Victims and Courts Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for the way in which he has explained these amendments. I am also extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for injecting a note of caution and to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for injecting a note of questioning about the proposed amendments.

In their explanatory statement, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, state that the amendments in this group probe

“the rationale behind restricting the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing to only the Crown Courts”.

The noble and learned Lord explained why he suggests that there is no difference, for the purpose of this power, between the Crown Courts and the magistrates’ courts.

I should make it clear that we on these Benches start from the position that defendants should be obliged to attend court for their sentencing hearings. But the fact that they are obliged to attend court does not lead to the conclusion that the courts ought to have the power to get them to court however much they wish to resist.

It is, of course, important from the victims’ point of view—this is a point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, made—that the defendants who have committed offences against them are in court for the occasion when they are brought to justice. It is appropriate, therefore, that in the right cases, the court should have the power to order them to do so.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out what a serious power this is. It is particularly a serious power, as I will come to say, because the use of force is sanctioned to get defendants to court. We have heard tell, in the press and in the House of Commons, from some of the wilder speeches—if I may put it that way—of, in effect, the court having the power to order that offenders be brought to court by considerable force and in chains. I am quite clear that that is not the way the Bill puts it; it puts it in terms of the use of force being reasonable, proportionate and appropriate. Nevertheless, it is a very serious power.

It is also important from the offenders’ point of view that they should come to court, first, to hear what the court says about their offences as well as what their counsel and the prosecution say about their offences. It is also important because their attending court and listening, hopefully with some care, to what goes on at their sentencing hearing may be taken as a sign of their understanding of the import of the hearing. If an order is made, the breach of such an order to attend court for a sentencing hearing is a sign of a lack of remorse on the part of the defendant. A lack of remorse will usually involve a court treating a defendant more severely than it might treat a defendant who does show remorse for the offences that they have committed and an understanding of the impact of those offences on the victims.

The scheme of this Bill is to bring in a very strong regime of compulsion with a specific incorporation of provisions about contempt of court and significantly, as I adumbrated, about the right to use force to bring defendants to court who are unwilling and refuse to attend their sentencing hearings. The conditions for the new regime, as set out in the Bill, are that the defendant has been convicted and is in custody awaiting sentencing by the Crown Court. That brings into play the kind of reservation that the noble and learned Lord spoke about. This new regime is designed to deal with serious offences. A third condition is that the offender has refused or is likely to refuse to attend the sentencing hearing.

It follows that the code for punishment for contempt should be confined to adult offenders. The amendments seek to make this procedure and all its features applicable to a wider group of offenders, and to magistrates’ courts as well as Crown Courts. I ask the Minister and the noble and learned Lord when they close how far a change to include magistrates’ courts will help victims. One can see how it is justified and might help victims in serious cases, but I question how far the use of force will ever be in the public interest. One must question the purpose of the use of force. It could be twofold. It could be to force offenders to face up to their offences and help them to avoid reoffending. It could be to help the victims by letting them see that those who have committed offences against them are being brought to justice. There may be force in that.

However, there is also a risk, which may be important, of forced attendance becoming a means for defendants to get publicity for themselves, their offences and their resistance to justice: to portray themselves as public martyrs and, in some cases, to make political gestures that could be thoroughly undesirable. If these orders became the norm, those dangers would be real. If it is to have a positive effect, this power is likely to be much more effective for serious cases in the Crown Court than it is for cases in the magistrates’ court. Of course we take the point that the scope of hearings in magistrates’ courts has been increased over what it was before the distinction was changed. Nevertheless, I will be very interested to hear the Minister’s response on the distinction. Our position at the moment is that the distinction is plainly justified.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, explores the reasons for limiting this power to the Crown Court.

Before I begin, I am sure that the whole Committee will wish to join me in paying tribute to the families of Jan Mustafa, Henriett Szucs, Sabina Nessa, Zara Aleena, and Olivia Pratt-Korbel—whose mother and aunt sit below the Bar today. Their tireless campaigning has brought about this change. They have persuaded the Government that when a cowardly offender refuses to attend court, it causes anger and upset, which can feel like a final insult to victims and their families, who have sat through the trial waiting for the moment when they can tell the world—and, importantly, the offender—about the impact their crimes have had. Many of them want the opportunity to look the offender in the eye as he or she hears about the effects of what they have done.

Offenders are expected to attend court for sentence, and the overwhelming majority do so. Because magistrates’ courts hear less serious cases, offenders are more likely to be on bail, and where an offender is on bail, the courts have powers to compel attendance by issuing a warrant. When a warrant is issued, the defendant is brought before the court in custody for the warrant to be executed, and the judge can add an additional sentence for the offence of failing to surrender to bail, which will appear on their record in future.

However, in the Crown Court, which deals only with the top level of serious crime, offenders are much more often remanded in custody, and so court powers to get them physically into court are more restricted. That is why the Government have acted by bringing forward this legislation which gives three powers that can be used in relation to recalcitrant—that is the right word, as used by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—offenders: first, authorising the use of reasonable force, except in the case of children, because we are a civilised country, and this Government do not believe in using force on children; secondly, for offenders who still refuse to attend, or for those who are disruptive once they are there, the power to add an additional sentence; and, thirdly, the power to impose the same kinds of prison sanctions as a prison governor can impose.

However, getting an unwilling and often disruptive offender to court is by no means straightforward, and it inevitably causes a delay to the sentencing hearing for the following reasons. At the outset, the judge will have to hear submissions from prosecution and defence counsel, as well as possibly from the prison and escort staff, as to whether the offender has a reasonable excuse for non-attendance and, if not, whether to exercise these new statutory powers. Then the judge will need to give a ruling, giving reasons as to why, in the circumstances of that particular case, it would be necessary, reasonable and proportionate to use reasonable force to get the offender to court.

Then the prison and transport staff will have to go and get the prisoner from the place, whether it is a prison or a court cell, which they are refusing to leave. The prison and transport staff will then have to use their judgment as to how best to execute the judge’s ruling, including what degree of force to use. Finally, if the offender is forced into court and is then disruptive, this is likely to cause more delay while the judge decides what to do next.

There is probably one thing we can all agree on: the criminal courts do not need any additional delays. Judges will need to weigh up carefully whether and when to use their new powers. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the question of the inherent powers that courts already have. Both the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts have inherent powers to deal with a non-attendance as a contempt of court, but these are used sparingly because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out very powerfully, it is far from straightforward.

For these reasons, the Government’s view is that this new legislation is appropriately restricted to Crown Court sentencing. It represents a reasonable and proportionate response to the problem, because it is the Crown Court where these powers are needed. Operational arrangements are already in place for producing the most serious and violent offenders at the Crown Court, managing the risks that that involves and, where necessary, using proportionate force. So, for these reasons, we consider that expanding the power to magistrates’ courts might create legal and operational uncertainty and unnecessary delay to court proceedings. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to the debate, and indeed the observations with regard to the timing of any extension of these powers.

I would observe, with respect to the submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that if these provisions help victims in the Crown Court, it is not clear why they would not help victims in magistrates’ courts.

The Minister talked at length of the difficulty of implementation with regard to these provisions, but that would apply equally in the Crown Court and the magistrates’ courts. Indeed, the appearance of serious offenders in the magistrates’ courts will of course be an immediate development with the changes under the Sentencing Act, which extend the sentencing powers of magistrates to three years.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 3, 4, 8 and 9, once again in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seek to give a victim or a bereaved family a defined role in the process of ordering someone to attend their sentencing hearing.

Victims have been at the forefront of this measure. It is precisely because an offender’s refusal to attend sentencing can compound the trauma for victims that we are giving judges an express power to order attendance, building on the judge’s existing common-law powers. Whether to order attendance must remain a judicial assessment of what is in the interests of justice. It will be made case by case, with the judge retaining the ultimate discretion having considered all the circumstances.

As I said when responding to the previous group, we anticipate that judges who are considering making an attendance order will hear submissions from both prosecution and defence. Prosecuting counsel will inevitably be expected to advance the views of the victim and the family, having sought them beforehand and having asked them; I can tell the Committee from my own experience that if they have not spoken to the victim or the victim’s family, the judge is likely to tell them to go away and do so—so it happens now. If there is no victim personal statement, the judge will, in my experience, inevitably say, “Why isn’t there one? Does the victim want to make one?” I can tell the Committee, again from my own experience, that the views of victims and their families are given great weight by the judge.

That said, we are anxious not to create unrealistic expectations in the minds of victims or their families that they would have the right to require the offender’s attendance at court. That could lead to some difficult experiences for victims and their families. What if, for example, the judge were to find that the offender had a reasonable excuse for non-attendance but the family of the victim disagreed? Plainly, the judge’s decision would have to prevail, but at what cost to the family if they had believed that they had the right to require attendance? We do not want to make sentencing hearings any more stressful or distressing for victims than they already are.

Judges must have the discretion to do what is right based on the facts in front of them and the submissions that they hear. There will be cases where it is not in the best interests of victims or families for the offender to be in court, including the occasions—thankfully rare—when the offender is likely to be disruptive or disrespectful and cause further distress.

To place a statutory duty on the court to consult a victim whenever an order is not made risks creating additional delay at the point of sentence. What, for example, if the victim’s family have chosen not to attend court, yet there is a mandatory statutory duty upon the judge to find out and consult them? As I have already said, the one thing that the Crown Courts do not need is any additional delay. In addition, such a statutory requirement risks placing an additional unnecessary emotional burden on victims and families.

The Bill preserves judicial discretion. We expect judges to take account of all relevant circumstances, including victims’ interests, and we are confident that they will do so because that is what they already do. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who contributed to this short but thoughtful debate, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. This debate has underlined how crucial these provisions are to the overall purpose of the Bill, why they warrant close attention and the balance that may have to be struck. We must, of course, get this right.

The Bill was brought forward with the express purpose of strengthening victims’ rights and improving their experience of the criminal justice system. But, as drafted, if we are not careful, victims will remain on the sidelines of a key decision-making process: whether an order should be made to compel an offender to attend their sentencing hearing. If the Bill does not allow victims to make explicit requests for compelled attendance then it will fall short of its own purpose and logic.

Notwithstanding the Minister’s assurance as to what happens in practice so far as the CPS is concerned—or happened when she was sitting in the Crown Court—surely it should be made obligatory for the CPS to ask the victim whether they wish the defendant to be compelled to attend and, if in receipt of a positive answer, to pass that view to the court. It will then be for the judge.

The current position is that judges have discretion to use their powers to compel attendance, even without a request from the prosecution, but we suggest that it is not clear when judges would exercise that power. We look to Ministers to confirm that—whether from them or, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has pressed for, from the judiciary—there should be guidance as to the exercise of the powers. We would also be grateful if the Minister would outline the reasoning behind why these orders are not automatic in the event of non-attendance and when reasonable force can be safely administered.

Our amendments offer a simple and straightforward improvement. They would have ensured that victims could make such requests and are consulted where the court is minded not to make a compulsory order, regardless of whether they had made the request. Sentencing hearings are often the final opportunity for victims to be heard and to feel that they are heard, so why would we deprive them of a say in decisions that directly shape that experience? Victims’ voices must be embedded in the process; they should not be treated as merely passive observers.

We have also observed that where a victim has died or is incapacitated, the system must not simply move on without them. Family members or appropriate representatives should be consulted in their place. We hope the Minister will carefully reflect on the points raised today to help fulfil the Bill’s stated purpose and fill what I am sure are unintentional gaps in its drafting. We look forward to hearing how the Government intend to move forward in due course but, for the moment, we will not press these amendments.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by reassuring your Lordships’ House that an attendance order can be made in respect of all offenders, including children. Most children are not tried in the Crown Court; they are tried in the youth court, even for serious offences. It is very rare for children of this age to appear in the Crown Court. If they do, an attendance order for their sentencing hearing can be made. The only difference is that force will not be used to get those children to court. The reason is that current operational policy, informed by the Taylor review of 2020, restricts the use of force on children. Domestic policy is also informed by the UK Government’s signatory status to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. We have committed to complying with its duties under the convention. During the debate a week ago in your Lordships’ House on the age of criminal responsibility, I said that this Government recognise that children in the youth justice system can be some of our most vulnerable citizens. Many of them are themselves victims of neglect and abuse, at the very least, and there is a disproportionate occurrence of special educational needs and neurodivergence in this cohort.

While we acknowledge that some children have committed very serious crimes for which they must be punished, this Government do not treat them merely as small adults. We have devised a separate but related regime for them. Where a child fails to attend court, or is disruptive once there, that may be treated as a contempt of court, but the maximum penalty is a fine, with the court taking into account limited means and making relevant arrangements for younger children. Lowering the threshold from 18 to 16 would cut across that safeguarding architecture. The Government’s view is that the strongest coercive path should be reserved for adults, where the legal, operational and ethical framework properly supports their use. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their measured observations on these proposed amendments. There is broad agreement across the House that attendance at sentencing is about accountability, about dignity for victims and about respect for the court. Refusal to attend sentencing has rightly been described by Ministers as a final insult to victims and families. The question before the House, then, is not whether the principle is right but to whom it should be applied.

These provisions are about ensuring that offenders confront the consequences of their actions, allowing victims to see justice done and hear sentencing remarks. They also uphold the authority and integrity of the court.

We are dealing with a situation in which 16 and 17 year-olds find themselves prosecuted in the Crown Court for serious offences, including murder, in respect of which they receive long custodial sentences. A 16 year-old can be convicted of murder or serious violence; that same 16 year-old would face no statutory obligation to attend their own sentencing hearing. Accountability cannot logically begin at conviction, however, and then disappear at sentencing. From a victim’s perspective, the same harm emerges regardless of whether an offender is 16, 17 or 18 years of age. The distress caused when an offender refuses to attend sentencing does not diminish by virtue of their age.

There is also the wider policy context that I mentioned before, which is that we now treat 16 year-olds, in essence, as adults in respect both of the proposal that they should be able to vote and of the fact that they can marry and can join the Armed Forces, and in respect of their wider social and political autonomy.

These amendments do not impact on the youth justice system. They do not remove judicial discretion. The courts will always retain discretion and take account of the welfare, capacity and safeguarding of 16 year-olds. In these circumstances, it respectfully appears to us that this proposal does not undermine Clauses 1 and 2, but rather seeks to strengthen them for the benefit of victims: someone whose conduct is serious enough to warrant Crown Court sentencing should not be shielded from accountability at the point of sentencing. But, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government understand that the aim of this group of amendments is to ensure that the children, who are at the heart of these cases, are protected. We share that objective, but these amendments may cause more problems than they are intended to solve. The amendments are all intended to be made to legislation, either proposed or already enacted, which deals with slightly different situations—convictions for certain serious sexual offences, children conceived as a result of rape and where one parent has been convicted of the murder of the other. However, all these pieces of proposed or enacted legislation have one thing in common. They are not intended to be additional punishments or to replicate—far less, replace—the experience and expertise of the family court. They are intended to protect children who are caught up in these very serious situations as quickly as possible.

In each of these three situations, the Government have identified issues in which the crime for which the relevant person has been sentenced is so serious, with them usually serving a long prison sentence, that it is relatively straightforward to conclude that a prohibited steps order will be in the best interests of the child. These proposals allow the Crown Court judge automatically to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility at the time of sentence. At the moment, following sentence the remaining parent must apply to the family court to do the same thing, but this inevitably takes time and causes distress.

It is known that some perpetrators use their parental responsibility to continue to exercise control, even though they are behind bars. In relation to a parent serving a life sentence for the murder of the other parent, it is axiomatic that there will be no other parent to make the application. What this legislation does not do is automatically restrict the exercise of parental responsibility in all cases forever. The defendant who has had it restricted can apply to the family court to have it restored. It does put the onus on them to do so. These provisions merely provide a quick and convenient method of protecting children and victims. However, restricting the exercise of parental responsibility is an extremely serious thing to do. For this reason, the Government must give serious consideration to how to balance the competing principles that are involved.

Against this background, I turn to Amendments 13, 14, 15, 19, 22 and 27, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie. They seek to broaden the offences that are within the scope of this measure and reduce the minimum sentencing threshold from four years. The Government believe that any individual who poses a serious risk to children should not be able to exercise their parental responsibility. For the avoidance of doubt, I make it clear that the Government’s view is that parents do not have rights. The only rights are those of the child.

However, to create a power allowing the automatic restriction at the point of sentence, we must be sure that to do so would be in the best interest of the child. That is why we have set the threshold at sentences of four years’ imprisonment. In our judgment, if the behaviour of the defendant is sufficiently serious to warrant a sentence of four years or more, it is safe to assume that it would be right to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility. We have set it at four years because this is already a threshold for seriousness used for other purposes in criminal sentencing. For certain offences, including sexual offences, an offender who is sentenced to four or more years serves two-thirds rather than a half of their sentence in prison. It already recognises the particular seriousness.

This pre-existing legislative provision is why we have chosen four years as the indicator of seriousness. If we were to lower the four-year threshold, we could risk moving away from where we can be sure that restricting the exercise of parental responsibility will always be in the best interests of a child into territory where it is less clear. Equally, we must ensure that these measures are not in contravention of a person’s human rights. In particular, we need to ensure that any interference with a person’s right to private and family life under Article 8 of the European convention is a justifiable and proportionate way of achieving a legitimate aim. We have set the threshold at four years for serious child sexual offences as we are of the view that, given the risk of harm to children, this intervention is justified.

That is not to say that the parental responsibility of offenders who have committed sexual offences, whether against their own child or someone else’s, but have received a sentence of less than four years, cannot be restricted. In those cases, an application can still be made to the family court, which is best placed to consider all circumstances, including what is in the best interests of the child.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, raised a number of issues about shortcomings in the family court. With the greatest of respect to her, this is perhaps not the time and place to expand on those, though they are of course serious points. As I think the noble Baroness knows, I have responsibility for family justice policy within my department, so these are issues that perhaps she and I can discuss on another occasion.

When we met, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, asked about appeals, and it has been raised again today. I promised him a reply. In cases where there is a successful appeal and an offender is acquitted or the sentence is reduced below four years, the Bill provides a clear process for the review of the prohibited steps order. The relevant local authority will be under a duty to make an application within a very short time to the family court, so that the family court can consider, exercising its expertise and experience, whether the prohibited steps order imposed by the Crown Court should be varied or discharged.

I turn now to Amendment 27 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston. The offence of having sexual communications with a child carries a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment, so this could not be added to the list unless the requirement of a four-year minimum sentence were removed.

I turn now to Amendment 34 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and to which the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, put her name and has spoken. This would expand Jade’s law, which provides for the automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility in cases where one parent kills the other. The noble Lord and the noble Baroness wish to amend the legislation so that it includes cases of attempted murder. I am grateful for being told that that was at the suggestion of the Victims’ Commissioner, Claire Waxman, for whom I have the utmost respect.

I entirely recognise that, in order to be convicted of attempted murder, what the defendant has done will have been truly horrific—after all, a defendant can be convicted of this only if they had the intention actually to kill—and nothing I say is intended to minimise that. But I repeat what I said earlier. The automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility is not intended to punish the defendant, far less to act as a mark of societal disapproval. It is about children. I repeat that Parliament must be satisfied that restricting the exercise of parental responsibility will be in a child’s best interests.

The sad but determining factor in these killing cases is that the child is going to have only one parent left, and that parent will usually be serving a life sentence. There is no other comparable situation. Where the defendant did not succeed in murdering the other parent, although they intended to do so, they will usually be serving a long sentence, but there will be a surviving parent. In most cases, the surviving parent will be able to make an application to the family court if one is felt necessary. This lessens the need for an automatic referral to the family court.

It would also be difficult to justify why, if attempted murder were included, other serious criminal offences such as Section 18 wounding, which also carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, were not. Your Lordships should also be aware that adding a further measure into Jade’s law at this point will risk delaying its implementation, which has already taken a lot longer than the Government would have wished.

I have been asked for the reasons for that, and I will give them as quickly as I am able to. It is a complicated situation, but this is a unique piece of legislation. There is no existing process that we can import or learn from. There has been significant engagement with various partners that will be involved in the delivery of Jade’s law: local authorities; the Crown Prosecution Service; the National Police Chiefs’ Council; and His Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service. The Government also have to make changes to criminal and family procedure rules, and we also have to develop broader guidance for practitioners and families. But we are on it. We must bring Jade’s law into force as soon as possible to protect the children who need it most. We must be cautious about doing anything at this stage that could extend this process.

As with the measures we are bringing in through this Bill, officials are developing a robust system to measure how Jade’s law works in practice. We want to understand how it works in practice, and from there we can properly consider whether other changes can be made to it. For all these reasons, I invite your Lordships not to press these amendments.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

If I understood my noble friend correctly, the protected steps order can be made only if Clause 3 is activated, and there is no discretion in the Crown Court to make a prohibited steps order in other circumstances, particularly where the offence did not, as drafted, carry a four-year imprisonment. In fact, I think my noble friend then said that parents can apply to the family court for the protected steps order. I find that rather awkward. Surely, when the Crown Court has all the facts in front of it and is in a position, therefore, to make a prohibited steps order, it should do so because it has the necessary knowledge. Of course, the prohibited steps order could be adjusted in a separate application to the family court.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The short answer to my noble friend’s question is that he is right: there is no discretion. The reason that there is no discretion is because, in fact, the Crown Court is the one court that does not have all the experience and all the knowledge—it will not have Cafcass reports or anything like that. It is simply making an automatic order when there is a certain level of seriousness that has been reached. It is for the family court to consider all the important factors in other cases about whether such an order is in the interests of the child. The Crown Court judge does not have the expertise, and it will cause delay. I have said it once before today—I may have already said it twice—the one thing the criminal courts do not need is any further delays.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken during this debate. As I said right at the start, we are looking at the entire spectrum of time as to where the responsibility for imposing these orders should start and stop, and that is anywhere between any child sexual offence and a sentence of four years.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for his comments about parental rights and responsibilities. I absolutely understand that. I am sure he also understands that, to the other parent, it often feels as though the convicted parent has more rights than their children. That is where the problems lie, and that is why there is such passion about this among those parents who are trying to make sure that their children are protected. I am also grateful to him for highlighting the data. It is important for us to remember that around 1,000 children might possibly be at risk if this goes wrong.

Just before I respond to the Minister, I want to thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. Yes, the court system is starved of resources. I want to go further than he does. It is not just about looking at resources; it is about a clear plan to increase resources and ensure that duplication and anything else does not happen. But we know the court system is under real pressure, and I say to the Minister that I recognise, in the amendment that I have table, that the last thing that we would want to do is to impose further burdens on an already difficult area.

I completely understand that the Government have to balance their competing restrictions. The problem is that those of us who have tabled amendments say that four years is not the safety net that the Minister alluded to; it is too high. I wondered whether there might be any way to provide guidance to the family court that asks it to look very clearly at any child sexual offence, even if it is not a four-year sentence, so that the Crown Court is not burdened with the responsibilities of looking at it in the way that the family court would.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions that have been made. I shall begin with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, in his amendments, which seek to clarify what is meant by, for example, the “relevant local authority” in this Bill, as well as to put extra provisions in place concerning parental responsibility. We support the aim behind Amendment 17 that others with parental responsibility for the child in question are properly and, indeed, promptly informed if a prohibited steps order is made against an offender. These are clearly well-intentioned amendments that highlight that certain aspects of the Bill need to be thought through a little more carefully and clarified. I hope that the Minister will provide assurances about how that can be achieved.

I also thank my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth for bringing forward his amendments, which would allow the Crime Court to take into account not only the interests of justice but the best interests of the child when deciding whether to make a prohibited steps order. On these amendments, we are not at this stage able to adopt a settled position. That is not because the underlying principle is unsound, but because further clarification is required from the Minister. As drafted, one of the exemptions to the making of a prohibited steps order is where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so, but that, as has been observed, is a broad and somewhat opaque formulation. We would be grateful if the Minister could explain what circumstances the Government envisage falling within that exemption. In particular, can the Minister offer examples of cases in which it would genuinely be in the interests of justice for a child to remain under the parental responsibility of an individual convicted of a serious sexual offence and sentenced to more than four years’ imprisonment?

These amendments would add an explicit reference to the best interests of the child. That is a familiar concept in family law, but its interaction with the existing exemption is not at all clear. I invite the Minister to clarify whether the Government consider that the child’s best interests are already subsumed within the interests of justice, or whether this amendment would materially alter the test applied by the court.

Amendments 18, 20, 24, 30, 31 and 32 in my name reflect our concerns about the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. As drafted, both clauses state that a prohibited steps order against an offender that restricts their parental responsibility will not immediately cease to have effect if an offender is acquitted on appeal. Instead, both clauses include sections that set out a review process whereby the relevant local authority must make an application to the court for the acquitted offender. That is hardly consistent with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to as a short, speedy and summary order in circumstances where there is a successful appeal.

The clauses as drafted unnecessarily complicate and confuse the issue. The law should be clear that an acquittal brings the prohibited steps order to an end. People who are found to be not guilty of an offence should not have their parental responsibility, or indeed any other rights, restricted, even on a temporary basis. That principle is straightforward and our amendments seek only to ensure that the legislation reflects that clarity. I hope that will have the support of the House, and I urge the Minister to reconsider and simplify the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. There is no compelling reason why these review orders should be left in place for innocent citizens and then be the subject of applications by a local authority on their behalf to another division of the court.

Amendment 18 is tabled to affirm our support for the provision of Clause 3 that, where an offender only has their sentence reduced, a prohibited steps order should continue to apply. We on these Benches already have reservations over why an offender’s length of imprisonment or detention must be four years or more for parental responsibility to be restricted. I note that the amendment made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, refers to a period of six months rather than four years. Clearly, there is scope for consideration as to where the line might be drawn as a matter of policy. If a sentence of four years is reduced on appeal, we do not believe that this should result in a prohibited steps order ceasing to have effect. It is quite unlike the situation where there is an acquittal on appeal. Such an outcome could create significant uncertainty for the child for whom the offender previously had parental responsibility. Crucially, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the offender remains guilty of a serious sexual offence against the child regardless of any adjustment in the sentence. An increased risk to the child’s safety or well-being could well emerge from such a situation.

There is also the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, about what happens in circumstances where a sentence is increased under the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. I invite the Government to address that point because clearly it has not been considered in the context of the present drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. For these reasons, I hope the Government will take all these amendments very seriously and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by repeating what I said in the debate about an earlier group. A prohibited steps order is not intended to be an additional punishment; rather, it is a tool devised to protect children. The aim of keeping the child safe and doing what is best for them is the central factor in every case. As I have already said, these powers are not intended to replicate, far less replace, the powers of the family court. Crown Court judges are simply not trained to make decisions about children, and they do not have the time to do so. The point has been made most powerfully by both the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. To ask the Crown Court to replicate the procedures of the family court could lead only to more time being needed to consider every case. As I have now said on at least three occasions today, the one thing the Crown Courts do not need is for cases to take longer.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

Jade’s law was brought in specifically to prevent victims having to immediately go to the family courts. Why have things changed since that principle emerged in the Victims and Prisoners Act?

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

As far as the Jade’s law situation is concerned, it remains the case that it will be dealt with automatically.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

If the principle stands, why is that not also true when an offender has committed a sexual offence of a certain bar?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

We might be slightly at cross-purposes here. The question is whether the Crown Courts have the ability to consider what is in the best interests of the child rather than automatically making the order when the threshold is reached. That is the difference. As I say, the point has been made most powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. The Crown Court is simply not equipped to go that extra mile of starting to look at things like reports from experts as to what is in the best interests of the child.

I turn to Amendments 18, 20, 24, 30, 31 and 32 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. The aim of these is to ensure that a prohibited steps order made under Clauses 3 or 4 would cease to have an effect if the offender was acquitted on appeal. I repeat what I have said. This is not a punishment; it is designed to protect the child. The measures require that, following an acquittal, the relevant local authority must, in very short order, bring an application before the family court to consider whether the prohibited steps order should be upheld, varied or discharged. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, mentioned an innocent parent. This is not about the rights of parents; it is about the rights of children and protecting them. It is not a punishment and therefore it is not something that should be automatically swept away on acquittal.

We recognise the need for a quick resolution in these situations, which is why both clauses state that the application must be made by the local authority within 30 days of the acquittal. This process brings the consideration of the child’s best interests and their potentially very complex family dynamics to the correct forum, which is the family court. It will mean that in every case a judge will undertake a review of all the circumstances, including whether the original prohibited steps order has already been varied by the family court while the appeal was under consideration, or whether other related orders are in place, before deciding what should happen in the best interests of the child. The family court is the right place for this to happen because that puts the interests of the child front and centre, where they should be.

I turn to Amendments 17, 21, 23, 26 and 29 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Meston. I think we can all agree that it is vital to have clear processes for identifying the offender’s children, notifying other parental responsibility holders of a prohibited steps order, and making the victims of a rape aware when the court has made an automatic order, but the Government’s view is that primary legislation is not the best way of doing this. These matters are better suited to being addressed in guidance, where we can work closely with those responsible for delivering it to ensure that we have a process that works in practice. We do not want a system that ties practitioners to an approach that cannot evolve with their own processes and where every time we want to make a change we have to come back and amend the primary legislation.

By way of example, we are not using primary legislation to prescribe the processes as we are working to implement Jade’s law. Instead, work is taking place across government—I ran through some of the things that we are doing earlier in relation to the previous debate—and with partners to develop a process that is clear and practical and that delivers the spirit of the aims of the amendment. In the case of these provisions, we will ensure that all relevant parties, including all other parental responsibility holders, are kept informed at each stage. We will take lessons from Jade’s law when this is implemented and, where possible, work with our partners to apply the same processes here. This will allow for consistency across all legislation in this space, rather than multiple processes for the same aim, which could lead to confusion and inconsistency in application. I warmly invite your Lordships to work with the Government to make sure that we get this right. I am more than happy to meet any of your Lordships who would like to discuss those matters with me, both in my capacity as Lords Minister and as Minister responsible for family justice policy.

In relation to identifying the children of offenders, this Government have separately committed to developing a mechanism to identify children who are affected by parental imprisonment to make it easier to provide support to them. I can assure your Lordships that the Ministry of Justice is working closely with the Department for Education to determine how we can best identify all children affected and ensure that they get support to enable them to thrive, but to legislate only for children in the scope of this measure risks distracting from the broader work intended to support all children.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 35, standing in both my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, would insert a new clause into the Bill to extend the safeguarding framework in Clause 3 beyond serious sexual offending so that it also applied to those convicted of the most serious child cruelty offences. In effect, it would mirror Clause 3.

Before I address the amendment in detail, I want to place on record my thanks to Helen Grant, Member of Parliament, for her tireless work on this issue. Over a number of years and across several Bills, she has consistently drawn Parliament’s attention to a clear and troubling gap in our safeguarding framework—that is, the absence of a coherent, systematic response to the most serious forms of child cruelty. Her campaigns for a child cruelty register and her persistence in ensuring that these issues remain firmly on the parliamentary agenda are no doubt something that all noble Lords can both respect and support.

Clause 3 introduces an important and welcome provision for the protection of children. The logic is compelling: where conduct is so grave that it demonstrates a fundamental incompatibility with the exercise of parental responsibility, there should be an automatic safeguarding mechanism. Amendment 35 asks a simple but profound question: why should that logic apply only to sexual offences and not to other, most serious forms of child cruelty?

The new clause proposed by the amendment would mirror the architecture of Clause 3 in many ways. It would introduce a duty on the Crown Court to make a prohibited steps order where an offender with parental responsibility was convicted and sentenced for a defined list of serious child cruelty offences. The threshold for such offences would be a custodial sentence of two years or more. We suggest that that is an appropriate balance between protection and practicability.

These offences have been carefully selected and reflect those on Helen Grant’s proposed child cruelty register, for which the Government have previously expressed support. They embrace serious crimes such as causing or allowing the death or serious harm of a child, child cruelty and neglect, infanticide, certain offences under the Offences Against the Person Act where the victim is a child, and offences relating to female genital mutilation, FGM. During the Crime and Policing Bill, the noble Baroness said,

“Ministers will continue to pursue this issue with vigour”.—[Official Report, 20/1/26; col. 250.].

The offences set out in this amendment strike at the very heart of a child’s safety and well-being. It is only right that a prohibited steps order be imposed.

If the Government truly believe in acting to prevent child cruelty, then to reject this amendment would be to defend an inconsistency in the current framework which we say is difficult to justify. A parent convicted of a serious sexual offence might automatically be prevented from exercising parental responsibility, while a parent convicted of causing severe physical harm or life-threatening neglect may not be. From the child’s perspective, that distinction is artificial. The harm is real, the risk is real and the need for safeguarding is just as acute. This amendment does not undermine family life unnecessarily. It does not sever parental responsibility permanently. It simply ensures that in the most serious cases, no steps may be taken by the offender without the oversight and consent of the family courts. They are best placed to make decisions concerning welfare and long-term outcomes. The amendment would bring coherence to the Bill and align it with the broader safeguarding principles that Parliament has repeatedly endorsed.

This amendment is motivated by a simple proposition. Children who have suffered the most serious forms of cruelty deserve the same automatic safeguarding protections as those who have suffered serious sexual abuse. I commend this amendment to the Committee and urge the Government to engage constructively with it, in the same spirit in which Clause 3 itself was conceived. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the automatic restriction of a person’s parental responsibility is a novel change to the law and must be done in a responsible and proportionate manner. The Government want to understand how these new measures operate in practice before we consider expanding the scope to other offences. We will carefully monitor how the provision operates once it is implemented and, as part of that implementation, officials will develop a system to help us understand the impact the measures are having, how the measures work in practice and how we can make improvements. For cases not in scope of the measure, whether that is because they fall outside the four-year threshold that has previously been debated or because they involve different crimes such as child cruelty, there are existing routes available in the family courts to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility. It is our evaluation that it is right that children are protected in that way while we evaluate the effect of the measures in the Bill. For these reasons I invite the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I find that an interesting reply. No reasons are given other than that this is novel. The provisions in Clause 3 are themselves novel, and all we ask is that where a serious offence of cruelty has been committed in respect of a child, that should be sufficient reason to adopt the same approach as that taken with sexual assault. What is the difference in practice for the child between being sexually assaulted and suffering cruelty? Having said that, we hear what is said and will engage with the Minister between now and Report, but we will wish to consider the position on Report.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord has just used the phrase “common sense”, and I think that that is what is expected by people who are affected, who know that they could look to consular services for help if they have lost a passport, but not in such a difficult situation as this. I simply say—and this is not addressed to the noble Baroness but possibly to some of her colleagues—that over the period that we have discussed this issue, there has almost been a sense of, “That’s the Foreign Office, it’s not us”. If we could get this into the victims’ code, it might mean a duty on the FCDO to be prepared to be more effective, and actually to be more effective.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 36 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to add agreements entered into by the National Crime Agency, the NCA, to the list of agreements in new subsection (7) that are exempt from the measure. Non-disclosure agreements, or NDAs, should not be used to silence victims or cover up crime: I think we can all agree on that. New subsections (7) and (8) of Clause 6 provide that the provision will not apply to a narrow cohort of specified agreements, in the interests of national security.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for everything she said. Early on, she said that the problem is that the victims’ code is not always applicable abroad. Can she comment on proposed new subsection (2) in the amendment, which talks specifically about the Secretary of State by regulation issuing an appendix to the victims’ code, setting out how the code applies to these victims? It is understood, from our side, that it would be different.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this point. Our current position is that we do not believe that that is necessary, but I am happy to meet her and get her to try to persuade me why I am wrong and she is right—there is my challenge to the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Finlay.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

The FCDO has a duty of care and a responsibility for UK citizens when they are in whichever country. It does not seem too bizarre or extreme to hope that it would accept a degree of responsibility for the very small number of unfortunate victims who, for whatever reason, are unlawfully killed in the course of a year. For the FCDO to accept that that is part of its responsibility—a very small part, albeit an important one—and to prepare itself thoroughly enough to be able to fulfil that duty in a professional, proper and sensitive way in the unhappy event that it is required does not seem too much to ask.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord, Lord Russell, puts it very persuasively and it is extremely tempting, particularly given that I do not speak for the FCDO, to say that it sounds utterly reasonable. However, I am sure he will understand why I cannot give that kind of commitment from the Dispatch Box, but I can commit to meeting and discussing this further.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

Forgive me for interrupting again on this issue. Can the Minister undertake to discuss with the FCDO the concept that each embassy or consulate has one named lead person for when it experiences managing one of these tragic situations, and that it is handed over to another named person when they leave? They could also come together as a group to provide support for, and learn from, each other, and compare where particular difficulties have occurred so that, over the years, the training can improve for each of these people. The worry at the moment is that these cases are so unusual in some places that it is a once-in-a-lifetime experience for some of the staff.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Again, the noble Baroness puts it very persuasively and, listening to her now, it all seems to make total sense. If, as a Government, we are committed to supporting victims of crime and putting them front and centre, that does not stop at our borders. However, I do not think that I can give an answer today and it would not be right to do so. I will commit to meeting the noble Baroness and seeing whether I can find out from the FCDO at least what its approach would be to such a suggestion. If she would put it in writing to me I could then pass it on so that we can try to take matters further.

Amendment 47A, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to add victims of persistent but non-criminal anti-social behaviour to the definition of a victim, as set out in Section 1 of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. The Government agree that anti-social behaviour is a blight on our communities and its impact should never be underestimated. We have committed to provide better support and information to victims of anti-social behaviour and have taken significant steps to do so. This includes the measures in this Bill that will strengthen the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers to hold the agencies that support anti-social behaviour victims to account.

Where anti-social behaviour amounts to criminal conduct, such as criminal damage, victims will benefit from the rights and entitlements within the victims’ code. However, expanding the definition of a victim to bring those affected by non-criminal anti-social behaviour within the code would, in our view, not be appropriate, as it is not an effective or efficient response to this kind of the behaviour. For example, in our view, it would be neither appropriate nor necessary for a victim of a neighbour who is playing loud music on one occasion to be brought within the scope of the victims’ code. Doing so could create unrealistic expectations and divert attention and resources from those experiencing serious criminal harm, such as victims of child sexual abuse.

In our view, there are better routes available to help these victims, including the anti-social behaviour case review, which gives the victims of persistent behaviour the right to request a multi-agency review to secure a resolution. In the proposals for the new victims’ code, on which we are currently consulting, we have clarified what victims of criminal anti-social behaviour can expect from the code and provided information about the case review process. I would welcome your Lordships’ responses to the consultation to outline in detail what further provision would be required for these victims.

On Amendment 47B, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, my noble friend Lord Bach and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I begin by acknowledging the problems brought by our current inability reliably to identify the same victim or witness across the criminal justice system. We accept that this results in duplication of records, slows the flow of information and leads to inconsistent data across the agencies. In addition, this fragmentation places a significant administrative burden on staff, who must reconcile records manually and then chase the missing information. However, perhaps most importantly, it means that victims and witnesses are sometimes provided with conflicting information, which can cause confusion at best and serious distress at worst.

The Government are already working to address these issues through the cross-criminal justice system data improvement programme, jointly led by the Ministry of Justice and Home Office. This programme aims to strengthen data sharing across the criminal justice system and is actively exploring how individuals, including victims, can be more reliably recognised across agencies. We are clear that improvements to data sharing must be underpinned by robust safeguards to ensure personal data is handled lawfully, securely and proportionately, with a strong focus on minimising unnecessary circulation of sensitive information, which I know is a key concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.

The Government are open to considering legislative options to improve data sharing, data quality and the use of unique identifiers where that is shown to be necessary and proportionate. However, introducing a statutory requirement at this stage, ahead of the completion of the work of the programme, could unintentionally constrain future design and implementation choices, before we are confident it would deliver the intended benefits for victims and the wider criminal justice system. For these reasons, the Government do not believe that primary legislation at this stage is the appropriate mechanism.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

For well over a decade, since the passage of the Children and Families Act 2014, we have been discussing as a House a unique identifying number for children who may end up either in the health system or care system as well as schools. It has taken well over a decade—they are just about to use the NHS number as part of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill. I urge the Minister to have a look at this again; otherwise, we will be here for another 10 years, arguing the same point.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

This Government have not been in power over the whole of the last of the decade, and we are doing our best to look at it. I will certainly look at it and discuss it with her. We are simply saying that, at this stage, we do not think primary legislation is the right way of dealing with it.

Finally, I turn to Amendments 55, 56 and 57, in the names of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who is not in his place, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. Before I do, let me say that I recently had the privilege of meeting with Emma Webber and with Julian Hendy of Hundred Families. They explained very clearly to me the issues as they see them, and it was a very moving experience. I pay tribute to their strength and honour the memories of those they have lost. Their experiences, along with the experiences of all victims of crime, must continue to guide us.

Part of the rationale for providing information to victims is to help them to feel safe and so they can plan for an offender’s eventual release or discharge. That is why the legislation requires that hospital managers provide victims with specified information where appropriate, regardless of any assessment by a hospital manager of the victim’s safety and well-being, because we acknowledge that the hospital manager’s assessment could well be different from the victim’s own assessment.

Where hospital managers receive a request for information from an eligible victim outwith the specified list within the Bill, they will consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to provid it, and this assessment can of course include considering the risk to the victim. Where there are specific concerns about a victim’s safety, there are other, more appropriate processes to be followed. It is important to note that this is not the primary purpose of the victim contact scheme.

Where a decision is made that it is not appropriate to provide some information, reasons can and should be provided wherever possible. However, these should reflect the victim’s communication preferences, and considerations about this would, in our view, be most appropriately set out in operational guidance, which would also provide the necessary flexibility to adjust requirements as we monitor practice.

We agree that victims should have a route for some recourse where information is not provided. There are existing complaint routes for all cohorts, and the Government consider that a more effective way of going about this would be to make sure hospital managers understand and fulfil their obligations to victims at the outset, rather than introducing additional bureaucracy. My officials are working closely with the Department of Health and Social Care to consider routes by which to support hospital managers, including whether a joint departmental protocol, or via planned updates to the Mental Health Act code of practice—statutory guidance under the Mental Health Act 1983—might provide an appropriate vehicle.

In relation to all the amendments in this group and many of the others, we are listening and we want to get it right. We will continue to work with your Lordships and with victims’ groups, but for now I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to this wide-ranging and thoughtful debate on the operation of the victim contact scheme and the wider support network for victims. The debate has demonstrated broad consensus on the principle that victims’ rights and access to information must keep pace with changes in sentencing policy and criminal justice practice. The question is not whether victim engagement matters but whether our current structures are fit for purpose in the systems we now operate.

Several amendments in the group had common concerns: gaps in coverage within the victims’ code and the victim contact scheme; lack of transparency, consistency and accountability in how information is provided; the risk that victims fall through the cracks; and the technical thresholds or institutional boundaries that exist. Taken together, these amendments seek to ensure that victim support is timely, trauma-informed, consistent and capable of scrutiny. The amendments also recognise that, among others, where the state chooses to sentence offenders in the community, it assumes a greater, not a lesser, responsibility to support victims. Victim engagement must be strengthened not weakened in a non-custodial sentencing landscape. I therefore urge the Government to consider carefully how victims are to be protected and informed under current policy. In the meantime, I seek leave to withdraw my amendment.