Lord Keen of Elie
Main Page: Lord Keen of Elie (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Keen of Elie's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 week, 5 days ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 39 in my name would require the Secretary of State to issue revised guidance on victim personal statements, clarifying what victims may include and ensuring that the courts appropriately disregard prejudicial material.
Victim personal statements are a valuable and important part of our criminal justice process. They allow victims to articulate in their own words the impact that a crime has had on them and on their families. This personal element is often deeply cathartic and can provide a sense of agency in a system that victims have described as otherwise procedural and somewhat distant. However, as this Bill was scrutinised in the other place, it became clear that many victims and practitioners find the current approach to personal statements unclear and, in some cases, unnecessarily restrictive.
Members spoke of victims feeling that they were sometimes advised to omit heartfelt and deeply personal material from their statements. These omissions were not for any legal reason, but appeared to be due to an overly cautious interpretation of the guidance. There is also a concern that victims do not always understand what is and is not permissible, and that this lack of clarity can undermine their confidence in the entire process.
One recurring theme from previous debates is that victims should not be left uncertain about what they can and cannot say, nor should they feel that their legitimate expressions of harm are being suppressed for procedural reasons. At the same time, the amendment acknowledges the equally important principle that personal statements must not be vehicles for
“allegations of untried criminal conduct”,
or material that is contrary to
“statutory limitations on free speech”
or due process. It is designed precisely to strike the appropriate balance. It would not remove any existing safeguards. It simply asks the Secretary of State to revisit and clarify the guidance governing the content of personal statements in a way that gives victims clarity and a genuine sense of voice.
The amendment would require revised guidance to be issued within six months of the Bill passing. The revised guidance must stipulate that, when making a victim personal statement, the victim should be able to say
“anything they wish about the defendant”,
so long as it does not go beyond lawful free speech, make untested allegations of new criminal conduct, or contain “disorderly language”. These are sensible and well-established legal boundaries.
The amendment also states that the court must disregard any
“prejudicial comments made during a victim personal statement”.
In practice, this would simply enshrine what is already understood by judges: that victims may express themselves freely, while judges continue to confine themselves to factors that are legally relevant and admissible. Placing this in the Bill would reassure victims that greater freedom of expression in their statements will not be misconstrued as diminishing the fairness of proceedings, or indeed as providing a basis for an appeal. This would not mean that victims would be able to litigate matters that fall outside the scope of the case before the court, nor would it mean that victim personal statements would supplant other evidence or judicial reasoning. It would mean that victims would know where they stand, and that they would not be discouraged from expressing the full impact of their experience simply because the existing guidance is interpreted excessively cautiously.
The importance of clarity in this area cannot be overstated. Victims and their families often report that they do not know what is expected of them when making a personal statement, or that they are told they must temper their comments in ways that feel artificial or perhaps insensitive. That undermines public confidence in the system and risks denying victims a meaningful voice at a critical moment in the justice process. This amendment offers a proportionate way forward. It respects judicial integrity and would preserve the lawful limits on personal statements. At the same time, it would provide victims with the clarity and the dignity that they deserve. It would ensure that they can say what they need to say without fear that well-meaning but over cautious guidance may curtail their voice.
I present the amendment in a constructive spirit. I look forward to the Minister outlining how the Government believe that the current guidance is operating—whether it achieves its objectives, and whether there is an appetite for revision that reflects victims’ legitimate expectations—and speaking to the points raised by Members on both sides of the House and in the other place. I beg to move.
My brief observations draw on my experience of what happened about 20 years ago when the statements were being developed. For more serious cases, such as murder and manslaughter, there was an attempt to give the victim’s family an advocate. It had transpired that drafting these statements was not easy, and so this was trialled for a few years. It proved to be an extremely expensive way forward, and the scheme came to an end with the financial crisis of 2008.
That left us with the problem, in all these cases, of how you formulate what was then called a victim impact statement and is now called a personal statement? They are extraordinarily difficult to formulate. Those with experience of civil cases will know that, if you ask a witness to produce something in his own words, or you ask the claimant in a case to do the same, you get something you could never put before the court, because it would never really convey what had to be put forward. Therefore, the way in which progress was made was along the cautious lines of developing guidance. I think such guidance always needs to be kept under review. You need consultation with the Crown Court judges, who see this all the time. Clarity in the guidance is essential, but I greatly caution against allowing a victim to do more than explain to the court the way in which the crime has affected the victim, his family and the community. Going beyond that seems to raise all sorts of problems, and the last thing one wants to do is to revictimise a victim by saying, “You shouldn’t say that in court”. Clarity is essential, but I say, with respect to the noble and learned Lord, that his formulation goes too wide of the mark.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, clearly, we have to achieve a balance between preserving due process in the justice system and empowering victims. We have to be able to reassure victims but, at the same time, protect the judicial process. We must reduce the risk of misunderstanding, or indeed even of appeal, in the context of these statements.
However, there does seem to be a widely held concern that these guidance provisions are not working as they should at the present time. There seems to be an understanding that further work is needed to clarify how victim guidance is construed and applied. I suggest that it is not simply a matter for the criminal practice directions, but one that we should consider, whether in the form of a review or further directions or guidance from the House.
In the circumstances, I seek to withdraw the amendment, but I do so on the basis that the Government understand the need to revisit this issue and why the guidance is not working, and will come to a view as to how it can be improved going forward.
My Lords, from these Benches, the Liberal Democrats have been concerned for a long time about the victim’s right to access court transcripts. We have tabled amendments to a number of Bills, including, most recently, the now Victim and Prisoners Act 2024, and I have Amendment 41 to this Bill. I thank open justice campaigners for the contact that we have had with them during the Victims and Prisoners Act and since then.
During the Victims and Prisoners Bill, the then Minister finally agreed to a trial in certain locations that would ensure that victims could have access to sentencing remarks but to nothing else. Ministers of both this and the last Government have said that it would just cost too much to extend the scheme but, as we have said, the process that is used is extraordinarily expensive, and technology should be our friend these days. To give the Committee a feel of some of the figures that we have been made aware of, we have seen people quoted £30 for a copy of sentencing remarks to over £300 for an original transcript, and where victims requested a transcript of the entire court case we have seen figures of £7,500 and even £22,000.
Victims and their families are in principle able to access remarks at no cost. I am not just talking about since the pilot; I am talking about some of the other things, and I will come on to the detail later on. They can sometimes get access at no cost, but the problem is that the paperwork that some courts have required families to fill out is burdensome and intrusive, requiring families to declare salaries, debts, bank balances and more. That really should not be the case when they are getting to the end of a trial, with all the burdens that that has brought them.
Amendment 41 would go beyond sentencing remarks but not as far as our amendments to the Victims and Prisoners Bill. It would include transcripts of judicial summings-up, bail decisions and conditions that are relevant to their case. It would also set a time limit for the Secretary of State to ensure that the transcripts were provided within 14 days.
We thank the Government for confirming that access to the judge’s sentencing remarks is being rolled out across the country, but we remain concerned that some victims need access to more. This is because for far too long, as we discussed in an earlier group, victims have been advised by the police and prosecutors either not to attend a trial or to frame their own remarks carefully.
I have three brief quotes on that. The first is:
“I wanted to go and watch the trial after I had given my evidence but was told by the prosecution barrister that it would not look good with the jury. The police said the same. I didn’t really question it. I was so scared to do anything that *might* have a detrimental effect on the outcome”.
Another victim said:
“We were advised not to attend because it may make us look bitter”.
And another said:
“I was told I couldn’t watch the court case after giving evidence as I’d look like I wasn’t scared of the perpetrator and it could harm the jury’s decision”.
Open justice campaigners say:
“This advice from professionals is in direct contrast to Judges we meet, who very much want the victims to attend hearings”.
So there is a gap there.
The reason why we propose including judicial summings-up and bail decisions is that there is often more detail in things like bail decisions and conditions that affect the victim directly. I have recently been involved in advising a family where there was a bail condition that required the alleged perpetrator not to go within two miles of the victim. That was changed without the victim’s knowledge, and suddenly she found the perpetrator nearby and could not understand why. A victim in that sort of instance should be able to ask for the details of those. It was clear that she was completely unaware that the bail conditions had been changed after the perpetrator’s solicitor had asked for a hearing. For judicial summing up, there is often more detail in there that can help the victim to come to terms with the entire process. That is one reason why we are pushing for that.
We would still like occasionally for some victims in really traumatic cases, particularly where a therapist advises this—this is not in the amendment, and there is a reason for that—to be able to access the entire court transcript, but we recognise that that is unlikely until technology can provide it at virtually no cost to the court. I think we are nearly there, but at the moment the structure of the way in which people can apply for help and the way that transcripts are made is overly expensive, given the world that we are living in in 2026. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendment 41, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and Amendment 73 in my name. Both these amendments are designed to strengthen victims’ engagement with the justice system by enhancing access to, and the availability of, transcripts of important court decisions.
We give full and unequivocal support to Amendment 41. This is a broader right than the one we were able to secure during the passage of the Sentencing Bill, where our amendments sought to ensure victims’ access to transcripts of sentencing remarks. Initially, that amendment was opposed by the Government, who argued that embedding a statutory duty for universal access and universal publication would create significant operational and resource pressures and risk increasing judicial workload.
The importance of these amendments has been further underscored by the report—released, I believe, today—that the Ministry of Justice has instructed the deletion of a substantial archive of court records held by Courtsdesk: data analysis that supports journalists and civil society in scrutinising the justice system. That archive has long been relied on to track sentencing outcomes and judicial decisions. Its removal has understandably raised concerns about the future accessibility of court information and the practical operation of open justice.
In that context, the case for clear, structured and victim-centred access to sentencing information becomes even more compelling. If independent archives and informal routes to transparency are diminishing, it is all the more important that Parliament ensures that formal mechanisms exist to guarantee access to core judicial material, particularly for victims whose lives are directly affected by these decisions.
In previous debates, Ministers made it clear that they supported the principle of transparency and of victim access to sentencing remarks. Sentencing remarks can already be published in high-profile cases but the Government maintained that expanding those limited provisions into a broad statutory requirement, as initially tabled, was not necessary to achieve the objective of openness and could impose burdens that the current system was not equipped to bear. We therefore tabled a more diluted version of our amendment to extend free provision of Crown Court sentencing transcripts to victims who request them.
The importance of this measure cannot, in my view, be overstated. Sentencing remarks explain the judge’s reasoning as well as the factors taken into account when outlining legal judgment behind a sentence. For victims and their families, this explanation is essential to understanding why justice has been administered in the way it has and becomes particularly important in the context of, for example, unduly lenient sentence appeals.
Amendment 73 complements the amendment passed in the Sentencing Bill, now the Sentencing Act, by addressing the publication of sentencing remarks online. It would require that, when a request is made for sentencing remarks delivered in the Crown Court, those remarks are made available publicly online within 14 days, subject to an important safeguard. The court must first inform the applicant of their right to request that the remarks not be published and, if such a request is made, the remarks must not be published.
This opt-out mechanism is a proportionate and indeed pragmatic response to government concerns that prevented broad publication being adopted previously. Ministers explained that, while they supported the principle of transparency, they could not accept a universal statutory obligation to publish all sentencing remarks, citing the risk of significant workload increases and resource pressures on an already stretched judiciary and courts system. By allowing individuals to choose not to have their own remarks published, this amendment preserves transparency for the public while safeguarding privacy and individual choice and reducing operational risk.
We stand in favour of open justice: the principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. When victims and the wider public can access the reasoning behind sentencing decisions, confidence in the rule of law and in the integrity of judicial decision-making is strengthened. A criminal justice system that is opaque risks undermining the very legitimacy that it seeks to uphold. If victims cannot see the reasoning behind the rulings that affect their lives, they and the public will struggle to have confidence that justice has actually been done. When sentences are handed down with discretion and complexity, the need for transparency is greater, not less. For these reasons, we support Amendment 41 and look forward to the Minister’s response to Amendment 73.