Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hogan-Howe Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hogan-Howe]

422A: After Clause 151, insert the following new Clause—
“Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/2) are amended as follows.(2) After Regulation 13 (timeliness of investigations), insert—“13A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings. (5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.”(3) The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/4) are amended as follows.(4) After Regulation 19 (timeliness of investigation), insert—“19A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment proposes a 12-month limit, unless extraordinary circumstances reviewed by a legally qualified person dictate otherwise, which would encourage forces and external bodies to complete misconduct and gross misconduct processes quicker, allowing officers to resume duties and limiting the negative impact on their health and wellbeing.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, has made a good suggestion with this amendment. He makes the broad point that the police misconduct process takes far too long, and I agree. To be fair, it is not the only misconduct process that takes a long time, but this one is particularly challenged.

I will particularly mention two things. First, time deadlines would be helpful. There are two ways to approach that. One is that there might be an absolute deadline of 12 months, as the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests, and then some independent, legally qualified person looks at the case. That could work. The alternative is to set some deadlines so that, for example, 90% of cases are resolved in one year, which at least would give the system a kick. At the moment, I am afraid the system is not getting any better—rather, it is getting worse—so either something statutory or some kind of guidelines would be a good idea.

On Tuesday I raised the issue of firearms officers, a group particularly affected by this, and that is what I want to speak to here. I have argued that there should be a higher bar before they are prosecuted for murder, but the Government do not accept that at the moment. They have offered anonymity, and we are to debate that shortly.

Part of the problem, particularly for firearms officers, is the incredible length of time in some cases. There have been two cases over the last 20 years that took 10 years: the case of PC Long, who was prosecuted after a series of legal machinations only to be found not guilty 10 years later, and that of W80, where after a public inquiry—basically an inquest led by a High Court judge because intercept evidence was involved in the case—the High Court judge decided that there was no unlawful killing, the IOPC or its predecessor decided that there should be some gross misconduct, the Metropolitan Police disagreed, the Supreme Court ordered that there would be a misconduct hearing and the legally qualified chair of the independent tribunal said there was no case to answer. After consideration by the Supreme Court, an officer had been under investigation for 10 years. That cannot be right.

Some of the problems are to do with the sequential nature of the decision-making in these cases. Officers are often under jeopardy, first from the IOPC and then from the CPS. Then obviously it could go to court and there may be a finding of not guilty, but then—for firearms officers in cases where someone has died—the case can go back to a coroner’s inquest, which can find an unlawful killing verdict, at which point it goes back through the cycle again. That is one of the reasons why some of these problems are arising.

First, deadlines would be a good idea as either an advisory or a mandatory limit. Secondly, I do not understand why some of the people involved in the decision-making that I have described have to do it sequentially, not in parallel. For example, why can the CPS and the IOPC not decide together whether something is a crime or misconduct?

At the moment, not only are there many links in the chain that sometimes come to contradictory conclusions but, more importantly, it is taking too long. I argue that in all this there are two groups of people who suffer: one is firearms officers, the group whose case I am arguing, but the other is the families waiting to hear what is happening. If people have lost someone, they deserve to hear whether or not this is a crime or misconduct, but at the moment that is not happening.

This amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, is a sensible suggestion and I support it. If the Government do not, perhaps they would like to make some indication of how they intend to improve the misconduct system, particularly as it affects firearms officers in the circumstances I have described.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a short debate. I agree with many of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I find it almost extraordinary that misconduct investigations linger on for so long; it really is a disgrace for everybody involved. Police professional standards departments have for too long been seen as something of a Cinderella function within forces, chronically underprioritised, underfunded and understaffed, and now they are buckling under the surge in the volume of complaints. This is combined with a narrowing of the remit of the IOPC, which increasingly takes on only the most serious and high-profile cases, resulting in a growing backlog and indefinite drift.

Amendment 422A confronts this head on. Such independent legal oversight could act as a checkpoint, strengthening individual case oversights and extracting timely lessons from failures. Criminal investigations would stay exempt, protecting the pursuit of serious crime.

There are risks in setting time targets for investigations—there is no question about that—not least the incentive for officers to delay co-operation if the clock is ticking. We have concerns that a rigid cap could risk corner-cutting on complex investigations. At the very least, stronger guidance on the expected length of inquiries is now required, as well as real scrutiny when these expectations are missed.

There also needs to be a much sharper focus on leadership and case management. Complainants should not face long waits, especially knowing time will diminish the strength of their evidence; neither should innocent officers endure years in limbo, with their careers stalled and well-being eroded. Taxpayers should not bear the rising cost of suspensions while losing front-line capacity at the same time.

Amendment 422A would restore some balance by prioritising fairness to officers, closure for victims and credibility for policing. We are happy to support it, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

--- Later in debate ---

There is a point in the general thrust of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. There is a problem that needs to be resolved, but I suggest that the Government can resolve it without the legislative proposal before the Committee. I ask the noble Lord, who nobly volunteered to move the amendment, to now nobly volunteer to withdraw it.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

It is certainly a first for me.

I thank the Minister for his reply and other people for their comments. I thought I might make only a couple of points in response. I indicated that although the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests a mandatory limit, there may be difficulties with that. I wonder whether the Government, might consider three things in their review, which the Minister mentioned. First, they could set an expectation so that, for example, cases should be completed within 12 months unless, for example, the director-general of the IOPC or some arbiter concludes otherwise. Secondly, I raised the sequential nature of the decision-making. That compound effect gives a longer time than I regard as necessary.

I am trying to work out now whether I should let the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, speak—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

The noble Lord was not here for the start of the group, so I am afraid that he cannot contribute.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I will conclude. I wonder whether, in the review, the Government could consider this sequential decision-making, which I do not think helps speed. Thirdly, if they are really adventurous they could look at whether police officers should be employees, because then you would get lawyers out of the system—I sit surrounded by them, but they never make it quicker or cheaper. Everyone else who is an employee can go to the employment tribunal, but officers cannot; it is on these grounds that lawyers get involved. I am afraid that is one of the major factors in why this takes so long and is expensive. I have taken my life in my hands, so I will sit down and withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 422A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I share with the noble Lord, Lord Carter, concern and admiration for our firearms officers and officers generally, who have a very difficult job. I declare an interest having acted for police forces in cases involving the use of firearms. However, I do not share his conclusions about these provisions.

I should also declare an interest as the chairman of the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which regulates the press or those bodies that choose to be regulated by it. I hope that has given me some indication of some of the challenges that journalists face, particularly in reporting court proceedings. Very often, they struggle to cover court cases because of the reduced number of journalists and the general facilities available to newspapers. Were this provision to become law, they would be faced with a presumption that changes the balance and represents, on the face of it, a challenge to our principles of open justice.

Given that there is already a discretion available to the courts on anonymity, I ask the Minister this: what is wrong with the existing law, which provides that there is such a balance to be exercised by the judge? If there is nothing wrong with the law, there is no need to change it. This is a significant change, and the Government must have some very clear thoughts as to why they are making it. What is the situation that now persists which requires a fundamental change in questions of reporting and free speech?

Supposing it is possible to persuade a judge to rebut the presumption which will now exist in these provisions, what would be a good reason for lifting the anonymity which prima facie is going to be imposed by them? It is important, before we make such a significant change in the law, that the rationale is clearly understood.

While not in any way undermining or questioning the importance of protecting officers in appropriate circumstances, I say that the balance is a very subtle one, and that balance should not be disturbed by these provisions. I do not think we even need to consider the European Court of Human Rights’ position. This is an ancient tradition of open justice, and it is one which is, I am afraid to say, threatened by these provisions.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I oppose the stand part notices and support the Government in their clauses. I have heard the proposers of the stand part notices make much of what is a relatively weak argument, suggesting that this is a constitutional outrage, when all that is happening is a change in the assumption about anonymity. Anonymity is already available; this is just about who has to prove whether it should be granted. A lot of hyperbole has been used about this. I accept that the media will make this argument; I do not deny that. I agree that the police should be held accountable; that is not the issue. It is about a very small group of people. I will try to address the point about evidence. A point was made about what evidence had been advanced; I will try to address at least two things.

First, of course, this was built on the Chris Kaba case. Frankly, I think the judge made the wrong decision about anonymity. I believe that because Mr Kaba was arrested having been connected to two shootings and linked to an organised crime gang who had access to firearms. Naming the officer put him at risk of attacks by connected people. Bear in mind that, three years later, within three hours a jury found him not guilty. It was never a very strong case, but why did the judge order the anonymity order to be lifted in those circumstances?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carter, for reminding us of his late-night work the other night, and I look forward to discussing that subject when we come back to it on Report. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing a practical police view to this very difficult debate. I come at this from a position essentially in favour of these clauses not standing part, for the reasons so far advanced by my noble friends Lady Cash and Lord Black, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.

This is a difficult question. Unquestionably, it is a difficult question. If it were not, we would not be here. We have, as parliamentarians, as legislators, to work out where the balance should lie between the desire for anonymity for police officers in these circumstances and the desire for openness, open justice and the ability of the public—not just the press but the public as a whole—to see what is being done in their name in the court system.

I hope I shall not go on too long merely repeating what others have already said, but it is worth reminding ourselves that the courts work on the basis of open justice. The public are entitled to watch, to read and to comment about trials, and to know who has been charged and prosecuted and with what result. There are exceptions to protect national security, vulnerable witnesses, victims of sexual offences and children. We have a regime for, first of all, providing for reporting restrictions; secondly, for restricting public access to the courtroom and for holding all or part of some trials in private; and, thirdly, for withholding the name of witnesses—for example, under a witness order under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. But a witness order under that provision is a special measure of the last practical resort, and requires the court to be vigorous in its consideration of the statutory hurdles that have to be overcome and to ensure that the defendant is not irreparably disadvantaged or denied a fair trial. Fourthly, we have within that regime provision for anonymity in investigations—for example, when considering fatal gang crimes involving the use of guns and knives by those aged 11 to 30.

Police officers are human—I underline the word “human”. They are a human example of state power—and I underline the word “state”. We respect and we admire them for their often dangerous and selfless work. We know from our own work here in Parliament how vital police officers are for our own protection. I was not far away from the scene of PC Palmer’s murder in March 2017. He was unarmed and later awarded a posthumous George Medal, but there were armed officers there who had to kill PC Palmer’s murderer. I heard those shots as I walked along the colonnade in New Palace Yard from my office in Portcullis House to take part in a Division in the other place. The noble Lord, Lord Hanson, may well have gone through the same experience. I was grateful then, as I am to this day, to the police men and women on duty that day who ushered me and other Members of the other place to safety, regardless of their own.

But it is, in the final analysis, a matter of judgment on which side of this argument we need to come down—on the side of anonymity or on that of open justice. I bear in mind the need for armed police officers and their families to be protected from reprisals, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned. I bear in mind the operational need not to discourage volunteers suitably qualified to become armed response officers or armed officers. We have been reminded this morning of the case of Martyn Blake, which created, I think, the genesis of these clauses.

However, I also bear in mind the constitutional and public policy demands. I would not describe this as a constitutional outrage; it is a perfectly rational debate about which side of a difficult line one wishes to land. It is not a constitutional outrage to do one thing or the other. It is just advancing an argument. But I bear in mind the constitutional and public policy demands for open justice, for public trust and for transparency in a justice system that applies to us all without creating different categories of defendant as a question of blanket rule. Blanket rules of the sort envisaged by Clauses 152 to 155 are, I suggest, best avoided where a stronger, focused case-by-case approval approach can be achieved—and it is, in my experience, already achieved under our current system.

In the last few days, we have seen the ICE officer shoot that woman driving her car in Minnesota. Of course I have only seen the news footage, but I suggest that, here, that ICE officer would be prosecuted for murder, subject to any defence he could advance. That case aside, we face the problem of some lawyers and campaigners using every police shooting as the basis of an anti-police pile-on, or for some other political campaign that they happen to support. In short, if we are, as I hope we will be, sceptical about Clauses 152 to 155 standing part of the Bill, we must prevent the appalling hunting parties against the police. Let us then pause and reflect before agreeing to these clauses.

I dare say we will not make a decision today, other than that the issue advanced by my noble friend Lord Black will be withdrawn. But we all have a little time between now and Report—we come here with the best of intentions and good will—to think a little more carefully about the practical solution to this, and whether we need to use the blunderbuss of legislation or whether we can still rely on judicial discretion, vigorously applied and well argued for in each separate case, to see where justice can be found.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I ask him this? I respect his opinion, for obvious reasons, but one issue he did not address—it was one of my arguments for why these clauses should stand part—is the difficulty of proving the threat at the beginning of an investigation. It is not straightforward. We have to say that someone out there is going to kill this officer or try to attack them—that there is a threat to them in some way. Of course we all make our best attempts to assess whether that is accurate or not. He describes the present system as a blanket arrangement, but actually there is only an assumption, which can be removed, and in the Kaba case was removed. That leaves the officer at risk of that decision being automatic—that is, to be named if they cannot prove otherwise. Why should they bear the risk of being named, when the reverse could allow, first, an assumption they would not be named, and if later that changed, they could be named. What we can never do is name someone, then introduce anonymity—so it is a one-way valve that surely the law might help to respect.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

The matter that the noble Lord is bringing up is the very sort of discussion that ought to be had in front of the judge. Presumably, no prosecutor, and no one acting on behalf of a police officer who wished to maintain his anonymity, would advance an argument unless there were some basis for it. If someone went in front of the judge and said, “I’m generally fearful that, just because he’s a police officer who bears arms, he is likely to be the victim of reprisal”, I think they would probably need to do a bit better than that. I suspect nobody would go in front of the judge and make that argument unless they had something better than that.

I suspect that, in the usual run of things, there will be information. It may not be information that the court would wish the world at large to know about. It could be intelligence evidence. It could be other information that both the applicant—the applicant police officer or the applicant prosecutor—and the judge would agree should be kept private. That surely can be done now. We have all sorts of national security cases where evidence is not disclosed to the world at large. All I ask is: let us just think a little bit further. It may well be that, at the end of the day, we shall come to the same conclusion as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and as the Government do in their clauses. But I have yet to be persuaded that we have got to the right answer today.