Assisted Dying Legislation: Isle of Man and Jersey
Baroness Levitt Excerpts(4 days, 8 hours ago)
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Lord Bassam of Brighton
To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to enable legislation passed by the Tynwald of the Isle of Man and States Assembly of Jersey allowing assisted dying to receive Royal Assent in a timely fashion.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, since receiving the Isle of Man’s Assisted Dying Bill, we have engaged with its authorities, in line with the UK’s responsibility for its international relations. This includes ensuring compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. Advice on Royal Assent will go to the Lord Chancellor in due course and, when we receive the Jersey law, we will follow the normal process of scrutiny in a timely manner.
Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her reply. We are in an odd position—are we not?—on the assisted dying Bill. The Isle of Man has legislation in place, the Welsh Assembly has just approved a legislative consent Motion, the States Assembly of Jersey has agreed a Bill and the Scottish Parliament will shortly follow. Yet, after nearly nine months and 180 hours of consideration in our Parliament, we are still stuck on Clause 3 of a 57-clause Bill. Given that 73% of the public back the Bill, is not the position of the Bill’s House of Lords opponents beginning to look rather odd and, frankly, out of touch?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, as my noble friend knows, the Government have been clear that we are neutral on the topic of assisted dying and the passage of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. It is a Private Member’s Bill and my noble friend the Chief Whip has made it clear that there will be no government time given to the Bill in your Lordships’ House. It is for your Lordships to determine the progress of the Bill.
Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)
My Lords, before Royal Assent has even been granted to Jersey’s Bill, a Deputy has tabled a Motion calling for assisted dying to be extended to non-terminally ill people with unbearable suffering. In reply, the Health Minister has said “Now is not the time, but it would be appropriate to consider extending the law as part of the three-year review of the Act”. Does the Minister not agree that this demonstrates that the terminal illness criterion is no cast-iron guarantee, but is simply the mission creep that many of us have warned against concerning our legislation?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the Crown dependencies are self-governing jurisdictions with their own democratically elected Parliaments. The UK is not responsible for looking at the content or the policy of any legislation that they pass, but merely for checking that it is compatible, for example, with the European convention. I am certainly not going to say anything that would change the Government’s position of neutrality in relation to the Private Member’s Bill that is passing through your Lordships’ House.
Lord Beith (LD)
My Lords, the process leading up to advising on Royal Assent is one in which the UK Government examines island legislation to see if it has unintended effects in the United Kingdom. Is that process being gone through and, if so, how, given that we do not know what the Government’s position would be on such fundamental questions as whether assisted dying would be provided within or outside the National Health Service, and all the dependencies rely on specialist medical help from hospitals in England?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
At the risk of repeating myself, the Government do not look at the merits of the legislation that they receive in relation to the Crown dependencies: these are stand-alone pieces of legislation that do not affect the position the Government take in relation to the Private Member’s Bill before this House.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, in addition to the assisted dying legislation in the Crown dependencies of Jersey and the Isle of Man, there is, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, observed, also legislation coming forward in Scotland and, quite distinctly and separately, in England and Wales. If assisted dying becomes lawful in one jurisdiction of the United Kingdom but not another, can the Minister explain what UK-wide framework has been developed to manage the legal, ethical and medical consequences of that divergence, or are we in danger of creating for the United Kingdom a fragmented regime in this most ethically sensitive issue, without any agreed cross-border protocol?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I understand why the noble and learned Lord asks that question, but it would be entirely premature of the Government to work out what the situation is going to be, since we do not know whether or if that Private Member’s Bill will pass through your Lordships’ House.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I oppose the principle of assisted dying and I think that the current Bill is very flawed. However, I also regret the fact that your Lordships’ House has not been able to actually have votes on some of the key elements within the Bill. I think there are many noble Lords who regret the way this Bill is being conducted.
My noble friend says the Government are neutral, which I fully understand, but, in the current circumstances, surely the Government need to think about how Parliament can be helped to come to some conclusions. Surely, we would start with a vote in principle in the Commons. If it is in favour, the Government should produce a Bill that would allow us to have proper scrutiny. Will she at least consider a way forward that enables us to come to a proper conclusion?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I do not know how many more ways I can find to say that the Government are neutral on this Bill. My noble friend the Chief Whip has made extra days available on Fridays: we still have four more to go. How that time is used is a matter for your Lordships’ House, bearing in mind that the position of the Government consistently has been that this is a question of conscience and not a matter for the Government.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, how are the Government considering the proposed legislation in the different areas to be safe within the European Convention on Human Rights, given that we have already heard that Jersey’s euthanasia is proposed to extend to those who are not terminally ill and that the deficits in the infrastructure of the Isle of Man Bill have already been identified? There is ongoing discussion about the Bill proposed in Scotland, which looks quite different, and the Welsh Assembly gave legislative consent to only some parts of the Bill, under the impression that, if it did not, it would have no control whatever over how the legislation was enacted, given that health is devolved to Wales.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for her question. She has asked for quite a lot of information and we may have to write to her on that. I can certainly speak about what happened in relation to the Isle of Man. We have the Isle of Man for assistance on the Bill’s reliance on codes of practice for the implementation of pre-death and post-death reviews. We also asked for assistance on the training and guidance of healthcare professionals, specifically around safeguarding against potential coercion. The Jersey Bill has not arrived with us yet, but I repeat that the merits of the legislation are not a matter for this Government.
Lord Harper (Con)
My Lords, set out in the Ministry of Justice’s communications with the Isle of Man, there are a number of concerns with the legislation there that are very similar to the concerns that many of us have with the Bill before this House, and many amendments have been put down to deal with those concerns. We would be making faster progress if the sponsor of the Bill would engage seriously with those concerns and accept some of the amendments that have been put forward by those who want to make the Bill better.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
Can anybody think of another way for me to say that the Government are neutral in relation to this Bill? And I am certainly not going to comment on matters that are for the sponsor.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, does the Minister agree that respecting the settled will of the legislatures of the Isle of Man and Jersey on matters within their domestic competence strengthens the constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and the Crown dependencies? Will the Government therefore commit to publishing clear criteria and timeframes for the granting of Royal Assent?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The most recent communication from the Isle of Man—the latest information—was received at the end of January. Officials are now preparing advice for the Lord Chancellor. It would be completely inappropriate for me to comment on either the timing or the content of that advice.
Baroness Jay of Paddington (Lab)
My Lords, notwithstanding the Government’s determined position of neutrality, which the Minister has rightly said she has repeated many times, would she not accept that, once Royal Assent is given to the procedures and the Acts in Jersey and in the Isle of Man, there will be an extraordinarily unsatisfactory patchwork of provision across the United Kingdom for assisted dying, and therefore it is particularly important that the Government should make sure that the Bill before your Lordships’ House is properly completed?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I still cannot think of another, better way of saying it. I think it would be rude to my noble friend to say that I refer her to my previous answer, but I am afraid I do.
Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Levitt ExcerptsMonday 2nd March 2026
(5 days, 8 hours ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-II(c) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (2 Mar 2026)
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her amendment, which would place a duty on the Secretary of State, within 12 months of the Act being passed, to make provisions for the way in which offences of sharing intimate images are reported and the mechanisms by which content is removed by the relevant internet service. I understand that the Government have given my noble friend an undertaking for Third Reading, and I am pleased that they have done so.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I am pleased to put on record that this Government completely accept and agree with the intention that underlies this amendment. That is why, as I said earlier, the Government will introduce a legal duty for tech platforms to take down reported non-consensual intimate image abuse within 48 hours, to ensure that victims get rapid protection. This change, which will be brought forward at Third Reading, will create a strong, enforceable foundation for getting harmful material removed from online circulation, so that victims are no longer left chasing platforms for action. To support swift and effective action to remove this material by internet infrastructure providers, we will also explore any barriers to blocking and how this can be addressed. This will help ensure that rogue sites operating outside the scope of the Online Safety Act will be targeted. I appreciate the noble Baroness’s eagerness to see this change brought about quickly, but as the Government intend to bring forward amendments to this effect at Third Reading, I hope she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
Can the Minister confirm to the House that not only will the Government be bringing forward amendments but if I am not satisfied with them, I may bring back my own?
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
May I just check that that is an undertaking? We have a nod. Thank you. I am very pleased that we will return to this issue at Third Reading, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Levitt
“1A After section 66A insert—“66AA Sharing semen-defaced image(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally shares a semen-defaced image of another person (B),(b) B does not consent to the sharing of the semen-defaced image, and(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.(2) A “semen-defaced image” of a person (B) is—(a) a photograph or film which—(i) shows, or appears to show, B, and(ii) has, or appears to have, semen on it or in its immediate vicinity, or(b) a photograph or film of a photograph or film within paragraph (a). (3) “Photograph” includes the negative as well as the positive version.(4) “Film” means a moving image.(5) References to a photograph or film also include—(a) an image, whether made or altered by computer graphics or in any other way, which appears to be a photograph or film,(b) a copy of a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a), and(c) data stored by any means which is capable of conversion into a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a).(6) A person “shares” a semen-defaced image if the person, by any means, gives or shows it to another person or makes it available to another person.(7) But a provider of an internet service by means of which a semen-defaced image is shared is not to be regarded as a person who shares it.(8) For the purposes of subsection (1)—(a) “consent” to the sharing of a semen-defaced image includes general consent covering the particular act of sharing as well as specific consent to the particular act of sharing, and(b) whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for sharing the semen-defaced image.(10) A person (A) who shares a semen-defaced image of another person (B) does not commit an offence under subsection (1) if—(a) the semen-defaced image had, or A reasonably believes that it had, been previously publicly shared, and(b) B had, or A reasonably believes that A had, consented to the previous sharing.(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence of sharing a photograph or film of a person where the image has, or appears to have, semen on it or in its immediate vicinity, without the person’s consent.
Baroness Levitt
“66AD Creating a copy of intimate photograph or film shared temporarily(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—(a) another person (B)— (i) shares with A a photograph or film which shows, or appears to show, B in an intimate state, and(ii) does so in such a way that A can view the photograph or film for a limited time, but cannot send it to another person,(b) A intentionally creates a copy of the photograph or film that A can view at other times,(c) A knows that the photograph or film is shared with A by B,(d) B does not consent to the creation of the copy, and(e) A does not reasonably believe that B consents to the creation of the copy.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a)(ii)—(a) the cases in which A can view the photograph or film for a limited time include the case where A can view it for as long as B allows A to do so;(b) sending the photograph or film to another person does not include showing it to another person.(3) References in this section to creating a copy of a photograph or a film include —(a) creating a copy of part of a photograph or film, or(b) creating a copy of a photograph or film with modifications,where the copy shows, or appears to show, B in the intimate state in which B is shown, or appears to be shown, in the photograph or film.(4) Subsection (1) is subject to section 66AE (exemptions).(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for creating the copy.(6) Section 76 applies to an offence under this section.(7) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).66AE Creating a copy of intimate photograph or film shared temporarily: exemptions(1) A person (A) does not commit an offence under section 66AD(1) in relation to a photograph or film shared with A if—(a) the photograph or film was, or A reasonably believes that it was, taken or recorded in a place to which the public or a section of the public had or were permitted to have access (whether on payment or otherwise),(b) the person the photograph or film shows, or appears to show, in an intimate state (B) had no reasonable expectation of privacy from such a photograph or film being taken or recorded, and(c) B was, or A reasonably believes that B was, in the intimate state voluntarily.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy from a photograph or film being taken or recorded is to be determined by reference to the circumstances that A reasonably believes to have existed at the time the photograph or film was taken or recorded.(3) A person (A) does not commit an offence under section 66AD(1) in relation to a photograph or film shared with A if—(a) the photograph or film had, or A reasonably believes that the photograph or film had, been previously publicly shared, and(b) B had, or A reasonably believes that B had, consented to the previous sharing.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence of creating a copy of a photograph or film showing, or appearing to show, a person in an intimate state, that has been shared with the person creating the copy only temporarily.
Baroness Levitt
“(2A) In subsection (3), at the end insert “, or as a person with whom it is shared”.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the provider of an internet service by means of which a photograph or film is shared is not regarded as a person with whom it is shared for the purposes of the offence in section 66AD of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13).
Baroness Levitt
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment applies the definition of consent in section 66D(10) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to the new sections inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13.
Baroness Levitt
“(za) section 66AA;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment extends the time limit for prosecuting the offence in new section 66AA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 321, line 19).
Baroness Levitt
“Online Safety Act 2023 (c. 50)
23 In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 28A (Sexual Offences Act 2003), at the end insert—“(c) section 66E (creating purported intimate image of adult);(d) section 66F (requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult).””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds offences to Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023, requiring service providers to take action to identify and minimise users’ exposure to content created or requested in the commission of those offences and to mitigate the risk of services being used to commit those offences.
Baroness Levitt
“Pornographic images of sex between relatives(1) After section 67D of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert—“67E Possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives(1) It is an offence for a person (P) to be in possession of an image if—(a) the image is pornographic, within the meaning of section 63,(b) the image portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, a person (A) sexually penetrating—(i) the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of A’s body or anything else, or(ii) B’s mouth with A’s penis,(c) a reasonable person looking at the image would think that A and B were real, and(d) a reasonable person—(i) looking at the image, and(ii) taking into account any sound or information associated with the image,would think that A and B were related, or pretending to be related, in a way mentioned in subsection (2).(2) That is to say, A being related to B as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.(3) It is an offence for a person to publish an image of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).(4) Publishing an image includes giving or making it available to another person by any means.(5) For the purpose of subsection (1)(d)—(a) the reference to sound or information associated with the image is—(i) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (1), to sound, or information, associated with the image that is in P’s possession, and(ii) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (3), to sound, or information, associated with the image that the person in subsection (3) publishes with the image, and(b) A and B are not to be taken as pretending to be related if it is fanciful that they are actually related in the way pretended.(6) In subsection (2)—“(a) “parent” includes an adoptive parent;“(b) “child” includes an adopted person within the meaning of Chapter 4 of Part 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002;“(c) “uncle” means the brother of a person’s parent, and “aunt” has a corresponding meaning;“(d) “nephew” means the child of a person’s brother or sister, and “niece” has a corresponding meaning.(7) For the purpose of this section—“(a) “image” has the same meaning as in section 63;(b) penetration is a continuing act from entry to withdrawal;“(c) “vagina” includes vulva; (d) references to a part of the body include references to a part surgically constructed (in particular through gender reassignment surgery).(8) Subsections (1) and (3) do not apply to excluded images, within the meaning of section 64.(9) Nothing in—(a) section 47 of the Adoption Act 1976 (which disapplies the status provisions in section 39 of that Act for the purposes of this section in relation to adoptions before 30 December 2005), or(b) section 74 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (which disapplies the status provisions in section 67 of that Act for those purposes in relation to adoptions on or after that date),is to be read as preventing the application of section 39 of the Adoption Act 1976 or section 67 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 for the purposes of subsection (6)(a) or (b).(10) Proceedings for an offence under this section may not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.67F Defences to offence under section 67E(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67E(1), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2).(2) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the image concerned;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67E(1);(c) that the person—(i) was sent the image concerned without any prior request having been made by or on behalf of the person, and(ii) did not keep it for an unreasonable time;(d) that—(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or B mentioned in section 67E(1)(b),(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person, and(iii) the person is not related to person B or A (as the case may be) in a way mentioned in section 67E(2).(3) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67E(3), it is a defence for a person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4).(4) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for publishing the image concerned to the persons to whom they published it;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67E(1);(c) that—(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or B mentioned in section 67E(1)(b),(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person,(iii) the person is not related to person B or A (as the case may be) in a way mentioned in section 67E(2), and(iv) the person only published the image to person B or A (as the case may be).(5) In this section, “non-consensual harm” has the same meaning as in section 66. 67G Penalties for offences under section 67E(1) A person who commits an offence under section 67E(1) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).(2) A person who commits an offence under section 67E(3) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).”(2) In section 68 of that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), after “67A” (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “and 67E”.(3) In Schedule 14 to that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), in paragraphs 3(1), 4(2) and 5(1) after “67A” (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “or 67E”.(4) In section 47(1) of the Adoption Act 1976, for “or sections 64 and 65 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sex with an adult relative)” substitute “sections 64 and 65 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sex with an adult relative), or section 67E of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives)”.(5) In section 74(1) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002—(a) omit the “or” after paragraph (a);(b) after paragraph (b) insert “, or(c) section 67E of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives).”(6) In Schedule 34A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (child sex offences for the purposes of section 327A), after paragraph 13ZA (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert—“13ZB An offence under section 67E of that Act (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives).”(7) In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 29, after paragraph (b) (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “;(c) section 67E (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives)”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence to possess or publish pornographic images of sex between relatives (that is to say, incest).
Baroness Levitt
“Sexual activity with an animal(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).(2) For section 69 (intercourse with an animal) substitute—“69 Sexual activity with an animal(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) the person intentionally touches an animal (whether living or dead),(b) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, that is what is touched, and(c) the touching is sexual.(2) For the purposes of this section, touching is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that—(a) because of its nature it may be sexual, and(b) because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years.” (3) In section 78 (meaning of “sexual”), after “66D” insert“, 69”.(4) In section 79 (Part 1: general interpretation) omit subsection (10).(5) In paragraphs 35 and 92 of Schedule 3 (sexual offences that make offender subject to notification requirements), for “intercourse” substitute “sexual activity”.(6) In the following provisions, for “intercourse” substitute “sexual activity”—(a) paragraph 151 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003;(b) paragraph 38(az) of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment replaces the existing offence of intercourse with an animal with a wider offence of sexual activity with an animal.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, we have dealt with some unattractive topics already this evening, and we are about to embark on another one. Government Amendments 301, 302, 451 and 465 in my name deal with the unpalatable but very serious question of animal sexual abuse.
These amendments respond directly to concerns raised in both Houses. I am grateful to many noble Lords, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Black, Lord Blencathra and Lord Pannick, and Danny Chambers MP, all of whom argued persuasively that the current offence does not reflect the full range of abhorrent behaviour that we believe should be prohibited. I pay particular tribute to David Martin and Paula Boyden from the Links Group, who met me and provided the Government with further evidence.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken to the amendments in this group and I echo the thanks of my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood to the Minister for her remarks and for listening and acting on the concerns raised in Committee. I acknowledge the work of my noble friends Lord Black and Lord Blencathra, who are tireless champions of animal welfare and have worked effectively with the Government on the Bill.
We welcome the introduction of Amendment 301 and its consequential amendments, which build on the debate in Committee and update the offence of “intercourse with an animal” with a wider provision that covers all sexual activity, as we have heard. This area of law has long needed updating, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, and I am glad that the Government are doing it now. My noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood raised a couple of concerns that were worth highlighting. He said that to deprive an individual of animals that they own after they have been convicted is a logical next step. If the primary goal is to promote the welfare of animals, as I believe it is, it seems to me that the best way to achieve that would be to ensure that those who have been convicted are prevented from owning or having access to animals.
Similarly, he spoke about the discrepancy in sentences and that does not seem to make complete sense, as it stands. I look forward to hearing what the noble Baroness has to say in reply.
My noble friend also mentioned the possession and sharing of animal pornography. I am sure that there is not much appetite for further discussion of pornography today, but this is an important issue, and I would be grateful if the Minister could commit to considering measures to curbing animal pornography in the future.
Finally, these Benches wholly support the intention behind the amendment in the names of my noble friends. In the interest of brevity, I will not repeat the statistics or arguments raised by my noble friend Lord Black in his speech, but the evidence base is clear and irrefutable. It seems there is a causal link between animal abuse and domestic abuse and sexual violence. As he highlighted, pets are often used to coerce and control victims of domestic abuse. There seems to be institutional knowledge within relevant authorities that this is happening and yet we lack the safeguards to address it. My noble friend also mentioned the tragic case of Holly Bramley.
The cost/benefit of this measure is hard to argue against. The child sex offender register, a current practice that uses the same principle, costs just £1.92 million per year. I suggest that we would be in similar sums for this. I understand that the Minister may not be able to offer her support to this measure at this point, but I hope that it is something that the Government will return to in the future.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Black, Lord Blencathra, Lord Pannick and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for welcoming the Government amendments today and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for the flattering remarks that he made which were very welcome after a long day in your Lordships’ House. I am pleased to hear that the amendments have this support and, once again, I thank those who raised this with us in Committee.
This new offence is focused solely on strengthening the criminal offence relating to sexual abuse of animals, given the scope of this Bill. To establish this offence, the new offence that the Government are bringing today, the prosecution does not have to prove that the animal actually suffered, because this was sometimes an obstacle to prosecutions in the past. This was something that we were persuaded of during the meetings with the noble Lord and those who came with him. Where the conduct has caused the animal to suffer, the defendant can be charged with an offence under the Animal Welfare Act 2006, for which orders such as removing the animal from the offender’s ownership, rehoming or destroying the animal, or disqualifying the offender from keeping animals are available. It is not either or—they can both be charged at the same time. It is quite common with criminal behaviour.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
The Minister says that the accused could be charged. Charged and prosecuted by whom?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
Although the RSPCA conventionally prosecutes, there is nothing to stop the Crown Prosecution Service from prosecuting. If you had conduct that fell within both, you would not have two separate prosecutors bringing two separate sets of proceedings; it would be the Crown Prosecution Service for both. However, I understand the concerns. I am committing to continuing to engage with parliamentarians and key stakeholders on this issue. We will keep it under consideration.
As far as animal pornography is concerned—obviously a great worry to everybody—the offence of possession of extreme pornographic images under Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 already criminalises possession of pornographic images depicting extreme acts, which includes intercourse or oral sex with an animal, whether living or dead. We do not believe that further legislation is necessary.
Turning to the question of sentence, the current offence of intercourse with an animal carries a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment, which we will retain for the new offence. We do not have evidence at the moment that this is insufficient to enable the courts to deal appropriately with offending of this nature, but we know that, when animal suffering occurs, there are higher penalties available under the animal cruelty legislation, which—as has already been said by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—provides sentences of up to five years’ imprisonment. Once again, we will engage with parliamentarians and key stakeholders as to how the existing animal cruelty offences operate alongside the new offence. With that in mind, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw—
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am sorry for holding the House back this late at night. The Minister says that there is nothing to stop the CPS prosecuting for animal cruelty if it is prosecuting a case of sex with an animal and discovers cruelty. In that case, will she guarantee that the CPS will issue guidance to all its prosecutors that, where a prosecutor is prosecuting for animal sexual abuse and discovers animal cruelty, he or she will automatically prosecute it and not wait for the RPSCA to do it God knows when?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The difficulty is that the Crown Prosecution Service, as a matter of constitutional convention, is independent of the Government and does not take well to being told what to do by them. However, we can raise this with it and ask whether it will look at it again. I beg to move.
Baroness Levitt
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment updates the wording of a reference to the offence of sexual activity with a corpse in paragraph 92 of Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I had written “I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones”, which I crossed out, and then “the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey”, which I also crossed out. I will now say that I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for bringing forward this amendment and for the careful way in which he outlined the basis for it.
We support the intention behind Clauses 115 and 116. These are serious offences, designed to capture those who deliberately encourage or assist serious self-harm. Precisely because the subject matter is so grave and so bound up with vulnerability, it is essential that the law is applied with clarity and care.
The amendment’s focus on consultation and guidance is pragmatic and proportionate, because policy in this area must be rooted in the lived experience of mental health professionals and legal practitioners, so guidance that distinguishes criminal intent from legitimate activity will be vital to avoid unintended consequences. For those reasons, we lend our support to the principle behind this amendment and look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I too had a speech that started off thanking the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I too crossed that out and wrote in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I also now thank the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for moving this amendment.
I am, however, grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who is not in his place now, for meeting me to discuss his amendment. I think I was able to persuade him and to reassure him that guidance on the application of Clauses 115 and 116 is not necessary. I also wrote to him—I know I cleared the letter, and it may even have been the day before yesterday; I think I have just received a message saying that it may not have been sent until this afternoon, but it has definitely gone. We have placed a copy in the House Library. The letter was written with the intention that it could be sent to the various charities so that they could see exactly what I was saying.
As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and I discussed, the existing offence that these amendments seek to broaden, which is under Section 184 of the Online Safety Act, is already in active use by the CPS and law enforcement. We are not aware of any cases involving therapeutic support where prosecutors have struggled to determine whether a prosecution was appropriate. The CPS guidance is clear about the requirement of intention, which must be present to meet the threshold of the offence, and the CPS legal guidance will be updated to reflect the widened scope of the offence, which now covers conduct both online and in person.
The offence also contains two important safeguards. First, the defendant must intend to encourage or assist the serious self-harm. Secondly, their act must be capable of doing so. These safeguards ensure that vulnerable individuals and those providing mental health support are not also inadvertently captured.
I should make it clear that it is absolutely not the Government’s intention to target either vulnerable people or the therapeutic services that support them. The Government believe the offence as it operates now and as it will be expanded in the Bill is proportionate and targets only the most serious and culpable offending. I hope that the noble Lord is content with these reassurances and will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Addington (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for giving that assurance. Having it repeated again at the Dispatch Box makes it easier for people to feel secure about this. That, along with the letter, which I am sure is a work of great wisdom, will add to the fact that we will have a defence in place, just in case there are misunderstandings. With that, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment.
Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Levitt ExcerptsMonday 2nd March 2026
(5 days, 8 hours ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 167-II(c) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (2 Mar 2026)
Baroness Levitt
“(ia) sections 8A to 8C (rape and other offences against children under 16);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16), inserted after clause 73.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak to government Amendments 234, 235, 237, 249, 250, 448 and 467, which will give effect to recommendation 1 of the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. She recommended that the law should be changed so that an adult who engages in penetrative sexual activity with a child who is under 16 is charged with rape. I thank the noble Baroness for the audit. She worked closely with us as we developed these offences, and it was important to us to ensure that we met her objectives. I thank her for her strong support of the Government’s proposals.
We are taking a two-stage approach, starting with the amendments being debated today. These will create new offences covering rape and other penetrative sexual activity with a child who is under 16 by an adult. The important thing to note is that the prosecution does not have to prove that the child did not consent, so ostensible or purported consent or reasonable belief in consent is completely irrelevant. This eliminates any question of whether an under-16 seemed to have consented. All that matters is the age of the child. If the child is under 13, the defendant’s belief about their age is irrelevant. If the child is aged 13 to 15, an adult who believed that the child was aged 16 or over would not be guilty, but only if that belief was reasonably held. This mirrors the existing approach to sexual offences committed against children.
The maximum penalty for these offences will be life imprisonment, and these offences will sit alongside existing ones in relation to sexual activity with and towards children. The Crown Prosecution Service will therefore retain discretion to charge the full range of child sex offences where appropriate, though we expect that the use of other offences will be very limited. As with existing offences against children under 13, the CPS will prioritise the more serious charges. We are also tabling the necessary consequential amendments, such as ensuring that where the relevant criteria are met, offenders will be eligible for extended determinate sentences.
This brings me to the second stage. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was clear in her audit that the law in this area needs to be changed to ensure that children are treated as children. Alongside our new offences, we are committed to doing two things. We are going to carry out a public consultation to look at how to treat what are known as “close-in-age relationships” within the cohort of relevant child sexual offences. This responds to the noble Baroness’s recommendation that the Government should consider a close-in-age exemption to prevent the criminalisation of teenagers who are in relationships with each other.
We will also conduct a post-implementation review of the new offences to test the impact they are having. We know that there are some concerns about the element of reasonable belief in age, and this review will look closely at how that works in practice. I assure the House that the Government will continue to progress this work as a matter of priority to ensure that we get the law right in the long term. I beg to move.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, we believe that Amendment 235 delivers on the crucial recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in her national audit. By creating these strict liability offences where consent is rightly irrelevant and the offence of reasonable belief in age cannot apply, these clauses send an important signal making it unambiguously clear that no adult can claim ignorance or excuse when preying on the young and vulnerable.
The audit explained how grooming gangs repeatedly evaded rape charges for penetrative sex with 13 to 15 year-olds. Cases were downgraded or dropped because victims were misperceived as having consented or been in love with abusers, despite children under 16 being legally incapable of consent. Perpetrators avoided accountability by claiming it was reasonable to believe their victims were older than 16, perhaps due to their demeanour or because they had fake ID. These clauses strip away both loopholes for good, and on these Benches we give them our full support.
The intent of Amendment 236 to elevate penetrative offences against young teens to rape is laudable, but, as we signalled in Committee, we have several concerns. Mandating rape charges for every act of intercourse with a child under 16 may sound resolute, but it introduces unnecessary evidential hurdles and extra elements that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, which could result in guilty offenders walking free. Forcing every case into a life sentence framework risks deterring pleas from defendants and unnerving juries, driving up acquittals on technicalities. Amendment 236 also retains the “reasonable belief in age” defence, which—as the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, highlighted—offenders have exploited to evade justice. We believe the Government’s approach offers a surer path to protecting vulnerable children, and it has our support.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I am very grateful for the acknowledgement by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, that, in essence, Amendment 236 covers the same ground as the government amendments. I commend the noble Lords for bringing forward their amendment and making sure that it is on everybody’s radar. As the noble Lord said, the Government’s amendments go further than Amendment 236 was intended to, in that it covers all penetrative activity, not just penile penetration, and it is accompanied by all the necessary consequential amendments, such as ensuring, when relevant criteria are met, that offenders are eligible for extended determinate sentences.
We are indebted to the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, for her work and bringing about this important change. It makes it absolutely clear that penetrative sexual activity between adults and children under 16 is fundamentally wrong, cannot be excused by any suggestions about consent and will be treated with the utmost seriousness.
Baroness Levitt
“Sexual offences against children under 16(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) After section 8 insert—“Rape and other offences against children under 16
8A Rape of a child under 16(1) A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with A’s penis, and(b) either—(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or(ii) B is under 13.(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.8B Assault of a child under 16 by penetration(1) A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of A’s body or anything else,(b) the penetration is sexual, and(c) either—(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or(ii) B is under 13. (2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.8C Causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration(1) A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally causes or incites another person (B) to engage in an activity within subsection (2),(b) the activity is sexual, and(c) either—(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or(ii) B is under 13.(2) An activity is within this subsection if it involves—(a) penetration of B’s anus or vagina,(b) penetration of B’s mouth with a person’s penis,(c) penetration of a person’s anus or vagina with a part of B’s body or by B with anything else, or(d) penetration of a person’s mouth with B’s penis.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.”(3) In section 73(2) (exceptions to aiding, abetting and counselling) after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) an offence under section 8A or 8B (offences against children under 16);”.(4) Schedule (Sexual offences against children under 16: consequential amendments) contains minor and consequential amendments.”Member's explanatory statement
This new Clause creates new offences of rape, assault by penetration, and causing or inciting a sexual activity involving penetration, in relation to children under 16.
Baroness Levitt
“(ca) an offence under any of sections 8A to 8C of that Act (rape and other offences against children under 16),”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16), inserted after clause 73.
Baroness Levitt
“ScheduleSexual offences against children under 16: consequential amendmentsFirearms Act 1968 (c.27)
1 (1) Paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 to the Firearms Act 1968 (offences to which section 17(2) applies) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (f), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (f) insert—“(fa) section 8A (rape of a child under 16);(fb) section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(fc) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused;”.Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978 (c.17)
2 (1) Section 1(1A) of the Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978 (offences for purposes of section 1) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (e), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (e) insert—“(ea) an offence under section 8A or 8B of that Act;(eb) an offence under section 8C of that Act, where the activity involving penetration was caused;”.Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 (c.26)
3 (1) Paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (d), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (d) insert—“(da) section 8A or 8B (rape of a child under 16; assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(db) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused;”.Criminal Justice Act 1982 (c. 48)
4 (1) Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (early release of prisoners: excluded offences) is amended as follows.(2) In the entry for section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After the entry for section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 insert— “Section 8A (rape of a child under 16).Section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration).Section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused.”Children Act 1989 (c. 41)
5 In Schedule ZA1 to the Children Act 1989 (serious sexual offences for the purposes of section 10C), in paragraph 3 after paragraph (h) insert—“(ha) section 8A (rape of a child under 16);(hb) section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(hc) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration);”.Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33)
6 (1) Section 25(2) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (offences to which bail restrictions apply) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (k), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (k) insert—“(ka) an offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16);(kb) an offence under section 8B of that Act (assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(kc) an offence under section 8C of that Act (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused;”.Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (c. 53)
7 In section 11(9) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (definition of “rape”), for “or 5” substitute “, 5 or 8A”.Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (c. 43)
8 In section 32ZAB(1) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (specified offences for purposes of section 32ZAA), after paragraph (f) insert—“(fa) an offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16);”.Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44)
9 (1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) In section 256AZBB(1) (specified offences for purposes of section 256AZBA), after paragraph (e) insert—“(ea) an offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16);”.(3) In Schedule 4 (qualifying offences for purposes of section 62), after paragraph 16 insert—“Rape of a child under 16
16A An offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Attempted rape of a child under 16
16B An offence under section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 of attempting to commit an offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Assault of a child under 16 by penetration
16C An offence under section 8B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Causing a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration
16D An offence under section 8C of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where it is alleged that the activity was caused.” (4) In Schedule 5 (qualifying offences for purposes of Part 10) after paragraph 15 insert—“Rape of a child under 16
15A An offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Attempted rape of a child under 16
15B An offence under section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 of attempting to commit an offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Assault of a child under 16 by penetration
15C An offence under section 8B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Causing a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration
15D An offence under section 8C of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where it is alleged that the activity was caused.”(5) In Part 2 of Schedule 15 (specified sexual offences for purposes of sections 244ZA and 325) after paragraph 109 insert—“109A An offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16).109B An offence under section 8B of that Act (assault of a child under 16 by penetration).109C An offence under section 8C of that Act (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration).”(6) In paragraph 7 of Schedule 34A (child sex offences for purposes of section 327A), after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) sections 8A to 8C of that Act (rape and other offences against children under 16);”.Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (c.12)
10 In section 116(8)(a) of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (offences constituting child sexual exploitation), after the entry for sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 insert—“sections 8A to 8C (rape and other offences against children under 16);”.Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c.30)
11 In paragraph 33 of Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (sexual offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), after the entry for section 8 insert—“section 8A (rape of child under 16)section 8B (assault of child under 16 by penetration)section 8C (causing or inciting child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration)”.Sentencing Act 2020 (c. 17)
12 (1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 14 (extended sentences: the earlier offence condition: offences), in the table in paragraph 9, after the entry for section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 insert—
“(ga) Section 8A (rape of a child under 16) |
(gb) Section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration) |
(gc) Section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration)”. |
“(ga) section 8A (rape of a child under 16) | The date on which section 8A comes into force |
(gb) section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration) | The date on which section 8B comes into force |
(gc) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration) | The date on which section 8C comes into force” |
“(fa) Section 8A (rape of a child under 16) |
(fb) Section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration) |
(fc) Section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration)”.” |
This new Schedule makes minor and consequential amendments in relation to my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16) inserted after clause 73.
Baroness Levitt
“(ia) sections 8A to 8C (rape and other offences against children under 16);”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16), inserted after clause 73.
Baroness Levitt
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a provision which requires the courts to dismiss certain actions in respect of personal injuries attributable to child sex abuse if there would be substantial prejudice to the defendant and it would not be equitable for the action to proceed.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, government Amendment 270 makes a change to Clause 87. In making this change, the Government are responding to the concerns raised by some of your Lordships in Committee.
Clause 87 itself is vital; it removes the current three-year limitation period for personal injury claims brought by victims and survivors of child sexual abuse in respect of the abuse committed against them and gives effect to a recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. This is needed because many victims and survivors are not able to talk—or even think—about the abuse they suffered until many years afterwards, which is a direct consequence of the abuse itself.
Clause 87 inserts new Section 11ZB into the Limitation Act 1980 because it is that Act that makes provision for the dismissal of actions which are outside the time limit for personal injury claims. Under new Section 11ZB(2), if an action is brought outside the usual three-year limitation period, for it to be dismissed the defendant must satisfy the court that a fair hearing cannot take place. Under the current drafting of new Section 11ZB(3), the action may also be dismissed if the defendant demonstrates that allowing the action to proceed would cause them substantial prejudice.
We have listened carefully to the testimony of victims and survivors, and reflected on the amendments debated in Committee, all of which raised concerns about the substantial prejudice test. We decided that they were right. The retention of Section 11ZB(2) alone both implements the relevant IICSA recommendation and ensures that those accused of child sexual abuse maintain their right to a fair hearing. I am therefore pleased to say that Amendment 270 removes new Section 11ZB(3) from Clause 87.
Many have spoken about this, and I pay tribute to them all, but I make special mention of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and Mr Stephen Bernard, who brought this to our attention swiftly. Mr Bernard spoke to me most movingly about his own experiences, and I thank him for this; he has played a big part in ensuring that the Government reached this decision. I beg to move.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, as I mentioned at Second Reading, I am very proud that with Clause 87 this Government abolished the time limitations in historical Church child sexual abuse cases. Survivors such as my friend Stephen Bernard, whom my noble friend the Minister referenced, were concerned that the clause, as originally drafted, added a new substantial prejudice, especially for historical cases. This created uncertainty, delays and an extra hurdle for survivors.
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for listening to the concerns of survivors such as Stephen, and for tabling Amendment 270. With the removal of lines 31 to 39, the IICSA recommendation has now been adopted in full, thus ensuring better access to justice for the survivors of historical sexual abuse. I am very grateful to my noble friend.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this is a significant amendment which my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, with the support of noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House, originally tabled as a probing amendment in Committee. The removal of new Section 11ZB(3) from the Bill is important. If it had remained in the Bill, it would have weakened the removal of limitation periods for civil claims arising from child sexual abuse, correctly introduced by the proceeding provision new Section 11ZA. By removing subsection (3), it is fair to say we send a clear message that the law recognises the particular trauma and complexity that so often characterises historic cases of child sexual abuse.
In Committee, we moved the amendment on the grounds that new Section 11ZB added uncertainty for survivors. Noble Lords from across the House raised concerns then, and have mentioned them today as well, that an additional hurdle could undermine the purpose of the reform and create ambiguity for claimants. I am therefore very pleased that the Minister has had a change of heart. I am tempted to explore further the reasons behind that, but for the time being, I thank her for the change of heart.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all Members of your Lordships’ House who welcomed this government amendment. On the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, sadly the courts are very used to dealing with non-recent cases of child sexual abuse and the issues of loss of evidence and loss of opportunity to present matters, and I am confident that the courts will be able to deal with that in a fair way. I am pleased to hear that there is overall support for the amendment. I thank again those who raised this with us in Committee, and I beg to move.
Baroness Levitt
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment creating a new offence of sharing semen-defaced images (see my amendment to Schedule 11, page 321, line 19).
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, it is an honour to be opening today’s debate on intimate image abuse. It gives me great pleasure to be able to say that, over the course of the passage of this Bill in your Lordships’ House, I have had a number of extremely helpful conversations on the subjects of pornography, child sexual abuse images, misogyny and a lot of other subjects which, while often distasteful, are important in the fight against violence against women and girls. We will cover some of those issues in this group and others in subsequent groups. I want to say, in relation to all of them, how grateful I am to those Members of your Lordships’ House who have taken the time to speak to me and work with me.
In the context of this group, I pay tribute to the noble Baronesses, Lady Owen, Lady Kidron, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Clement-Jones. A substantial part of my career as a lawyer has been spent in the fight against violence against women and children—not only girls—and I thought that I was pretty knowledgeable about it in the context of the criminal law, but I am more than happy to acknowledge that I have learned a great deal from those to whom I have spoken in the context of this Bill, and I pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. On a number of occasions, I have changed my mind after speaking to them and I have no doubt that this is a better Bill as a result, and so I thank them.
As a result of what has been said in the debates and other conversations, the Government have tabled a collection of amendments that, taken together, create a package of further changes that strengthen the overall intimate image abuse regime already contained in the Bill. I hope that your Lordships will agree that they show that the Government are listening and acting.
I have already mentioned the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, but I also thank Professor Clare McGlynn; they have both worked hard to keep these issues at the top of the agenda. These amendments are also a tribute to the vital work of organisations such the Revenge Porn Helpline and Refuge and, of course, the victims and survivors themselves, who have taken the courageous and important step of reporting online abuse and raising awareness.
I have already said that I am proud of these amendments, but I am aware that, for some, they do not go far enough. I ask those who will speak to their amendments today to accept two things: that we are all on the same side about the harm that we are trying to prevent and that I am truly committed to trying to get this right. When I say that I cannot accede to something, there is a good reason for it, and I am not refusing to accept amendments for partisan reasons or simply out of stubbornness.
This landscape changes fast and usually not for the better, but there is a reason that we sometimes urge caution before creating new criminal offences and penalties. There can be real dangers in making piecemeal changes as soon as we are confronted by some new horrifying behaviour causing harm to so many victims. It is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that we do not legislate in haste and then come to regret it. If, in relation to some of these proposals, I ask that the Government are given time to gather more evidence and then consider the best way of going about preventing such behaviour, I ask your Lordships to accept that this comes from a good place—namely, wanting to make sure that any laws we pass capture the crimes we have in mind but do not have unanticipated consequences.
I turn to semen-defaced images. This is not a pleasant thing to discuss in polite society, but I need to make it clear what is meant by this, what the harm is and what we are doing in relation to it. What is meant by semen-defaced images are images of semen deposited on to another image, often a photograph and usually a photograph of a woman. It is disgraceful behaviour. It is designed to degrade and humiliate the woman in the picture, and we cannot tolerate this misogynistic behaviour in a civilised society. The noble Baroness, Lady Owen, persuaded me that we should make this a criminal offence and so we have done so. That is why the Government are bringing forward Amendments 271, 278, 279, 290 and 292 today. Together, they introduce a new offence of sharing a semen-defaced image of another person without consent.
This is the first step in stamping out this type of behaviour for good, but it is not the end. We are determined to tackle violence against women and girls in all its forms, and we want to ensure that the criminal law gets ahead of emerging harms. That is why we have announced in the VAWG strategy that we are launching a call for evidence better to understand online misogynistic, image-based abuse and the extent to which there are new harms and behaviour that may not be fully captured by existing criminal offences.
The issue of screenshotting was also raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, at Second Reading and in Committee. Intimate images are personal and private. Consenting adults are of course free to share them and may do so in ways that are permanent or temporary. A person’s right to share their image temporarily in private must be respected, and if there is a violation of that right, it must be addressed. Government Amendments 281, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 291, 293, 294 and 295, taken together, make it a criminal offence non-consensually to take a screenshot of, or copy in any way, an intimate image that the victim has shared only temporarily. This offence sits alongside, and mirrors wherever relevant, the other intimate image offences, and it sends a clear message to those who engage in this non-consensual behaviour that it is unacceptable and will be punished.
I briefly turn to the subject of takedown. I know that Amendment 275, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, will be debated later today in a separate group, but I will take a moment to mention the announcement made by the Prime Minister on 19 February. We will bring forward government Amendments at Third Reading in response to Amendment 275 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to ensure that tech companies are legally required to have measures to take down reported non-consensual intimate image abuse within 48 hours to ensure that victims get rapid protection. It is important to refer to this now to demonstrate the Government’s action in this space as a whole. Where we have been able to, we have moved. I hope that your Lordships will bear that in mind as we progress through this debate.
I am also pleased to say that Amendments 296 and 456 designate new offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to criminalise creating and requesting purported deepfake, non-consensual intimate images as priority offences under the Online Safety Act. As many of your Lordships will know, this means that platforms will face the stronger duties that apply to the most serious illegal content. They will be required to assess specifically the risks of the service being used to facilitate this offence; to mitigate and manage the risk of the service being used to commit the offence; to take proactive steps to prevent users encountering such content; and to minimise the time that such content is present on their platform. There has been understandable public concern over the creation and dissemination of non-consensual sexual deepfakes on X, and the Government have been clear that no woman or child should live in fear of having their image sexually manipulated. These amendments help put that principle into practice.
Finally, Amendment 455 makes a small minor and technical change in respect of the taking and installing offences in the Bill, and I can provide further details if any of your Lordships would like them. I beg to move.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 273, 274, 275, 276, 284 and 296A in my name and the names of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Pannick, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. In doing so, I declare an interest as I have received pro bono legal advice from Mishcon de Reya on image-based sexual abuse. I will also speak to government Amendments 278, 281 and 296. I want to place on record my support for Amendment 277 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.
I thank the Minister for her determination to make progress on this issue. We have made huge strides since Committee, and I am very grateful. I also thank the survivors and campaigners who have fought for so long for these changes.
Amendment 273 seeks to ensure that in relation to abusers who are convicted of an intimate image abuse offence the court must,
“order the destruction of any content used to commit the offence on any device or data store containing”
it, and that prosecutors,
“lodge a deletion verification report within 28 days”.
While I acknowledge that the Government have updated the law to clarify that this content should be seen as being used to commit the offence under Section 153 of the Sentencing Act 2020, this does not offer victims any guarantee of the total destruction of the content used to commit the crime.
One survivor, Daria, whose convicted abuser was allowed to keep the content of her, said, “The weapons with which he caused life-shattering harm remain in his arsenal. Despite the severity of the crimes, as reflected in the sentences handed down by the Crown Court, I remain at his mercy with regard to whether he chooses to violate me again in the same way”. Daria is not alone in her experience. Shanti Das, a journalist who undertook research on this and published in February 2025, found that of the 98 image-based abuse offences prosecuted in magistrates’ courts in England and Wales in the preceding six months, only three resulted in deprivation orders. It is quite simply appalling. Survivors of this abuse deserve better. On this amendment, I will test the opinion of the House.
Amendments 274 and 276 mandate the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to create a centralised statutory hash registry and mandate hash sharing. The Revenge Porn Helpline currently runs the voluntary register called StopNCII.org and has confirmed that it would be willing to run the centralised registry. The Revenge Porn Helpline does incredible work supporting victims of intimate image abuse and has a 90% success rate on the removal of content. However, 10% of the content is on non-compliant sites.
The amendment seeks to tackle non-compliance by allowing the Revenge Porn Helpline to co-ordinate with internet service providers to mandate the blocking of verified NCII content in cases of non-compliance, thus avoiding the long and bureaucratic process of obtaining business disruption measures under Ofcom that are of little comfort to victims whose image remains online. One victim, Jane, stated that,
“the platform’s slow and inconsistent enforcement left me feeling trapped in a relentless cycle, where the harm snowballed with every hour the abusive content stayed up. Constantly monitoring the internet, reporting the same material, and watching it reappear has taken a huge mental toll”.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the people-pleaser in me would love to be able to say, “Oh, go on then— I will accept them all and make everybody happy”, but I am afraid there are some good reasons why I cannot accept some of these amendments. I am going to try to respond to them all as briefly as possible, in the hope of explaining why the Government do not consider these amendments necessary in some cases, and do not consider it desirable for them to be done through the unwieldy mechanism of primary legislation in others.
I start with Amendment 273 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, on deletion orders. I say at the outset that the Government of course recognise the harm caused by those who retain copies of intimate images, and we want to ensure that the legal framework protects victims. We agree that it is a no-brainer about the principle, but, for reasons I will come to in a moment, it is not as simple to enact as it might seem.
The noble Baroness has correctly identified that there is a difference between depriving offenders of devices that have been used, and actually getting rid of—deleting—the images themselves. If there is an issue about insufficient judges making deprivation orders for devices, then we must tackle that. This amendment is not the solution to that. Indeed, if she is right that judges are proving to be reluctant, there is a risk that, even if this deletion order provision came into force, they might be reluctant to do that as well. That is not the way to tackle judges not making the orders.
We must make sure that what we do is workable. Verified deletion is highly complex in practice. There are a number of challenges concerning, for example, images stored in the cloud. The noble Baroness’s amendment is very short on the practical measures that would be needed to make it effective, such as how the verification is to be carried out, what the penalty would be for an offender who refuses to comply with an order to provide the password, or what happens during the appeal period. For example, in the Crown Court, defendants have 28 days following conviction to lodge grounds for appeal. These are all significant drafting issues that present problems with the amendment as tabled by the noble Baroness, so we need to give this further thought.
As I said to the noble Baroness in Committee and during our recent meetings, we are already amending deprivation orders so that they can be applied to seize intimate images and any devices containing those images, regardless of whether the device was used in the offence itself.
One of the issues which concerns us is that only a fraction of the victims of intimate images go through the criminal justice system. Many victims do not want to go anywhere near a criminal court, so we want to look at the available remedies in the civil courts in order to ensure that these, too, will offer meaningful redress for victims.
But anything we do needs to be comprehensive and in a package that works well together, ensuring removal of these images as quickly as possible. That is why I am pleased to announce today that we intend to review the available court order protection for victims of intimate image abuse across civil and criminal courts. The review is going to include routes for deletion to ensure that it is fit for purpose, that it identifies necessary improvements and that it has attached to it all the consequential provisions that are needed to make sure that it is actually effective.
This is not an attempt by the Government to kick the can down the road. We want to get it right, and we want it to have material value. We do not want to create something that does not work so judges do not use it. But we do not think a court order available in the criminal court addresses this problem as a whole, and that is why we need to take time to think more comprehensively about a tailored solution, working for victims and for criminal justice partners. The noble Baroness, Lady Owen, Professor McGlynn and I have discussed this, and I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment today in the light of that announcement.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. The amendment, as she understands, imposes a duty on judges. Therefore, there is no question of a judge deciding not to use it. More substantially, I am very concerned about the delay that will result if the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, does not move her amendment. Surely, the proper way to deal with this is for the Government to accept the amendment, and, if they will not, for the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to move it. If the Government wish, as they are perfectly entitled to, to add or to subtract, they can do so at Third Reading or, perhaps more realistically, in the other place. They will have plenty of time to do that; let us get on today and put this into law.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I will say two things in response to the noble Lord. The first is that the criminal courts tend not to be very keen on provisions that they regard as complex when they come at the end of a sentencing hearing. They tend to react by saying, “We’re going to leave this to be dealt with through some other mechanism because it’s too complicated. We can’t work out how to verify it”—the sorts of objections that occasionally are made in relation to, for example, very complicated compensation orders or confiscation orders. The second point is that there is, as I have already said, a real risk in piecemeal legislation that you bring in provisions for one court that then do not work in the read-across from the civil courts. On the civil courts, we cannot do that today.
We need to do this quickly, and we absolutely recognise this. After all, there is no point in saying that we take this stuff seriously and then saying that we are not going to do anything about getting rid of the images. It is illogical, apart from anything else, as well as perhaps not being very moral either. I ask the noble Baroness to accept the sincerity of what we say. That is as far as I can go today.
I turn now to Amendment 274, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. I understand and agree with what she is trying to achieve. The only issue between us is whether this is the right way to do it. Ofcom has already consulted on additional safety measures for its illegal content codes of practice. These proposed measures explicitly include the use of perceptual hash-matching technology to detect and remove non-consensual intimate imagery, including deepfakes.
To be deemed compliant with their Online Safety Act duties by following the codes, services would need to deploy this technology automatically to identify and remove such content, providing victims with reassurance that their images are being removed swiftly. Given the urgent need to strengthen protection in this area, Ofcom announced on 19 February that it is accelerating timelines and will publish its final decision on these proposals on the use of hash matching in May, with measures expected to come into effect by the summer.
We consider that the work of Ofcom meets the aims of the noble Baroness’s amendment. The protection that she seeks will be delivered promptly and robustly through Ofcom’s forthcoming codes of practice. It is an area where unnecessarily imposing duties in statute, especially where work is already in progress, could have the adverse effect of restricting the flexibility of this work should it need to respond and change to the ever-changing online landscape in the future.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
The Prime Minister launched his strategy for tackling non-compliance by saying that it would be a “one and done” system. Does the Minister acknowledge that the Ofcom system is not a “one and done” system? It is dependent on a series of factors, including whether all service providers choose to adopt third-party hashing. If they choose to operate their own hash database where they do not share the hashes, it is not a “one and done” system. I would really like to tidy up the confusion here between whether the Prime Minister is right or what is being said here is correct.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The Prime Minister is right. The difference between us is what we understand by the system. The Government’s position is that the Ofcom system will achieve what the Prime Minister said he wanted to achieve. That is the difference between the noble Baroness and me. I am not sure that I can go any further than that this evening.
I turn now to Amendment 276, once again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, on the NCII register. The Government recognise the vital work undertaken by the Revenge Porn Helpline, including operating a database of existing hashes of non-consensual intimate images that are shared with participating companies to detect and remove the images online. We recognise the benefits that a register of verified NCII content would provide, including the important role that it could play in supporting victims in the removal of the content.
This is one of those instances where the issue between us is whether it is necessary or desirable to put it on a statutory footing. The Government’s position is that it is not a necessity for its success and needs very careful consideration, especially to ensure that an NCII register aligns with the process taken by the Internet Watch Foundation’s register for child sexual abuse imagery, which operates successfully and has never been on a statutory footing, and to avoid any unintended consequences. For this reason, I confirm that the Government are committing to undertake a preliminary evaluation to determine the operational needs and impact of establishing a successful central register for non-consensual intimate image abuse.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
I think it is important to clarify for the sake of the House that, with regard to the Internet Watch Foundation’s CSAM register, CSAM is illegal in and of itself. NCII—non-consensual intimate image—material is not illegal in and of itself. Therefore, a voluntary system will not work. It needs to be on a statutory footing.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I do not think anyone is suggesting that it should be voluntary. It is simply whether it should be established through primary legislation or regulation. I used the expression earlier about the unwieldiness of primary legislation. After all, one of the problems with legislating through primary legislation is that, if you get it wrong, you have to try to amend it or repeal it, whereas if you have regulations, particularly backed up by enforcement powers, it is a much nimbler way of going about things. That is the issue between us.
The evaluation will also assess critical considerations that are still outstanding, including the effect that such a registry has on intermediary liability and what is needed to establish robust verification procedures. The findings will be used to guide next steps to ensure that any options are sustainable and effective and work alongside existing regulation for platforms.
Turning again to semen-defaced images and Amendments 284 and 296A, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, as I said when opening this group, the Government agree with her that semen imagery is disgusting behaviour. That is exactly why we have brought forward our own amendments to criminalise the sharing of a semen-defaced image without consent. The inclusion of
“semen … on any part of their body”,
as in the noble Baroness’s amendment, is unnecessary, because such images would already fall within the scope of the intimate image offences. To answer her question directly, I can confirm that the example she gave will, and should, already be covered by the existing legislation. The noble Baroness asked whether we can, in effect, require the CPS to amend its guidance to make it clearer. The CPS is, of course, an independent organisation—constitutionally, importantly so—but we can certainly look at asking the CPS whether it would be prepared to do so.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, I am sure the whole House agrees with, in essence, what Amendment 273 says, but I also noted from my noble friend that it is much more complex than I had understood. I am sure that she is as frustrated as everyone else that these things take time, and I wonder whether she is able to give us any timeline. Sorry, I am an optimist, but this is an extremely important amendment. I will be supporting the Government, but it would be good to know if we are talking about months or whatever, because obviously we want to see this in statute as soon as possible.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I do not think I can quite express how unpopular I would be if I suddenly, on the hoof, came out with a time. All I can say is that we are committed to doing this quickly.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I emphasise that we have talked about drafting issues on Amendment 273. Obviously, I do not want to delay proceedings, but I remind the House that I first brought up forced deletion in September 2024, so the issue has been before the House now for about 17 months. It was in the Data (Use and Access) Bill in December 2024, when the Minister said, “There’s no problem here because it should be seen under Section 153 of the Sentencing Act 2020”. This is not working, and the only answer really is to deal with the matter tonight.
Baroness Levitt
“Purported intimate image generators(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) After section 66H insert— “66I Making or supplying purported intimate image generators(1) A person commits an offence if the person—(a) makes or adapts a thing, or(b) supplies or offers to supply a thing,for use as a generator of purported intimate images.(2) A “generator of purported intimate images” is a thing for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person.(3) A person makes, adapts, supplies, or offers to supply a thing for use as a generator of purported intimate images if a reasonable person (having regard to all the circumstances) would consider that they do so.(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the thing being used for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person without the person’s consent.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or a fine (or both).(6) Section 72(1) applies in relation to an act which, if done in England and Wales, would constitute an offence under this section as if references to a United Kingdom national included—(a) a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, or(b) an unincorporated association formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom.(7) In this section—“purported intimate image” of a person, and references to creating a purported intimate image of a person, have the same meaning as in section 66E;“thing” includes a program, information in electronic form and a service.66J Section 66I: further defences(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 66I to prove that the person did the act which constituted the offence for the purposes of the prevention, detection or investigation of crime, or for the purposes of criminal proceedings, in any part of the world.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 66I to prove that the person—(a) was a member of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ (a “security body”), and(b) did the act which constituted the offence for the purposes of the exercise of any function of the security body.(3) “GCHQ” has the meaning given by section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994.(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 66I to prove that the person—(a) was a member of OFCOM, was employed or engaged by OFCOM, or assisted OFCOM in the exercise of any of its online safety functions, and(b) did the act which constituted the offence for the purposes of OFCOM’s exercise of any of its online safety functions.(5) In subsection (4)—(a) “OFCOM” means the Office of Communications; (b) a reference to OFCOM’s “online safety functions” has the meaning given by section 235 of the Online Safety Act 2023.66K Section 66I: application to internet service providers(1) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 66I by—(a) providing access to a communication network, or(b) transmitting, in a communication network, information provided by a user, if the provider does not—(i) initiate the transmission,(ii) select the recipient of the transmission, or(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(2) The references in subsection (1) to providing access to, or transmitting information in, a communication network include storing the information transmitted so far as the storage—(a) is automatic, intermediate and transient,(b) is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network, and(c) is for no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.(3) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 66I by storing information provided by a user for transmission in a communication network if—(a) the storage of the information—(i) is automatic, intermediate and temporary, and(ii) is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other users at their request, and(b) the internet service provider—(i) does not modify the information,(ii) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(iii) on knowing of a matter within subsection (4), promptly removes the information or disables access to it.(4) The matters within this subsection are that—(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or(c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.(5) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 66I by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if—(a) when the information was provided the provider did not know that it was, or contained, a generator of purported intimate images, and(b) on knowing that the information was, or contained, a generator of purported intimate images, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.(6) In this section—“generator of purported intimate images” has the same meaning as in section 66I;“internet service provider” means a provider of—(a) a service that is made available by means of the internet, or(b) a service that provides access to the internet; “user”, in relation to an internet service provider, means a user of a service provided by the internet service provider.66L Liability for offence under section 66I committed by bodies(1) This section applies where an offence under section 66I is committed by a body.(2) If the offence is committed with the consent or connivance of—(a) a relevant person in relation to the body, or(b) a person purporting to act in the capacity of a relevant person in relation to the body,the person (as well as the body) commits the offence and is liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.(3) In this section—“body” means a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association other than a partnership;“relevant person” , in relation to a body, means—(a) in the case of a body corporate other than one whose affairs are managed by its members, a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body;(b) in the case of a limited liability partnership or other body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, a member who exercises functions of management with respect to it;(c) in the case of a limited partnership, a general partner (within the meaning given by section 3 of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907);(d) in the case of any other partnership, a partner;(e) in the case of an unincorporated association other than a partnership, a person who exercises functions of management with respect to it.”(3) In section 79(5) (meaning of references to image of a person), for “and 66G” substitute “, 66G and 66I”.(4) In paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 (sexual offences for purposes of section 72), after paragraph (c) insert—“(ca) an offence under section 66I;”.(5) In Schedule 3 (sexual offences for purposes of Part 2), after paragraph 33B insert—“33C An offence under section 66I of this Act (purported intimate image generators), if the offender is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause creates offences of making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply a generator of purported intimate images.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I am pleased to be opening this group with the introduction of government Amendments 272, 297, 449, 450 and 458. I once again thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for the insightful recommendations in her pornography review. I also thank her for meeting me on a number of occasions over the last few months, and for the cordial and constructive tone of those meetings.
There is very little between the Government and the noble Baroness in our objectives. We recognise that her intention is to prevent the deeply unpleasant and damaging effect of what happens in both the online and offline worlds, including the effects upon our children. I hope and believe she also recognises that I am sincere when I say that we want to achieve the same thing. Where possible, the Government have tried to deliver on the issues that she has raised, and I thank her for the time she has taken to talk them through with us. I know that she has some concerns with regard to certain aspects of these amendments, to which I will respond later, but first I will speak to the government amendments.
I start with nudification apps. Together, Amendments 272 and 449 introduce a new offence that will ban the making, adapting, supplying or offer to supply of a tool or service for use as a generator of intimate images. The offence will give effect to our violence against women and girls strategy commitment to ban nudification tools. The offence will capture intimate image generators in all their unpleasant forms, including, but not limited to, apps, software, websites, AI models and bots. To be captured by the criminal offence, the tool must be made or supplied for the use of generating purported intimate images, irrespective of whether that is a primary purpose. The nudification tool ban will be the first of its kind in the world, and it will target the developers and suppliers who profit from the profound distress and victimisation of others. We will work with international partners and fora to tackle this issue.
The Government are committed to tackling the scourge of non-consensual sexual deepfakes and will continue to act to ensure that artificial intelligence cannot be misused to generate this abusive content. In addition to banning image generators, we have announced that we will table an amendment to the Bill to allow the Government to bring additional chatbots into the scope of the Online Safety Act and require them to protect their users from illegal content, including non-consensual intimate images. We will also work with international partners and fora to tackle this issue. Once the offence is in force, the Online Safety Act will impose requirements on social media and search services to have processes and systems in place to remove illegal content that supplies or offers to supply nudification tools, and this will significantly limit their accessibility to users in the UK.
I turn to another unpleasant topic: incest. It is with some pride that I bring forward Amendments 297, 450 and 458. Together, these amendments criminalise the possession or publication of pornographic images that portray sexual activity between family members, otherwise known unattractively as incest porn. In doing so, we give effect to one of the key recommendations of the Independent Review of Pornography by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I know that she will soon speak to a cluster of her own amendments on this issue but, before she does, I place on record my sincere thanks to her for the vital role that she has played in bringing forward this important change.
We know there are concerns that the proliferation of incest-themed pornography can contribute to extremely harmful attitudes, particularly where it risks normalising child sexual abuse. The government amendment recognises those concerns. We are also pleased to announce that the new offence will be listed as a priority offence under the Online Safety Act, requiring platforms to take proactive and proportionate steps to stop this harmful material appearing online.
The offence as it stands will not capture pornography depicting relationships between step-relatives. This is a controversial topic, but such relationships are not illegal in real life. To be clear, though, any pornography involving real children, whether a step element is present or not, is already criminalised under the Protection of Children Act 1978. I beg to move.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 298, 297A to 297D, 281A, 300 and 300A in my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, in particular, who has worked on this issue for so many years, the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Kennedy, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for adding their names to this set of amendments.
One thing is clear from the past few weeks: the status quo that has allowed abuse, misogyny, paedophilia and the exploitation of women and girls to flourish cannot continue. The recent release of the Epstein files, which were porn-drenched, should be our moment of reckoning, a moment that forces us to confront uncomfortable truths about power, complicity and the systems that allow abuse to thrive in plain sight.
One of those systems is the modern online pornography industry. This House knows my steadfast commitment to bringing effective regulation to that sector, and I believe that this group of amendments will bring about this much-needed reset. It is a sector that has been driven to abusive extremes by powerful, profit-driven algorithms, too often monetising sexual violence and degradation. Categories such as “barely legal” may claim legality because performers are over 18, but the aesthetic is deliberate: youth, vulnerability and childhood. They are a fig leaf for the sexualisation of minors. Exploitation and trafficking are rife. Sexual abuse material remains far too easy to find on these sites, and many survivors tell us that what is filmed as content is in reality recorded abuse. This cannot continue.
Amendment 298, when tabled, had the intention of closing the gaping disparity between offline and online regulation. If content cannot be legally sold in a shop or on a DVD, it should not be freely available online. For decades, physical distribution has had classification, compliance and enforcement; online, self-regulation still dominates. This amendment sets out in clear terms the material that must not be distributed online. This is based on the BBFC’s guidelines and therefore mirrors what is illegal and prohibited offline, bringing parity across regimes. It also provides for an independent auditing body working alongside Ofcom—I would suggest the BBFC but I am not being specific on that—to carry out spot checks and audits of pornography so that content that would never meet the criteria for physical distribution is detected and removed, not simply noticed and ignored.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the Government of course sympathise with the intention behind all these amendments. They raise important but tricky issues. I am pleased that they have received such an extensive airing this evening, and I apologise in advance for the fact that this speech is a bit longer than some of the others, but some of these are complicated. I know that some of what I will say will not be what some of your Lordships may wish to hear. I remind the House that the Government have moved on some of the important issues raised, and I assure your Lordships that we have no intention of stopping here. But there are some areas that need further consideration and others where we have genuine operational concerns.
We are committed to continuing to work with the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I and my fellow Ministers in the Home Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology have immensely valued her time and expertise in our meetings with her. It is because of this direct engagement that we have brought forward some of the amendments today. They are entirely to her credit, and I hope we can continue the discussions.
On nudification apps, we have sympathy with the underlying objective of Amendment 281A, but we do not believe that it is necessary for two reasons. First, the aim of Amendment 281A is already captured by the recently commenced Section 66E of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which bans individuals from using nudification tools to create intimate images without consent. Section 66B of the 2003 Act bans anyone from sharing such images once they have been created.
Secondly, nudification tools are commonly accessed online—for example, via a website, an AI model or a chatbot. A person using a tool will not necessarily possess or have downloaded the relevant software or model. That means that Amendment 281A would risk creating an unworkable discrepancy between very similar tools being accessed via different means. For example, it might capture a tool if it was downloaded as code by a user but not if it was accessed as a website. For this reason, we have focused the government amendment on banning the creation and the supply of such tools, rather than just the software. The Government are confident that the combined effect of the new offence in government Amendment 272, along with regulation via the Online Safety Act and existing criminal offences banning individuals from creating and sharing intimate images without consent, is an effective package in tackling this egregious harm in all its forms.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
I promise not to interrupt the Minister too much, but what about the point that it will not extend beyond UK apps?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
This is always the problem with criminal offences, which is why, on occasions, the Government have said that we want to urge caution before creating criminal offences when things that can be dealt with through regulation have a much wider reach. One drawback of criminal offences is that they typically apply only where prosecutors are able to establish UK jurisdiction. To provide some extraterritorial effect, we have ensured that Section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act applies to this offence, which will enable prosecutors to target overseas offending by UK nationals, bodies and associations. But the regulations—
Baroness Bertin (Con)
I accept that and, let us face it, this is the wrong Bill for this piece of legislation— I am prepared to accept that. I know that this is a criminal Bill, but surely the Government and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology have to accept—and make the point on the Floor of this House—that they will therefore re-open the Online Safety Act and bring regulation in to support the very good amendments that they are putting in at this point, or my Amendment 281A.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
These are exactly the conversations that we wish to carry on having, on how to best go about this to make sure that we achieve the aim that we are all trying to get to: getting rid of these horrible things. I would like to continue the conversation with the noble Baroness in due course.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, stressed that there was undue emphasis on intention and states of mind. Again, this is the problem with criminal offences: we do not create criminal offences where people who have done something accidentally end up being criminalised. That is why, on occasions, we say that regulation may be a better tool. The noble Baroness is looking outraged.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
No, I dare not tackle the noble Baroness on legal matters—what we do and do not do in the law—but, if you accidentally poison children’s food, you do not get a free pass. There are all sorts of places and spaces that have to—
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
We will continue this, but with the greatest of respect to the noble Baroness, the fact is that all criminal offences, pretty much, apart from those that are strict liability offences, which are pretty unpopular in the criminal law—[Interruption.] We will discuss this later, but take it from me that it is very rare to criminalise something that is done accidentally.
I turn now to incest. As I said earlier today, the Government have tabled a cluster of amendments that seek to go further than Amendment 299 by criminalising the possession and publication of pornography that depicts sexual activity between both adult and child family members. The reason for doing that is that it makes it more straightforward for law enforcement and regulators to tackle the harmful content, as pornography that portrays a family relationship will be criminalised and the prosecutor does not need to have to prove that the person concerned is under 18 or is a child. It can be very difficult to prove that the person is actually a child. We therefore consider government Amendment 297 to more robustly address the harm that the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, seeks to address.
I turn to the noble Baroness’s Amendments 297AA, 297B, 297C and 297D. Although I understand why she wishes to extend the Government’s amendment to a wider range of relationships, it is important that your Lordships understand that such an extension would criminalise sexual relationships that are lawful between adults in real life. With her Amendment 298, the noble Baroness has specifically sought to include that. It would go further than offline regulation, where some portrayals of step-relative relationships are classified, provided they are not in any way abusive in nature.
In addition, this change proposed by the noble Baroness’s amendment would significantly increase the complexity of the offence. For example, if the pornographic image depicted sex between step-siblings, operational partners would then also have to consider whether the persons live or have lived together, or whether one person is or has been regularly involved in caring for the other. It would be challenging for the police and the CPS to determine and ultimately prosecute. The intention behind the Government’s amendments is to make it as straightforward as possible to enforce and prosecute. That said, although I appreciate what the noble Baroness is trying to achieve, I urge her not to press her amendment.
Turning now to parity, I put on record that the Government accept the principle at the heart of Amendment 298 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. There is a clear and urgent need for greater parity between the treatment of harmful pornography online and offline. This Government, who have prioritised tackling all forms of violence against women and girls, will show the leadership necessary to deliver it. We have, with thanks to the noble Baroness, already taken steps in the Bill to criminalise some of the most egregious forms of content that are currently mainstream online. The strangulation pornography offence added in Committee and the further changes we are bringing forward today on incest pornography have been added because of the noble Baroness. These matters are now prohibited under offline regulation.
Acknowledging that the changing online world brings new challenges that must be tackled to address emerging harms, we will also be reviewing the criminal law relating to pornography to assess its effectiveness. We will ensure that our online regulatory framework keeps pace with these changes to the criminal law. Delivery of parity in regulatory treatment has already started. Once enforced, these offences will become priority offences under the Online Safety Act, requiring platforms to have proportionate systems and processes in place to prevent UK users encountering this content. This should stop this abhorrent content circulating unchecked on online platforms, where right now it is being recommended to unwitting users.
While these measures mark a significant step forward in protecting individuals online, we acknowledge that they do not address the totality of the complex question on parity. The current offline regime relies on checks on individual pieces of content, which can consider wider context and nuance in a way that does not easily translate to the scale and speed of online content. For this reason, we cannot accept the noble Baroness’s amendment, but because we completely agree with the need for greater parity, the Government are committing our joint pornography team, which was announced as part of the VAWG strategy, to produce a delivery plan within six months of Royal Assent.
Crucially, the delivery plan will set out how, not whether, the Government can most effectively close the gap. This will include consideration of how a new approach can address other potentially harmful content, such as pornography portraying step-incest relationships or adults role-playing as children. The delivery plan will thoroughly test which approach will be most effective by testing audit and reporting functions and considering how this can be done at scale to achieve the desired impact. The plan will also consider how and which regulatory frameworks can best address the issue, noting the interactions with the BBFC’s existing remit and that of Ofcom under the Online Safety Act, and how to ensure that there is effective enforcement in any future system. It will examine the case for tools, including fines and business disruption measures. We will keep up the pace. I can commit to including clear timelines for implementation in the plan, and we will keep them as short as possible, factoring in the possible need for legislation, subject to parliamentary timing. I know that my fellow Ministers will welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, joining us as we conduct this work.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
I want to say thank you. The Minister has just made a very big announcement and I thank her, because she has acknowledged parity, and I hope that she will therefore be using regulation to make sure that we absolutely do create that level playing field. I just want to acknowledge that.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I turn to Amendment 300. While we accept the intended aim of this amendment, we cannot accept the proposed approach. The part of the amendment relating to the withdrawal of consent and its application to professional entertainment contracts has a number of practical implications. Where content is produced legally, as with the wider film industry, the rules and regulations governing its use are usually a commercial matter to be agreed between the performer and the production company, taking into account the intellectual property framework. I add that much of the content captured by this proposed offence is already illegal. The creation, distribution and possession of child sexual abuse material and sharing an intimate image without consent are already criminal offences.
The law is also crystal clear about the distribution of indecent images of children. Under the Protection of Children Act 1978, the UK has a strict prohibition on the taking, making, circulation and possession with a view to distribution of any indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child under 18. That said, as I said earlier this evening, we accept that there is harmful material, including content that is non-consensual and displays child sexual abuse, that remains online, and that is not good enough. So, while we cannot support the amendment today, we are keen once again to work with the noble Baroness further to consider existing best practice in the area and, where there are gaps, how these can be filled. The outcome of the work on parity to which we have committed today will also influence consideration of how this amendment could be regulated.
Baroness Bertin (Con)
Law enforcement is already duty bound to investigate any material that may contain a child, so I do not believe that the amendment would suddenly create a whole load of legal activity that could stop the protection of children. I just do not accept that.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The concern expressed by law enforcement is that it would divert resources from what they are doing at the moment. We will consider this issue as part of our rapid work on parity, and we will also consider the issue as part of our broader work on reviewing the criminal law. I do not underestimate the importance of all these matters. I hope your Lordships will forgive me for the length of time it has taken me to deal with them. My hope is that your Lordships will take the commitments that I have made and the government amendments that I have tabled as a sign of the Government’s genuine intention. Take it from me: we will go further, but we must get these issues right. In the meantime, with every respect, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.
Victims and Courts Bill
Baroness Levitt Excerpts(5 days, 8 hours ago)
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Baroness Levitt
That the amendments for the Report stage be marshalled and considered in the following order: Clauses 1 to 3, Schedule 1, Clauses 4 to 7, Schedule 2, Clauses 8 to 18, Title.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill
Baroness Levitt ExcerptsFriday 27th February 2026
(1 week, 1 day ago)
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Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak very briefly to the amendment in this group in the name of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar. His Amendment 913A seeks to probe an issue raised by a number of noble Lords in this debate: namely, the means by which the assisted dying commissioner may be held accountable. As the Bill is drafted, and as we have heard, the commissioner is appointed by the Prime Minister. In his amendment 124, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier would have them appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Lord Chancellor. The point that the amendment addresses is that, whoever appoints the commissioner, there ought to be a clear accountability mechanism and a process whereby concerns about the conduct of the commissioner can be investigated in response to formal representations. My noble friend suggests that representations might be made to the Prime Minister, but I would be very interested to hear from the noble and learned Lord what thought he and his co-sponsor have given to the way in which the commissioner will be held to account.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, given the size of this group and the need to keep my remarks within the speaking limit, I have taken a rather different approach to the structure of my speech, which I hope your Lordships will find helpful. Rather than going through the amendments thematically or in chronological order, I will structure my speech by first setting out some observations about the legal implications of some of the amendments. Then, I will outline what the Government see as operational workability issues presented by some amendments and, finally, I will turn briefly to drafting considerations. Essentially, I will be flagging issues by theme, but if your Lordships have any further questions relating to the workability of any amendments, I will be very happy to write to set out the Government’s views in more detail and place a copy in the House Library. I will not comment on all the amendments. If I say nothing about a particular amendment, it is because the Government have no concerns.
As my noble friend Lady Merron, the Health Minister, and I have set out many times, the Government’s position remains that it is for Parliament to consider the policy, so I will not be providing a government view on the merits of any proposed changes or make any observations in a personal capacity.
In other debates on the Bill, your Lordships have asked how the Government plan to implement it. I will set this out at the outset. The Government have not undertaken any detailed implementation work that would precede the parliamentary process. Should Parliament pass the Bill, the Government will then undertake detailed work to develop a delivery model, which would involve engaging with stakeholders and delivery partners, including the judiciary. To answer the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, this relates also to NHS England and providers, although your Lordships may wish to note that the Bill does not specify where the provision of assistance may or may not take place.
A number of your Lordships, including the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord McCrea, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, asked about the role of the Prime Minister. I remind the Committee that this is a Private Member’s Bill, so the proposal to designate the Prime Minister as the person who is to appoint the voluntary assisted dying commissioner was made by the sponsor, not the Government. It has nothing to do with the Government. It is up to noble Lords whether they wish to retain that provision.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked me to confirm whether the standards in the Cabinet Office governance code would be adhered to. If it is the will of Parliament that the Prime Minister is the person who is to appoint the commissioner, the standard recruitment arrangements for prime ministerial appointments will be followed. These are made through an open, regulated appointments process, which includes selection by an assessment panel containing an independent member. Whether or not the Select Committees are involved will be a matter for the sponsor. The reason I shook my head at the noble Lord, Lord Harper—I meant no discourtesy to him as I did so—was that I thought, and continue to think, that it is a shame that he did not pass by the opportunity to make a party-political point, when, for example, his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was assiduous in ensuring that he did not. I felt it did not help and was not constructive, but I did not mean it discourteously.
I turn to the first of the three groups in my speech, on legal considerations and, specifically, the compatibility of some proposed amendments with the European Convention on Human Rights. The articles in question are Article 14, on protection from discrimination, and Article 6, on the right to a fair trial. On Article 14, Amendment 913 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would prevent the employment of a person as commissioner, or a member of their staff, should they have links with any agency promoting assisted deaths. The Government wish to highlight that the amendment as drafted is unbalanced, creating a risk of breach of Article 14 of the convention. This would be avoided if it also prevented the employment of individuals who campaigned against assisted dying. In addition, the amendment as drafted would prevent the employment of a person in the commissioner role, or a member of their staff, should they have links with any agency that provides assisted deaths. But, if assisted dying were to be provided through the NHS, that would prevent the commissioner employing staff with relevant NHS experience.
Amendment 496C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Weir, would involve differential treatment as between how reconsiderations of panel decisions would be made in the cases of, on the one hand, identified groups of people in the amendment and, on the other, those not belonging to those groups. If that is the intention behind the amendment, consideration would need to be given to whether the approach is proportionate and justified to avoid a risk of breach of Article 14. But if the intention behind the amendment is to afford everyone a right to hearings with the commissioner, but for only remote hearings to be permissible in the circumstances specified, then drafting changes would be needed.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, for these amendments. There is a very serious issue here, evidenced by the nature of the conversation we are having, because it is a conversation about realities. The noble Lord, Lord Empey, said that it was time we started using the language that described exactly what we are doing. I think that is what we are doing now. We are talking about how this is going to be paid for and who should pay for it. How should it be managed?
We have seen the Canadian experience. The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, spoke about wheelchair access. In Canada, it is regularly reported that people who cannot get wheelchairs are offered assisted dying instead. I grant you that that would not necessarily apply in this particular Bill, but you can see how, with mission creep and with changes, this could happen. We could end up in a situation in which we are making the kind of decisions that the noble Lord just referred to in this matter.
I must declare that I have an interest, because I am a trustee of a hospice—an unpaid trustee, I would add, and it is not in my register of interests for that reason, but it is relevant to this debate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, defined the variety of costs attached to the proposals quite clearly. I have to ask, following the noble Lord, Lord Deben, if the estimate of £2,000 is in any way realistic for providing a service which requires for each individual the cost of clinicians, the commissioner, panels, admin staff, communications, monitoring and audit, et cetera. That is to say nothing of maybe a national help service, independent advocates and all sorts of other things. We know that to die at Dignitas and places like that costs an average of £10,000, not £2,000. I would like the noble and learned Lord to ask the Minister if we can have a proper assessment of what is currently planned might cost and where it is to come from.
I have another question for the noble and learned Lord, because it is not the Government who pay; it is us. It is taxpayers who pay. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, rejects these proposals or something which approximates to taking the cost away from the National Health Service—as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, says, it is in such a parlous state that palliative care services are being extinguished or diminished very significantly—does he think that the public and the voters will think well of a Government who fund suicide while not funding hospices properly? Does he think it will enhance trust and confidence in the Government?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak only to the amendments about which the Government have significant operational workability concerns. Before I do so, I want to say a few words on the general points about funding raised by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Harper, the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Grey Thompson, and others.
I make it absolutely clear that I entirely understand the point that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, is making and why it might seem as though the choice is being restricted if you do not actually know the amounts involved, but I reiterate that it is for Parliament to decide whether this service should be provided and, if so, whether it should be publicly funded. If that decision is made, the Government will fund it. I am not evading the issue when I say that I simply cannot explain how that will be done, because that would be to put that ahead of Parliament’s own decision. We cannot possibly start, for example, putting aside a war chest for something that Parliament may decide that it does not want. As far as priorities are concerned, as I say, it is not a matter of evasion; it is a matter of principle.
It is also not right to assume that funding this, if that is the will of Parliament, will involve taking money away from other parts of the health service. That is not what the Government are saying; we are simply saying that the funding will be made available if that is what Parliament wants. My noble friend Lady Merron, the Health Minister, has written twice on this subject, and those letters are available in the Library for anybody who is interested. As for palliative care, there is an absolute commitment by the Government to increase funding for palliative care and make sure that palliative care is offered properly, irrespective of what happens in relation to this.
As for the noble Lord, Lord Deben, of course I am not upset by what he says about the impact assessment—as if I would ever be upset by anything that he says—but we are doing what is usual, which is to deliver the impact assessment at the outset and, as with other Bills, a further updated impact assessment will be provided following Royal Assent, if we get to that stage. There is a logic to this, because there are so many different elements to what has been debated in Committee that to provide a costing for each and every one would probably keep us here for as long as we are here debating all these amendments anyway. It simply cannot be done. It is not practical. I am not upset, but I am simply saying that we cannot do it and we will not do it until Royal Assent.
Turning to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, these are collectively intended, as we have heard, to prevent the establishment and running of this service being publicly funded. Your Lordships may wish to note that, if passed, these amendments would create an internal inconsistency with Clause 41(5), which requires that the provision of voluntary assisted dying services must be provided free of charge.
Amendments 835 and 868, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, propose a delivery model whereby the Secretary of State must make regulations for the assisted dying service, which would be delivered only by private providers. The key workability risk here is that the new clause created by Amendment 835 would duplicate Clause 41, but with additional constraints, and that would create legal uncertainty, when the Act is looked at in the round, about the limits on the Government’s powers when commissioning a service. The Committee may also wish to note that this amendment may have implications for the devolution settlement, as Wales and the Welsh NHS trusts are implicitly included, which potentially constrains the powers for Wales in Clause 42.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
This group concerns the question of funding. First, the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, raised the question: should the people who benefit from this have to pay for it? Secondly, the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, raised the question of whether it should be free to the patient. Could it be provided by private providers? Separately, there were questions along the lines of: will this change the nature of the relationship between the doctor and the patient? Finally, there were questions over whether this might lead somebody to urge people to take an assisted death.
I start with the provisions of the Bill at the moment, which, subject to the amendments to Clause 41 that I propose, require that the integrated care board, or NHS England or the Secretary of State, commission the services. A separate provision, in Amendment 753A, makes provision that, in practice, they have to be free for the person getting them.
The principle that underlies that approach—my noble friend Lady Levitt is right and this is the choice that the Bill makes—is that it will be available free to somebody who wants it and who satisfies the conditions. The reason for that is that we do not want to create a two-tier system where you can have an assisted death only if you can afford to pay for it.
In evidence to the Commons Public Bill Committee, Dr Michael Mulholland, the honorary secretary of the Royal College of GPs, said:
“Whether it occurs in the NHS is not our decision, but we would be very concerned about health inequalities creeping into any part of the health service … If the Bill comes through, we will want to make sure that there is not a differential in who is able to access it”.—[Official Report, Commons, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Committee, 30/1/25; col. 278.]
The amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, do not affect that. The amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, do, and it is for that reason that I oppose them.
I will first deal with the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, which would restrict the model that could be used to private providers only—albeit that she is not saying that it should not be free. I agree with what my noble friend Lady Levitt has said, to the effect that the way it is delivered should not be restricted. I would therefore not be in favour of the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, in that respect.
Public Office (Accountability) Bill: Exclusion
Baroness Levitt Excerpts(1 week, 2 days ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, it is customary to begin by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for securing this debate, but I am sure she would agree that I should start by paying tribute to the victims of the Hillsborough disaster and their families. In doing this, I make it clear that the victims and bereaved must always be front and centre of the Government’s mind as the Bill makes its long overdue way through Parliament.
I hope your Lordships will understand what I mean when I say that the Bill is not just about justice for Hillsborough victims and families, and those of the other disasters; it determines what kind of a society we are. Do we protect vested interests, or do we believe in the importance of rights of and protections for our fellow citizens as individuals? To that extent, I entirely understand the points made, very forcefully, by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my noble friend Lord Knight.
The noble Baroness and I had a very short discussion yesterday when she explained her concerns to me. I am grateful to her for that. I hope she knows that my objective in this matter is not to make partisan points or to be stubborn about legislation but to make sure that, as we go through the process of introducing a new law, we get it right. By “right”, I mean that the law captures the behaviour that we think is so egregious that it merits being criminalised while not trespassing on other important issues, which will include convention rights. By securing today’s debate, the noble Baroness and all the other Members of your Lordships’ House who have spoken have given the Government food for thought, and I have treated everybody’s contributions as, in effect, being those of critical friends.
The offence of misleading the public is a brand new offence contained in the Public Office (Accountability) Bill. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, your Lordships will have the opportunity to scrutinise it fully when it is sent to us from the other place. My intention today is to explain the policy reasoning behind the Government’s decision to limit the offence to the Executive rather than extend it to all MPs and Peers. To do this, I need briefly to outline what the Bill in general, and this clause in particular, intend to do.
The Government are clear that what happened following the Hillsborough disaster must never happen again. In that case, police lied and changed witness statements to protect their reputations. Bereaved families from Hillsborough, and too many other examples over many years, faced an inquest process with no funding for legal representation. All of that was underpinned by a lack of a duty of candour. The Bill contains a powerful new package of measures to address these failings and others, such as the infected blood and Horizon scandals.
As part of the measure, the Bill creates not one but four new criminal offences, and they fall into two groups. There is plainly some level of misunderstanding about this. That was articulated most clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton; I owe him an apology because, in a recent letter on the Crime and Policing Bill, I addressed him as “Lord Young of Action”, although perhaps he will not have minded too much.
The first group of these four offences includes two offences to replace the common-law offence of misconduct in public office, which will be repealed. The first of those new offences is committing seriously improper acts and the second is breaching the duty to prevent death or serious injury. These new offences broadly replicate the effect of the common-law offence, and they have a very wide reach. They cover a much broader range of behaviour than the kind that was seen at Hillsborough; for example, misconduct in public office has in the past been used to prosecute for offences such as corruption in public office—that is what these two new offences are intended to replicate.
We are replacing the old common-law offence because there was a lack of certainty about it. One of the issues with it was the lack of a list of those to whom the law applied. To deal with that, those two new offences do have a list. Both those two very broad offences do apply to MPs and Peers, as well as to a number of other public office holders, including judges.
Secondly, we have created another two new offences, which are completely separate from the old misconduct in public office offence. They were designed specifically to deal with a narrower range of circumstances and to deal with the situation that has arisen in these large-scale disasters. These two new offences are: first, a breach of the new duty of candour; and, secondly, the offence of misleading the public contained in Clause 11. It is only the latter offence, out of the four new ones, with which we are concerned today.
As I have already said, this offence is designed to be much narrower than the ones designed to replace misconduct in public office. It was designed specifically with what happened at Hillsborough in the front of our minds, and I will explain the reason for that. As the scale of the disaster at Hillsborough was becoming apparent, the police lied about its cause, saying that Liverpool fans had broken into the stadium. However, as we now know, and as the Taylor inquiry uncovered, in fact the main reason for the disaster was the failure of police control.
This new offence is aimed squarely at those who intentionally or recklessly aim to mislead the public and cover up the truth. It is intended to capture only the most serious instances of public officials or authorities misleading the public. An example might be a chief executive of a hospital instructing the staff to lie about a major incident to avoid criticism of the hospital. It is not intended to apply to instances of accidental or inadvertent misleading.
To reassure the noble Lord, Lord Young, prosecutions cannot be brought without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, specifically to avoid vexatious private prosecutions. The noble Lord mentioned judicial review, but the doorway to a judicial review is a narrow one—it is a very restricted set of circumstances and is subject to a permission stage from the High Court.
The Government thought very carefully about to whom this offence should apply. It applies to public officials and public authorities, so it captures those working in government and the wider public sector who take decisions on behalf of the state. That includes Ministers and other politicians in executive roles, but not MPs and Peers.
Our thinking was this: Parliament has a unique role in our society. Parliamentarians are responsible for legislating, scrutinising legislation and holding the Government to account. In addition, MPs are responsible for representing their constituents. However, individual MPs and Peers do not directly take decisions on behalf of the state, nor do they have access to the kind of government information that would be available to Ministers. For that reason, we have come to the conclusion that it would not be appropriate to extend the offences in the Bill to all MPs and Peers—and they are not extended to judges either. We have the wide group of offences designed to replace misconduct in public office, which applies to Back-Benchers, the Opposition and the judiciary, and this narrow offence designed to cover those who take decisions.
Of course, the Government agree that misleading the public in any capacity is not acceptable, and there should be consequences for parliamentarians who do so, but this new offence is not the appropriate vehicle for regulating political speech. Parliament has its own arrangements for ensuring accuracy and truthfulness in proceedings, including processes for determining whether MPs have misled the other place, and it is for the House of Lords Procedure and Privileges Committee to consider any instances where a Member of your Lordships’ House is alleged to have misled the House. This reflects the important principle that parliamentary proceedings are rightly privileged and cannot be questioned in a court of law. Each House is responsible for determining the right sanctions when it is alleged that someone has misled the House.
Members of both Houses must also act in accordance with the Nolan principles in all their public functions, and the very high standards expected of public office holders, conducting themselves with honesty and integrity. It is for each House to determine the procedures for investigating and sanctioning those who break the rules. The Government are confident that the scope of the new offence, combined with the existing arrangements and the codes of conduct for parliamentarians, strike the right balance between capturing the most serious wrongdoing while not infringing the tried and tested procedures that govern all noble Lords and all those in the other place to ensure that we conduct ourselves to the highest standards.
This has been an interesting and important debate and I will of course meet the noble Baroness, any lawyer she wants to bring with her and indeed any other Members of your Lordships’ House who would like to discuss this further.
Court Reporting Data
Baroness Levitt Excerpts(3 weeks, 3 days ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the Courtsdesk court reporting data has been a great success in providing access to data from our courts. It has been reported that about 1,500 journalists have used the platform. It has proved particularly important in collating information about grooming gangs and in properly investigating that terrible issue. It would be extremely damaging to the transparency of our justice system if that service was to be extinguished.
Various excuses have been advanced by the Minister in the other place, despite her having announced in July of last year that the agreement with Courtsdesk would be continued. I highlight two of the excuses put forward. First, there is the allegation of a data breach. We now know that the Ministry of Justice data protection officer concluded, following investigation of that report, that there was no basis for a report to the Information Commissioner. Does the Minister agree with her department’s data protection officer? Secondly, there was an allegation of the sharing of data with a third-party AI company—I use the term “third party” advisedly. The data platform had contracted with an AI firm to carry out sub-processing in terms of an agreement. Does the Minister agree that, under Article 4(10) of the general data protection regulation, someone carrying out processing in terms of such an agreement is not to be regarded as a third party for the purposes of data protection?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt)
My Lords, I am in the happy position of being able to reassure your Lordships’ House that there is no cover-up or conspiracy. The facts are as follows. Courtsdesk, a commercial company, was given copies of the data held in magistrates’ courts’ registers for one purpose only: to share it with bona fide journalists. However, Courtsdesk then shared it with a third-party company without asking or even telling the Ministry of Justice. This data contained sensitive information about both defendants and victims.
When the Ministry of Justice found out that Courtsdesk had done this, it was less than transparent with us, at which point the Government did what any responsible Government would have done: we stopped sending copies of the data to Courtsdesk and required it to remove the copies it still had from its platform. I reassure your Lordships’ House that the original data has always been retained by the Ministry of Justice, and no records have been deleted or lost.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, we are all committed to open justice, but so we are to the protection of sensitive personal data. Minister Sackman told the Commons yesterday, as has the Minister here, that Courtsdesk had been sharing with an AI company, no doubt for commercial purposes, personal data of defendants and victims, including full names, personal addresses and birth dates. Minister Sackman said that at least 700 individual cases were involved in that direct breach of contract by Courtsdesk, which Courtsdesk has accepted was a breach.
I suggest that we accept both Ministers’ accounts as accurate, as, notably, did Conservative MP Sir Julian Lewis, who, unlike his Front Bench—and indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen—rightly described this as a “cause of great concern”. How and when do the Government propose to replace Courtsdesk with an alternative provider? Meanwhile, can the Minister say how HMCTS will deliver accurate information in a more easily accessible and digestible form? By all accounts, journalists are currently finding the MOJ’s presentation of data to be fragmented, impractical and difficult to navigate.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, first, I reassure your Lordships’ House that all journalists can access the information in exactly the same way as they could through Courtsdesk—it is just a slightly more complicated method: they have to go through HMCTS. The point about Courtsdesk was that it provided a slightly more convenient method, but there is no material that journalists could get then that they cannot get now.
Secondly, the agreement with Courtsdesk, which was a licensing agreement rather than a contract, was entered into by the previous Government as a pilot, which is why it applied to magistrates’ courts only. This Government decided that it might be better to make it available to more than one commercial company. We are in the process of looking at new licensing agreements, which lots of companies can bid for if they wish to, including Courtsdesk if it would like to do so. Anybody who can reassure us that they will treat our data with the respect and dignity that victims and defendants deserve will probably get that licence.
Baroness Brown of Silvertown (Lab)
My Lords, I know my noble friend the Minister will agree that it was utterly unacceptable for the company concerned to release personal information about vulnerable victims and witnesses without their permission or the permission of the department. As she knows, I am not a lawyer, but does she consider this to be a breach of the contract made with the previous Government by the company concerned?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for her question. In fact, there was no contract; it was a licensing agreement. Our view is that there was a clear breach of the licensing agreement, and that is why we were concerned. The real issue is Courtsdesk’s lack of candour with us when this came to our attention. If there was no problem, why did Courtsdesk not ask us about it or even tell us that that was what it was doing?
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, it is worth saying that there has been a substantive rebuttal by the CEO of Courtsdesk, to which I understand the Government have not responded. I have no vested interest in this issue, but it is a matter of fact that Courtsdesk has gone to extensive lengths to protect victims’ personal data and ensure that it was handled responsibly and securely. This included working only with security-cleared engineers and building its AI test features in an encrypted sandbox environment, hosted in the EU, that is automatically and permanently deleted every 24 hours. Is it not the case that there has been a misunderstanding, and that this company has been treated quite shabbily by the Government?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
Absolutely not. The first thing I would say in reply to the rebuttal put up very recently by the chief executive of Courtsdesk—it went up during my meeting with officials earlier this morning to discuss this issue—is, they would say that, wouldn’t they? Secondly, if there was nothing wrong with this, why did they not ask us and tell us they were doing it?
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, while I commend the MoJ for doing what departments do not always do—policing these contracts properly—is there an argument, given the importance of this information and of making it accessible to journalists, but also of protecting sensitive data, for the department developing an in-house function capable of sorting this out, with a panel of journalists and others to help devise the scheme?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
It is a very good question. In fact, that already exists in part. There is something known as CaTH, which deals with listing information in relation to civil courts and tribunals, and a criminal court listing service is going to be added to it in March. The thing about the information Courtsdesk had is that it went a bit further than that. It would, for example, give the charges; it would say what the outcome was; it would give what the sentence was. We accept entirely that journalists need and ought to have that information, but only journalists, because, first, journalists are familiar with the contempt of court rules and know what they can and cannot do. Secondly, there is an HMCTS protocol in place with journalists, which is based on the criminal procedure rules and makes it clear how this data can be used. We do not know what a third party is going to do—we did not know about this, we did not see its contract, and we want to know why not.
Viscount Stansgate (Lab)
My Lords, I read the exchanges yesterday in the other place and I welcome what the Minister has said about this. Out of interest, what reason—or should I say, what excuse—did Courtsdesk give when it was revealed that it was passing personal, private and legally sensitive information to a third-party AI company? Will my noble friend reassure the House, partly in the light of the answer she has just given, that the information that is there and is publicly available will continue to be publicly available? I appreciate that journalists need to have it in a more accessible way, and I hope that, as a result of this episode, the Government will continue to do what they can to provide to journalists the information they have every right to have.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The answer to the first of my noble friend’s questions is that Courtsdesk says that it did not think there was anything wrong with what it was doing. We venture to disagree. The answer to the second question is, absolutely, and that is why we are going to issue licences to far more commercial companies, in the interests of competition, so that others can perform the same service and journalists can get the vital information they need so there is transparency in our courts.
Victims and Courts Bill
Baroness Levitt ExcerptsWednesday 11th February 2026
(3 weeks, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 141-II Second marshalled list for Committee - (10 Feb 2026)
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for outlining the detail of the amendments in this group. I was slightly surprised by what he said, because I understood that it was not about whether a prison term was suspended or not, it was the conviction itself that acted as the trigger for the victim’s rights. I see the Minister is nodding. Just to double-check, I went to the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime. This makes it absolutely clear that the moment there is a possible crime against somebody which falls within something that could be considered by the code, the victim is entitled to support and help. For certain particular crimes, they are entitled to enhanced rights and help. I am sorry: I printed it off the web and it does not have a page number, but it states that victims of the most serious crimes are eligible for enhanced rights under this code. There is no question at all of them being reduced or stopped if a conviction is suspended. Once again, I repeat that this is exactly what happened to me. In my particular case, the offender was given a prison sentence and it was suspended, but the victim support continued in spite of that.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity of setting out the Government’s position. Our approach is carefully considered. I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to make party-political points out of this by using language such as “insult to victims”, particularly when, in relation to the principal part of his argument, he is just plain wrong.
The starting point is that we must prioritise public funds to ensure that they go where they are most needed. We have done this by providing proactive support to those victims where the court has imposed a longer sentence, because a longer sentence reflects the seriousness of the offence. Of course we recognise that all victims of crime will want information about the offender in their case. For that reason, we are introducing a new route for all victims—the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is quite right about this—to request information via a dedicated helpline.
This is why new Schedule 6A is in three parts. Part 1 ensures that the most serious cases, involving victims of violent, sexual, and terrorism offences where the defendant has been sentenced to a custodial sentence of 12 months or more, can receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.
Part 2 ensures support for victims of stalking and harassment offences, regardless of sentence length. We recognise that, even where there is a short sentence, this cohort of victims needs and will receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.
I am just trying to ensure that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, can hear the information I am giving him back, because we think that what the noble Lord said is not right, so I thought he might be interested in hearing what I have to say about it.
Part 3 ensures that victims of other sexual and violent offences, and breach offences linked to violence against women and girls, will be able to get information through the helpline should they request it, including for those offences in Part 1 where the sentence for the offence is less than 12 months. We consider that this is the right place to draw the line, but we will keep eligibility under review to make sure that we are reaching the right victims.
The Bill includes regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences, and the specified lengths of sentence of such offences, which determine eligibility for either service. The Bill also includes a discretionary power that enables victims of any offence, where the offender is serving a sentence of imprisonment, to be provided with either service, where they request it and probation deem it to be appropriate.
The victim contact scheme and the victim helpline will apply only where there is a custodial sentence. That is not only because of the consideration of public funds but because the information provided via these routes, such as the date of release on licence and conditions of licence, self-evidently does not apply unless there has been a custodial sentence. Where a suspended or community sentence is imposed by the court, under the victims’ code, the police witness care unit will explain the sentence to the victim.
Finally, regarding Amendment 54, I am pleased to reassure the noble Lord that there is already a route for victims to request a senior probation officer review of a decision about what information to provide, so this is already catered for. In the circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I addressed this at some length in opening. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the Minister for correcting my errors. I shall add nothing more. I am also grateful for the Minister’s explanation of how—she hopes, at least—this will work in practice. On that basis, I shall withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the Government firmly believe that the Victims’ Commissioner—I have known the current occupant of the role for many years and have the utmost regard for her—has a crucial strategic role in representing the interests of victims and the witnesses of crime and anti-social behaviour.
Amendment 58 would significantly widen the commissioner’s remit by requiring her to support and protect individuals who assist victims. Of course, we agree that the work of those who dedicate their efforts to supporting victims is crucial, but the proposed widening of the Victims’ Commissioner’s statutory functions would, in the Government’s view, dilute the fundamental purpose of the Victims’ Commissioner; that is, to promote the interests of victims and witnesses themselves. In fact, the commissioner’s statutory function of promoting the interests of victims and witnesses already allows her to work with and support those who themselves support victims, and she does not need an explicit statutory function to continue with that.
Since the definition of “those assisting victims” could be interpreted broadly, this amendment also risks heavily extending the casework burden that would be imposed by the two other amendments, to which I now turn.
The Government have already brought forward Clause 8, which proposes to amend the existing statutory limitation on the exercise of the commissioner’s functions in relation to individual cases to allow her to exercise her functions in relation to cases that indicate a wider systemic issue. But Amendments 59 and 60 would go further—either entirely removing or narrowing the existing limitation. We understand the amendments to be creating an alternative. We do not believe that this is the right approach and consider that our carefully designed Clause 8 achieves the right balance.
The Victims’ Commissioner is not a complaints body, and it is important to maintain this distinction. Her role is to advocate for victims as a group and to address system-wide issues—that is what Clause 8 does. It is up to her to decide which cases she believes create those system-wide issues.
Individual victims already have a clear escalation route through the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman if they are dissatisfied with their experience of the criminal justice system. Expanding the commissioner’s involvement in individual casework to this extent would shift his or her role towards handling complaints rather than overseeing the system as a whole.
It is also vital that decisions of the judiciary and other independent public bodies that support victims of crime remain free from external influence. The current legislative bar, and the amendment to it that we have proposed through Clause 8, safeguards that independence and avoids any uncertainty about the commissioner’s role in such processes. We do not believe that Amendments 59 or 60 achieve that.
The point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which she has raised and discussed with me before on the many occasions on which we have now met—obviously, I look forward to many more—is a good point and one that we need to keep under review. Perhaps the noble Baroness and I can discuss it further the next time we meet. As I say, I very much look forward to that.
I hope the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, agrees that preserving the Victims’ Commissioner’s strategic function is essential to holding the system to account effectively, and I invite him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I listened with interest to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, had to say, and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I encourage the Minister to listen with care to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said and perhaps to move our way on certain aspects.
Dealing with Amendment 58, the law should not leave people such as Mr Hehir exposed to detriment for acting courageously. It may be that the Victims’ Commissioner is not the right person, but we put this forward in the hope that it would allow consideration of what to do in such situations. The amendment sends a clear message that civic responsibility and bravery should not be met with silence or indifference on the part of authority.
Amendment 59 would remove the restriction on individual cases. We appreciate that the commissioner has a strategic role to promote the interests of victims and witnesses generally, but that cannot be done effectively if individual cases are placed beyond reach. We accept that Clause 8 enables the commissioner to act in cases relevant to public policy, and we are grateful for that, but individual cases often reveal systemic failings. Removing the restriction entirely would enable oversight and the identification of patterns that will require reform. If we are serious about learning lessons, we suggest that the commissioner should be able to look at cases from which those lessons arise, but do so with discretion.
If the Minister considers that Amendment 59 is too broad, Amendment 60 would provide a possible balanced alternative. It would preserve the integrity of live criminal proceedings, it would allow engagement in individual cases once proceedings have concluded, and it would ensure that the commissioner can examine outcomes, seek information and promote improvements without interfering with the courts. It reflects a sensible constitutional boundary.
In summary, these amendments would not unduly expand the commissioner’s role but would clarify and strengthen it. They would ensure that individual experiences inform systemic reform and that statutory restrictions do not undermine the purpose of the office itself. A Victims’ Commissioner who cannot meaningfully engage where necessary with individual cases is constrained in fulfilling the commissioner’s core duty.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
The noble and learned Lord has said what I wanted to say much more sensitively and tactfully, but I will say what I was going to say.
There is a danger that lawyers of my generation— I shall just apply it to my generation and not suggest which generation other Members of the House belong to—are prejudiced against lawyers who do not have standard qualifications, if you like, or the backgrounds that many of us come from. I understand from CILEX that there are 133 members working as associate prosecutors who cannot progress or get promotion. That is a real shame. It is a much wider issue than just prosecution.
I think the noble Lord answered his own point because he was talking about members of the Bar progressing. The Minister will tell us—I cannot believe it is not the case—that no one joins the CPS and prosecutes a murder the next day. Every profession has its hierarchy, and one progresses in the hierarchy dependent on both skill and experience. The current position is out of date, so, even if it were not to solve an immediate problem, what is proposed in the Bill is a good idea. I am afraid that we cannot support the opposition to the clause.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, it is vital to ensure that the Crown Prosecution Service can recruit and retain a sufficient number of qualified Crown prosecutors. We suggest that Clause 11 supports this aim by increasing the CPS’s recruitment flexibility through the removal of an unnecessary legislative barrier. In turn, this will help increase the pool of eligible candidates for appointment as Crown prosecutors. It is axiomatic that a shortage of Crown prosecutors adds to the backlog because it cannot make decisions quite as quickly about prosecutions as it could if there were more of them.
Currently, the Crown Prosecution Service is restricted in who it can appoint as Crown prosecutors due to an unnecessary legal requirement. This is set out in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which provides that Crown prosecutors and those who prosecute cases on behalf of the CPS must hold what is known as the general qualification. The general qualification is a term of art, having a very specific meaning in this context. It means that a prospective Crown prosecutor must have
“a right of audience in relation to any class of proceedings in any part of the Senior Courts, or all proceedings in county courts or magistrates’ courts”,
even though most of those rights of audience—for example, before the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—are never going to be exercised by a Crown prosecutor in a million years.
This requirement can exclude certain qualified legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners—from the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives—who have relevant criminal practice rights but are prohibited from becoming Crown prosecutors. These legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners, often hold the right skills and specialist qualifications required to perform the Crown prosecutor role, including having rights of audience for the courts in which they will actually appear, as opposed to rights of audience for the courts in which they will not, but they do not meet the general qualification criteria. This restriction limits the DPP’s ability to consider a wider pool of legal talent and reduces the CPS’s flexibility in managing existing and future recruitment challenges.
The purpose of this clause is to remove the requirement for the general qualification and, in doing so, give the DPP the discretion to appoint appropriately qualified legal professionals, such as CILEX practitioners, as Crown prosecutors for the CPS. I can reassure the Committee that the removal of the general qualification requirement will not in any way dilute professional standards; there are appropriate safeguards to preserve standards.
Prospective professionals eligible to be a Crown prosecutor who do not at the moment hold the general qualification must still meet the authorisation requirements of the Legal Services Act 2007—they have to be appropriately qualified, authorised and regulated, and be able to exercise rights of audience and conduct litigation, both of which are reserved legal activities under the Act. It is a criminal offence under the Act to carry out reserved legal activities unless entitled to do so.
In addition, it is important to note that the measure does not require the CPS to appoint any specific type of legal professional. Instead, it gives it the flexibility to do so where appropriate and ensures that recruitment decisions remain firmly within the DPP’s control. The DPP will retain full discretion over appointments, ensuring that only suitably qualified and experienced individuals become Crown prosecutors. Newly eligible professionals must meet the same Crown prosecutor competency standards as those who qualify through more traditional routes. I also emphasise that those appointed following this change will, like all Crown prosecutors, be subject to performance monitoring by the CPS, including case strategy quality assessments focused on the application of the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
This change reflects the modern legal services landscape, spoken to powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. Alternative routes to qualification are increasingly common, where professionals from non-traditional backgrounds play a growing role in the justice system. By removing this unnecessary legislative barrier, the clause may also support the recruitment of a diverse and representative cohort of Crown prosecutors.
I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has ever met any CILEX practitioners; I certainly have, and they are an amazing cohort of people. I am sure he absolutely did not intend to suggest that somehow those who have qualified through an alternative route are, by very definition, less competent than those who have gone through the traditional route. If that is the suggestion, then it is not one this Government can support. I therefore hope that the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 11 to stand part of the Bill and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his opposition to it.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. At the heart of it lies the underfunded state of our criminal justice system—something which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has highlighted. Looking forward, the criminal justice system needs more money and the prosecution service needs proper funding, as of course do those who defend in the criminal courts; but Clause 11 does propose a significant shift, extending the right to prosecute to individuals who do not hold the long-standing qualifications of solicitors and barristers. I cast no aspersions on CILEX, but I make that observation. There is a difference in their training and educational background. This clause will expand capacity, there is no doubt about it—and there is no doubt that the system requires it, for the reasons that others have outlined in this debate—but it will not address the underlying cause of problems faced in the criminal courts. We must not go down a route which results in weakening of standards, undermining of public confidence, and unfairness to victims and witnesses involved in the criminal courts.
A central issue remains the absence of clear evidence in support of Clause 11. We have sought clarity from the Minister on what assessments were undertaken on the impact of this change, whether risks to standards were considered, and whether safeguards are in fact in place to maintain standards over time. Without clear evidence, Parliament cannot truly judge whether the proposed reform protects the quality of prosecutions. We must not embark on a position where there are unclear professional boundaries and variations in training and oversight.
We recognise the pressures facing the criminal justice system and the need for more good people to embark on careers in the criminal courts, whether in defence or in prosecution; in this case, we are talking about prosecutors. We share the desire for a stronger, more resilient system, but Clause 11 does not, we suggest, properly address the causes of these pressures. We urge the Minister to reflect carefully on the concerns which I have raised and to consider whether Clause 11 provides the assurance and evidence that this House, our justice system and, indeed, victims deserve. That said, I will not pursue my opposition.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has inevitably given us a very brief tour d’horizon of the problems of the costs and charges of the legal profession getting out of hand. Looking at the Bill over the weekend, I had to turn up the 1985 Act and write into it the changes that would be made by the Bill. It seems that the one to focus on is making the provisions subject to regulations, which boils down to the Lord Chancellor setting rates—at least that is how I read it. It is not much of a stretch to think that those are going to be linked to legal aid rates, and one can see the problem.
The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who explained some of the problems very clearly, mentioned consultation and rather dismissed it as being helpful, but it is important that the Committee should know what is planned by way of consultation. I hope the Minister can help us on that, because so much turns on its outcome.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, in the view of the Government, Clause 12 provides a modest enabling power for the Lord Chancellor to set through regulations the rates at which private prosecutors may recover expenses from central funds where a court has ordered that such costs be paid. To be clear at the outset, this clause does not set any rates, and it does not affect the long-established right to bring a private prosecution, which remains protected under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.
I should say at this stage that I have a great deal of experience in the area of private prosecutions, both as a state prosecutor working for the Crown Prosecution Service, where I oversaw all the private prosecutions that came to the CPS for consideration, and in private practice, where I brought a number of private prosecutions on behalf of clients and advised on many more.
The Justice Select Committee, in its 2020 report, Private Prosecutions: Safeguards, invited the Government to take a closer look at the private prosecution landscape, particularly where public funds are engaged. Taking an enabling power of this kind allows us to do precisely that in a careful and evidence-based way. The committee highlighted three key principles, which this Government agree should underpin reform: first, addressing the disparity between defence resources and those of private prosecutors; secondly, safeguarding the right of individuals to bring a private prosecution; and, thirdly, ensuring the proportionate and responsible use of public funds.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and her eminent supporters for bringing forward these amendments, and to all noble Lords for their contributions in respect of Amendments 61 and 62. I think I can deal with Amendment 61 quite shortly. We have had powerful and compelling speeches on the amendment from its proposers. It seeks to remove a presumption that a computer and software system on which a prosecution relies is working and reliable. We all know what has prompted this: the terrible Post Office scandal.
It is absolutely plain that prosecutors must no longer be able to rely on the systems being necessarily in working order as evidence for the purpose of criminal cases. The Government have had long enough now—and officials even longer than this Government—to look at this problem. If they have not, they have been prodded with a sharp stick by these amendments, and I am confident that, prodded with that sharp stick, they will come up with a solution. They will have to do so by Report, because otherwise I think this amendment will be carried then. I need not say any more.
Amendment 62 proposes a new clause to prevent an overreliance on a person’s musical taste as probative of criminal proclivity or intent. On this side we agree that a person’s creative or artistic taste should not result in them being treated prejudicially by the judicial system. We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, the noble Baronesses, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon and Lady Chakrabarti, and others in support of this amendment.
We have some reservations about this amendment as it is currently drafted. We accept the good intentions behind it. We understand the danger it is designed to meet, namely that people are treated prejudicially for their creative and artistic tastes, and it is undoubtedly the case that those from particular backgrounds are vulnerable to this and may in effect suffer, or risk suffering, mistreatment in our courts. Against that, we fear also that the amendment might create other difficulties, creating genre-specific shields for certain evidence and thereby treating some expressions differently from others—in other words, shifting the balance too far and creating another class that is not protected. While we are sympathetic to this amendment, for those reasons we cannot support it.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I get to my feet with some diffidence, given the range of eminent speakers, many of whom I have the most utmost respect for, who have spoken in favour of this group of amendments. I start with Amendment 61 in the names of my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lord Beamish, my other friend, who is in fact also noble—the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot—and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. This is a powerful group, and I entirely accept what they say about the difficulties created when there is a presumption that a computer is working properly unless the defendant is able to produce evidence that it is not. That can create an enormous obstacle for defendants. It is extremely difficult to prove that something is not working in those circumstances, so I accept that. I also understand that what is sought here is to reverse that position and to take it back to the position of Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.
I have already discussed this briefly with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. The difficulty I have with this amendment is that it is extremely broad, and the problem with that is that, since Section 69 was introduced, what constitutes digital material has evolved significantly. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, says that it is no answer to say that computers are everywhere, but I am afraid we have to be realistic about this. The computer evidence that is adduced in the criminal courts is, for example, the extremely complicated accounting software that is relied on by banks. That is at one extreme. But there is also the routine evidence that comes into criminal courts every single day, which can include text messages from mobile telephones, email chains, social media posts, DVLA printouts, medical records from GP surgeries and even criminal records themselves from the police national computer.
There is a real risk that if the amendment in this broad form were introduced, it could bring the criminal courts to a standstill. I know that is obviously not the intention, but I am concerned about whether there is a way of finding that we can limit it so that it excludes the routine use of computers—often things that people would not even think of as computers at all; the law recognises that a mobile phone is a computer, but most people would not think of it that way—and is limited to the cases that have caused real concern to those in your Lordships’ House, where a conviction is often based solely or mainly on the evidence of a computer. I can see a very different case to be made for that kind of evidence as well.
I entirely understand the intention behind this amendment, and I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Beamish and the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, for the work that they have done in relation to Horizon. It is humbling to stand here and talk about the Horizon victims and survivors and what happened to them, and I would not want anyone to think that the Government are not listening in relation to this.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
I am not opposed to consultation, but, I am sorry, this Government are hiding behind consultation. Once the consultation is finished, we then need action, but that is not happening, not just in this area but in a whole host of other areas.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I do not accept that. My noble friend should think carefully about making accusations such as that.
The point is that we are looking at the evidence that we have received in order to evaluate it to ensure that we make evidence-based and informed changes. The Government are considering this matter carefully. I am not announcing another review or another consultation; I am simply saying that we are looking at the evidence that we have.
I hope that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti will hear the words that I am using. She knows that I understand the problem and that I am not unsympathetic, but we need to find a way that does not create a lot of unintended consequences.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The noble Baroness is competing with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
I would never compete with the noble and learned Lord.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I will answer the noble and learned Lord and then I will give way to the noble Baroness, because, as she knows, we do not permit interventions on interventions.
The answer to his question is that this is not the only thing we are doing. Your Lordships know how much legislation is passing through this House. It is a question of bandwidth and having time to do things. I am trying to assure the Committee that our intentions are good ones and that we are listening.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
The words that the Minister used, which I believe her to believe, are exactly the same words that we have heard from several other Ministers. The only words that would give succour to members of the Committee are, “We will have something on Report”. While I take her point about broad and narrow, that is not an excuse that can last for years. That consultation was not the first consultation, so we have been waiting for years.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I entirely understand the point that the noble Baroness is making, and I pay great tribute to her expertise. She can imagine just how popular I would be if I gave that undertaking from the Dispatch Box right now. All I can say is: leave it with me.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
Having been a Minister myself, I know that the Minister can do that tonight. She knows what will happen if she does not bring it forward: an amendment will be tabled, and it will get passed.
Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (Con)
Before the Minister moves on to Amendment 62, would she please comment on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, about the Law Society’s contribution to the consultation about a system of assurances? That may be a way forward that might allow her to bring forward her own amendment on Report.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
That is exactly what the Government are evaluating. I cannot go any further than that today, but those are all the things that are being considered. I cannot go any further than to say that I am listening.
I turn to Amendment 62, in the names of my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Lawrence. I am very aware of these issues, particularly in relation to rap and drill. I knew about this amendment, but in the course of my practice and when I was a judge I have been to a number of lectures on the subject and read a number of articles, including some by Keir Monteith, King’s Counsel, who I see is sitting below the Bar today.
The question here, on the use of this material, is one of relevance. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, I do not want to go into a boring exegesis of when evidence is admissible and when it is not. The real concern here is to make sure that if—and it is a big if—this evidence is to be used then it has proper probative value, on the basis that it goes further than either that this defendant is a bad person because they like rap and drill music or, even worse, some spurious and crude racial stereotypes. Judges have a duty to ensure that only evidence meeting these standards is adduced and they should exclude any evidence that does not meet the required threshold—that is not a matter of discretion. However, I understand the concerns about the fact that that has not happened in all cases.
It is axiomatic to say that creative and artistic expression is of itself not a crime, and it is rare that it would feature in the evidence of a prosecution unless it inherently involved criminal activity, such as damaging another person’s property with graffiti or drawing sexual images of children. As for musical expression, the Crown Prosecution Service is clear that creating or listening to music is not a crime, but it says that, on occasion, it has encountered cases where, upon investigation into a violent offence, it became clear that drill and rap music had been used in the build-up to encourage or incite violence or to reveal information about a crime that only the attackers would know. These instances are rare and, importantly, are already subject to rigorous scrutiny under existing evidential rules. However, I am aware of the disquiet, and we understand the community concerns.
I take the point made by my noble friend Lady Lawrence. I am a lover of crime fiction but I do not think anyone is ever going to use that in a prosecution against me—well, I hope they do not. She makes a valid point.
The Crown Prosecution Service is actively consulting on this matter through a public consultation, seeking views on whether formal prosecution guidance should be issued regarding the use of musical expression evidence. We want to ensure that any future approach is clear and informed by a wide range of perspectives.
It is the Government’s view that, as currently drafted, the amendment would be unduly restrictive and would, in effect, frustrate the ability of the Crown to adduce relevant and probative evidence before the court, with the potential consequences of frustrating justice for victims in some serious cases. The Government intend to await the outcome of the CPS consultation and announce next steps in due course. I invite all noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I did not speak to Amendment 62 when I briefly got up but I did some research on it. I think it is usually the case in a particular area of law that, where you have a body of experts in particular areas of evidence, it is not uncommon for those experts to be used by both the prosecution and the defence. In doing my research on Amendment 62, I found that that is not the case. The so-called experts who are used by the prosecution are solely used by the prosecution, while the experts who are used by the defence—who would be able to talk knowledgably in the sort of detail that the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, was able to give us—are used only by the defence. That in itself tells you that there is something wrong.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I do not disagree with the noble Lord. I have already made it clear that I understand the disquiet, the concerns about it and the very real possibility for something that is in fact crude racial stereotyping to look as though it is evidence. That is why we need to await the outcome of the CPS consultation.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in what was a very important debate that did credit to the whole Committee. I am most grateful to my noble friend the Minister, who is a distinguished criminal lawyer and a distinguished former member of the CPS, but, with all due respect, no one should mark their own homework. It is not for the Crown Prosecution Service to mark its own homework, nor any other lawyers even.
In relation to Amendment 62, to go in reverse order, I urge my noble friend to consider what the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and others have said about what is happening in practice—the University of Manchester study and so on—because just reading out the official statement from the CPS is hope-sapping—I know that my noble friend would not want to sap my hope in difficult times. In relation to Amendments 62 and 61, she suggested that she is listening and said it with some personal input. She is not AI. She is not a projection from the Government. She will forgive me for saying that she is one of our best advocates on these Benches and the Government are very lucky to have her. However, as I know our noble friend Lord Timpson has said, publicly and privately, many times, we are not all here for ever; we are not on this earth for ever; we are not in this Chamber for ever; we are not in positions of power and influence for ever. We must make the most of our opportunities to make change, as was promised, and make it for good. Race equality surely must be one of the foundations of any Labour Government, specifically one that has promised so much.
In relation to both amendments, I heard no proper pushback from any side of the Committee. On Amendment 61, I have to defer to the noble Lords, Lord Beamish and Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. The time is now; the vehicle is this Bill. Finally, I say gently to my noble friend that when she walks into rooms in the Ministry of Justice with officials or even Commons Ministers, I hope she realises that she is the cleverest person in the room or at least the one with the most direct experience of practising criminal law in the courts. If anyone can find a way through, I trust that that is my noble friend.
Amendment 62 could theoretically be dealt with by rules of court—but it must be dealt with—but with Amendment 61 we need an urgent legislative amendment in this Bill. My noble friend foreshadowed the possibility of a way through, partly on her concerns about sole and determinative evidence and partly responding to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. I urge her to deliver for the Committee and for the people of this country, for the past victims of miscarriages and for all those who might come. I say that as respectfully and positively as I can to my noble friend. I hope she knows how much respect I have for her, but we are looking for something on Report in respect of both Amendments 61 and 62. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I can be brief. I support Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. We have already spoken about the need for consistency across our justice system. That includes extending the powers to compel offenders to attend their sentencing in the Crown Court to magistrates’ courts. This amendment would also bring the periods in which a case can be discontinued into alignment; indeed, I am interested to see what justification exists for the difference between the two. We have heard a compelling speech also from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, with a particular example. I know that one should be wary of individual examples, but it is a compelling example and we should listen to it carefully.
Apart from making the system more consistent in its procedures, this amendment would allow prosecutors in the Crown Court to discontinue a case at a late stage, preventing unnecessary, costly and time-consuming trials. In the context of a court backlog and the need for efficiency, allowing this more flexible mechanism for bringing prosecutions to an end appears to us to be a measured and sensible improvement. To be clear, Amendment 63 still allows the option to reopen a case following a successful victim’s right to review request, if it is concluded that the CPS has made an error in stopping the prosecution. This amendment would not do away with this important scheme which is available to victims. We thank the noble Lord for his efforts and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I will start with a little trip down memory lane. In either 2010 or 2011, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, when sitting in the Court of Appeal, heard a case called Killick. That was a case where prosecution had been restarted and, as part of his judgment in relation to it, the noble and learned Lord said that the Crown Prosecution Service needed to come up with a system that would allow victims to challenge a decision not to prosecute, without them having to bring judicial review proceedings. As he may remember, I was the prosecutor who remade the decision to charge in that case and, as a result, the Crown Prosecution Service—under a certain Director of Public Prosecutions, who may be known to your Lordships in another context at the moment, and I, working as his principal legal adviser—devised the victims’ right to review scheme.
I wrote much of the legal guidance, so the noble Lord, Lord Russell, is correct when he says I know quite a lot about it. I am a huge fan of the victims’ right to review scheme, because although the Crown Prosecution Service is in many ways a completely wonderful organisation, everybody is human and sometimes people get things wrong—and when we get it wrong, we want to put it right. Obviously, a right is not a right unless it has a remedy attached to it, and that is a real problem in some of these cases. The noble Lord knows, because I discussed this with him when we met, that my practice when I was dealing with reviews of cases was always that if I took the decision to offer no evidence, I would write to the victim and say, “In 14 days I am proposing to do this, unless you want to make representations to me as to why I should not, or seek judicial review proceedings”. I completely get the issue here.
The only note of caution I will sound is this. It would be a substantial change, with wide-ranging implications for both victims and defendants. For that reason, it needs to be considered carefully, because discontinuing a case is not simply putting a pause into proceedings. Restitution requires fresh proceedings, starting back in the magistrates’ court, which risks delay and uncertainty for both victims and defendants. It does not go straight back into the Crown Court as a restart. That is why robust safeguards and controls, which are not in this amendment, are essential when making these decisions.
For example, in the magistrates’ court procedure, which this amendment seeks to replicate, the defence can refuse to accept a discontinuance and insist on no evidence being offered, or insist that the Crown Prosecution Service makes a decision as to what it is going to do. We are anxious to ensure that discontinuance is not, for example, used in the Crown Court as a way of getting an adjournment that would not be got under other circumstances, as in saying: “We don’t have enough evidence here. We need another three months to get it, so we’re going to discontinue and then restart”. That could create awful uncertainty, both for victims and defendants, as to what is going on. There are, for example, cases where somebody is a youth at the time they are charged and, if the case is then discontinued, they may then be tried as an adult later on.
I am not saying that I do not understand the problem or that this may not be part of the solution, but it needs to be considered carefully. What we plan to do is to consider this proposal further in the context of the wider court reforms and Sir Brian Leveson’s most recent report, with his recommendations for improving efficiency. I also welcome the expansion of the CPS pilot, strengthening victims’ voices before final decisions to offer no evidence are made. The outcome of that pilot will also inform our thinking. For the time being, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
I thank the Minister very much for her response. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for adding her name and for the examples she put forward. As I surmised, the Minister does indeed know what she is talking about—on a 24 hours a day, seven days a week basis, from what we have heard—and she is looking remarkably well on it.
I thank the Minister very much for the broadly positive way in which she has responded. I think she acknowledged, as we have all acknowledged, that there is an issue and an inconsistency here. But putting it right is not a matter of just snapping one’s fingers and changing one thing, because that has knock-on effects. I am hoping that the Minister will agree to have some follow-up discussions between now and Report, to see either what it will be possible to do by Report or what changes one can start instituting or committing to look at carefully, which can then be enacted later. But on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, when I say that I will be brief, I will be very brief. I have listened carefully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. He is quite right in his observations, and particularly about the ultimate test of whether a sentence is set aside because it is unduly lenient. However, I think the answers have already been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell: this is a notification. The CPS is not taking a position on the merits of making the application; it is just setting up a timetable.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I will deal first with the existing time limit. We are listening—I am making a “we are listening” speech—not just to the strength of views in this Committee and in the other place on the time limit for the unduly lenient sentencing scheme but to the victims themselves. We are consistently hearing that this time limit is simply not long enough when victims are processing the outcome of the case, and I am extremely sympathetic to their representations. A ticking clock is the last thing that they need at a difficult time. The Government have been persuaded by arguments that something needs to be done, but we want to make sure that we get this right. Currently, we have been given a number of conflicting views on the best way to go about this. I would like to meet all noble Lords who have tabled amendments, and indeed any other interested Members of your Lordships’ House, to discuss the best way forward.
Turning to the question of notification, it goes without saying how important it is that victims are made aware of the ULS scheme. It is another subject that comes up over and again; it is not much of a right if you do not know that you have it. I am afraid that I am not persuaded by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, saying that we should not tell people that they have this right in case they want to use it—if that is not what he meant to say, I apologise and withdraw the remark. The way it is supposed to work is this. Under the victims’ code, police-run witness care units are required to inform victims about the unduly lenient sentencing scheme within five working days. However, we are hearing that this is not happening, so we need to ensure that it does. The question is how best to go about it.
At present, I am not persuaded that putting the obligation into primary legislation is the best way. The first reason is that, usually, if you create an obligation, you have to create a penalty for the breach. The second is that if you want to change it, you have to amend primary legislation in order to do so. The victims’ code is a statutory code of practice. Last week, we launched a consultation to ensure that we get it right and that the code is fit for purpose. Again, we would welcome your Lordships’ engagement with that consultation before it closes on 30 April, and any other ideas before we reach our final conclusion. For now, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Sater, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for tabling Amendment 68. We agree with the principle that children who commit crimes should thus be charged as children, even if by the time of their court appearance they are above the age of 18. What matters is the mental state of the offender at the time the offence was committed, not the lottery of when he or she comes to court. The amendment seeks to ensure that there is no loophole preventing this being the case, and we therefore hope that the Government will agree with that aim.
Amendment 70 in my name concerns the collection and publication of data relating to offenders’ immigration history and status. This is a sensitive issue. Illegal immigration has long been a core political issue for voters and has become even more salient in recent years. There continues to be widespread misinformation and unfounded assertions, both in person and online. That is because empirical evidence concerning immigration has not always been readily available. People perceive changes occurring as a result of policy, but often operate under the assumption that the Government are shielding themselves from transparency. That is not the case, of course, but it must be dealt with.
Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than with crime rates. The public feel less safe, they see the demographic change and they link the two. This is problematic. It can lead to misguided opinions about certain parts of society. There is no available data to inform opinions of what the true position is. Non-governmental studies and disjointed data releases have repeatedly justified this connection, but the lack of clarification from the Government still leaves room for the general public to be decried as fearmongering or bigoted. It is not just policy: people deserve to know the impact that government policies are having on their everyday lives, especially when they can have immediate impacts on their safety.
We say that there is a clear case to publish crime data by immigration status. Accurate and comprehensive data allows for informed debate and evidence-based policy. At present the information is scarce, it is fragmented and it leaves the public, and indeed policymakers, reliant on conjecture. If transparency and open justice are priorities, to release offender data by foreign national status and immigration history would provide clarity, support public confidence and allow all sides to address the facts without speculation.
The Minister will be aware of the time we have previously spent on the topics in Amendments 71 and 74. Amendment 71 would exempt sex offenders and domestic abusers from being eligible for early release at the one-third point of their sentence, while Amendment 74 would reaffirm the Government’s policy of favouring suspended sentences but once again seeks to exclude sexual offences and domestic abuse from the presumption. Custodial sentences should of course by judged by the extent to which they deter reoffending. We accept the Government’s belief that short custodial sentences often do not serve this end, but reoffending cannot be the sole metric by which the nature of a punishment is decided. The prison system at least prevents individuals from offending while they are incarcerated.
For sexual offences and domestic abuse, these considerations are not abstract, certainly for the victims. Victims’ lives, safety, sense of security, the opportunity to reorganise their lives and perhaps move or otherwise change their way of living, are directly affected by whether an offender is at liberty or in custody. In 2019, the first year for which comparable data is available, there were 214,000 arrests for domestic abuse and 60,000 convictions, a conviction proportion of 28%. In 2025—six years later and under this Government—there were 360,000 arrests for domestic abuse but only 41,000 convictions, a drop from 60,000 and a conviction rate of just 11%. Something must be done.
The Government have highlighted the scale and seriousness of sexual offences and domestic abuse. They have described violence against women and girls as a “national emergency”. They have committed to strategies including specialist investigative teams and enhanced training for officers, and demonstrated recognition that these crimes demand careful handling. It would be inconsistent to promote such measures while making it easier for offenders of these crimes to avoid immediate custody.
This principle also extends to early release. It becomes a moral question rather than a purely empirical one when an offender has drastically altered the life of a victim by means of their crime. I do not think it reflects who we are as a society if we say that those who commit as invasive and exploitative a crime as sexual assault or domestic abuse should not serve the full extent of their sentences.
I end by saying I hope the Liberal Democrats will support these amendments. They have made it a point of principle, as have we, that victims of domestic violence deserve targeted measures to prevent them suffering further harm. Their justice spokesman in the other place, Josh Barbarinde, tabled a Bill last year to prevent domestic abusers from being released early under the Government’s SDS40 scheme. They now have a chance to put their principle into practice, as Amendment 71 would have exactly the same effect. I hope they will be able to offer their support.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start with Amendment 68 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sater. She spoke passionately about this issue during the passage of the Sentencing Act and I pay tribute to her wealth of experience on this topic. As a former youth magistrate and a member of the Youth Justice Board, I have a lot of sympathy for the issues raised.
However, this amendment would radically change the youth justice landscape. As the noble Baroness knows, sentencing guidelines already make it clear that, when an individual is dealt with as an adult for crimes that were committed when they were a youth, they are to be sentenced as though they were being sentenced at the time that they committed the offence and not when they appear before the court. They also state that the courts have got to consider not only the chronological age of the offenders but their maturity and other relevant factors that remind the court they are not just mini-adults and need to be treated differently. Our position is that we remain concerned about the operational and legal complexity associated with a proposal like this. We are worried that we may not be able to achieve this during the passage of the Bill. However, I would like to speak to the noble Baroness, if she is willing to meet with me, and let us see what we can do.
Amendment 70, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, aims to place statutory duties on the Crown Court, HMCTS and the Secretary of State in relation to collecting and publishing data on sentencing. This Government remain committed to developing the data we publish on foreign national offenders. The Ministry of Justice has already taken action to increase transparency on the data published and, notably, in July, for the first time the offender management statistics included a breakdown of foreign national offenders in prison by sex and offence group.
Victims and Courts Bill
Baroness Levitt ExcerptsMonday 9th February 2026
(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 141-I(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (6 Feb 2026)
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for the way in which he has explained these amendments. I am also extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for injecting a note of caution and to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for injecting a note of questioning about the proposed amendments.
In their explanatory statement, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, state that the amendments in this group probe
“the rationale behind restricting the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing to only the Crown Courts”.
The noble and learned Lord explained why he suggests that there is no difference, for the purpose of this power, between the Crown Courts and the magistrates’ courts.
I should make it clear that we on these Benches start from the position that defendants should be obliged to attend court for their sentencing hearings. But the fact that they are obliged to attend court does not lead to the conclusion that the courts ought to have the power to get them to court however much they wish to resist.
It is, of course, important from the victims’ point of view—this is a point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, made—that the defendants who have committed offences against them are in court for the occasion when they are brought to justice. It is appropriate, therefore, that in the right cases, the court should have the power to order them to do so.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out what a serious power this is. It is particularly a serious power, as I will come to say, because the use of force is sanctioned to get defendants to court. We have heard tell, in the press and in the House of Commons, from some of the wilder speeches—if I may put it that way—of, in effect, the court having the power to order that offenders be brought to court by considerable force and in chains. I am quite clear that that is not the way the Bill puts it; it puts it in terms of the use of force being reasonable, proportionate and appropriate. Nevertheless, it is a very serious power.
It is also important from the offenders’ point of view that they should come to court, first, to hear what the court says about their offences as well as what their counsel and the prosecution say about their offences. It is also important because their attending court and listening, hopefully with some care, to what goes on at their sentencing hearing may be taken as a sign of their understanding of the import of the hearing. If an order is made, the breach of such an order to attend court for a sentencing hearing is a sign of a lack of remorse on the part of the defendant. A lack of remorse will usually involve a court treating a defendant more severely than it might treat a defendant who does show remorse for the offences that they have committed and an understanding of the impact of those offences on the victims.
The scheme of this Bill is to bring in a very strong regime of compulsion with a specific incorporation of provisions about contempt of court and significantly, as I adumbrated, about the right to use force to bring defendants to court who are unwilling and refuse to attend their sentencing hearings. The conditions for the new regime, as set out in the Bill, are that the defendant has been convicted and is in custody awaiting sentencing by the Crown Court. That brings into play the kind of reservation that the noble and learned Lord spoke about. This new regime is designed to deal with serious offences. A third condition is that the offender has refused or is likely to refuse to attend the sentencing hearing.
It follows that the code for punishment for contempt should be confined to adult offenders. The amendments seek to make this procedure and all its features applicable to a wider group of offenders, and to magistrates’ courts as well as Crown Courts. I ask the Minister and the noble and learned Lord when they close how far a change to include magistrates’ courts will help victims. One can see how it is justified and might help victims in serious cases, but I question how far the use of force will ever be in the public interest. One must question the purpose of the use of force. It could be twofold. It could be to force offenders to face up to their offences and help them to avoid reoffending. It could be to help the victims by letting them see that those who have committed offences against them are being brought to justice. There may be force in that.
However, there is also a risk, which may be important, of forced attendance becoming a means for defendants to get publicity for themselves, their offences and their resistance to justice: to portray themselves as public martyrs and, in some cases, to make political gestures that could be thoroughly undesirable. If these orders became the norm, those dangers would be real. If it is to have a positive effect, this power is likely to be much more effective for serious cases in the Crown Court than it is for cases in the magistrates’ court. Of course we take the point that the scope of hearings in magistrates’ courts has been increased over what it was before the distinction was changed. Nevertheless, I will be very interested to hear the Minister’s response on the distinction. Our position at the moment is that the distinction is plainly justified.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, explores the reasons for limiting this power to the Crown Court.
Before I begin, I am sure that the whole Committee will wish to join me in paying tribute to the families of Jan Mustafa, Henriett Szucs, Sabina Nessa, Zara Aleena, and Olivia Pratt-Korbel—whose mother and aunt sit below the Bar today. Their tireless campaigning has brought about this change. They have persuaded the Government that when a cowardly offender refuses to attend court, it causes anger and upset, which can feel like a final insult to victims and their families, who have sat through the trial waiting for the moment when they can tell the world—and, importantly, the offender—about the impact their crimes have had. Many of them want the opportunity to look the offender in the eye as he or she hears about the effects of what they have done.
Offenders are expected to attend court for sentence, and the overwhelming majority do so. Because magistrates’ courts hear less serious cases, offenders are more likely to be on bail, and where an offender is on bail, the courts have powers to compel attendance by issuing a warrant. When a warrant is issued, the defendant is brought before the court in custody for the warrant to be executed, and the judge can add an additional sentence for the offence of failing to surrender to bail, which will appear on their record in future.
However, in the Crown Court, which deals only with the top level of serious crime, offenders are much more often remanded in custody, and so court powers to get them physically into court are more restricted. That is why the Government have acted by bringing forward this legislation which gives three powers that can be used in relation to recalcitrant—that is the right word, as used by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—offenders: first, authorising the use of reasonable force, except in the case of children, because we are a civilised country, and this Government do not believe in using force on children; secondly, for offenders who still refuse to attend, or for those who are disruptive once they are there, the power to add an additional sentence; and, thirdly, the power to impose the same kinds of prison sanctions as a prison governor can impose.
However, getting an unwilling and often disruptive offender to court is by no means straightforward, and it inevitably causes a delay to the sentencing hearing for the following reasons. At the outset, the judge will have to hear submissions from prosecution and defence counsel, as well as possibly from the prison and escort staff, as to whether the offender has a reasonable excuse for non-attendance and, if not, whether to exercise these new statutory powers. Then the judge will need to give a ruling, giving reasons as to why, in the circumstances of that particular case, it would be necessary, reasonable and proportionate to use reasonable force to get the offender to court.
Then the prison and transport staff will have to go and get the prisoner from the place, whether it is a prison or a court cell, which they are refusing to leave. The prison and transport staff will then have to use their judgment as to how best to execute the judge’s ruling, including what degree of force to use. Finally, if the offender is forced into court and is then disruptive, this is likely to cause more delay while the judge decides what to do next.
There is probably one thing we can all agree on: the criminal courts do not need any additional delays. Judges will need to weigh up carefully whether and when to use their new powers. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the question of the inherent powers that courts already have. Both the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts have inherent powers to deal with a non-attendance as a contempt of court, but these are used sparingly because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out very powerfully, it is far from straightforward.
For these reasons, the Government’s view is that this new legislation is appropriately restricted to Crown Court sentencing. It represents a reasonable and proportionate response to the problem, because it is the Crown Court where these powers are needed. Operational arrangements are already in place for producing the most serious and violent offenders at the Crown Court, managing the risks that that involves and, where necessary, using proportionate force. So, for these reasons, we consider that expanding the power to magistrates’ courts might create legal and operational uncertainty and unnecessary delay to court proceedings. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to the debate, and indeed the observations with regard to the timing of any extension of these powers.
I would observe, with respect to the submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that if these provisions help victims in the Crown Court, it is not clear why they would not help victims in magistrates’ courts.
The Minister talked at length of the difficulty of implementation with regard to these provisions, but that would apply equally in the Crown Court and the magistrates’ courts. Indeed, the appearance of serious offenders in the magistrates’ courts will of course be an immediate development with the changes under the Sentencing Act, which extend the sentencing powers of magistrates to three years.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 3, 4, 8 and 9, once again in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seek to give a victim or a bereaved family a defined role in the process of ordering someone to attend their sentencing hearing.
Victims have been at the forefront of this measure. It is precisely because an offender’s refusal to attend sentencing can compound the trauma for victims that we are giving judges an express power to order attendance, building on the judge’s existing common-law powers. Whether to order attendance must remain a judicial assessment of what is in the interests of justice. It will be made case by case, with the judge retaining the ultimate discretion having considered all the circumstances.
As I said when responding to the previous group, we anticipate that judges who are considering making an attendance order will hear submissions from both prosecution and defence. Prosecuting counsel will inevitably be expected to advance the views of the victim and the family, having sought them beforehand and having asked them; I can tell the Committee from my own experience that if they have not spoken to the victim or the victim’s family, the judge is likely to tell them to go away and do so—so it happens now. If there is no victim personal statement, the judge will, in my experience, inevitably say, “Why isn’t there one? Does the victim want to make one?” I can tell the Committee, again from my own experience, that the views of victims and their families are given great weight by the judge.
That said, we are anxious not to create unrealistic expectations in the minds of victims or their families that they would have the right to require the offender’s attendance at court. That could lead to some difficult experiences for victims and their families. What if, for example, the judge were to find that the offender had a reasonable excuse for non-attendance but the family of the victim disagreed? Plainly, the judge’s decision would have to prevail, but at what cost to the family if they had believed that they had the right to require attendance? We do not want to make sentencing hearings any more stressful or distressing for victims than they already are.
Judges must have the discretion to do what is right based on the facts in front of them and the submissions that they hear. There will be cases where it is not in the best interests of victims or families for the offender to be in court, including the occasions—thankfully rare—when the offender is likely to be disruptive or disrespectful and cause further distress.
To place a statutory duty on the court to consult a victim whenever an order is not made risks creating additional delay at the point of sentence. What, for example, if the victim’s family have chosen not to attend court, yet there is a mandatory statutory duty upon the judge to find out and consult them? As I have already said, the one thing that the Crown Courts do not need is any additional delay. In addition, such a statutory requirement risks placing an additional unnecessary emotional burden on victims and families.
The Bill preserves judicial discretion. We expect judges to take account of all relevant circumstances, including victims’ interests, and we are confident that they will do so because that is what they already do. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who contributed to this short but thoughtful debate, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. This debate has underlined how crucial these provisions are to the overall purpose of the Bill, why they warrant close attention and the balance that may have to be struck. We must, of course, get this right.
The Bill was brought forward with the express purpose of strengthening victims’ rights and improving their experience of the criminal justice system. But, as drafted, if we are not careful, victims will remain on the sidelines of a key decision-making process: whether an order should be made to compel an offender to attend their sentencing hearing. If the Bill does not allow victims to make explicit requests for compelled attendance then it will fall short of its own purpose and logic.
Notwithstanding the Minister’s assurance as to what happens in practice so far as the CPS is concerned—or happened when she was sitting in the Crown Court—surely it should be made obligatory for the CPS to ask the victim whether they wish the defendant to be compelled to attend and, if in receipt of a positive answer, to pass that view to the court. It will then be for the judge.
The current position is that judges have discretion to use their powers to compel attendance, even without a request from the prosecution, but we suggest that it is not clear when judges would exercise that power. We look to Ministers to confirm that—whether from them or, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has pressed for, from the judiciary—there should be guidance as to the exercise of the powers. We would also be grateful if the Minister would outline the reasoning behind why these orders are not automatic in the event of non-attendance and when reasonable force can be safely administered.
Our amendments offer a simple and straightforward improvement. They would have ensured that victims could make such requests and are consulted where the court is minded not to make a compulsory order, regardless of whether they had made the request. Sentencing hearings are often the final opportunity for victims to be heard and to feel that they are heard, so why would we deprive them of a say in decisions that directly shape that experience? Victims’ voices must be embedded in the process; they should not be treated as merely passive observers.
We have also observed that where a victim has died or is incapacitated, the system must not simply move on without them. Family members or appropriate representatives should be consulted in their place. We hope the Minister will carefully reflect on the points raised today to help fulfil the Bill’s stated purpose and fill what I am sure are unintentional gaps in its drafting. We look forward to hearing how the Government intend to move forward in due course but, for the moment, we will not press these amendments.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start by reassuring your Lordships’ House that an attendance order can be made in respect of all offenders, including children. Most children are not tried in the Crown Court; they are tried in the youth court, even for serious offences. It is very rare for children of this age to appear in the Crown Court. If they do, an attendance order for their sentencing hearing can be made. The only difference is that force will not be used to get those children to court. The reason is that current operational policy, informed by the Taylor review of 2020, restricts the use of force on children. Domestic policy is also informed by the UK Government’s signatory status to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. We have committed to complying with its duties under the convention. During the debate a week ago in your Lordships’ House on the age of criminal responsibility, I said that this Government recognise that children in the youth justice system can be some of our most vulnerable citizens. Many of them are themselves victims of neglect and abuse, at the very least, and there is a disproportionate occurrence of special educational needs and neurodivergence in this cohort.
While we acknowledge that some children have committed very serious crimes for which they must be punished, this Government do not treat them merely as small adults. We have devised a separate but related regime for them. Where a child fails to attend court, or is disruptive once there, that may be treated as a contempt of court, but the maximum penalty is a fine, with the court taking into account limited means and making relevant arrangements for younger children. Lowering the threshold from 18 to 16 would cut across that safeguarding architecture. The Government’s view is that the strongest coercive path should be reserved for adults, where the legal, operational and ethical framework properly supports their use. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendments.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their measured observations on these proposed amendments. There is broad agreement across the House that attendance at sentencing is about accountability, about dignity for victims and about respect for the court. Refusal to attend sentencing has rightly been described by Ministers as a final insult to victims and families. The question before the House, then, is not whether the principle is right but to whom it should be applied.
These provisions are about ensuring that offenders confront the consequences of their actions, allowing victims to see justice done and hear sentencing remarks. They also uphold the authority and integrity of the court.
We are dealing with a situation in which 16 and 17 year-olds find themselves prosecuted in the Crown Court for serious offences, including murder, in respect of which they receive long custodial sentences. A 16 year-old can be convicted of murder or serious violence; that same 16 year-old would face no statutory obligation to attend their own sentencing hearing. Accountability cannot logically begin at conviction, however, and then disappear at sentencing. From a victim’s perspective, the same harm emerges regardless of whether an offender is 16, 17 or 18 years of age. The distress caused when an offender refuses to attend sentencing does not diminish by virtue of their age.
There is also the wider policy context that I mentioned before, which is that we now treat 16 year-olds, in essence, as adults in respect both of the proposal that they should be able to vote and of the fact that they can marry and can join the Armed Forces, and in respect of their wider social and political autonomy.
These amendments do not impact on the youth justice system. They do not remove judicial discretion. The courts will always retain discretion and take account of the welfare, capacity and safeguarding of 16 year-olds. In these circumstances, it respectfully appears to us that this proposal does not undermine Clauses 1 and 2, but rather seeks to strengthen them for the benefit of victims: someone whose conduct is serious enough to warrant Crown Court sentencing should not be shielded from accountability at the point of sentencing. But, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the Government understand that the aim of this group of amendments is to ensure that the children, who are at the heart of these cases, are protected. We share that objective, but these amendments may cause more problems than they are intended to solve. The amendments are all intended to be made to legislation, either proposed or already enacted, which deals with slightly different situations—convictions for certain serious sexual offences, children conceived as a result of rape and where one parent has been convicted of the murder of the other. However, all these pieces of proposed or enacted legislation have one thing in common. They are not intended to be additional punishments or to replicate—far less, replace—the experience and expertise of the family court. They are intended to protect children who are caught up in these very serious situations as quickly as possible.
In each of these three situations, the Government have identified issues in which the crime for which the relevant person has been sentenced is so serious, with them usually serving a long prison sentence, that it is relatively straightforward to conclude that a prohibited steps order will be in the best interests of the child. These proposals allow the Crown Court judge automatically to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility at the time of sentence. At the moment, following sentence the remaining parent must apply to the family court to do the same thing, but this inevitably takes time and causes distress.
It is known that some perpetrators use their parental responsibility to continue to exercise control, even though they are behind bars. In relation to a parent serving a life sentence for the murder of the other parent, it is axiomatic that there will be no other parent to make the application. What this legislation does not do is automatically restrict the exercise of parental responsibility in all cases forever. The defendant who has had it restricted can apply to the family court to have it restored. It does put the onus on them to do so. These provisions merely provide a quick and convenient method of protecting children and victims. However, restricting the exercise of parental responsibility is an extremely serious thing to do. For this reason, the Government must give serious consideration to how to balance the competing principles that are involved.
Against this background, I turn to Amendments 13, 14, 15, 19, 22 and 27, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie. They seek to broaden the offences that are within the scope of this measure and reduce the minimum sentencing threshold from four years. The Government believe that any individual who poses a serious risk to children should not be able to exercise their parental responsibility. For the avoidance of doubt, I make it clear that the Government’s view is that parents do not have rights. The only rights are those of the child.
However, to create a power allowing the automatic restriction at the point of sentence, we must be sure that to do so would be in the best interest of the child. That is why we have set the threshold at sentences of four years’ imprisonment. In our judgment, if the behaviour of the defendant is sufficiently serious to warrant a sentence of four years or more, it is safe to assume that it would be right to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility. We have set it at four years because this is already a threshold for seriousness used for other purposes in criminal sentencing. For certain offences, including sexual offences, an offender who is sentenced to four or more years serves two-thirds rather than a half of their sentence in prison. It already recognises the particular seriousness.
This pre-existing legislative provision is why we have chosen four years as the indicator of seriousness. If we were to lower the four-year threshold, we could risk moving away from where we can be sure that restricting the exercise of parental responsibility will always be in the best interests of a child into territory where it is less clear. Equally, we must ensure that these measures are not in contravention of a person’s human rights. In particular, we need to ensure that any interference with a person’s right to private and family life under Article 8 of the European convention is a justifiable and proportionate way of achieving a legitimate aim. We have set the threshold at four years for serious child sexual offences as we are of the view that, given the risk of harm to children, this intervention is justified.
That is not to say that the parental responsibility of offenders who have committed sexual offences, whether against their own child or someone else’s, but have received a sentence of less than four years, cannot be restricted. In those cases, an application can still be made to the family court, which is best placed to consider all circumstances, including what is in the best interests of the child.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, raised a number of issues about shortcomings in the family court. With the greatest of respect to her, this is perhaps not the time and place to expand on those, though they are of course serious points. As I think the noble Baroness knows, I have responsibility for family justice policy within my department, so these are issues that perhaps she and I can discuss on another occasion.
When we met, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, asked about appeals, and it has been raised again today. I promised him a reply. In cases where there is a successful appeal and an offender is acquitted or the sentence is reduced below four years, the Bill provides a clear process for the review of the prohibited steps order. The relevant local authority will be under a duty to make an application within a very short time to the family court, so that the family court can consider, exercising its expertise and experience, whether the prohibited steps order imposed by the Crown Court should be varied or discharged.
I turn now to Amendment 27 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston. The offence of having sexual communications with a child carries a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment, so this could not be added to the list unless the requirement of a four-year minimum sentence were removed.
I turn now to Amendment 34 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and to which the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, put her name and has spoken. This would expand Jade’s law, which provides for the automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility in cases where one parent kills the other. The noble Lord and the noble Baroness wish to amend the legislation so that it includes cases of attempted murder. I am grateful for being told that that was at the suggestion of the Victims’ Commissioner, Claire Waxman, for whom I have the utmost respect.
I entirely recognise that, in order to be convicted of attempted murder, what the defendant has done will have been truly horrific—after all, a defendant can be convicted of this only if they had the intention actually to kill—and nothing I say is intended to minimise that. But I repeat what I said earlier. The automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility is not intended to punish the defendant, far less to act as a mark of societal disapproval. It is about children. I repeat that Parliament must be satisfied that restricting the exercise of parental responsibility will be in a child’s best interests.
The sad but determining factor in these killing cases is that the child is going to have only one parent left, and that parent will usually be serving a life sentence. There is no other comparable situation. Where the defendant did not succeed in murdering the other parent, although they intended to do so, they will usually be serving a long sentence, but there will be a surviving parent. In most cases, the surviving parent will be able to make an application to the family court if one is felt necessary. This lessens the need for an automatic referral to the family court.
It would also be difficult to justify why, if attempted murder were included, other serious criminal offences such as Section 18 wounding, which also carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, were not. Your Lordships should also be aware that adding a further measure into Jade’s law at this point will risk delaying its implementation, which has already taken a lot longer than the Government would have wished.
I have been asked for the reasons for that, and I will give them as quickly as I am able to. It is a complicated situation, but this is a unique piece of legislation. There is no existing process that we can import or learn from. There has been significant engagement with various partners that will be involved in the delivery of Jade’s law: local authorities; the Crown Prosecution Service; the National Police Chiefs’ Council; and His Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service. The Government also have to make changes to criminal and family procedure rules, and we also have to develop broader guidance for practitioners and families. But we are on it. We must bring Jade’s law into force as soon as possible to protect the children who need it most. We must be cautious about doing anything at this stage that could extend this process.
As with the measures we are bringing in through this Bill, officials are developing a robust system to measure how Jade’s law works in practice. We want to understand how it works in practice, and from there we can properly consider whether other changes can be made to it. For all these reasons, I invite your Lordships not to press these amendments.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
If I understood my noble friend correctly, the protected steps order can be made only if Clause 3 is activated, and there is no discretion in the Crown Court to make a prohibited steps order in other circumstances, particularly where the offence did not, as drafted, carry a four-year imprisonment. In fact, I think my noble friend then said that parents can apply to the family court for the protected steps order. I find that rather awkward. Surely, when the Crown Court has all the facts in front of it and is in a position, therefore, to make a prohibited steps order, it should do so because it has the necessary knowledge. Of course, the prohibited steps order could be adjusted in a separate application to the family court.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The short answer to my noble friend’s question is that he is right: there is no discretion. The reason that there is no discretion is because, in fact, the Crown Court is the one court that does not have all the experience and all the knowledge—it will not have Cafcass reports or anything like that. It is simply making an automatic order when there is a certain level of seriousness that has been reached. It is for the family court to consider all the important factors in other cases about whether such an order is in the interests of the child. The Crown Court judge does not have the expertise, and it will cause delay. I have said it once before today—I may have already said it twice—the one thing the criminal courts do not need is any further delays.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken during this debate. As I said right at the start, we are looking at the entire spectrum of time as to where the responsibility for imposing these orders should start and stop, and that is anywhere between any child sexual offence and a sentence of four years.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for his comments about parental rights and responsibilities. I absolutely understand that. I am sure he also understands that, to the other parent, it often feels as though the convicted parent has more rights than their children. That is where the problems lie, and that is why there is such passion about this among those parents who are trying to make sure that their children are protected. I am also grateful to him for highlighting the data. It is important for us to remember that around 1,000 children might possibly be at risk if this goes wrong.
Just before I respond to the Minister, I want to thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. Yes, the court system is starved of resources. I want to go further than he does. It is not just about looking at resources; it is about a clear plan to increase resources and ensure that duplication and anything else does not happen. But we know the court system is under real pressure, and I say to the Minister that I recognise, in the amendment that I have table, that the last thing that we would want to do is to impose further burdens on an already difficult area.
I completely understand that the Government have to balance their competing restrictions. The problem is that those of us who have tabled amendments say that four years is not the safety net that the Minister alluded to; it is too high. I wondered whether there might be any way to provide guidance to the family court that asks it to look very clearly at any child sexual offence, even if it is not a four-year sentence, so that the Crown Court is not burdened with the responsibilities of looking at it in the way that the family court would.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions that have been made. I shall begin with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, in his amendments, which seek to clarify what is meant by, for example, the “relevant local authority” in this Bill, as well as to put extra provisions in place concerning parental responsibility. We support the aim behind Amendment 17 that others with parental responsibility for the child in question are properly and, indeed, promptly informed if a prohibited steps order is made against an offender. These are clearly well-intentioned amendments that highlight that certain aspects of the Bill need to be thought through a little more carefully and clarified. I hope that the Minister will provide assurances about how that can be achieved.
I also thank my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth for bringing forward his amendments, which would allow the Crime Court to take into account not only the interests of justice but the best interests of the child when deciding whether to make a prohibited steps order. On these amendments, we are not at this stage able to adopt a settled position. That is not because the underlying principle is unsound, but because further clarification is required from the Minister. As drafted, one of the exemptions to the making of a prohibited steps order is where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so, but that, as has been observed, is a broad and somewhat opaque formulation. We would be grateful if the Minister could explain what circumstances the Government envisage falling within that exemption. In particular, can the Minister offer examples of cases in which it would genuinely be in the interests of justice for a child to remain under the parental responsibility of an individual convicted of a serious sexual offence and sentenced to more than four years’ imprisonment?
These amendments would add an explicit reference to the best interests of the child. That is a familiar concept in family law, but its interaction with the existing exemption is not at all clear. I invite the Minister to clarify whether the Government consider that the child’s best interests are already subsumed within the interests of justice, or whether this amendment would materially alter the test applied by the court.
Amendments 18, 20, 24, 30, 31 and 32 in my name reflect our concerns about the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. As drafted, both clauses state that a prohibited steps order against an offender that restricts their parental responsibility will not immediately cease to have effect if an offender is acquitted on appeal. Instead, both clauses include sections that set out a review process whereby the relevant local authority must make an application to the court for the acquitted offender. That is hardly consistent with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to as a short, speedy and summary order in circumstances where there is a successful appeal.
The clauses as drafted unnecessarily complicate and confuse the issue. The law should be clear that an acquittal brings the prohibited steps order to an end. People who are found to be not guilty of an offence should not have their parental responsibility, or indeed any other rights, restricted, even on a temporary basis. That principle is straightforward and our amendments seek only to ensure that the legislation reflects that clarity. I hope that will have the support of the House, and I urge the Minister to reconsider and simplify the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. There is no compelling reason why these review orders should be left in place for innocent citizens and then be the subject of applications by a local authority on their behalf to another division of the court.
Amendment 18 is tabled to affirm our support for the provision of Clause 3 that, where an offender only has their sentence reduced, a prohibited steps order should continue to apply. We on these Benches already have reservations over why an offender’s length of imprisonment or detention must be four years or more for parental responsibility to be restricted. I note that the amendment made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, refers to a period of six months rather than four years. Clearly, there is scope for consideration as to where the line might be drawn as a matter of policy. If a sentence of four years is reduced on appeal, we do not believe that this should result in a prohibited steps order ceasing to have effect. It is quite unlike the situation where there is an acquittal on appeal. Such an outcome could create significant uncertainty for the child for whom the offender previously had parental responsibility. Crucially, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the offender remains guilty of a serious sexual offence against the child regardless of any adjustment in the sentence. An increased risk to the child’s safety or well-being could well emerge from such a situation.
There is also the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, about what happens in circumstances where a sentence is increased under the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. I invite the Government to address that point because clearly it has not been considered in the context of the present drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. For these reasons, I hope the Government will take all these amendments very seriously and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start by repeating what I said in the debate about an earlier group. A prohibited steps order is not intended to be an additional punishment; rather, it is a tool devised to protect children. The aim of keeping the child safe and doing what is best for them is the central factor in every case. As I have already said, these powers are not intended to replicate, far less replace, the powers of the family court. Crown Court judges are simply not trained to make decisions about children, and they do not have the time to do so. The point has been made most powerfully by both the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. To ask the Crown Court to replicate the procedures of the family court could lead only to more time being needed to consider every case. As I have now said on at least three occasions today, the one thing the Crown Courts do not need is for cases to take longer.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
Jade’s law was brought in specifically to prevent victims having to immediately go to the family courts. Why have things changed since that principle emerged in the Victims and Prisoners Act?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
As far as the Jade’s law situation is concerned, it remains the case that it will be dealt with automatically.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
If the principle stands, why is that not also true when an offender has committed a sexual offence of a certain bar?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
We might be slightly at cross-purposes here. The question is whether the Crown Courts have the ability to consider what is in the best interests of the child rather than automatically making the order when the threshold is reached. That is the difference. As I say, the point has been made most powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. The Crown Court is simply not equipped to go that extra mile of starting to look at things like reports from experts as to what is in the best interests of the child.
I turn to Amendments 18, 20, 24, 30, 31 and 32 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. The aim of these is to ensure that a prohibited steps order made under Clauses 3 or 4 would cease to have an effect if the offender was acquitted on appeal. I repeat what I have said. This is not a punishment; it is designed to protect the child. The measures require that, following an acquittal, the relevant local authority must, in very short order, bring an application before the family court to consider whether the prohibited steps order should be upheld, varied or discharged. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, mentioned an innocent parent. This is not about the rights of parents; it is about the rights of children and protecting them. It is not a punishment and therefore it is not something that should be automatically swept away on acquittal.
We recognise the need for a quick resolution in these situations, which is why both clauses state that the application must be made by the local authority within 30 days of the acquittal. This process brings the consideration of the child’s best interests and their potentially very complex family dynamics to the correct forum, which is the family court. It will mean that in every case a judge will undertake a review of all the circumstances, including whether the original prohibited steps order has already been varied by the family court while the appeal was under consideration, or whether other related orders are in place, before deciding what should happen in the best interests of the child. The family court is the right place for this to happen because that puts the interests of the child front and centre, where they should be.
I turn to Amendments 17, 21, 23, 26 and 29 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Meston. I think we can all agree that it is vital to have clear processes for identifying the offender’s children, notifying other parental responsibility holders of a prohibited steps order, and making the victims of a rape aware when the court has made an automatic order, but the Government’s view is that primary legislation is not the best way of doing this. These matters are better suited to being addressed in guidance, where we can work closely with those responsible for delivering it to ensure that we have a process that works in practice. We do not want a system that ties practitioners to an approach that cannot evolve with their own processes and where every time we want to make a change we have to come back and amend the primary legislation.
By way of example, we are not using primary legislation to prescribe the processes as we are working to implement Jade’s law. Instead, work is taking place across government—I ran through some of the things that we are doing earlier in relation to the previous debate—and with partners to develop a process that is clear and practical and that delivers the spirit of the aims of the amendment. In the case of these provisions, we will ensure that all relevant parties, including all other parental responsibility holders, are kept informed at each stage. We will take lessons from Jade’s law when this is implemented and, where possible, work with our partners to apply the same processes here. This will allow for consistency across all legislation in this space, rather than multiple processes for the same aim, which could lead to confusion and inconsistency in application. I warmly invite your Lordships to work with the Government to make sure that we get this right. I am more than happy to meet any of your Lordships who would like to discuss those matters with me, both in my capacity as Lords Minister and as Minister responsible for family justice policy.
In relation to identifying the children of offenders, this Government have separately committed to developing a mechanism to identify children who are affected by parental imprisonment to make it easier to provide support to them. I can assure your Lordships that the Ministry of Justice is working closely with the Department for Education to determine how we can best identify all children affected and ensure that they get support to enable them to thrive, but to legislate only for children in the scope of this measure risks distracting from the broader work intended to support all children.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 35, standing in both my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, would insert a new clause into the Bill to extend the safeguarding framework in Clause 3 beyond serious sexual offending so that it also applied to those convicted of the most serious child cruelty offences. In effect, it would mirror Clause 3.
Before I address the amendment in detail, I want to place on record my thanks to Helen Grant, Member of Parliament, for her tireless work on this issue. Over a number of years and across several Bills, she has consistently drawn Parliament’s attention to a clear and troubling gap in our safeguarding framework—that is, the absence of a coherent, systematic response to the most serious forms of child cruelty. Her campaigns for a child cruelty register and her persistence in ensuring that these issues remain firmly on the parliamentary agenda are no doubt something that all noble Lords can both respect and support.
Clause 3 introduces an important and welcome provision for the protection of children. The logic is compelling: where conduct is so grave that it demonstrates a fundamental incompatibility with the exercise of parental responsibility, there should be an automatic safeguarding mechanism. Amendment 35 asks a simple but profound question: why should that logic apply only to sexual offences and not to other, most serious forms of child cruelty?
The new clause proposed by the amendment would mirror the architecture of Clause 3 in many ways. It would introduce a duty on the Crown Court to make a prohibited steps order where an offender with parental responsibility was convicted and sentenced for a defined list of serious child cruelty offences. The threshold for such offences would be a custodial sentence of two years or more. We suggest that that is an appropriate balance between protection and practicability.
These offences have been carefully selected and reflect those on Helen Grant’s proposed child cruelty register, for which the Government have previously expressed support. They embrace serious crimes such as causing or allowing the death or serious harm of a child, child cruelty and neglect, infanticide, certain offences under the Offences Against the Person Act where the victim is a child, and offences relating to female genital mutilation, FGM. During the Crime and Policing Bill, the noble Baroness said,
“Ministers will continue to pursue this issue with vigour”.—[Official Report, 20/1/26; col. 250.].
The offences set out in this amendment strike at the very heart of a child’s safety and well-being. It is only right that a prohibited steps order be imposed.
If the Government truly believe in acting to prevent child cruelty, then to reject this amendment would be to defend an inconsistency in the current framework which we say is difficult to justify. A parent convicted of a serious sexual offence might automatically be prevented from exercising parental responsibility, while a parent convicted of causing severe physical harm or life-threatening neglect may not be. From the child’s perspective, that distinction is artificial. The harm is real, the risk is real and the need for safeguarding is just as acute. This amendment does not undermine family life unnecessarily. It does not sever parental responsibility permanently. It simply ensures that in the most serious cases, no steps may be taken by the offender without the oversight and consent of the family courts. They are best placed to make decisions concerning welfare and long-term outcomes. The amendment would bring coherence to the Bill and align it with the broader safeguarding principles that Parliament has repeatedly endorsed.
This amendment is motivated by a simple proposition. Children who have suffered the most serious forms of cruelty deserve the same automatic safeguarding protections as those who have suffered serious sexual abuse. I commend this amendment to the Committee and urge the Government to engage constructively with it, in the same spirit in which Clause 3 itself was conceived. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, the automatic restriction of a person’s parental responsibility is a novel change to the law and must be done in a responsible and proportionate manner. The Government want to understand how these new measures operate in practice before we consider expanding the scope to other offences. We will carefully monitor how the provision operates once it is implemented and, as part of that implementation, officials will develop a system to help us understand the impact the measures are having, how the measures work in practice and how we can make improvements. For cases not in scope of the measure, whether that is because they fall outside the four-year threshold that has previously been debated or because they involve different crimes such as child cruelty, there are existing routes available in the family courts to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility. It is our evaluation that it is right that children are protected in that way while we evaluate the effect of the measures in the Bill. For these reasons I invite the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I find that an interesting reply. No reasons are given other than that this is novel. The provisions in Clause 3 are themselves novel, and all we ask is that where a serious offence of cruelty has been committed in respect of a child, that should be sufficient reason to adopt the same approach as that taken with sexual assault. What is the difference in practice for the child between being sexually assaulted and suffering cruelty? Having said that, we hear what is said and will engage with the Minister between now and Report, but we will wish to consider the position on Report.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord has just used the phrase “common sense”, and I think that that is what is expected by people who are affected, who know that they could look to consular services for help if they have lost a passport, but not in such a difficult situation as this. I simply say—and this is not addressed to the noble Baroness but possibly to some of her colleagues—that over the period that we have discussed this issue, there has almost been a sense of, “That’s the Foreign Office, it’s not us”. If we could get this into the victims’ code, it might mean a duty on the FCDO to be prepared to be more effective, and actually to be more effective.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 36 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to add agreements entered into by the National Crime Agency, the NCA, to the list of agreements in new subsection (7) that are exempt from the measure. Non-disclosure agreements, or NDAs, should not be used to silence victims or cover up crime: I think we can all agree on that. New subsections (7) and (8) of Clause 6 provide that the provision will not apply to a narrow cohort of specified agreements, in the interests of national security.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister for everything she said. Early on, she said that the problem is that the victims’ code is not always applicable abroad. Can she comment on proposed new subsection (2) in the amendment, which talks specifically about the Secretary of State by regulation issuing an appendix to the victims’ code, setting out how the code applies to these victims? It is understood, from our side, that it would be different.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this point. Our current position is that we do not believe that that is necessary, but I am happy to meet her and get her to try to persuade me why I am wrong and she is right—there is my challenge to the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Finlay.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
The FCDO has a duty of care and a responsibility for UK citizens when they are in whichever country. It does not seem too bizarre or extreme to hope that it would accept a degree of responsibility for the very small number of unfortunate victims who, for whatever reason, are unlawfully killed in the course of a year. For the FCDO to accept that that is part of its responsibility—a very small part, albeit an important one—and to prepare itself thoroughly enough to be able to fulfil that duty in a professional, proper and sensitive way in the unhappy event that it is required does not seem too much to ask.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Russell, puts it very persuasively and it is extremely tempting, particularly given that I do not speak for the FCDO, to say that it sounds utterly reasonable. However, I am sure he will understand why I cannot give that kind of commitment from the Dispatch Box, but I can commit to meeting and discussing this further.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
Forgive me for interrupting again on this issue. Can the Minister undertake to discuss with the FCDO the concept that each embassy or consulate has one named lead person for when it experiences managing one of these tragic situations, and that it is handed over to another named person when they leave? They could also come together as a group to provide support for, and learn from, each other, and compare where particular difficulties have occurred so that, over the years, the training can improve for each of these people. The worry at the moment is that these cases are so unusual in some places that it is a once-in-a-lifetime experience for some of the staff.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
Again, the noble Baroness puts it very persuasively and, listening to her now, it all seems to make total sense. If, as a Government, we are committed to supporting victims of crime and putting them front and centre, that does not stop at our borders. However, I do not think that I can give an answer today and it would not be right to do so. I will commit to meeting the noble Baroness and seeing whether I can find out from the FCDO at least what its approach would be to such a suggestion. If she would put it in writing to me I could then pass it on so that we can try to take matters further.
Amendment 47A, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to add victims of persistent but non-criminal anti-social behaviour to the definition of a victim, as set out in Section 1 of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. The Government agree that anti-social behaviour is a blight on our communities and its impact should never be underestimated. We have committed to provide better support and information to victims of anti-social behaviour and have taken significant steps to do so. This includes the measures in this Bill that will strengthen the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers to hold the agencies that support anti-social behaviour victims to account.
Where anti-social behaviour amounts to criminal conduct, such as criminal damage, victims will benefit from the rights and entitlements within the victims’ code. However, expanding the definition of a victim to bring those affected by non-criminal anti-social behaviour within the code would, in our view, not be appropriate, as it is not an effective or efficient response to this kind of the behaviour. For example, in our view, it would be neither appropriate nor necessary for a victim of a neighbour who is playing loud music on one occasion to be brought within the scope of the victims’ code. Doing so could create unrealistic expectations and divert attention and resources from those experiencing serious criminal harm, such as victims of child sexual abuse.
In our view, there are better routes available to help these victims, including the anti-social behaviour case review, which gives the victims of persistent behaviour the right to request a multi-agency review to secure a resolution. In the proposals for the new victims’ code, on which we are currently consulting, we have clarified what victims of criminal anti-social behaviour can expect from the code and provided information about the case review process. I would welcome your Lordships’ responses to the consultation to outline in detail what further provision would be required for these victims.
On Amendment 47B, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, my noble friend Lord Bach and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I begin by acknowledging the problems brought by our current inability reliably to identify the same victim or witness across the criminal justice system. We accept that this results in duplication of records, slows the flow of information and leads to inconsistent data across the agencies. In addition, this fragmentation places a significant administrative burden on staff, who must reconcile records manually and then chase the missing information. However, perhaps most importantly, it means that victims and witnesses are sometimes provided with conflicting information, which can cause confusion at best and serious distress at worst.
The Government are already working to address these issues through the cross-criminal justice system data improvement programme, jointly led by the Ministry of Justice and Home Office. This programme aims to strengthen data sharing across the criminal justice system and is actively exploring how individuals, including victims, can be more reliably recognised across agencies. We are clear that improvements to data sharing must be underpinned by robust safeguards to ensure personal data is handled lawfully, securely and proportionately, with a strong focus on minimising unnecessary circulation of sensitive information, which I know is a key concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.
The Government are open to considering legislative options to improve data sharing, data quality and the use of unique identifiers where that is shown to be necessary and proportionate. However, introducing a statutory requirement at this stage, ahead of the completion of the work of the programme, could unintentionally constrain future design and implementation choices, before we are confident it would deliver the intended benefits for victims and the wider criminal justice system. For these reasons, the Government do not believe that primary legislation at this stage is the appropriate mechanism.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
For well over a decade, since the passage of the Children and Families Act 2014, we have been discussing as a House a unique identifying number for children who may end up either in the health system or care system as well as schools. It has taken well over a decade—they are just about to use the NHS number as part of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill. I urge the Minister to have a look at this again; otherwise, we will be here for another 10 years, arguing the same point.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
This Government have not been in power over the whole of the last of the decade, and we are doing our best to look at it. I will certainly look at it and discuss it with her. We are simply saying that, at this stage, we do not think primary legislation is the right way of dealing with it.
Finally, I turn to Amendments 55, 56 and 57, in the names of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who is not in his place, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. Before I do, let me say that I recently had the privilege of meeting with Emma Webber and with Julian Hendy of Hundred Families. They explained very clearly to me the issues as they see them, and it was a very moving experience. I pay tribute to their strength and honour the memories of those they have lost. Their experiences, along with the experiences of all victims of crime, must continue to guide us.
Part of the rationale for providing information to victims is to help them to feel safe and so they can plan for an offender’s eventual release or discharge. That is why the legislation requires that hospital managers provide victims with specified information where appropriate, regardless of any assessment by a hospital manager of the victim’s safety and well-being, because we acknowledge that the hospital manager’s assessment could well be different from the victim’s own assessment.
Where hospital managers receive a request for information from an eligible victim outwith the specified list within the Bill, they will consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to provid it, and this assessment can of course include considering the risk to the victim. Where there are specific concerns about a victim’s safety, there are other, more appropriate processes to be followed. It is important to note that this is not the primary purpose of the victim contact scheme.
Where a decision is made that it is not appropriate to provide some information, reasons can and should be provided wherever possible. However, these should reflect the victim’s communication preferences, and considerations about this would, in our view, be most appropriately set out in operational guidance, which would also provide the necessary flexibility to adjust requirements as we monitor practice.
We agree that victims should have a route for some recourse where information is not provided. There are existing complaint routes for all cohorts, and the Government consider that a more effective way of going about this would be to make sure hospital managers understand and fulfil their obligations to victims at the outset, rather than introducing additional bureaucracy. My officials are working closely with the Department of Health and Social Care to consider routes by which to support hospital managers, including whether a joint departmental protocol, or via planned updates to the Mental Health Act code of practice—statutory guidance under the Mental Health Act 1983—might provide an appropriate vehicle.
In relation to all the amendments in this group and many of the others, we are listening and we want to get it right. We will continue to work with your Lordships and with victims’ groups, but for now I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to this wide-ranging and thoughtful debate on the operation of the victim contact scheme and the wider support network for victims. The debate has demonstrated broad consensus on the principle that victims’ rights and access to information must keep pace with changes in sentencing policy and criminal justice practice. The question is not whether victim engagement matters but whether our current structures are fit for purpose in the systems we now operate.
Several amendments in the group had common concerns: gaps in coverage within the victims’ code and the victim contact scheme; lack of transparency, consistency and accountability in how information is provided; the risk that victims fall through the cracks; and the technical thresholds or institutional boundaries that exist. Taken together, these amendments seek to ensure that victim support is timely, trauma-informed, consistent and capable of scrutiny. The amendments also recognise that, among others, where the state chooses to sentence offenders in the community, it assumes a greater, not a lesser, responsibility to support victims. Victim engagement must be strengthened not weakened in a non-custodial sentencing landscape. I therefore urge the Government to consider carefully how victims are to be protected and informed under current policy. In the meantime, I seek leave to withdraw my amendment.
Victims and Courts Bill
Baroness Levitt ExcerptsMonday 9th February 2026
(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 141-I(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (6 Feb 2026)
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their valuable contributions to this debate and to the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Goudie, for bringing forward the amendments.
Amendment 38 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, proposes a new clause that seeks to place a duty on relevant authorities to commission support services for caregivers of victims of domestic abuse, sexual violence or exploitation. The amendment would ensure that those with responsibility for the victims are not overlooked by the system and have access to the appropriate support. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response as to how the amendment could be delivered and might function in practice.
Amendments 43 and 44 would introduce new clauses concerning restorative justice. These build on the provisions in the Bill, better to enable victims to explain the impact of a crime to the offender and to participate meaningfully in the justice process. Some victims engage with restorative justice services, but such engagement must be voluntary. Victims should not be placed under any pressure to engage further with the offender. None the less, there are findings showing that these services reduce the likelihood of offenders reoffending and can result in other social benefits, including delivering value for money. We on this side are interested to hear from the Minister how the Government will ensure that services such as these are used where it is thought they are likely to be beneficial.
Amendment 45 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, seeks to implement the recommendation of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee that victim navigators be rolled out nationally so that they are available in all cases. In response to that recommendation, the Government stated in December 2024 that they want to build on the research of the previous Government on how best to support victims. In addition, the Government said they had met the NGOs delivering the victim navigator programme to understand its impact and to explore options for expansion. We have also heard an authoritative and persuasive speech from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, who obviously has real hands-on experience in this area. We should listen carefully to what he has to say, and I hope the Minister will speak to him and engage with him.
We look forward to hearing an update from the Minister on what further research has been undertaken and what conclusions the Government have reached since then. I reiterate my thanks to noble Lords for raising these important issues, all of which speak to the purpose of the Bill: to ensure that victims receive the support and services they deserve throughout their journey through the justice system.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
I shall speak first to Amendment 38 in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Hamwee. While entirely understanding the motivation for the amendment, the Government believe that it would be neither necessary nor helpful to place a statutory obligation on certain authorities to commission certain support services for this cohort. In a world of finite resources, that would prioritise provision to third parties.
I reassure the noble Baronesses that the parents and carers of victims of abuse and exploitation can already access support services. The funding that the Ministry of Justice provides to the Rape and Sexual Abuse Support Fund and to police and crime commissioners can be, and is, used to commission specific support services for parents and carers.
Parents and carers will often access services that the victim themselves is accessing, particularly where the victim is a child. Parents and carers of victims of crime can also seek mental health support or other support through local services and the NHS. Having said this, I recognise that more can be done to support this cohort. As part of the violence against women and girls strategy, this Government has committed up to £50 million to transform support for victims of child sexual abuse through expanding the use of child houses. These are incredible places, as anybody who has had a chance to visit the one in London can tell you. They offer vital wraparound support to non-abusing parents and carers in one physical location. In addition, the Ministry of Justice has founded the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse to develop an online directory of support services for those affected by child sexual abuse. This can be easily navigated to identify services for parents and carers and other affected adults.
I turn now to Amendments 43 and 44 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton, Lady Jones and Lady Hamwee. This Government recognise the positive impact that restorative justice can have in appropriate cases and are very grateful to the restorative justice providers who continue to offer this important service. We agree that when delivered in the right circumstances restorative justice can improve victim satisfaction, reduce reoffending and bring benefits to victims, offenders and their communities. Under the current victims’ code, victims must be told about restorative justice services when reporting a crime, but we have been told that this may be too early—we are listening— and that is why under the new code consultation launched last week we are retaining this but have proposed an additional entitlement for the victim to be told about restorative justice again after an offender has been convicted. We look forward to engaging stakeholders during the code consultation.
Where services are available and victims and offenders are willing, referrals are already made, and that is supported through PCC-funded local services alongside our facilitation of restorative justice across prisons and probation. However, placing referral to restorative justice for all victims on a statutory footing, in our view, is neither necessary nor appropriate. Restorative justice self-evidently requires the consent and participation of both parties and the safety and welfare of those involved is paramount. Automatic referral is therefore not always suitable. For example, a victim of stalking who has fought tooth and nail to end all contact might understandably see the offer of restorative justice as, at best, insensitive and, at worst, a way in which the perpetrator in their case could continue their campaign.
The Government already monitor delivery. PCCs submit biannual reports as part of the MoJ grant management process, providing insight into victim support services, including restorative justice. Many PCC police and crime plans also set out clear commitments to supporting restorative justice. In our view, introducing a further national assessment would simply duplicate these existing measures. As we prepare for upcoming changes to the PCC commissioning model, we will explore changes to the delivery of victims’ funding, including restorative justice, to ensure that this is delivered in the best way in the future while avoiding unnecessary statutory requirements. For these reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to not to press her amendments.
I turn now to Amendment 45 in the name of my noble friend Lady Goudie and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. We value the excellent work delivered by Justice and Care through its victim navigator programme. This Government are committed to ensuring that victims of modern slavery and human trafficking are supported to help rebuild their lives and to engage with the criminal justice system to bring those who have exploited them to justice. We recognise the positive impact that tailored support can have on securing victim engagement, and that is why we have already put provision in place across a number of areas important for supporting prosecutions. Adult victims of modern slavery and human trafficking are already supported by the modern slavery victim care contacts in England and Wales. That is where they have access to a dedicated support worker who will support them to help access legal aid, legal advice and legal representation and assistance during criminal proceedings.
The Home Office is also in the process of procuring the new support for victims of modern slavery contract for adults. To support child victims of exploitation and modern slavery, the government-funded independent child trafficking guardian service provides specialist modern slavery support and advocacy, across two-thirds of local authorities in England and Wales, to child victims and professionals who work with them. This includes help for the child to navigate the complexities of the criminal justice system. An invitation to tender for the national contract, which covers all of England and Wales from 2027, is currently live. Because of the existing provision, the Government do not consider it necessary to enact an additional statutory requirement to fund independent victim navigators, as this would duplicate the support services they have already put in place. I hope that, in the light of this, my noble friend will feel able not to press her amendment.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I shall add a couple of very brief points. First, from my own experience, also nearly 20 years ago now when I was a victim of stalking, as were some of my colleagues, I found that the police encouraged me to make a victim statement, but we were advised quite specifically to talk not about what the stalker had done but solely about the effect on us of what he had done: in other words, to completely avoid making any comment about him or his actions. That was quite difficult. I was advised very heavily not to get involved and show how emotional many of us were as a result of his actions, and I chose not to do that at all.
However, I talked last week to Glenn Youens, the father of a four year-old who was killed. He and his family were asked if they wanted to do a victim impact statement, and the police advised them not to use certain language because the court had advised them not to. They were told that bluntness might upset the perpetrator, they could not call him a child killer; they were not allowed any props in court, such as their daughter’s teddy bear; and the CPS advised them not to appeal the unduly lenient sentence, because it might actually make the Attorney-General get less for him in the long run. So, this particular family’s experience of making a statement was the exact opposite of what it was intended to be. While I have some sympathy with some elements of the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, I think I am more with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, on the grounds that we would have to design it so carefully to make sure that a victim is doing it willingly and that they are able to say what they want without jeopardising the court process. I am afraid that that would also mean very strict guidance on the officials helping them not to do so in a way that prevents victims speaking in their own voice.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for talking about what happened to her, because in your Lordships’ House, that kind of personal experience really resonates with all of us. I thank her for that. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for speaking from his experience in the courts. He speaks with a great deal of authority and I know the House has vast respect for him.
Let me start with that with which we all agree: of course I recognise that victim personal statements are a powerful tool for victims and their families to tell the court about the effect that these crimes have had on them. The victim personal statement is also important for the judge when deciding the appropriate sentence. The VPS provides evidence and information which can help the judge in determining the seriousness of the offence as part of the sentencing process, and plainly it is right that victims should have a voice in that. However, it is also right that this must be done fairly. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, that there are limits to what can be said in the VPS, as we cannot have legally irrelevant matters—for example, other behaviour of which the defendant has not been convicted. The judge is not by law allowed to take account of such things.
That said, I too have heard from victims and their families about their concerns about how the VPS process operates in practice. I completely understand how frustrating it must be to be told that they cannot express themselves in the way in which they expected to be able to, or to include all the information which they feel the judge ought to have. We agree that further work is needed to consider how we can make sure that victims fully understand the process, including the value of being able to have their voice heard in the sentencing process, but also an explanation as to why there have to be limitations on this.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for bringing forward their amendments and helping to shape what has been a valuable debate about the issue of just compensation for victims.
Amendment 40, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, raises an important concern about how the victims of fraud, bribery and money laundering offences can be better compensated both domestically and abroad. Indeed, I have heard his arguments on more than one occasion before and never failed to be persuaded by them.
These crimes do not just inflict monetary loss on victims; they often involve sophisticated deception. They can cause significant psychological distress, emotional trauma and lasting insecurity. More widely, they undermine trust in our society, and so deserve the Government’s attention. The Government must look carefully at my noble and learned friend’s suggestions for a review. It could be important and beneficial for the City of London, as a centre of finance of worldwide renown. If we can take the lead on this, that would be an encouragement to people to do business here.
This brings me to Amendment 67, in my name. I should say that a gremlin came in here—and I am not blaming the typist. Where it says:
“Sentencing guidelines on court fines”,
it should of course say compensation orders. The amendment is intended to correct an imbalance for victims. Its purpose is clear: to ensure that victims are compensated properly, according to the actual value of items stolen. This principle would apply in cases of fraud, burglary or theft, and in any other crime which has resulted in a victim suffering financial loss. The responsibility for repayment should be put squarely on the offender through the issuing of compensation orders. It is only right and just that offenders pay back the value of what they have stolen to their victims. There should be a direct link, so that offenders fully face up to the consequences of their actions in a real and logical way.
This measure is simply proportionate. At present, offenders may not be made even to begin to compensate for the damage inflicted, which only adds further insult to injury. To correct this imbalance, the amendment would require the Sentencing Council to revise the relevant sentencing guidelines within 18 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. This would lead to a more consistent approach across cases, and sentencing would recognise and account for the amount actually taken or lost. Justice for victims should be material, not merely symbolic. That would help to strengthen public confidence in our courts. We urge the Minister to give serious consideration to the amendment.
Amendment 46, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and Amendment 47, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, concern the criminal injuries compensation scheme. The former seeks to broaden its eligibility to all victims of child abuse; the latter aims to bring online-only child sexual abuse into the scope of recognition of the scheme. It is important that the scheme keeps apace with the evolving landscape in which criminal activity now takes place. All victims must be properly supported, with access to the appropriate mechanisms for compensation and redress. I look forward to hearing the response of the Minister, on how the scheme can be updated.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
Not at all. I apologise. I waited for the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, to introduce his amendment before I spoke.
I will speak briefly to Amendment 40, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and then to Amendment 67, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. I will say nothing on Amendments 46 and 47 on child sexual abuse, except that I fully support them, for the reasons that have been given.
Amendment 40 is on fraud, bribery and money laundering. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, rightly says that it is not the first time that he has brought this issue before the House or before Parliament. Indeed, he has been a formidable campaigner on the issue for a number of years. On these Benches, we think he is right about it. It is a very difficult area on which to propose legislation in precise or specific terms. With this amendment, he seeks to require a review of the whole area of fraud, bribery and money laundering within the UK and abroad.
The background is the inevitable inadequacy of existing civil proceedings, in this jurisdiction or elsewhere, not only from a jurisdictional point of view but because of the inevitable cost of civil proceedings, the difficulty of valuation and the difficulties of enforcement for the victims of substantial economic crime. They cannot be properly compensated by the existing regime of compensation orders. A review is needed to consider how compensation might be ordered and to consider the principles that are brought into play by complex economic crime for criminal activity here and abroad, and not always just in one jurisdiction but often across countries and in multiple jurisdictions.
The noble and learned Lord highlights our poor record as a country—though rightly he says that we are better than many—in providing compensation for victims of economic offences. He highlights that there may not be just individual or corporate losers; there can also be organisations or states which deserve compensation but for which, presently, our law and the law elsewhere makes no proper provision.
These are difficult issues and there are very difficult issues concerning quantification. The inadequacy of how we fail the victims of overseas corruption and other economic crime amounts, in effect, to our holding our hands up and admitting defeat in the face of those issues. The review for which the noble and learned Lord calls needs to be illuminated and energised by some extremely innovative and imaginative thinking which holds out the prospect of real improvement of the position and accepts that we may not be precise in any award of compensation. A real attempt to provide adequate compensation can be made and should be made.
I am bound to say that I also agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that grasping this issue could enhance the business reputation of London as a centre of economic and business excellence where others have failed in this area.
Amendment 67, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks a review of sentencing guidelines to insist on compensation which is commensurate, they say, with the value of stolen items, although I appreciate that the way the amendment was opened goes wider than cases of theft.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I apologise once again to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for standing up before him a few moments ago.
Amendment 40 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, raises the important issue of compensating victims of economic crime. I really mean it when I say that I am grateful to him for his continued interest in this matter. No one could accuse him of not being consistent. Indeed, he and I are due to meet after the Recess to discuss his amendment further, and I look forward to that.
As the noble and learned Lord knows, I practised at the Bar in the area of economic crime, including fraud and other crimes, and I want to make it clear that the Government take the compensation of victims of economic crime very seriously. It is of critical importance in limiting the harm of these often ruthless and cruel crimes. We are committed to ensuring that, whenever possible, funds are taken from criminals and returned to victims.
As the noble and learned Lord knows, as things currently stand, there are already several mechanisms that enable victims of economic crime to be compensated. For example, the asset recovery powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 already provide the court with the ability to prioritise the payment of compensation orders to victims. Noble Lords may be interested to learn that, where both a compensation order and a confiscation order are imposed but there are not enough funds available to satisfy both, the court may direct that the compensation order be paid out of the confiscation order funds to ensure that victims are prioritised. A total of £47.2 million was paid in compensation to victims from the proceeds of confiscation orders in the financial year ending March 2025. Of course, I acknowledge that we could do better.
In addition, the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 allows applications for stolen crypto assets or funds in accounts to be released to victims at any stage of civil forfeiture proceedings.
Through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, the then Government legislated to require the Payment Systems Regulator to introduce mandatory reimbursement for authorised push payment scams. In the first nine months of the APP reimbursement scheme, 88% of eligible losses were reimbursed, with £112 million returned to victims. This further protects victims and provides incentives for firms to prevent these scams in the first place.
Victims of unauthorised fraud, where payment has been taken without the victim’s permission, are already reimbursed by payment service providers. But we want to go further. The Government recognise the serious financial and emotional impact that fraud can have on victims, which is why we will shortly publish a new fraud strategy that will improve how we safeguard and respond to victims of fraud.
I am of course acutely aware that one of the noble and learned Lord’s major considerations is overseas victims. As far as they are concerned, the Serious Fraud Office, Crown Prosecution Service and National Crime Agency compensation principles have committed law enforcement bodies to ensuring that compensation for overseas victims of economic crime is considered in every relevant case and to using whatever legal mechanisms are available to secure it whenever appropriate.
Internationally, victims’ interests also continue to be a priority issue for the United Kingdom. As a signatory to the UN Convention Against Corruption, the UK places great importance on the recovery and return of the proceeds of corruption to those affected by bribery, embezzlement of public funds, money laundering, trading in influence and other abuses of official functions. The UK is required to return funds where the conditions for mandatory return are met. However, the UK also exercises its discretion to return funds in appropriate cases even when it is not otherwise required to do so.
The noble and learned Lord’s amendment calls for a review, but the Government have already publicly committed to reviewing UK policies and procedures for compensating victims of foreign bribery in the UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025. We look forward to the results of this review, expected in 2027.
In addition, I refer to the Crime and Policing Bill, which will introduce a new measure to redirect funds to victims when a confiscation order is increased if it is identified that the defendant has additional assets with which to satisfy it. The Bill will also reinforce that compensation orders are to be prioritised over confiscation orders.
There are already significant measures in place, and further work is being done to strengthen the rights of victims of economic crime to compensation. I hope that this provides the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, with some reassurance. I look forward to discussing this further with him, but for now I invite him to withdraw his amendment.
I turn now to Amendments 46 and 47 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. This Government share the strength of feeling in this House and in the other place about the importance of supporting the victims of child sexual abuse. The proposed new clauses would implement a recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse about which the previous Government consulted. However, in April last year, the Government announced that we would not take it forward. The reason is that such changes would benefit only victims of child sexual abuse, and that would undermine the scheme’s core principle of universality—in other words, it compensates all seriously injured victims of violent crimes, and the payments are based on the injury suffered rather than the crime type from which they resulted. We are very concerned not to create a hierarchy of victims in which some are seen as more deserving than others. Different support for different violent crimes would imply that some victims are less important than others. It would also put the scheme under more financial pressure. It is taxpayer-funded and is already facing record and increasing demand. However, we agree that the scheme needs reform, and it is our intention to decide how best to support all victims with the resources that we have. We will update Members of both Houses as our work progresses.
Dealing very briefly with Amendment 47 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, I am going to ask him to leave it with me for the time being. I want to give this some further thought. He and I began to discuss it when we met about a week ago. We did not make an awful lot of progress on that occasion, but I would like to talk to him about it further. I know that he has sent me some literature, and I will look at that and consider it further. While I am grateful to the noble Baronesses and the noble Lord for ensuring that we remain focused on the criminal injuries compensation scheme, I ask them not to press their amendments.
Amendment 67 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, would require the revision of sentencing guidelines so that the court would have to award compensation to a victim to the value of the items stolen. When a judge passes a sentence, she or he is already required to consider making a compensation order that requires the offender to make financial reparation to the victim for any personal injury, loss or damage resulting from an offence, and that includes the offences captured by this amendment. Magistrates are subject to the same duty, but for simplicity I am going to refer just to the judge for the rest of my remarks. If the judge decides not to make such an order, she or he must explain why they are not doing so. There is no set amount for compensation, because that would fetter the discretion of the independent judge. The law says that compensation may be ordered for such an amount as the court considers appropriate, having regard to any evidence and any representations made by the offender or the prosecutor. For adult offenders, there is no limit on the value of a single compensation order, and compensation is paid to the victim first before any other financial orders made by the court are satisfied by the offender.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has already powerfully made the point that it is not always a straightforward process to determine the value of the loss. I am not going to repeat that, but I am going to add to the second part of his concerns about this. As part of the process of deciding on the level of compensation, the court must also consider the financial circumstances of the offender, so far as they are known. The reason is to ensure that the offender has sufficient means to pay. This amendment would require the judge to ignore the fact that there may in some cases be absolutely no prospect of the offender being able to pay. This would create a system requiring the authorities to spend time and money chasing people for money that they are never going to be able to pay, in the process causing a cycle of unnecessary harm and emotional distress to victims whose expectations had been raised that they were going to receive compensation for the full amount.
I want to reassure your Lordships that most judges will order the full amount unless the defendant does not have sufficient means. For these reasons, the Government are satisfied that the existing system allows courts to strike an appropriate balance between seeking compensation for the harm caused to victims in a way that is enforceable and ensuring that victims are not left waiting for debts to be paid to them which were always unrealistic. The Sentencing Council has issued explanatory information on compensation which outlines these matters to help sentencers when considering or making compensation orders. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I begin by apologising to noble Lords who had other amendments in the group for not addressing their arguments, but I do not think they needed my assistance. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Sandhurst and to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for their support for my Amendment 40. As has been pointed out, my amendment asks for a review. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that we need to be imaginative and inventive—those were not his precise words, but I think that is the thrust of what he was saying. I suggest that doing nothing, doing a little slowly or patting ourselves on the back for what we might have done in the past are no longer acceptable.
I know that the Minister is sincere in her response. I am also aware of her professional experience, both in private practice and at the Crime Prosecution Service, and I look forward with gratitude to our meeting. I am aware of the terms of the 2002 Act to which she referred, but it does not meet the problem I have identified, as I know from my own professional experience. Furthermore, the provisions of FiSMA are untested, or insufficiently tested in my view, and I am not sure that reliance on that statute answers the problem we have been discussing. The review that the Minister spoke about is not due to report until 2027. Everything is always tomorrow, the week after, the month after or the year after; nothing is ever grabbed now and answered. This is my experience, having spoken about these questions for many years in the past, so I ask the House to forgive me if I come across as cynical.
That said, I look forward to having a positive discussion with the Minister during the Recess.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, my noble friend quoted from a briefing from the Victims’ Commissioner, I think from when she was the London victims’ commissioner, about the costs that have been charged and the costs of transcripts for a whole case—which have perhaps been requested rather than actually charged, for obvious reasons. She also mentioned paperwork. I had this briefing. It refers to a form which some courts are asking bereaved families to fill out, so I had a look at that form. I am appalled. I think it is four pages. The amount of detail requested is so intrusive, and it is unclear to me why that is necessary. Why disclose for this purpose the rent you are paying on a home and all your assets, in a whole number of categories? Does it matter how many Premium Bonds you have? On expenses, there are 14 categories, ranging from council tax to TV licences and anything else you can imagine. I wanted to express that, even though it is late. I will not take longer on it.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has just talked about open justice. It seems sad if the courts we are talking about cannot go in the same direction as other courts. The Lady Chief Justice talks about the work being done to issue press releases to explain the decisions of the courts elsewhere in our justice system.
The noble and learned Lord is looking puzzled, but I am saying that I agree with him—I know that may be unusual, but on this occasion the direction of travel—a horrible phrase—suggests that we should be going much faster than a trial pilot from next spring. That brings me to my question. When is spring for this purpose? We have known that the seasons of the year are somewhat false when it comes to what Governments propose to do.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start with Amendment 41, in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Hamwee. As your Lordships are of course aware, the Government recently announced the expansion of the provision of free transcripts of sentencing remarks to victims whose cases are heard in the Crown Court upon request. That is now contained in the recently passed Sentencing Act 2026. The detail of timeframes and processes for providing these transcripts will be set out in regulations, following a review of current operations. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, for his work with the Government during the passage of the Sentencing Bill which has brought this about.
Sentencing remarks have been chosen because the way they are structured and what they contain can give victims a real insight into what happened in the sentencing hearing. They are always structured in the same way. They start with a summary of the case and the facts, and go on to explain the background of how the plea came to be entered, if it is a plea, or how the conviction came about. They then set out why the sentence was imposed, which guidelines have been referred to and applied and, if not applied, why, and the various calculations that go on as to what the starting point was and whether it has been increased or decreased. That is all in the judge’s own words.
Bail decisions and summings-up are very different. Extending provision of free transcripts for victims to a wider range of hearing types also risks creating significant operational burdens on the court. I will deal first with bail decisions. The victims’ code sets out a victim’s right to be told the outcome of any bail hearing and any relevant conditions imposed “within five working days”. This is carried out by witness care units, which are also supposed to provide victims with other timely, tailored updates about proceedings. In that sense, we are already delivering the information the victims need in a proportionate and effective way, without the cost and risk that mandatory transcript provision would entail.
Bail decisions are rarely delivered in a structured way that would tell the victim any more than they will already have been told by the witness care unit. What happens normally is that the judge listens to both sides and then simply says that bail is refused—for instance, if there is a failure to surrender, or the prospect of the commission of further offences. Alternatively, they will say that they are prepared to grant bail subject to certain conditions, and they rattle those off. This is exactly what victims are going to be told by the witness care unit. I am not sure what more information I can offer to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton; in my experience, there is nothing more.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
The problem is that the witness care unit does not always provide that information.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
That is what needs to be looked at, then. Providing transcripts is not going to solve anything that would not be solved by making sure that the witness care unit does what it is meant to do. The noble Baroness gave the example of the victim who had not been told that the bail conditions had been amended. That simply should not happen. That is not a transcript issue, though; it is a witness care unit issue. It is something that plainly needs looking at, though, if it is a problem.
In addition, the vast majority of bail decisions are dealt with at magistrates’ courts, where proceedings are not currently recorded and cannot therefore be transcribed. Without that recording ability in place, it would not be operationally feasible to create a statutory entitlement of the kind proposed. We cannot extend an entitlement that the system is not yet equipped to deliver. As the noble Baroness will know, one of the proposals the Government seem likely to accept from Sir Brian Leveson’s review of the criminal courts is that all proceedings in the magistrates’ courts should be recorded, and that it will become a court of record. At that point the situation may change, but at the moment we simply cannot provide transcripts of bail decisions in the magistrates’ court.
In the Government’s view, a transcript of the summing-up is unlikely, in most cases, to add significant value for many victims. The summing-up consists of two parts: there is a set of directions on the law, which are written out and handed to the jury, and these could be given to the victim without any difficulty at all if it would help them. Most victims are not especially interested in what is said about the application of the law. The only other thing it contains is a summary of the evidence, wherein the judge decides the level of detail to include, what to put in and what to leave out. The important thing to note is that the summary has to be even-handed, and the judge is not meant to make any comment one way or the other, so the summing-up is not going to help the victim to understand how or why the jury reached its verdict. As these remarks are not an explanation of the outcome, victims may well feel that the summing-up bears little resemblance to their lived experience of the case. So there is a real danger of the summing-up being misunderstood and, in some instances, causing further distress, rather than providing clarity or closure.
For these reasons, we do not propose to extend free provision to include summings-up in cases where the defendants are acquitted. Expanding access further would also create significant operational and funding pressures. Providing transcripts of bail decisions and summings-up free of charge would require a substantial increase in resources, diverting key and limited resources away from core court functions. Importantly, it would take resources away from implementing our existing commitment to provide free sentencing remarks to all victims who request them.
I have heard what the noble Baroness said to me and to the Committee about victims being discouraged from attending the rest of the trial on many occasions. It should not happen. When I was a judge, I used to say to the victim, once they had completed their evidence, “Would you like to observe the rest of the trial? I can have arrangements made for you to do so; we encourage you to do so, and that includes attending remotely where you can’t be seen but you will be able to see and hear, and we can have those arrangements made”. It ought to happen all the time. If it does not, again, that is something that we should look at.
I turn to Amendment 73 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. While the Government remain firmly committed to improving transparency across the justice system, this has to be balanced carefully against our capacity to deliver existing priorities and commitments. Imposing a blanket obligation to publish all sentencing remarks where they have been requested would create significant operational and financial pressures at a time when we are focused on rolling out free access to Crown Court sentencing remarks for all victims, a major step towards increased transparency in its own right. The level of anonymisation required to protect victims’ identities in a published transcript is very different from the level required in a transcript provided to the victim themselves. It is not just a question of redacting the name; it is also a question of removing any other details which might permit a jigsaw identification of the victim. That anonymisation cannot yet reliably be carried out using AI; it has to be done manually and it would have to be done by a judge, taking them away from other duties and inevitably adding to the backlog.
Furthermore, this amendment as drafted places no constraints on who may request a transcript. It could be the offender; it could be their family; it could be a journalist or simply a curious member of the public. A situation where the victim does not have an opportunity to object to sentencing remarks containing intimate details of their case being published online, but another requester does, is not a proposal that this Government can support, and it is likely to contravene the victim’s Article 8 rights.
I reassure noble Lords that the Government’s commitment to openness and transparency is ongoing. In cases of high public interest, sentencing remarks are already made publicly available online. Furthermore, broadcasting of sentencing remarks is possible, with the agreement of the judge, providing an additional route through which the public may access this information. We are also actively exploring the opportunities offered by AI to reduce the cost of producing transcripts in the future. I therefore invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment and the noble and learned Lord not to press his.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, particularly my noble friend Lady Hamwee for giving details of the ridiculous form that victims have been asked to fill in to access sentencing remarks for free. I hope the noble Baroness will look at that and make sure that it does not continue in this format. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for his amendment and I very much appreciate what the Minister said, but I think we are looking for transparency in the longer term. I remain concerned, as is the noble and learned Lord, about the closure or erasure of information from Courtsdesk. I hope we might be able to discuss that in another forum, because it is extremely concerning that it seems to be happening very quickly and suddenly— I am sorry for that quick diversion, given the hour.
I thank the Minister for her explanation. I am not surprised that she has raised the issue of costs. I appreciate the issue about magistrates’ courts, and I really hope that Sir Brian Leveson manages to resolve that in his report in a way that will make it work. Judicial summings-up are important. When we meet on Wednesday, we will be looking at unduly lenient sentences, and judicial summings-up are very helpful to victims if they are considering making an application to the Attorney-General—they have quite a lot of information in them. Victims may not understand it, but if they are going that far, they are likely to consult a solicitor or somebody else involved, and it is quite likely to be helpful.
I think the issue about bail conditions is important, barring the example I gave, which may not have been quite correct. Again, it is useful for victims to see in writing, when something has been gabbled off, exactly what all the conditions are. This is particularly important in domestic abuse and stalking cases, where there may be a perpetrator who is particularly following people and there may have been some form of abuse. However, I am very aware of the hour, and I hope we can continue discussions with the noble Baroness outside your Lordships’ Committee, so I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.