked about the polarisation in our society being because people are now saying things to others, with people becoming offended. We discussed this briefly last week. The things being said to people on the street would not have been said five or six years ago. People might have thought them as they walked past, but it was quite rare. We are deeply offended if it targets us. We often do not recognise when we are being offensive to other people. I say again: there is something about the way our society is working at the moment that means we have to learn to look at ourselves, not just at the others we do not like. The police, who are literally trying to police all this, are in a very invidious position. They need tools to record information because it helps them to assess and understand when other things happen. It is much broader than non-crime hate incidents, as I have alluded to already.

Paul Giannasi OBE, the national hate crime lead for the police, has been reviewing the current protocols and his recommendations for a new code of practice will be very welcome. I am sure, from what the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, has said and from what I have heard elsewhere, that there certainly will be changes. We have to understand that the key issue here is balancing those individual rights: the absolute freedom of expression as expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—he and I had a debate about JS Mill last week—alongside the state’s obligation to protect citizens against targeted victimisation. The police must be able to gather intelligence and evidence and log symbolic messaging to targeted groups. All the other things—about whether those end up on DBS—can be looked at as part of this review, and I am sure they will be. But the police need to see that bigger, wider picture.

One of the problems about the Lawrence murder was that the police were not watching what was happening in that community in the months and years running up to it. That institutional blindness was certainly one of the things that came out of the inquiry. As others have said, the monitoring of such incidents was the result of the recommendations by Sir William Macpherson as part of his public inquiry in response to Stephen Lawrence’s murder.

I come back to this point: in terms of practical value, the police must be able to record incidents that do not in and of themselves amount to criminal offence, because many crimes, such as I described with harassment, and indeed with stalking, require evidence of a course of conduct. People say to me, “Oh, but stalking is always about relationships; that’s not about a hate crime”. Quite a lot of stalking is actually non-domestic, and it is targeted at somebody because of a particular characteristic.

I finish on the point I made right at the start about the evidence that police need for this course of conduct if behaviour escalates. If a group of people go out and do things again and again, there is a point at which it is going to tip over. I was party to and a survivor of something that ended up as 132 crimes; once the police saw all the evidence that we had been holding of the earlier non-crime hate, it was extremely helpful when things started to escalate. Reform is absolutely needed. We hope that the review will have recommendations for a new regime. But I also hope that it will not leave victims vulnerable, either from perpetrators whose behaviour escalates or from police who are not quite clear about the role they have in recording non-crime incidents.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

In conclusion, this is about proportionality. Yes, children should not escape punishment, and a fine or penalty fare is entirely appropriate, but a criminal record for 11 years for a first offence by a child is totally disproportionate.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have signed my noble friend Lord Marks’s Amendment 420 and thank him for his excellent explanation. I am also reminded that our noble friend Lord Dholakia has campaigned for decades for a review of the way in which society deals with children in the criminal justice system. His principal concern, and the subject of a number of Private Members’ Bills, was on increasing the age of criminal responsibility, and we will address that specific issue in the next couple of Committee days. He also expressed some concerns about the treatment that children and young people who had entered the criminal justice system would face later on.

Reference has been made to David Lammy’s review. I also remind the Committee about Iain Duncan Smith’s report for the Centre for Social Justice in 2012, in which he said:

“There is now a significant body of research evidence indicating that early adolescence (under 13-14 years of age) is a period of marked neurodevelopmental immaturity, during which children’s capacity is not equivalent to that of an older adolescent or adult. Such findings cast doubt on the culpability and competency of early adolescents to participate in the criminal process and this raises the question of whether the current MACR”—


minimum age of criminal responsibility—“at ten, is appropriate”. I think that also reflects on cautions and convictions for that age group, although I recognise that my noble friend’s amendment goes right up to the end of childhood.

All the amendments in front of us look at how convictions and cautions are handled and how they are disclosed. Mention has already been made of the organisation FairChecks. It has called for a major review of the criminal records disclosure system. Interestingly, it produced the same evidence as Iain Duncan Smith about the capacity of people of this age to understand and take responsibility for their actions. As has already been mentioned, young people hoping to move on suddenly discover that in trying to get work or a promotion they have to disclose their criminal records, and too often, on top of the almost inevitable rejection letters, their shame emerges once again, destroying their chance of creating a new life once they have served their time.

FairChecks proposes that there should be an automatic disclosure of a caution in criminal records, the slate should be wiped clean for childhood offences and we should stop forcing people to reveal short and suspended prison sentences for ever. But, it says—as has every other speaker so far today—safeguards must remain in place for more serious offenders in order to protect the public. At the same time, it would give individuals the chance to move beyond their childhood criminal record so they could get work and forge a new life as an adult, and the first steps towards that would be a review. I hope the Minister will look favourably on Amendment 420.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to move Amendment 420A. Although it is in my name, it is a product of tireless campaigning from my honourable friend Helen Grant MP. I thank her for her long-standing commitment to this issue. It is thanks to her unwavering commitment that we are one step closer to making a child cruelty register a reality.

I thank the Government for their ongoing communication with us on this important topic and their assurances that they would like to implement a policy that supports a child cruelty register. When this amendment was tabled during the passage of the Sentencing Bill in your Lordships’ House, government officials requested that it be reserved for Home Office legislation, rather than that of the Ministry of Justice. That is why I am moving this amendment today.

This proposed register would be very similar in kind to the register for convicted child sex offenders, for whom notification requirements already exist. It would ensure that those convicted of cruelty to vulnerable children must notify the police of their home address and other relevant details following their release from prison. The register would act as a safeguard by providing the police with the oversight needed to manage offenders and reduce the risk to children. It would mean that those who commit cruelty to children in a non-sexual manner cannot simply disappear back into the community.

These provisions already exist for sex offenders, and we see no reason why they should not similarly pertain to those convicted of child cruelty. Although the offence is different, its effects are detrimentally serious in nature. Child cruelty is a heinous crime that can have a lifelong impact on victims and affects the most vulnerable individuals in society.

Common sense requires that those who commit crimes such as allowing the death of a child, neglect of a child, violence towards a child, infanticide or female genital mutilation should not be able to slip under the radar in local communities once their custodial sentence is spent. There should be a centralised mechanism for the police to know where these people live. This is particularly so given that, in the vast majority of child cruelty cases, the offender has parental responsibility for the victim. They are therefore likely to have connections to the child’s guardian, who, in many cases, will be a family member.

There is a clear gap in the child protection systems that unnecessarily endangers children. The child protection system must exist to free children from the conditions of cruelty towards them, but it must also contain preventive measures to ensure that children are not placed in such appalling situations. Child cruelty offences have doubled in the past few years; now more than ever, it is important to act swiftly to curb this rise. Given the Government’s previously stated support for this measure, I hope that the Minister will be equally able to offer her support today.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, my colleagues in the Commons very much supported Helen Grant in her campaign for this amendment. I pay particular tribute to Jess Brown-Fuller MP. It is very helpful that it has been directed to this Bill, and we on these Benches are very pleased that the Opposition have laid the amendment to this Bill.

It is getting late, and I will not speak for very long. The only other people we need to credit are Tony Hudgell and his parents. After being taken away from his birth parents, he has lived for many years with his foster parents, who he describes as his parents. He has endured 23 operations after injuries that resulted in him losing both legs when he was a toddler. That is the sort of cruelty—although unusually bad in this case—that the amendment is intended to address. For all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, outlined, we absolutely support the progress of this amendment, and we hope that the Government will look favourably on it.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, notification requirements received attention during the passage of the Government’s Sentencing Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for ensuring this important matter remains firmly on our agenda. I join the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in paying tribute to Helen Grant MP and to Paula Hudgell, both of whose tireless campaigning has done so much to advance the protection of children. As my noble friend Lord Timpson set out in Committee on the Sentencing Bill, this Government are committed to safeguarding children and ensuring robust measures are in place to protect them from those who seek to cause them harm. We are working hard to consider the best way to manage such offenders effectively.

We are unable to support the amendment at present, as further work is needed to determine the most effective way to strengthen offender management. We need to consider fully all aspects of implementation when it comes to adding notification requirements to a new cohort of offenders, particularly in light of the Government’s recently published violence against women and girls strategy, which sets out significant reforms to offender management.

It is right that we take the time to understand the potential impact of these proposals. One of the issues is that adding notification requirements to a new cohort of offenders would involve significant costs for policing. For example, notification duties such as taking biometric data, verifying personal details, recording changes, conducting compliance visits and managing ViSOR data must all be absorbed into the general workload of the police. One of the tasks for the Government is to reflect that this could mean shifting resource from other important areas of police work.

I can reassure noble Lords, however, that since December, Home Office and Justice Ministers have met regularly to discuss options in this space and have held initial discussions with national policing representatives. So, I can add my reassurances to those already given by my noble friend Lord Timpson: Ministers will continue to pursue this issue with vigour. With these reassurances, I hope that at this stage the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I am never sure what a probing amendment means, because surely all our amendments are probing, and I certainly would support both these amendments on Report, because they are actually crucial. Although I am vastly older than the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I, too, have been working on this for quite a long time, but only for two and a half decades. The number of police officers who have, in some way, been found guilty of a crime and yet still get their police pensions and all the benefits of having been a police officer for some years, however badly it has ended, really is annoying.

Police officers do a very difficult job—I am very appreciative of that and understand the problems—and most do it well. But when someone abuses that role, the damage is much greater for public trust. It is wider than any single case. Trust in policing depends on people believing that no one is above the law. In the previous debate the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made the point that the rule of law is for us all, and I will bring that issue up again when we get to the public whatsit Bill, on—

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

Accountability.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the noble Baroness very much.

At the moment the rule of law is not for us all, as exemplified by the way we treat police in some cases. On pensions, why do the Government prefer decisions about pension forfeiture to be taken later behind closed doors rather than in open court, where reasons are given and can be tested on appeal? If a judge has heard all the evidence in a criminal case involving a police officer, and has seen the harm done and the abuse of trust, why do the Government think that a judge should have no say at all over a publicly funded police pension?

I ask this out of long experience. We have been told for decades now that existing systems are enough or that reforms are coming, and clearly that is not happening. I personally would like to see, instead of these little baby steps, a bold, straightforward move towards the kind of accountability that people can see and understand. Time and again, in cases of serious police misconduct, the consequences remain unclear and invisible to the public.

From the public’s point of view, the current system makes very little sense. Some serious criminal convictions of police officers fall outside the pensions rule altogether, simply because they do not meet a narrow legal definition. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why judges who hear the evidence are excluded and why transparency in court is still seen as a step too far.

When this Labour Government got elected, I really hoped for some changes in the way that we apply a sense of fairness to the whole of our legal system. Quite honestly, they have disappointed me very badly. They are no better than this side of the Chamber. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, we have been waiting a long time for this, and a Labour Government should really put it right.

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The purpose of the Bill is to protect victims. To do so, officers must be able to recognise exploitation, stalking or cuckooing, to handle complex anti-social behaviour and protest laws, and to support victims of online fraud or image abuse. Without robust training to recognise offences, secure evidence and build chargeable cases, these aims will not be met. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to support the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on Amendment 427, and I have signed Amendment 428, which I will address. I come to the issue of mental health because I was present at and contributed to the debate the last time your Lordships’ House reviewed and improved the Armed Forces covenant. Mental health plays a vital part in that. I have friends and family members who are past and present members of the military, and I have seen how the military, over the last 15 to 20 years, has managed and improved its mental health.

That is the position I took when trying to have a look at how our police, not just officers but ancillary staff, are supported when they face difficult circumstances that might put their mental health under pressure. The difference between the MoD’s approach and the College of Policing’s approach is really quite stark. To start with, the College of Policing—I looked at some individual constabularies as well—is all about signposting elsewhere to outside organisations. There is virtually nothing on what happens inside your own organisation if you are a police officer. The front page of the advice rightly refers to the Samaritans first; it then talks about Mind, social media support, and support for police officers and staff experiencing mental illness or distress. Then, and only then, on page four, does it start to talk about what happens inside your own place of employment and how you can find support there.

The contrast with the MoD advice on mental health is that soon after the headline

“Armed forces covenant and mental health”,


it has a massive headline that says:

“Getting advice or help urgently”


for “serving personnel”; it goes through that and then it does it for “veterans”. It starts by saying that

“your first point of call should be your chain of command, unit medical officer, welfare officer or chaplain if you are in the UK or overseas”,

so if you are a serving member of staff you know instantly that your first place is the place in which you live and work, and you have your chain of command—the people above you and the people who may be junior to you.

I recognise that the details of the Armed Forces covenant are different from the employment relationship that police officers have, but before I move specifically on to the amendment I want to say that one of the other things that the armed services learned as a consequence of the Afghan campaign was that they needed to get a much better dialogue going on between staff. They were almost the first people to start introducing mental health first-aiders. It absolutely transformed areas of the military where it was introduced with gusto. This idea about the chain of command meant that there was an instant response from somebody who, like a first-aid trainer, could go and say to a colleague, “Are you all right? Have you got some problems?”, or whatever.

In policing, it appears very patchy as to whether mental health first-aiders are properly encouraged. In fact, the only thing that I could find online was that Staffordshire Police said in 2023 that it had over 50 mental health first-aiders. That is a really good standard, but there is no evidence held centrally about that level. It also indicates the seriousness with which a service, in its entirety, looks after its personnel.

I looked at the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which sets out some criteria to start to gather that information about the response to mental health—not just mental health first-aiders. Again, I could not find anything online that was solely about policing. However, there was a recent report by the King’s Centre for Military Health Research, jointly researched by King’s College London, the OU and the Royal Foundation, entitled Assessing the Mental Health and Wellbeing of the Emergency Responder Community in the UK. That obviously is not just the police; it includes the ambulance service and firefighters.

In its very good research paper, the centre noted that, across the three emergency responder services, there was generally an absence of definitions and very little monitoring and evaluation. The paper talked about the importance of trauma support, including for PTSD. It emphasised, as I have already mentioned, the reliance on signposting to outside bodies and a lack of involvement inside police forces, and it certainly emphasised the lack of data collection and evaluation, including on self-harm, suicide, and alcohol and substance misuse.

The paper noted that there was no real sense of how emergency responder services were going to address what worked and did not work, and therefore whether any training that they were doing was going to be relevant. The paper recommended a promotion of good practice, so that responders know what good practice is, as well as the promotion and extension of support for “mental health/wellbeing ‘champions’”, which I think means mental health first aiders and some of the other forms of that.

The key thing the paper said was that there should be access to a single “Universal Gateway” website, analogous to the MoD page, and that to have that universal gateway there must be a single, universal collection of data and evaluation, so that across the board the police can understand what works and what does not work.

The UK systematic review found 81 recent results of ad hoc research projects, of which 43 were from police forces. Frankly, everybody needs to work together much better to make this work. That brings me back to the amendment, which, at the very least, sets out a route to collect that data right across the police forces in England and Wales. It focuses on a series of issues that I have already mentioned, and it would be a good start to approaching issues of mental health in the way that the military does for its people, which is having success. I hope that the Home Office Minister will look at that when deciding whether or not this amendment should be supported.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 427 and 428, both in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, raise important questions about police training and how best to ensure that officers are properly equipped for the demands of modern policing.

Amendment 427 would require the Secretary of State to establish an independent review of in-service police training. We recognise the important underlying principle of the point being made here. Policing has changed significantly in recent years, not least because of the growth of digital crime, involving investigative techniques and greater awareness of trauma and professional standards. It is entirely right that we ask whether training keeps pace with these demands and whether there is sufficient consistency and effectiveness across forces. An independent review is one way of taking stock of that landscape and identifying gaps or best practice.

However, reviews of this nature inevitably come with costs in time and resource and risk introducing potential further bureaucratic hurdles for the police. It is worth reflecting on whether there may be other mechanisms, such as through existing inspection or the monitoring of professional standards frameworks, that could achieve similar outcomes. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government currently assess the quality and consistency of in-service training and whether further work of this kind is already under way.

Amendment 428 focuses specifically on mandatory mental health training for front-line officers. The intention behind this amendment is clear. Police officers are often the first responders in highly distressing situations involving individuals in mental health crises. A degree of appropriate training in de-escalation and communication is clearly valuable. However, we on this side have some concerns that I hope the Minister can address.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. I think I was making a very slightly different point. I am aware of these courses, but my argument was that what the military has achieved has been through culture change within the entire organisation, rather than just sending people on a course to get a qualification.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is important to do that, but I also say to the noble Baroness that the police are not mental health experts, nor should we expect them to be. At the end of the day, they will be the first responders who have to identify and support people. The work on the Right Care, Right Person project over the last two years by police and health partners, to ensure that people who are in mental health crisis get the right response from the right person with the right training and skills at the right time, is important. That work has shown a decrease in unwarranted police intervention in mental health pathways. We want people with a mental health challenge to have support. The police are dealing with the crisis in the moment, and perhaps the consequential behaviour of the crisis, rather than the underlying long-term trends.

There will always be a role for police in dealing with mental health calls where there is a risk of serious harm. It is important that police have access to relevant health information and use their police powers to do that.

Importantly, as I have mentioned already, there is an important set of training material available, which goes to points that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, mentioned. The College of Police’s mental health training is for all new officers to go through. There is an additional suite of training material I have referred to that provide, I hope, the approach to the culture change that the noble Baroness is seeking. This training provides officers with knowledge to recognise what mental health challenges there are and to communicate with and support people exhibiting such indicators.

I think this is a worthwhile discussion, but I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that it would be helpful to withdraw the amendment now, and we will reflect on the outcome of the White Paper in due course.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not have details of the contract in front of me. I am, of course, aware that there could be commercially confidential issues at play which might prevent the level of disclosure that she wants, but, in the spirit of trying to be helpful, I will certainly go away, take it back and write to the noble Baroness if I can.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very sorry. I am recalling the passage of the Procurement Act, where we discussed at some considerable length what contract could and could not be kept from the public. The detail can be confidential, but the fact of the contract and who it is let to should surely be part of the public domain—it should be on websites.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I will certainly defer to the noble Baroness’s knowledge of the Procurement Bill because I think it went through the House before I was in the House. I am happy to share what detail that we can under the details of that Act. I hope that that satisfies the noble Baroness.

I will also go away and look at the issue of capital funding. I am afraid I do not have the figures in front of me, but of course it is important that we fund all these systems adequately. We would contend that, unfortunately, for the past 14 years some of the investment in policing that we would have liked to see has been lacking, and we have been very clear about our wider approach as a Government to investing, particularly in neighbourhood policing but in policing at all levels. We want to improve on recent experience.

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[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of the amendments, to which I have put my name. As the noble Lord, Lord Hain, has made such an eloquent speech in relation to youth justice, I will concentrate on the police because the arguments are identical. The reason I say they are identical is that the three commissions that have looked at this issue—commissions made up not of politicians interested in hanging on to power but of individuals who have experience and expertise in the systems—have all recommended the devolution of youth justice and the devolution of the police. The first was Sir Paul Silk, the distinguished clerk; then I chaired a Commission on Justice in Wales, which reported in October 2019; and then there was the report of Dr Rowan Williams and Professor Laura McAllister. All recommended the same thing.

In view of the pressing need for a debate to occur at 4 pm—it may be a minute or two early—I refer to paragraphs of the report that we wrote. The police are dealt with at paragraphs 4.77 to 4.151, and youth justice is dealt with at paragraphs 4.181 to 4.195. I give those paragraph numbers in the hope that someone in the Home Office might read them. One of the problems of the report that the commission I chaired submitted is that no one has ever answered it. I assume it has never been answered because it is unanswerable. It is therefore important, in the light of the forthcoming paper on the police, that this point is grappled with.

The two fundamental arguments have been outlined by both the noble Lord, Lord Hain, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. First, if you devolve everything else, you have to devolve police and justice. They are integral to the proper management of a system. Secondly, there is the democratic argument that if Wales is paying the greater part of what it costs, there should be accountability—certainly greater accountability than that enjoyed by the Mayors of Manchester and London. At the moment, the accountability is the other way around.

Where this is so important is that the view used to be expressed that the people of Wales really were not up to governing themselves. That was the 19th-century and early 20th-century view and, thank goodness, is gone. But now one asks: what is the argument against devolution? It is very difficult to see what it is. It will be a testing point as to what will happen on the publication of this White Paper.

The Government are abolishing police and crime commissioners. I express no view as to whether that is a good thing or a bad thing, but it forces the Government to grapple with what happens in Wales. Are they going to set up some elaborate structure to avoid devolution, or are they going to face up to devolution? We shall know the answer to this in the forthcoming White Paper. I hope that the Home Office officials, when they have read the paragraphs to which I have referred, will see that there is one unanswerable response to this question: devolution. On the other hand, if they set up some elaborate structure, no longer will it be said, “Well, the Welsh aren’t quite up to running their own police force”. It might be said, “There are other reasons why politicians don’t like giving up power in London. They want to hang on”. One has already seen reflected in remarks made in and across Wales that it is about time that these important powers were transferred to Wales to make the Government coherent, rather than hanging on to them and to power for what I hope I have wrongly understood—or been told—are purely party-political reasons. I hope that is not the case, but the proof will be in the pudding of the police White Paper.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, we on the Liberal Democrat Benches are grateful to the noble Lady Baroness, Smith of Llanfaes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for tabling Amendments 433 and 434, and to the noble Lord, Lord Hain, for adding his name to Amendment 434. These amendments relate to the devolution of policing and youth justice to Wales.

My noble friend Lady Humphreys has signed both amendments as they agree with Lib Dem policy and our ambitions for Wales, but, unfortunately, she cannot be in her place today. Our manifesto for the general election in 2024 promised to:

“Deliver a fair deal for the people of Wales by … Devolving powers over youth justice, probation services, prisons and policing to allow Wales to create an effective, liberal, community-based approach to policing and tackling crime”.


To the disappointment of many in Wales, the issue of devolving justice to Wales was absent from Labour’s general election manifesto, despite Keir Starmer committing a year before, in 2023, to introducing a take back control Bill to devolve new powers to communities from Westminster. This commitment appears to apply to England only, and gradually, over the months since the election of the Labour Government, their lack of ambition for Wales has become more apparent.

After the State Opening of Parliament in 2024, there was no new mention of new powers for Wales in the King’s Speech. In July 2025, the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, said that the UK Government could row back on its promises on the devolution of probation and youth justice, despite the Welsh Government beginning the groundwork to prepare for what they believed to be a realistic project.

Noble Lords have raised queries about the consequences of the decision taken by the Government in November last year to abolish police and crime commissioners—a decision that those of us on these Benches applauded. At the time, noble Lords from Wales were concerned about the lack of clarity on the Government’s plans for the transference of the PCCs’ functions to Wales. The assumption was that the functions would transfer to mayors in England and to the Senedd in Wales. However, far from providing clarity, the answers they received amounted to pure obfuscation. Now we learn, in what could be described as a slap in the face to the Senedd, that the functions of the PCCs are to be transferred to a new board, placing the Welsh Parliament on the same level as a non-mayoral authority in England.

On these Benches we understand the difficulties so ably clarified by the noble and learned Lord in his contribution to the Sentencing Bill of devolving just one part of a system. But where has English Labour’s ambition for Wales disappeared to? For all the platitudes about mutual respect and co-operative working, the disrespect is beginning to show, sadly. Where is the recognition that Wales has been ready for the devolution of the justice system for the last 25 years at least, and where is the road map for our two nations to achieve that together?

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, I do not come from Wales. I am speaking because I have sympathy, and I have friends there. I remember somebody asking me, “Are you evangelical or Anglo-Catholic?” I said, “Catholic, yes; Anglo, no”. Wales may sometimes feel it is singing that song.

The devolution of justice and policing to Wales are two sides of one coin, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said. To those who tabled Amendments 433 and 434—the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain—I simply ask one question: if policing and youth justice, this one coin with two sides, are devolved to Scotland, why not Wales?

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and my noble friend Lord Hain for tabling these amendments. I speak as Home Office Minister but also as a resident of Wales, a Member of Parliament for Wales for 28 years, a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Wales who helped bring in devolution, and a Welsh Whip who took it through the House of Commons, so I am a supporter of devolution and know my way around this patch. However, I say to the noble Baroness that the Government cannot support in full the direction of travel that she has proposed.

I recognise again the great contribution that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has made on this issue and in his reports, but the view of the Government remains that devolving police and youth justice would require extensive institutional change and carry major operational and financial implications. Devolving policing in particular would undermine the UK Government’s ability to deliver crime prevention and the safer streets mission in Wales.

The noble Baroness raised finance. The position she mentioned in Wales is no different from that across the border in Cheshire. Taxpayers there have a burden of funding carried forward, with UK central support. That is a common issue. The noble Baroness does not have too long to wait, as the police settlement for England and Wales will be issued by the Home Office very shortly. I expect that—

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The noble Lord commented about it not being the right time for Wales, but does this mean that the Labour Government are changing their view about police devolution in Scotland? It works perfectly well.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful for all the contributions to this, as usual, heated debate about recording data. I will focus mainly on data in my response from these Benches.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for starting by quoting some data sources, but neither she nor the amendment acknowledges the existing police guidance about capturing demographic data and annual data requirement 153, all the work already being done by the National Police Chiefs’ Council to review these policies following the April 2025 Supreme Court judgment, and its desire to develop a national standard for recording protected characteristics. In November last year, an equality impact assessment for the Law Enforcement Data Service noted:

“There is no legal obligation on any person with a GRC to inform the police that they have changed their name or gender”.


It is vital that data collection by public bodies has a clearly defined purpose and scope, and that staff have the right training and guidance to deliver services that support and accommodate all service users.

In addition, the Home Office produces the annual data requirement, which sets out requests and requirements for data that police forces should collect and report to the Home Office. Some are mandatory, some are voluntary. Requirement 153, which I referred to earlier, is voluntary and details how forces should capture demographic data

“in a consistent way by aligning it to ONS census 2021”.

This sets out that data about sex

“should be recorded in line with information on … birth certificate or gender recognition certificate”.

At the moment, it is not clear how widely this has been adopted.

Since 1974, the police national computer has been the main database of criminal records and is used by front-line officers from all police forces in the UK to understand who they are interacting with. In 2016, the Home Office established the national law enforcement data programme to replace the PNC and PND with the Law Enforcement Data Service or LEDS—sorry, another acronym. That will replace the existing PNC capability across all police forces this coming March.

The equality impact assessment for LEDS was published in November 2025 and considered how the programme would impact on those with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. The EIA states:

“There is no legal obligation on any person with a GRC to inform the police that they have changed their name or gender. Where a person does wish this to be acknowledged then LEDS user can add an Information Marker”.


The EIA notes that the NPCC is undertaking a policy review following the April 2025 Supreme Court judgment, which

“aims to strike a balance that is both lawful and respectful of all individuals involved”—

that is a quote from the judgment—and that

“LEDS is being built to configure new policies as they take effect”.

The EIA also notes that a working group on national protected characteristics data recording standards was established by the Diversity, Equality and Inclusion Coordination Committee and the NPCC diversity, equality and inclusion lead. It is important to note, as has been mentioned by others, that the Supreme Court judgment in the case of For Women Scotland v the Scottish Ministers considered the definition of “woman” only for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.

In addition to that, I have found an FoI dated May 2025 and the ONS response on a question about the collection of data. It gives a somewhat detailed response to about 10 different questions on how many people who have undertaken gender reassignment have been convicted of certain offences or groups of offences. Under the category of collection of data for gender identity, which is different from the sex registered at birth category, it says:

“We have to be robust enough to provide reliable estimates”.


It cannot provide reliable estimates. Why? Because the numbers are so low. As I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, knows, as she has been quoting data quite a bit, if you cannot rely on the data because it is low compared with the millions of women across the country, it becomes a problem to be able to include it. Why? Because the data will not show, or, if it is pulled out separately, individuals will become identifiable to the public. That is the fundamental problem.

So, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment. The National Police Chiefs’ Council is already undertaking work to review policies in light of the Supreme Court judgment. The Supreme Court judgment was limited in considering the meaning of “sex” for the purposes of the Equality Act, not for wider legislation or policy. Frankly, it is unclear how this amendment would be practically workable; front-line police forces would be asked to challenge information provided about an individual’s sex. It is also unclear how the amendment would be consistent with data protection legislation, the Gender Recognition Act, and, indeed, Article 8 rights to a private life.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to speak.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

It is Front-Bench speeches.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It is Front-Bench speeches.

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[Baroness Cash (Con)]

My Lords, I am sincerely grateful to everyone who has spoken and to the winding speakers today. It is such an important question, and it is such a pleasure to have a debate like this and to engage with former colleagues and noble Peers to discuss an often emotional or passionate issue.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I have known each other for such a long time, but not everyone knows that. I believe that I may have referred to the noble Baroness with a pronoun during my speech, and I am very sorry if I did that; it was a lapse from knowing each other and I want to put that on the record. I am very grateful to her for speaking with her typical compassion and empathy for everyone—a testament to her time as the head of Liberty, and the principles that she has lived by ever since.

I say the same to the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, and I am very grateful to her for engaging in this debate and being present. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for citing the data, and noble Peers who supported the amendments. I am very grateful to everyone.

The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, referenced Scotland. I would like to end on that thought. There is, of course, a direction of travel by the Government, which we welcome and support, but in his response the noble Lord, Lord Katz, did not address what data is going to be collected in relation to sex. I know we are coming on to ethnicity next. I say to the Minister that this is an opportunity to grapple with this issue and to do something by accepting this amendment, which would really support the violence against women and girls strategy. The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, also made some very sensible points about the common-sense approach of the police, and we have confidence in them to be able to act in a sensible way. For the record, there is no suggestion in this amendment that anyone would be embarrassed or outed. It is about the police recording the data, not publishing the data. We know that data, when the statistics are processed off it, is anonymised.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful for that last point. The point I raised was that the data is so small that if only two people had committed a certain offence in a year, they would be identifiable. That was the point the ONS made in its response to somebody else’s FoI request—I do not know whose—because of that identification and then breaching of data for the individual concerned.

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

That has not concerned His Majesty’s inspectorate, the Ministry of Justice or, indeed, Professor Sullivan. In fact, they make the opposite point, which is that the small numbers of trans-identifying individuals—

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. At the police level—at the level of arrest—it has to be some version of self-identification. The police need to ask—and, if necessary, have the conversation—but it cannot be that the police observe, decide and adjudicate. That is not viable. The noble Baroness may disagree with me, but if this is going to happen in relation to race and ethnicity it will probably have to be self-identification. As I say, anything else at the level of arrest or charge is not practical.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interest that my son is a senior lecturer at Swansea University, specialising in online radicalisation. He advises a number of Governments and parliaments, including our own, and other public bodies, including on Prevent.

In the previous group, we noted that the police are in the middle of changing the databases that they use for recording data and moving to the new law enforcement data service. The details are due to be published very shortly, we hope, in March this year. It is important that proper data is collected on ethnicity. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, quoting the review of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, because those points are extremely important.

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[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, the public sector equality duty exists so that our public services in the UK, which are funded by all of us, obey the laws on equalities. It is there because that is not what used to happen—and sometimes it still does not happen. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that all he had to do was watch the recent television programme about the goings-on—the racism and misogyny—in one of our local police stations to know that we need these things on our statute book. As a veteran of the Equality Act 2010, I am very proud that we have them there. I hope my noble friend the Minister will give his usual defence of, “It’s Labour that always triumphs and always puts forward equalities, because that is actually important for our society”.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for outlining the core, essential use of the public sector equality duty. I note that the Government’s website says:

“The Public Sector Equality Duty … requires public authorities to have due regard … when exercising their functions, like making decisions … It is intended to help decision-makers, including Government ministers, to comply with the duty”.


It does not talk about Pride marches or the detail of training.

Section 149 of the Equality Act says:

“A public authority must … eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act”.


I do not think the police could argue with anything there. It must also

“advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it”.

That speaks to the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, about some of the very poor, racist behaviour we have seen from a few individuals. It must also

“foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it … A person who is not a public authority but who exercises public functions must, in the exercise of those functions, have due regard to the matters mentioned in subsection (1)”.

I have quoted that very short section because the descriptions by some previous speakers in this short debate have made it sound like something completely different. I would be very worried if the police no longer had to follow the public sector equality duty as set out in the Equality Act. We can all argue about whether we do or do not like going on training days, or about a certain amount of money being well spent or not, but we really want to see discrimination eliminated, and that is particularly important in the police.

The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, said on the last group that we all need common sense and practicality. The PSED is the tool that does that, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for outlining the detail. He is right that the police should follow the law; the point is that the PSED and the impact assessments also fit within that. Getting rid of the PSED would mean that unlawful discrimination might well be missed, and that would be dreadful. He also said that it is not down to the police to deliver equality. I think the Equality Act differs on that and, given the work the police do, we would be pretty horrified if they suddenly said they did not have to deliver equality.

One of the ways that racism can be eliminated from the police is by ensuring compliance with the PSED. It is not the PSED itself at fault, but what is going on inside police authorities. That is why, for the third group today, we are talking about the importance of the White Paper on policing that has just been published, which will change the culture and ensure that that stops. We on these Benches believe that the PSED is a vital tool for the police to deliver that.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Thornton, cannot both be right. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is making the case that the public sector equality duty is a tool to tackle racism. Yet, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, made clear, the appalling, racist events at Charing Cross took place a year ago, 14 years after the PSED came into being. Surely it has not worked and a cultural change has to happen from within the organisation, as well as complementary legislation being imposed. On this occasion, it does not seem to have worked in that part of the Metropolitan Police.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for mentioning that. That is exactly why I mentioned the Metropolitan Police’s London Race Action Plan earlier on—because it has not worked. But that action plan is underpinned by the PSED and the responsibilities without the police. Get rid of that and it might never happen.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Does the noble Baroness acknowledge the problems of mission creep? The original aims may well have been worthy but, on training days, for example, my concern is that the content of those training days can breach impartiality rules. In fact—I will not go through it now—there have been well-documented instances of, for example, the fight against racism being turned into the campaign for Black Lives Matter, which are two very different things. Is there any concern at all about any politicisation or dangers?

One of the things we discussed in the Employments Rights Bill was that, attendant to this particular duty, there has been a huge increase in HR. It is the fastest-growing industry in the UK, sadly. Largely, that has been to try to interpret this equality duty, and it has led to a wide range of activities that may never have been envisaged by the Equality Act originally.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for mentioning those things. I am not quite sure what the questions are, but I can say quite clearly that I do not see a direct line between the public sector equality duty and Black Lives Matter. What I have seen with Black Lives Matter is black people being treated very poorly and some being killed because it was not working properly. The fact that it was not working properly was not because it existed; it was not working properly because the police were not avoiding and fighting discrimination.

On the point about the increase in HR, those of us who are perhaps behind on our fire safety assessments might be concerned about that. Each organisation must assess what it needs to do for all its members of staff. I keep saying to the Minister, “Please don’t just train specialist staff in things like violence against women and girls; it has to be throughout”. Why does it have to be throughout? Because of the equality issues and all the points that were raised by noble Lords who have spoken and, indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, earlier on, about women being much more likely to be victims of serious crime. That is why we need it: because it is absolutely underpinning everything the police do.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to support the public sector equality duty in legislation and to say to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that there are times when you know before anybody has even spoken that you are not going to agree with the premise of the argument. This is one of those occasions. I am not going to agree with the premise of the argument, but I will not repeat what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has said. I will only in part repeat part what she said by referring to what Section 149, the public sector equality duty, is.

It says:

“A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to … eliminate discrimination”—


or should the police not be looking at making sure that they eliminate discrimination in their dealings? On harassment, should the police not be ensuring that they are not involved in harassment in their dealings? On victimisation, should the police not be involved in ensuring that they do not victimise in their dealings? It goes on to refer to

“any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act”.

It says in this Section, which the noble Lord wishes to remove from legislation, that the police or any public authority should

“foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it”.

Section 149(5) says:

“Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to … tackle prejudice, and … promote understanding”.


Does the noble Lord think that the police should not have a role in tackling prejudice and promoting understanding? That is what he is saying by seeking to remove this piece of legislation. The section goes on to say:

“The relevant protected characteristics are—age; disability; gender reassignment; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation”.


Does the noble Lord believe—he obviously does, since he has tabled the amendment—that those protected characteristics should not be ones that the police seek to take into account when dealing with these matters?

The noble Lord has put a perfectly fair argument, but it does not take my listening to it in detail to know, as I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that it is not on my core values list or my core approach to how we deal with policing, and it is not how the public sector equality duty is designed. It is designed to embed day-to-day work in all our public authorities. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, that leads to better outcomes for individuals and for communities. For policing, the duty is vital to maintain public trust and legitimacy. I say to the noble Lords, Lord Jackson of Peterson and Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that the Peelite principles mean that the police police with the consent of the community. If they did not take into account the duty not to discriminate, victimise or harass then I am sorry, but that is not a police service that would secure the support of the community in its policing.

Compliance with this duty is not a bureaucratic exercise. It is a practical tool, but one with a moral under- pinning, for better decision-making and accountability. Removing the duty would risk undermining confidence in policing, particularly among those communities that are in the protected characteristic list in Section 149 of the Equality Act.

There are times when we can have a debate, have an argument and, potentially, listen to areas where we will have some movement from either the Opposition or the Government. This is not one of those times. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment now but, if he brings it back on Report, I will take great pleasure in asking every Member of this House to vote it down.

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I hope that the Government will take seriously this attempt to make sure that these fundamental British political values are built into the whole psyche of our national life, and in particular with young people who are at risk of being drawn into crime and terrorism.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interest again. My son is an academic who specialises in online radicalisation and Prevent, and advises Governments, Parliaments and public bodies, including our own Parliament and Government.

From these Benches we share the Government’s concern about the rising number of young people investigated for terrorism offences, and we welcome, in principle, earlier intervention and diversion away from the criminal courts. However, we also share many of the misgivings already expressed, particularly about using a low balance of probabilities civil threshold to impose what are, in effect, terrorism-labelled controls on children.

As drafted, the bar for imposing a youth diversion order is worryingly low for a measure that can place wide-ranging restrictions on children as young as 10, a breach of which may result in custody despite no criminal conviction. Can the Minister explain why the court need only find an order “necessary”, rather than applying the more familiar “necessary and proportionate” test for such intrusive measures?

The scope of these orders is also troubling. A YDO may be made if the court finds it more likely than not that a child has committed a terrorism-related offence, behaved in a way likely to facilitate one, or—as clarified by government Amendment 439—attempted, encouraged, aided, abetted, counselled or procured a listed terrorism offence. On top of that, I question the inclusion of “serious harm”, given that the justification for the serious nature of these orders is terrorism prevention, which needlessly risks widening the type of behaviour captured.

I am grateful for the briefing provided by Justice, whose work highlights that orders of this kind would fall more harshly on young people than they would on adults, especially those with intellectual disabilities or who are neurodivergent. There is also a real risk of disproportionate use against minority communities, particularly Muslim children, given existing disproportionality in terrorism policing. Action for Race Equality reports that, between 2021 and 2024, 31% of under-21s arrested for terrorism-related offences were Asian, despite making up only 9% of the population.

Justice and other organisations argue that, if youth diversion orders proceed, the Bill must be significantly strengthened, and we support that direction of travel from these Benches. They call for piloting before full commencement; a requirement for police to give reasons if they depart from youth offending team advice, with those views placed before the court; proper risk assessments before an order is imposed, as with respect orders; and for statutory guidance from the Secretary of State to be mandatory, not optional.

Amendment 445 would require those receiving youth diversion orders to be given citizenship education in British values. From these Benches, we recognise the good intent. It seeks to equip young people with a positive understanding of civic life, reinforcing shared values through education. That is a worthy aim which merits some consideration, particularly for those at risk of radicalisation.

We do have questions, however, around implementation and resourcing, and whether this might dilute the order’s core diversionary purpose. In short, we do not oppose early diversion in principle but require stronger safeguards in practice. In the case of the measures in the Bill, this chiefly means a higher and more appropriate test, tighter scope and better protection for vulnerable children.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I apologise that I missed the moment. I thought somebody else was going to speak, so I will be quick. In the last couple of weeks, the United Arab Emirates has curbed state funding for its citizens seeking to enrol at UK universities over concerns that they will be radicalised by Islamists. That is an extraordinary piece of information and it also indicates that we do have a real problem. I commend the Government for trying to find new ways of dealing with young people who are being radicalised: I understand that that is a real problem.

I was slightly worried that, in the same week, we heard about a regional game being used by some councils for Prevent, which identified one of the signs of pre-terrorism or extremism as those who support cultural nationalism, which seems to me to be muddling up again the terms of what is an extremist, what is not, and so on. I do not know that it is entirely clear.

I happen to share the reservations that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, raised on civil liberties and these youth diversion orders. As I have previously said, I am always concerned that where we lack moral courage in taking on radicalisation in public, procedures, process and legislation are used as a substitute for that. In that context I commend the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, on at least trying, as he has many times, to raise the issue of teaching British values. Ironically, it has become quite controversial to say that we should shout British values from the rooftops. We are not encouraged to do so. That itself can be seen as exclusionary, not inclusive enough and so on. The noble and right reverend Lord has explained in detail why he wants that. I am not necessarily a fan of all the things in that list or the whole notion of citizenship education, but I think it is the right approach.

However, I note with some irony that some of the British values in that list include the importance of freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly and association. This is in a Bill that could curtail many of those very things, and those of us who try to raise them have been dismissed and told, “Those things are not a threat. Don’t worry about it. We need to do this”. I also think it is interesting that in that list we have “regular elections”. I agree; I would not be cancelling them myself. In relation to the rule of law, jury trials are a key part of British values and democracy, ensuring that we have democratic representation for ordinary people and that justice is done in the criminal justice system. We know that they are in jeopardy.

I want us to push British values more. That would be far more important and effective than youth diversion orders. If we are to have youth diversion orders, let us have some British values in there—and if we are going to mention British values, let us stick to them ourselves, rather than just having them as a list that we can nod through.