Lord Cameron of Lochiel
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Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Banner for introducing this series of amendments and congratulate those who supported him. This is an important public policy question that can, from time to time, raise its ugly head—although it is then ignored. I hope that, as my noble friend has so attractively argued for his amendments just now, we will gain some momentum.
I turn to a related but not exactly identical subject: compensation for overseas victims of crimes committed by British defendants. I raised that question during Second Reading of the Victims and Courts Bill on 16 December, just before Christmas. The Minister there, who is in her place—I think it is the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, who will kindly respond to this group, and I am, as always, grateful to him for bearing that burden—recognised that the question of compensation for overseas victims was a matter of some importance that she would think about. Indeed, she suggested that she might like to meet me to discuss it further. I am open to that invitation, as I am sure would be my noble friend Lord Banner.
My noble friend has opened up a discussion about a lacuna in our law, in that we fail adequately to compensate victims. The victims could be those who have suffered at the hands of the Russians or of those that we, the European Union or the United States have sanctioned. I say in parenthesis that part of my practice at the Bar involves sanctions law, so anything that legislates to increase the size of my practice is to be welcomed. More to the point, it seems to me that we have two parallel streams, which demonstrate that the way we treat victims is insufficient and inadequate.
I thank my noble friend for bringing this to the attention of the Committee and the Government more directly. I trust that, when the Minister comes to respond, he will do so positively. If he is unable to do so, I invite my noble friend to reintroduce his amendment to the Victims and Courts Bill when it comes back to us in Committee at some as yet unannounced date.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Banner and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their amendments in this group, and all noble Lords who spoke.
Amendments 417 and 419, tabled by my noble friend Lord Banner, would provide courts with the power to make public interest compensation orders during the sentencing of certain offences. He made a typically eloquent and compelling case for these amendments. He has consistently and powerfully campaigned, especially on Ukraine and the proceeds of sanctions, and I pay tribute to him for that.
Public interest compensation orders would grant the courts the ability to compel offenders to pay money to approved international or public interest bodies that support victims of serious human rights violations, such as torture or aggression. The courts would have to consider relevant factors, such as the broader human rights impact of the crime and the need to prioritise direct victims where relevant.
The amendment also lists relevant eligible recipient organisations with powers for the Secretary of State to update them, creating a structured mechanism for using the proceeds of sanctions-related crime in reparative funding for victims in the wider public interest. The amendment proposes a reasonable and practical process through which courts could divert illegally obtained funds to support victims, and I hope that the Government consider it very carefully. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Amendment 418 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, similarly proposes a mechanism through which the courts could direct a portion of confiscated proceeds for public interest or social purposes. It is very similar in nature to Amendment 417; it differs slightly in that it specifically requires the courts to consider whether the crime in question
“involved serious human rights violations, mass atrocity crimes, or grand corruption”.
But like Amendment 417, it raises very important issues as well as a broader question: if we are to make public compensation orders, what crimes should they apply to? I look forward to the Minister’s thoughts on that matter too.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Banner, for his amendments. He has had a wide level of support today from, among others, the noble Lords, Lord Kempsell, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Alton of Liverpool, the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and my noble friend Lady Goudie. They have all spoken well on this series of amendments. I will try to address the amendments, self-evidently, but I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Banner, in particular, that I know how committed he is to Ukraine. He has my support in addressing the viciousness of the Russian regime and the international crimes that it has committed by invading Ukraine. There are obviously a number of consequences to that, but the principles that he puts forward today could apply to a number of other regimes as well.
The amendments seek to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to enable courts to issue public interest compensation orders. These orders would be for public interest or social purposes to support those who may be impacted by offences under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, including victims of human rights violations, as well as other offences added by the Secretary of State via secondary legislation. I recognise the intentions behind these amendments and affirm the Government’s support for victims of human rights abuses and our commitment to tackling economic crime.
On Amendment 417, courts already have the power to impose a compensation order on an offender, which would require them to make financial reparation to a direct victim of a specific offence for any resulting personal injury, loss or damage. Therefore, in seeking to amend the Sentencing Act to allow courts to award compensation orders for public interest or social purposes, there is a danger that it would undermine the current victim-centred approach of the legislation to date.
In passing, I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that I know he is seeking a meeting with my noble friend Lady Levitt. It may be my fault that it has not happened, because of a diary clash, but we are agreeing to examine that, and either my noble friend’s office or mine will get back to him with regard to a meeting on those issues.
I recognise the critical importance of supporting victims of crime. As noble Lords will know, the victim surcharge is imposed on offenders by the court in the public interest to ensure that they hold some responsibility towards the cost of supporting victims and witnesses. The revenue raised from this surcharge is currently used to fund victim services through the victims and witnesses general fund, so the principle has been established.
The UK provides support for victims of human rights and sanctions violations worldwide. Noble Lords may wish to know that we have committed to provide £22 billion of funding to Ukraine. The Government are currently exploring further avenues—such as the extraordinary revenue acceleration loan to Ukraine—alongside our colleagues in the G7 and the EU. This has seen a $50 billion loan to Ukraine, which—this goes to the heart of the amendments tabled—is to be serviced and repaid by future profits generated from frozen Russian sovereign assets.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for his Amendment 420. In general, of course, these Benches abide by the notion that policy and practice should be guided by the feedback of evidence and outcomes, and the amendment would support that objective with regard to childhood convictions and cautions. I believe the data that currently exists on this would have to be thoroughly analysed to determine whether the measure is necessary, and I hope the Minister can shed some light on that existing evidence in her response.
We have great sympathy with the general thrust of Amendments 476 to 478. I have some reservations about Amendment 476, in that we have already removed the automatic disclosure of youth cautions on DBS certificates and I am unsure whether that should be extended now to the more serious youth conditional cautions, which of course include duties alongside the original caution. But I completely understand the principle behind Amendment 477, in the name of the same noble Lords, and why the legislation as currently drafted may lead to individuals being treated as adults when they commit an offence as a juvenile—all the more so given the backlog that the courts are currently suffering and delays in the court system, as the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, pointed out. Likewise, I see the rationale behind Amendment 478, which seeks to ensure that custodial sentences received by youths are removed from their criminal records after five and a half years.
On Amendment 486D in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, as others have said, children of course make mistakes, and there is a spectrum of offences, where avoiding a fare payment and travelling without a ticket is certainly on the less severe end. There is plainly a case that, as first-time offences, these do not warrant a criminal conviction certificate being issued.
My only point in conclusion is to echo what my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington said: we have to be a little careful not to increase the incentives for petty crime. As he pointed out, that can perhaps lead—especially with regard to criminal gangs—to a potential for danger. With that said, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Carter of Haslemere, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede for tabling Amendments 420, 476 to 478 and 486D. They form a formidable trio in terms of not just their expertise but the respect that they rightly command in your Lordships’ House.
A number of noble Lords have raised the question of the age of criminal responsibility. I hope I will be forgiven for not addressing that now; I know for certain that we will be addressing it at least twice in the days and weeks to come.
The Government acknowledge the principle that underpins these amendments—namely, that having a criminal record will have a significant impact on children and that such a record can, in some circumstances, follow them into later life as adults, again with profound consequences. That said, as I think all noble Lords agreed, it is critical that our criminal records disclosure regime strikes the right balance. On the one hand, we want to support people who have committed criminal offences, either some time ago or when they were very young, to be able to move on with their lives. But there is also a need for appropriate risk management in the public interest, as well as to safeguard the most vulnerable.
I will deal first with Amendments 420 and 476 to 478. The existing regime helps employers make informed recruitment decisions through the disclosure of appropriate and relevant information. This will mean that some serious offences, even when committed as a child, will always need to be disclosed, particularly where a person is applying to work with children or vulnerable adults. As some of your Lordships will be aware, in his recent independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson recommended that the Government review the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. In the Statement I made to your Lordships’ House on 2 December, I said that we will consider opportunities to simplify the criminal records regime to ensure that it is both clear and proportionate, particularly in relation to childhood offences.
I would be very happy to meet with any of your Lordships over the coming weeks to discuss this in more detail. It is of the utmost importance to the Government that we work together to ensure that we get this right. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I was very struck by the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, that this is not always as straightforward as it might appear, hence the need to make sure that we do this carefully, in a structured and thoughtful way. As I said, I would be delighted to see any of your Lordships. Given the offer made by my noble friend Lord Hanson in the previous group, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and I may be seeing rather more of each other than perhaps he had intended—but it is always a pleasure on my part.
Turning to Amendment 486D, I am very surprised to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Carter, says because the Government’s view echoes what my noble friend Lord Ponsonby said: children are generally treated leniently when fare evasion occurs. This offence is most commonly dealt with by transport staff, so usually no question arises of a child acquiring a criminal record for fare evasion and similar offences. The police usually become involved only in cases of a refusal to pay for a ticket, for repeat offences or because of some other complicating factor. Even when the police become involved, this does not usually result in a prosecution taking place because the Code for Crown Prosecutors requires prosecutors to consider, as a specific public interest factor tending against prosecution, where a child is young or where it is a first offence.
Police officers can give out-of-court disposals, which allow them to respond to low-level offending proportionately and effectively. These out-of-court disposals, of which there are a variety, provide opportunities for children to make reparation and restoration to victims, and to be diverted into courses or services which can help to change their offending behaviour. Most types of out-of-court disposals are not automatically disclosed on criminal record certificates.
The Government believe that it would be very unusual for a child or young person to get a criminal conviction for this type of offence but, were that to happen, the disclosure time limits under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act are very different from those that affect adults. Rehabilitation periods for children are typically half the length of those for an adult. For example, if a court were to impose a fine for fare evasion, there would usually be a requirement that the child disclose their conviction for only six months, as opposed to the case of an adult, who would have to disclose it for a year.
For all these reasons, under the existing legislation, the Government’s view is that there is a very small chance of a child who is a first-time offender getting a criminal record for a fare evasion offence in the first place, and an equally small chance of such a conviction following them into adult life. I will, however, make inquiries and write to the noble Lord giving such statistics as I am able to find.
“Child cruelty offences: notification and offender management requirements(1) A person (“relevant offender”) is subject to the notification requirements of subsections (2) and (3) for the period set out in subsection (4) if the relevant offender is convicted of an offence listed in subsection (6). (2) A relevant offender must notify to the police within the three days of the time of their conviction or their release from custody, and annually thereafter, providing —(a) the relevant offender’s date of birth,(b) their national insurance number,(c) their name on the notification date and, where using one or more other names on that date, each of those names,(d) their place of residence on the date of notification,((e) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which, at the time the notification is given, they regularly reside or stay, and(f) any information that may be prescribed in regulations by the Secretary of State.(3) A relevant offender must notify to the police, within the period of three days beginning with the event occurring, about—(a) their use of a name which has not been notified to the police under subsection (2);(b) a change to their place or residence;(c) any other prescribed change of circumstances as defined in regulations made under this section.(4) The dates of discharge from notification requirements under this section are the same as those set out in Section 88B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.(5) The information required by subsections (2) and (3), once received, must be—(a) monitored regularly by the police and probation service, and(b) retained for the purposes of offender management.(6) The relevant offences are—(a) causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult, or allowing them to suffer serious harm (section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004);(b) child cruelty, neglect and violence (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933);(c) infanticide (section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938);(d) exposing children whereby life is endangered (section 27 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861);(e) an offence under sections 4, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 or 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1860, if the victim is under the age of 16;(f) an offence under any of the following provisions of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—(i) female genital mutilation (section 1);(ii) assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia (section 2);(iii) assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl’s genitalia (section 3);(g) cruelty to children (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933).”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would create notification requirements for people convicted of child cruelty, analogous to the Sex Offenders Register. Their information and personal details would be kept on record by the police for the purposes of offender management, with the aim of reducing the risk to children from future offences.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to move Amendment 420A. Although it is in my name, it is a product of tireless campaigning from my honourable friend Helen Grant MP. I thank her for her long-standing commitment to this issue. It is thanks to her unwavering commitment that we are one step closer to making a child cruelty register a reality.
I thank the Government for their ongoing communication with us on this important topic and their assurances that they would like to implement a policy that supports a child cruelty register. When this amendment was tabled during the passage of the Sentencing Bill in your Lordships’ House, government officials requested that it be reserved for Home Office legislation, rather than that of the Ministry of Justice. That is why I am moving this amendment today.
This proposed register would be very similar in kind to the register for convicted child sex offenders, for whom notification requirements already exist. It would ensure that those convicted of cruelty to vulnerable children must notify the police of their home address and other relevant details following their release from prison. The register would act as a safeguard by providing the police with the oversight needed to manage offenders and reduce the risk to children. It would mean that those who commit cruelty to children in a non-sexual manner cannot simply disappear back into the community.
These provisions already exist for sex offenders, and we see no reason why they should not similarly pertain to those convicted of child cruelty. Although the offence is different, its effects are detrimentally serious in nature. Child cruelty is a heinous crime that can have a lifelong impact on victims and affects the most vulnerable individuals in society.
Common sense requires that those who commit crimes such as allowing the death of a child, neglect of a child, violence towards a child, infanticide or female genital mutilation should not be able to slip under the radar in local communities once their custodial sentence is spent. There should be a centralised mechanism for the police to know where these people live. This is particularly so given that, in the vast majority of child cruelty cases, the offender has parental responsibility for the victim. They are therefore likely to have connections to the child’s guardian, who, in many cases, will be a family member.
There is a clear gap in the child protection systems that unnecessarily endangers children. The child protection system must exist to free children from the conditions of cruelty towards them, but it must also contain preventive measures to ensure that children are not placed in such appalling situations. Child cruelty offences have doubled in the past few years; now more than ever, it is important to act swiftly to curb this rise. Given the Government’s previously stated support for this measure, I hope that the Minister will be equally able to offer her support today.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, my colleagues in the Commons very much supported Helen Grant in her campaign for this amendment. I pay particular tribute to Jess Brown-Fuller MP. It is very helpful that it has been directed to this Bill, and we on these Benches are very pleased that the Opposition have laid the amendment to this Bill.
It is getting late, and I will not speak for very long. The only other people we need to credit are Tony Hudgell and his parents. After being taken away from his birth parents, he has lived for many years with his foster parents, who he describes as his parents. He has endured 23 operations after injuries that resulted in him losing both legs when he was a toddler. That is the sort of cruelty—although unusually bad in this case—that the amendment is intended to address. For all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, outlined, we absolutely support the progress of this amendment, and we hope that the Government will look favourably on it.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, notification requirements received attention during the passage of the Government’s Sentencing Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for ensuring this important matter remains firmly on our agenda. I join the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in paying tribute to Helen Grant MP and to Paula Hudgell, both of whose tireless campaigning has done so much to advance the protection of children. As my noble friend Lord Timpson set out in Committee on the Sentencing Bill, this Government are committed to safeguarding children and ensuring robust measures are in place to protect them from those who seek to cause them harm. We are working hard to consider the best way to manage such offenders effectively.
We are unable to support the amendment at present, as further work is needed to determine the most effective way to strengthen offender management. We need to consider fully all aspects of implementation when it comes to adding notification requirements to a new cohort of offenders, particularly in light of the Government’s recently published violence against women and girls strategy, which sets out significant reforms to offender management.
It is right that we take the time to understand the potential impact of these proposals. One of the issues is that adding notification requirements to a new cohort of offenders would involve significant costs for policing. For example, notification duties such as taking biometric data, verifying personal details, recording changes, conducting compliance visits and managing ViSOR data must all be absorbed into the general workload of the police. One of the tasks for the Government is to reflect that this could mean shifting resource from other important areas of police work.
I can reassure noble Lords, however, that since December, Home Office and Justice Ministers have met regularly to discuss options in this space and have held initial discussions with national policing representatives. So, I can add my reassurances to those already given by my noble friend Lord Timpson: Ministers will continue to pursue this issue with vigour. With these reassurances, I hope that at this stage the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful both to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and to the Minister for their contributions. I think we can all agree that child protection should be a priority for any Government and that we must ensure that any gaps in the law are plugged with immediate effect.
This amendment, unlike many in this Bill, is not about creating a new category of offender or about an expansion of the criminal law; it simply reflects and seeks to fix the troubling reality that individuals who commit acts of cruelty or violence or neglect do not have a monitoring regime upon leaving custody. That is what we believe needs to be corrected. We already accept, as a matter of principle, that where an offence demonstrates a clear and ongoing risk to children, the state has a responsibility to ensure appropriate oversight in the community, and that is why notification requirements exist for child sex offenders. This amendment merely extends the same logic to offences that, while different in nature, can be as devastating in their consequences and no less indicative of future risk.
I am grateful to the Government for acknowledging the need and the advantages of this amendment both inside and outside of this Chamber. I am grateful for the Minister’s words of support tonight, and I understand the point she made about considering this properly, but the rise in child cruelty offences demands action rather than any kind of delay. Every year that passes without a mechanism of this kind leaves children unnecessarily exposed to harm. Therefore, I want to give, with the greatest of respect, notice to the Minister that unless there is an amendment from the Government on Report that supports the substance of this amendment, it is likely that I would want to bring it back. I re-emphasise my gratitude for the Government’s co-operation on this point, but for present purposes I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said, if ever there was a pertinent time to debate this matter, it is now. The mechanism by which chief constables can be removed has faced significant scrutiny, given the very controversial actions taken by West Midlands Police in the Maccabi Tel Aviv scandal. I pay tribute to my honourable friend Nick Timothy MP for his tenacity in pursuing the truth of that matter. I think it is now axiomatic that the former chief constable of West Midlands Police failed in his professional duties, and it is welcome that he has now accepted that his position is no longer tenable and has announced his retirement. It is against this backdrop that we discuss the amendments in this group.
On Amendment 421, I am of course aware of the Government’s indication that they will abolish PCCs in due course; that is important context to this amendment. For the time being, of course, they remain in place. I am not entirely convinced about the necessity of Amendment 421. With the Maccabi Tel Aviv affair, it was evident for quite some time that the PCC for the West Midlands should have dismissed the chief constable. As it happens, he did not, but I am not sure that consulting His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services beforehand would have had any bearing on the PCC’s decision. Furthermore, if the PCC was required by statute to consult the inspectorate, would that not have provided further delays to any decision?
Amendment 438EC seeks to grant the Home Secretary the power to remove chief constables. In her Statement to the other place on the 14 January, the Home Secretary said that until 2011, the Home Secretary had the authority to dismiss a chief constable, but the power was removed by the previous Conservative Government. On the face of it, that is correct. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 repealed the direct power of the Home Secretary to remove the chief constable of a police force, and Section 38 of that Act grants the power of dismissal to the PCC of the police area. However, the Home Secretary has the power to give directions in relation to police forces and local policing bodies under Sections 40 and 40A of the Police Act 1996. If, for instance, it was clear that West Midlands Police was failing to discharge its functions in an effective manner, the appropriate measure to remedy that failure would have been the removal of the chief constable. Therefore, according to those sections, the Secretary of State has perhaps an indirect ability to remove chief constables.
In her Statement to the other place, the Home Secretary also said that the Government are going to reintroduce the Home Secretary’s power to dismiss chief constables and that this will be part of the Government’s upcoming White Paper on wider police reform, with legislation to follow. Does the Minister have a timeline for when the police reform White Paper might be published, and, if he does not have precise date, can he give us an indication of its rough progress? Will any change in the law be brought forward in time for Report on this Bill, or will we have to wait until the next Session for another policing Bill?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendment, which concerns the process by which police and crime commissioners may call on a chief constable to resign or retire. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, has mentioned, the Government’s intention is to replace police and crime commissioners with a mayoral model or, in some cases in which the mayoral model is inappropriate, with a policing board made up of local councillors, and that will be brought forward in due course. Further details will be set out again in the policing White Paper. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, asked me when that would be produced. I say again to him the time-honoured phrase of “shortly”, but by shortly I do mean shortly; I hope he will not have too long to wait for the report be published as a White Paper. Self-evidently, it is a very complex document with lots of discussion items in it. Again, any legislative proposals in it will be brought forward when parliamentary time allows. I am not trying to short-change him, but we will give that detail in the near future.
As the noble Baroness has explained, the purpose of her amendment is to ensure that, before taking steps to dismiss a chief constable, a police and crime commissioner must first seek the views of HMICFRS. I agree that this is a desirable approach, and I am pleased to tell your Lordships that this is already in place as a requirement. The noble Baroness should know, and I hope that it is helpful to her, that under Section 38(3) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, PCCs may call upon the relevant chief constable to resign or retire. Before exercising this power, and under regulation 11A of the Police Regulations 2003, police and crime commissioners are required to seek the views of HM inspectorate in writing and provide them to the chief constable and the relevant police and crime panel, alongside their rationale for why the PCC is proposing to call for retirement or resignation. I appreciate that it is a confusing landscape to have regulations under the Act and under police regulations. However, the position currently is there in black and white, and what her amendment seeks to do is already enshrined in law.
The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is not in his place so I will not say too much now, if anything, about Amendment 438EC. However, because it was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, I want to place on record for the Committee the fact that the Home Secretary has already announced the Government’s intention to reintroduce the Home Secretary’s power to remove chief constables. It has been a difficult few weeks in the West Midlands and, following the changes that were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, it has highlighted the absence of such a power allowing the Home Secretary to act. We believe that action is needed, and I can assure your Lordships that this is high on the Government’s agenda. The White Paper is due in very short order. It will set out exactly the Government’s intentions in this regard and will be followed by legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows, because we need to make changes on a range of matters, not least the abolition of PCCs. I look forward to debating this with noble Lords across the House. However, if the noble Baroness accepts that, difficult though they are to find, the regulations and the requirement are there, I hope she will be able to withdraw her amendment for the moment. I look forward to further discussion when the other matters come before the House at some future point.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, these three amendments raise a difficult but important question: how should the law treat the use of lethal force by authorised firearms officers so as to protect both the public and those officers who act in good faith in dangerous situations?
Amendment 422 would make it clear in the Police (Conduct) Regulations that when an officer uses force based on a mistaken belief, that belief must be both honestly held and objectively reasonable. This reflects the Supreme Court’s decision in W80 and would give bereaved families, and communities that often feel over-policed, greater clarity and confidence in the system.
Amendment 423A would update Section 76 of the 2008 Act so that force used by an authorised firearms officer could never be treated as reasonable if it was grossly disproportionate to the situation as they saw it. That would set a clear upper limit on what can count as lawful force, drawing a boundary beyond which self-defence cannot reach, however real the threat appears.
From these Benches, we understand the intentions behind both amendments: the first writes the W80 test into disciplinary rules; the second provides clearer statutory guidance in firearms cases.
Amendment 423 goes further. It proposes that if an authorised firearms officer kills someone while acting under an honest but mistaken belief that the force used was necessary and reasonable, the conviction should be manslaughter rather than murder. We are concerned that this would, in effect, create a special route from murder to manslaughter for authorised firearms officers, one not available to others who also face life-and-death decisions.
When police use potentially unlawful lethal force, there must be full investigation, prosecution where appropriate, and robust disciplinary proceedings. The central question, then, is whether these amendments strike the right balance between public accountability and fair protection for officers who must make split-second decisions in life-threatening situations.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 422 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, has had a detailed introduction, and I would like to abbreviate my remarks as a result.
The issue under consideration in that case was whether, in police disciplinary proceedings, a police officer could have a finding of misconduct against them if their use of force was found to be honest and mistaken but unreasonable. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate test was the civil law test and that an honest but mistaken belief that the use of force is necessary is justification for that use of force only if the belief is objectively reasonable.
Amendment 422 would place that judgment into statute. Regardless of the merits or otherwise of the Supreme Court’s ruling on whether the criminal or civil test should be applicable, I am not convinced that it needs to be codified into statute, because there now exists relevant case law at the highest level which can be applied by the IOPC and the courts in the future. It is not clear to me what benefit there would be in placing this into the regulations.
I would like to concentrate my remarks on Amendment 423 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, because I want to express my strong support for it. I believe firmly that we must support our armed police officers who regularly put themselves in danger. This amendment presents an opportunity to do that. It would create a defence to a charge of murder for authorised firearms officers who used lethal force in the honest but mistaken belief that such force was necessary and reasonable and convert a conviction for murder into manslaughter.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
The point I was making is that the prospect of a murder conviction may have an effect on an officer if they feared that an error that they made may result in a murder charge. On the noble Lord’s own amendment, as I said, I listened with sympathy to it, and I await the Government’s response on it and, indeed, all the amendments in this group.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, as we have heard during this short but important debate, these amendments all relate to the same matter of principle—namely, the legal standard by which an authorised firearms officer should be judged on the thankfully rare occasions when they discharge a firearm.
The Government pay tribute to our armed officers. Theirs is a difficult, dangerous and stressful job. They do it to keep us all safe, and we have a great deal for which to thank them. Of course we recognise that they often find themselves in exceptionally difficult circumstances, having to make life and death decisions in an instant. That said, there is the matter of public confidence in the police. I do not think that any of your Lordships would disagree that confidence in the police is of equal importance. I would not be doing justice to this debate if I did not recognise and mark the fact that some of our citizens feel great anxiety about the accountability of firearms officers. In the past, when there have been high-profile fatal shootings by the police, this anxiety has boiled over into anger and social unrest.
The Government’s job is to balance these factors. We must ensure that the law offers protection to our brave police officers while at the same time providing reassurance to our fellow citizens that, if officers do fire their weapons, their conduct will be rigorously scrutinised. It is only right that the public should have confidence that any officer whose actions fall below the high standards we rightly expect will be held to account in the public interest.
Our conclusion is that we should not create a two-tier justice system where police officers who kill or injure in the course of their duties are judged by a more lenient standard than applies to the rest of the population. Our reason is this: we are confident that the criminal law which covers self-defence, defence of others and the use of force in the prevention of crime already provides sufficient protection for police officers. Because of the lateness of the hour, I am not going to go through the details of this, which I had intended to do, but will move straight to the amendments.
Amendment 423, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, would change the law so that an authorised firearms officer who acts with disproportionate—in other words, unreasonable—force would still be guilty of an offence, but it would be manslaughter, not murder.
I want to say a few words about what the law says about how a jury must consider whether the amount of force used by the officer was reasonable, sometimes described as proportionate. While this is an objective test, if the jury is told that what the officer did in the heat of the moment, when fine judgments are difficult, was no more than they genuinely believed was necessary, even if they were mistaken in that belief, that would be strong evidence that what they did was reasonable. If the jury also considers that the officer may have done no more than was reasonable in the light of what they believed to be happening, they are not guilty of anything. In other words, the law provides a full defence.
It is unclear whether Amendment 423 is intended to replace this full defence with a partial one, or whether, as I think is the case, it is intended to work alongside it in some way. If the noble Lord’s intention is to create a partial defence, then what he is saying is that officers who use unreasonable or excessive force should be held to a different standard from the rest of the population. We cannot accept this because the Government believe that to do so would fundamentally damage confidence in the police and in the justice system.
I turn to Amendment 423A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, which seeks to amend Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. As your Lordships have heard, Section 76 deals with householder cases. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to make authorised firearms officers subject to the same standard as the householder confronted by an intruder. The amendment attempts to raise the threshold for when force becomes unreasonable from disproportionate to grossly disproportionate for firearms officers. In effect, this means that firearms officers could rely on the defences of self-defence, preventing crime or making a lawful arrest if they used force that was disproportionate in the circumstances, provided it was not grossly disproportionate.
For the reasons I have already given, the Government are of the strong belief that it would be wrong in principle to authorise the police to use excessive force and that this would be extremely damaging to public confidence. In any event, we do not think there is a proper comparison to be made between householders facing an unexpected intruder and trained firearms officers. The threshold was raised in householder cases to recognise the exceptional nature of being unexpectedly confronted by an intruder in one’s home. The unique stress and shock of a home invasion justifies greater legal protection, allowing a higher level of force than in other self-defence contexts. The same logic does not apply to firearms officers, who are trained and equipped to use lethal force and are deployed only in the most high-risk situations. They are subject to strict command, control and training protocols to ensure that lethal force is used only when necessary and in accordance with the current legal framework.
I turn finally to Amendment 422, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. As the noble Baroness has explained during the debate, her amendment deals not with criminal trials but with police conduct hearings. The previous Home Secretary commissioned Timothy Godwin and Sir Adrian Fulford to carry out an independent police accountability rapid review because it was recognised that there was ongoing complexity and confusion, and that there were concerns that this was having an impact on recruitment and retention of these essential and much valued officers. Sir Adrian and Mr Godwin examined the matter thoroughly and heard evidence from a wide range of stakeholders. Their conclusions and recommendations, published in October 2025, were clear that the Government should change the legal test for use of force in police misconduct cases from the civil to the criminal law test.
The reviewers found that police officers need confidence and greater consistency in the disciplinary system and that this would improve fairness and public confidence. The Government have taken on board that recommendation and we are in the process of making the necessary changes to The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020. Our intention is that these changes will come into force in the spring. We accept that the amendment is well intended, but I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why the Government cannot support it and, for the reasons I have given, I invite her to withdraw her amendment.