Victims and Courts Bill
Lord Keen of Elie ExcerptsTuesday 10th March 2026
(1 week, 3 days ago)
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Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for her helpful meeting between Committee and Report. As a result of her concerns about the practicalities of summing up for victims, I have amended my Amendment 5 following discussion with others outside your Lordships’ House.
From these Benches, I say again that both the previous and present Government undertook the pilot scheme to provide victims with judges’ sentencing remarks. It is encouraging that this pilot scheme will now be rolled out across England and Wales—it is certainly better than nothing at all.
In Committee, I argued that there are a number of reasons why sentencing remarks alone might well not provide the help a victim needs, whether this is information to explain what has happened when they may not have been present or to give them an understanding that it might help lead them to closure after whatever the incident was, or information that might help them to decide whether to challenge the sentence as unduly lenient—the subject of the last group in this Report stage later today.
Yesterday, I submitted a revised amendment which deletes the summings-up and replaces them with the route to verdict. Those I discussed it with said that this has to be done anyway, and it should be cost-free as it will be produced as part of the court process for others and should provide victims with an extra understanding of what has happened and why. That being cost-free is very important, because in Committee we heard of the extraordinary amounts of money that some victims have been asked to pay when they have asked for transcripts of court hearings. In one case, this was quoted at £7,000—that is too much. I am therefore grateful that the Minister says the Ministry of Justice will look at how technology can be harnessed in the future to ensure victims are not charged thousands of pounds if they need to see a full transcript, or even a partial one, and I will hold the Minister to that in the future.
Amendment 5 also says that the victims should be informed about bail conditions. This is important especially if there is a restriction placed on the defendant from approaching the victim. Too often, victims are not told of bail conditions. We know they should be, but they are not, which can cause chaos, especially when changed at short notice and without the knowledge of the victim.
Amendment 16, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, sets a framework and timescale for the publication online of sentencing remarks. We hope that if this is accepted, the Government would also undertake to ensure the victim is told as soon as they are published online. The amendment also says the victim must be aware they have the right to request anonymity. This is already covered in the rights of victims set out in the victims’ code for the entirety of the process and not just at the end, but it is helpful that it is clearly stated here. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 5 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, reflects a commitment to ensuring victims are entitled to free transcripts on the route to verdict and bail decisions and conditions that are relevant to their case. In Committee, we supported the broader amendment, which included sentencing remarks as well. On the amendment now before us, which includes transcripts of the route to verdict, our position has not changed; if anything, we are even more supportive, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing this matter to Report.
Similarly, Amendment 16 in my name and in the name of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst is also designed to enhance access to important transcripts without charge, this time focusing on sentencing remarks. I will not rehearse the arguments and evidence for this, as we have all heard the benefits and how it would help the interests of victims and underlines our open justice system.
We have listened carefully and, after further thought, have revised the amendment that we brought forward in Committee. While we have not changed our position on this amendment focusing on sentencing remarks, the amendment now gives the relevant victims the right to anonymity rather than non-publication. In addition, it still requires the court to make victims aware of this right before sentencing remarks are published. With this crucial and pragmatic safeguard in place, we hope that the House finds this to be a well-considered and reasonable amendment that focuses on how this will work in practice and not only on the principle of transparency, on which I believe we are all agreed. In these circumstances, I intend to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 16.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for their constructive engagement on the subject of court transcripts over recent weeks.
As the noble and learned Lord said, there is nothing between us on the principle of increased transparency for criminal court proceedings. As your Lordships will know, the Government recently announced that we will provide free transcripts of sentencing remarks for victims whose cases are heard in the Crown Court; it is one of the provisions of the Sentencing Act. Delivering this new entitlement is a significant operational undertaking. It is essential that we get it right, so that victims can receive the information they need in a timely way. However, the new proposals in the amendments in this group, taken either individually or together, would put that commitment under strain.
Through her Amendment 5, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, wants to include an entitlement to transcripts of bail decisions and the route to verdict. There are two difficulties with that. First, providing transcripts of bail decisions would involve extra resource. Transcripts are not free and producing even those for short hearings, if extended across England and Wales, would be expensive. Secondly, it would not provide significant benefits over and above the systems already in place. Transcripts on bail decisions are rarely informative for victims; they usually just set out the decision—where the judge says either that bail is granted and lists the conditions, or that bail is refused, with rarely any kind of reasoned judgment—and, as I said, they would come with cost implications. Under the victims’ code, victims already have the right to be informed of bail outcomes and release conditions.
We recognise that, when information is not provided in a timely or consistent way, this can cause distress and anxiety for victims and add to what is already a difficult experience. The experiences spoken to in Committee by the noble Baroness is clearly not what we expect or wish—nor are they, I am pleased to say, the norm. We are currently exploring how responsibilities under the victims’ code are being met by the relevant service providers and how better to support them in the delivery of the code.
We will also seek victims’ views on access to bail information and whether current processes are working correctly, through the ongoing victims’ code consultation. To strengthen that further, the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 will introduce a compliance framework requiring criminal justice bodies to keep their delivery of the code under review. Therefore, legislation needed to drive improvement in notifying victims of bail conditions is already in place.
Because this amendment arrived only yesterday, I have not had an opportunity to discuss the question of routes to verdict with the noble Baroness, but I think it is possible that she may have been misinformed about what a route to verdict is and what it consists of. It is our view that a route to verdict is unlikely to add significant, or indeed any, value for victims. It is usually a very short document; in most trials, it is typically about 10 lines long. Very rarely would a route to verdict be longer than two pages. It sets out a few questions that the jury should ask themselves in private, when they are applying the law to the facts of the case. However, the jury never gives its answers to those questions because we do not have reasoned judgments in criminal trials. Therefore, the victim will not be any wiser as to what the answers were; they would simply know the questions that were asked. These routes to verdict are almost always—unless the printer is broken—provided to the jury in hard copy, so a transcript is not needed and would add nothing.
The noble Baroness also raised concerns in Committee about victims being asked to leave the courtroom after giving evidence. I agree that this is a real issue and should not happen. I give the noble Baroness my assurance that I will work with the appropriate officials to ensure that victims understand that they are generally entitled to remain in court if they wish to do so and that arrangements—such as the use of screens or remote observation, so that they cannot be seen and do not have to see the person they accuse—can be made in some, if not all, circumstances. This is a practical and immediate step that we hope will make a real difference to victims’ experience without requiring further legislation.
Amendment 16 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, would require the Crown Court to publish transcripts of sentencing remarks within 14 days of a request for such remarks being made. Publishing sentencing remarks online is significantly more resource-intensive than simply providing them to the victim.
Public release demands a higher standard of anonymisation to remove both direct and indirect identifiers of victims and witnesses. Jigsaw identification is where a number of apparently innocuous pieces of information, when put together, particularly by people who have some knowledge of the local area, for example, can in fact lead to the identification of the victim. Even something such as the location of a shop, if there are people around who know it, could tell them who the victim is.
That kind of anonymisation is detailed and skilled work. Current AI-based tools cannot reliably carry out anonymisation for the complex and sensitive material heard in the criminal courts. The cost of getting it wrong is profound. It requires trained staff manually to review each transcript, and research suggests that it takes around 45 minutes of staff time to review every hour of a transcript before publication is possible. That means that even a modest increase in publication volumes would create disproportionate pressures in operational capacity in the Crown Courts, which cannot take any further pressure.
Furthermore, requiring the court to make the victim aware of their right to request anonymity, to make the appropriate redactions and to publish the transcript online within 14 days of any request is just not viable. Our priority must be delivering the sentencing remarks for victims, as set out in the Sentencing Act, properly and at pace, before taking on any further changes that could undermine or delay that work.
Finally, I would like to reassure your Lordships that we have listened to what was said in Committee, and work is already under way to improve the transcripts application process to make the system more accessible for all users. I thank your Lordships for raising these important issues. We all agree about the principle of transparency; the only issue between us is the best way to deliver it. We believe these issues can be and are being addressed through non-legislative means, and I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, if content, to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie
“Extension of Victim Contact Scheme(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that the Victim Contact Scheme is made available to—(a) victims of offenders sentenced to less than 12 months for violent and sexual offences,(b) victims in cases involving coercive or controlling behaviour, stalking, or harassment, and(c) bereaved families in manslaughter or death by dangerous driving cases.(2) The Secretary of State must ensure that information under the Victim Contact Scheme is communicated in a timely and trauma-informed manner.(3) The Secretary of State must publish data each year on uptake and accessibility of the Victim Contact Scheme.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to extend the Victim Contact Scheme to certain categories of victim. It would also ensure information is provided in a timely, trauma-informed way and require annual reporting on the Scheme’s uptake and accessibility.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, within this group are amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, regarding the victims’ code, and from the noble Lord, Lord Russell, with regard to incidental matters thereto.
Perhaps I may begin with the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell. These address the important question of how hospital managers exercise their discretion when responding to requests for information about offenders detained under the mental health legislation. Amendment 17 seeks to ensure that when hospital managers consider whether it is appropriate to disclose information, they explicitly take into account the risk of further physical or psychological harm to victims if that information is withheld. The purpose of providing information to victims is in large part to enable them to feel safer and to plan appropriately for an offender’s discharge. We support the principle underlying this amendment.
Amendment 18 would require hospital managers to provide written reasons when information is not disclosed. Greater transparency in decision-making can help build confidence in the system and ensure that victims and probation services understand how such determinations have been reached.
Amendment 19 would create a clearer route of appeal where information requests are refused. This amendment raises the question of whether a more structured and independent route of appeal might provide additional clarity and reassurance to victims.
Amendment 10 would require the Secretary of State to create an appendix to the victims’ code outlining how the code applies to victims whose close relative was the victim of murder, manslaughter or infanticide outside the United Kingdom. This is a proposal with which we are at least sympathetic.
Amendment 15 in my name would extend the victim contact scheme to include victims whose offenders are sentenced to less than 12 months for violent and sexual offences—as well as bereaved families in manslaughter or death by dangerous driving cases where the offender is sentenced to less than 12 months. Much has been said about the Sentencing Act in this Chamber. In light of that legislation, it is undeniable that many victims captured by those provisions will have to face the reality of their offenders living in their communities. It is therefore only appropriate that victims of violent and sexual offences should be eligible for the scheme. For stalking, the Government are happy to extend the victim contact scheme with no limitation on sentence length. There should similarly be no such limits for the narrowly drawn list of serious offences in this amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 10 in this group, on bereaved victims of murder abroad. I have also signed the three amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, on victims of mentally disordered offenders.
To speak briefly to those amendments, which we are happy to support from these Benches, it is very important that hospital managers and senior clinicians take a balanced approach regarding victims of offenders who are detained under the Mental Health Act. Unfortunately, hospital managers and clinicians often withhold data that could be released which would assist victims—and worse, not even tell them that they are withholding it. The amendments set out a balanced approach for hospitals and would require written reasons to be given to the victim for any decision to withhold some or all of the information requested. The third amendment would create an independent route for victims to appeal where a hospital manager has decided not to share information.
I turn to my Amendment 10, which seeks a pathway for bereaved victims of murder abroad. We had an extensive debate on this in Committee, and I am grateful to the Minister for the very helpful and informative meeting with Home Office and FCDO staff who specialise in this area, including those who liaise with the coroners service and support victims whose family members have been murdered abroad.
With around 80 British nationals being murdered abroad each year, the numbers may appear low, but families are not just navigating the horror of a murder, which is bad enough at home in the UK, but doing so in a country where legal systems will differ. There are also likely to be language barriers. Even worse is managing the complex logistical issues of repatriation of the body—which, speaking from personal family experience, is hard even with a natural death—as well as coping with limited police updates from afar.
The problem is that these people are not recognised as formal victims of crime because the murder occurred outside the United Kingdom, nor do they receive any of the relevant protections and entitlements given to their UK equivalents. These Benches thank the Government for their recently updated family information guide on murder and manslaughter abroad, and on how the differing parts of the Government will work. We believe this is a good start and we understand that these new arrangements will take time to bed in.
The Minister mentioned in Committee that the homicide service, which is currently run by Victim Support, is being retendered at the moment. Is there any news yet as to whether the budget for that service is being absolutely sustained? I realise that times are hard, but we cannot have a service that cannot function and support these families because it does not have the resources that it needs. It is clear from the guide that the homicide service is the key that keeps on top of all the different moving parts and keeps the victims informed.
However, it is early days, and I know from talking to Murdered Abroad that there are still real concerns about how this will work effectively. Too often, despite the best intentions of the very willing staff across the board, families still struggle for information, support or translation services. That is why we have retabled our amendment, which sets out the application of the victims’ code in respect to victims of murder, manslaughter or infanticide abroad. We do not seek for these families to be treated exactly the same as UK victims. Rather, the amendment seeks an appendix to the victims’ code that sets out which services they can access, and only those.
I hope that the Minister feels that this is a supportive mechanism which would give core strength to the excellent but invisible work of those in the Home Office, the FCDO and our embassies, and the coroners service, as well as of Murdered Abroad. Above all, it would support the bereaved families at the worst time of their lives. At present, I am minded to test the opinion of the House, but I really hope for a more positive response from the Minister on the recognition of the status of these victims.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, these amendments clearly touch on important issues about victim safety, transparency and access to information. Amendment 10 raises an interesting question about how the victims’ code applies where a close relative has been killed abroad. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on that proposal.
With regard to Amendment 15 in my name, the victim contact scheme needs to be extended here, given that some offenders convicted of violent and sexual offences may now receive sentences much lower than before. It is important to consider whether victims in those circumstances will be adequately supported and informed. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on that amendment as well.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I begin with Amendments 9 and 15 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, which seek to extend the eligibility for the victim contact scheme. As far as Amendment 9 is concerned, as I said in Committee, victims of coercive or controlling behaviour, stalking and harassment are already eligible for the updated scheme regardless of sentence length. Victims of violent and sexual offences, and of dangerous driving, where the offender receives a sentence of less than 12 months’ imprisonment will be able to request information through the new dedicated helpline.
The Bill already includes a mechanism for providing information about an offender to victims of any offence, irrespective of sentence length, where probation considers them to be at risk of physical or psychological harm if they are not given such information. However, the Government have a duty to safeguard taxpayers’ money and to ensure that it is used in the most effective and proportionate way. Our approach targets finite public funding on those most in need of the proactive contact through the victim contact scheme, while still providing the helpline for all victims to request information. Any expansion of the scheme would require diverting public funds from other essential parts of the criminal justice system.
That said, we will keep the eligibility under review. The Bill includes regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences and the specified lengths of sentence of such offences, which determine eligibility for either scheme. The Government believe that secondary legislation is the much more effective way of being able to tweak the scheme should it prove to be needed, rather than requiring primary legislation, which, of course, is much more difficult to deal with if it has an unintended consequence. Each of these amendments contains a requirement that information should be communicated in a timely and sensitive way. Of course this matters, but we believe that this is best achieved through guidance and training, not primary legislation.
Finally on the subject of these two amendments, I reassure your Lordships that we will be monitoring the scheme through the victims’ code compliance framework under the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, which will include an annual report. With this in mind, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I turn next to Amendment 10 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. I thank them both for their tireless work for victims and for continuing to raise this important matter. We have had a number of helpful and constructive meetings about this, and it is common ground between us that, when the unimaginable happens and a relative is a victim of homicide abroad, the help available to their families and loved ones can be patchy. We know that, and we all agree that it is not good enough.
As is so often the case with the noble Baroness’s and the noble Lord’s amendments, we agree entirely on the objective, but there is perhaps less consensus about the right way forward, because we think we can do this a better way. In addition—as the noble Baroness knows because I have discussed this with her—we are worried about unrealistically raising the expectations of victims’ families at an enormously sensitive and difficult time for them. The difficulty with this amendment, attractive though it may seem, is that many of the provisions of the victims’ code cannot and do not apply to most homicides abroad, because they cannot be prosecuted in the UK. In cases where the offence can be prosecuted in the UK, the code already applies.
Many aspects of support in these cases depend upon overseas judicial systems, which fall outside the scope of the victims’ code. Including them in an appendix risks creating unrealistic expectations. At a very stressful and dangerous time, we do not want families, who have had a quick look at the code and were not able to take in all the detail, to have the impression that they are guaranteed support and then to feel let down because decisions are made by foreign authorities over which the UK has no control.
Police in England and Wales can become involved only if they are formally invited by the relevant overseas authority. For example, under right 6 of the current victims’ code, victims have the right to be told by the police when key decisions on the investigation are made. However, in cases overseas, updates and access to information are determined by the processes and timelines of the foreign jurisdiction. This means that fixed reporting requirements, such as those in the victims’ code, cannot be guaranteed.
That said, we are all in agreement that these families can experience particular challenges navigating overseas criminal justice processes. For that reason, the Government published the victim-facing guidance in January 2026, and I am pleased to hear from the noble Baroness that she regards this as a good start. It brings together clear and accessible information for families in these difficult situations, setting out the services that can support them and directing them to the help that they need. As the new victims’ code is developed, we will review what further signposting information can be included to support all families bereaved by homicide abroad. Our feeling is that it should be a bespoke thing, rather than being tacked on to a victims’ code, most of which will not apply. The code consultation went live on 5 February; we are interested in encouraging everybody to contribute to it.
In addition, the newly updated organisational roles and responsibilities document, published in February 2026, sets out how the FCDO, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Ministry of Justice, the Chief Coroner and the coroners service will work together when a British national is the victim of murder or manslaughter abroad. While every case is considered individually, this document seeks to ensure a consistent level of service for bereaved families.
Within this, the Homicide Service can and does support families bereaved by a homicide abroad, including emotional and practical support, such as by covering the cost of translated documents. I suspect that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will not be surprised to hear that I cannot confirm anything today about the long-term future and budget of the Homicide Service. I am sorry that I cannot do that here and now, but I am sure she understands.
When the Bill was in Committee in this place, I heard concerns that families accessing Homicide Service support for translated documents are not always having a consistent experience. In the delivery of the next multi-year Homicide Service contract from April 2027, the Ministry of Justice will work with the provider to look again at how translation services are provided for this group of victims. We want to ensure that their needs are properly met when documents require translation and that this is reflected in the contract.
In addition to addressing concerns from Members of your Lordships’ House, the FCDO will review and refresh the training provided to consular staff on supporting families bereaved by homicide abroad.
Finally, I am grateful to the office of the Victims’ Commissioner for engaging with the FCDO and other agencies through the murder and manslaughter working group, which brings together stakeholders from across government, policing and the third sector to share expertise, align efforts and drive meaningful improvement. Where appropriate, the FCDO’s senior officer for global consular services will offer to meet the Victims’ Commissioner herself, or her representative, when particular issues arise that merit further discussion. I have already put the Victims’ Commissioner in touch with those representatives whom the noble Lord and the noble Baroness met at our meeting.
I turn finally to Amendments 17, 18 and 19 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. Before I move on to the operational issues that concern the Government, there is a drafting issue, so I first must raise a technical point. These amendments apply only to new Sections 44F and 44K in Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Bill. Those sections apply where a restriction order or restriction direction is not made. In Committee, noble Lords indicated that their concern is with cases of homicide—entirely understandably—but, in such cases, the offender will almost certainly be a restricted patient. Those victims would therefore be eligible for the victim contact scheme and would not need to request information through the helpline. The provisions updating the victim contact scheme are in Part 1 of Schedule 2, so the amendments as drafted cannot achieve their aim. I believe that noble Lords are more concerned about homicide cases, which would not be covered.
However, I turn to the wider points of principle. I listened carefully to the contributions made in your Lordships’ House and to the powerful arguments made to me by Emma Webber and Julian Hendy of Hundred Families, whom I was privileged to meet. I entirely accept that these three amendments are motivated by a desire to improve the provision of information to victims of mentally disordered offenders, but the challenge we face is not a legislative gap. The most effective way to secure better outcomes for victims is to ensure that clinicians have the understanding, confidence and tools to get it right first time. That is not achieved through more primary legislation, nor through complex, costly bureaucracy; it is achieved through improving decision-making in the first place, increasing awareness and embedding a clearer understanding of responsibilities—ensuring that there is not a knee-jerk defensiveness about supplying information.
That is why I am pleased to announce that we will be bringing forward a comprehensive capability-building programme with three core strands. First, we will make sure that clinicians understand their duties. To do that, we will work together with the Department of Health and Social Care to update the statutory Mental Health Act code of practice. We are going to add victim liaison requirements to the NHS secure service specifications, introduce a detailed joint protocol for clinicians and HMPPS staff and work with the Caldicott Guardian Council to support guardians’ role as expert information advisers to clinicians. Secondly, we will improve victim liaison officers’ understanding of this complex area and provide training to bolster the role of specialist mentally disordered offender victim liaison officers. Thirdly, we will produce victim-facing materials to explain clearly what information is and is not usually provided to victims of mentally disordered offenders. These will also explain the routes by which they can make a complaint, including if they did not receive the information they expected.
I consider that these measures will significantly improve the consistency of information provided to victims, and I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Russell, not to press his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
I am sorry, my Lords; I had not actually spoken to Amendment 9, as may have been noted, so it rather passed me by that it was for me to respond.
Having heard from the Minister, it is certainly my intention to support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which she will be moving.
Lord Keen of Elie
“Publication of court transcripts of sentencing remarks(1) Where a request is made for the sentencing remarks delivered in the Crown Court, the court must, subject to subsection (2), make those remarks publicly available online within 14 days of the request being received.(2) The court must, before publication, make the relevant victim(s) aware that they have a right to request anonymity, and if such a request is made, take the necessary steps to prevent the risk of identification of the victim, including through jigsaw identification.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that sentencing remarks released by the Crown Court are freely published online, whilst also requiring the Court to inform applicants of their right to request anonymity in such remarks.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I wish to test the opinion of the House with regard to Amendment 16, which was addressed during our submissions on the second group of amendments.
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, in this group there are Amendment 20, in which I move that Clause 12 should not stand part of the Bill, Amendment 23 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, to extend the period in which a case can be discontinued in the Crown Court to bring it into line with the magistrates’ court, and Amendment 29 in my name, which deals with exemptions to early release for sex offenders.
On Amendment 20, Clause 12 would represent a major departure from the long-established practice of private prosecution, with damaging consequences for access to justice in England and Wales. Where the state fails or indeed is unable to act, private prosecutions provide an alternative route for victims, be they individuals, corporations or, in many instances, charitable organisations. That is plainly in the public interest, and private prosecutors should therefore receive a reasonably sufficient compensation for the costs incurred, and indeed the victims should not have to meet the costs of having to vindicate their rights in the absence of a public prosecution. As I observed earlier, in Committee, the total reimbursement of private prosecution costs, which comes from the Legal Aid Fund, amounts to 0.18% of that fund. It would hardly pass muster in the stationery department. It is a tiny proportion of overall costs.
Clause 12 would give the Government the power to impose a cap on those costs. The saving would obviously be minimal but the result would be to make many private prosecutions quite untenable. Take the example of charities. They have to take action on a regular basis to protect their reputation in circumstances where they have been the victims of fraud—often very minor fraud, but which nevertheless can be highly damaging to their reputation and their ability to raise funds. In the present circumstances, the solicitors they engage to carry on those private prosecutions recover a reasonable amount of costs. The court can award costs, although it is not bound to, and thereafter they can be determined by the senior costs judge. They are not going to take up alternative judicial time.
I shall touch upon the Explanatory Notes that were issued by the Ministry of Justice. They acknowledge that the costs are generally those given in the Senior Courts Cost Office Guide. As the notes say:
“These are intended to reflect civil market rates of pay”.
Yes, they are, and these are the very lawyers who step forward to carry out these private prosecutions.
The relevant guidelines or rates are set by the Master of the Rolls. They did not move for 11 years but now they are subject to annual review, and rightly so. They are assessed in line with the services producer price index, which is entirely appropriate. The problem for the Ministry of Justice is the disparity between that reasonable rate of pay for those who carry out the private prosecution and what is paid to the defence under the legal aid scheme, which is, frankly, outrageously low and has not changed to any material extent during the last almost two years of this Government. The result is a vast disparity between one party’s costs and another’s. The Explanatory Notes go on to tell us that this is going to be an enabling power:
“This measure seeks to address this inequality to reduce the disparity between the amounts which may be paid to private prosecutors and legally aided defence lawyers”.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I begin with Amendment 20, which deals with Clause 12. First, I am relying on the Explanatory Notes from the Minister’s own department. Where there is a private prosecution and then an award of costs, the costs are assessed by the criminal cases unit in the Ministry of Justice. If there is a dispute—and there should not be, because there are established guidelines, the Senior Courts Costs Office guidelines—it can go to the senior costs judge, who is experienced in addressing these matters. So that is not a problem at all, and there is no real difficulty there.
However, the Minister suggested that there was “some evidence at the margins” that people might be overcharging. Well, if you think that there is some evidence at the margins, go away and consult—and if you discover that there is evidence at the margins, come back and we can legislate. But you do not legislate and then go looking for some evidence at the margins: that is simply back to front.
I make one further point. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, mentioned that this was money leaving the MoJ. Let us put this into context: 0.18% of the legal aid budget is £3.6 million, and it is not leaving: it is actually a very wise investment by the Ministry of Justice. Investing that very modest sum relieves the Crown Prosecution Service of a vast number of relatively minor prosecutions that would cost a great deal to pursue. So I do not accept that this is somehow “lost money”: it is actually an extremely good investment on the part of the MoJ and it shows results.
I appreciate that the issues around Amendment 29 were touched on in the Sentencing Act, but there is no prohibition, subject to the clerks, on us revisiting it if we did not get it right the first time. We now have an ideal opportunity to get it right, and there is no reason why, with sexual and domestic abuse offences, we should not be able to reconcile our sentencing provisions with other serious crimes. So I shall seek to test the opinion of the House on both Amendment 20 and Amendment 29.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I were members of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House, which was formed only in 2020. Our first inquiry and report were on the advent of new technologies in the justice system. During that work, I often asked myself—sometimes aloud—how you would feel if you were arrested, charged, convicted and imprisoned on the basis of evidence that not only did you not understand but could not be explained. We now know how people felt and feel.
That was in 2022, which was centuries ago in technical terms. I realise that the lexicon has expanded here and I hear terms that I have never heard before, but the basic issues remain. Our concerns then were about transparency and regulation, among other things, and that anyone could be affected. We were talking not just about insider trading and corporate fraud, as one witness powerfully put it, but
“high-volume data that is mostly about poor people”.
We found a lot of enthusiasm for the technology, but not a corresponding commitment to a thorough evaluation of it. These Benches support Amendment 21, which seems to have been a very constructive contribution to taking these issues forward.
At the last stage, I supported Amendment 22. I do so no less now. Sometimes we show that we are not as open as we should be to the way that society moves on or to the life experiences of people younger than almost all of us and how they wish to express them. I do not really feel qualified to say more than that.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, this has been a thoughtful debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and her supporters for their work on these issues.
On Amendment 21, I reiterate the sentiments expressed in Committee and by many noble Lords across the House from all parties. In light of the appalling Post Office scandal, keeping in mind the increasing use of artificial intelligence, the need to remove the presumption of reliability for computer evidence is now clear. The noble Baroness has responded to some of the concerns expressed in Committee in bringing forward this redrafted amendment. I commend her attention to this issue.
My concern is that the Government have had long enough to look at this. Their call for evidence closed on 15 April 2025, so I look forward to hearing from the Minister where we are now, given that the call for evidence is a year old. I am sure she will be anxious to update us on that.
I understand the basis for Amendment 22, but I have some reservations about its detail. There is an issue about the objectivity of the conditions listed in subsection (2) of the proposed new clause. I would certainly be interested to hear more about how the court should consider who is suitably qualified to give evidence about
“linguistic and artistic conventions and the social and cultural context of the creative or artistic expression”.
It is an important area, but it is also a difficult one that will repay further consideration.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 21 in the names of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and a formidable trio of other Members of your Lordships’ House, the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, who is not in his place, is extremely important. I really mean it when I say I want to thank my noble friend, both for tabling it and for the work she has done to refine it since Committee. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and my noble friend Lord Beamish, all of whom have given up their time to meet me during the last two weeks to discuss this amendment to try to get it right. I know the entire House wants to thank the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and my noble friend Lord Beamish for their ceaseless championing of the victims of the Post Office Horizon scandal. It is thanks to them that we are here taking the steps we are today.
Lord Keen of Elie
“(b) in that sub-paragraph, for the words from “within” to the end substitute “—(a) in relation to England and Wales, within 56 days from the day on which the sentence, or the last of the sentences, in the case was passed, subject to sub-paragraph (2);(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, within 28 days from the day on which the sentence, or the last of the sentences, in the case was passed.”;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would extend the time limit for the Attorney General to apply for leave to refer an unduly lenient sentence in England or Wales to the Court of Appeal.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, this group contains my amendment seeking to increase the unduly lenient sentence deadline to 56 days, and amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeking to allow that timeframe to be extended in exceptional circumstances. The whole group concerns both how the unduly lenient sentence scheme operates in practice and how long the timeframe should be for an application. Amendments 24 and 25 in my name would increase the window for applications to 56 days.
These were in fact amendments that the Government had pledged to table. However, they decided to withdraw them just two days later. They explained that an increased timeframe for the scheme would be of little use if victims were unaware of its existence. I entirely agree with that in principle, but I wonder why we cannot have both an increase in the timeframe and a suitable means of intimation.
Amendments 26 and 27 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, would also act to strengthen victims’ rights in this respect, and we support them. Amendment 27 would place a duty on a nominated government department to inform victims and their families. While the Minister will no doubt say that this is the responsibility of the witness care unit and should therefore not be in legislation, we are inclined to disagree. Too many cases exist of victims losing the right to an unduly lenient sentence application because they were either not notified or notified too late, and therefore statutory provision may be appropriate.
I do not intend to press these amendments to a Division, but I hope that the Minister will address the reasons why the Government decided to withdraw their own amendment and explain the reasoning behind that. I believe that that would be welcomed across the House.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I express my thanks to Claire Waxman, the Victims’ Commissioner, and to Tracey Hanson and Katie Brett, who have campaigned with great commitment on behalf of victims.
In Committee, much was said on all sides about the importance of the unduly lenient sentence scheme in ensuring consistency. As all who participated know, it is not an appeal for victims who are dissatisfied by the length or type of sentence: rather, it is a legal safeguard, exercisable by the Attorney-General, to correct sentences that fall outside the appropriate range. As such, it is a constitutional safeguard vested in the Attorney-General as guardian of the public interest, not a mechanism for anyone to relitigate sentencing. That said, victims will often play a vital role in drawing cases to the Attorney-General’s attention for consideration: we recognise and indeed encourage that.
As is generally known, the time limit is a strict one: 28 days with no exceptions. The Government are aware of and have listened to the comments of the victims and those supporting them, who have long complained that the system just is not working for them; in particular, that they are often not told about the ULS scheme; and, in any event, 28 days is not long enough.
Against that background, I turn to the amendments concerning the time limits, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Sandhurst. Your Lordships will be aware that the Government had been considering tabling their own amendment to increase the time limit. As I said in Committee, we hoped to bring something forward on Report. Today, I take up the invitation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, to set out why we have not done so.
This is fundamentally a Bill for victims. Unsurprisingly, victims have told us that they want to be listened to by the Government. Both victims and the Victims’ Commissioner have told us clearly that increasing the time limit to 56 days would not address the problem they face. They have told us that any time limit, whether it is 28 days, 56 days or 365 days, is meaningless if they are not informed about the ULS scheme in the first place.
Plainly, all victims should be told. There are mechanisms in place for doing so, but we have heard enough from victims to make it clear to us that there are occasions on which this is not happening. To paraphrase what I said today in an earlier group, a right is not much of a right if you do not know about it.
To the victims, I say: we have heard you and we will continue to listen. The victims asked us not to bring forward our amendment extending the time limit to 56 days, and so we have not done so. This explains why we cannot accept Amendments 24 and 25.
I turn to Amendment 26 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I thank her for not only raising the issue but for the positive and constructive talks we have had. As some of your Lordships may have gathered, the noble Baroness and I have been spending rather a lot of time together over the last few weeks. I have enjoyed every moment, of course. I can understand why it is felt that an exception from the strict time limit would be a good thing, but there are a number of issues with it, and I will try to deal with these briefly.
First, it seeks to treat a symptom of the problem rather than tackling the cause. The underlying problem is that some victims are apparently not being told about the ULS scheme. The noble Baroness’s amendment seeks to address that by creating a mechanism to bypass the time limit if that happens. But this Government are not here to patch up the symptoms; the Government’s view is that we must address the root cause—victims are telling us that they are not being informed—rather than create a mechanism that responds only after the problem has occurred.
The second issue is the question of what exceptional circumstances would mean in practice. The Government’s concern is that the amendment will be self-defeating, because “exceptional” has its ordinary meaning—something unusual, not typical—and cannot be exhaustively defined in legislation, but something that is not genuinely unusual cannot be described as exceptional. Given that the noble Baroness’s reason for tabling the amendment is, regrettably, that victims do not get told about it, if they are not told, it cannot be exceptional. This is very likely to apply to the very cases that would not be able to take advantage of the law. I hope the noble Baroness will understand why the Government cannot accept the amendment and that she will work with me and my officials as we look to address the real issue: ensuring that victims are notified of the scheme in the first place.
Amendment 30 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, would require a public consultation. The Law Commission did exactly this. The Law Commission has held a public consultation on the ULS scheme, including specific questions about the 28-day time limit. Holding another one would be a waste of taxpayers’ money. I hope your Lordships will join me in looking forward to the commission’s final report when it is published later this year. The Government will, of course, consider its findings carefully.
I turn briefly to the remaining amendments, which seek to place a statutory duty on a designated government department or the Crown Prosecution Service to notify the victims. Again, there is no issue between us about the fact that the Government need to ensure that every victim is told. I entirely agree with what the noble Baroness is trying to achieve, but I want to persuade her that there is a better way of doing it.
The amendments seek to create a duty which already exists. Police in witness care units are already responsible for informing victims about the unduly lenient sentence scheme. Using primary legislation to try to make people do what they are already required to do is not the best way of going about things. These amendments impose a duplicative statutory duty, potentially with different timeframes or differing lines of accountability. It must be self-evident that this risks confusion rather than clarity, particularly where concurrent statutory duties could blur operational responsibilities. The fear is that the victims might actually, as a result, end up worse off.
I therefore ask your Lordships to work with us, the Victims’ Commissioner and the victims themselves to get to the heart of the issue and develop practical, workable improvements to notification and awareness. We want every victim to be properly informed, in good time, so that they can exercise their rights with confidence. Our focus is on fixing the long-standing problems with notification rather than changing the time limits themselves.
We already have the commitment of the Attorney-General’s Office, the CPS, the Home Office and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to work closely with us to improve awareness of the scheme. They have all urgently assessed what actions can be taken in their respective areas. There is a quite a detailed plan.
Given the time, I will undertake to write to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, rather than read out the next four pages of my speech, for which I do not think anybody would thank me. For these reasons, I ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
I thank the Minister for her explanation and understand that she is giving further consideration to this issue. In these circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Assisted Dying Legislation: Isle of Man and Jersey
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(2 weeks, 3 days ago)
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Baroness Levitt (Lab)
At the risk of repeating myself, the Government do not look at the merits of the legislation that they receive in relation to the Crown dependencies: these are stand-alone pieces of legislation that do not affect the position the Government take in relation to the Private Member’s Bill before this House.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, in addition to the assisted dying legislation in the Crown dependencies of Jersey and the Isle of Man, there is, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, observed, also legislation coming forward in Scotland and, quite distinctly and separately, in England and Wales. If assisted dying becomes lawful in one jurisdiction of the United Kingdom but not another, can the Minister explain what UK-wide framework has been developed to manage the legal, ethical and medical consequences of that divergence, or are we in danger of creating for the United Kingdom a fragmented regime in this most ethically sensitive issue, without any agreed cross-border protocol?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I understand why the noble and learned Lord asks that question, but it would be entirely premature of the Government to work out what the situation is going to be, since we do not know whether or if that Private Member’s Bill will pass through your Lordships’ House.
Court Reporting Data
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(1 month, 1 week ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the Courtsdesk court reporting data has been a great success in providing access to data from our courts. It has been reported that about 1,500 journalists have used the platform. It has proved particularly important in collating information about grooming gangs and in properly investigating that terrible issue. It would be extremely damaging to the transparency of our justice system if that service was to be extinguished.
Various excuses have been advanced by the Minister in the other place, despite her having announced in July of last year that the agreement with Courtsdesk would be continued. I highlight two of the excuses put forward. First, there is the allegation of a data breach. We now know that the Ministry of Justice data protection officer concluded, following investigation of that report, that there was no basis for a report to the Information Commissioner. Does the Minister agree with her department’s data protection officer? Secondly, there was an allegation of the sharing of data with a third-party AI company—I use the term “third party” advisedly. The data platform had contracted with an AI firm to carry out sub-processing in terms of an agreement. Does the Minister agree that, under Article 4(10) of the general data protection regulation, someone carrying out processing in terms of such an agreement is not to be regarded as a third party for the purposes of data protection?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt)
My Lords, I am in the happy position of being able to reassure your Lordships’ House that there is no cover-up or conspiracy. The facts are as follows. Courtsdesk, a commercial company, was given copies of the data held in magistrates’ courts’ registers for one purpose only: to share it with bona fide journalists. However, Courtsdesk then shared it with a third-party company without asking or even telling the Ministry of Justice. This data contained sensitive information about both defendants and victims.
When the Ministry of Justice found out that Courtsdesk had done this, it was less than transparent with us, at which point the Government did what any responsible Government would have done: we stopped sending copies of the data to Courtsdesk and required it to remove the copies it still had from its platform. I reassure your Lordships’ House that the original data has always been retained by the Ministry of Justice, and no records have been deleted or lost.
Captain of the King’s Bodyguard of the Yeomen of the Guard and Deputy Chief Whip (Baroness Wheeler) (Lab)
My Lords, this is a 10-minute Urgent Question, so questions must be brief. We will now move on to the Lib Dems.
Separation Centres Review
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(1 month, 1 week ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to respond to the Government’s Statement on separation centres and the independent review by Jonathan Hall KC. While the review itself contains important material, we must be frank about several critical issues that have been raised both in and out of Parliament.
First, on the fundamental question of what threat we are talking about when discussing the need for separation centres, the reality is clear. Islamist extremism remains the predominant form of extremist offending within our prison estate. As the shadow Justice Secretary pointed out in the other place, Security Service statistics show that Islamist-related threats form the majority of the counterterrorism focus, and most terrorist prisoners in custody are convicted on Islamist-related charges. This is not a matter of debate but an acknowledgement of the practical threat that separation centres are designed to contain, and it must inform both policy and parliamentary scrutiny.
Secondly, we have concerns about the Government’s stated intention to look at litigation based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. While that may offer superficial reassurance, it is in fact Article 3 of the convention that is the real legal barrier. Article 3 is absolute. There are no exceptions, no public order or national security carve-outs and no limited derogations. It prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the strongest terms, as that may be interpreted.
We have already seen its damaging consequences in our own courts. In the case of Abu v Secretary of State for Justice, the High Court found that prolonged segregation of a convicted terrorist, who was already in a separation centre, amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment, in breach of Article 3. It was found that Ministers had failed to account for his mental health needs adequately before imposing those conditions. This was a binding judicial judgment, applying the European convention directly to the operation of separation regimes in England and Wales.
Let us be clear: Article 3 cannot be overridden or restricted by statute or ministerial policy; it is absolute. No amount of legislative tweaking proposed by the Justice Secretary will permit separation conditions that our courts find contravene Article 3. If the Government’s strong desire is to insulate separation centre management from litigation, they will find that Article 3 presents the true legal limit, far beyond anything provided by Article 8, which is a qualified act. I therefore ask the Minister to confirm precisely what steps the Government intend to take in relation to Article 3. How, in practical and legal terms, do they plan to deal with the fact that the law, as it stands, prohibits what is interpreted to be inhuman or degrading treatment, even in the face of compelling public safety arguments?
In these circumstances, while we want to ensure that our prisons are safe, that our staff are protected and that dangerous offenders cannot radicalise others or cause greater mayhem, clearly there is a fundamental problem with the legal constraints imposed by the convention, and the Government need to address these.
Lord Addington (LD)
My Lords, when it comes to the basic question that has already been raised today—the European Convention on Human Rights—I am afraid that my Benches very much disagree with the noble and learned Lord who has just spoken. It was Churchill who said that it is the way you treat your prisoners that defines you as civilised. So are we going to make sure that we define their rights? If we look at this in practical terms, how are we going to balance this out?
If we are going to make sure that the prison officers in charge of this are safe—that is surely one of the most important parts here—when will the Minister be able to tell us whether we have gone through the improved training programmes that have been suggested and when they will have the equipment they need? These are two fundamental things.
The secure centres mean that we are not going to allow this highly dangerous section of prisoners into the main prison population, which is right; radicalisation has always been a problem in prisons, and we are doing something to stop it here. It is not only Islamic terrorists but far-right extremists—I think it was 60%, 30% and then 10% of other groups, if I understood the figures right. What are we doing to make sure these people are isolated and do not make the situation worse, and are we going to make sure that those who are containing it are properly equipped? That is the basic question here.
I appreciate that the Government have moved and have accepted Jonathan Hall’s recommendations. The timeframe is very important, as then we will know what we are going to expect from the Government and will be able to judge how it has succeeded. I hope that the Minister will be able to answer these basic questions in fairly short order.
Victims and Courts Bill
Lord Keen of Elie ExcerptsMonday 9th February 2026
(1 month, 1 week ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the rationale behind restricting the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing to only the Crown Courts.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments in my name relates to Clauses 1 and 2. I start by observing that we on these Benches are broadly supportive of most of the provisions in the Bill. Many of the amendments tabled in my name, save one or two exceptions, have the aim of strengthening the Bill’s existing provisions rather than removing them. The use of reasonable force to compel attendance at sentencing hearings was a measure first proposed by the previous Conservative Government in the Criminal Justice Bill, which fell at the Dissolution of Parliament. It is, therefore, a policy that we on these Benches strongly support.
As the Government have consistently said, victims and their families deserve to see justice done. They deserve to hear directly those remarks which explain the court’s reasons for the sentences that are being imposed, and they deserve the chance to face their offenders and have their own voices heard in open court. In that spirit, many of the amendments in my name probe details of Clauses 1 and 2, and question how they would operate in practice. These clauses set out the statutory powers for judges to order an offender to attend court for their sentencing hearing, by reasonable force if necessary. As we have heard previously, offenders who refuse to attend their sentencing hearing thereby insult their victims. Offenders should not be able to undermine the final moment of justice in such a way. The amendments in this group ask the important question of why the Government are not taking this opportunity to expand the applicability of Clauses 1 and 2, given their upcoming and substantial court reforms.
I understand that the application only to the Crown Court in these clauses is the same as the approach taken in our Criminal Justice Bill, but I point out a crucial difference between the positions of the last Government and this Government. When this clause was originally proposed, there were no plans to alter the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ courts. However, this Government are now proposing to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to three years, thereby shifting a large number of cases away from the Crown Court towards magistrates. As such, magistrates will hear a much greater proportion of increasingly serious cases, which surely throws into question the application and scope of Clauses 1 and 2.
In fact, this is a different contextual background from not only that of the previous Government but that of this Government. The Bill was introduced in the other place before the Government announced their court reforms. So, as published, Clauses 1 and 2 would have permitted the compulsory attendance of an offender for sentences between one year and three years. Now, however, if the Bill is unamended, and the Government’s court reforms go ahead, a person convicted in a magistrates’ court for an offence that would have previously been heard only before a Crown Court will not be required to attend their sentencing hearing.
If it was previously the Government’s view that offenders facing between one and three years’ imprisonment should be subject to compulsory attendance at their sentencing hearing, why have they not made the necessary amendments to the Bill? Perhaps that is because they have changed their mind, in which case the Minister should be clear about that. If it is the Government’s position that the scope of offenders who should be compelled to attend their sentencing hearing should remain the same as when the Bill was introduced, they must surely accept these amendments. The question that then arises is: why stop at the Crown Court, when extending these powers to other courts could make a meaningful and positive difference to the victims of other crimes?
We should not dismiss the experience of victims of, for example, burglary. Requiring an offender to attend their sentencing hearing may give those victims just as much closure. Conversely, an offender refusing to attend could cause just as much insult, if this series of amendments is not accepted. If anything, by reserving these powers for the Crown Court only, we risk playing down the significance of other crimes by signalling that offenders do not have to face their victims. Extending these powers to other courts would not only provide greater consistency but show that no crime is more permissible than another, or that one victim’s experience is not more or less important than another’s. If the rationale is one of practicality or resource, the Government should make that case. If, however, there is no compelling reason, whether it be legal, procedural or financial, the Bill presents an ideal opportunity to address a gap, rather than requiring further primary legislation later on down the line after court reform has been implemented.
If the Government’s intention is to strengthen victims’ confidence in the criminal justice system, surely consistency must be at the heart of that ambition. Victims do not experience crime through the lens of jurisdictional boundaries. They experience the indignity of being wronged and they rightly expect the justice system to deal with offenders in a manner that recognises that harm each time, regardless of which court is sentencing. It is for these reasons that I believe the Government should revisit the decision to confine these powers solely to the Crown Court; otherwise, the Bill risks creating a two-tier system, where the victims of some crimes are afforded the closure of seeing justice done in person, while others are denied it for reasons that are administrative rather than principled.
I would be grateful if the Minister could also clarify what consideration has been given to victims’ expectations and their confidence in the justice process when limiting these powers to the Crown Court. I hope that the Minister will reflect on these points and consider whether there is scope for a more ambitious and comprehensive approach. I look forward to her response and to working to strengthen this legislation for the benefit of all victims. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I will make a brief observation about the amendment. The exercise of this power by a judge is never going to be easy, and we should be very cautious about the way this is introduced. Let us first see how it works with people who have the experience of handling what, in the circumstances, will be a very difficult position before we move on to doing it in all courts. This power must be confined to those cases where it is really necessary, because I think that a number of us who have had experience of this would be very worried indeed if this power came to be routinely deployed.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, explores the reasons for limiting this power to the Crown Court.
Before I begin, I am sure that the whole Committee will wish to join me in paying tribute to the families of Jan Mustafa, Henriett Szucs, Sabina Nessa, Zara Aleena, and Olivia Pratt-Korbel—whose mother and aunt sit below the Bar today. Their tireless campaigning has brought about this change. They have persuaded the Government that when a cowardly offender refuses to attend court, it causes anger and upset, which can feel like a final insult to victims and their families, who have sat through the trial waiting for the moment when they can tell the world—and, importantly, the offender—about the impact their crimes have had. Many of them want the opportunity to look the offender in the eye as he or she hears about the effects of what they have done.
Offenders are expected to attend court for sentence, and the overwhelming majority do so. Because magistrates’ courts hear less serious cases, offenders are more likely to be on bail, and where an offender is on bail, the courts have powers to compel attendance by issuing a warrant. When a warrant is issued, the defendant is brought before the court in custody for the warrant to be executed, and the judge can add an additional sentence for the offence of failing to surrender to bail, which will appear on their record in future.
However, in the Crown Court, which deals only with the top level of serious crime, offenders are much more often remanded in custody, and so court powers to get them physically into court are more restricted. That is why the Government have acted by bringing forward this legislation which gives three powers that can be used in relation to recalcitrant—that is the right word, as used by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—offenders: first, authorising the use of reasonable force, except in the case of children, because we are a civilised country, and this Government do not believe in using force on children; secondly, for offenders who still refuse to attend, or for those who are disruptive once they are there, the power to add an additional sentence; and, thirdly, the power to impose the same kinds of prison sanctions as a prison governor can impose.
However, getting an unwilling and often disruptive offender to court is by no means straightforward, and it inevitably causes a delay to the sentencing hearing for the following reasons. At the outset, the judge will have to hear submissions from prosecution and defence counsel, as well as possibly from the prison and escort staff, as to whether the offender has a reasonable excuse for non-attendance and, if not, whether to exercise these new statutory powers. Then the judge will need to give a ruling, giving reasons as to why, in the circumstances of that particular case, it would be necessary, reasonable and proportionate to use reasonable force to get the offender to court.
Then the prison and transport staff will have to go and get the prisoner from the place, whether it is a prison or a court cell, which they are refusing to leave. The prison and transport staff will then have to use their judgment as to how best to execute the judge’s ruling, including what degree of force to use. Finally, if the offender is forced into court and is then disruptive, this is likely to cause more delay while the judge decides what to do next.
There is probably one thing we can all agree on: the criminal courts do not need any additional delays. Judges will need to weigh up carefully whether and when to use their new powers. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the question of the inherent powers that courts already have. Both the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts have inherent powers to deal with a non-attendance as a contempt of court, but these are used sparingly because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out very powerfully, it is far from straightforward.
For these reasons, the Government’s view is that this new legislation is appropriately restricted to Crown Court sentencing. It represents a reasonable and proportionate response to the problem, because it is the Crown Court where these powers are needed. Operational arrangements are already in place for producing the most serious and violent offenders at the Crown Court, managing the risks that that involves and, where necessary, using proportionate force. So, for these reasons, we consider that expanding the power to magistrates’ courts might create legal and operational uncertainty and unnecessary delay to court proceedings. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to the debate, and indeed the observations with regard to the timing of any extension of these powers.
I would observe, with respect to the submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that if these provisions help victims in the Crown Court, it is not clear why they would not help victims in magistrates’ courts.
The Minister talked at length of the difficulty of implementation with regard to these provisions, but that would apply equally in the Crown Court and the magistrates’ courts. Indeed, the appearance of serious offenders in the magistrates’ courts will of course be an immediate development with the changes under the Sentencing Act, which extend the sentencing powers of magistrates to three years.
Lord Keen of Elie
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes why the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing applies to offenders aged 18 and above.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst propose that the provisions in Clauses 1 and 2 apply to offenders from the age of 16, rather than only to those aged 18 and over. As drafted, Clauses 1 and 2 are explicitly limited in their application to those aged 18 or over. That is a departure from the original Conservative proposal for this power, which would have required the court to consult the relevant youth offending team if the offender in question was under 18. We therefore believe that the blanket threshold of 18 should be examined.
The age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is, of course, 10 years of age. Even if it is believed that the age of criminal responsibility might reasonably be set higher than 10—a subject of recent debate in this Chamber—there is widespread cross-party consensus that it should be significantly lower than 18. Indeed, Scotland, after extensive consultation and careful consideration, chose to set the age of criminal responsibility at 14, reflecting evidence of developmental science and, indeed, public expectations in the field of criminal law.
A 16 year-old who has been convicted of a serious offence will be expected to go before a Crown Court judge to receive their sentence, yet will face no statutory obligation to attend their own sentencing hearing under these provisions. That appears inconsistent with the intent of these provisions.
We have seen both in recent cases and in parliamentary proceedings on this Bill how deeply distressing and unfortunate it can be for victims and families when an offender refuses to face the court at sentencing, an act described by Ministers as a “final insult” to those already traumatised. It is difficult to articulate why someone aged 16 who has been found guilty of a serious offence should be exempt from measures designed to ensure that they confront the consequences of their own criminal actions.
We should also reflect upon the wider tapestry of civic responsibility that has developed, and which this Government would also confer upon 16 year-olds. The Government have proposed to lower the voting age to 16. Someone aged 16 can marry; they can pay tax and join the Armed Forces. They assume a suite of responsibilities in civil society. They are treated as autonomous agents in a host of legal and social contexts, and to exempt them uniquely in this narrow but important sphere from the requirement to attend their own sentencing hearing when convicted of a crime appears inconsistent with those wider developments.
We owe it to victims and to the public to ensure that the measures we put on statute reflect a coherent and principled approach. These amendments ensure that they align with the realities of criminal responsibility and the Government’s wider policy. Someone who commits a serious crime at 16, such as murder or serious violence, should not be placed beyond the reach of these important attendant provisions. That is the inconsistency which appears to us in the present form of Clauses 1 and 2.
Accountability cannot be robust at conviction and sentencing in substance but simply optional at the point of sentencing in practice. We have seen very recent examples of relatively young people aged 15 and 16 committing the most heinous offences, in some instances murder. There can be no doubt, of course, that the existing framework for youth justice should be maintained and remain separate and distinct from these provisions. Nevertheless, when it comes to those of 16 years and older, their personal conduct does take them before the Crown Court. They appear there for sentencing and there is no principled justification for differentiating on the basis of age alone between 16 and 18 when culpability and legal responsibility have already been established. With that in mind, I respectfully commend these amendments.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, briefly, these amendments would treat offenders over the age of 16 in the same way as offenders over the age of 18 in relation to three aspects of the compulsory attendance regime. The first aspect is the requirement that the court consult a youth offending team before making an order; the second is the use of force against young offenders, and the third is the use of prison sanctions in the case of service offenders.
The Member’s Explanatory Statement explains that these amendments probe why these provisions apply only to offenders over the age of 18. The position that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has taken is that they should apply to everyone over the age of 16. I suggest that the answer to the question is that, modest as they are, these provisions make different arrangements for offenders under 18 because they are designed to protect 16 and 17 year-old offenders, who are children and not yet adults. I submit, and we on these Benches believe, that it is right that contemporary criminal justice attempts to treat offenders under 18 in a way that acknowledges the particular vulnerabilities of 16 and 17 year-olds.
In the first group of amendments today, the noble Baroness said that the Government broadly agree with that position. The amendments seek to remove the distinction between 16 and 17 year-olds on the one hand and adults, albeit young adults, on the other. We say that this would be a retrograde step and that it should be opposed. I would add that of the measures that are proposed in the amendments, those sanctioning the use of force against 16 year-olds—to bring them to sentencing hearings against their will—would be particularly egregious and potentially very damaging.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start by reassuring your Lordships’ House that an attendance order can be made in respect of all offenders, including children. Most children are not tried in the Crown Court; they are tried in the youth court, even for serious offences. It is very rare for children of this age to appear in the Crown Court. If they do, an attendance order for their sentencing hearing can be made. The only difference is that force will not be used to get those children to court. The reason is that current operational policy, informed by the Taylor review of 2020, restricts the use of force on children. Domestic policy is also informed by the UK Government’s signatory status to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. We have committed to complying with its duties under the convention. During the debate a week ago in your Lordships’ House on the age of criminal responsibility, I said that this Government recognise that children in the youth justice system can be some of our most vulnerable citizens. Many of them are themselves victims of neglect and abuse, at the very least, and there is a disproportionate occurrence of special educational needs and neurodivergence in this cohort.
While we acknowledge that some children have committed very serious crimes for which they must be punished, this Government do not treat them merely as small adults. We have devised a separate but related regime for them. Where a child fails to attend court, or is disruptive once there, that may be treated as a contempt of court, but the maximum penalty is a fine, with the court taking into account limited means and making relevant arrangements for younger children. Lowering the threshold from 18 to 16 would cut across that safeguarding architecture. The Government’s view is that the strongest coercive path should be reserved for adults, where the legal, operational and ethical framework properly supports their use. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendments.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their measured observations on these proposed amendments. There is broad agreement across the House that attendance at sentencing is about accountability, about dignity for victims and about respect for the court. Refusal to attend sentencing has rightly been described by Ministers as a final insult to victims and families. The question before the House, then, is not whether the principle is right but to whom it should be applied.
These provisions are about ensuring that offenders confront the consequences of their actions, allowing victims to see justice done and hear sentencing remarks. They also uphold the authority and integrity of the court.
We are dealing with a situation in which 16 and 17 year-olds find themselves prosecuted in the Crown Court for serious offences, including murder, in respect of which they receive long custodial sentences. A 16 year-old can be convicted of murder or serious violence; that same 16 year-old would face no statutory obligation to attend their own sentencing hearing. Accountability cannot logically begin at conviction, however, and then disappear at sentencing. From a victim’s perspective, the same harm emerges regardless of whether an offender is 16, 17 or 18 years of age. The distress caused when an offender refuses to attend sentencing does not diminish by virtue of their age.
There is also the wider policy context that I mentioned before, which is that we now treat 16 year-olds, in essence, as adults in respect both of the proposal that they should be able to vote and of the fact that they can marry and can join the Armed Forces, and in respect of their wider social and political autonomy.
These amendments do not impact on the youth justice system. They do not remove judicial discretion. The courts will always retain discretion and take account of the welfare, capacity and safeguarding of 16 year-olds. In these circumstances, it respectfully appears to us that this proposal does not undermine Clauses 1 and 2, but rather seeks to strengthen them for the benefit of victims: someone whose conduct is serious enough to warrant Crown Court sentencing should not be shielded from accountability at the point of sentencing. But, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions that have been made. I shall begin with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, in his amendments, which seek to clarify what is meant by, for example, the “relevant local authority” in this Bill, as well as to put extra provisions in place concerning parental responsibility. We support the aim behind Amendment 17 that others with parental responsibility for the child in question are properly and, indeed, promptly informed if a prohibited steps order is made against an offender. These are clearly well-intentioned amendments that highlight that certain aspects of the Bill need to be thought through a little more carefully and clarified. I hope that the Minister will provide assurances about how that can be achieved.
I also thank my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth for bringing forward his amendments, which would allow the Crime Court to take into account not only the interests of justice but the best interests of the child when deciding whether to make a prohibited steps order. On these amendments, we are not at this stage able to adopt a settled position. That is not because the underlying principle is unsound, but because further clarification is required from the Minister. As drafted, one of the exemptions to the making of a prohibited steps order is where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so, but that, as has been observed, is a broad and somewhat opaque formulation. We would be grateful if the Minister could explain what circumstances the Government envisage falling within that exemption. In particular, can the Minister offer examples of cases in which it would genuinely be in the interests of justice for a child to remain under the parental responsibility of an individual convicted of a serious sexual offence and sentenced to more than four years’ imprisonment?
These amendments would add an explicit reference to the best interests of the child. That is a familiar concept in family law, but its interaction with the existing exemption is not at all clear. I invite the Minister to clarify whether the Government consider that the child’s best interests are already subsumed within the interests of justice, or whether this amendment would materially alter the test applied by the court.
Amendments 18, 20, 24, 30, 31 and 32 in my name reflect our concerns about the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. As drafted, both clauses state that a prohibited steps order against an offender that restricts their parental responsibility will not immediately cease to have effect if an offender is acquitted on appeal. Instead, both clauses include sections that set out a review process whereby the relevant local authority must make an application to the court for the acquitted offender. That is hardly consistent with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to as a short, speedy and summary order in circumstances where there is a successful appeal.
The clauses as drafted unnecessarily complicate and confuse the issue. The law should be clear that an acquittal brings the prohibited steps order to an end. People who are found to be not guilty of an offence should not have their parental responsibility, or indeed any other rights, restricted, even on a temporary basis. That principle is straightforward and our amendments seek only to ensure that the legislation reflects that clarity. I hope that will have the support of the House, and I urge the Minister to reconsider and simplify the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. There is no compelling reason why these review orders should be left in place for innocent citizens and then be the subject of applications by a local authority on their behalf to another division of the court.
Amendment 18 is tabled to affirm our support for the provision of Clause 3 that, where an offender only has their sentence reduced, a prohibited steps order should continue to apply. We on these Benches already have reservations over why an offender’s length of imprisonment or detention must be four years or more for parental responsibility to be restricted. I note that the amendment made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, refers to a period of six months rather than four years. Clearly, there is scope for consideration as to where the line might be drawn as a matter of policy. If a sentence of four years is reduced on appeal, we do not believe that this should result in a prohibited steps order ceasing to have effect. It is quite unlike the situation where there is an acquittal on appeal. Such an outcome could create significant uncertainty for the child for whom the offender previously had parental responsibility. Crucially, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the offender remains guilty of a serious sexual offence against the child regardless of any adjustment in the sentence. An increased risk to the child’s safety or well-being could well emerge from such a situation.
There is also the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, about what happens in circumstances where a sentence is increased under the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. I invite the Government to address that point because clearly it has not been considered in the context of the present drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. For these reasons, I hope the Government will take all these amendments very seriously and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start by repeating what I said in the debate about an earlier group. A prohibited steps order is not intended to be an additional punishment; rather, it is a tool devised to protect children. The aim of keeping the child safe and doing what is best for them is the central factor in every case. As I have already said, these powers are not intended to replicate, far less replace, the powers of the family court. Crown Court judges are simply not trained to make decisions about children, and they do not have the time to do so. The point has been made most powerfully by both the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. To ask the Crown Court to replicate the procedures of the family court could lead only to more time being needed to consider every case. As I have now said on at least three occasions today, the one thing the Crown Courts do not need is for cases to take longer.
Lord Keen of Elie
“(d) the National Crime Agency.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds the National Crime Agency to the list of relevant bodies.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this group which concern the operation of Clauses 6 and 7 and the scope and operation of the victim contact scheme. I turn first to Amendment 42 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I recognise the intention behind this amendment and the principle that underpins it: that victims whose close family members have been murdered, killed unlawfully or subjected to infanticide abroad should not find themselves falling between the cracks of the victims’ code simply because the offence occurred outside the United Kingdom. There is a strong case for ensuring that any victim should receive clear information and appropriate support on how to engage with the criminal justice system. The amendment seeks to give effect to that principle by requiring an appendix to the victims’ code setting out how it applies in such circumstances.
That said, it is also right to acknowledge that this amendment raises practical and operational questions that would need careful consideration. These include questions about jurisdiction, the extent to which criminal justice processes are engaged domestically, and how responsibilities would be allocated between domestic agencies and those overseas. I therefore look to the Minister to address how the Government would envisage this operating in practice while recognising and engaging with the important principle that the amendment seeks to advance.
Amendments 47A and 47B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, extend the definition of “victim” to include those who have experienced persistent antisocial behaviour meeting the statutory threshold for an antisocial behaviour case review. They also create a victim identifier linked to compliance with the victims’ code across criminal justice agencies. Both proposals are ideas that I am sure will instigate interesting debate; I look forward to hearing the noble Lord expand on them, and the Government’s response.
Amendments 56 and 57 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby—which may or may not be spoken to—concern transparency and accountability in decisions taken by hospital managers not to disclose information requested under Sections 44F or 44K. Clearly, if hospital managers are to be entrusted with the discretion to withhold information in cases that may directly affect victim safety, it is entirely reasonable that there should be clear written reasons for such decisions and a meaningful route to appeal. Transparency in decision-making is essential, not only for victims but for other parties, such as the Probation Service, which are tasked with managing risks.
I turn to Amendments 36 and 37 in my name. Amendment 36 is a technical amendment that adds the National Crime Agency to the list of relevant bodies to which Clause 6 does not apply. Given the National Crime Agency’s distinct operational role and intelligence-handling functions, it may be appropriate that it be expressly included in that provision. I hope the Government will see this amendment as a sensible clarification rather than as a point of contention.
Amendment 37 would require the Secretary of State to extend the victim contact scheme to certain categories of victim who are currently excluded from it—victims of offenders sentenced to less than 12 months for violent and sexual offences; victims of coercive or controlling behaviour, stalking or harassment; and bereaved families in cases of manslaughter or death by dangerous driving. It would also require information to be communicated in a timely manner and for annual data to be published on the scheme’s uptake and accessibility.
The importance of this amendment has only been heightened by recent legislative developments. The Sentencing Bill, which has now passed, represented a marked shift in sentencing policy, particularly through the automatic and blanket presumption against short custodial sentences, regardless of offence type. During the passage of that legislation, particularly in debate in this House, a number of noble Lords repeatedly raised the consequences for victims. Although the Government may respond by saying that in exceptional circumstances this presumption may be overturned, the reality is rather clearer. An increasing number of offenders convicted of violent and sexual offences will now serve their sentences in the community, rather than in custody.
From the victim’s perspective, that is not an abstract policy choice. It has immediate and practical consequences for their perception of justice being served, for their sense of safety, for their ability to plan their lives and for their need to receive appropriate information. Under the current framework, many of these victims are excluded from the victim contact scheme because the custodial threshold is not met. That is now, I suggest, a glaring inconsistency in the light of the Government’s Sentencing Act. If anything, victims whose offenders are serving sentences in the community have a greater need for timely, accurate and trauma-informed information, not a lesser one. Further, without timeliness the scheme risks becoming meaningless. Information provided late is often information too late to be of use, and, without transparencies, such as through the publication of annual data on uptake and accessibility, there can be no meaningful accountability for offenders or for the Government.
We now live in a sentencing landscape that places a far greater reliance on community supervision. The Government have said that they expect to more or less double the number of people being tagged rather than incarcerated. The need for transparency and accurate data has never been more pressing. Amendment 37 insists that, where the state chooses to sentence offenders in the community, it must accept the corresponding responsibility to support and protect victims properly. In the absence of custody, robust victim engagement is really not an option; it is essential. I therefore urge the Government to engage seriously with this amendment and, if they are minded to resist it, explain how victims are to be adequately protected in a system that is going to leave an increasing number of offenders in the community. I beg to move.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 42, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay; to the two amendments in my name, Amendments 47A and 47B—I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for adding her name to them; and to Amendments 55, 56 and 57, on which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, may speak to us by some supernatural means. I am not quite sure, but the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I will try to cover it.
I point out that what all these amendments have in common is that they have been laid with the active engagement and support of the Victims’ Commissioner, Claire Waxman. The Minister mentioned that she knows and has a high regard for her. Rather than going on at great length about each amendment, although I am sure that your Lordships are dying to hear about them, I suspect that it would be better to have follow-up meetings involving Claire Waxman to go into the detail as to why she feels, and we feel, that these amendments are important enough to raise in Committee.
On bereaved victims of murder abroad, as in Amendment 42, we covered this ground in previous legislation when we attempted to get it into a Bill. My noble friend Lady Finlay will be able to go into much more detail about this but, in essence, we are dealing with a slight anomaly in the way that victims are treated. On average per annum, between 80 and 90 individuals who are UK citizens are murdered while they are abroad. At the moment, the experience of their families when those unfortunate incidents happen ranges from quite good to absolutely appalling. That is because there is no consistency in the way they are treated.
The Government have made attempts to get their house in order on what happens within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction. Where we seem to have an issue is in getting the FCDO to apply a form of guidance, and above all training, across its key consulates in the areas where these incidents take place to ensure that those consulates are properly equipped, if and when such a tragedy appears, to deal with it effectively and consistently. The experience from the victims whose loved ones have been murdered abroad is that, in some cases, the consulates are absolutely brilliant and go out of their way to be helpful, while in other instances the victim truly is left entirely on their own. In particular, if this has happened when the partner of the person who has been murdered is abroad, they may find no help whatever and not be familiar with the language of that country. You can imagine the complexity and agony of trying to deal with all of that, on top of the shock of having had somebody very close to you murdered. However, my noble friend will go into that in more detail.
What Amendments 47A and 47B have in common is that for certain victims of antisocial behaviour, when that behaviour really is persistent—it often conforms to an escalating pattern—and has a deep effect on the victim, there is not consistency at the moment in the way that is dealt with. Amendment 47A tries to ensure that the authorities are more effective in identifying that pattern of behaviour and are able to join the dots, put them together and recognise that the behaviour has triggered a threshold at which proper support and access to victim services should be allowed.
Again, Amendment 47B is about joining up the dots. The way in which antisocial behaviour is dealt with is that it might come to the attention of the police, or it might come to the attention of a local authority or a housing association. There is no consistent way of that information, first, being recorded in a consistent and helpful manner, and, secondly, being communicated across those different boundaries in a way that enables whichever of those three jurisdictions is looking at the pattern of behaviour to pull the evidence together that it needs to understand exactly what has been going on. This is a request for a unique identifier for each victim which would, I hope, be the start of a process to enable that information to be channelled in a more consistent and co-ordinated manner. That would obviously be helpful to the victims, but also extremely helpful to whichever authority is trying to identify just how severe that pattern of antisocial behaviour is, and whether the effect it is having on the subject—the victim—is sufficient for it to trigger comprehensive wraparound support.
Lastly, I will deal with the three amendments that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will deal with in more detail. They concern where somebody in one’s family has been murdered by an individual who is identified as mentally disordered and who is then detained because of their mental disorder. The ability of the victims to get access to the sort of information which they can get from the Prison Service and the courts is completely different from what is able to be accessed from the hospital system. Again, some hospitals and hospital managers go out of their way to be understanding and helpful, and try to give the victims whatever succour and information they can. Others refuse point blank. They say that a variety of laws and processes prevent them doing that and that they are not at liberty to do it. All that we and the Victims’ Commissioner are asking is to look at this closely.
Julian Hendy, the founder of an organisation called Hundred Families, is very involved in this; he can give chapter, book and verse. First, we need to establish just how much of a problem this is, perhaps through meetings. Secondly, what are the different ways in which we might do something about it? Thirdly, how complicated is that: does it need to be in primary legislation, or are there other ways of doing it?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
This Government have not been in power over the whole of the last of the decade, and we are doing our best to look at it. I will certainly look at it and discuss it with her. We are simply saying that, at this stage, we do not think primary legislation is the right way of dealing with it.
Finally, I turn to Amendments 55, 56 and 57, in the names of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who is not in his place, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. Before I do, let me say that I recently had the privilege of meeting with Emma Webber and with Julian Hendy of Hundred Families. They explained very clearly to me the issues as they see them, and it was a very moving experience. I pay tribute to their strength and honour the memories of those they have lost. Their experiences, along with the experiences of all victims of crime, must continue to guide us.
Part of the rationale for providing information to victims is to help them to feel safe and so they can plan for an offender’s eventual release or discharge. That is why the legislation requires that hospital managers provide victims with specified information where appropriate, regardless of any assessment by a hospital manager of the victim’s safety and well-being, because we acknowledge that the hospital manager’s assessment could well be different from the victim’s own assessment.
Where hospital managers receive a request for information from an eligible victim outwith the specified list within the Bill, they will consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to provid it, and this assessment can of course include considering the risk to the victim. Where there are specific concerns about a victim’s safety, there are other, more appropriate processes to be followed. It is important to note that this is not the primary purpose of the victim contact scheme.
Where a decision is made that it is not appropriate to provide some information, reasons can and should be provided wherever possible. However, these should reflect the victim’s communication preferences, and considerations about this would, in our view, be most appropriately set out in operational guidance, which would also provide the necessary flexibility to adjust requirements as we monitor practice.
We agree that victims should have a route for some recourse where information is not provided. There are existing complaint routes for all cohorts, and the Government consider that a more effective way of going about this would be to make sure hospital managers understand and fulfil their obligations to victims at the outset, rather than introducing additional bureaucracy. My officials are working closely with the Department of Health and Social Care to consider routes by which to support hospital managers, including whether a joint departmental protocol, or via planned updates to the Mental Health Act code of practice—statutory guidance under the Mental Health Act 1983—might provide an appropriate vehicle.
In relation to all the amendments in this group and many of the others, we are listening and we want to get it right. We will continue to work with your Lordships and with victims’ groups, but for now I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to this wide-ranging and thoughtful debate on the operation of the victim contact scheme and the wider support network for victims. The debate has demonstrated broad consensus on the principle that victims’ rights and access to information must keep pace with changes in sentencing policy and criminal justice practice. The question is not whether victim engagement matters but whether our current structures are fit for purpose in the systems we now operate.
Several amendments in the group had common concerns: gaps in coverage within the victims’ code and the victim contact scheme; lack of transparency, consistency and accountability in how information is provided; the risk that victims fall through the cracks; and the technical thresholds or institutional boundaries that exist. Taken together, these amendments seek to ensure that victim support is timely, trauma-informed, consistent and capable of scrutiny. The amendments also recognise that, among others, where the state chooses to sentence offenders in the community, it assumes a greater, not a lesser, responsibility to support victims. Victim engagement must be strengthened not weakened in a non-custodial sentencing landscape. I therefore urge the Government to consider carefully how victims are to be protected and informed under current policy. In the meantime, I seek leave to withdraw my amendment.
Victims and Courts Bill
Lord Keen of Elie ExcerptsMonday 9th February 2026
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 141-I(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (6 Feb 2026)
Lord Keen of Elie
“Victim personal statements(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, issue revised guidance on the content of victim personal statements.(2) The revised guidance issued under subsection (1) must stipulate that when making a victim personal statement, a victim must be able to say anything they wish about the defendant, provided it is not contrary to any statutory limitations on free speech, makes allegations of untried criminal conduct or is disorderly language.(3) The court must disregard any prejudicial comments made during a victim personal statement.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review how to make victim personal statements less restrictive and clarify what can be included.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 39 in my name would require the Secretary of State to issue revised guidance on victim personal statements, clarifying what victims may include and ensuring that the courts appropriately disregard prejudicial material.
Victim personal statements are a valuable and important part of our criminal justice process. They allow victims to articulate in their own words the impact that a crime has had on them and on their families. This personal element is often deeply cathartic and can provide a sense of agency in a system that victims have described as otherwise procedural and somewhat distant. However, as this Bill was scrutinised in the other place, it became clear that many victims and practitioners find the current approach to personal statements unclear and, in some cases, unnecessarily restrictive.
Members spoke of victims feeling that they were sometimes advised to omit heartfelt and deeply personal material from their statements. These omissions were not for any legal reason, but appeared to be due to an overly cautious interpretation of the guidance. There is also a concern that victims do not always understand what is and is not permissible, and that this lack of clarity can undermine their confidence in the entire process.
One recurring theme from previous debates is that victims should not be left uncertain about what they can and cannot say, nor should they feel that their legitimate expressions of harm are being suppressed for procedural reasons. At the same time, the amendment acknowledges the equally important principle that personal statements must not be vehicles for
“allegations of untried criminal conduct”,
or material that is contrary to
“statutory limitations on free speech”
or due process. It is designed precisely to strike the appropriate balance. It would not remove any existing safeguards. It simply asks the Secretary of State to revisit and clarify the guidance governing the content of personal statements in a way that gives victims clarity and a genuine sense of voice.
The amendment would require revised guidance to be issued within six months of the Bill passing. The revised guidance must stipulate that, when making a victim personal statement, the victim should be able to say
“anything they wish about the defendant”,
so long as it does not go beyond lawful free speech, make untested allegations of new criminal conduct, or contain “disorderly language”. These are sensible and well-established legal boundaries.
The amendment also states that the court must disregard any
“prejudicial comments made during a victim personal statement”.
In practice, this would simply enshrine what is already understood by judges: that victims may express themselves freely, while judges continue to confine themselves to factors that are legally relevant and admissible. Placing this in the Bill would reassure victims that greater freedom of expression in their statements will not be misconstrued as diminishing the fairness of proceedings, or indeed as providing a basis for an appeal. This would not mean that victims would be able to litigate matters that fall outside the scope of the case before the court, nor would it mean that victim personal statements would supplant other evidence or judicial reasoning. It would mean that victims would know where they stand, and that they would not be discouraged from expressing the full impact of their experience simply because the existing guidance is interpreted excessively cautiously.
The importance of clarity in this area cannot be overstated. Victims and their families often report that they do not know what is expected of them when making a personal statement, or that they are told they must temper their comments in ways that feel artificial or perhaps insensitive. That undermines public confidence in the system and risks denying victims a meaningful voice at a critical moment in the justice process. This amendment offers a proportionate way forward. It respects judicial integrity and would preserve the lawful limits on personal statements. At the same time, it would provide victims with the clarity and the dignity that they deserve. It would ensure that they can say what they need to say without fear that well-meaning but over cautious guidance may curtail their voice.
I present the amendment in a constructive spirit. I look forward to the Minister outlining how the Government believe that the current guidance is operating—whether it achieves its objectives, and whether there is an appetite for revision that reflects victims’ legitimate expectations—and speaking to the points raised by Members on both sides of the House and in the other place. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My brief observations draw on my experience of what happened about 20 years ago when the statements were being developed. For more serious cases, such as murder and manslaughter, there was an attempt to give the victim’s family an advocate. It had transpired that drafting these statements was not easy, and so this was trialled for a few years. It proved to be an extremely expensive way forward, and the scheme came to an end with the financial crisis of 2008.
That left us with the problem, in all these cases, of how you formulate what was then called a victim impact statement and is now called a personal statement? They are extraordinarily difficult to formulate. Those with experience of civil cases will know that, if you ask a witness to produce something in his own words, or you ask the claimant in a case to do the same, you get something you could never put before the court, because it would never really convey what had to be put forward. Therefore, the way in which progress was made was along the cautious lines of developing guidance. I think such guidance always needs to be kept under review. You need consultation with the Crown Court judges, who see this all the time. Clarity in the guidance is essential, but I greatly caution against allowing a victim to do more than explain to the court the way in which the crime has affected the victim, his family and the community. Going beyond that seems to raise all sorts of problems, and the last thing one wants to do is to revictimise a victim by saying, “You shouldn’t say that in court”. Clarity is essential, but I say, with respect to the noble and learned Lord, that his formulation goes too wide of the mark.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, clearly, we have to achieve a balance between preserving due process in the justice system and empowering victims. We have to be able to reassure victims but, at the same time, protect the judicial process. We must reduce the risk of misunderstanding, or indeed even of appeal, in the context of these statements.
However, there does seem to be a widely held concern that these guidance provisions are not working as they should at the present time. There seems to be an understanding that further work is needed to clarify how victim guidance is construed and applied. I suggest that it is not simply a matter for the criminal practice directions, but one that we should consider, whether in the form of a review or further directions or guidance from the House.
In the circumstances, I seek to withdraw the amendment, but I do so on the basis that the Government understand the need to revisit this issue and why the guidance is not working, and will come to a view as to how it can be improved going forward.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches, the Liberal Democrats have been concerned for a long time about the victim’s right to access court transcripts. We have tabled amendments to a number of Bills, including, most recently, the now Victim and Prisoners Act 2024, and I have Amendment 41 to this Bill. I thank open justice campaigners for the contact that we have had with them during the Victims and Prisoners Act and since then.
During the Victims and Prisoners Bill, the then Minister finally agreed to a trial in certain locations that would ensure that victims could have access to sentencing remarks but to nothing else. Ministers of both this and the last Government have said that it would just cost too much to extend the scheme but, as we have said, the process that is used is extraordinarily expensive, and technology should be our friend these days. To give the Committee a feel of some of the figures that we have been made aware of, we have seen people quoted £30 for a copy of sentencing remarks to over £300 for an original transcript, and where victims requested a transcript of the entire court case we have seen figures of £7,500 and even £22,000.
Victims and their families are in principle able to access remarks at no cost. I am not just talking about since the pilot; I am talking about some of the other things, and I will come on to the detail later on. They can sometimes get access at no cost, but the problem is that the paperwork that some courts have required families to fill out is burdensome and intrusive, requiring families to declare salaries, debts, bank balances and more. That really should not be the case when they are getting to the end of a trial, with all the burdens that that has brought them.
Amendment 41 would go beyond sentencing remarks but not as far as our amendments to the Victims and Prisoners Bill. It would include transcripts of judicial summings-up, bail decisions and conditions that are relevant to their case. It would also set a time limit for the Secretary of State to ensure that the transcripts were provided within 14 days.
We thank the Government for confirming that access to the judge’s sentencing remarks is being rolled out across the country, but we remain concerned that some victims need access to more. This is because for far too long, as we discussed in an earlier group, victims have been advised by the police and prosecutors either not to attend a trial or to frame their own remarks carefully.
I have three brief quotes on that. The first is:
“I wanted to go and watch the trial after I had given my evidence but was told by the prosecution barrister that it would not look good with the jury. The police said the same. I didn’t really question it. I was so scared to do anything that *might* have a detrimental effect on the outcome”.
Another victim said:
“We were advised not to attend because it may make us look bitter”.
And another said:
“I was told I couldn’t watch the court case after giving evidence as I’d look like I wasn’t scared of the perpetrator and it could harm the jury’s decision”.
Open justice campaigners say:
“This advice from professionals is in direct contrast to Judges we meet, who very much want the victims to attend hearings”.
So there is a gap there.
The reason why we propose including judicial summings-up and bail decisions is that there is often more detail in things like bail decisions and conditions that affect the victim directly. I have recently been involved in advising a family where there was a bail condition that required the alleged perpetrator not to go within two miles of the victim. That was changed without the victim’s knowledge, and suddenly she found the perpetrator nearby and could not understand why. A victim in that sort of instance should be able to ask for the details of those. It was clear that she was completely unaware that the bail conditions had been changed after the perpetrator’s solicitor had asked for a hearing. For judicial summing up, there is often more detail in there that can help the victim to come to terms with the entire process. That is one reason why we are pushing for that.
We would still like occasionally for some victims in really traumatic cases, particularly where a therapist advises this—this is not in the amendment, and there is a reason for that—to be able to access the entire court transcript, but we recognise that that is unlikely until technology can provide it at virtually no cost to the court. I think we are nearly there, but at the moment the structure of the way in which people can apply for help and the way that transcripts are made is overly expensive, given the world that we are living in in 2026. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendment 41, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and Amendment 73 in my name. Both these amendments are designed to strengthen victims’ engagement with the justice system by enhancing access to, and the availability of, transcripts of important court decisions.
We give full and unequivocal support to Amendment 41. This is a broader right than the one we were able to secure during the passage of the Sentencing Bill, where our amendments sought to ensure victims’ access to transcripts of sentencing remarks. Initially, that amendment was opposed by the Government, who argued that embedding a statutory duty for universal access and universal publication would create significant operational and resource pressures and risk increasing judicial workload.
The importance of these amendments has been further underscored by the report—released, I believe, today—that the Ministry of Justice has instructed the deletion of a substantial archive of court records held by Courtsdesk: data analysis that supports journalists and civil society in scrutinising the justice system. That archive has long been relied on to track sentencing outcomes and judicial decisions. Its removal has understandably raised concerns about the future accessibility of court information and the practical operation of open justice.
In that context, the case for clear, structured and victim-centred access to sentencing information becomes even more compelling. If independent archives and informal routes to transparency are diminishing, it is all the more important that Parliament ensures that formal mechanisms exist to guarantee access to core judicial material, particularly for victims whose lives are directly affected by these decisions.
In previous debates, Ministers made it clear that they supported the principle of transparency and of victim access to sentencing remarks. Sentencing remarks can already be published in high-profile cases but the Government maintained that expanding those limited provisions into a broad statutory requirement, as initially tabled, was not necessary to achieve the objective of openness and could impose burdens that the current system was not equipped to bear. We therefore tabled a more diluted version of our amendment to extend free provision of Crown Court sentencing transcripts to victims who request them.
The importance of this measure cannot, in my view, be overstated. Sentencing remarks explain the judge’s reasoning as well as the factors taken into account when outlining legal judgment behind a sentence. For victims and their families, this explanation is essential to understanding why justice has been administered in the way it has and becomes particularly important in the context of, for example, unduly lenient sentence appeals.
Amendment 73 complements the amendment passed in the Sentencing Bill, now the Sentencing Act, by addressing the publication of sentencing remarks online. It would require that, when a request is made for sentencing remarks delivered in the Crown Court, those remarks are made available publicly online within 14 days, subject to an important safeguard. The court must first inform the applicant of their right to request that the remarks not be published and, if such a request is made, the remarks must not be published.
This opt-out mechanism is a proportionate and indeed pragmatic response to government concerns that prevented broad publication being adopted previously. Ministers explained that, while they supported the principle of transparency, they could not accept a universal statutory obligation to publish all sentencing remarks, citing the risk of significant workload increases and resource pressures on an already stretched judiciary and courts system. By allowing individuals to choose not to have their own remarks published, this amendment preserves transparency for the public while safeguarding privacy and individual choice and reducing operational risk.
We stand in favour of open justice: the principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. When victims and the wider public can access the reasoning behind sentencing decisions, confidence in the rule of law and in the integrity of judicial decision-making is strengthened. A criminal justice system that is opaque risks undermining the very legitimacy that it seeks to uphold. If victims cannot see the reasoning behind the rulings that affect their lives, they and the public will struggle to have confidence that justice has actually been done. When sentences are handed down with discretion and complexity, the need for transparency is greater, not less. For these reasons, we support Amendment 41 and look forward to the Minister’s response to Amendment 73.
Sentencing Bill
Lord Keen of Elie ExcerptsWednesday 21st January 2026
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to see the Sentencing Bill return to your Lordships’ House for, I hope, the final time. Subject to your Lordships’ agreement, the Bill will have completed all its stages and will shortly become law. That moment will be hugely significant for our prison and probation services. It will put them on a sustainable footing and deliver punishment that works. I am very proud of having played my part in taking the Bill through Parliament. Apart from a brief Bill on the Sentencing Council, this is my first experience of getting a Bill through, and I have been struck by the fantastic teamwork from everyone involved.
I will briefly set out the Government’s rationale for disagreeing with Amendment 7 and tabling our own amendments in lieu. Before I do so, I thank again the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. In keeping with their approach throughout the passage of the Bill, they have engaged constructively and openly. Once again, their interventions have made this a better Bill.
The Government fully supported the intention of Amendment 7: to promote transparency in the courts and improve the experience of victims as they navigate the justice system. We could not accept it as drafted due to the risk that it would significantly increase judicial workload at a time when courts are working intensively to drive down the court backlog. However, I am delighted that we have tabled an amendment in lieu, which expands the provision of Crown Court sentencing transcripts, free of charge, to all victims who request them. This new clause represents an important step forward for victims, ensuring that they are able to request and receive relevant sentencing remarks for free.
Sentencing remarks set out the judge’s reasoning, helping victims to understand how the sentence was reached without having to visit the courtroom—an experience that can be retraumatising for many. This change will embolden victims to look back on their bravery, and to process their experience at their own pace. This clause also delivers a major step forward for transparency more broadly, enabling victims to digest sentencing remarks outside the pressures of a courtroom setting, and free of charge. This is consistent with Sir Brian Leveson’s Independent Review of the Criminal Courts and the 2017 Lammy Review, which sought to shape a more open justice system fit to serve every victim.
The detail on timeframes and processes for providing transcripts will be set out in regulations, but I can confirm to the House that our intention is that the regulations will specify that transcripts will be provided within 14 days of a request being made. This timeframe will support requests under the unduly lenient sentence scheme, which currently allows referrals up to 28 days after sentencing. I also assure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, that we are considering his amendment to the Victims and Courts Bill, which would extend this deadline to 56 days, extremely carefully.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the honourable Member for Chichester in the other place for raising important questions about the definition of “victim” and why it is necessary to allow for exceptions. We are carefully considering the scope of the definition of victim for these purposes, but I assure noble Lords that this clause does not restrict us to a narrow definition. We will ensure that there is as much consistency as possible in the definition of victim for the purpose of the code, and we will specifically consider the circumstances that the honourable Members for Chichester and Bexhill and Battle raised in the other place yesterday, where a victim is personally unable to request sentencing remarks. We have no intention of restricting access in these circumstances.
Further details will be set out in regulations, including any necessary safeguards or limited exceptions. We will ensure that any exceptions are limited, and our intention is that all victims will be able to request and receive their Crown Court sentencing remarks free of charge. But there may be circumstances where exceptions or omissions are necessary; for example, to protect the identity of another victim. I reassure noble Lords that these regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so your Lordships’ House will have the opportunity to scrutinise the regulations carefully.
I can also confirm that an assessment of the previous pilot for free sentencing remarks for rape and serious sexual offence victims is under way. The results will be published shortly. This explores application volumes, costs of provision and any feedback from the courts on the process. It also includes applicant survey feedback, shared by victims or by those applying on their behalf.
This change represents a profound step forward for victims and for transparency in our justice system. For the first time, every victim whose case is heard in the Crown Court will have the right to access, free of charge, a clear explanation of how the sentence was reached. This is a landmark moment for transparency and open justice and a meaningful improvement for victims across the country. I urge all noble Lords to support the Government’s Motion, and I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his remarks and the explanation he gave for the government amendment in lieu of our own amendment. I also thank him for his sustained engagement with Peers across the House, both in and outside the Chamber.
The Government have now committed to publishing sentencing remarks for all Crown Court trials, and we thank the Minister for this step. It was only in response to our successful Conservative amendment that the Government finally acted. It was regrettable that they opposed our original amendment in both Houses, but we welcome their amendment as a step forward in the right direction.
Sentencing remarks explain the judge’s reasoning in determining the sentence imposed. This is important not only for the victims, whose lives are disrupted in the most profound way by crime, but for the transparency required in the justice system. The provision of sentence remarks upon request will mean that victims who are unable to visit the courtroom, whether for practical reasons or because the experience is simply too traumatising, will be able to understand the reasoning behind sentences handed out to offenders.
This amendment builds on the work of the previous Conservative Government, who successfully piloted free access to sentencing remarks for victims of murder, rape and other sexual offences. This amendment now rightly widens that scope to all victims. It is wrong that a victim of, for example, aggravated burglary should have to pay to read the reasoning behind the sentence of the criminal who robbed their shop. This was a clear gap in the law that will now be filled.
The government amendment contains provisions for the timeline and processes for providing transcripts to be set out in regulations. I thank the Minister for his assurance that regulations will specify that transcripts will be provided within 14 days of a request being made. Under our current system, victims have just 28 days to submit an application for the unduly lenient sentence scheme. This can be a complex legal process to contend with in less than a month. It is our intention, as indicated by the Minister, to double the time that victims have available to 56 days. I am grateful that the Minister shares my commitment to ensuring that victims receive their transcripts before that point. Without timely access to these remarks, victims would risk being shut out of the scheme and denied access to justice.
Finally, I turn to the matter of publication. Open justice is an essential foundation of our democracy and sentencing will no doubt become more complex and discretionary under this Bill. We therefore believe that, in principle, sentencing remarks should be made available to the wider public to maintain transparency and accountability. Although the Government are unable to commit to the public release of sentencing remarks at this point, we note the progress made on this issue and we will raise the matter again during the passage of the Victims and Courts Bill.
This amendment represents a significant step forward for victims and for transparency in our justice system. It ensures that those affected by crime can access the reasoning behind sentences, and it builds on a clear Conservative record of reform. While there is more to do, we have now made real progress, and we will continue to press for full public access to sentencing remarks in future legislation.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Marks will no doubt repeat some of the niceties, but I too am glad to see this step forward. I shall ask the Minister some questions on the government amendment.
First, there is the phrase
“sentencing remarks … relevant to”
the victim will be supplied. From what the Minister has said, is that distinguishing one particular victim from another victim in the same case, or what is meant by sentencing remarks relevant to the victim? I have to say that, if I were a victim, I would think that everything that was said in sentencing would be relevant. It also occurs to me that, if the court is required to edit the remarks before supplying them, that is actually more work for the court, which is something that the Government are obviously aware of. I take it that “remarks relevant to the victim” are different from
“circumstances in which, for the purposes of this section, sentencing remarks are relevant to a victim”,
in paragraph (11) of the proposed new clause. Can the Minister clarify what is meant by “circumstances” in this context?
There is also provision for the “omission of information” and making
“further provision about the supply of a transcript”,
which I take it covers not supplying it, though I am obviously not pushing that point. Like the noble and learned Lord, I am concerned to know about publication. A number of us have heard from the Lady Chief Justice of the progress that has been made and the success in using new technology in this context. I also ask what consultation is planned on circumstances, on exceptions and so on—the various points that will be covered by the regulations.
The Minister has said, and we are grateful for this, that answers will be given to questions asked by my honourable friend the Member for Chichester. Briefly, they are whether the term “victim” is to be the same as the definition used in the victims’ code, including where the victim is unable personally to request sentencing remarks; and, where the amendment provides for exceptions, what sort of exceptions—this goes back to my point about consultation—and what sort of information may be omitted. And possibly overarching all this, will the Government be publishing a review of the pilot that was carried out recently? We have heard about it, we gather it has been successful, if limited, so can we hear more about it?
Age of Criminal Responsibility
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
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Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I thank the right reverend Prelate. I think it is from 15 to 13.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, as has already been noted, until just a few years ago, the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland was eight. In the last three or four years, it has been raised from eight to 12. Does the Minister agree that before we take any further steps with regard to the age of responsibility in England, it would be appropriate to examine and analyse the impact of the changes on policing, crime prevention and public safety in Scotland which have emerged since the change in the age of criminal responsibility there almost four years ago?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I say to the noble and learned Lord that the Government keep all these matters under review.
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2025
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(2 months ago)
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, as many noble Lords will be aware, I am passionate about the rehabilitation of offenders. I have seen at first hand how transformative employment can be for those seeking to rebuild their lives after offending.
The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, which I will refer to as the ROA, governs the disclosure of cautions and convictions for most employment purposes. Its purpose is simple but vital: to ensure that, once a conviction is spent, individuals are not defined for ever by their past. For most people, once a conviction or caution becomes spent, it does not need to be disclosed when applying for work. This supports rehabilitation, helps to reduce reoffending and allows people to move on with their lives. However, this must always be balanced against the need to protect the public. That is why the ROA is accompanied by the exceptions order 1975, which sets out specific roles and activities where fuller disclosure is required. This is typically work involving vulnerable people, such as children, or a high degree of public trust. This instrument amends the exceptions order in a targeted and proportionate way.
Before I turn to the detail, I want to make something clear: even when an employer is aware of a spent conviction or caution, that should not amount to an automatic bar to employment. The Government encourage employers to take a balanced and thoughtful approach, considering factors such as the age of the individual at the time of the offence, how long ago it occurred, its relevance to the role and what safeguards can be put in place. In my own business experience, I have employed many people with criminal records. Time and again, they have proved to be among the most loyal, committed and capable colleagues. That experience has shaped my belief that disclosure rules must be fair and proportionate. They must give employers the information that they need to manage risk responsibly while still giving people the chance to rebuild their lives. We know that finding employment after release can reduce reoffending by up to nine percentage points, which is why we are strengthening links between prisons, probation and employers through employment advisory boards and the new regional employment councils.
In developing these proposals, officials have looked at evidence around gaps in the current framework and have considered the findings of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. This instrument addresses those gaps and does so carefully. The instrument makes four amendments to the exceptions order. First, it extends access to enhanced DBS checks to self-employed individuals or personal employees working closely with children and vulnerable adults. Secondly, it brings within scope staff employed by the MoJ’s contracted provider of electronic monitoring and field services. Thirdly, it includes registered healthcare professionals employed or engaged by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions or by their contractors and subcontractors. Finally, it enables appropriate disclosure checks for pedicab drivers in London, bringing them into line with taxi and private hire vehicle licensing following the Pedicabs (London) Act 2024. In each case, the amendment allows spent convictions to be considered as part of an informed and proportionate decision-making process, when assessing suitability for the role or licence in question. Relevant departments have committed to producing or updating guidance to support fair and consistent decision-making.
There is a compelling case for these changes. The first amendment closes a clear safeguarding gap. Families increasingly hire tutors, carers and therapists directly, often in unsupervised settings, yet without this change those individuals can only be asked for a basic criminal record check. Extending access to enhanced checks, including barred lists where appropriate, gives families the same reassurance that they would have if services were provided through an organisation such as a school. It also delivers on a key recommendation of the Alexis Jay inquiry.
The second amendment relates to electronic monitoring staff. These individuals play a crucial role in maintaining the integrity of court orders and release conditions. They have access to sensitive systems and exercise significant discretion. By enabling standard rather than basic disclosure checks, providers can better identify and manage risks and protect public confidence in the justice system.
Thirdly, the amendment covering registered healthcare professionals working for the DWP or its contractors reflects the vulnerability of the people they support. Around 2 million health assessments are carried out each year for individuals with long-term conditions or disabilities. Enabling fuller disclosure ensures that suitability for these roles can be properly assessed and appropriate safeguards maintained.
Finally, on pedicabs in London, following years of operating without regulation, TfL is now introducing a licensing regime. For that regime to command public confidence, pedicab drivers must be subject to the same safeguarding standards as taxi and private hire drivers. Without this amendment, TfL would be limited to basic checks, which is simply not sufficient, given the nature of the work.
This instrument strikes a careful and necessary balance. It strengthens safeguarding where it is needed, closes identified gaps and maintains the central principle of the ROA. The people who have moved on from their offending deserve the chance to rebuild their lives. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his clear exposition of this matter. From these Benches, we are supportive of the order before us. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act has, for more than 50 years, played an important role in supporting rehabilitation and enabling people who have offended to move on with their lives. That principle commands strong support, but it has always been recognised that rehabilitation cannot be an absolute and that there are particular roles, especially those involving children, vulnerable adults or positions of trust, where fuller disclosure is both reasonable and necessary to protect the public.
This order is modest in scope and targeted in nature. It does not represent a wholesale expansion of disclosure but rather responds to specific and well-evidenced gaps in the current framework. In particular, extending eligibility for enhanced DBS checks to self-employed individuals and those employed directly by families who work with children is a sensible and overdue step. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse commissioned under a Conservative Government made it clear that safeguarding should not depend on the technicality of whether someone is employed through an organisation or directly by a parent. Families deserve the same level of assurance in either case.
Similarly, we recognise the logic of bringing electronic monitoring contractor roles within the exception order. These are sensitive positions with real risks of corruption and serious consequences if safeguards fail. Ensuring that employers can properly assess suitability is essential for maintaining confidence in the criminal justice system. The inclusion of registered healthcare professionals carrying out DWP assessments is also proportionate. These individuals occupy positions of trust and have access to sensitive personal data. It is reasonable that the department is able to take a full view of suitability when making appointments to such roles.
Finally, aligning the DBS regime for pedicab drivers in London with that already in place for taxis and private hire vehicles is both logical and, indeed, necessary. Regulation without proper disclosure would expose Transport for London to unnecessary operational and reputational risk and would be out of step with public expectations.
However, as my honourable friend Kieran Mullan noted in the other place, support for these changes comes with a note of caution. The system for obtaining enhanced DBS checks is already under strain, with delays in some police force areas. As eligibility is expanded, it is incumbent on the Government to ensure that the system can cope and that safeguarding improvements are not undermined by avoidable backlogs.
Taken together, these measures strike the right balance between rehabilitation and public protection. They are proportionate, targeted and consistent with existing safeguarding frameworks.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for his contribution. I hope that noble Lords will agree that this instrument is necessary and proportionate. The amendments before the Committee address clear and specific safeguarding gaps, covering individuals working closely with children and vulnerable adults, electronic monitoring staff, healthcare professionals supporting vulnerable claimants and pedicab drivers in London. They strengthen public protection in high-trust roles, while remaining true to the purpose of the ROA, supporting rehabilitation and enabling people to move on. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, mentioned Kieran Mullan’s comments in the other place. I have been assured that the DBS system can cope with this volume coming through. I commend the instrument to the Committee.
Sentencing Bill
Lord Keen of Elie ExcerptsTuesday 6th January 2026
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Sentencing Act 2026 View all Sentencing Act 2026 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 151-I(a) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (5 Jan 2026)
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I co-signed Amendment 76, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and shall support it. The amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, would achieve the same outcome. Either amendment would right this injustice. The present position is simply cruelty.
I have very little to add to the speeches, all of which have been principled and humane. Across the House, noble Lords have gone to great lengths to acknowledge and address the risk of further offending while seeking to end the appalling injustice of the continued indefinite incarceration of IPP prisoners. My noble friend Lady Ludford referred the House to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and challenged the Government to come forward with a response to the human rights case. There is none.
I simply do not understand the reasoning behind the proposition that we cannot or will not release IPP prisoners when prisoners serving determinate sentences are entitled to be released, and are released, at the end of their terms. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, pointed out, resistance to ending this injustice fails to balance the actual harm of the present regime to IPP prisoners against the possible risk of further offences by a released IPP prisoner. The Government have a duty to balance risks and harms. On this issue, the balance is between the actual harm to IPP prisoners and the theoretical but possible harm that is risked by releasing them.
As we have heard, subsection (6E) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 76 would leave the Parole Board in charge. It is more than reasonable. Justice and humanity demand that we end this.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, these amendments address the most complex and sensitive of legacies in our sentencing framework. Few issues illustrate more clearly the challenge of balancing public protection, fairness to victims, management of risk and the injustice to individuals who have already served far beyond their original tariff. The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, correctly pointed out that there is an issue here of proportionality; we seem to sometimes lose sight of that.
Amendment 76 does not provide for automatic or immediate release. Instead, it would require the Parole Board, where it does not direct release, to fix a future release date, subject to conditions intended to ensure public protection but also to instil some element of hope. The amendment would preserve a central role for the Parole Board, including, of course, powers to issue directions, vary release dates and reconsider decisions where public safety requires it. The inclusion of time limits seeks to balance progression with caution, though views may differ as to whether these limits are set at the right level.
These are complex judgments, and reasonable views can differ on how best to reconcile rehabilitation and public protection. These proposals represent a thoughtful attempt to impose coherence and fairness on an area of law that has become impossibly difficult, while attempting to keep public protection firmly in view. I hope that the Minister will engage constructively with the principles underlying these amendments and explain how the Government intend to address the long-term sustainability of the IPP regime. The status quo is untenable.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their amendments on IPP sentences and for their impassioned speeches this evening. As the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, kindly said, I share their commitment to addressing this issue with compassion, evidence and tenacity. I thank the many noble Lords who have participated in debates, meetings and discussions on this issue. I am grateful for their challenge and support, both in your Lordships’ House and at our Peers meetings, which I plan to continue in the future.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, we welcome the inclusion of the additional condition proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, in Amendments 83 and 86, to ensure that, for a transitional period, an offender who has breached a licence condition or court order in relation to their victim is not automatically released. It is an important amendment for protecting victims and maintaining confidence in the justice system. We are also supportive of Amendment 87, which excludes certain serious offenders from automatic release. This aligns with our Amendment 25 and ensures that those who pose the greatest risk to the public cannot benefit from automatic release.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lords for tabling these amendments. Although we are still convinced that the approach in the Bill is right, it is only right that it receives thorough scrutiny. In drafting these measures, we have sought to strike a balance between ensuring that offenders can be safely managed in the community and the need to achieve a sustainable prison system. Nothing would be worse for victims than running out of prison cells.
The new system has been carefully designed to achieve this and to ensure consistent and proportionate responses to risk and non-compliance across all offence types. The offence-based exemptions proposed by Amendments 79 and 87 would undermine that consistency and may not reflect an individual’s actual risk level. The Bill already contains significant safeguards so that offenders who pose a greater risk are excluded from 56-day fixed-term recall. This includes those recalled on account of being charged with a further offence and those subject to multi-agency supervision levels 2 and 3. This applies to many sexual, violent and domestic abuse offenders.
Before any recalled offender is re-released, professionally qualified probation officers will undertake a thorough review of the release plans and licence conditions. They will ensure that needs and risks are managed, with a focus on mitigating risks against known victims. Furthermore, a prisoner given a fixed-term recall can be transferred to a standard recall if certain conditions are met, including if their risk escalates and they are then managed at multi-agency supervision levels 2 and 3. Offenders will leave prison to probation supervision and can be recalled again if considered a risk.
Amendments 80 and 81 seek to allow release from fixed-term recall at an earlier point than 56 days. The Independent Sentencing Review found that the current short duration of fixed-term recalls—14 or 28 days—does not provide enough time for offenders to address their risky behaviours in custody or for further risk reduction measures to be implemented. The Government agree with this assessment. This has been carefully considered with operational colleagues, and 56 days is enough time to undertake and put in place risk-management plans. Our proposed framework already provides sufficient flexibility without any further legislative change needed.
The Bill already allows the Secretary of State to keep an offender in custody past 56 days by overriding automatic re-release and converting a fixed-term recall to a standard recall. Where this happens, release is subject to Parole Board approval or, under the existing risk-assessed recall review process, allowing offenders to be released at any point before the 56 days where it is assessed safe to do so. For example, an offender could be recalled because of an increased risk linked to substance misuse. Having received structured support in custody that can be continued in the community, probation staff assess they can now be safely managed in the community. In this situation, they can be re-released before 56 days.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I shall move this amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, who unfortunately cannot be present. I wish to express first his appreciation of the time the Minister has taken to speak to him about the issue raised by this amendment. I can explain it very briefly. In the independent review conducted by Mr David Gauke, he considered whether foreign national offenders should be removed to reduce pressure on capacity and ensure that punishment was served for crimes committed in the United Kingdom. Under the then existing law, foreign national offenders had to serve 50% of their sentence but could then be removed and returned to their own state, where they would get no further punishment. The review recommended that the 50% rule be reduced to 30%—this was accepted and brought in by a statutory instrument—and that those who were sentenced to three years or less could be removed without serving any part of their sentence here. Clause 32 proposes the removal of the three-year time limit, so that any offender, however serious the offence is, can be removed without serving any part of their sentence whatever.
The amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, seeks to do three things. First, it seeks to restore the position recommended by Mr David Gauke: to ensure that people who receive sentences of more than three years could not be removed without serving part of their sentence. Secondly, it would make it clear that it is inapplicable to a person who has been deported and returns. That is to stop the revolving door of committing a crime, being deported, coming back, committing a crime and going round and round. Thirdly, it would require the Secretary of State to be satisfied, in the case of serious crimes,
“that the interests of justice are not defeated by the removal, having regard to the gravity of the offence and the impact … on those affected by it”.
There is a change from the amendment put forward in Committee in one respect, in that it drops the requirement that the offender serve his term overseas.
The most important of the three points raised by this amendment is the first: restoring the recommendation of the Gauke review. As I understand it, there are about 3,000 such offenders and it costs about £61,000 a year to keep each of them in prison here. I can see no objection to sending them back if they are to serve the remainder of the term in their own country, but it is evident from the figures that only a tiny proportion would serve such a term. The Bill as it stands, therefore, will send back at our own cost a very significant number of people who have committed crimes that deserve at least three years’ imprisonment.
It seems that the Government have said that they are not prepared to accept the amendment partly because they cannot agree to anything that will effect a reduction in prison capacity. Secondly, they are determined to make sure that the public Exchequer is relieved of the burden of paying for the imprisonment of foreign national offenders.
The purpose of this amendment is to try to reverse what can only be described as the interests of short-term expediency over the principles of sentencing, because the amendment infringes three of those principles First, if a person commits a wrong that merits three years’ or more imprisonment, that person merits equivalent punishment. Being sent back to his own country at taxpayers’ expense is not a punishment. Secondly, the purpose of sentencing is to deter crime. What deterrence is there in making it clear that, if a person comes to this country to commit a crime, he will be sent home free, without punishment? Thirdly, and most importantly, proper punishment retains public confidence in the system. If, for example, someone commits a series of shoplifting offences to go to the lower end of the three-year limit or, more seriously, comes here deliberately to commit a crime, paid for, what deterrence is there if that person knows he can go back? We hope that the Government will think again on this point.
However, on the second and third points—that is to say, dealing with the revolving door problem in the first place, while requiring the Secretary of State to be satisfied that the interests of justice are not defeated by removal, having regard to the gravity of the offence and the impact on those affected by it—why can the Government not accept them? I hope the Minister will be able to say, “Well, we’ve got to have a framework to deal with those kinds of issues” and will make it clear that, among the issues to be contained in the policy framework that governs the way in which foreign national offenders are dealt with, those two points, namely the revolving door and maintaining and examining each case to ensure that the gravity of the offence and the effect of the offender will not be that which casts doubt on the integrity of the criminal justice system, will be looked at and properly included within it. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for the carefully framed amendment and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for the very careful way in which he presented the amendment. We agree with all the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, without qualification.
When the previous Secretary of State for Justice first intimated this policy last year, I referred to it in this Chamber as being “completely mad”. I have not deviated from that opinion, I have to confess. The idea that someone coming from a safe country in Europe will commit a series of robberies and then, when caught, will be returned to their country of origin at public expense in order to pick up a different set of identity papers or a different passport and then return yet again strikes me as quite absurd. That is the revolving door point that has been touched upon, but the other points are equally important.
Of course, they may not have come from a safe country, in which case we cannot deport them, but no accommodation has been made for that either. It is going to be optional, essentially. You may seek to argue that you have not come from a safe country and therefore you cannot be deported, so you prefer to stay in prison. It is a quite extraordinary proposal that somehow punishment lies in the fact that you have been returned to your country of origin after committing a serious offence in this country. We have a foreign national who rapes a child and flees back to his country of origin, and presumably we no longer make any efforts to extradite him because as far as this policy is concerned, he has been punished. He has gone home. What is that going to do for public confidence in the justice system? It will damage it, but I cannot see any upside. It is an impossible proposal.
David Gauke proposed, very sensibly, that there should be a minimum term of punishment, and that is necessary because it is not just punishment; it is also deterrence. Without that, we end up in the strange situation in which people commit a crime, leave for their home country at public expense and return as and when they wish to do so. We have had instances of that already. I will not go into the detailed cases at this stage in the evening, but it is not uncommon for those who have been arrested and convicted of offences to return to their country of origin and then return to these islands in due course. There have recent instances of that. We strongly support the idea that there has to be a minimum term of imprisonment in these cases, while understanding the pressure on our prisons. Does the Minister truly believe that public confidence in the justice system will be improved or even maintained as and when the full implications of this proposed policy become public?
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for meeting with my noble friend Lord Timpson to discuss the amendment proposed by him and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, relating to the early removal scheme and for the spirit in which this has been debated. Considering the lateness of the hour, I shall try to be brief. A number of the points I want to make, I will make very quickly, but there are one or two points that I do not think have been adequately addressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. I will perhaps just dwell on those.
To be clear, the Government’s priority is protecting victims in the UK and ensuring that foreign national offenders can never again offend here. Once deported, they will be barred from ever returning to the UK, protecting victims and the wider public. Limiting the early removal scheme to only those in receipt of a sentence of less than three years would effectively put the brakes on sustaining the removal of foreign national offenders.