Crime and Policing Bill
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
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Lord Hogan-Howe
“Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/2) are amended as follows.(2) After Regulation 13 (timeliness of investigations), insert—“13A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings. (5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.”(3) The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/4) are amended as follows.(4) After Regulation 19 (timeliness of investigation), insert—“19A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment proposes a 12-month limit, unless extraordinary circumstances reviewed by a legally qualified person dictate otherwise, which would encourage forces and external bodies to complete misconduct and gross misconduct processes quicker, allowing officers to resume duties and limiting the negative impact on their health and wellbeing.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, has made a good suggestion with this amendment. He makes the broad point that the police misconduct process takes far too long, and I agree. To be fair, it is not the only misconduct process that takes a long time, but this one is particularly challenged.
I will particularly mention two things. First, time deadlines would be helpful. There are two ways to approach that. One is that there might be an absolute deadline of 12 months, as the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests, and then some independent, legally qualified person looks at the case. That could work. The alternative is to set some deadlines so that, for example, 90% of cases are resolved in one year, which at least would give the system a kick. At the moment, I am afraid the system is not getting any better—rather, it is getting worse—so either something statutory or some kind of guidelines would be a good idea.
On Tuesday I raised the issue of firearms officers, a group particularly affected by this, and that is what I want to speak to here. I have argued that there should be a higher bar before they are prosecuted for murder, but the Government do not accept that at the moment. They have offered anonymity, and we are to debate that shortly.
Part of the problem, particularly for firearms officers, is the incredible length of time in some cases. There have been two cases over the last 20 years that took 10 years: the case of PC Long, who was prosecuted after a series of legal machinations only to be found not guilty 10 years later, and that of W80, where after a public inquiry—basically an inquest led by a High Court judge because intercept evidence was involved in the case—the High Court judge decided that there was no unlawful killing, the IOPC or its predecessor decided that there should be some gross misconduct, the Metropolitan Police disagreed, the Supreme Court ordered that there would be a misconduct hearing and the legally qualified chair of the independent tribunal said there was no case to answer. After consideration by the Supreme Court, an officer had been under investigation for 10 years. That cannot be right.
Some of the problems are to do with the sequential nature of the decision-making in these cases. Officers are often under jeopardy, first from the IOPC and then from the CPS. Then obviously it could go to court and there may be a finding of not guilty, but then—for firearms officers in cases where someone has died—the case can go back to a coroner’s inquest, which can find an unlawful killing verdict, at which point it goes back through the cycle again. That is one of the reasons why some of these problems are arising.
First, deadlines would be a good idea as either an advisory or a mandatory limit. Secondly, I do not understand why some of the people involved in the decision-making that I have described have to do it sequentially, not in parallel. For example, why can the CPS and the IOPC not decide together whether something is a crime or misconduct?
At the moment, not only are there many links in the chain that sometimes come to contradictory conclusions but, more importantly, it is taking too long. I argue that in all this there are two groups of people who suffer: one is firearms officers, the group whose case I am arguing, but the other is the families waiting to hear what is happening. If people have lost someone, they deserve to hear whether or not this is a crime or misconduct, but at the moment that is not happening.
This amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, is a sensible suggestion and I support it. If the Government do not, perhaps they would like to make some indication of how they intend to improve the misconduct system, particularly as it affects firearms officers in the circumstances I have described.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, this has been a short debate. I agree with many of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I find it almost extraordinary that misconduct investigations linger on for so long; it really is a disgrace for everybody involved. Police professional standards departments have for too long been seen as something of a Cinderella function within forces, chronically underprioritised, underfunded and understaffed, and now they are buckling under the surge in the volume of complaints. This is combined with a narrowing of the remit of the IOPC, which increasingly takes on only the most serious and high-profile cases, resulting in a growing backlog and indefinite drift.
Amendment 422A confronts this head on. Such independent legal oversight could act as a checkpoint, strengthening individual case oversights and extracting timely lessons from failures. Criminal investigations would stay exempt, protecting the pursuit of serious crime.
There are risks in setting time targets for investigations—there is no question about that—not least the incentive for officers to delay co-operation if the clock is ticking. We have concerns that a rigid cap could risk corner-cutting on complex investigations. At the very least, stronger guidance on the expected length of inquiries is now required, as well as real scrutiny when these expectations are missed.
There also needs to be a much sharper focus on leadership and case management. Complainants should not face long waits, especially knowing time will diminish the strength of their evidence; neither should innocent officers endure years in limbo, with their careers stalled and well-being eroded. Taxpayers should not bear the rising cost of suspensions while losing front-line capacity at the same time.
Amendment 422A would restore some balance by prioritising fairness to officers, closure for victims and credibility for policing. We are happy to support it, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington for tabling his Amendment 422A and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for ably stepping into the breach to allow it to be debated. It is a very important matter and I am glad we have had a chance to debate it.
I am very sympathetic to the amendment’s goals. It aims to set a 12-month time limit for misconduct and gross misconduct investigations within police forces. As others have said, timely legal restitution is the only way that justice is effectively served. That applies both to those in the police who are under investigation and, obviously, to victims who are let down by delays that are needlessly, but often, the result of administrative workload. Applying a strict deadline for remedies, excepted under only extraordinary circumstances, is an easy way by which institutions can be encouraged to proceed with investigations in a timely fashion.
That said, I am a little wary of fully endorsing a blanket time limit on police forces for investigations. Although in some cases, perhaps even most, misconduct investigations can and should be sped up, it would be heedless to assume that all forces are simply being inefficient in the time that investigations take. There is a vast disparity between forces’ capacity to deal with their primary function of investigating crime, let alone with administrative internal matters, such as misconduct matters. Certain forces’ ability to spare the resources to source, for instance, legally qualified adjudicators should not, therefore, be assumed. Officer numbers are down, crime is up, and we should be careful about placing additional requirements on police forces that expedited conduct investigations might entail.
Of course, we support the aim of increasing efficiency and ensuring justice is delivered. I thank my noble friend for his amendment and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I am grateful to the Committee, and in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for moving the amendment. To be fair to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, he stayed here very late—until the end—on the previous day on this. I am sorry that he is not able to be in his place today. He was here to move the amendment when we pulled stumps on Tuesday night at gone 11 pm.
Having said that, the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to introduce a new system of independent legal adjudicators with powers to close down investigations. I think I can agree with the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that delays in investigations are in nobody’s interests—of police officers who subsequently are proved innocent, of victims, or of speedy justice for those who have strayed and committed potential offences. Lengthy delays risk impacting the confidence of complainants and the welfare of the police officers involved.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
It is certainly a first for me.
I thank the Minister for his reply and other people for their comments. I thought I might make only a couple of points in response. I indicated that although the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests a mandatory limit, there may be difficulties with that. I wonder whether the Government, might consider three things in their review, which the Minister mentioned. First, they could set an expectation so that, for example, cases should be completed within 12 months unless, for example, the director-general of the IOPC or some arbiter concludes otherwise. Secondly, I raised the sequential nature of the decision-making. That compound effect gives a longer time than I regard as necessary.
I am trying to work out now whether I should let the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, speak—
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
The noble Lord was not here for the start of the group, so I am afraid that he cannot contribute.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I will conclude. I wonder whether, in the review, the Government could consider this sequential decision-making, which I do not think helps speed. Thirdly, if they are really adventurous they could look at whether police officers should be employees, because then you would get lawyers out of the system—I sit surrounded by them, but they never make it quicker or cheaper. Everyone else who is an employee can go to the employment tribunal, but officers cannot; it is on these grounds that lawyers get involved. I am afraid that is one of the major factors in why this takes so long and is expensive. I have taken my life in my hands, so I will sit down and withdraw the amendment.
Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)
My Lords, I oppose Clauses 152 to 155 standing part of the Bill. I declare my interests as deputy chairman of the Telegraph Media Group and chairman of the News Media Association. This stand part notice is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who unfortunately cannot be here today as he is on business abroad. I added my name to it along with the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, to whom I am very grateful. Like the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, I am aware that I am surrounded by lawyers wherever I look, but I must admit to not being one of them.
These clauses introduce a statutory presumption of anonymity for firearms officers charged with a qualifying offence involving the discharge of a lethal weapon. Clause 152 creates a presumption that the criminal courts grant anonymity to any firearms officers charged with a “qualifying offence”, unless to do so would be
“contrary to the interests of justice”.
Clause 153 allows the court to preserve or reimpose anonymity after conviction if there is an appeal. Clause 154 defines the reporting direction as barring the publication of any matter that might lead to identification, including name, address, place of work, photographs and video. Clause 155 sets out the kinds of measures that may be required to be taken under an anonymity order, including screening or voice modulation during a court appearance.
Under the clauses, anonymity would apply from the point of charge until conviction and sentence or, where relevant, an appeal is abandoned or dismissed. If an officer is acquitted or charges are dropped, anonymity, including reporting restrictions, can persist indefinitely. Taken together, these measures are a significant attack on open justice, press and media freedom, and the public’s right to receive information, something that should be curtailed in only the most exceptional circumstances. They would undermine the already fragile trust in the police, limit opportunities for public scrutiny of those entrusted with firearms—which is a most serious manifestation of state power—and have a profound chilling impact on public interest reporting.
I will outline the reasons why I believe these clauses are wrong. First, their provision is unnecessary. Judges already have the power to grant anonymity where there is clear evidence of a real and immediate risk to an officer or their family, with proper and proportionate safeguards in place for fairness and review. Under the current law, a defendant applying to the court for anonymity must rightly demonstrate, with clear and cogent evidence, that anonymity is strictly necessary to protect their rights. Such orders are tailored, time-limited and subject to review. They therefore do not interfere with the rights of the media or the expectations of the public, and they strike the right balance between officer safety, which we must obviously be very concerned about, and open justice. That is a workable and trusted balance between safety and open justice. These clauses reverse that position for a special category of alleged offender and are therefore an unprecedented shift in English law.
Secondly, there is no evidence for making such sweeping changes to the law. The Home Office has never provided evidence that police officers as a group are more likely to be subject to harm by being identified as a defendant in a criminal case than any other defendant in a high-profile or controversial case. There is therefore no need to upend the existing law to give firearms officers greater protection from legitimate scrutiny than anyone else. That would create a justifiable perception in the public’s mind that there is one rule for firearms officers and another for everyone else, and they would be right.
Thirdly, these provisions clearly undermine the long-standing principles of open justice that are a fundamental tenet of our legal system and essential to our free society. Justice must not only be done; it must also always be seen to be done by the public, and therefore by the press. Such a sweeping privacy regime, which would apply automatically, regardless of any actual risk posed to an officer, and which gives protection to state agents, would clearly undermine confidence in the system. If anything, there is the clearest possible public interest in serious criminal cases involving police officers being subject to the highest form of rigorous public scrutiny and transparency, not the most lax. Anything that undermines open justice risks increasing the possibility of miscarriages of justice.
Fourthly, one of the most practical advantages of open justice and transparency is the critical role of a robust media in identifying systemic issues and patterns of offending. These clauses would make that impossible. Clause 155, for instance, allows for a wide range of contextual information to be kept from the public, including, vitally, an officer’s workplace. How can the press and the public help identify patterns or bring additional information to light in the absence of such basic information? That would hamper investigations and make public appeals for information far less effective. Indeed, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Mark Rowley has recently supported calls to share more details, not fewer, about suspects with the public earlier, in a bid to stop the spread of misinformation.
Fifthly, and on that very point, these clauses create a heightened risk of jigsaw identification of a suspect, where separate, anonymised details are combined with publicly available information to identify an individual. This is inevitable, particularly in small communities with their own online networks. The danger of false identification, with very serious repercussions for an individual, is all too obvious. That would also produce a chilling effect on legitimate, verified journalism, because editors would inevitably act with extreme caution in reporting, needlessly censoring it to avoid harsh penalties for breaching a court order.
Finally, there are issues about the compatibility of these clauses with the ECHR. Others are far more expert on this than I am, and I will let them deal with it during this debate, but it is clear to me as a lay person that the interference with freedom of expression contained in these clauses is wholly disproportionate given that no pressing social need has been demonstrated.
In summary, no evidence has been provided as the basis for such a sweeping change in the law set out in these clauses, which would produce a two-tier justice system. They would interfere with press and media freedom in a wholly disproportionate way and create a profound chilling effect on public interest reporting. They undermine the principles of open justice that are the bedrock of our judicial system and vital to our open democratic society. They risk further damaging public confidence in the police, already at an all-time low after the appalling murder of Sarah Everard, and in our judicial system. Above all, they are unnecessary because suitable safeguards that balance officer safety with public accountability and scrutiny already exist and have proved themselves workable and effective. For all these reasons, these clauses should not stand part of the Bill. I hope the Minister will indicate that the Government are going to think again.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I support the stand part notices tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood. Clauses 152 to 155 should be removed from the Bill in their entirety.
Before I begin, I want to make absolutely clear to the Committee that there is no question of whether authorised firearms officers encounter danger, because of course they do. I pay tribute to them and their families for the risks they assume in the course of their daily lives to protect us all. Nor is this about whether the court should protect individuals where there is a real and immediate risk to life or safety, because that already exists. I spent 15 years in chambers as a libel and media barrister with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, defending freedom of expression with great passion against the imposition of reporting restrictions. It is that defence that I am here to speak about today, because these clauses would see a constitutional cornerstone of our democracy overturned.
Open justice is not a concession to the media; it is about the public. It is about understanding what is going on in our criminal justice system. It protects the very sacred principle in this country of policing by consent, in which we rely on the public’s confidence and belief in transparency. It maintains confidence in the legitimacy of criminal proceedings. When, tragically—let us be realistic, it is what we are talking here—the state, represented by a fire officer, has killed or maimed someone by the use of force, open justice provides accountability to the public, and the public should have that accountability. That is why anonymity has always been exceptional. It is justified only on evidence and where strictly necessary. Even in cases of national security and terrorism, that remains the case.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, I respectfully disagree with the proposition that these clauses should be removed from the Bill. My views will come as no surprise to the 10 noble Lords who were present in the Chamber on Tuesday night at 11.15 pm to debate my amendment on why police officers who use excessive force on the spur of the moment, in the honest but mistaken belief that their use of force was reasonable, should be sentenced differently. There will be an opportunity to debate that further at on Report.
The underlying principles here as to whether anonymity should be given to police firearms officers in criminal proceedings where they are charged with a qualifying offence are exactly the same. As the House of Lords Judicial Committee said 30 years ago in the case of Lee Clegg, law enforcement officers deserve to be treated differently, since they go on patrol to assist in the maintenance of law and order with no intention of killing or wounding anyone. They face evil people who get out of bed with the full intention of trying to kill them and us. That life and death situation does not normally confront the rest of us. These officers have to make split-second decisions in order to protect us and deserve, at the very least, to be given anonymity if they are charged with a criminal offence, so that they and their families are protected from adverse publicity during those proceedings.
The last thing we want is such brave officers being deterred from volunteering for firearms training when the National Police Chiefs’ Council says that police forces across England and Wales are grappling with a significant shortage of firearms officers, exacerbated by the lack of legal protections afforded to them, particularly regarding criminal and misconduct proceedings.
Clauses 152 to 155 are a welcome recognition by the Government that police firearms officers are in a unique position. As I have said, I would take this further to address how such officers are sentenced, but that must wait for Report. In the meantime, the modest protection of anonymity during criminal proceedings, with an exception built in where anonymity would not be in the interest of justice, is a proportionate measure which is long overdue.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I share with the noble Lord, Lord Carter, concern and admiration for our firearms officers and officers generally, who have a very difficult job. I declare an interest having acted for police forces in cases involving the use of firearms. However, I do not share his conclusions about these provisions.
I should also declare an interest as the chairman of the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which regulates the press or those bodies that choose to be regulated by it. I hope that has given me some indication of some of the challenges that journalists face, particularly in reporting court proceedings. Very often, they struggle to cover court cases because of the reduced number of journalists and the general facilities available to newspapers. Were this provision to become law, they would be faced with a presumption that changes the balance and represents, on the face of it, a challenge to our principles of open justice.
Given that there is already a discretion available to the courts on anonymity, I ask the Minister this: what is wrong with the existing law, which provides that there is such a balance to be exercised by the judge? If there is nothing wrong with the law, there is no need to change it. This is a significant change, and the Government must have some very clear thoughts as to why they are making it. What is the situation that now persists which requires a fundamental change in questions of reporting and free speech?
Supposing it is possible to persuade a judge to rebut the presumption which will now exist in these provisions, what would be a good reason for lifting the anonymity which prima facie is going to be imposed by them? It is important, before we make such a significant change in the law, that the rationale is clearly understood.
While not in any way undermining or questioning the importance of protecting officers in appropriate circumstances, I say that the balance is a very subtle one, and that balance should not be disturbed by these provisions. I do not think we even need to consider the European Court of Human Rights’ position. This is an ancient tradition of open justice, and it is one which is, I am afraid to say, threatened by these provisions.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I oppose the stand part notices and support the Government in their clauses. I have heard the proposers of the stand part notices make much of what is a relatively weak argument, suggesting that this is a constitutional outrage, when all that is happening is a change in the assumption about anonymity. Anonymity is already available; this is just about who has to prove whether it should be granted. A lot of hyperbole has been used about this. I accept that the media will make this argument; I do not deny that. I agree that the police should be held accountable; that is not the issue. It is about a very small group of people. I will try to address the point about evidence. A point was made about what evidence had been advanced; I will try to address at least two things.
First, of course, this was built on the Chris Kaba case. Frankly, I think the judge made the wrong decision about anonymity. I believe that because Mr Kaba was arrested having been connected to two shootings and linked to an organised crime gang who had access to firearms. Naming the officer put him at risk of attacks by connected people. Bear in mind that, three years later, within three hours a jury found him not guilty. It was never a very strong case, but why did the judge order the anonymity order to be lifted in those circumstances?
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carter, for reminding us of his late-night work the other night, and I look forward to discussing that subject when we come back to it on Report. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing a practical police view to this very difficult debate. I come at this from a position essentially in favour of these clauses not standing part, for the reasons so far advanced by my noble friends Lady Cash and Lord Black, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.
This is a difficult question. Unquestionably, it is a difficult question. If it were not, we would not be here. We have, as parliamentarians, as legislators, to work out where the balance should lie between the desire for anonymity for police officers in these circumstances and the desire for openness, open justice and the ability of the public—not just the press but the public as a whole—to see what is being done in their name in the court system.
I hope I shall not go on too long merely repeating what others have already said, but it is worth reminding ourselves that the courts work on the basis of open justice. The public are entitled to watch, to read and to comment about trials, and to know who has been charged and prosecuted and with what result. There are exceptions to protect national security, vulnerable witnesses, victims of sexual offences and children. We have a regime for, first of all, providing for reporting restrictions; secondly, for restricting public access to the courtroom and for holding all or part of some trials in private; and, thirdly, for withholding the name of witnesses—for example, under a witness order under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. But a witness order under that provision is a special measure of the last practical resort, and requires the court to be vigorous in its consideration of the statutory hurdles that have to be overcome and to ensure that the defendant is not irreparably disadvantaged or denied a fair trial. Fourthly, we have within that regime provision for anonymity in investigations—for example, when considering fatal gang crimes involving the use of guns and knives by those aged 11 to 30.
Police officers are human—I underline the word “human”. They are a human example of state power—and I underline the word “state”. We respect and we admire them for their often dangerous and selfless work. We know from our own work here in Parliament how vital police officers are for our own protection. I was not far away from the scene of PC Palmer’s murder in March 2017. He was unarmed and later awarded a posthumous George Medal, but there were armed officers there who had to kill PC Palmer’s murderer. I heard those shots as I walked along the colonnade in New Palace Yard from my office in Portcullis House to take part in a Division in the other place. The noble Lord, Lord Hanson, may well have gone through the same experience. I was grateful then, as I am to this day, to the police men and women on duty that day who ushered me and other Members of the other place to safety, regardless of their own.
But it is, in the final analysis, a matter of judgment on which side of this argument we need to come down—on the side of anonymity or on that of open justice. I bear in mind the need for armed police officers and their families to be protected from reprisals, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned. I bear in mind the operational need not to discourage volunteers suitably qualified to become armed response officers or armed officers. We have been reminded this morning of the case of Martyn Blake, which created, I think, the genesis of these clauses.
However, I also bear in mind the constitutional and public policy demands. I would not describe this as a constitutional outrage; it is a perfectly rational debate about which side of a difficult line one wishes to land. It is not a constitutional outrage to do one thing or the other. It is just advancing an argument. But I bear in mind the constitutional and public policy demands for open justice, for public trust and for transparency in a justice system that applies to us all without creating different categories of defendant as a question of blanket rule. Blanket rules of the sort envisaged by Clauses 152 to 155 are, I suggest, best avoided where a stronger, focused case-by-case approval approach can be achieved—and it is, in my experience, already achieved under our current system.
In the last few days, we have seen the ICE officer shoot that woman driving her car in Minnesota. Of course I have only seen the news footage, but I suggest that, here, that ICE officer would be prosecuted for murder, subject to any defence he could advance. That case aside, we face the problem of some lawyers and campaigners using every police shooting as the basis of an anti-police pile-on, or for some other political campaign that they happen to support. In short, if we are, as I hope we will be, sceptical about Clauses 152 to 155 standing part of the Bill, we must prevent the appalling hunting parties against the police. Let us then pause and reflect before agreeing to these clauses.
I dare say we will not make a decision today, other than that the issue advanced by my noble friend Lord Black will be withdrawn. But we all have a little time between now and Report—we come here with the best of intentions and good will—to think a little more carefully about the practical solution to this, and whether we need to use the blunderbuss of legislation or whether we can still rely on judicial discretion, vigorously applied and well argued for in each separate case, to see where justice can be found.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I ask him this? I respect his opinion, for obvious reasons, but one issue he did not address—it was one of my arguments for why these clauses should stand part—is the difficulty of proving the threat at the beginning of an investigation. It is not straightforward. We have to say that someone out there is going to kill this officer or try to attack them—that there is a threat to them in some way. Of course we all make our best attempts to assess whether that is accurate or not. He describes the present system as a blanket arrangement, but actually there is only an assumption, which can be removed, and in the Kaba case was removed. That leaves the officer at risk of that decision being automatic—that is, to be named if they cannot prove otherwise. Why should they bear the risk of being named, when the reverse could allow, first, an assumption they would not be named, and if later that changed, they could be named. What we can never do is name someone, then introduce anonymity—so it is a one-way valve that surely the law might help to respect.
Lord Garnier (Con)
The matter that the noble Lord is bringing up is the very sort of discussion that ought to be had in front of the judge. Presumably, no prosecutor, and no one acting on behalf of a police officer who wished to maintain his anonymity, would advance an argument unless there were some basis for it. If someone went in front of the judge and said, “I’m generally fearful that, just because he’s a police officer who bears arms, he is likely to be the victim of reprisal”, I think they would probably need to do a bit better than that. I suspect nobody would go in front of the judge and make that argument unless they had something better than that.
I suspect that, in the usual run of things, there will be information. It may not be information that the court would wish the world at large to know about. It could be intelligence evidence. It could be other information that both the applicant—the applicant police officer or the applicant prosecutor—and the judge would agree should be kept private. That surely can be done now. We have all sorts of national security cases where evidence is not disclosed to the world at large. All I ask is: let us just think a little bit further. It may well be that, at the end of the day, we shall come to the same conclusion as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and as the Government do in their clauses. But I have yet to be persuaded that we have got to the right answer today.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I strongly support keeping these clauses in the Bill. I admire the moral courage of Ministers in this Government for putting these clauses in the Bill, despite the well-made arguments against doing so.
My calculation is that, in central London, a rampaging terrorist’s life expectancy is about nine minutes. Not surprisingly, these events are infrequent, because they are not likely to be successful. This is primarily due to the fortitude, courage and training of the armed police officers of the Metropolitan Police.
I have been on duty in an operational military headquarters, in the field, overseas, when we had to deal with life-threatening emergencies. There is nearly always an information fog, and it is exceptionally difficult for commanders to understand what is actually happening on the ground. The same will apply to police control rooms during a terrorist attack. I understand the difficulties; I have been there. Nevertheless, the Metropolitan Police and other forces usually manage to suppress an attack within a few minutes, for which we should all be really grateful. Unfortunately, it is inevitable that, if there are enough such incidents, perceived or real problems will arise. We only need to think of the difficulties that arose with the Bondi Beach tragedy. We must accept that things might not go as desired.
I am not a lawyer, but the Committee will be aware that I have engaged in armed military operations. I knew that I was accountable for my actions, as well as any troops under my command. That was an obvious risk, but one that, as a prudent risk-taker, I was prepared to accept because I was confident that I would be fairly and promptly dealt with if something went wrong. I am not convinced that the same applies to armed police operations. We have already discussed in the last group delays in the disciplinary machinery. Unfortunately, I was late attending, but I agreed with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said—I apologise for not being there at the start.
In questionable police firearms cases, the CPS has the very difficult task of balancing two conflicting factors. On one hand, there is the very low probability of conviction in these cases—perhaps the Minister will tell us how many armed officers on duty have been convicted of such offences. If that were the only consideration, it would be difficult to authorise a prosecution because the prospect of a conviction would be very low. But, on the other hand, we need to secure public confidence that the police and the state are not above the law and that the evidence against a relevant police officer will be tested by a jury in court. If we do not agree these clauses, we run the risk of prudent risk-takers declining to be trained or to keep their firearms ticket.
The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, touched on the use of the military instead of the police. The military is not correctly trained to undertake civil policing duties. It can in certain circumstances be used, but the military will apply overwhelming military force to resolve the issue.
This lack of willingness to volunteer for firearms duty could, in turn, result in standards being surreptitiously lowered in order to meet demand for authorised firearms officers, leading to precisely the opposite effect to the one we desire. I am sure the Minister will deny that there is any possibility of standards being surreptitiously lowered, but I assure noble Lords that, in the military—not so much in firearms training but in other areas—we are surreptitiously lowering the standards, so this is a very real risk. The noble Lord, Lord Carter, touched on existing recruiting difficulties.
When, regrettably, an armed police officer has to do his or her duty, we cannot allow the lives of his or her family and friends to be turned upside down by media attention that serves no useful purpose.
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (CB)
My Lords, this is not a small matter that we are debating. I have listened to both sides of the argument. The argument in favour of these stand part notices was made in detail, initially by the noble Lord, Lord Black, and was then supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. I listened to those submissions, and they strongly reflected my own. I asked myself: is there anything I can usefully add? I do not think there is, but we are dealing with a matter of high principle. The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, reminded us of the statement that hard cases make bad law. What we have heard in opposition to these stand part notices exemplifies that proposition. We are dealing with a very important matter, and we should not allow a few hard cases to make bad law.
Lord Sentamu (CB)
My Lords, I find myself persuaded by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. This is a moment when, as legislators, we have to pause and ask where the balance really lies. For me, this is not an either/or. When legislators try to legislate, they must not pass the burden of coming to terms with difficult conundrums to someone else to resolve. I would be quite unhappy if we were to leave it to the judge to decide. If they go for anonymity, the courts could then be seen by some people as being on the side not of the citizen but of a few. We have to resolve this and come to a common mind on where we think this should be done. It seems to me that we should not burden the courts with coming to a decision. Legislators should make up their minds on what way they want to go.
I am persuaded by the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I have always been in favour of open courts, trial by jury and no citizen being above the law. We should all have equality before the law, but that argument can sometimes, unfortunately, ignore circumstances that need to be differentiated—not because you do not want fairness and equality but because, if you blindly go down a particular road, you may cause a greater injustice. That is why I am not in favour of people who are so moralist and who keep to their morals: if you are not careful, you could end up with an injustice.
To those who oppose these clauses and to the Government, who bravely want to put this particular way of doing it in the Bill, I suggest that a further conversation needs to be had. How do we resolve this? Clearly, some of us—and I am one of them—would like to defend police officers who have to decide in a split-second to do something, without a lot of thought. They see a danger and they want to neutralise it—not like in Minnesota, where I do not think there was any danger; I would not want to defend those kinds of actions. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has given us the figures, and actually the statistics are very low. In the unfortunate cases where this has happened, most of our armed police officers are disciplined and well trained. However, in life, you always end up with risks you did not anticipate.
I would want to go the way that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, argued for—that if somebody took a decision because they saw greater danger and they took somebody out, I can tell you, the media and other people will focus on their family, not on the decision that was taken. We who are legislators cannot ignore the difficulty that that raises for families.
I do not think that volunteers will disappear immediately if these clauses are not part of the Bill. I still think there are people who, for the sake of security and the well-being of society, will continue to volunteer—but you are going to make it more difficult. I plead with all of us in that regard. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has encapsulated my thoughts on this but I am still in a quandary: will I vote for this or for that? I just hope that the mover of this stand part notice will withdraw it, knowing that Report is still to come, so that it is a clear conversation, and then we can all make up our mind where this is going to lie.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, can I just make an observation that the question is whether we agree these clauses in the Bill or not? If we do not agree the clauses in the Bill, they will fall out of the Bill and then we cannot consider them at a later stage. If we want to consider them at a later stage, we must agree them today.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, it is with great trepidation that I speak, very briefly. Having heard such powerful legal voices discussing these issues—and I hugely respect the legal expertise that we have in the House—on the basis of what we have heard and how the Government have approached this issue, I am minded to support the Government in the initiatives that they are taking here. I feel that we really ought to support these highly disciplined firearms officers. We are living in the era of lawfare and of the courts being used not to the advantage of those who seek to protect us all.
We are very fortunate in this country, unlike in other countries, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, mentioned, to have a situation where the discharge of police firearms is a very rare eventuality. Those who hold that responsibility are highly trained, highly disciplined and highly motivated individuals. If there is a situation where they end up in a court of law because of the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duty, we should support them until there is a decision of that court. Of course, everything changes at that point. But this is about them being endangered, and having the threat of being endangered. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said about how difficult it is to describe that threat in the beginning—and you cannot go backwards on this. In this very specific and rare eventuality, I believe that we should give those who put their lives in danger to protect us the benefit of the doubt.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I may be wrong, but I had never understood that until there was a vote anything in a Bill disappeared. Consequently, unless I am wrong, unless we vote on these three clauses, they will remain until Report. Consequently, I do not entirely understand what the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, was telling us.
To move on, I shall speak extremely briefly—and, I have to say, unlike some noble Lords, I genuinely mean briefly. First, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, has pointed out, this is a profoundly important issue. Secondly, hard cases do not make good law. I am very unhappy at the idea that anyone should automatically be given anonymity in a situation in which they have behaved in a way where there is at least a possibility that they may be guilty of some crime. I would prefer to see the situation as it remains today—but I also listened to, and think that it is a very sensible suggestion from, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that the pause should give us time to discuss further how on earth this should be dealt with.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches we support a carefully framed presumption of anonymity for firearms officers facing criminal charges, but we believe that it should be tightly drawn and subject to clear judicial safeguards.
Giving automatic anonymity to firearms officers who face criminal charges would mark a major and highly sensitive change. It deserves careful and measured consideration and scrutiny to strike the right balance. The public must have confidence that wrongdoing by officers will be dealt with fairly and transparently. But equally—and I think this is very important—officers must feel assured that if they act in good faith and follow their training, the system will protect and not punish them.
We welcome the wider provisions of the Bill to strengthen police accountability, particularly those speeding up investigations by the IOPC, but we understand why firearms officers seek reassurance. These are exceptionally difficult and high-risk roles, where hesitation can have tragic consequences. With fewer than 6,000 operational firearms officers across England and Wales, those concerns cannot be lightly dismissed.
At the same time, we recognise the force of the arguments made by those noble Lords who support the stand part notices proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and accept that a broad, inflexible anonymity system sits uneasily with the principle of open justice. The public have a legitimate right to know when those entrusted with legal powers are alleged to have acted unlawfully. Our preference is for a statutory presumption in favour of anonymity in firearms cases, rebuttable when the court is satisfied that identification is necessary in the interests of justice or public confidence.
We should trust our judges to apply a clear statutory test, protecting officers where necessary, while safeguarding the principles of open justice on which confidence in policing depends. A narrowly tailored presumption, coupled with robust judicial oversight, can provide the reassurance that firearms officers need without creating the perception of a two-tier justice system that treats police officers differently from everyone else. Of course, rebuilding trust in policing must be our shared priority, and ultimately that rests not on secrecy but on transparency, fairness and confidence that accountability will apply equally to all.
Thankfully, fatal police shootings are rare, and it is even rarer still for such cases to reach the courts. In these exceptional, highly charged cases, a carefully limited presumption of anonymity is a reasonable and proportionate step to keep skilled officers in these vital roles, while upholding open justice.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, as I think we all agree, this is a profoundly important issue, and one in which there is realistically no perfectly right answer. But let us start with the position that it remains one of the greatest triumphs of British policing that to this day we do not routinely have armed police officers. The image envisaged by Sir Robert Peel when he established the Metropolitan Police—that of policing by consent and the avoidance of a militarised police force, when he had the example of what he saw on continental Europe at the time—has endured. I have listened anxiously to the speeches today, which have been thoughtful and balanced. But we start, on this side, in His Majesty’s Opposition, with the view that on balance the approach of Clauses 152 to 155 is the right one. I shall say more about that in a moment.
While the vast majority of police officers in this country are unarmed, we know that, in order to protect the public, a few thousand brave officers volunteer to put themselves in harm’s way and become authorised firearms officers. The latest figures show that, as of 31 March 2025, there were 6,367 firearms officers in England and Wales. Of those, 5,753 were operationally deployable. That represented a decrease of 108—or 2%—from the previous year. There is a downward trend in the number of armed police officers, which should be a matter of concern to us all. It has to be arrested.
It is not hard to see why fewer and fewer officers are willing to take on this role. The recent prosecution of, and events surrounding, Martyn Blake demonstrate what can go wrong. Throughout, Martyn Blake was public property. He was left in limbo for two years while awaiting an IOPC investigation, a CPS decision and then a murder trial. As we have heard, he was eventually acquitted in October 2024. Despite that acquittal, the IOPC then announced that it was launching a further investigation for gross misconduct. This remains unresolved. Through all of that, he has been publicly known to everyone.
Matt Cane, the general secretary of the Metropolitan Police Federation, has criticised that in the strongest terms—with which we, on this side, broadly agree. The concern and criticisms which he raised have real-world consequences. Police officers feel that their reasonable use of force may be treated disproportionately or unreasonably after the event in a manner which does not recognise the pressures they face when they make split-second decisions.
During the trial of Martyn Blake, dozens of officers handed in their weapons. There was a serious concern that, in the event of a guilty verdict, police forces across the country would be faced with real, severe shortages of armed officers. The publicity given to all that must have been an aggravating factor for Mr Blake. We have to protect these police officers.
We have heard powerful speeches, from the proposer, my noble friend Lord Black, my noble friend Lady Cash and others, not least the noble and learned Lords, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers and Lord Garnier, either in full support of these stand part notices or asking us to look very carefully at them with a view to doing something along those lines.
There are important issues to consider: open justice; whether or not there should be special treatment for police officers; and concerns about unintended consequences. I remind the Committee of the provisions in Clause 152(3), which says that the court must, first,
“cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”;
then come the identification details. The court must also
“give a reporting direction … in respect of D”—
the defendant—
“(if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”.
This is putting in place a presumption which can be rebutted.
I feel that this is rather broad. In practice, it would be helpful for the courts and for those who have to deal with applications to act on that presumption and to lift that bar, if this was put rather more clearly, with some examples. I do not have any to put before the Committee today, but I came to that view when listening to the debate. I invite the Government to think very carefully about whether something should be done about the terms in the clause. This might go quite a way to addressing the concerns of those who are legitimately concerned about the wrong sort of special treatment being given to police officers, and about open justice more generally.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
His Majesty’s Opposition are broadly in favour of these provisions, but I ask the noble Lord: if this becomes law, how is a judge going to change his or her approach to the issue of anonymity from the position that prevailed before this change? How is it going to alter things?
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
He is going to start—assuming that the judge is a he—from the position that, unless there is an application to the contrary, the bar against publication is in force. I am asking the Government to consider, before we return on Report, whether guidance can be developed and something put into the Bill which addresses the concerns about it being too difficult and imprecise to address in practice. We can listen to and address this on Report. At the moment, we support the provisions in the Bill, but I advance certain—I would not say reservations—anxieties about how this will work in practice and whether, in fact, it would be an absolute bar. Clearly, one hopes that this is not what is intended and that these words are not there just as some sort of fig leaf.
This is not an easy position. We heard some powerful and very persuasive speeches on the other side from the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, calling for support for our officers, and from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who, perhaps, more than any of us, knows what is truly involved for these police officers.
We support the clauses as they are. I remind the Committee that, as we stand here debating the issue of anonymity for firearms officers, outside this building, we are being protected by members of this very special group. In and around this building, they work every day—day in, day out—to keep us safe. We are able to continue with our important work of legislating only because of the safety which armed police officers provide. We owe those who protect us a real degree of protection. On the assumption that they are acting in good faith, they must be spared from the anxiety that if something goes wrong—and it will have gone wrong if they feel they have to shoot—they must not then be left exposed, as Martyn Blake was. We have seen how that went wrong. On this basis, for the time being at least, we support these clauses.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for giving notice of his opposition that Clauses 152 to 155 stand part of the Bill, and the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, for introducing the clause stand part debate and allowing this important and interesting discussion. I acknowledge from the outset that the Government agree these are not easy issues.
Clauses 152 to 155 largely stand or fall together, creating a bespoke system for a very small and discrete category of defendants in criminal trials; namely, authorised firearms officers charged with offences arising from the discharge of their weapon during the course of their official duties.
Notwithstanding the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about lawyers—of which, of course, I am one—made during the course of the debate on the last group, I agree with much of what he has said. The starting point for the Government is that armed police officers perform a unique and high-risk role. They are trained to use lethal force, on behalf of the state, to protect the public, often in fast-moving and dangerous situations. This puts them personally at risk of death or serious injury every day in the course of their duties. They deserve our thanks and admiration for putting themselves in harm’s way to protect the public—and that, a point made by many of your Lordships, includes you and me. Because many of those with whom they engage are involved in serious crime, it exposes them and their families to the risk of retribution. That is the Government’s starting point.
There is another equally important principle in play: we do not have secret trials in this country. The principles of open justice and the ability for the press to report on cases continues to be one of our proudest and most carefully and jealously guarded traditions. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for whom I have the utmost respect, for putting in impassioned terms the importance of freedom of the press and freedom of speech.
So why then have the Government decided to introduce a presumption of anonymity in trials for authorised firearms officers? This limited presumption is being introduced due to the unique nature of firearms officers’ roles and the risks that arise from them being identified during court proceedings. What marks them out from other categories of defendant is that these are not risks merely to their reputation but to their lives. These are not theoretical risks. Firearms officers who have been charged with an offence can face serious death threats and other forms of intimidation. The threats do not stop with them but extend to their families as well. The real and present nature of this danger cannot be ignored.
I want to give two illustrations of incidents which demonstrate how extreme the consequences can be for those who serve as firearms officers. In one case, a contract for murder was issued against an officer who had acted in the line of duty and who was later found to have acted entirely within the law. In another, a bounty was placed on an officer who, as things turned out, had been lawfully carrying out their responsibilities. The threat is not theoretical; it is a stark reality. The safety of our officers and those they love must not be compromised. Some of these officers may later be found not guilty by a jury, but if they and their families have faced real and credible threats, by then the damage is done.
The time has come for action to be taken. The National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that firearms officers are fearful of the consequences and processes for them if they are involved in a death or serious injury case because of what has happened to colleagues, mostly so because of how it has played out in the media.
The noble Lord, Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made the point that the courts already have the power to order reporting restrictions in a case where the court judges that disclosure of a defendant’s identity would give rise to a real and immediate risk to life, and asked why a presumption is necessary. Our answer is this. It must be remembered, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out, that police officers volunteer for armed roles and they are not compelled to undertake such duties, nor are they paid more to do so. Data from armed policing shows the start of a slow decline in the number of those wishing to serve as armed officers. The armed policing attrition and retention document records that, since 2019, there has been a loss of 583 armed officers. That is an 8.8% reduction. Everyone hearing this should be worried. We rely on these officers to keep us and those we love, as well as our fellow citizens, safe. We, a Labour Government, are persuaded and have decided to act.
We have concluded that we need to strike a balance between the safety and security of our brave firearms officers, who are presumed innocent unless or until convicted by a court of law, and their families and our inviolable principles of open justice and freedom of the press. I venture to suggest that this is what these provisions achieve. The most important things to note are that these. First, once a jury has decided that the defendant is guilty then of course their identity will be made public. Secondly, these provisions establish only a presumption of anonymity during the trial. The judge at any stage has the ability to order that part or all of the defendant’s identifying characteristics should be revealed. It changes only where we start, not necessarily where we end up. Thirdly, the media and others will be informed, as is usual, of cases where there is a reporting restriction in place. Journalists and others will be able to make representations to the judge as to why they say that the identity should be known at an early stage, to help the judge decide where the balance should be struck in any individual case.
I remind your Lordships of the old truism about the difference between what is in the public interest and matters in which the public are interested. It is judges who make decisions of this kind every day and are best placed to do so. I add the reassurance that, where a judge concludes that narrower steps will suffice, the court will order only the minimum necessary. I can say to your Lordships from my own experience, and knowing my former judicial colleagues as I do, that they take the freedom of the press to report trials very seriously indeed. I venture to say that the two distinguished former judges who have spoken in this debate—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—have shown just that.
Open justice remains the starting point. This measure introduces a narrow, rebuttable presumption for a small, clearly defined cohort. Proceedings will remain public, evidence will be tested in open court, and judicial reasons are given. Only the defendant’s details may be withheld, where necessary, until the point of conviction. It expressly allows the court to lift anonymity wherever it would be
“contrary to the interests of justice”
for the anonymity to remain.
I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that this is a difficult issue that needs to be approached with care and that everyone should be moderate in the way they approach it. However, this measure does not compromise transparency or judicial independence. All it does it ensure that officers are not exposed to undue risk before the facts have been tested and decided upon by a court. It is about fairness, safety, and maintaining confidence in policing and justice.
I hope that my explanation of these clauses has gone some way to reassuring your Lordships. It would, as always, be a pleasure to meet the noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, again—I think this is the third time in 48 hours that I have offered to meet him—as well as representatives of the News Media Association, who have written to me at least twice on this important topic. I would be more than happy to discuss all of their concerns. In the meantime, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw his opposition to the clause standing part.
Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)
I thank the Minister very much for her comments and the offer to meet. I suspect she is involved in a large number of meetings at the moment, and we will try not to add too much to the burden.
This has been a very good debate on a difficult subject, but one, as we have heard from a number of people, that is of profound importance. We have to get the balance right, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, and that is what this debate has shown.
I will make three quick points, if I may. First, to underline what we heard a number of times in this debate, of course we all have huge admiration and respect for firearms officers. They are a very brave group of people who do a great deal here to protect us, and we are in their debt. They deserve protection. The points we have tried to make are that they have it at the moment. The difficulty with these clauses is that it is made automatic. That means, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, it is not always going to be easy to rebut.
There is an issue, as far as the media is concerned, that a presumption of anonymity could mean that the media is not put on proper notice and therefore is unable to challenge the presumption, if indeed those media outlets possess the resources to do so. If it is left to potluck that reporters become aware then open justice erodes, because the media has not got a chance to consider whether it should contest the presumption.
Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others have said that, thankfully, it is a very small number of cases such as this that ever come to court. It is not about that; this is a matter, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, of high principle. In my experience, open justice and press freedom do not perish because of obvious assaults against them but because of apparently innocuous incremental changes such as this and the provision of special cases. The point, as my noble friend Lady Cash said, is that if anonymity becomes the default, openness has to be justified. That is the end of a very slippery slope, which is one of the things the Minister and I can talk about when we meet.
Finally, to echo a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made, at the end of the day, this is about state power and the exercise of state power. We chip away at the scrutiny of that at our peril. To do so, we should have overwhelming evidence. I appreciate what the Minister said in summing up, but I still do not believe that the case has been made. A number of noble Lords have said that we have time before Report to consider this further. It is a matter of huge importance, so let us take the time before Report to do so. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my opposition to the clause.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“Service as a police officer: aggravating factor in criminal sentencing(1) On sentencing for any criminal offence, current or past service as a police officer shall be presumed to be an aggravating factor.(2) Where in a particular case, a court decides against any such aggravation justifying an increased penalty, it shall state the reasons for this decision.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause and another in the name of Baroness Chakrabarti relate to the criminal sentencing of serving or retired police officers. This amendment creates a rebuttable presumption that such service should be an aggravating factor.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I will rise slowly to allow for the appropriate exodus.
I have Amendments 425 and 426 in this group. They are probing amendments only, and therefore I do not propose to detain the Committee for too long, not least as these follow the excellent previous debate, for which I commend the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, and all the participants. Many of the sentiments in that discussion informed my thinking behind these two amendments.
Let me explain. Like other noble Lords, I have a huge amount of respect for the overwhelming majority of police officers in this country, perhaps best exemplified by those who keep us safe outside and inside this building, and indeed those former officers who contribute so ably to debates in your Lordships’ House. Unfortunately, that is not the whole story of policing.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I am never sure what a probing amendment means, because surely all our amendments are probing, and I certainly would support both these amendments on Report, because they are actually crucial. Although I am vastly older than the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I, too, have been working on this for quite a long time, but only for two and a half decades. The number of police officers who have, in some way, been found guilty of a crime and yet still get their police pensions and all the benefits of having been a police officer for some years, however badly it has ended, really is annoying.
Police officers do a very difficult job—I am very appreciative of that and understand the problems—and most do it well. But when someone abuses that role, the damage is much greater for public trust. It is wider than any single case. Trust in policing depends on people believing that no one is above the law. In the previous debate the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made the point that the rule of law is for us all, and I will bring that issue up again when we get to the public whatsit Bill, on—
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I thank the noble Baroness very much.
At the moment the rule of law is not for us all, as exemplified by the way we treat police in some cases. On pensions, why do the Government prefer decisions about pension forfeiture to be taken later behind closed doors rather than in open court, where reasons are given and can be tested on appeal? If a judge has heard all the evidence in a criminal case involving a police officer, and has seen the harm done and the abuse of trust, why do the Government think that a judge should have no say at all over a publicly funded police pension?
I ask this out of long experience. We have been told for decades now that existing systems are enough or that reforms are coming, and clearly that is not happening. I personally would like to see, instead of these little baby steps, a bold, straightforward move towards the kind of accountability that people can see and understand. Time and again, in cases of serious police misconduct, the consequences remain unclear and invisible to the public.
From the public’s point of view, the current system makes very little sense. Some serious criminal convictions of police officers fall outside the pensions rule altogether, simply because they do not meet a narrow legal definition. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why judges who hear the evidence are excluded and why transparency in court is still seen as a step too far.
When this Labour Government got elected, I really hoped for some changes in the way that we apply a sense of fairness to the whole of our legal system. Quite honestly, they have disappointed me very badly. They are no better than this side of the Chamber. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, we have been waiting a long time for this, and a Labour Government should really put it right.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, both these amendments seek to sharpen the consequences for police officers, serving or retired, who commit criminal offences. High-profile cases and damning reports have exposed toxic elements of policing culture, eroding public trust. Yet the vast majority of police officers do an excellent job and are let down by a small minority. Recent cases highlight public expectations that the law should rightly demand higher standards of personal integrity from police officers and, at the very least, adherence to the law of the land.
There is also no question but that public confidence in policing’s ability to police its own is fragile. While the latest figures from the Independent Office for Police Conduct show record high complaints, over a quarter of the public lack confidence in the organisation itself, most cannot even describe what it does, and nearly half distrust the police complaints system. That should give us pause for thought, because it is really quite serious.
When officers are seen to evade scrutiny or punishment, trust erodes further. This has major repercussions for those doing the job properly, because many members of the public then say, “Well, they’re all the same, aren’t they?” I fully accept the noble Baroness’s argument that more can and should be done.
Amendment 425 would create a rebuttable presumption that police service can be treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing. This rightly recognises the unique betrayal of public trust when those entrusted to uphold the law instead break it. However, I have a concern that in marginal cases, being a police officer could flip from helping to reduce the sentence, as somebody who has served the public, to becoming an automatic burden.
Amendment 426 goes further, granting courts the power to forfeit a sizeable chunk of an offender’s police pension. This could serve as a highly effective deterrent. However, I worry on two counts. First, it could discourage quality recruits, who fear that one mistake could destroy their and their family’s lifetime financial security. Secondly, it could entail taking away pension benefits that the officer has already earned fairly during what were presumably good years of service.
These amendments definitely merit serious consideration, but they also focus on symptoms rather than causes. From these Benches, we want to see the Government go further to strengthen the front line of police misconduct systems, with vetting that catches risks early and misconduct processes that are swift, transparent and trusted. Only then will sentencing reforms such as this land with any amount of force.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 425 and 426 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, relate to the criminal sentencing of serving or retired police officers. We on this side of the Committee cannot support them. These amendments are well intentioned, and we understand where the noble Baroness is coming from, but we believe they will cause more problems than the issues they are trying to address. I do not see, for example, that they would have had any impact on the behaviour of the officer in the Everard murder or in other cases of police misconduct.
Amendment 425 would create a rebuttable presumption that current or former police officers should have their service as a police officer treated as an aggravating factor when being sentenced for a criminal offence. We, like the noble Baroness, believe that police officers should be held to a high standard. Abuses of power should be treated with the utmost seriousness, but the amendment is far too wide and risks creating unintended outcomes. Sentencing should, as far as is reasonably possible, be a specific exercise based on the facts of the case before the court.
At present, the courts already have the ability to treat an abusive position of trust or authority as an aggravating factor where relevant. This will allow for judges to distinguish between offences that may have been connected to an individual’s role as a police officer and those that are completely independent of it. They should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Amendment 425 would apply regardless of whether the offence had any connection to police service, resulting in the inclusion of offences that were wholly unconnected to an officer’s professional role and committed perhaps many years after the officer had retired or left the force.
Introducing such a provision, even as a rebuttable presumption, risks introducing an unnecessary and inappropriate counterproductive legal complexity. In practice, judges reflect on the defendant’s status and whether it is an aggravating factor. Furthermore, it would require the court to judge a person by their job and quite possibly what they were doing many years before. It could be 20 years before the commission of the offence and wholly unconnected with their service.
Similarly, we have significant concerns about Amendment 426. Pensions are deferred pay. They have been earned by service. I appreciate that issues arise where, while being so paid, the officer embarks on perhaps corrupt behaviour, but the police service will have to think about how it addresses that. It requires careful consideration of terms of service. If the police service wishes to include appropriate terms to address that sort of conduct, it is a matter for careful and balanced drafting, not for the relative sledgehammer—I mean that politely—proposed here. Once money has been earned and transferred to the relevant individual, that money is now their property. This amendment would undermine that principle and give the courts the power to deprive someone of money that may be entirely unrelated to the crime of which they are being convicted. It is potentially a large mandatory fine on top of any other sentence. We all know that police officers who go to prison face undoubted unpleasantness and very often have to be offered solitary confinement and protection. That in itself is a very substantial penalty.
We agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about the risks of these amendments and the steps that should equally be taken to improve the way in which the police service operates. But the forfeiture of pension rights for just any criminal offence, especially in cases distinct from instances of abuse of police powers, could lead to disproportionate unintended consequences. We recognise that maintaining public confidence in policing is essential, but that confidence must be upheld through clear standards and conviction when things go wrong, then more effective punishment if needed; and, if necessary, by revision of the terms of service, but done by a matter of the terms of service, not by this rather blunt instrument. We look to the Minister for assurances on those points.
Relevant penalties must be imposed on the basis of conduct, not just status, so we cannot support the amendments. The context in which the sentence is passed is the fact of service; that would be relevant, but it is relevant only if that particular case comes before the court.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti indicated that this was a probing amendment and I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss these points.
I start by saying to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Doocey, and my noble friend that this Labour Government are committed to making improvements in police standards. That is why we have introduced significant reforms to strengthen police vetting and to act on misconduct and performance systems. This includes placing a duty on officers to hold and maintain vetting clearances and introducing a presumption of dismissal for proven gross misconduct. There are a number of measures in the Bill, but also in secondary legislation—and I trail the White Paper on police reform, shortly to be produced—that will show that this Labour Government, to answer the noble Baroness’s point, are committed to upholding standards and improving them, particularly in the wake of the murder of Sarah Everard and the conviction of police officers for simply heinous crimes. I put that on the record as a starting point because, with due respect, I do not accept the noble Baroness’s position that we are not doing anything on these matters.
I also support my noble friend’s broader position on strengthening accountability in the police service. I wish to see that happen but, in probing these amendments, I ask her to consider whether they are proportionate, fair or necessary. I take up and share some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, made in his contribution.
Amendment 425 would make an individual’s current or former service as a police officer a statutory aggravating factor when sentencing them for any criminal offence. It is right that an officer’s service should be an aggravating factor where an offence has been committed in connection with their service, particularly where officers have abused their position of trust. It cannot be right that individuals should be sentenced more harshly than other members of the public based on their occupation or, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, said, their former occupation. That is why the existing sentencing guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council must be followed by the courts, unless it is not in the interest of justice to do so, and make clear that abuse of power or position is an aggravating factor in sentencing. My noble friend knows that, because she mentioned it in her contribution. Introducing a statutory provision is therefore unnecessary. I submit to my noble friend that there is no gap in law or practice, and it would be neither fair nor proportionate to presume that a person’s current or previous service as a police officer was an aggravating factor in all cases.
Amendment 426 would give powers to the Crown Court to make decisions on the forfeiture of police officers’ pensions where an officer has been convicted of a criminal offence. As I have mentioned already, I am sympathetic to strengthening accountability in the police service, but responsibility for the forfeiture of a police officer’s pension is already set out in legislation. I know that my noble friend knows this, because she referred to it. In most cases, the matter is in the hands of elected police and crime commissioners. Police and crime commissioners are not only the pension supervising authority for police officers but the locally elected officials designed to represent the public and local communities. I therefore contend to my noble friend that they are clearly well positioned to consider the impact of such offending on public confidence in policing.
However, it is also worth mentioning to the Committee that the Home Secretary has a role in this matter. Pension forfeiture cannot happen without a conviction having been first certified by the Home Secretary as being gravely injurious to the interests of the state or liable to lead to serious loss of confidence. While the Crown Court has an existing role as the relevant appeal body following a forfeiture decision, the process of considering whether to pursue and apply for pension forfeiture is not, I suggest, properly the responsibility of the criminal courts, especially given that they have an appeal role in that process and that there is no mechanism in the amendment that would allow the Home Secretary to make submissions to the Crown Court on public interest factors that should be considered.
I know that my noble friend has probed in this amendment, and I know she knows this because she referenced it in her speech: those two mechanisms are available. We are trying to look at the key issue, which in my view is sorting out vetting issues and standards and making sure that we maintain those standards. That is what we are doing in the Bill, and in the White Paper that will shortly be before the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I therefore ask my noble friend, at least on this occasion, to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
I did not hear an answer to my question about why a judge should not hear about pension forfeiture in an open court. The forfeiting of pensions does happen, but it happens outside the court in closed rooms, and we never really understand the reasons given. Why not allow it to happen in court in front of a judge?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
As I just said, it can be done in court in front of a judge on appeal. The decisions are taken by the police and crime commissioner and/or the Home Secretary, who is accountable for those matters, and the Government intend to hold to that position. It may not satisfy the noble Baroness, as ever, but I look forward to her support on the key issue, which is improving vetting to make sure that we do not have those significant bad apples in the police force in the first place. That is our key focus in the White Paper and the measures in the Bill.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. I said these were probing amendments because I thought it was important that we discussed in Committee on this Bill the issues of police standards, discipline and public confidence, as well as all the other measures that we are constantly debating to do with additional police powers. I am so grateful.
I say gently to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that in his response to the pension forfeiture provision he spoke as if this was not already an established principle. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, got it right when she said the issue here is about how you will inspire most public confidence when forfeiture proceedings are happening. Would there not be some benefit in this being part of the sentence and therefore being given greater publicity because it has been announced in an open Crown Court? I think that is really the only difference between us.
I am grasping at any straw of how we might try to improve confidence in policing in this country, where, year on year, this is not happening. I was particularly grateful to my noble friend the Minister for, in a sense, responding to the provocation of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to talk about what he plans with the White Paper and so on. I am sure we all look forward to engaging with all that. For the moment, though, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Police training – independent review(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must establish an independent review of the quality of in-service police officer training within police forces in England and Wales. (2) The review must—(a) assess the consistency, effectiveness and outcomes of all training provided to police officers after completion of their initial entry-level training, including all—(i) in-service training,(ii) workforce development programmes,(iii) refresher courses, and(iv) specialist training,(b) consider the extent to which training equips officers with the necessary skills, knowledge and professional standards to reflect the demands of modern policing, including—(i) digital skills,(ii) investigative skills,(iii) trauma awareness and conflict management, and(iv) processes by which police officers are informed of, and trained in, changes to the law, and(c) make recommendations for improvement, where appropriate.(3) The review established under subsection (1) must complete its work within 12 months of its establishment.(4) Within three months of receiving the review, the Secretary of State must lay a statement before Parliament containing their response and proposals to take forward the recommendations in the review.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to establish an independent review on police training.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 427 concerns one of the most vital levers for improving the performance and professionalism of our police service: the training of front-line officers. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review of the training that officers receive once deployed by their forces. At present, the College of Policing sets national standards and issues codes and regulations, but it cannot force them to comply. Implementation depends on the forces themselves, the Home Office and inspectorates to give those standards real force. The result is uneven training and a postcode lottery for the public.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to support the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on Amendment 427, and I have signed Amendment 428, which I will address. I come to the issue of mental health because I was present at and contributed to the debate the last time your Lordships’ House reviewed and improved the Armed Forces covenant. Mental health plays a vital part in that. I have friends and family members who are past and present members of the military, and I have seen how the military, over the last 15 to 20 years, has managed and improved its mental health.
That is the position I took when trying to have a look at how our police, not just officers but ancillary staff, are supported when they face difficult circumstances that might put their mental health under pressure. The difference between the MoD’s approach and the College of Policing’s approach is really quite stark. To start with, the College of Policing—I looked at some individual constabularies as well—is all about signposting elsewhere to outside organisations. There is virtually nothing on what happens inside your own organisation if you are a police officer. The front page of the advice rightly refers to the Samaritans first; it then talks about Mind, social media support, and support for police officers and staff experiencing mental illness or distress. Then, and only then, on page four, does it start to talk about what happens inside your own place of employment and how you can find support there.
The contrast with the MoD advice on mental health is that soon after the headline
“Armed forces covenant and mental health”,
it has a massive headline that says:
“Getting advice or help urgently”
for “serving personnel”; it goes through that and then it does it for “veterans”. It starts by saying that
“your first point of call should be your chain of command, unit medical officer, welfare officer or chaplain if you are in the UK or overseas”,
so if you are a serving member of staff you know instantly that your first place is the place in which you live and work, and you have your chain of command—the people above you and the people who may be junior to you.
I recognise that the details of the Armed Forces covenant are different from the employment relationship that police officers have, but before I move specifically on to the amendment I want to say that one of the other things that the armed services learned as a consequence of the Afghan campaign was that they needed to get a much better dialogue going on between staff. They were almost the first people to start introducing mental health first-aiders. It absolutely transformed areas of the military where it was introduced with gusto. This idea about the chain of command meant that there was an instant response from somebody who, like a first-aid trainer, could go and say to a colleague, “Are you all right? Have you got some problems?”, or whatever.
In policing, it appears very patchy as to whether mental health first-aiders are properly encouraged. In fact, the only thing that I could find online was that Staffordshire Police said in 2023 that it had over 50 mental health first-aiders. That is a really good standard, but there is no evidence held centrally about that level. It also indicates the seriousness with which a service, in its entirety, looks after its personnel.
I looked at the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which sets out some criteria to start to gather that information about the response to mental health—not just mental health first-aiders. Again, I could not find anything online that was solely about policing. However, there was a recent report by the King’s Centre for Military Health Research, jointly researched by King’s College London, the OU and the Royal Foundation, entitled Assessing the Mental Health and Wellbeing of the Emergency Responder Community in the UK. That obviously is not just the police; it includes the ambulance service and firefighters.
In its very good research paper, the centre noted that, across the three emergency responder services, there was generally an absence of definitions and very little monitoring and evaluation. The paper talked about the importance of trauma support, including for PTSD. It emphasised, as I have already mentioned, the reliance on signposting to outside bodies and a lack of involvement inside police forces, and it certainly emphasised the lack of data collection and evaluation, including on self-harm, suicide, and alcohol and substance misuse.
The paper noted that there was no real sense of how emergency responder services were going to address what worked and did not work, and therefore whether any training that they were doing was going to be relevant. The paper recommended a promotion of good practice, so that responders know what good practice is, as well as the promotion and extension of support for “mental health/wellbeing ‘champions’”, which I think means mental health first aiders and some of the other forms of that.
The key thing the paper said was that there should be access to a single “Universal Gateway” website, analogous to the MoD page, and that to have that universal gateway there must be a single, universal collection of data and evaluation, so that across the board the police can understand what works and what does not work.
The UK systematic review found 81 recent results of ad hoc research projects, of which 43 were from police forces. Frankly, everybody needs to work together much better to make this work. That brings me back to the amendment, which, at the very least, sets out a route to collect that data right across the police forces in England and Wales. It focuses on a series of issues that I have already mentioned, and it would be a good start to approaching issues of mental health in the way that the military does for its people, which is having success. I hope that the Home Office Minister will look at that when deciding whether or not this amendment should be supported.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 427 and 428, both in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, raise important questions about police training and how best to ensure that officers are properly equipped for the demands of modern policing.
Amendment 427 would require the Secretary of State to establish an independent review of in-service police training. We recognise the important underlying principle of the point being made here. Policing has changed significantly in recent years, not least because of the growth of digital crime, involving investigative techniques and greater awareness of trauma and professional standards. It is entirely right that we ask whether training keeps pace with these demands and whether there is sufficient consistency and effectiveness across forces. An independent review is one way of taking stock of that landscape and identifying gaps or best practice.
However, reviews of this nature inevitably come with costs in time and resource and risk introducing potential further bureaucratic hurdles for the police. It is worth reflecting on whether there may be other mechanisms, such as through existing inspection or the monitoring of professional standards frameworks, that could achieve similar outcomes. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government currently assess the quality and consistency of in-service training and whether further work of this kind is already under way.
Amendment 428 focuses specifically on mandatory mental health training for front-line officers. The intention behind this amendment is clear. Police officers are often the first responders in highly distressing situations involving individuals in mental health crises. A degree of appropriate training in de-escalation and communication is clearly valuable. However, we on this side have some concerns that I hope the Minister can address.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for raising these issues. I know she feels strongly about them. We have an interchangeable Front Bench here between the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Brinton. It is always of interest to me that we have a good dual ability between the two noble Baronesses on these matters; I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, from the Front Bench/Back Bench.
The noble Baroness is right that training and support are vital. Police officers do a difficult job. They need to identify and have that support. I am grateful to her for shining a light on this in the amendment today. She knows—I just want to put this on the record again—that the College of Policing currently sets standards for police training and development, including the national policing curriculum, to support initial learning for new recruits, and standards and an accreditation for those who work in high-risk or specialist roles. The College of Policing also works strongly with police forces to support standards and to look at ongoing training and development. Again, our White Paper, which will appear in very short order, will consider the future workforce and will set out reform proposals on leadership and on culture to ensure that the Government’s safer streets and other projects and the mission that we have is equipped with support to achieve those objectives.
The noble Baroness will also know that my noble friend Lord Blunkett and the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, who is currently the chair of the College of Policing, have been appointed to review police leadership in a new commission, which the Government support. I expect that that will include looking at the wider training issues that the noble Baroness has made reference to today. I do not want to pre-empt that work, but it is important that we just recognise that. The request for the Home Secretary to commission as independent review, as Amendment 427 suggests, would potentially duplicate or pre-empt what is already being undertaken by the White Paper and by the two colleagues from this House.
Amendment 428 would ensure that police officers are equipped to deal with people suffering a mental health crisis. It is an extremely important issue. It is important that our police have the training and skills to not just be able to identify when a person is vulnerable but to understand how to intervene appropriately when people are experiencing a mental health crisis. For the reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has given, very often officers will be the first port of call when mental health crises happen, because they are the first port of call in every circumstance. It is important that officers are equipped to make appropriate decisions in that range of circumstances and to treat people fairly, with humanity, and understand the issues accordingly.
Evidence shows that they are doing a reasonable job. The Mental Health Act review by Professor Sir Simon Wessely noted that
“numerous examples of police treating those with mental health problems with kindness and compassion”
were identified. That is what the public can expect, and that is what we want to see.
I say to both the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, that the College of Policing sets relevant standards, guidance and training on these operational matters. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said that she tried to find examples of that. The College of Policing currently has a mental health learning programme available via College Learn. It has programme specification and training guides which are updated and have been updated very recently—in the last few years. There are module titles on mental health and the police, providing a first response to mental health incidents, responding to suicide, providing specialist support at incidents of mental health and developing a strategic response to mental health.
With operational support from chief constables, who are independent of government, how they use that resource is a matter for the police. Different police forces will face different challenges and pressures and have different ways of doing it. But there is a level of support, which the outcomes of the police White Paper and the reviews by the two noble Lords I have mentioned will assist and support. It is important that we recognise that work is ongoing.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. I think I was making a very slightly different point. I am aware of these courses, but my argument was that what the military has achieved has been through culture change within the entire organisation, rather than just sending people on a course to get a qualification.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
It is important to do that, but I also say to the noble Baroness that the police are not mental health experts, nor should we expect them to be. At the end of the day, they will be the first responders who have to identify and support people. The work on the Right Care, Right Person project over the last two years by police and health partners, to ensure that people who are in mental health crisis get the right response from the right person with the right training and skills at the right time, is important. That work has shown a decrease in unwarranted police intervention in mental health pathways. We want people with a mental health challenge to have support. The police are dealing with the crisis in the moment, and perhaps the consequential behaviour of the crisis, rather than the underlying long-term trends.
There will always be a role for police in dealing with mental health calls where there is a risk of serious harm. It is important that police have access to relevant health information and use their police powers to do that.
Importantly, as I have mentioned already, there is an important set of training material available, which goes to points that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, mentioned. The College of Police’s mental health training is for all new officers to go through. There is an additional suite of training material I have referred to that provide, I hope, the approach to the culture change that the noble Baroness is seeking. This training provides officers with knowledge to recognise what mental health challenges there are and to communicate with and support people exhibiting such indicators.
I think this is a worthwhile discussion, but I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that it would be helpful to withdraw the amendment now, and we will reflect on the outcome of the White Paper in due course.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and my noble friend Lady Brinton for her summing up, which I thought was excellent. I just want to make a couple of quick points.
I am very much aware that the College of Policing determines what training should be provided for police officers. However, the point I was making—perhaps not strongly enough—is that the training does not work. The training is inappropriate; every police chief will tell you that. HMICFRS, which is the inspectorate, has said on multiple occasions and in multiple reports that the training is inadequate and there need to be changes, and nothing has happened. I honestly think that, whatever happens, there has to be an independent national audit of police training because there has not been one since 2012. The last one was a PEEL inspection, which examined individual forces but not the national picture.
I am so looking forward to the Minister’s White Paper. I cannot even begin to describe how excited I am about it. I think I am correct in saying that the Minister has referred to it—that it will solve all our problems—in almost every topic we have ever discussed. My only concern is that, if it contains as many subjects and if it is going to solve as many problems as the Minister suggests, it will probably be more like an encyclopaedia than a White Paper. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Neighbourhood policing(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that every local authority area in England and Wales has a neighbourhood policing team which must be assigned exclusively to community-based duties, including—(a) high-visibility foot patrols,(b) community engagement and intelligence gathering,(c) crime prevention initiatives, and(d)s solving crime.(2) The Home Office must publish proposals detailing the additional funding that will be required to ensure that police forces can meet these requirements without reducing officer numbers in other frontline policing roles.(3) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report detailing—(a) the number of officers and PCSOs deployed in neighbourhood policing roles,(b) the total cost of maintaining the required levels, and(c) the impact on crime reduction and public confidence in policing.(4) If a police force fails to meet the minimum staffing levels required under subsection (1), the Home Office must intervene and provide emergency funding to ensure compliance within six months.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to ensure that every local authority area in England and Wales has a neighbourhood policing team which must be assigned exclusively to community-based duties.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 429 and 430, in my name. An effective, responsive and trusted police service must be built from the ground up, not imposed from the top down. I hope the forthcoming White Paper will start from that premise and reflect the Government’s stated commitment to community policing.
The Minister will no doubt highlight the neighbourhood policing guarantee and the promise of named officers in every community, and much of the Bill is described as strengthening neighbourhood officers’ ability to tackle the priorities of most concern to local communities—respect orders, tighter shoplifting laws and new vehicle seizure powers. However, none of this addresses the central challenge for chief constables: how to deliver on these promises amid rising demand, high turnover and chronic funding shortfalls. Front-line delivery depends on forces retaining officers in visible community roles rather than constantly redeploying them to plug shortages elsewhere.
Despite the new neighbourhood policing grant, the early signs are troubling. Last month, Cheshire police announced a 70% cut in PCSO numbers, from 87 to 27, despite public opposition, citing the need to save £13 million. Nationally too, PCSO numbers fell by 3.3% in the year to March 2025—a loss equivalent to 253 full-time officers—while front counters continue to close, and more and more school liaison programmes disappear.
This simply is not good enough. Public confidence rests on local responsiveness, yet neighbourhood policing teams today have about 10,000 fewer officers and PCSOs than in 2015. The police inspectorate has warned that some forces lack sufficient neighbourhood officers to deal effectively with anti-social behaviour, with huge variations of service across the country. Between 2019 and 2023, over 4 million anti-social behaviour incidents were not attended by an officer in person. Some forces responded to every report; others to very few. Of course, trusted neighbourhood officers are critical to tackling not only anti-social behaviour but knife crime, domestic abuse and retail theft, to name just a few.
Amendment 429 therefore seeks to guarantee for every local authority area a dedicated neighbourhood policing team protected from being routinely diverted to fill response gaps, and to require an annual Home Office report on the state of community policing.
Amendment 430 would make it a statutory duty for forces to maintain neighbourhood teams at effective staffing levels, the level to be determined by forces, councils, communities and ward panels to ensure that resources meet local demand. To support this, we propose ring-fencing 20% of future police grants, supplemented by a share of recovered proceeds of crime. This approach preserves operational flexibility. Forces could, of course, choose to exceed the minimum level if they so wished. I urge the Government to work with these Benches towards our shared goal—restoring visible, trusted and effective neighbourhood policing. I beg to move.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling Amendments 429 and 430. Neighbourhood policing is one of the most important facets of the job, and we support any approach that intends to increase the presence of officers within neighbourhood communities. It is all consistent and very much part of the approach of that great Conservative Sir Robert Peel. Visible police presence on the streets of local communities is an incredibly important role. There is the obvious consequence that more officers out on patrol results in more crime being deterred and prevented, but the latent impact is that more noticeable, familiar and engaged officers contribute to an atmosphere of order and civility within local neighbourhoods—in other words, generally better behaviour.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendments. I start, however, with the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who prayed in aid the great Conservative, as he said, Robert Peel. From my recollection, Robert Peel was certainly not in charge of the police force during the 14 years of the previous Government, under which the noble Lord served. I was Police Minister in 2009-10 and know that we lost 20,000 police officers—I repeat, 20,000—in the first years of the Conservative Government. I think Sir Robert Peel had gone walkabout during that period and was not serving as a neighbourhood police officer under the Conservative Government’s watch at that particular time.
There was a lamentable decline in neighbourhood policing between 2010 and the last election. This Government have delivered on our commitment in the election to restore neighbourhood policing. We have already announced that police forces will be supported to deliver an increase of 13,000 officers for neighbourhood policing by the end of this Parliament. In the previous six months, we have delivered 80% of our year-one target, with nearly 2,400 additional neighbourhood officers in post. We remain on track to reach a full 3,000 uplift by April this year, which goes to the heart of the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. We backed that with £200 million of additional investment in the current financial year, as part of a total funding settlement to police forces of £17.6 billion. Total funding will again rise next year, 2026-27, by £746 million, taking the total funding for police forces up to £18.3 billion next year. That is a major level of investment in policing that this Government have brought forward, and I argue that it meets the objective of the noble Baroness’s amendment.
It is because of our neighbourhood policing guarantee that every neighbourhood across England and Wales now has named and contactable officers. These neighbourhood teams are dedicated to engaging with communities, gathering intelligence, and preventing crime and anti-social behaviour. Forces are ensuring that regular beat meetings take place, providing local people and businesses with a direct platform to shape policing priorities. We have more visible patrols, and officers and PCSOs have started to complete the new neighbourhood policing programme. There is career pathway training, launched in June 2025. There are designated leads for anti-social behaviour in every police force and a commitment to 72-hour response times to neighbourhood queries. These are all measures that I am sure Robert Peel would have welcomed had he been in charge for the previous 14 years—but he was not, and it did not happen, but it is now.
The new police standards and performance improvement unit will ensure that police performance is consistently and accurately measured. The work of the unit is going to reinforce our commitment to transparency and, for the noble Baroness, I pray in aid the upcoming White Paper on police reform—she will not have too long to wait for it now. It will detail how wider reforms will support the Government’s pledge to rebuild neighbourhood policing.
The amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, are absolutely in the right direction of travel. The question is whether she wants to constrain chief constables with the demands that she seeks to put centrally. I argue that the Government will continue to bolster neighbourhood policing and have reversed the cuts imposed by the previous Government—the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seems to have had a memory blank around what happened over that time. The Government have set clear standards of local policing, and will work with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing and others. We are heading in the direction of the noble Baroness’s amendment, without the need to legislate.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
Could the Minister say something about the Police Federation’s attitude to the list of changes to enforcement that he has laid out?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The Government work closely with the Police Federation and will always listen and gauge the situation with them. I have met the chair of the Police Federation on a number of occasions, and other Ministers in government do the same. We will engage with that body. Like other federations or any form of trade union—although it is not a trade union—there will on occasion be differences between the organisation, the police chiefs and the Government, as is perfectly natural. I believe that we are investing in supporting police officers on the ground to do a better job in what they are trying to do and ensuring that the Government undertake a focus on neighbourhood policing, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, seeks. On that basis, I urge her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I thank the Minister for his response. I do not think that we are miles and miles apart. To be clear, I would never do anything that I thought chief constables would not be very much in favour of. They do a fantastic and astonishing job, and I would never do anything that I thought would be operationally wrong for them.
Our amendments are designed to complement what the Government are trying to do, but our aim is to ensure that all communities receive a guaranteed minimum level of visible local policing attached to the funding that makes that happen. I look forward to discussing in further detail with the Minister how that can happen. We are not miles apart and I am sure that when we see this mythical White Paper it will give us all the answers that we require. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“Duty to record algorithmic tools(1) Each police force in England and Wales must disclose its use of any algorithmic tool used in the exercise of its functions that may affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals by completing entries in the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard (ATRS).(2) Under subsection (1) “algorithmic tool” means a product, application or device that supports or solves a specific problem using complex algorithms.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment places a duty on police forces to disclose any algorithmic tool used in the exercise of its functions.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, powerful AI tools are transforming policing and reshaping how forces investigate, patrol and make decisions, often with profound implications. This amendment would make it a legal requirement for forces to disclose any algorithmic tool used in this way that might affect a person’s rights or freedoms.
The Government’s algorithmic transparency recording standard, ATRS, provides a consistent way for public bodies to explain how their algorithmic tools work, what data they use and how human oversight is maintained. Its goal is a public, searchable record of these systems. Use of the ATRS is mandatory for arm’s-length bodies delivering public services, though the previous Government did not extend that to the police, despite calls from the Committee on Standards in Public Life and from the Justice and Home Affairs Committee.
The College of Policing has now integrated the ATRS into its authorised professional practice. Forces are expected to complete an ATRS report for all relevant tools. That is welcome progress. The hope is that forces will increasingly comply to build public trust and meet their equality and data protection duties. However, while compliance is now expected, failure to record a tool is still not a legal requirement. A force could still choose not to use the ATRS, citing operational necessity, and it would not be breaking any law.
Transparency is vital across public services but nowhere more so than in policing, where these systems have the power to alter lives and restrict liberty. That is why Justice and civil liberties groups such as the Ada Lovelace and Alan Turing institutes want police use of these tools to be publicly declared and for this to be placed on a statutory footing. What is ultimately needed is a national register with real legal force—something the NPCC’s own AI lead has called for.
Government work on such a register is under way. I welcome that project but it will take time, while AI capabilities advance very rapidly indeed. The ATRS is the mechanism we have for now. This amendment would immediately strengthen it, requiring every operational AI tool from facial recognition to predictive mapping to be publicly declared.
Why does this matter? Take gait analysis, identifying people by how they move. No UK force has declared that it uses it, but its potential is recognised. Ireland is already legislating for its use in serious crime. Without a legal duty here, a UK force could deploy gait analysis tomorrow, with no public knowledge or oversight, just as facial recognition pilots proceed today with limited transparency.
This year, forces will spend nearly £2 billion on digital technology and analytics. With growing demand and limited resources, it is no surprise at all that forces turn to AI for efficiency. Yet, without total transparency, this technological shift risks further eroding public trust. Recognition of that need is growing. No one wants to return to the Met’s unlawful gangs matrix, quietly risk-scoring individuals on dubious grounds. For that reason, I urge the Government to accept this vital safeguard. It is a foundation for accountability in a field that will only grow in power and in consequence. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Doocey explained, Amendment 431 seeks to place a statutory duty on every police force in England and Wales to disclose its use of algorithmic tools where they affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals.
We are witnessing a rapid proliferation of algorithmic decision-making in policing, from predictive mapping to risk assessment tools used in custody suites. Algorithms are increasingly informing how the state interacts with the citizen, yet too often these tools operate in a black box, hidden from public view and democratic scrutiny. As we have discussed in relation to other technologies such as facial recognition, the deployment of advanced technology without a clear framework undermines public trust.
This amendment requires police forces, as my noble friend explained, to complete entries in the algorithmic transparency recording standard. The ATRS is the Government’s own standard for algorithmic transparency, developed to ensure public sector accountability. My Private Member’s Bill on public authority algorithmic and automated decision-making allows for a more advanced form of reporting. In my view, the ATRS is the bare minimum required for accountability for AI use in the public sector.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, the noble Baroness’s amendment would place a duty on police forces in England and Wales to disclose their use of any algorithmic tool that may affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals by completing entries in the algorithmic transparency recording standard.
That standard, ATRS, was developed as part of the Government’s wider digital and AI policy to ensure transparency about how public sector bodies use algorithmic tools in decision-making that impacts the public. It provides a template to publish information about such tools—specifically, information concerning what the tools are, why they are used and how they influence outcomes. This is seen as an important step to build public understanding of and trust in algorithmic systems used by government.
ATRS is already mandatory for central government departments and their arm’s-length bodies when tools have a significant influence on decisions with public effect or interact directly with the public, and guidance has been issued to support the publication of records. I recognise the intention behind this amendment, to promote transparency, accountability and public confidence in the use of algorithmic tools in policing. The use of complex algorithms and artificial intelligence in law enforcement raises legitimate questions about fairness, oversight and the protection of fundamental rights. It is right that Parliament scrutinises how we manage such risks.
I look forward to the Minister’s response, including the Government’s assessment of whether the ATRS framework as it currently applies can readily be extended to policing and what further measures might be needed to ensure that transparency and accountability are enhanced, without unintended consequences for operational effectiveness.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 431 deals with the use of algorithmic tools in policing. While the Government agree on the importance of transparency in the use of algorithmic tools by police forces, we do not believe that the amendment would be the optimal means of delivering either meaningful improvements in public confidence or operational benefits for policing.
The proposed duty would require police forces to disclose all algorithmic tools through the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard—the ATRS. The ATRS was designed for government departments and arm’s-length bodies, not for operationally independent police forces. While it is an effective tool for those organisations, its high level of technical detail and lack of narrative explanation mean that disclosures would not provide the clarity expected by the public and would risk burying key information in jargon. More importantly, mandating disclosure of all tools beyond the exemptions policy of the ATRS could inadvertently compromise operational security and policing tactics.
The Government are, however, keen to encourage transparency in the use of algorithmic tools by police forces in England and Wales to maintain the support of the public for their use and in keeping with the core tradition of policing by consent. In line with this, the Government have commissioned work on transparency measures for police use of AI and are working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s AI portfolio and the National Policing Chief Scientific Adviser to develop policies encouraging and supporting appropriate levels of transparency while safeguarding operational integrity. This approach will ensure that transparency is meaningful, proportionate and does not undermine the effectiveness of policing.
It is important to recognise that we are listening to the public in dealing with concerns that have been raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, around policing encroaching on civil liberties. Indeed, the Government commissioned and published research into public attitudes on the police’s use of AI last year. The research demonstrated strong support for AI use by the police. There are rightful concerns about the need for AI use to be underpinned by rigorous oversight, humans always being clearly involved in decision-making and transparency. These findings have been supported elsewhere; for example, in recently published research by CENTRIC, which surveyed 10,000 members of the public. That is why we are working closely with the NPCC to build upon and implement the principles of the covenant for the use of AI in policing, to which all forces in England and Wales have signed up. Of course, it is important.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, referred to the use of gait analysis, and there was a comparison to live facial recognition. It is important that we understand the risks of bias and discriminatory outcomes from using any policing tool.
To be clear, police deployments must comply with the Equality Act 2010 and data protection law. Forces are required to assess potential discrimination risks and should be able to evidence that tools are necessary, proportionate and fair. Humans remain clearly involved in decision-making, and forces are expected to monitor performance against protected characteristics so that any bias is identified and addressed. Where tools cannot meet these standards in practice, they should not be deployed or must be withdrawn pending remediation.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to black box systems. To be clear, we are not comfortable with black box systems being used in policing. Policing requires—
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I thank the Minister. Much of what he said about developing an alternative to the ATRS has been encouraging, but, obviously, quite a lot will also depend on—and he went on to talk about data protection—whether officers are trained in how Article 22 of the GDPR operates in terms of automated decision-making. What assurance can the Minister give about the level of knowledge and training in that area?
Lord Katz (Lab)
As I said, police deployments must comply with the Equality Act 2010 and data protection law, which, of course, include the latest data protection law under the GDPR. In relation to that specific point on Article 22 of the GDPR, I will have to write to the noble Lord to give him the full details, but, as I say, the general principle of compliance applies.
Just to finish the point I was making in reference to the noble Lord’s point about black box systems, where a system is inherently opaque, forces must have compensating controls such as rigorous testing, performance monitoring and strong human review, or not use that system.
Given these assurances—and I am grateful to the noble Lord for saying that he was encouraged, and we will wait to hear from his colleague as to whether she is encouraged by these responses—I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I am very interested in this area and supportive of the right use of AI in policing, because it can be enormously helpful to the police in terms of resources. I remember when I was at the Cabinet Office, they were doing a trial where they were using AI instead of officers to look through CCTV of abuse and child abuse, and that was saving a lot of resource and a lot of difficulty for police officers. The Minister did not mention what kind of use the police were making of AI. Does he have any information on that, or can I be referred elsewhere?
Lord Katz (Lab)
A range of use is made by police forces at individual force level. Each force makes operationally independent decisions as to what tools they test or deploy. Sometimes it is around administrative tasks that we see across lots of public services and sometimes it is specifically around operational issues and investigation. It is probably best that I do not go into too much detail, but I can certainly go back and talk to officials to see what we might be able to follow up on in writing with the noble Baroness, if there is more detail we can provide.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. Yesterday, I looked at the public ATRS repository that is meant to record what AI tools police forces are deploying. It contained only two entries for police AI tools, even though we know that many are already being used, including systems such as live facial recognition, which is not listed at all. A great deal of AI development takes place within individual police forces, rather than through national programmes, and there are several reasons why these tools may not be appearing in the central record. Some forces believe that putting information on their own website is sufficient to meet transparency requirements. Others may avoid reporting tools by categorising them simply as standard software rather than as algorithms or AI systems. There may also be worries about publishing full information which could make it easier for defence lawyers to challenge decisions in court.
I think, therefore, that both the Government and we are clear—as well as the Official Opposition—that there absolutely is a problem that needs to be addressed, because it is not being addressed at the moment. AI is moving at such a rapid pace that this is not something that can be kicked into the long grass; it really needs to be addressed now. I therefore look forward to seeing the proposals that the Government are going to come forward with—I will not mention the war or the White Paper—but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“National plan on police data intelligence systems(1) Within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a national plan to modernise police data and intelligence systems in England and Wales.(2) The plan must include steps to be taken to further the aims of—(a) replacing any antiquated police technology;(b) closing capability gaps identified in the National Audit on Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse;(c) enabling real-time secure information exchange between police forces and partner agencies;(d) supporting improved—(i) risk identification,(ii) early intervention, and(iii) co-ordinated action,to protect children.(3) The national plan must set out clear milestones of how to achieve the aims set out in subsection (2) within five years of the plan being published.(4) Every 12 months after publication of the plan under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay a further report before Parliament outlining the progress to date in achieving the aims set out in subsection (2), until those aims have been completed.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment aims to take forward part of Recommendation 7 of Baroness Casey’s National Audit on Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, relating to updating police information systems.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 432 seeks to press the Government on their plans to address long-standing problems of fragmented police and criminal justice data systems. I must tell noble Lords that I was working on this very subject when I was a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, which I left more than 16 years ago, and the system has neither changed nor got any better. The recent national audit on group-based child sexual exploitation produced by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, described policing’s data intelligence infrastructure as antiquated and identified systemic failures that continue to put children at serious risk. The audit also highlighted the wider paucity of technology underpinning policing.
These concerns echo what has been said for many years, and when I served on the Metropolitan Police Authority, the same warnings had already been voiced about creaking systems that did not keep pace with the demands placed on them. Yet despite endless reviews, there is still no fully integrated digital system linking the police with the rest of the criminal justice system.
Fragmented, outdated IT undermines public protection more broadly. Officers’ time is wasted on manual workarounds; investigative opportunities are missed; prosecutions are delayed, and known risks are not always identified, let alone shared. As digital evidence proliferates and crime becomes more cross-border and complex, the lack of seamless data sharing between forces and agencies becomes even more damaging.
Concerns about poor IT integration between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service were being formally raised as far back as the late 1990s. A major joint inspection published in July 2025 reiterated that the CPS case management system was never designed to interface properly with the 43 different police IT systems, contributing to delays, low charge rates and victim frustration. In other words, the same structural problems persist nearly three decades on.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I support much of what the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said about the problems we face. This links in well with my amendments, which will be taken next week: Amendment 436 on enforcement data and Amendment 437 on police paperwork.
The fact of the matter is that a lot of officer time is wasted. There is too much paper and too much copy and paste, and, as the noble Baroness said, opportunities are missed. I know this because my son works in the Met and often complains when he comes to see me about the poor IT integration, particularly between the police, the CPS and the courts, where cases are being progressed.
I am sure that the Minister is well aware of all this and that steps are being taken to improve things, and I know, having worked in government on IT systems-related work, that it is very difficult. However, there is an enormous advantage to be gained from making progress in this area and spending police time on chasing and catching criminals, not on so much bureaucracy.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I want to make a very brief contribution—cheekily, because I have not taken any role in this Bill. My noble friend’s amendment, what she said in support of it and the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, are highly pertinent to the debate on the Government’s proposal to restrict jury trials. On the Tube in, I read an account of the report from the Institute for Government, which has looked at the Government’s proposals and concluded that the time savings from judge-only trials would be marginal at best, amounting to less than 2% of Crown Court time. It suggests, pertinently, that the Government
“should instead focus on how to drive up productivity across the criminal courts, investing in the workforce and technology required for the courts to operate more efficiently”.
As others who know the situation much better than I do have said, it sounds dire. One is used to all these problems of legacy systems—lack of interoperability and so on. I remember all that being debated at EU level. It is difficult and probably capital-intensive work—at least, initially—but instead of promoting these headline-grabbing gestures about abolishing jury trials, the Government need to fix the terrible lack of efficiency in the criminal justice system. I am not sure that the civil justice system is any better. Having, unfortunately, had a modest involvement in a case in the county court, I found that it was impossible to phone any staff. You might be lucky to get a response to an email after a week.
Making the system work efficiently, with all bits interacting with each other, would do a great deal more to increase productivity and save the time of all those people who are running around. One hears accounts from people who work in the criminal courts of reports not being available, files being lost and staff being absent, let alone the decrepit state of court buildings. All this investment needs to go in before the Government resort to gesture politics and things such as abolishing jury trials.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 432 was so well introduced by my noble friend Lady Doocey. This lack of appropriate technology and how it is handicapping our police services is something that she feels very strongly about. I was delighted to hear what the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and my noble friend Lady Ludford had to say, because this lack of the appropriate technology extends beyond the police services into the wider criminal justice system. This proposed new clause would address the desperate state of police data infrastructure by requiring the Secretary of State to publish a national plan to modernise police data and intelligence systems within 12 months.
As mentioned in the explanatory statement, this is not an abstract bureaucratic request. It is a direct response to, among other things, recommendation 7 of the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. The audit painted a damning picture of the current landscape: intelligence systems that do not talk to one another, vital information trapped in silos and officers unable to join the dots to protect vulnerable children. It is unacceptable that, in 2025, we still rely on fragmented, obsolete IT systems to fight sophisticated networked criminality. This amendment seeks to mandate a coherent national strategy to ensure that antiquated police technology is replaced, that intelligence regarding predatory behaviour is shared effectively across police borders in real time and that we finally close the capability gaps that allow perpetrators of group-based child sexual exploitation to slip through the net.
Amendment 432 would ensure that, when the police hold vital intelligence, they have the systems to use it effectively. We cannot claim to be serious about tackling child exploitation if we do not fix the digital infrastructure that underpins our investigations.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing forward this amendment, which seeks to require the Government to publish a national plan to modernise police data and intelligence systems in England and Wales. At its heart, this amendment speaks to a very practical and pressing concern: that our policing infrastructure must stay up to date with modern crime, particularly the most harmful and insidious forms of abuse.
Outdated and fragmented information systems can frustrate effective policing. That point was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, which noted that some police forces are still operating antiquated legacy systems that inhibit real-time data sharing and hinder co-ordinated action across forces and with partner agencies.
Group-based child sexual exploitation is a complex crime. Our response must therefore be equally networked and technologically capable. Recommendation 7 from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, made it clear that improving data systems is essential—I emphasise that word—to ensuring children’s safety and enabling earlier intervention and more efficient information exchange. I look forward to the Minister’s outline of the steps the Government have already taken to address this issue.
This amendment seeks to take that recommendation forward by requiring a national plan with clear steps and milestones to modernise police data and intelligence systems. We strongly support the idea of having clear milestones not just for police forces and agencies but for the public and Parliament. Transparent targets allow for progress to be measured and debated, and provide operational leaders with something concrete and tangible to work towards.
We also welcome the requirement for annual progress reports to be laid before Parliament until the plan’s objectives are achieved. That level of ongoing scrutiny is important if we truly want to drive systemic improvement rather than to allow good intentions to gather dust. I therefore echo the helpful contributions of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford; we really must do better.
I look forward to the Minister’s response to this amendment. I would be grateful if he would outline how the Government intend to address the problems identified in the national audit and how they will respond to the constructive challenge that this amendment presents.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for explaining the rationale behind her amendment, which would require that a comprehensive national plan to improve police data and intelligence systems is set out within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent.
While I am sympathetic to the intent of this amendment—I think probably everyone in the Committee is—I stress that Parliament already has a role in holding the Home Office to account on policing systems. The Public Accounts Committee has oversight of the Law Enforcement Data Service and has required the Home Office to provide detailed information on its development. The Commons Home Affairs Committee also regularly scrutinises Home Office digital transformation and policing technology, and it is open to the Justice and Home Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House to do likewise.
Additionally, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services publishes State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales. This report is laid before Parliament, ensuring that Parliament remains informed about the performance, challenges and progress of police forces across England and Wales. This provides information on police efficiency, effectiveness and progress on reforms, including those relating to IT and crime data integrity.
Work to improve access to policing data is already under way. For example, last June the Home Office conducted a preliminary market engagement to better understand what solutions the market could offer policing to improve data integration. We are currently evaluating those responses against the existing policing landscape to determine the best way forward. We also awarded a contract to deliver a police technology strategy and road map.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
Before the Minister sits down, I am obviously delighted to hear about the White Paper. We are really looking forward to it being published. He helpfully mentioned a contract that has been let to look at this whole area—a police technology strategy and road map for intelligence and the technical use of it. I wondered who that contract had been let to and what the timeframe was for delivering conclusions. The other point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, was the question of having enough capital for the IT. Being a businesswoman, I know very well how expensive that can be. If the Minister could say a little bit more about that, that might help us before Report.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not have details of the contract in front of me. I am, of course, aware that there could be commercially confidential issues at play which might prevent the level of disclosure that she wants, but, in the spirit of trying to be helpful, I will certainly go away, take it back and write to the noble Baroness if I can.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very sorry. I am recalling the passage of the Procurement Act, where we discussed at some considerable length what contract could and could not be kept from the public. The detail can be confidential, but the fact of the contract and who it is let to should surely be part of the public domain—it should be on websites.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will certainly defer to the noble Baroness’s knowledge of the Procurement Bill because I think it went through the House before I was in the House. I am happy to share what detail that we can under the details of that Act. I hope that that satisfies the noble Baroness.
I will also go away and look at the issue of capital funding. I am afraid I do not have the figures in front of me, but of course it is important that we fund all these systems adequately. We would contend that, unfortunately, for the past 14 years some of the investment in policing that we would have liked to see has been lacking, and we have been very clear about our wider approach as a Government to investing, particularly in neighbourhood policing but in policing at all levels. We want to improve on recent experience.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I thank the Minister for his response, but I am, frankly, gobsmacked at his suggestion that my amendment was not needed because the Home Office had a role in deciding what IT the police had and making sure that they had what they needed. For more than two decades, report after report has documented the same weaknesses: fragmented systems, wasted effort, and vital intelligence lost between agencies. People who did not understand would find it almost impossible to believe that vital intelligence can be lost between agencies, but it has been happening for years and years. We cannot keep treating this as a series of isolated IT upgrades that are needed when what is needed is a national strategy, with clear responsibility and sustained investment. There is no way past that; that is what is needed and it is what must be provided. This amendment does not prescribe the solution. It simply asks for leadership and for a timetable to deliver what everyone thinks is now essential.
The Minister mentioned talking to different people and finding out what was needed. All you have to do is talk to 43 chief constables and they will tell you exactly what is needed, for free. We do not have to go out to thousands of people and run various inquiries, taking days and months trying to work out what is needed. Everyone knows what is needed: the money, the will and the leadership. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Policing: devolution to Wales(1) Schedule 7A of the Government of Wales Act 2006 is amended as follows.(2) In section B5 (crime, public order and policing)—(a) omit “and policing”, and(b) omit line 41 “policing”.(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause seeks to devolve policing to Wales, by removing it from the list of reserved matters in the Government of Wales Act 2006.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
My Lords, Amendments 433 and 434 are in my name. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, for adding their names to both amendments, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, for supporting Amendment 434. I look forward to hearing contributions from across the Committee on how we can ensure that policing and youth justice in Wales genuinely meet the needs of the people of Wales.
I will take the amendments in turn, beginning with policing. Amendment 433 would remove policing from the list of reserved matters in the Government of Wales Act, thereby devolving responsibility for policing to Wales. My case rests on two central arguments. The first is the current shake-up in police governance across England and Wales and what that means for Wales, and the second is the reality of how policing in Wales is already funded.
First, on governance, His Majesty’s Government’s proposal to abolish police and crime commissioners in England and Wales makes the amendment particularly timely. In England, PCC functions are expected to transfer to mayoral authorities. Wales, however, has no equivalent governance structures. That leaves a serious constitutional gap, with no clarity as to where those powers will ultimately sit. This moment therefore presents a clear choice: either Wales is left in a governance limbo or policing is devolved to the Senedd, allowing Wales to take responsibility for its own public safety. It cannot be right that devolved English regions, such as Greater Manchester, can exercise greater control over policing than the democratically elected legislature of Wales.
Secondly, on funding, what strengthens this argument considerably is the financial reality. My understanding is that in 2024-25 only around 43% of policing expenditure in Wales came from the UK Government. The remainder came from within Wales itself, with approximately 44% funded directly through council tax; in other words, the people of Wales are already paying for the majority of their policing.
It therefore follows that policing policy and priorities should better reflect Welsh needs and Welsh circumstances. The Welsh Government have, for example, used their health budget to support police officers working directly within the education system, engaging with young people on substance misuse, healthy relationships and cybercrime. This preventive work not only supports public health objectives but helps build trust between communities and the police.
The geography and demographics of Wales are markedly different from those in much of England. We have fewer large urban centres and many rural communities, where access to services is already challenging. Centralisation, often driven by cost-saving decisions made at a distance, has had a particularly damaging impact in Wales. Court closures provide a clear example—increasing travel times, costs and complexity for victims, witnesses, offenders and professionals alike. Within this context, policing must strike a careful balance, recognising Cardiff’s role as a capital city, while also addressing the unique challenges faced by rural communities, where service delivery is often more expensive and more fragile.
Wales is also a bilingual nation, yet the College of Policing, which trains officers for England and Wales, is not required to comply with the Welsh Language Act. Welsh-medium training for police embedded in Welsh communities should not depend on good will. It should be embedded as a core requirement. That too points towards the need for devolved control.
I turn to Amendment 434, which would remove youth justice from the list of reserved matters and devolve it to Wales. Youth justice is already, in practice, quasi-devolved. The services that young people most frequently interact with—education, health, social services—are all devolved. In Wales, the vast majority of young people who come into contact with the youth justice system are low-level offenders and many are dealt with out of court through youth bureaus. These bureaus run by Welsh local authorities take a public health and restorative justice approach. The Welsh Government’s child-centred framework, Children First, Offenders Second, has been widely recognised. Sometimes described as the “dragonisation of justice”, it reflects Welsh values and Welsh priorities.
Once again, funding tells an important story here. In 2022-23, around 64% of youth justice funding in Wales came from devolved sources. While more recent data is not publicly available, there is little reason to believe that this position has materially changed. That same year, the proportion of funding provided by the Ministry of Justice to Wales was lower than for any English region. For example, the Youth Justice Board core grant made up 44% of total funding in the north-east of England and 40% in the north-west. In Wales it accounted for just 24%. Once again, Wales is largely funding a system it does not control.
On the wider constitutional point, Scotland and Northern Ireland both have full responsibility for their justice systems and Wales remains the outlier. This is not an argument for devolution for its own sake; it is an argument for fairness, coherence and effectiveness. Many of the most powerful levers for reducing crime—health, housing, education and social care—have been devolved to the Senedd for over 26 years. Retaining justice powers here at Westminster fragments responsibility and weakens accountability. When systems fail, it is often unclear who is responsible, and communities pay that price. Welsh Labour’s 2021 manifesto committed to pursuing the case for devolution of policing and justice, as set out by the Thomas commission. We have had report after report, commission after commission. This is not a moment for further exploration, it is a moment for action.
Let Wales take responsibility for policing and youth justice. The people of Wales are already paying for these systems. They deserve the ability to shape them in line with their needs and values. The time is now. I look forward to the Minister’s response and hope that His Majesty’s Government will give serious consideration to these amendments as the Bill progresses through the House. I beg to move.
Lord Hain (Lab)
My Lords, I have not added my name to Amendment 433, but I have to Amendment 434. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for having tabled it.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of the amendments, to which I have put my name. As the noble Lord, Lord Hain, has made such an eloquent speech in relation to youth justice, I will concentrate on the police because the arguments are identical. The reason I say they are identical is that the three commissions that have looked at this issue—commissions made up not of politicians interested in hanging on to power but of individuals who have experience and expertise in the systems—have all recommended the devolution of youth justice and the devolution of the police. The first was Sir Paul Silk, the distinguished clerk; then I chaired a Commission on Justice in Wales, which reported in October 2019; and then there was the report of Dr Rowan Williams and Professor Laura McAllister. All recommended the same thing.
In view of the pressing need for a debate to occur at 4 pm—it may be a minute or two early—I refer to paragraphs of the report that we wrote. The police are dealt with at paragraphs 4.77 to 4.151, and youth justice is dealt with at paragraphs 4.181 to 4.195. I give those paragraph numbers in the hope that someone in the Home Office might read them. One of the problems of the report that the commission I chaired submitted is that no one has ever answered it. I assume it has never been answered because it is unanswerable. It is therefore important, in the light of the forthcoming paper on the police, that this point is grappled with.
The two fundamental arguments have been outlined by both the noble Lord, Lord Hain, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. First, if you devolve everything else, you have to devolve police and justice. They are integral to the proper management of a system. Secondly, there is the democratic argument that if Wales is paying the greater part of what it costs, there should be accountability—certainly greater accountability than that enjoyed by the Mayors of Manchester and London. At the moment, the accountability is the other way around.
Where this is so important is that the view used to be expressed that the people of Wales really were not up to governing themselves. That was the 19th-century and early 20th-century view and, thank goodness, is gone. But now one asks: what is the argument against devolution? It is very difficult to see what it is. It will be a testing point as to what will happen on the publication of this White Paper.
The Government are abolishing police and crime commissioners. I express no view as to whether that is a good thing or a bad thing, but it forces the Government to grapple with what happens in Wales. Are they going to set up some elaborate structure to avoid devolution, or are they going to face up to devolution? We shall know the answer to this in the forthcoming White Paper. I hope that the Home Office officials, when they have read the paragraphs to which I have referred, will see that there is one unanswerable response to this question: devolution. On the other hand, if they set up some elaborate structure, no longer will it be said, “Well, the Welsh aren’t quite up to running their own police force”. It might be said, “There are other reasons why politicians don’t like giving up power in London. They want to hang on”. One has already seen reflected in remarks made in and across Wales that it is about time that these important powers were transferred to Wales to make the Government coherent, rather than hanging on to them and to power for what I hope I have wrongly understood—or been told—are purely party-political reasons. I hope that is not the case, but the proof will be in the pudding of the police White Paper.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, we on the Liberal Democrat Benches are grateful to the noble Lady Baroness, Smith of Llanfaes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for tabling Amendments 433 and 434, and to the noble Lord, Lord Hain, for adding his name to Amendment 434. These amendments relate to the devolution of policing and youth justice to Wales.
My noble friend Lady Humphreys has signed both amendments as they agree with Lib Dem policy and our ambitions for Wales, but, unfortunately, she cannot be in her place today. Our manifesto for the general election in 2024 promised to:
“Deliver a fair deal for the people of Wales by … Devolving powers over youth justice, probation services, prisons and policing to allow Wales to create an effective, liberal, community-based approach to policing and tackling crime”.
To the disappointment of many in Wales, the issue of devolving justice to Wales was absent from Labour’s general election manifesto, despite Keir Starmer committing a year before, in 2023, to introducing a take back control Bill to devolve new powers to communities from Westminster. This commitment appears to apply to England only, and gradually, over the months since the election of the Labour Government, their lack of ambition for Wales has become more apparent.
After the State Opening of Parliament in 2024, there was no new mention of new powers for Wales in the King’s Speech. In July 2025, the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, said that the UK Government could row back on its promises on the devolution of probation and youth justice, despite the Welsh Government beginning the groundwork to prepare for what they believed to be a realistic project.
Noble Lords have raised queries about the consequences of the decision taken by the Government in November last year to abolish police and crime commissioners—a decision that those of us on these Benches applauded. At the time, noble Lords from Wales were concerned about the lack of clarity on the Government’s plans for the transference of the PCCs’ functions to Wales. The assumption was that the functions would transfer to mayors in England and to the Senedd in Wales. However, far from providing clarity, the answers they received amounted to pure obfuscation. Now we learn, in what could be described as a slap in the face to the Senedd, that the functions of the PCCs are to be transferred to a new board, placing the Welsh Parliament on the same level as a non-mayoral authority in England.
On these Benches we understand the difficulties so ably clarified by the noble and learned Lord in his contribution to the Sentencing Bill of devolving just one part of a system. But where has English Labour’s ambition for Wales disappeared to? For all the platitudes about mutual respect and co-operative working, the disrespect is beginning to show, sadly. Where is the recognition that Wales has been ready for the devolution of the justice system for the last 25 years at least, and where is the road map for our two nations to achieve that together?
Lord Sentamu (CB)
My Lords, I do not come from Wales. I am speaking because I have sympathy, and I have friends there. I remember somebody asking me, “Are you evangelical or Anglo-Catholic?” I said, “Catholic, yes; Anglo, no”. Wales may sometimes feel it is singing that song.
The devolution of justice and policing to Wales are two sides of one coin, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said. To those who tabled Amendments 433 and 434—the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain—I simply ask one question: if policing and youth justice, this one coin with two sides, are devolved to Scotland, why not Wales?
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, we oppose Amendments 433 and 434, which seek to devolve policing and youth justice to Wales. Let me be clear: I make no observations on the principle of devolution for its own sake, but these amendments would make profound constitutional and operational changes. They are presented without convincing evidence that devolution of policing or youth justice would improve outcomes for victims, communities or young people themselves.
Policing and youth justice are not isolated administrative functions—
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
May I ask the noble Lord whether his staff have read the report that contains all the evidence? To say that this is put forward without evidence is not correct.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
I cannot answer that from the Dispatch Box, I am afraid; nor do I have many staff.
Policing and youth justice are not isolated administrative functions. They sit at the heart of a single, integrated criminal justice system spanning England and Wales. Police forces operate across borders daily; so too with the criminal justice system. Intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, and serious organised crime and public order policing all rely on consistent legal frameworks, operational standards and accountability structures. Fragmenting those arrangements would introduce complexity, duplication and risk at precisely the moment when policing faces unprecedented pressures.
Policing in Wales is already delivered locally, is locally accountable and is responsible to Welsh communities. Police and crime commissioners in Wales set priorities based on local need. Chief constables in Wales are not directed from Whitehall on day-to-day policing. What is proposed is not so much localism but the creation of a new layer of political control over policing.
The amendments ask your Lordships’ House to place policing and youth justice under the control of the Welsh Government. This has been run by Labour continuously since devolution began. It is therefore legitimate to ask what that Government’s track record tells us about their capacity to take on these serious responsibilities. In area after area of devolved public policy, Labour-run Wales has failed to deliver. Educational outcomes in Wales have fallen behind those in the rest of the United Kingdom on many international measures. Health waiting times are persistently worse than in England. Major infrastructure projects have been delayed or mismanaged. Those are not ideological assertions; they are documented outcomes of more than two decades of one-party dominance and failure.
When systems fail in devolved areas, the response of the Welsh Government has often been to blame Westminster rather than to reflect on their own actions or inactions. If policing and youth justice were devolved, who would be blamed if and when crime rose, youth reoffending increased or serious failures occurred? Experience suggests that accountability would become more opaque, not clearer and more robust. Constitutional change should be driven by clear evidence of benefit, not by political symbolism. It has not yet been demonstrated how these proposals would reduce crime, improve public confidence or deliver better outcomes for young offenders; nor has it been shown that fragmentation would be avoided and how cross-border crime would be tackled more effectively, or failures remedied. For these reasons, we cannot support the amendments.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and my noble friend Lord Hain for tabling these amendments. I speak as Home Office Minister but also as a resident of Wales, a Member of Parliament for Wales for 28 years, a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Wales who helped bring in devolution, and a Welsh Whip who took it through the House of Commons, so I am a supporter of devolution and know my way around this patch. However, I say to the noble Baroness that the Government cannot support in full the direction of travel that she has proposed.
I recognise again the great contribution that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has made on this issue and in his reports, but the view of the Government remains that devolving police and youth justice would require extensive institutional change and carry major operational and financial implications. Devolving policing in particular would undermine the UK Government’s ability to deliver crime prevention and the safer streets mission in Wales.
The noble Baroness raised finance. The position she mentioned in Wales is no different from that across the border in Cheshire. Taxpayers there have a burden of funding carried forward, with UK central support. That is a common issue. The noble Baroness does not have too long to wait, as the police settlement for England and Wales will be issued by the Home Office very shortly. I expect that—
Baroness Brinton (LD)
The noble Lord commented about it not being the right time for Wales, but does this mean that the Labour Government are changing their view about police devolution in Scotland? It works perfectly well.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
There are significant differences between the positions in Scotland and Wales. Scotland has its own legal system, prison system and policing system; it has had that for some time. In Wales, we have a very integrated England and Wales court system and a cross-border, east-west relationship. For example, the regional organised crime centre that services the area of north Wales where I live is a cross-border co-operation on a cross-border issue.
We have looked at the noble and learned Lord’s points and reports and, from my perspective, attempting to separate elements of the offender management system from the wider criminal justice system would in practice be extremely complicated. It would lose some of the economies of scale that we have in the current arrangements, and it would put a jagged edge on an entirely new and complex interface. I know that the noble and learned Lord has looked at those issues, but that is the view of the UK Government. The UK Government recognise the importance of Welsh partnership structures such as the Policing Partnership Board for Wales and the Police Liaison Unit, but ultimately the Government have no plans to devolve policing in Wales at this moment.
Noble Lords mentioned the decision announced on 13 November last year to abolish police and crime commissioners. We have put in that plan, and it will require legislation at some point to give effect to those proposals. There will be further discussion in the forthcoming White Paper on them, but we have committed to work with the Welsh Government and other stakeholders to ensure that new arrangements provide strong and effective police governance for Wales, while recognising the unique nature of those Welsh arrangements.
Having said that, on the Labour Government’s commitment that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned, we are working with the Welsh Government to undertake a programme of work on the Labour Government’s 2024 manifesto commitments around youth justice, which goes to the heart of one of the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness. In light of the manifesto commitment, we are trying to ensure that the youth justice system delivers effectively for the people of Wales. We are undertaking a programme of work to meet that aspect of the manifesto commitment, which meets in part the objectives of the noble Lords who spoke to these amendments.
I am conscious of time, and I am sorry that this is a speedy debate pending the debate that is due any moment now. We can return to this on Report, as the noble Baroness may do, but the view of the Government to date is as I have outlined.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
First, I do not want the Minister to answer this now, but I would be very grateful if he would look again at the funding for the police in Wales. Unless I am mistaken, Manchester and London do not have a Government who make a grant to policing as the Welsh Government do. Secondly, the argument has been put forward, but the arguments that we have put contrary to all this have never been answered—and I hope they will be answered in the police White Paper. If the argument is a good argument, it stands or falls by its strength. The Government in London have never had the courage—and those who seek political advantage have stood behind that lack of courage in failing to answer independent views that have been expressed.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The Government will answer those questions, and they can make a very robust case for why devolution of policing should not happen. As I have said, we are exploring the issue of devolution of youth justice with the Welsh Senedd and the Welsh Government, and in the forthcoming police White Paper we will look at what the governance systems should be in consultation with the Welsh Senedd, police and crime commissioners and the police chiefs in Wales. That is a further debate. The noble Baroness has opportunities on Report to table amendments to get a fuller debate, and there will have to be legislation capacity at some point around the objectives set in the announcement on 13 November and in the forthcoming White Paper, which is coming very shortly. In the light of all that, and given the time that we have now, which is far too short to debate this in full—and I would like to do that at some point with the noble Baroness—I ask her to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response, although I admit that I am quite disappointed with the position expressed by the Government. I certainly do not agree that it is too complicated to devolve policing to Wales when apparently it is not too complicated to abolish PCCs and create a brand-new structure—so I do not accept that argument. But today we have a debate to come after this one, so I shall withdraw the amendment. However, I do not think that we have resolved the argument over how the policing will be governed after the abolition of PCCs. I hope that the police reform White Paper includes detailed proposals in relation to that issue.
The Minister mentioned some positive steps on youth justice, and it would be good to have further discussions on the details between Committee and Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.