(4 days, 5 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for outlining the detail of the amendments in this group. I was slightly surprised by what he said, because I understood that it was not about whether a prison term was suspended or not, it was the conviction itself that acted as the trigger for the victim’s rights. I see the Minister is nodding. Just to double-check, I went to the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime. This makes it absolutely clear that the moment there is a possible crime against somebody which falls within something that could be considered by the code, the victim is entitled to support and help. For certain particular crimes, they are entitled to enhanced rights and help. I am sorry: I printed it off the web and it does not have a page number, but it states that victims of the most serious crimes are eligible for enhanced rights under this code. There is no question at all of them being reduced or stopped if a conviction is suspended. Once again, I repeat that this is exactly what happened to me. In my particular case, the offender was given a prison sentence and it was suspended, but the victim support continued in spite of that.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity of setting out the Government’s position. Our approach is carefully considered. I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to make party-political points out of this by using language such as “insult to victims”, particularly when, in relation to the principal part of his argument, he is just plain wrong.
The starting point is that we must prioritise public funds to ensure that they go where they are most needed. We have done this by providing proactive support to those victims where the court has imposed a longer sentence, because a longer sentence reflects the seriousness of the offence. Of course we recognise that all victims of crime will want information about the offender in their case. For that reason, we are introducing a new route for all victims—the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is quite right about this—to request information via a dedicated helpline.
This is why new Schedule 6A is in three parts. Part 1 ensures that the most serious cases, involving victims of violent, sexual, and terrorism offences where the defendant has been sentenced to a custodial sentence of 12 months or more, can receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.
Part 2 ensures support for victims of stalking and harassment offences, regardless of sentence length. We recognise that, even where there is a short sentence, this cohort of victims needs and will receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.
I am just trying to ensure that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, can hear the information I am giving him back, because we think that what the noble Lord said is not right, so I thought he might be interested in hearing what I have to say about it.
Part 3 ensures that victims of other sexual and violent offences, and breach offences linked to violence against women and girls, will be able to get information through the helpline should they request it, including for those offences in Part 1 where the sentence for the offence is less than 12 months. We consider that this is the right place to draw the line, but we will keep eligibility under review to make sure that we are reaching the right victims.
The Bill includes regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences, and the specified lengths of sentence of such offences, which determine eligibility for either service. The Bill also includes a discretionary power that enables victims of any offence, where the offender is serving a sentence of imprisonment, to be provided with either service, where they request it and probation deem it to be appropriate.
The victim contact scheme and the victim helpline will apply only where there is a custodial sentence. That is not only because of the consideration of public funds but because the information provided via these routes, such as the date of release on licence and conditions of licence, self-evidently does not apply unless there has been a custodial sentence. Where a suspended or community sentence is imposed by the court, under the victims’ code, the police witness care unit will explain the sentence to the victim.
Finally, regarding Amendment 54, I am pleased to reassure the noble Lord that there is already a route for victims to request a senior probation officer review of a decision about what information to provide, so this is already catered for. In the circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I inform the Committee that if Amendment 59 is agreed to, I will not be able to call Amendment 60 by reason of pre-emption.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for tabling these amendments and to the Government for the expansion of the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers as set out in the Bill.
However, there are some broader issues that it might be helpful to air here, which are not the subject of amendments, for obvious reasons. It is 22 years since the office of the Victims’ Commissioner was created. I wonder whether, given the legislation that is going through to remove police and crime commissioners, that will change the landscape in which the Victims’ Commissioner’s office works. Therefore, it may be worth reviewing exactly what the roles of the Victims’ Commissioner are. I have some sympathy with the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in that context.
From these Benches, we have argued that the entirety of the responsibilities of the Victims’ Commissioner should be broader than they were up until the presentation of this Bill. But there is another point that we have raised consistently—not just in legislation but in Questions and at other times—and that is the disparity of resources between the Victims’ Commissioner’s office and the office of the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. I have been told that this is partly because the Victims’ Commissioner’s office looks only at policy, but we know the reality in the complex world of victims is that it sees many more things. If the Government would consider a review of the role in light of the change with police and crime commissioners, it might also be a time to look at whether the Victims’ Commissioner’s office has the resources that it needs to deliver the very important job that it does.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I am very doubtful about Amendment 58. It would expand the role of the Victims’ Commissioner very substantially indeed if the Victims’ Commissioner is going to take action to support or protect individuals who act in good faith to assist victims of crime. That would involve a great deal more work for the Victims’ Commissioner. I am very doubtful, with the resources available, that the role of the Victims’ Commissioner should be diverted from the primary responsibility of considering victims of crime.
Of course, one has every sympathy with the bus driver whom the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, mentioned—his behaviour was heroic and his treatment seems to have been very unjust indeed. I understand he does not actually want his job back, but that really is not the point. The point is that to expand the role of the Victims’ Commissioner to other persons who have assisted the victim seems to me to be unjustified and a diversion of resources.
My Lords, I support the principle behind Amendment 61. The real question is: how quickly can this be done?
I want to give an illustration of a problem that has arisen in civil courts across the world: the ability of artificial intelligence to hallucinate—to create cases and precedents for lawyers to use that do not exist. All civil courts across the world, including those in this country, have realised that this is an immense problem. It is being dealt with by practice direction—in some cases, very quickly indeed—because it is corrosive to the proper conduct of litigation, and it seems to me that there is no reason why, when this comes back on Report, it cannot be dealt with. It is not a difficult problem, and if it has been around for two years, that is 18 months too long.
The other point I want to address, in a slightly different manner, is Amendment 62. This is a much more difficult problem and has arisen because of the way in which drill music, and similar music, has been used in the prosecution of cases. The admissibility of such evidence is quite complicated.
What is very worrying—as can be seen by the attendance here today of one of the counsels involved in these cases—is that the way in which this evidence has been used in some cases has caused a lot of deep misunderstanding and suspicion about the way our criminal justice system operates for certain minorities. The thought that you will be found guilty because of the music you listen to is deeply troubling.
However, it seems to me that what we need to do first is look at the cases where this has been used. I looked at the case of the Manchester 10 and, coincidentally, in that case, the evidence had been admitted by agreement, and the Court of Appeal upheld the way in which it had been used for certain purposes.
It seems to me that this is a more complicated problem, and it would be helpful if the Minister was able, between now and Report, to put before the House a short letter explaining what the problem is. I think it would be easier to look at the amendment in the light of a better understanding. The last thing I want to do is to bore the Committee by explaining the ways in which evidence can and cannot be used legitimately. It is much better that members of the Committee have the benefit of reading that on a piece of paper.
My Lords, I have two brief points on Amendment 61, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for tabling it. It is really wrong that computers or systems have ever been deemed to be reliable, let alone infallible. My husband is a research and design engineer who has worked in Cambridge Science Park for well over 40 years. He and his friends have a phrase that they use among themselves and about themselves: “Garbage in, garbage out”. When we started hearing about the Post Office Horizon scandal and Fujitsu, the first thing he said to me was, “Garbage in, garbage out”. The problem we have is that too many people, the courts and the court of public opinion believe that computer systems are infallible.
I also want to touch very briefly on AI because we are seeing cases in the courts now. Facial recognition cases are coming up. Big Brother Watch reported on one last June. I notice that not quite weekly, but quite frequently, an individual is arrested as they go into a store and are accused of taking something very small and then evidence is produced of them on a facial recognition watch list. It then transpires some time later that they are not that individual. One particular firm’s name keeps coming up—I will not go into that —but the reaction of the shop is exactly that: it is infallible. I support the amendment, and I urge the Minister and the Government not to pause on this at all. It is needed, not just for the legacy of Post Office Horizon, but for cases in our courts right now.
Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)
I rise in support of Amendment 62, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Perhaps I can help the Minister with some of the intricacies of this. We have heard from Members who have a legal background. I have a youth work background, and I would like to say this: much of the music that is being talked about—drill music, rap music—is horrific. The content of the music is horrific and it is horrible, but, unfortunately, it is also very entertaining. Many young people will listen to it just by association. The music is entertaining, people party and you have no other choice. So for someone to view your output as an individual through your membership of that genre is a very slippery slope. Many years ago, I dealt with a group of young men who made a video that pointed to some serious criminality, and the police dealt with it in the right manner. They used it to understand who they might further investigate. They did not use the evidence, except one part that was quite blatant, as a reason to prosecute individuals.
When someone tells you that they are an expert in interpreting the music, I am afraid they are wrong. I was born in that community, I come from that community, many members of my family make that music, but because young people make the music and technology allows them to make it so quickly, the words they use, the meanings they use and the characters they build change almost on a daily basis. If you were to say to my son, “the man dem”, he would understand. Would noble Lords? When I grew up, “the man dem” existed as a concept, but the words did not, so he and I can have a conversation about the same thing and not know that we are talking about the same thing.
Very rarely will you hear me stand up, talk about race and accuse the police of being racist, but this cuts very close to that because when a lovely, well-meaning, educated, middle-class man or woman listens to the music, they have no understanding of the cultural background of that music or of the fact that that music might have been produced in the way it was to display a character. Much of the bragging and the boasting is simply that: bragging and boasting about fictitious situations that they hope they will never be in and that we also hope they will never be in. To present that in court as some kind of evidence of their associations and their behaviour is a slippery slope. If you want to destroy the relationship between young people, particularly young Black people, and our system, this would be the way to go.
My Lords, I signed Amendment 63, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Russell. I will not go into any of the detail that he has just given so comprehensively, but I did want to give your Lordships’ Committee the chance to hear two voices of victims who have found that VRR really worked for them.
In September 2021, “Daria”, an anonymous survivor, reported offences of harassment, stalking and image-based abuse to the police. The perpetrator was arrested in November 2021; however, confusion between police forces and errors in case handling resulted in delays and lapses in time limits for some offences. By December 2022, the CPS issued a decision of no further action for the most serious charges of disclosing and threatening to disclose private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress. This was despite Daria providing detailed evidence that the intent threshold was met.
Daria immediately requested a review under the victims’ right to review scheme. Over the following months, the CPS kept her updated and requested further statements, and in May 2023, a district Crown prosecutor overturned the original decision. The CPS authorised two counts of disclosing or threatening to disclose private sexual images with intent to cause distress. In December 2023, the perpetrator was convicted on both counts and sentenced in the Crown Court in March 2024. The CPS formally apologised for the distress caused by the initial wrongful decision.
Daria has said:
“Without the Right to Review, my case would have ended in silence. The CPS originally decided not to prosecute—despite everything I’d reported and the evidence I’d provided. It was only through the VRR process that my voice was finally heard, and justice was served. The man who targeted and humiliated me online was ultimately convicted. Survivors deserve this second chance. The right to review gave me mine”.
Victoria was groomed and sexually abused from the age of 14. When she reported the crime years later, the CPS initially decided on no further action, wrongly re-aging her as 16 and dismissing the evidence that she had been below the age of consent. Victoria requested a VRR. The first review upheld the decision, but she escalated it further. In 2021, after a second interview, the CPS overturned its decision and charged her abuser with seven counts of indecent assault. A further charge was added at trial. Her abuser was unanimously convicted on all eight counts and sentenced to 23 years in prison. He was also placed on the sex offenders register indefinitely. Despite this, Victoria had endured nearly six years of delays before her trial, which left her with PTSD, agoraphobia and severe anxiety. She said:
“After the CPS refused to charge my abuser, I requested a VRR. This led them to overturn that decision, and my abuser was later convicted. He would not have faced justice without the VRR process. My case highlights the need for VRRs to be permanently accessible to complainants so mistakes can be addressed”.
My Lords, this group of amendments concerns the terms of the unduly lenient sentence scheme, which we consider has too narrow a window to effectively allow for victims to reflect upon and review the sentences given to their offenders. Amendments 64, 65 and 66 aim to increase the existing 28-day window for applying to the unduly lenient sentence scheme to one of 56 days.
Similarly, Amendment 69, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to allow the 28-day time limit to be extended in exceptional circumstances. We thank the noble Baroness for this amendment. We on these Benches are very receptive to the idea of including an “exceptional circumstances” clause in the unduly lenient sentence framework. It is a safeguard that recognises that victims may, for one reason or another, not always be able to act within the current timeframe. Currently, there exists an asymmetry between offenders and victims. Offenders might be able to seek extensions or have certain deadlines adjusted, whereas victims are rigidly bound by the 28-day window. This amendment helps to address that imbalance.
The process of applying for review of a sentence is not one that can always be readily undertaken within four weeks. It requires a knowledge of the law that often requires the instruction and subsequent direction of a lawyer, which in and of itself is a process that can often take up to, if not beyond, the 28-day window that victims are given in which to appeal. Crucial to this process is the availability of the sentencing remarks, a problem which we have partially solved in the Sentencing Act by requiring their release within 14 days, but that occupies, none the less, half the time the Government currently offer to appeal a lenient sentence.
Perhaps the most effective case for change is a human one. Victims must face and relive the most traumatic events of their lives in court. They have to re-encounter their offender in some cases—not due to the current drafting of Clause 1, I accept—and in the cases we are concerned with, they have to deal with what they believe to be an unjust sentence.
An increase to 56 days is not a drastic one; it simply increases the window to two months, and it allows slightly more time for the process to be completed. We on these Benches are also open to the idea of a longer window to apply specifically for victims and, where they are murdered in cases of extremely serious crime, their next of kin. That may be for another day.
I turn to Amendment 72, which seeks to place a clear statutory duty on the Crown Prosecution Service to notify victims or, in the case of a deceased victim, their next of kin, of their right to request a review under the unduly lenient sentence scheme. At present, whether a victim is informed of the scheme can depend upon practice rather than principle. In some cases, of course, victims are advised promptly and clearly. In others, awareness depends rather upon chance, whether it is mentioned to them by their legal advocate or at some other time during the court process, or whether they independently discover its existence. That is not a satisfactory basis on which to safeguard a right of such importance, and particularly one that is time limited within a strict statutory window.
A right that expires after 28 days, or indeed 56 if our earlier amendments are accepted, is meaningful only if the person entitled to exercise it is made aware of it in good time, and before time starts to run. Without notification, the right is illusory at best. Amendment 72 therefore proposes a straightforward and practical safeguard; namely, the CPS must write to the victim, or their next of kin, within 10 working days of a sentence being delivered, informing them of their ability to seek a review. This is not burdensome. The CPS is already engaged with victims throughout the prosecution process. Contact details are held; communication channels should exist. This amendment simply makes notification consistent and mandatory. Amendment 75, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has the same aim as our amendment, albeit with a marginally different mechanism. I hope that we can work together to achieve this reform.
If we are to maintain a short and strict time limit for challenging unduly lenient sentences, the least that we can do is to ensure that victims are properly informed of that right. Without such a duty, access to the scheme may depend less on justice and more on happenstance. We trust our judges, but we know that even they are not infallible. Some will be more sparing with their sentences; some will be more certain in their own judgment and not feel the need to alert victims to the scheme. Others will simply forget on occasions. This should not be the case. The Government are very well equipped to create a system in which a letter is sent out, within 10 days, alerting victims of their right to apply for a review of the sentencing. They do it endlessly in other departments; it should be a seamlessly transferable process. All are equal before the law. I beg to move.
My Lords, my two amendments in this group, Amendments 69 and 75, also make proposals for unduly lenient sentences, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has mentioned. From these Benches, we have been keen to improve the access that victims have to challenge what they believe is an unduly lenient sentence. I had amendments to try to achieve this in the Victims and Prisoners Bill in 2023-24.
It is worth pausing to review what has happened since 1988, when the ULS scheme started and victims were given the right to ask the Attorney-General to reconsider the sentence of their offender. One of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, concerns guaranteeing that victims are informed. Currently, the victims’ code places responsibility for informing victims about the ULS scheme on witness care units. For bereaved families entitled to the Crown Prosecution Service bereaved families scheme, the CPS should where possible, through the prosecutor and the trial advocate, meet the family at court following sentencing—if they attend the hearing—and inform them about the ULS scheme where appropriate. However, evidence from victims and bereaved families shows that this often does not happen, with many learning about the scheme only when it is too late to apply. By contrast, the offender and their legal representatives are present at sentencing and able to start planning any appeal against the sentence. In extenuating circumstances, the offender can also be given more than 28 days to launch their appeal. The offender also has post-sentence meetings with their legal representatives. It was clear then, and it remains so now, that the offender had and has more rights and support than the victim. This is not a level playing field.
My Lords, I rise with a degree of caution. I entirely understand the motives behind the amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, and that moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. Shall we begin by trying to remember what an unduly lenient sentence is? It is one that falls outside the range of sentences that a judge, taking into consideration all the relevant factors and having regard to the sentencing guidance, could reasonably consider appropriate. In other words, the sentence must be not just lenient, but unduly lenient. One of the things the Court of Appeal must consider when it is looking at an application to review a sentence is that the offender has been put through the sentencing process, or will be put through the sentencing process, for a second time, and that it will not intervene unless the sentence is significantly below the one the judge should have passed.
Law officers often receive applications—I say this with some experience, as I was a law officer from 2010 to 2012, and in England and Wales it is the law officers who have the ability to make these applications to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division—on the basis that the person complaining about the sentence just thinks it is not adequately severe, but that is not the test. One therefore needs to not encourage an expectation—this is what may follow from the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton—that, by getting a government department or the Crown Prosecution Service to write to a disappointed victim or family member, it must follow that the CPS, or whichever government department is required to do this, agrees, or that it will lead to a successful appeal before the Court of Appeal.
I remember that all sorts of people used to read newspaper articles about a particular sentence that often bore very little resemblance to the sentencing remarks or the details of the case. Sometimes, in some newspapers, you would get an editorial saying that it was a disgrace that this lenient judge has done this, that or the other, and that something must be done, and all sorts of people would then write to the law officer’s department demanding that something be done. Very often the sentence was passed in relation to an offence that did not come under the scheme, or, if it did, on proper examination it did not fall within the ambit of what the Court of Appeal was likely to disturb. So I suspect that all sorts of expectations could be built into the public mind, which could lead only to disappointment.
Secondly, there is something to be said about finality. Although one does not always have any sympathy for a criminal defendant, they are entitled to justice and finality. Having sentenced people, I assure noble Lords that sentencing can be difficult, certainly for a judge who is dealing with, shall we say—I do not mean this in a silly way—the less serious types of criminal offence that none the less come within this scheme. I always found sentencing to be the most difficult part of the judicial function. This is a generalisation, but if you are a High Court judge dealing with criminal cases, the chances are that you will probably have to decide the tariff only on life sentences. But if you are sitting in the Crown Court as a recorder or circuit judge, you may very well have to deal with all sorts of quite complicated considerations when working out the just sentence for a particular defendant based on the facts of a particular offence. It is not always easy.
In my experience of having to seek the advice of the Treasury counsel and making up my own mind about whether an application should go to the Court of Appeal, I found that, by and large, the overwhelming majority of judges passed a just and correct sentence—when I say “correct”, it is not a binary exercise—that was entirely defensible and not the sort of thing that the Court of Appeal would have disturbed. To encourage people to make applications would be a mistake when it is going to lead only to disappointment.
The amendment would not encourage the CPS, or whatever the notifying body is, to encourage the victim to appeal; it would merely be notifying them of the right. Does the noble and learned Lord accept that?
I can see what the printed words say, but if the Crown Prosecution Service was to write to the victim saying, “Do you realise that you can apply to the law officers to have this sentence reviewed by the Court of Appeal?”, it would give an imprimatur and an indication. That is the implication, and we should resist it.
I do not want to go on too long. Anybody can write to the law officers to say, “Will you review this sentence?” It does have to be a victim, or the family or next of kin of a deceased victim. There are plenty of avenues available to the public and to victims if they wish to explore this. To come back to my first point, we need to exercise a degree of caution before opening the floodgates to lots of disappointment.
(6 days, 5 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my Amendment 13 and the other amendments in this group look at the arrangements set out in Clause 3 on how courts should manage the difficult issue of the rights of a person with parental responsibility who is a convicted child sex offender. The range of proposals, and indeed my Amendment 13, are probing at what point being a convicted child sex offender must take priority over the rights that a child sex offender may have as a parent himself or herself—although it is usually a man. A range of proposals in Amendments 14 and 22 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, argue for any sexual offence, which is broadly what we are arguing too, and Amendments 15, 19 and 27 from the noble Lord, Lord Meston, argue for a conviction of more than six months. The Government, of course, start at the point of four years and above. There are real tensions here, and I am particularly looking forward to the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Meston, who with his practical experience can help us non-lawyers bridge the differing priorities of having parental responsibility and the role of the family court versus the criminal court. This is where I want to start.
I am pleased that the Government recognise, in Clause 3, that we should have a clearer position on when convicted child sex abusers lose their parental rights. It has been iniquitous that parental rights have trumped the safeguarding of children, even when the person with parental rights has been convicted of CSA, child sexual abuse, including, astonishingly, of their own child or stepchild. The charity We Stand and the Victims’ Commissioner, Claire Waxman, have long campaigned to protect children from an abuser with parental responsibility and I thank them for their briefings. It is extraordinary that a parent convicted of raping their child has been able to retain access to and decision-making for that child even when they are in prison. There is absolutely no doubt that this has caused other parents and family members much distress, and often considerable expense when they have been to the family court to ask for access to be stopped, so we on these Benches welcome Clause 3 as a starting point. However, we are not convinced that it is quite strong enough.
One example is that the serious sexual offences listed in proposed new Schedule ZA1 to the Children Act 1989 include both indecent imagery offences and contact offences. Imagery offences have a minimum sentence of a community order, and this means that it could be argued that a Section 3 serious offence can be triggered at any sentencing threshold. However, the majority of sentences for indecent imagery tend to fall between three months and one year. Sentencing guidelines for contact offences start at a minimum of one year, so that would exclude these offenders under the Government’s proposals.
That is why Amendment 13 includes all convicted child sexual abusers. This is not about punishment of the offender; it is about protecting all children. We know from research that most child sex abuse takes place in the family environment and therefore that those children are at the highest risk from the offender. We Stand told us that research from the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse shows that natural parents are the highest-offending group in intra-familial child sex abuse, which accounts for over two-thirds of offences. As a result, the children of convicted child sex offenders are already at the most risk.
A non-abusing or protective parent has a legal duty to protect their child from any child sex offender and any level of offending. I personally saw, in a case some years ago, how hard it can be for a non-abusing parent to protect their child when they also have to fight the family court’s assumption about the rights of the other parent, even one who is a convicted child sex abuse offender, because that trumps the offence. We know that the protective parent will often have little or no legal aid to fight to protect their children, including having no right to know where the offender is. This means that papers cannot be served. They also have no right to any information about the offender’s rehabilitational risk assessments, and that is also extraordinary. How can they comment on them or ask for assessments to be made? They are the ones looking after the children. Another problem is the limited timeframe on protective orders, such as prohibited steps orders, and, worse, no powers of arrest if these orders are breached by the offender. One consequence of this is that it makes no sense at all.
Extraordinarily, the offender has the right to make multiple applications to vary or overturn protective orders and to make repeated requests for contact with the children. In households where there has also been coercive control and domestic abuse, these repeated requests continue that abuse. Too often, the family courts see it only through the eyes of the offending parent trying to assert their rights. Section 91(14) of the Children Act is the basis for that.
We Stand notes that the basis of the Children Act 1989, and more recent primary legislation that has not yet been repealed, states that the involvement of a parent in a child’s life is linked to the furthering of the welfare of a child. This means that judges and other authorities, such as social services and Cafcass, are forced into a legal anomaly. They must balance the potential harm to a child from a convicted sex offender and parent with legislation stating that both parents’ involvement in the child’s life furthers the welfare of that child. This leads to inconsistent outcomes. Even if the presumption is repealed, this fundamental belief is still enshrined in the introduction and guidance to the Children Act. Children of the CSA parent are often at greater risk than other children who are automatically protected by existing criminal restrictions, such as sexual harm prevention orders and registration requirements.
Other protective parental concerns include non-molestation orders granted by courts, often for very short durations—six months or a year—so they are not an alternative to prohibited steps orders. They have to defend themselves in a family court to counter allegations made by the offender, often including parental alienation, even after a CSA conviction. What is worse, the nature of the courts means that they often end up in a revolving door and are in and out of the family court for years, which has emotional and financial consequences for them, and the fact of the CSA conviction never changes. That leads to how the family court might think that parental responsibility being exercised by the offender parent is realistic; surely it is not.
Research shows that those guilty of online and non-penetrative offences are at just as high risk of reoffending against their own children. This is important, and the reason why Amendment 13 has reduced the bar from a four-year sentence to any CSA conviction. Surely, for safeguarding reasons, now is the time to change the legal responsibility to the offending parent having to prove why they are safe to exercise that parental responsibility, through rehabilitation courses and often assessment by professionals.
The position of the court must start with the assumption of the protection of the child, not with the rights of the offender parent. That is why all convicted child sex offenders with parental responsibilities should have a prohibited steps order for each child at the time of their conviction. The PSO should have a penal notice attached to it to prevent breaches, and a PSO is useless if it does not have the power of arrest if there is a safeguarding issue. Because many protective parents and their families are in a living hell, it would be good if the legislation can be retrospective, or there should be specific guidance to the family court that the protective parents are to be assumed to have overriding parental responsibility.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The short answer to my noble friend’s question is that he is right: there is no discretion. The reason that there is no discretion is because, in fact, the Crown Court is the one court that does not have all the experience and all the knowledge—it will not have Cafcass reports or anything like that. It is simply making an automatic order when there is a certain level of seriousness that has been reached. It is for the family court to consider all the important factors in other cases about whether such an order is in the interests of the child. The Crown Court judge does not have the expertise, and it will cause delay. I have said it once before today—I may have already said it twice—the one thing the criminal courts do not need is any further delays.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken during this debate. As I said right at the start, we are looking at the entire spectrum of time as to where the responsibility for imposing these orders should start and stop, and that is anywhere between any child sexual offence and a sentence of four years.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for his comments about parental rights and responsibilities. I absolutely understand that. I am sure he also understands that, to the other parent, it often feels as though the convicted parent has more rights than their children. That is where the problems lie, and that is why there is such passion about this among those parents who are trying to make sure that their children are protected. I am also grateful to him for highlighting the data. It is important for us to remember that around 1,000 children might possibly be at risk if this goes wrong.
Just before I respond to the Minister, I want to thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. Yes, the court system is starved of resources. I want to go further than he does. It is not just about looking at resources; it is about a clear plan to increase resources and ensure that duplication and anything else does not happen. But we know the court system is under real pressure, and I say to the Minister that I recognise, in the amendment that I have table, that the last thing that we would want to do is to impose further burdens on an already difficult area.
I completely understand that the Government have to balance their competing restrictions. The problem is that those of us who have tabled amendments say that four years is not the safety net that the Minister alluded to; it is too high. I wondered whether there might be any way to provide guidance to the family court that asks it to look very clearly at any child sexual offence, even if it is not a four-year sentence, so that the Crown Court is not burdened with the responsibilities of looking at it in the way that the family court would.
My Lords, this has been a good and fairly brief debate. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. Our Benches have some concerns with the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Murray, for exactly the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, have mentioned. I think perhaps the best way of summing the debate up is to say that these Benches are completely in agreement with the common-sense speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. We are trying to resolve a problem that should not be resolved by legislation. It should not be in the Bill. This is about how two different courts work and about ensuring that the information flow works. The fact that we are laying amendments demonstrates that there are failures in the system. The Minister has the unfortunate role of trying to resolve that problem. We in this House cannot always legislate against the detail. However, I hope the Minister has heard the real concerns around this Committee.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start by repeating what I said in the debate about an earlier group. A prohibited steps order is not intended to be an additional punishment; rather, it is a tool devised to protect children. The aim of keeping the child safe and doing what is best for them is the central factor in every case. As I have already said, these powers are not intended to replicate, far less replace, the powers of the family court. Crown Court judges are simply not trained to make decisions about children, and they do not have the time to do so. The point has been made most powerfully by both the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. To ask the Crown Court to replicate the procedures of the family court could lead only to more time being needed to consider every case. As I have now said on at least three occasions today, the one thing the Crown Courts do not need is for cases to take longer.
Jade’s law was brought in specifically to prevent victims having to immediately go to the family courts. Why have things changed since that principle emerged in the Victims and Prisoners Act?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
As far as the Jade’s law situation is concerned, it remains the case that it will be dealt with automatically.
If the principle stands, why is that not also true when an offender has committed a sexual offence of a certain bar?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
We might be slightly at cross-purposes here. The question is whether the Crown Courts have the ability to consider what is in the best interests of the child rather than automatically making the order when the threshold is reached. That is the difference. As I say, the point has been made most powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. The Crown Court is simply not equipped to go that extra mile of starting to look at things like reports from experts as to what is in the best interests of the child.
I turn to Amendments 18, 20, 24, 30, 31 and 32 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. The aim of these is to ensure that a prohibited steps order made under Clauses 3 or 4 would cease to have an effect if the offender was acquitted on appeal. I repeat what I have said. This is not a punishment; it is designed to protect the child. The measures require that, following an acquittal, the relevant local authority must, in very short order, bring an application before the family court to consider whether the prohibited steps order should be upheld, varied or discharged. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, mentioned an innocent parent. This is not about the rights of parents; it is about the rights of children and protecting them. It is not a punishment and therefore it is not something that should be automatically swept away on acquittal.
We recognise the need for a quick resolution in these situations, which is why both clauses state that the application must be made by the local authority within 30 days of the acquittal. This process brings the consideration of the child’s best interests and their potentially very complex family dynamics to the correct forum, which is the family court. It will mean that in every case a judge will undertake a review of all the circumstances, including whether the original prohibited steps order has already been varied by the family court while the appeal was under consideration, or whether other related orders are in place, before deciding what should happen in the best interests of the child. The family court is the right place for this to happen because that puts the interests of the child front and centre, where they should be.
I turn to Amendments 17, 21, 23, 26 and 29 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Meston. I think we can all agree that it is vital to have clear processes for identifying the offender’s children, notifying other parental responsibility holders of a prohibited steps order, and making the victims of a rape aware when the court has made an automatic order, but the Government’s view is that primary legislation is not the best way of doing this. These matters are better suited to being addressed in guidance, where we can work closely with those responsible for delivering it to ensure that we have a process that works in practice. We do not want a system that ties practitioners to an approach that cannot evolve with their own processes and where every time we want to make a change we have to come back and amend the primary legislation.
By way of example, we are not using primary legislation to prescribe the processes as we are working to implement Jade’s law. Instead, work is taking place across government—I ran through some of the things that we are doing earlier in relation to the previous debate—and with partners to develop a process that is clear and practical and that delivers the spirit of the aims of the amendment. In the case of these provisions, we will ensure that all relevant parties, including all other parental responsibility holders, are kept informed at each stage. We will take lessons from Jade’s law when this is implemented and, where possible, work with our partners to apply the same processes here. This will allow for consistency across all legislation in this space, rather than multiple processes for the same aim, which could lead to confusion and inconsistency in application. I warmly invite your Lordships to work with the Government to make sure that we get this right. I am more than happy to meet any of your Lordships who would like to discuss those matters with me, both in my capacity as Lords Minister and as Minister responsible for family justice policy.
In relation to identifying the children of offenders, this Government have separately committed to developing a mechanism to identify children who are affected by parental imprisonment to make it easier to provide support to them. I can assure your Lordships that the Ministry of Justice is working closely with the Department for Education to determine how we can best identify all children affected and ensure that they get support to enable them to thrive, but to legislate only for children in the scope of this measure risks distracting from the broader work intended to support all children.
I am most grateful for the way this has been introduced by my noble friend Lord Russell. When the family discover that their relative has been murdered abroad, the problem, as has been said, is that they have no idea what has happened. Unless a service from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is rapidly responsive, there is a serious danger that evidence will not be maintained, that it will be destroyed or lost, and therefore that any processes to bring someone to justice will be seriously impaired. As written, the victims’ code seems to differentiate between victims murdered on home soil versus murders that could occur anywhere in the world. The added difficulty is that different countries around the world have different police services and processes, and the language or dialect in different areas may create difficulties.
There are two aspects to this: there is the part that occurs in this country, which is where the family may be contacting the FCDO. I was glad to see that the information on the website had been recently updated. It reads as if everything will happen smoothly but, unfortunately, that is a very rose-tinted view of reality. Some parts have not been updated for a few years. I wonder whether one of the problems lies out there with our own staff in all these different countries. They may never have experienced managing a death before, and suddenly they find they are dealing with an incredibly difficult situation with all kinds of blocks because of the politics of wherever they are.
In terms of linking between here and our staff around the world, it would seem important that there is always one designated person who has responsibility for all aspects of deaths or injuries that could occur in that country, and that this is their designation from day one of their placement in that country. They would know the different dialects, the different police systems, the different ways of maintaining evidence. This would require a fair degree of forensic training; it cannot just be written in guidelines or in a handbook. It means that people need to be prepared ahead of time in order to cope with the situation. It may well be that the families—who are completely devastated and find themselves in a terrifying and unknown situation—are at least talking to somebody with some competencies regarding that country and how its judicial systems work. Sadly, the judicial standards that we expect here are not applicable everywhere around the world. Police services are not always as well organised as ours are. It can be extremely difficult to get the right people in the right place at the right time.
It is also important that whoever has that function holds a certain degree of responsibility to make sure that evidence is not inadvertently lost and destroyed. Until you have learned about evidence that should be kept, you may not realise how important some things are: it is not only aspects of clothing and the body. It might be any of the person’s personal effects; it might involve taking photographs before anything is moved in any way. Our own staff need to be equipped with those skills. I hope from this debate that we might see a link between the Ministry of Justice, which is obviously central to the Bill, and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and the ability for them to ensure that staff have training wherever they are, including forensic understanding. This could include junior members of staff, as long as they are fully trained.
My Lords, I tabled Amendment 42 in this group to ensure that certain parts of the victims’ code apply to victims whose close relative was the victim of murder, manslaughter or infanticide outside the UK. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for supporting the amendment, and for going into some detail. I will endeavour not to repeat what they have said.
I am grateful for the meeting with the Minister last week, during which she mentioned the new guidance that has been recently updated. It is a good document, but it gives the victims no formal rights at all and relies on two different people—the FCDO case manager and the Homicide Service officer, provided by the charity Victim Support—to help them navigate the system. I am sure that this guidance will help improve the service from its previous iteration, but the experience of families who have a loved one killed abroad is that it can be inconsistent. Some victims also receive fragmented, delayed updates about their case, and they often have to chase information themselves, not just with Victim Support or the FCDO but within the country.
Support from the Homicide Service is currently discretionary. This can leave families without dedicated help after the trauma if there are no resources. Having it in the victims’ code will ensure certainty for victims in receiving a service, despite the many differences and difficulties of dealing with the complex arrangements abroad. It is also clear from the guidance that only a certain level of financial help is available to victims from Homicide Service caseworkers. Finally, despite what is written in the guidance, many families have to find and pay for translation services themselves, and there is a risk of inconsistency in service provision. Having it in the victims’ code would ensure that the onus is no longer placed on the victim to get documents translated. This would also give families parity of support with foreign nationals who are victims in the UK, or with UK nationals whose first language is not English.
Turning to the other amendments, we on these Benches support Amendment 37, on the extension of the victim contact scheme, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie. This will probably be no surprise to him, given that it was tabled by Jess Brown-Fuller MP, my honourable friend in the House of Commons. I did write to the noble and learned Lord after it was tabled, asking him to withdraw the amendment, as we on these Benches had decided that we wanted to re-table it here in the House of Lords, as per our convention. The PBO told us recently that they received no such request, but that does not diminish our support for it.
I also signed Amendments 47A and 47B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. The first seeks to ensure that victims of persistent anti-social behaviour have access to victim support services provided by local police and crime commissioners. These services are only available to victims as defined by the victims’ code of practice. Persistent anti-social behaviour is not just tiresome and irritating: it can have a traumatising psychological effect on victims. I am particularly reminded of the late Baroness Newlove talking about the local youths who made her and her family’s lives an absolute misery before they brutally murdered her husband. If the police cannot stop it, then surely victims should be able to get support locally. Amendment 47B proposes that each victim have a unique identifier, to be used with all the different agencies involved in their experience. Given the debate we have had today on many of the amendments, this identifier might well solve some of the problems alluded to about different parts of the system and different bodies not understanding or even knowing what was going on.
At the moment, the experience of sharing data between relevant agencies can be woeful, and this number would strengthen the system. It would mean risk assessments can work better, as well as monitoring compliance with the victims’ code and improving communication and collaboration across agencies.
I have also signed Amendments 55, 56 and 57 from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, which tackle the problem that the noble Lord, Lord Russell, referred to earlier, of how hospitals ensure that they balance the needs of the victim with those of a patient who has murdered a family member of the victim. At the moment, unfortunately, because of the code of ethics that medical practitioners are bound by, the balance is in the patient is their absolute priority, which can mean that victims of the most serious crimes cannot know where the offenders, the patients, are, or if there are any changes in the care that they might need to know about, which might include such things as short-term home release. This is much less than the information that is available when an offender is in prison, and the process for the victim to ask for information involves asking a victim liaison officer at the hospital, who will ask for the information from the clinicians. That is two Chinese walls between the victim and the person providing the information. Because, once behind hospital walls, there is no evidence that the medics balance or give due regard to the safety and well-being of victims, and this is very retraumatising for the victims.
I also wonder sometimes whether medical practitioners do not get to see all the relevant data about the actual act and the consequences for the victim. From these Benches, we support proposals that would ensure that the medical professionals must take a balanced approach when deciding whether to provide information to the victim and must write to the victim to explain when they have decided not to take that balanced view. There should also be an appeal mechanism. These amendments would ensure that right 11 of the victims’ code is delivered for victims, giving them the same right of requesting that information from prisons and from other bodies where a patient might be held.
Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington (CB)
My Lords, in general I support these amendments, particularly those put forward by my noble friend Lady Finlay. Having been in charge of some of these investigations over a long period of time, take it from me that they are very difficult, indeed nearly impossible, when the victim dies outside the jurisdiction. In a lot of cases, in the old days, talking to the DPP, some of us went out there personally to actually do the investigations. It was difficult in a way that is not necessary, and I think that what has been outlined by my noble friend is absolutely common sense. In the old days, if I might refer to them, things were a bit simpler: we dealt with the police, who were sometimes not quite up to our standards, and we tried to form some relationship. However, things have got more difficult in terms of the technical side of the law, so I make a kind of brief supplication, basically, as a practitioner over a long period of time: I really think that some of these amendments would have a massive effect on securing justice for victims, particularly in those places where we do not have any jurisdiction whatever.
I am grateful to the Minister for everything she said. Early on, she said that the problem is that the victims’ code is not always applicable abroad. Can she comment on proposed new subsection (2) in the amendment, which talks specifically about the Secretary of State by regulation issuing an appendix to the victims’ code, setting out how the code applies to these victims? It is understood, from our side, that it would be different.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this point. Our current position is that we do not believe that that is necessary, but I am happy to meet her and get her to try to persuade me why I am wrong and she is right—there is my challenge to the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Finlay.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
Again, the noble Baroness puts it very persuasively and, listening to her now, it all seems to make total sense. If, as a Government, we are committed to supporting victims of crime and putting them front and centre, that does not stop at our borders. However, I do not think that I can give an answer today and it would not be right to do so. I will commit to meeting the noble Baroness and seeing whether I can find out from the FCDO at least what its approach would be to such a suggestion. If she would put it in writing to me I could then pass it on so that we can try to take matters further.
Amendment 47A, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to add victims of persistent but non-criminal anti-social behaviour to the definition of a victim, as set out in Section 1 of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. The Government agree that anti-social behaviour is a blight on our communities and its impact should never be underestimated. We have committed to provide better support and information to victims of anti-social behaviour and have taken significant steps to do so. This includes the measures in this Bill that will strengthen the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers to hold the agencies that support anti-social behaviour victims to account.
Where anti-social behaviour amounts to criminal conduct, such as criminal damage, victims will benefit from the rights and entitlements within the victims’ code. However, expanding the definition of a victim to bring those affected by non-criminal anti-social behaviour within the code would, in our view, not be appropriate, as it is not an effective or efficient response to this kind of the behaviour. For example, in our view, it would be neither appropriate nor necessary for a victim of a neighbour who is playing loud music on one occasion to be brought within the scope of the victims’ code. Doing so could create unrealistic expectations and divert attention and resources from those experiencing serious criminal harm, such as victims of child sexual abuse.
In our view, there are better routes available to help these victims, including the anti-social behaviour case review, which gives the victims of persistent behaviour the right to request a multi-agency review to secure a resolution. In the proposals for the new victims’ code, on which we are currently consulting, we have clarified what victims of criminal anti-social behaviour can expect from the code and provided information about the case review process. I would welcome your Lordships’ responses to the consultation to outline in detail what further provision would be required for these victims.
On Amendment 47B, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, my noble friend Lord Bach and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I begin by acknowledging the problems brought by our current inability reliably to identify the same victim or witness across the criminal justice system. We accept that this results in duplication of records, slows the flow of information and leads to inconsistent data across the agencies. In addition, this fragmentation places a significant administrative burden on staff, who must reconcile records manually and then chase the missing information. However, perhaps most importantly, it means that victims and witnesses are sometimes provided with conflicting information, which can cause confusion at best and serious distress at worst.
The Government are already working to address these issues through the cross-criminal justice system data improvement programme, jointly led by the Ministry of Justice and Home Office. This programme aims to strengthen data sharing across the criminal justice system and is actively exploring how individuals, including victims, can be more reliably recognised across agencies. We are clear that improvements to data sharing must be underpinned by robust safeguards to ensure personal data is handled lawfully, securely and proportionately, with a strong focus on minimising unnecessary circulation of sensitive information, which I know is a key concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.
The Government are open to considering legislative options to improve data sharing, data quality and the use of unique identifiers where that is shown to be necessary and proportionate. However, introducing a statutory requirement at this stage, ahead of the completion of the work of the programme, could unintentionally constrain future design and implementation choices, before we are confident it would deliver the intended benefits for victims and the wider criminal justice system. For these reasons, the Government do not believe that primary legislation at this stage is the appropriate mechanism.
For well over a decade, since the passage of the Children and Families Act 2014, we have been discussing as a House a unique identifying number for children who may end up either in the health system or care system as well as schools. It has taken well over a decade—they are just about to use the NHS number as part of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill. I urge the Minister to have a look at this again; otherwise, we will be here for another 10 years, arguing the same point.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
This Government have not been in power over the whole of the last of the decade, and we are doing our best to look at it. I will certainly look at it and discuss it with her. We are simply saying that, at this stage, we do not think primary legislation is the right way of dealing with it.
Finally, I turn to Amendments 55, 56 and 57, in the names of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who is not in his place, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. Before I do, let me say that I recently had the privilege of meeting with Emma Webber and with Julian Hendy of Hundred Families. They explained very clearly to me the issues as they see them, and it was a very moving experience. I pay tribute to their strength and honour the memories of those they have lost. Their experiences, along with the experiences of all victims of crime, must continue to guide us.
Part of the rationale for providing information to victims is to help them to feel safe and so they can plan for an offender’s eventual release or discharge. That is why the legislation requires that hospital managers provide victims with specified information where appropriate, regardless of any assessment by a hospital manager of the victim’s safety and well-being, because we acknowledge that the hospital manager’s assessment could well be different from the victim’s own assessment.
Where hospital managers receive a request for information from an eligible victim outwith the specified list within the Bill, they will consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to provid it, and this assessment can of course include considering the risk to the victim. Where there are specific concerns about a victim’s safety, there are other, more appropriate processes to be followed. It is important to note that this is not the primary purpose of the victim contact scheme.
Where a decision is made that it is not appropriate to provide some information, reasons can and should be provided wherever possible. However, these should reflect the victim’s communication preferences, and considerations about this would, in our view, be most appropriately set out in operational guidance, which would also provide the necessary flexibility to adjust requirements as we monitor practice.
We agree that victims should have a route for some recourse where information is not provided. There are existing complaint routes for all cohorts, and the Government consider that a more effective way of going about this would be to make sure hospital managers understand and fulfil their obligations to victims at the outset, rather than introducing additional bureaucracy. My officials are working closely with the Department of Health and Social Care to consider routes by which to support hospital managers, including whether a joint departmental protocol, or via planned updates to the Mental Health Act code of practice—statutory guidance under the Mental Health Act 1983—might provide an appropriate vehicle.
In relation to all the amendments in this group and many of the others, we are listening and we want to get it right. We will continue to work with your Lordships and with victims’ groups, but for now I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
(6 days, 5 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I laid Amendment 38, which proposes a duty to commission support services for caregivers of victims of abuse and exploitation. I am grateful to Restitute for its briefing, not just for this Bill but over the years. Cath Pickles from Restitute and her colleagues do an amazing job working with the caregivers—mainly parents, but also siblings—of victims of very serious abuse who have to pick up the pieces after the abuse, witnessing lives lived in trauma. Of course, it is obvious that, over time, many of these caregivers are traumatised, too.
Cath said in an interview with the Daily Express that the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse had findings showing that non-offending parents, particularly mothers, of survivors can experience psychological effects similar to those of the victims. A recent independent report by the University of Suffolk showed that Restitute has built a model of support for victims’ families from literally nothing. However, despite the sea change across the country, Cath knows from her bitter personal experience of the guilt, shame, stigmatisation and isolation that the work that Restitute can do is far from enough and more is needed. That is why Amendment 38 is so important.
It is important to recognise that support does not confer victim status for sentencing, compensation or criminal proceedings, but it can last for the mother—as it is in most cases—who often has to accept a child back into her home who has been an adult elsewhere and has been raped or badly sexually assaulted and may not be able to work or live independently for a very long time. That will of course affect the very close family caregivers. The Child Sexual Abuse Centre is due to publish national guidance in April. It is thought that it will explicitly recognise that parents and carers should be treated as victims in their own right, reflecting the harm that they experience as a consequence of child sexual abuse and the criminal justice response.
The amendment would provide clarity and coherence. It recognises that parents and carers of child or vulnerable adult victims may require proportionate support, distinct from evidential witness support. It would not expand sentencing or compensation rights, or dilute the primacy of the direct victim. However, it would resolve a documented structural inconsistency and support safeguarding, justice outcomes and cost-effective early intervention. Is the Minister prepared to meet me and Cath Pickles to discuss these issues further?
Amendment 43, also in my name, seeks to strengthen victims’ rights to access to restorative justice services. I thank the Common Ground Justice Project and the Why Me? group for their briefing. Today, we have heard so many different speeches mentioning the ongoing trauma faced by victims of serious crime. Many find that moving on is very difficult and they feel unheard. Restorative justice provides an opportunity for them to have a dialogue with the person who harmed them. They have the chance to explain the impact of the crime, then and now, to ask questions to understand why it happened, and to then have a way to move forward, which is often positive not just for them but for the offender.
At a time when only one in 10 victims trusts the criminal justice system, restorative justice achieves 85% victim satisfaction, reduces reoffending by up to 27% and saves £14 for every £1 invested in it. Despite these incredible impacts, access to restorative justice is poor and, shockingly, 95% of victims are not even told about it. We know that restorative justice providers have the capacity to do more, but poor awareness and low numbers of referrals are depriving victims of the opportunity to have their say.
The MoJ mechanism for improving RJ, re:hub, needs radical improvement and putting on a proper footing. The amendment seeks a legal right for all victims of crime to be told about restorative justice at all stages of the criminal justice process and to be offered a referral if that is the right thing. My honourable friend Paul Kohler MP laid this amendment in the Commons, and we were pleased with the Commons Minister’s positive response. We have laid it here because we think that this is the perfect time and the perfect Bill for the Government to make this commitment and make the UK a world leader in restorative justice. Paul is passionate about restorative justice because he was seriously attacked in his home. He and his wife and daughter met one of the attackers and it transformed Paul and his family. It was not about forgiveness, though that can be a byproduct. What it can really do is give victims an understanding and the ability to move on. What is more, it can help the offender as well.
In these tough financial times, using RJ consistently throughout the system would create substantial savings on spending across all the different bodies involved, because of its ability to substantially reduce offending—by up to 27%, as research has shown. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank all the speakers in this debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for his support and curiosity on how the Minister would respond. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, for speaking so powerfully on the issue of navigators for victims of modern slavery as well.
I thank the Minister for her response, too. She will not be surprised to hear that I do not quite agree with everything that she said. On Amendment 38 and the support for caregivers, she said it was not necessary for this cohort because they can already access support. It is not necessarily clear to that particular cohort that it is available, because they present as trying to fight for the support for their child. That is part of the problem and, as a result, the personal trauma and damage that they live with is often quite repressed. One reason for the amendment was to find a mechanism where people actually say, “And how are you? What can we do to support you?”. I asked the Minister earlier if it would be possible to have a meeting. It would be good, perhaps, to assess this. It is also financial—perhaps the Chancellor of the Exchequer should hear—because often these parents give up work to look after their children. Their lifestyles change, so it is a very big deal, but I thank the Minister for what she said on that point.
I am glad the Government agree that restorative justice can work. I am sorry to be a bit of a pain, but we were clear in our Amendment 43, in subsection (3) of its proposed new clause, that
“a victim must at all times give informed consent, and participation in any restorative justice process shall be voluntary”.
That is the core, because it would not work if not. The Minister said that it might be a problem for victims of stalking, for example, because they might not want to do it, but that is easy, as they can say, “No, I’m not interested in meeting my stalker”—I personally never want to meet my stalker; absolutely no, sorry—but that crime is of a different nature and there are plenty of other crimes, particularly some of the slightly lower-level ones, where if it really reduces reoffending that much, the Government have to look at it. On that basis, I really hope that the Government will seriously look at expanding it beyond its very small nature at the moment, where it seems to be a few people who might be interested rather than recognising that it will transform the court system and the justice system overall. I beg to withdraw my amendment.
My brief observations draw on my experience of what happened about 20 years ago when the statements were being developed. For more serious cases, such as murder and manslaughter, there was an attempt to give the victim’s family an advocate. It had transpired that drafting these statements was not easy, and so this was trialled for a few years. It proved to be an extremely expensive way forward, and the scheme came to an end with the financial crisis of 2008.
That left us with the problem, in all these cases, of how you formulate what was then called a victim impact statement and is now called a personal statement? They are extraordinarily difficult to formulate. Those with experience of civil cases will know that, if you ask a witness to produce something in his own words, or you ask the claimant in a case to do the same, you get something you could never put before the court, because it would never really convey what had to be put forward. Therefore, the way in which progress was made was along the cautious lines of developing guidance. I think such guidance always needs to be kept under review. You need consultation with the Crown Court judges, who see this all the time. Clarity in the guidance is essential, but I greatly caution against allowing a victim to do more than explain to the court the way in which the crime has affected the victim, his family and the community. Going beyond that seems to raise all sorts of problems, and the last thing one wants to do is to revictimise a victim by saying, “You shouldn’t say that in court”. Clarity is essential, but I say, with respect to the noble and learned Lord, that his formulation goes too wide of the mark.
My Lords, I shall add a couple of very brief points. First, from my own experience, also nearly 20 years ago now when I was a victim of stalking, as were some of my colleagues, I found that the police encouraged me to make a victim statement, but we were advised quite specifically to talk not about what the stalker had done but solely about the effect on us of what he had done: in other words, to completely avoid making any comment about him or his actions. That was quite difficult. I was advised very heavily not to get involved and show how emotional many of us were as a result of his actions, and I chose not to do that at all.
However, I talked last week to Glenn Youens, the father of a four year-old who was killed. He and his family were asked if they wanted to do a victim impact statement, and the police advised them not to use certain language because the court had advised them not to. They were told that bluntness might upset the perpetrator, they could not call him a child killer; they were not allowed any props in court, such as their daughter’s teddy bear; and the CPS advised them not to appeal the unduly lenient sentence, because it might actually make the Attorney-General get less for him in the long run. So, this particular family’s experience of making a statement was the exact opposite of what it was intended to be. While I have some sympathy with some elements of the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, I think I am more with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, on the grounds that we would have to design it so carefully to make sure that a victim is doing it willingly and that they are able to say what they want without jeopardising the court process. I am afraid that that would also mean very strict guidance on the officials helping them not to do so in a way that prevents victims speaking in their own voice.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for talking about what happened to her, because in your Lordships’ House, that kind of personal experience really resonates with all of us. I thank her for that. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for speaking from his experience in the courts. He speaks with a great deal of authority and I know the House has vast respect for him.
Let me start with that with which we all agree: of course I recognise that victim personal statements are a powerful tool for victims and their families to tell the court about the effect that these crimes have had on them. The victim personal statement is also important for the judge when deciding the appropriate sentence. The VPS provides evidence and information which can help the judge in determining the seriousness of the offence as part of the sentencing process, and plainly it is right that victims should have a voice in that. However, it is also right that this must be done fairly. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, that there are limits to what can be said in the VPS, as we cannot have legally irrelevant matters—for example, other behaviour of which the defendant has not been convicted. The judge is not by law allowed to take account of such things.
That said, I too have heard from victims and their families about their concerns about how the VPS process operates in practice. I completely understand how frustrating it must be to be told that they cannot express themselves in the way in which they expected to be able to, or to include all the information which they feel the judge ought to have. We agree that further work is needed to consider how we can make sure that victims fully understand the process, including the value of being able to have their voice heard in the sentencing process, but also an explanation as to why there have to be limitations on this.
My Lords, this is not the first time I have argued that this jurisdiction does not do enough to ensure that domestic—but more importantly, overseas—victims of economic crime committed by people or organisations based here are adequately compensated for their losses.
If the last Government and the present one have been less than enthusiastic about my proposals, I have received support from, among others, Sam Tate, a partner of the London law firm, Clyde & Co, other legal practitioners who have read my speeches and articles on this subject over the years, and from Sam Hickey, a lawyer qualified in Australia and the United States, in his paper entitled Compensating the Victims of Foreign Bribery: UK Legislation, Practice and Recommended Reforms, published in February 2025 by the International Centre for Asset Recovery, which is part of the Basel Institute on Governance, at Basel University in Switzerland.
Having been the initiator politically of the deferred prosecution agreement—DPA—system in this jurisdiction, and as a vocal advocate for the extension of the failure to prevent economic crime regime, and, I should make clear, also as a barrister whose practice includes economic crime cases, I have taken a long-term interest in this aspect of our justice system. It is, regrettably, my experience from the time I was reappointed as the shadow Attorney-General in 2009, then as Solicitor-General during the early part of the coalition Government in 2010, followed by what is now 14 years on the government and opposition Back Benches, both here and in the other place, that all three parties of government—the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party—have acknowledged with warm words the problems my amendment outlines but have not done enough to make the necessary practical changes.
I do not say that the United Kingdom has done nothing, and there is a reasonable case to suggest that we have been at the forefront of efforts to get a grip on foreign corruption. Several of the DPA cases concluded here have involved admitted allegations of failure to prevent bribery overseas, leading to the imposition of serious financial penalties. But when it comes to compensating the overseas victims of these offences, we have fallen short. It is not right that Crown Court judges—and it will usually be High Court or senior Crown Court judges well able to make the necessary assessments with the right evidence who will be dealing with these cases—should feel inhibited by existing statute law and practice from assessing and awarding compensation to the victims I had in mind because the assessment is or may be thought to be complicated. These judges deal with complex points of law and evidence every day, and victims should not be required to take out separate civil proceedings that are expensive in terms of cost and time in order to get justice.
As I said in your Lordships’ House on 7 February 2024, since the introduction of DPAs in 2014, the courts had by then fined corporations more than £1.5 billion for violations of the Bribery Act, yet only 1.4% of that sum had been given to the citizens of victim countries of the indicted corruption. We are therefore open to charges of hypocrisy, because the United Kingdom has been essentially acting as the world’s policeman while keeping the fines for the Treasury.
Sam Hickey in his paper makes six recommendations on how we can improve our performance as providers of just and appropriate compensation to the victims of overseas corruption. Having overburdened the House only last Thursday evening with my thoughts on the need to reform the criminal law of joint enterprise, I will not go into such depth or detail in arguing for my amendment today. But I recommend that the Minister just takes a few minutes to read Mr Hickey’s paper and the basis for his recommendations, even though he kindly makes several references to things I have already said in your Lordships’ House. If the Minister is really short of sleep, I invite her to read my speeches and published articles on the subject—but in any event, Mr Hickey’s paper should be part of the review I am asking for via Amendment 40.
In essence, Mr Hickey and I, both jointly and severally, urge upon the Government—and I have said as much myself several times in this House and in the articles I have written—that we should no longer simply rely on legal principles relating to compensation orders in favour of identifiable human victims in this jurisdiction when deciding whether to include compensation in the terms of a DPA or when sentencing a corporate defendant following a conviction or plea of guilty by the Crown Court. There should be a rebuttable presumption in favour of including compensation in such agreements or following conviction. Where compensation is included in the terms of a DPA, it should be tailored to the facts of each case.
More specifically, the Serious Fraud Office, as the usual prosecutor in cases of this sort, should actively apply for compensation to be awarded to discrete victims who have suffered quantifiable losses. In the case of Glencore, the SFO did not, despite my prompting when I was acting for the Government of Nigeria, seek to apply for compensation. There were legislative problems that prevented the court dealing with it, but at least the judge had the decency to hear my argument before saying, “Thanks, but no thanks”. However, it does seem to me that there should be a preference for compensation to be put toward the benefit of victim communities or societies in the foreign state through, for example, infrastructure projects such as schools or medical facilities, or towards the reduction of national debt. If none of those is possible, compensation moneys should be put towards the anti-corruption initiatives of governments, NGOs or international organisations—as I have suggested in the past, a United Nations ESCO account might be a suitable destination—as a final resort to ensure that some measure of compensation is paid in every case.
In any event, we should legislate for a rebuttable presumption in favour of real compensation. We should, as I have suggested before, consider a variety of methods for calculating the amount of compensation, including a victim’s losses, the value of the bribe, a percentage of the fines and penalties, or the gross profit of the briber. If there are no discrete victims with quantifiable losses, we should look to whichever measure of compensation is the greatest.
We should devise a formal procedure that victims, states and NGOs could use to request compensation. We need to clarify the concepts underlying compensatory practices, including the kinds of remedies available, the harm that might lead to compensation and the victims who might receive it. We also need, as I have said on several occasions before, to incentivise corporations to pay compensation by, for example, subtracting the compensation from the penalty. I accept that it could be said of my argument that repetition never made a bad point better. But I gently suggest that successive government failures to listen to a reasonable argument, year after year, is not evidence of its successful refutation but of a wilful or negligent refusal to see what is in front of them: that is to say, injustice piled on injustice, and corrupt companies being given license to bribe with impunity and to act without concern for their victims because it is happening out of sight and overseas. Amendment 40 is, if I may say so, a moderate amendment in its ambitions—perhaps too moderate—but it is certainly worthy of the Government’s consideration, and I urge them to do so. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 46 in this group. In the Commons, it was tabled by Sarah Champion MP, who has long argued for supporting victims effectively and has a particular interest in the function of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. The amendment asks the Secretary of State to amend the criminal injuries compensation scheme to widen eligibility for compensation to all victims of child sex abuse, including online-facilitated sexual abuse, to ensure applicants with unspent convictions are not automatically excluded where offences are linked to the circumstances of their sexual abuse, and to increase the time limit for applications for compensation from victims of child sexual abuse to seven years. I will not give any more detail of that.
The reason for this is that, until the 2012 scheme, a crime was generally considered violent if it involved physical injury, the threat of immediate violence or a non-consensual sexual assault. Those were the ones the compensation scheme could look at. In practice, this means that many cases of online child sexual abuse are excluded, even where the abuse involves sustained coercion, blackmail or domination and the child experiences profound and lasting harm.
We know that victims often face significant barriers in accessing compensation for this reason. There is a problem with the strict time limits that the CICA imposes, because that means that many traumatised victims, who may be navigating complex criminal justice processes and/or are unaware of their eligibility, often struggle to apply in time. The independent inquiry into child sexual abuse report on accountability and reparations recommended extending the time limit for child sexual abuse cases and giving claims officers greater discretion, but these proposals were sadly rejected by the previous Government.
My Lords, from these Benches, the Liberal Democrats have been concerned for a long time about the victim’s right to access court transcripts. We have tabled amendments to a number of Bills, including, most recently, the now Victim and Prisoners Act 2024, and I have Amendment 41 to this Bill. I thank open justice campaigners for the contact that we have had with them during the Victims and Prisoners Act and since then.
During the Victims and Prisoners Bill, the then Minister finally agreed to a trial in certain locations that would ensure that victims could have access to sentencing remarks but to nothing else. Ministers of both this and the last Government have said that it would just cost too much to extend the scheme but, as we have said, the process that is used is extraordinarily expensive, and technology should be our friend these days. To give the Committee a feel of some of the figures that we have been made aware of, we have seen people quoted £30 for a copy of sentencing remarks to over £300 for an original transcript, and where victims requested a transcript of the entire court case we have seen figures of £7,500 and even £22,000.
Victims and their families are in principle able to access remarks at no cost. I am not just talking about since the pilot; I am talking about some of the other things, and I will come on to the detail later on. They can sometimes get access at no cost, but the problem is that the paperwork that some courts have required families to fill out is burdensome and intrusive, requiring families to declare salaries, debts, bank balances and more. That really should not be the case when they are getting to the end of a trial, with all the burdens that that has brought them.
Amendment 41 would go beyond sentencing remarks but not as far as our amendments to the Victims and Prisoners Bill. It would include transcripts of judicial summings-up, bail decisions and conditions that are relevant to their case. It would also set a time limit for the Secretary of State to ensure that the transcripts were provided within 14 days.
We thank the Government for confirming that access to the judge’s sentencing remarks is being rolled out across the country, but we remain concerned that some victims need access to more. This is because for far too long, as we discussed in an earlier group, victims have been advised by the police and prosecutors either not to attend a trial or to frame their own remarks carefully.
I have three brief quotes on that. The first is:
“I wanted to go and watch the trial after I had given my evidence but was told by the prosecution barrister that it would not look good with the jury. The police said the same. I didn’t really question it. I was so scared to do anything that *might* have a detrimental effect on the outcome”.
Another victim said:
“We were advised not to attend because it may make us look bitter”.
And another said:
“I was told I couldn’t watch the court case after giving evidence as I’d look like I wasn’t scared of the perpetrator and it could harm the jury’s decision”.
Open justice campaigners say:
“This advice from professionals is in direct contrast to Judges we meet, who very much want the victims to attend hearings”.
So there is a gap there.
The reason why we propose including judicial summings-up and bail decisions is that there is often more detail in things like bail decisions and conditions that affect the victim directly. I have recently been involved in advising a family where there was a bail condition that required the alleged perpetrator not to go within two miles of the victim. That was changed without the victim’s knowledge, and suddenly she found the perpetrator nearby and could not understand why. A victim in that sort of instance should be able to ask for the details of those. It was clear that she was completely unaware that the bail conditions had been changed after the perpetrator’s solicitor had asked for a hearing. For judicial summing up, there is often more detail in there that can help the victim to come to terms with the entire process. That is one reason why we are pushing for that.
We would still like occasionally for some victims in really traumatic cases, particularly where a therapist advises this—this is not in the amendment, and there is a reason for that—to be able to access the entire court transcript, but we recognise that that is unlikely until technology can provide it at virtually no cost to the court. I think we are nearly there, but at the moment the structure of the way in which people can apply for help and the way that transcripts are made is overly expensive, given the world that we are living in in 2026. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendment 41, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and Amendment 73 in my name. Both these amendments are designed to strengthen victims’ engagement with the justice system by enhancing access to, and the availability of, transcripts of important court decisions.
We give full and unequivocal support to Amendment 41. This is a broader right than the one we were able to secure during the passage of the Sentencing Bill, where our amendments sought to ensure victims’ access to transcripts of sentencing remarks. Initially, that amendment was opposed by the Government, who argued that embedding a statutory duty for universal access and universal publication would create significant operational and resource pressures and risk increasing judicial workload.
The importance of these amendments has been further underscored by the report—released, I believe, today—that the Ministry of Justice has instructed the deletion of a substantial archive of court records held by Courtsdesk: data analysis that supports journalists and civil society in scrutinising the justice system. That archive has long been relied on to track sentencing outcomes and judicial decisions. Its removal has understandably raised concerns about the future accessibility of court information and the practical operation of open justice.
In that context, the case for clear, structured and victim-centred access to sentencing information becomes even more compelling. If independent archives and informal routes to transparency are diminishing, it is all the more important that Parliament ensures that formal mechanisms exist to guarantee access to core judicial material, particularly for victims whose lives are directly affected by these decisions.
In previous debates, Ministers made it clear that they supported the principle of transparency and of victim access to sentencing remarks. Sentencing remarks can already be published in high-profile cases but the Government maintained that expanding those limited provisions into a broad statutory requirement, as initially tabled, was not necessary to achieve the objective of openness and could impose burdens that the current system was not equipped to bear. We therefore tabled a more diluted version of our amendment to extend free provision of Crown Court sentencing transcripts to victims who request them.
The importance of this measure cannot, in my view, be overstated. Sentencing remarks explain the judge’s reasoning as well as the factors taken into account when outlining legal judgment behind a sentence. For victims and their families, this explanation is essential to understanding why justice has been administered in the way it has and becomes particularly important in the context of, for example, unduly lenient sentence appeals.
Amendment 73 complements the amendment passed in the Sentencing Bill, now the Sentencing Act, by addressing the publication of sentencing remarks online. It would require that, when a request is made for sentencing remarks delivered in the Crown Court, those remarks are made available publicly online within 14 days, subject to an important safeguard. The court must first inform the applicant of their right to request that the remarks not be published and, if such a request is made, the remarks must not be published.
This opt-out mechanism is a proportionate and indeed pragmatic response to government concerns that prevented broad publication being adopted previously. Ministers explained that, while they supported the principle of transparency, they could not accept a universal statutory obligation to publish all sentencing remarks, citing the risk of significant workload increases and resource pressures on an already stretched judiciary and courts system. By allowing individuals to choose not to have their own remarks published, this amendment preserves transparency for the public while safeguarding privacy and individual choice and reducing operational risk.
We stand in favour of open justice: the principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. When victims and the wider public can access the reasoning behind sentencing decisions, confidence in the rule of law and in the integrity of judicial decision-making is strengthened. A criminal justice system that is opaque risks undermining the very legitimacy that it seeks to uphold. If victims cannot see the reasoning behind the rulings that affect their lives, they and the public will struggle to have confidence that justice has actually been done. When sentences are handed down with discretion and complexity, the need for transparency is greater, not less. For these reasons, we support Amendment 41 and look forward to the Minister’s response to Amendment 73.
The problem is that the witness care unit does not always provide that information.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
That is what needs to be looked at, then. Providing transcripts is not going to solve anything that would not be solved by making sure that the witness care unit does what it is meant to do. The noble Baroness gave the example of the victim who had not been told that the bail conditions had been amended. That simply should not happen. That is not a transcript issue, though; it is a witness care unit issue. It is something that plainly needs looking at, though, if it is a problem.
In addition, the vast majority of bail decisions are dealt with at magistrates’ courts, where proceedings are not currently recorded and cannot therefore be transcribed. Without that recording ability in place, it would not be operationally feasible to create a statutory entitlement of the kind proposed. We cannot extend an entitlement that the system is not yet equipped to deliver. As the noble Baroness will know, one of the proposals the Government seem likely to accept from Sir Brian Leveson’s review of the criminal courts is that all proceedings in the magistrates’ courts should be recorded, and that it will become a court of record. At that point the situation may change, but at the moment we simply cannot provide transcripts of bail decisions in the magistrates’ court.
In the Government’s view, a transcript of the summing-up is unlikely, in most cases, to add significant value for many victims. The summing-up consists of two parts: there is a set of directions on the law, which are written out and handed to the jury, and these could be given to the victim without any difficulty at all if it would help them. Most victims are not especially interested in what is said about the application of the law. The only other thing it contains is a summary of the evidence, wherein the judge decides the level of detail to include, what to put in and what to leave out. The important thing to note is that the summary has to be even-handed, and the judge is not meant to make any comment one way or the other, so the summing-up is not going to help the victim to understand how or why the jury reached its verdict. As these remarks are not an explanation of the outcome, victims may well feel that the summing-up bears little resemblance to their lived experience of the case. So there is a real danger of the summing-up being misunderstood and, in some instances, causing further distress, rather than providing clarity or closure.
For these reasons, we do not propose to extend free provision to include summings-up in cases where the defendants are acquitted. Expanding access further would also create significant operational and funding pressures. Providing transcripts of bail decisions and summings-up free of charge would require a substantial increase in resources, diverting key and limited resources away from core court functions. Importantly, it would take resources away from implementing our existing commitment to provide free sentencing remarks to all victims who request them.
I have heard what the noble Baroness said to me and to the Committee about victims being discouraged from attending the rest of the trial on many occasions. It should not happen. When I was a judge, I used to say to the victim, once they had completed their evidence, “Would you like to observe the rest of the trial? I can have arrangements made for you to do so; we encourage you to do so, and that includes attending remotely where you can’t be seen but you will be able to see and hear, and we can have those arrangements made”. It ought to happen all the time. If it does not, again, that is something that we should look at.
I turn to Amendment 73 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. While the Government remain firmly committed to improving transparency across the justice system, this has to be balanced carefully against our capacity to deliver existing priorities and commitments. Imposing a blanket obligation to publish all sentencing remarks where they have been requested would create significant operational and financial pressures at a time when we are focused on rolling out free access to Crown Court sentencing remarks for all victims, a major step towards increased transparency in its own right. The level of anonymisation required to protect victims’ identities in a published transcript is very different from the level required in a transcript provided to the victim themselves. It is not just a question of redacting the name; it is also a question of removing any other details which might permit a jigsaw identification of the victim. That anonymisation cannot yet reliably be carried out using AI; it has to be done manually and it would have to be done by a judge, taking them away from other duties and inevitably adding to the backlog.
Furthermore, this amendment as drafted places no constraints on who may request a transcript. It could be the offender; it could be their family; it could be a journalist or simply a curious member of the public. A situation where the victim does not have an opportunity to object to sentencing remarks containing intimate details of their case being published online, but another requester does, is not a proposal that this Government can support, and it is likely to contravene the victim’s Article 8 rights.
I reassure noble Lords that the Government’s commitment to openness and transparency is ongoing. In cases of high public interest, sentencing remarks are already made publicly available online. Furthermore, broadcasting of sentencing remarks is possible, with the agreement of the judge, providing an additional route through which the public may access this information. We are also actively exploring the opportunities offered by AI to reduce the cost of producing transcripts in the future. I therefore invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment and the noble and learned Lord not to press his.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, particularly my noble friend Lady Hamwee for giving details of the ridiculous form that victims have been asked to fill in to access sentencing remarks for free. I hope the noble Baroness will look at that and make sure that it does not continue in this format. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for his amendment and I very much appreciate what the Minister said, but I think we are looking for transparency in the longer term. I remain concerned, as is the noble and learned Lord, about the closure or erasure of information from Courtsdesk. I hope we might be able to discuss that in another forum, because it is extremely concerning that it seems to be happening very quickly and suddenly— I am sorry for that quick diversion, given the hour.
I thank the Minister for her explanation. I am not surprised that she has raised the issue of costs. I appreciate the issue about magistrates’ courts, and I really hope that Sir Brian Leveson manages to resolve that in his report in a way that will make it work. Judicial summings-up are important. When we meet on Wednesday, we will be looking at unduly lenient sentences, and judicial summings-up are very helpful to victims if they are considering making an application to the Attorney-General—they have quite a lot of information in them. Victims may not understand it, but if they are going that far, they are likely to consult a solicitor or somebody else involved, and it is quite likely to be helpful.
I think the issue about bail conditions is important, barring the example I gave, which may not have been quite correct. Again, it is useful for victims to see in writing, when something has been gabbled off, exactly what all the conditions are. This is particularly important in domestic abuse and stalking cases, where there may be a perpetrator who is particularly following people and there may have been some form of abuse. However, I am very aware of the hour, and I hope we can continue discussions with the noble Baroness outside your Lordships’ Committee, so I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have signed my noble friend Lord Marks’s Amendment 420 and thank him for his excellent explanation. I am also reminded that our noble friend Lord Dholakia has campaigned for decades for a review of the way in which society deals with children in the criminal justice system. His principal concern, and the subject of a number of Private Members’ Bills, was on increasing the age of criminal responsibility, and we will address that specific issue in the next couple of Committee days. He also expressed some concerns about the treatment that children and young people who had entered the criminal justice system would face later on.
Reference has been made to David Lammy’s review. I also remind the Committee about Iain Duncan Smith’s report for the Centre for Social Justice in 2012, in which he said:
“There is now a significant body of research evidence indicating that early adolescence (under 13-14 years of age) is a period of marked neurodevelopmental immaturity, during which children’s capacity is not equivalent to that of an older adolescent or adult. Such findings cast doubt on the culpability and competency of early adolescents to participate in the criminal process and this raises the question of whether the current MACR”—
minimum age of criminal responsibility—“at ten, is appropriate”. I think that also reflects on cautions and convictions for that age group, although I recognise that my noble friend’s amendment goes right up to the end of childhood.
All the amendments in front of us look at how convictions and cautions are handled and how they are disclosed. Mention has already been made of the organisation FairChecks. It has called for a major review of the criminal records disclosure system. Interestingly, it produced the same evidence as Iain Duncan Smith about the capacity of people of this age to understand and take responsibility for their actions. As has already been mentioned, young people hoping to move on suddenly discover that in trying to get work or a promotion they have to disclose their criminal records, and too often, on top of the almost inevitable rejection letters, their shame emerges once again, destroying their chance of creating a new life once they have served their time.
FairChecks proposes that there should be an automatic disclosure of a caution in criminal records, the slate should be wiped clean for childhood offences and we should stop forcing people to reveal short and suspended prison sentences for ever. But, it says—as has every other speaker so far today—safeguards must remain in place for more serious offenders in order to protect the public. At the same time, it would give individuals the chance to move beyond their childhood criminal record so they could get work and forge a new life as an adult, and the first steps towards that would be a review. I hope the Minister will look favourably on Amendment 420.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to move Amendment 420A. Although it is in my name, it is a product of tireless campaigning from my honourable friend Helen Grant MP. I thank her for her long-standing commitment to this issue. It is thanks to her unwavering commitment that we are one step closer to making a child cruelty register a reality.
I thank the Government for their ongoing communication with us on this important topic and their assurances that they would like to implement a policy that supports a child cruelty register. When this amendment was tabled during the passage of the Sentencing Bill in your Lordships’ House, government officials requested that it be reserved for Home Office legislation, rather than that of the Ministry of Justice. That is why I am moving this amendment today.
This proposed register would be very similar in kind to the register for convicted child sex offenders, for whom notification requirements already exist. It would ensure that those convicted of cruelty to vulnerable children must notify the police of their home address and other relevant details following their release from prison. The register would act as a safeguard by providing the police with the oversight needed to manage offenders and reduce the risk to children. It would mean that those who commit cruelty to children in a non-sexual manner cannot simply disappear back into the community.
These provisions already exist for sex offenders, and we see no reason why they should not similarly pertain to those convicted of child cruelty. Although the offence is different, its effects are detrimentally serious in nature. Child cruelty is a heinous crime that can have a lifelong impact on victims and affects the most vulnerable individuals in society.
Common sense requires that those who commit crimes such as allowing the death of a child, neglect of a child, violence towards a child, infanticide or female genital mutilation should not be able to slip under the radar in local communities once their custodial sentence is spent. There should be a centralised mechanism for the police to know where these people live. This is particularly so given that, in the vast majority of child cruelty cases, the offender has parental responsibility for the victim. They are therefore likely to have connections to the child’s guardian, who, in many cases, will be a family member.
There is a clear gap in the child protection systems that unnecessarily endangers children. The child protection system must exist to free children from the conditions of cruelty towards them, but it must also contain preventive measures to ensure that children are not placed in such appalling situations. Child cruelty offences have doubled in the past few years; now more than ever, it is important to act swiftly to curb this rise. Given the Government’s previously stated support for this measure, I hope that the Minister will be equally able to offer her support today.
My Lords, my colleagues in the Commons very much supported Helen Grant in her campaign for this amendment. I pay particular tribute to Jess Brown-Fuller MP. It is very helpful that it has been directed to this Bill, and we on these Benches are very pleased that the Opposition have laid the amendment to this Bill.
It is getting late, and I will not speak for very long. The only other people we need to credit are Tony Hudgell and his parents. After being taken away from his birth parents, he has lived for many years with his foster parents, who he describes as his parents. He has endured 23 operations after injuries that resulted in him losing both legs when he was a toddler. That is the sort of cruelty—although unusually bad in this case—that the amendment is intended to address. For all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, outlined, we absolutely support the progress of this amendment, and we hope that the Government will look favourably on it.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, notification requirements received attention during the passage of the Government’s Sentencing Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for ensuring this important matter remains firmly on our agenda. I join the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in paying tribute to Helen Grant MP and to Paula Hudgell, both of whose tireless campaigning has done so much to advance the protection of children. As my noble friend Lord Timpson set out in Committee on the Sentencing Bill, this Government are committed to safeguarding children and ensuring robust measures are in place to protect them from those who seek to cause them harm. We are working hard to consider the best way to manage such offenders effectively.
We are unable to support the amendment at present, as further work is needed to determine the most effective way to strengthen offender management. We need to consider fully all aspects of implementation when it comes to adding notification requirements to a new cohort of offenders, particularly in light of the Government’s recently published violence against women and girls strategy, which sets out significant reforms to offender management.
It is right that we take the time to understand the potential impact of these proposals. One of the issues is that adding notification requirements to a new cohort of offenders would involve significant costs for policing. For example, notification duties such as taking biometric data, verifying personal details, recording changes, conducting compliance visits and managing ViSOR data must all be absorbed into the general workload of the police. One of the tasks for the Government is to reflect that this could mean shifting resource from other important areas of police work.
I can reassure noble Lords, however, that since December, Home Office and Justice Ministers have met regularly to discuss options in this space and have held initial discussions with national policing representatives. So, I can add my reassurances to those already given by my noble friend Lord Timpson: Ministers will continue to pursue this issue with vigour. With these reassurances, I hope that at this stage the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
(1 month, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for her clear introduction to the Bill this afternoon. The Liberal Democrats broadly welcome the principles behind the Victims and Courts Bill: strengthening support for victims, strengthening the powers of the Victims’ Commissioner and improving the court system. The current system is not just under severe stress; it is close to collapse. There are important changes that we believe need to be made for the courts service to be fit for purpose in this current era.
Because we do have some concerns and proposals to improve the Bill, some echoing amendments to it were laid by our Liberal Democrat colleagues in the Commons. I suspect that we will be discussing in minute detail the technicalities of improving systems for victims, as we did with the Crime and Policing Bill, the Sentencing Bill—currently going through your Lordships’ House—and the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. That Act was saved in the wash-up in the run-up to the 2024 general election, but most of it was not commenced, other than the infected blood compensation arrangements. I wondered whether this was the legislation the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, was referring to, and I apologise if I have that wrong. But it was saved, and I have a question for the Minister, which I will come to in a minute.
We do not often hear enough about what victims, survivors or complainants—however they may choose to describe themselves—face, and how long it takes to recover. That is why I am so grateful that the many victims, NGOs and charities keep their voices in front of us.
The definition of a victim in Section 1 of the Victims and Prisoners Act is someone who suffers
“harm as a direct result of … being subjected to criminal conduct, or … one or more of the circumstances mentioned”
in a subsection. The key thing for me is exactly what “harm” entails. In the Act,
“‘harm’ includes physical, mental or emotional harm and economic loss”,
and
“‘criminal conduct’ means conduct which constitutes an offence”.
That is a good definition, a helpful starting point and a reminder to us that victims will have suffered physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss, or been the victims of criminal conduct. Neither this nor the previous Government have commenced this section of the Victims and Prisoners Act, which remains disappointing. Do the Government intend to bring in this section of that Act?
In Section 1(4)(a) of the Victims and Prisoners Act, the clinical description of harm covers a wide range of experience. For example, harm can lie dormant in victims for many years, as with children sexually abused when young. We know it can take decades before they face up to what has happened, and that period, however long it is, can be mental agony, as well as physically distressing. Adults abused as children often say that their life remains irreparably changed by the experience. For some victims, the chance to see their perpetrator in the dock, and convicted, can be cathartic; but, for too many, the mental and physical anguish of this type of severe crime on and to a person just means that that experience continues to live on long after the court hearing.
We on these Benches’ starting point is that we have long called for more support for victims and survivors of crime. This Government are saying many of the right things and tomorrow, or on Thursday, we will see the strategy for VAWG, which is much welcomed and will be a key pillar in that support.
However, over the course of the last 18 months, we have seen that many good and worthy principles have not been followed through with priority or, worse, that there has been a lack of money to deliver the change that is actually needed. So I ask the Minister, will the Government guarantee to deliver the resources in order to make the ideas and words in the Bill and in the VAWG strategy, when it comes, happen?
Above all, there must be strategic and consistent planning and funding of the victim support service, for, without that, the service will not have victims at the heart of it, and it is likely that it will remain inconsistent across the country.
We welcome the strengthening of the Victims’ Commissioner role and the restriction of parental responsibility in certain heinous cases.
The areas of the Bill that we have particular concern with include an extension to the victim contact scheme to include victims of offenders sentenced to less than 12 months for violent and sexual offences; victims of coercive or controlling behaviour, stalking or harassment; and bereaved families in cases of manslaughter or death by dangerous driving. Access to free court transcripts for victims of criminal offences is increasingly important. This is broader than the original pilot and early proposals, but we believe it would be the right thing to introduce.
Other areas of concern include the provision of support for victims of online and technology-enabled crimes and the application of the victims’ code in respect of victims of murder, manslaughter or infanticide abroad. We have laid amendments on this subject in the past. The families of those killed deserve access to the same victim support back home in the UK as those whose family members were killed in the UK.
The Liberal Democrats have long sought to get restorative justice implemented broadly across the criminal justice system. When delivered with care and willingness on both the victim’s and the offender’s side, it can make a real difference to both parties. We laid amendments in the Commons on a victim’s right to referral and a duty to report on the use of restorative justice services, and we want to continue to make progress on this.
The government proposal to increase the period in which the Attorney-General may receive a request to challenge an unduly lenient sentence to 28 days, and the extra 14 days if submitted in the second half of the 28-day period, in our view remains too short. We supported the Official Opposition in some of their amendments in the Commons. Critically, it is unworkable unless a victim is notified when a sentence has been given, because the window to apply to the Attorney-General is too tight. I note, with regret, that the Minister said that the ULS was not an appeal mechanism for a victim. But many victims, on the rare occasion it might be used, should have access to it. One reason for that is that, too often, victims are encouraged by the CPS and the police not to be present at the end of a trial of the perpetrator, and they often miss the sentencing. Shockingly, too many are not even told about the unduly lenient sentencing arrangements and, within a very short number of days, cannot even submit a request to the Attorney-General. I have been laying amendments and proposing changes to the ULS scheme for some years now. We will continue to do so in your Lordships’ House on the Bill.
While the court proposals are in the main sensible, we remain concerned that there are very limited proposals to tackle the courts backlog. The announcements by David Lammy MP in relation to reducing the number of cases in front a jury has not helped. This Monday, 60 courts sat empty because of a lack of judges, barristers or other experts needed for court hearings.
There is little empirical evidence, proof or pilot, that shows that reducing juries alone will ease pressure on the courts system. The real problems are the poor buildings, court closures and legal aid cuts that penalise barristers and solicitors. A long-term commitment for investment is needed, with both restored funding to legal aid and capital investment in the courts of the future.
These are some of the key issues that need to be addressed in the Bill, but they are set in the context of giving a broad welcome to most of the Bill, while wanting to strengthen it.
(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have an amendment in this group. I repeat a declaration of interest I made at Second Reading: that I have appeared as a barrister in a number of the leading cases about limitation of the law of tort. The purpose of limitation periods is to give a claimant a fair chance to decide whether to bring a claim, but also to place some sort of time limit on claims. Limitation periods vary according to the cause of action—for example, defamation claims have to be brought within one year. Personal injury claims have always been in a special category. The normal limit is three years or, in the case of a young person, three years after attaining the age of majority. But because some personal injuries manifest themselves only some time after they have been caused, particularly those relating to disease claims, the law has responded by postponing the starting date to reflect something called the “date of knowledge”.
What constituted knowledge was difficult to encapsulate in statute and gave rise to a lot of litigation, particularly in the context of what are generally known as historic claims for child sexual abuse. But these difficulties were largely overcome by Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, which gave the court a complete discretion to disapply the limitation period. Although the section gave various sensible guidelines as to matters to be taken into consideration, the discretion was expressed to be entirely unfettered.
One difficulty of the law remained. In claims for deliberate acts of assault, there was a finite six-year limitation period, rather than a three-year extendable limit for claims in negligence, so some claimants did not have the advantage of Section 33. This problem was overcome by the decision of A v Hoare in 2008— I was one of the unsuccessful defendants in that case—when the House of Lords decided that, whether the claim was in negligence or in assault, there was still a discretion to disapply the limitation period.
The only question that remained was whether it would ever be too late to bring a claim in the light of Section 33. Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, a much-missed Member of your Lordships’ House, made this observation:
“If a complaint has been made and recorded, and more obviously still if the accused has been convicted of the abuse complained of, that will be one thing; if, however, a complaint comes out of the blue with no apparent support for it (other perhaps than that the alleged abuser has been accused or even convicted of similar abuse in the past), that would be quite another thing. By no means everyone who brings a late claim for damages for sexual abuse, however genuine his complaint may in fact be, can reasonably expect the court to exercise the section 33 discretion in his favour. On the contrary, a fair trial (which must surely include a fair opportunity for the defendant to investigate the allegations …) is in many cases likely to be found quite simply impossible”.
That passage was in fact referred to in the conclusions of IICSA, which decided that the three-year period should be removed, but that there should be
“express protection of the right to a fair trial, with the burden falling on defendants to show a fair trial is not possible”.
The Government responded to IICSA’s report and did not support getting rid of limitations. The Government acknowledged the importance of Section 33 and made this point:
“A limitation period also encourages disputes to be resolved timeously thus promoting finality and certainty. Both are key cornerstones of the legal system. As such, the Government’s opening position, ahead of consultation, is that it does not support this option”.
Nor did they support a special limit for claims arising from sexual abuse. I remind the Committee that, in 2017, in the case of Carroll v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, the Court of Appeal emphasised the unfettered nature of the Section 33 discretion.
My question to the Government at Second Reading was essentially this: what cases do they envisage would now be allowed to proceed which would not have done under the current law? I do not expect an immediate answer, but the Government have now had plenty of time to consider their response. There was a consultation following the Government’s response that I referred to, but it was not particularly large and did not contain consistent answers.
Changing the law of limitation is best an exercise following the careful balancing of respective interests, perhaps by the Law Commission. What appears to have happened here is that the Government, notwithstanding the initial view that I referred to, have decided to come up with some sort of compromise. In doing so, I fear they have produced in Clause 82 a real dog’s dinner of a provision.
Clause 82 is headed:
“Removal of limitation period in child sexual abuse cases”,
but it does not do that. It specifically provides that sexual abuse is in a separate category from, for example, physical abuse, although this was precisely what the Government did not want when they responded to the original recommendations. It contains a rather unclear provision that, when a dispute has been settled, it will no longer be subject to these new provisions. It probably does not include discontinued claims or claims settled otherwise than by way of a formal agreement.
New Section 11ZB contains some very unclear provisions as to the circumstances in which the court can dismiss an action, while at the same time containing in new subsection (2) the provision:
“The court must dismiss the action if the defendant satisfies the court that it is not possible for a fair hearing to take place”.
The interrelationship of new subsections (2) and (3) is incoherent and will inevitably result in litigation. The lack of clarity on what is and is not sexual abuse, and what is and is not settlement, will, I fear, also give rise to litigation.
I agree with the Opposition Front Bench’s probing amendment that we should get rid of new Section 11ZB(3), but that would leave a repetition of what the law is anyway and would not deal with the points about what constitutes sexual abuse or settlement via agreement. My conclusion is that there is absolutely nothing wrong with the law as it is. This rather messy compromise will give rise to unnecessary litigation and I am unsure it will provide remedies where remedies are not already available.
Sexual abuse, particularly of children, is abhorrent, and we now know there has been far more of it than was originally perceived. It is, however, important to point out that claims are not usually made against individual perpetrators; one can understand why there would not be much sympathy for a claim being brought, however late, against such a perpetrator. The usual defendant is, for example, a school, religious organisation, local authority or even central government. They may or may not have any knowledge of what happened but, because of the expanded doctrine of vicarious liability, will be deemed in law to be responsible for what occurred. They may or may not be covered by insurance.
As Lord Brown pointed out, there will come a time when it is quite simply inappropriate, many years later, for claims to be brought before the court. However sympathetic one is to the victims of sexual abuse, the law currently caters adequately for the balance between the interests of claimants and defendants. If we include Clause 82 in the Bill, I fear we will make bad law. The clause should not stand part.
My Lords, I have signed Amendment 289. This is the first opportunity I have had to speak in Committee because of family illness, and it is good to be back.
In a previous group of amendments last week, the Committee heard the concerns of a number of Peers worried that the Government’s proposals might not ensure a fair route to reporting child sexual abuse. This amendment is just as important, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling it. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for his helpful exposition of the legal details. I come to this as a champion for victims, rather than from the legal perspective.
Despite the many concerns about those accused of child sexual abuse being able to escape from the accountability provided by the courts, the Bill, in Clause 82, lines 3 to 11, lays out a specific route for those accused who the courts “must”—a strong word; we note that it does not say “consider”—cease action against if the defendant in question claims
“there would be substantial prejudice to the defendant”
if the proceedings were to proceed. To put it bluntly, this is a gift to any defence lawyer. Much of the evidence heard by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse was scenario after scenario where senior people—clergy, politicians, police officers, magistrates and so on—were able to cover up what had happened because they were in a position of power over the victim, and, quite often, over potential witnesses too.
My Lords, Amendment 293 in my name is very straightforward and necessary. Victims of child sexual abuse and other offences often do not come forward themselves at the time of the offences. Research has shown that, on average, it takes around three decades for a survivor to get the courage to come forward—and then even longer to get to court. As a result, almost all abuse claims are brought outside the statutory time limit. The problem is that, if the survivor cannot convince the court that a fair trial is possible, the claim falls and the victim can never get justice.
All the various strands of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, which were referred to earlier—including the Westminster report, the Anglican Church report, the Catholic Church report and the children in custodial sentences report—said that it was usually decades after the offences that victims reported what had happened. Frequently, this then gave other victims the confidence to come forward too, in exactly the way that happened after the BBC presenter Nicky Campbell spoke up in 2022 about the abuse at his school, the Edinburgh Academy, decades before. The abuse there involved arbitrary violence on boys under 11, including choking, throwing them down stairs and various other disgusting forms of abuse.
In September 2023 an ex-teacher, Russell Tillson, was jailed for sexually abusing boys. Beginning in the 1980s, it continued for 20 years, but allegations were first made only in 2018, nearly a further two decades after the teacher had retired. Both cases are absolutely typical of the behaviour of perpetrators and, indeed, of victims.
Earlier this year the Government said they were minded to consider removing the limitation period, but we believe that it needs to happen now and be in the Bill. The amendment seeks to remove any limitation period for historical child sex offences. It just must not be possible for a perpetrator to escape justice because the victims were too traumatised to come forward until years later. I beg to move Amendment 293.
My Lords, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I need not take very long, because she has explained her very straightforward amendment impeccably. After the brilliant previous group led by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, and her team, perhaps there is no need to go into all the quite serious sexual contact included in Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act that need not necessarily be tried in the Crown Court.
I support the amendment for two simple but important reasons. First, there is some very serious sexual activity with children that could be tried in the magistrates’ courts—there is not necessarily a problem with that. Secondly, there is the obvious reason of historic child abuse and victims coming forward sometimes only many years after the fact. Those are very good reasons to depart from the norm of the six-month time limit and, indeed, to have no time limits at all.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The noble Lord has explained it rather better than I did.
I am very grateful to everyone who has spoken. I am probably the only non-lawyer in this debate, and as it is my amendment I feel something of a duffer.
I am very grateful for the advice. I came to this amendment after reading the recommendations of IICSA, and what concerned me particularly was picking up that people who had come forward years afterwards were told that things were timed out—that might have been a decision by the CPS to say that it felt that it would not be effective going to trial. However, I very much appreciate the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, because I have experience of the issue of which court deals with issues through my interests in stalking and other domestic abuse cases, where often that is the place that things happen. All the description that has been given for “no time limits” has not been for the magistrates’ court, excepting the detail that the noble Baroness provided, which is way beyond my knowledge.
There is the difficulty that Professor Jay reported. In two cases where I was heavily involved with the victims, decisions were made initially by the CPS and the victims were told that they had timed out. That may not have been the case, but that is what they were told. In another case, when there were three pupils from the same school all giving evidence, none of them knowing each other, the first victim was told by the judge, “Yours is over 20 years ago; you can’t possibly remember what happened and therefore it’s timed out”. That is what is happening in the practice of the courts. Professor Jay’s report spoke to the experience of the victims. We have gone into extraordinary technical detail that many victims would be completely oblivious to. I would be very grateful for a letter. If there is an easy solution, it may just be that it needs to be clarified with the police and the CPS. There are a lot of unhappy victims out there. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(6 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberAs I think I said in answer to an earlier question, the Government have been quite clear that, under the duty of candour, public officials will be bound by that duty, with criminal and professional consequences—the noble Lord is shaking his head. What I also said is that we think there needs to be a wider cultural change and there need to be other programmes put in place to achieve this. If I can provide more detail, I will happily write to the noble Lord, but I think that we are being very genuine and explicit in the ambition that we have set forth, that a duty of candour will be at the core of all public officials’ roles.
My Lords, we will shortly be hearing a Statement, yet again, on the infected blood compensation scheme. Last week, we heard about the continuing problems with the Post Office Horizon scheme. Both scandals were made much worse over decades because of the lack of candour by officials. In opposition, Labour—including the Minister, many of whose amendments on the duty of candour I signed—said that it would introduce that duty to prevent scandals such as these in the future. But the press are reporting that the delay is caused by officials watering down the details, including the level at which officials are bound by the duty of candour. Can the Minister confirm that there is no truth in this?
I think that is, if I may say so, a similar question to that from my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I have heard that the ongoing discussions are in fact reasonably positive, and we are very hopeful of reaching an agreement in the coming weeks and months. It is certainly not the intention to water down recommendations; however, it is our intention to come up with a workable Bill that forms part of a wider work programme. As I think I said in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, we have also put in place this website where people can monitor how the Government are making progress on other recommendations on other scandals, such as the infected blood scandal and the Grenfell scandal.
(1 year, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberAt end insert “but that this House, while welcoming the progress made to compensate eligible infected persons, regrets that close family members and carers affected by the infected blood scandal are not included in the Regulations, as recommended by the Inquiry”.
My Lords, I start by saying that I shall not call a vote on my regret amendment. It is important to avoid any delay to the infected blood victims receiving either interims or full compensation settlements—it would be wrong. However, I have a number of questions relating to this instrument and to the one that the Government say that they will lay next year. It is good to see the Minister in his place, as well as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, on the other Benches, because it was we three who debated this in detail during the passage of the Victims and Prisoners Bill.
I understand that these are complex matters, but at the root of them is the vital and delicate issue of trust with the victims of this scandal. Would the Minister meet me, as well as writing to me with some of the detailed answers to my questions that I have today, which I appreciate that I have not been able to give him advance sight of? I also thank the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, and the Minister for responding to its concerns. In its second report of this Session, it points out that the Explanatory Memorandum is
“overly complex and technical, while lacking basic information”.
At paragraph 44, it points out that there is “no clarity” about how many infected persons will have been paid by the end of this year.
The September Statement from the Paymaster-General talked about a “user group” testing out the new scheme. Can the Minister confirm that this user group, or the group that he described a couple of minutes ago—the “test and learn” group—comprises only 20 people? Will those 20 people be paid by the end of this year and how many others of the eligible infected persons will receive their settlements by the end of this year? Is there now a likely time when those infected persons already in the system will have received payment?
The main reason I move this regret amendment is that the regulation in front of us today does not deal with the group of victims called the “affected”. As the Minister said, these are the wives, partners, parents, children and siblings of infected victims. The Victims and Prisoners Act, passed on the last day of Parliament before the general election, sets out in Section 49 the definition of the two groups of people entitled to compensation under the scheme. The outgoing Government were absolutely clear that they wanted the regulations for the compensation scheme within three months of passing the Bill, which is why this regulation, 872, was laid on 24 August, in the depths of recess, and brought into effect immediately under the emergency processes. I am very grateful to the Paymaster-General for telephoning me on 22 August to explain that the Government were keeping to the arrangements made by the previous Government.
I thank both the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for their very thoughtful discussion of the regulations. I recognise they have both had long experience of these issues. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, the three of us were involved in the passing of the Victims and Prisoners Act, which was a precursor to these regulations.
In response to the very last question of the noble Earl, the Government are aiming for a second set of regulations to be in place—regarding affected people—by 31 March 2025. It is our intention that people who are affected can start receiving payments in 2025. That was in my original speech and that is the Government’s commitment.
I will make a general point before I start trying to answer some of the individual questions. It is in the best interests of everybody that the House continues to work collaboratively on this issue—both for infected and affected people. All sides of the House acknowledge the British state has failed the victims, and these regulations are a step on the road to addressing the infected victims.
Of course I will agree to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, if he so wishes. I will write with detailed answers if I fail to answer any of the questions—no doubt I will fail to answer some.
As the noble Earl quite rightly said as he introduced his comments, these regulations are fulfilling one element of Sir Brian Langstaff’s report. A lot of the questions have been about the second element: the affected people. As he rightly said, 69 of the 74 recommendations were accepted.
On the bulk of the speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which was about the affected people, the timetable available to develop these regulations was necessarily limited. The regulations prioritise people who are infected as a result of the infected blood scandal. Where people have sadly died, the recommendations make provisions for claims under their estate. This ensures the Infected Blood Compensation Authority can start delivering the compensation scheme for the infected, as per its statutory function.
The Government’s decision to split, and therefore sequence, infected and affected regulations was taken with the reassurance that it would allow orderly implementation of the legal framework without impacting or delaying the delivery timetable for payments to infected and affected victims. Subject to parliamentary approval, the Government are aiming for the second set of regulations to be in place by 31 March next year, as I mentioned, with an expectation of beginning payments by the end of the year.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, also asked about the eligibility of affected siblings and children. The scheme’s definition of siblings is based on the recommendations made in Sir Robert Francis’s compensation framework study. The definition recognises the likely heightened impacts on a sibling living with an infected person during childhood. This is not to dismiss or deny the suffering of those who were adults when their siblings were infected. Individuals who were adults when their sibling was infected may be eligible for compensation through the scheme as a carer. Siblings will be eligible where under the age of 18 they lived in the same household as an infected person for the period of at least two years after the onset of the infection. Similarly, the scheme’s definition of children of the infected person is based on the recommendations made in Sir Robert Francis’s compensation framework study. The scheme recognises the likely heightened impact on a child who was under 18 while living with a parent who was infected.
I hope that provides some clarity to the noble Baroness. However, I will also acknowledge the examples she gave of the terrible effects on affected people and the terrible experiences, some of which she spoke about. It is absolutely not right to suggest that affected people are somehow second-class citizens. That is not right; it is just a practical decision which the Government have made to try and progress these matters as soon as possible. These regulations are for the infected group, but I have set out as clearly as I can what the Government’s intentions are for the affected group.
The noble Earl, Lord Howe, spoke about the complexity of regulations and the Explanatory Memorandum. Work is under way on a second set of regulations. We will take on board the committee’s helpful feedback when drafting the Explanatory Memorandum for those regulations. We recognise the point made by the SLSC on the complexity of these regulations, but it is absolutely the Government’s intention to carefully consider the committee’s report and findings.
The noble Earl asked about the two channels of funding: the core route and the IBCS route. This is an additional level of complexity, but it was recommended by Sir Robert Francis because it was the wish of the infected group that the existing method of funding should continue. Because we accepted that recommendation, that inevitably adds to the complexity.
The noble Earl also asked about psychological illness, and in particular whether recommendations were accepted by the report. I am afraid I do not know the answer to that, but I will write to the noble Earl and the noble Baroness about it.
The noble Earl also raised Treloar’s school and unethical experimental research on certain young children. It is absolutely not the intention that this particular scandal should lead to any delay in the rollout of infected or affected compensation, but we recognise the particular, scandalous nature of what happened to those victims.
In conclusion, we regard the timetable as realistic. In opposition, we worked constructively with the then Government, and we have continued working as practically as possible to try to move the timetable forward. All of us across this House must continue to work collaboratively. These regulations ensure that we can finally deliver compensation to those who fought so hard; they deserve nothing less. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank both the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the Minister for their contributions to this debate. We are all broadly on the same page. I do not think there is a difference on the principles of moving ahead, and certainly absolutely no intention on my part to try to slow down or block the approval of the regulations today.
I will not go through the arguments we have all made, but the key thing the Minister did not cover was the issue of communication, which seems to me to be the most important thing moving forward. If there is confusion and distress on the one hand, and complexity and a large number of recommendations being modified on the other, it is absolutely understandable that the affected and the infected may have concerns about what is going on. I really hope that when we meet, the Minister will talk to us about what he plans to do.
I pay personal tribute to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for the way he worked with the communities over the years. That baton has clearly been handed over to the other side of the House. We need to rebuild trust; there are a lot of very distressed people out there at the moment. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend Lady Brinton will respond to most of these items. I cannot resist wondering whether she will comment on whether it is inappropriate to rush towards the duty of candour given the history of the item, but I want to speak particularly to Motion E regarding data sharing for immigration purposes. This amendment has an unhappy history: we have never succeeded before, and I know we will not succeed today—as I say that, I look at the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, in whose name the amendment was tabled to this Bill.
The threat comes from abusers, often domestic abusers, but other abusers as well. In saying to someone who has immigration status that they are illegal, it is irrelevant that that is inaccurate: the abuser provokes fear, and this trumps everything in the mind of the person who is affected. Sadly, for some people, this amendment would be highly “appropriate”, picking up the words in the Commons reason, and the circumstances are immigration control. But for the Home Office, immigration control, even if this amendment is not really about immigration control, trumps everything. The Home Office has previously resisted attempts to control data sharing, so this is no surprise, but we will not pursue it today.
My Lords, it seems only 24 hours ago that we were discussing these amendments. Indeed, we were. There has been some progress made, for which we thank the Government from these Benches. It may not meet everything that we were seeking, but there has been some clarity on some of the issues.
On Amendment 33—the training support and the alternative offer from the Government—the reason that those of us who supported it really wanted to see it is the lack of consistency in training between police forces and other parts of the criminal justice system. Although the Minister says that is expensive, it is also very expensive when mistakes are made because the training has not been adequate. We put on notice that this is yet another of the items that will, I suspect, appear as amendments in the future.
I completely support everything my noble friend Lady Hamwee has said on the immigration firewall, and I will not add any more to that. The review of the duty of candour for major incidents is welcome, given that the Government would not agree to Labour’s amendment on it. I hope the review will look at not just major incidents but the duty of candour widely in the public sector, because I am not sure, for example, that the infected blood scandal would have appeared as a major incident for perhaps a decade, or two decades, or even longer. I hope those involved with that committee will look at that, but we welcome the review.
On the MAPPA points, I think that is a helpful amendment, and I can understand why it has been laid. From these Benches, we would like to see it in operation to make sure that it works.
The final point I want to come to is on the Government’s own amendment to the eligibility for home detention curfews. I am very pleased that the Minister specifically mentioned that those convicted of stalking, even with sentences of under four years, will not be able to access home detention curfew. We spent some considerable time during the passage of the Bill also discussing why it is often the case that the CPS charges people with things other than stalking. Those people who are known to be stalkers, but are convicted of a lesser crime, still pose the same risk, particularly when they have been multiple offenders. We urge the Government from these Benches to make sure that the CPS looks at charging stalking and a lesser offence because we believe that that is a problem for many of the things that have been progressed during the passage of the Bill.
I will say very briefly that I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, for her help as the Victims’ Commissioner, and to the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and the London Victims’ Commissioner —who is in the Gallery today—and all their teams. They have briefed your Lordships’ House to help the progress of this Bill. The London Victims’ Commissioner and I were remembering that it was 14 years ago that the stalking inquiry report was published, and much but not all of that has been enacted. I hope that future Governments will make sure that we can better resolve stalking cases in the future.
My Lords, we welcome the discussions that have taken place in the usual channels to ensure that the calling of the election does not unduly disadvantage victims who have waited for many years for this legislation to be brought forward. We on our side have strived to be collaborative throughout the Bill’s progress and, while we have not been able to achieve everything we would have liked, we acknowledge that the department has been willing to negotiate on some matters and make a number of amendments in lieu.
It is a shame that my noble friend Lady Royall’s amendments on stalking were not successful as part of the negotiating process. On stalking and the eligibility for home detention curfew, I thought that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made a very interesting point about the CPS charging stalkers with alternative offences as well. As I have said in other debates, I have dealt as a magistrate with stalking matters relatively recently. If lesser charges of harassment can be pressed in the alternative, the court would have better choices to make when determining guilt or otherwise. I thought that that was an interesting point.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, did not mention unduly lenient sentencing. While that was not part of the wash-up agreement, the Government nevertheless committed from the Dispatch Box to keep unduly lenient sentencing under review. As far as I can or cannot commit any future Government, I think it is something that any Government would want to keep under review, as the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is important.
We also welcome the amendment in lieu, Amendment 32A, on the duty for agencies to co-operate with the Victims’ Commissioner. I congratulate her on all her sterling work on this Bill. This does not go quite as far as we asked, but it is an improvement, nevertheless.
The Labour Party remains committed to introducing a statutory duty of candour. It is a shame that the Government have not felt able to go further, but at least there is a review in the Bill.
We are pleased that the infected blood provisions will make it on to the statute book and be commenced at Royal Assent, and we welcome the recent government Statements and hope that compensation will get to people as early as possible.
On IPP, we have tried to work collaboratively across party lines and there is further work to be done. We want to ensure that solutions proposed are robust and assessed with public safety in mind, and we will work at pace, consulting widely on potential ways forward.
We of course welcome the concession on controlling or coercive behaviour and the MAPPA process, in Amendment 99A. It is an important marker, but only part of a bigger picture where violence against women and girls needs to be addressed. There is more work to do, but passing this Bill is an important step towards a new era of transparency and advocacy for victims of crime.
In conclusion, I thank my honourable friend Kevin Brennan for steering Labour’s response to the Bill through the other place and my noble friend Lady Thornton for her support for me during the passage of the Bill. I also thank our advisers, Catherine Johnson and Clare Scally.
Finally, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy. I also thank his civil servants, who have been extremely helpful to me and, I know, to many other noble Lords who have taken an interest in this Bill. Turning back to the noble and learned Lord, I know he will say that he works as part of a team, but the team needs a leader and he has been the leader for this Bill in this House—and that has been to the benefit of all noble Lords who have taken an interest in the Bill.
The Bill is an accomplishment. It is only a step in the road, and I hope we can work on the progress that has been made in any future Governments who may be formed.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak very briefly. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, for her persistence and skills in negotiating with her own party, which is possibly easier than doing it from outside the party.
I stress the absolute importance of giving crystal clear guidance. The occupation of data controller is not necessarily high on the list of most of us as a potential career. I suspect that it is not the most exciting part of many bureaucracies. I also suspect that it is an area where one follows the rulebook, or what one perceives to be the rulebook, particularly closely. I suspect that the ability of individuals to feel that they have the power to exercise their own judgment is somewhat limited and probably not encouraged. It is incredibly important that there is absolutely no doubt in the mind of even the least curious or the most obdurate data controller as to what is and is not acceptable in terms of erasure.
Other than that, I thank the Government for having thought about this carefully, and for having responded. I hope that as a result of this, the data controller in Waltham Forest who is making Stella Creasy’s life rather difficult will at least read this debate or be told of it and will rethink his or her decision to not erase the data.
It is my privilege to follow both the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan. I signed this amendment and continue to offer my support. I echo and agree with everything they said.
I have slight concerns that this is not just an issue about the data controller; it is also about social work practice. That really worries me, because there is a mindset that says that if anyone makes a complaint, we have to have it on the record just in case for the future. I hope that the government amendments are sufficient to provide an answer, but should we discover either that Stella Creasy’s case is not dealt with or that there are others, I put all future Governments on notice that there is a team in this House that will return to the subject.
I will make just one point to the Minister: will the direction and guidance given to the data controller say that the information being found to be vexatious will be an automatic reason to delete it? As soon as something is found not to be true, it should be deleted and the data controller should have the obligation to remove it straightaway.
My Lords, certain noble Lords wish to speak to this Motion.
My Lords, I am very grateful for the opportunity to raise some issues that have arisen since the publication of the framework and tariffs for the new infected blood compensation scheme on Tuesday afternoon. I thank the noble Earl and John Glen for providing the details to make that possible, and the usual channels for ensuring that the work done so far is not lost but carried through.
However, over the last 24 hours, we have heard from a substantial number of members of the infected blood community who are distraught by the detail that has come out in the framework and tariffs, which seem to be at complete odds with the schemes that have gone before. I have a long shopping list of over 20 points; I will not detain the House with them, but I forwarded them to the Minister in advance of this debate. I will raise two or three as illustrations.
Under the new framework, there will be no distinction between chronic hepatitis B and C in calculating infection. There is no consistency about other diseases; for example, variant CJD has been left out of the new scheme but was included in the old one, as has Hodgkin lymphoma and possibly other cancers. Many people believe that the Government’s proposals still mean that the current schemes will be closed down, leaving them worse off, and that the Government have an incentive to wait longer to pay compensation. They need great reassurance and clarity that that will not be the case, because that is not evident in what was published on Tuesday afternoon.
Can the Government provide a breakdown of how the core route awards examples have been calculated? That would be helpful, even if only to say that there will be further information published online. There are concerns about the illustrative awards being worded as
“for a living infected person”
and not simply an “infected person”. Given that your Lordships’ House has debated a great deal of the wonderful news that estates will also be able to claim, does that mean that estates will be excluded from this part of the scheme?
Noble Lords can see that there is a lot of detail here. A community that thought, on Tuesday morning, that everything was going to be all right are now very concerned that there are a large number of anomalies that need to be corrected. I will not go on, except to say that I am really grateful for all the help that the Minister has given, and I hope that he can provide some reassurance.
My Lords, I will be brief because I know that time is of the essence. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her sterling work on this Bill. She has given great comfort and strength, as well as enormous amounts of information, to the infected blood community, so that they can keep up with what we have been doing in this House up until today. She is right that there is now confusion in the community.
At the end of a very long day on Monday, I had thought that I might just get a day off, but by Tuesday my phone was ringing off the hook, and I became a helpline to many in the infected blood community who have the concerns that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, just described. I urge the Minister to give a little more clarity, if he can today, so that we can go back and continue to give reassurances to a community that has been campaigning and working towards this week for probably 35 years. I thank the Minister for his open door, because we have been going in and out of it for weeks. I, for one, really appreciate his support and help.