Courts and Tribunals Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, the backlogs are now so great, and the delays in trials taking place so vast, that we are talking about cases being listed two or three years in the future, which is a hopeless situation for witnesses, victims, complainants and, of course, defendants. Some sort of structural change is necessary, but the question is what form it should take.

As I made clear at Second Reading, I do not have a difficulty with courts making the decision about where cases should be allocated, rather than defendants. In fact, granting defendants that right is comparatively unusual across the common-law world and does not even exist universally across the United Kingdom. It is not the system that pertains in Scotland, and I imagine your Lordships would all agree that Scotland has a civilised, decent and fair legal system—that is certainly my view, as someone whose parents were natives of Scotland.

My concern, however, as I expressed at Second Reading, is whether the magistrates’ courts can cope with the new levels of work that they are going to receive. I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson of Liverpool, that it is not simply a lack of funding or the Covid pandemic that have caused the backlogs—although lack of funding has been a very significant contributor, and Governments of all persuasions have deliberately starved the justice system of cash because it was an easy target, and it is obviously true that Covid played its part. As the noble and learned Lord said, the increasing complexity of criminal trials and the bulk of evidence—CCTV evidence, DNA evidence, scientific evidence and all the rest of it—have made trials longer and contributed to the backlog.

The obvious flaw in that argument, however, when it comes to the Government’s proposed reform, is this: why would those cases be any less complicated in the magistrates’ court? How is the magistrates’ court to cope with the increasing complexity? There is no doubt at all that most of our magistrates’ courts in greater urban areas are presently in a state of chaos: the backlogs are enormous and growing; we are failing to recruit sufficient magistrates; and we do not have enough district judges. Unless we significantly increase the number of magistrates and district judges, magistrates’ courts will simply be unable to cope with the increased volume and complexity of work that is destined for those courts because of this legislation. The Government are going to have to devote significant funding to this change if it is to work.

All these issues make even more important Amendment 2, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and other noble Lords, on the question of allocation. It is going to be critical that magistrates’ courts have some allocation guidelines in this area. If not, there is an obvious risk—I speak as someone who knows a number of magistrates—that magistrates simply continue to send everything up to the Crown Court because their courts cannot cope. That will happen if there is not some form of allocation and increased funding for the magistrates’ courts. I do not say any of this with great pleasure. Funding has played a major part in the situation in which we find ourselves, and the lack of funding on the part of many Governments has been reprehensible.

Finally, I cannot support Amendment 1. Why should people of good character have more rights in our justice system than people of bad character? I practised in the criminal courts regularly for almost 40 years. I do not any more; I last did a trial in 2012. Why should defendants of bad character have fewer rights when it comes to allocation? I say this frankly and with due respect to them, but most of the defendants who I represented over my 30 or 40 years at the criminal Bar were people of bad character. I never felt that they should have fewer rights in the criminal justice system than people of good character, but that is what Amendment 1 proposes, and I am surprised that it does so. Allocation should apply according to fair and rational guidelines, regardless of the character of the individual who is being allocated.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Clause 1. At its heart, this clause raises a simple question: do we trust magistrates? Throughout my professional life, I have regarded magistrates as one of the great strengths of our criminal justice system. Every single day, magistrates determine guilt. They pass sentence and make decisions that affect liberty, livelihoods and futures. If they can be trusted to do that, why can they not be trusted to decide where a case should be tried? That is the question I have yet to hear satisfactorily answered by the opponents of Clause 1.

Some argue that magistrates may underestimate the seriousness of a case. My experience suggests the opposite; magistrates frequently err on the side of caution. Indeed, many cases sent to the Crown Court ultimately result in sentences that magistrates themselves could have imposed. If there is a tendency, it broadly appears to be towards caution, not recklessness. With respect to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—with whom I agree on almost everything, but not on this occasion—I am slightly mystified by the suggestion that magistrates are going to keep the person of good character in a magistrates’ court but send a serial shoplifter to the Crown Court. My instinct is that rather the opposite is likely to happen. I could not agree more with the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, that all those who appear before the courts must be treated in exactly the same way.

I am a strong supporter of jury trial; it is one of the strengths of our constitution. However, it does not follow that every case capable of being tried by a jury must be tried by a jury. If that were the principle, the vast majority of criminal cases presently heard by magistrates would need to be transferred back to the Crown Court, and nobody is sensibly arguing for that. Magistrates’ courts do not provide some lesser form of justice, and lay magistrates, like jurors, are members of the public performing a public duty; both reflect the principle that justice should not be administered exclusively by professionals.

As has been frequently said at Second Reading and during this debate, more than 90% of criminal cases are dealt with in the magistrates’ court, and without lay magistrates the system simply would not function. Throughout my career, I have seen magistrates approach difficult cases conscientiously, thoughtfully and fairly. They have earned the confidence of judges, practitioners and the communities which they serve, and they have earned the confidence of Parliament as well. Clause 1 does not ask the magistrates to undertake some radical new judicial function. It asks Parliament to trust them with a decision that is modest when compared with the responsibilities they already discharge every day. The real question is not whether magistrates are ready for this responsibility; it is whether we are prepared to recognise the responsibility they already shoulder.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, in supporting Amendment 5, in my name, I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union.

I agree with all those noble Lords who have spoken already and expressed reservations about Clause 1, but, if we are going to have to live with Clause 1, I want to suggest ways in which it could be improved by exempting certain classes of offences from it. My amendment would exempt from Clause 1 the removal of the right to trial by jury for those accused of speech offences that are currently triable either way.

The argument for doing this is that whether someone is guilty of one of these offences depends on where the line is drawn, and that question hinges on the meaning of words such as insulting, threatening, abusive, harassment, alarm, distress and grossly offensive, or whether something has a tendency to deprave and corrupt. There are often no hard and fast rules when it comes to understanding or interpreting the meaning of those words, and no unambiguous statutes or precedents that a judge can refer to. Instead, it comes down to a moral judgment about what is and is not socially acceptable. When it comes to making those kinds of decisions, that is properly a matter for a jury, not a judge.

That is not just my view. In Brutus v Cozens, a case heard before the House of Lords in 1973, the Lords held that the meaning of an ordinary word such as “insulting” is not a question of law. It is a question about ordinary language and ordinary standards and where the line should be drawn, and such matters are best left to juries composed of ordinary people, not experts in law.

There is another reason for maintaining the “either way” status of the particular speech offences listed in my amendment. According to research carried out by the Free Speech Union, people charged with speech offences are twice as likely to be acquitted in the Crown Court as they are in the magistrates’ court. That is to say, juries are more tolerant when it comes to what speech is or is not socially acceptable.

I will give an example. In 2024, shortly after the Southport attack, an ex-Royal Marine called Jamie Michael, who was under the false impression that the attack had been carried out by an undocumented migrant, put out a video on Facebook urging his followers to protest outside the offices of elected politicians against illegal immigration. He did not use any racial epithets and he made a point of stressing that such protests should be peaceful. A complaint was made to the police by a member of staff of a Member of the Welsh Parliament, and he was charged with stirring up racial hatred, the maximum sentence for which is seven years in prison. The Free Speech Union found him a good solicitor and barrister, he pleaded not guilty and it took a jury a grand total of 17 minutes to acquit him. Would a magistrate have acquitted him in the same way? I doubt it.

When it comes to our fundamental right to freedom of speech, which is, after all, the most important right, because without it we would not be able to defend any of the others, I urge noble Lords to continue to entrust it to 12 ordinary Britons, who have proven to be a reliable guide to where to draw the line, as they did in the Lady Chatterley trial and have done so often since.

Rape and Serious Sexual Offences: Jury Directions

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Monday 9th November 2026 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Levitt]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of introducing mandatory jury directions on harmful myths and stereotypes in trials for rape and serious sexual offences; and the potential implications of this for confidence in the criminal justice system among victims and the public.

[The Lord Speaker (Lord Forsyth of Drumlean)]

My Lords, I remind the House to exercise our customary caution in refraining from references to ongoing investigations or court processes.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, independent judges already can and do give directions concerning rape myths, based on the specifics of each case. In the Courts and Tribunals Bill, we are taking action to stop rape myths being weaponised in court, ensuring that previous allegations of rape or compensation claim information cannot be used unfairly as evidence. We will consider my noble friend Lady Levitt’s amendments to the Bill on this issue, which will be debated next week.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Russell Brand has just been sentenced to 10 and a half years’ imprisonment. Irrespective of the accuracy of every detail reported from the trial, the reports themselves have caused considerable distress to victims and grave concern among those who support them. I welcome the Prime Minister’s recognition of that harm. Does my noble friend agree that, while most judges follow best practice by directing juries about harmful myths and stereotypes, the fact that some do not means that it is now time for Parliament to require that such a direction be given—before any evidence is heard, not just at the end of the trial, when the damage may have already been done?

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, your Lordships would not expect me to comment on the Russell Brand case but I will say this: I pay tribute to the courage of the victims in seeing this case brought to justice. On the wider question, judges give a tailored direction to assist the jury where they deem it necessary, based on the specifics of each case. The primary source of guidance, as my noble friend knows, is the Judicial College’s Crown Court Compendium, which gives examples where guidance may be necessary. All judges who hear sexual offences in the court receive specific training through RASSO ticketing. The specific issue my noble friend raises is exactly what we will be debating in relation to her amendment.

Adults Lacking Mental Capacity: Child Trust Funds

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Wednesday 28th October 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord. We understand the seriousness of this problem and remain committed to resolving this long-standing issue of access to child trust funds for young adults who lack mental capacity. This is a high priority for Minister Richards, who has engaged extensively with stakeholders and wants to move quickly towards a practical solution. The Government are very hopeful of making progress in the coming weeks.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the law currently requires parents of disabled adult children to navigate procedures which were designed to protect vulnerable people from fraud and financial abuse. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that, where parents are simply seeking to access a child trust fund or junior ISA on behalf of a son or daughter for whom they have cared all their lives, there is a strong case for a bespoke and proportionate process which starts from a position of trust rather than one of suspicion?

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I agree with my noble friend. Of course we do not think that all parents are a danger to their children; that would be ridiculous. As I have said, Minister Richards is looking for a solution in the coming weeks. However, as I am sure my noble friend would agree, not every adult has loving parents and the principles that underlie the Mental Capacity Act about adults—we are talking about adults—being entitled to agency over their own funds is an important one.

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 27th October 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I spent 35 years at the criminal Bar as both a defender and a prosecutor, and then I spent three years as a Crown Court judge dealing with jury trials. From that, it is clear to me that our criminal courts are under pressure that is unlike anything I have seen in my professional career. From inside the system, every day it can be seen that delay is not just a question of statistics but a daily reality that shapes the experience of victims and defendants, and, increasingly, takes a toll on the judges, advocates and court staff who work tirelessly to keep the system functioning. This is not spoken about as much.

There is insufficient time in this debate to explore the recruitment and retention crisis at the criminal Bar, or its looming equivalent in the judiciary, but, in summary, it is contributed to by the working conditions created by the backlog, which puts pressure on the system to speed up throughput, sometimes at the expense of careful consideration of an individual case. That is not justice; it is administrative crisis management, and it is not good enough. We can therefore all probably agree that the Bill matters, but it may be less easy to agree on what to do about it.

What I say next is said with great affection for my own profession: lawyers have a tendency to regard procedural reform as the first sign of constitutional collapse; experience suggests otherwise. The history of criminal justice is a history of adaptation. The question is not whether change should occur, because change has always occurred; the question is whether it leaves the system fairer, more effective and better able to deliver justice. Some of the debate generated by the Bill has proceeded as though jury trial were the only fair means by which guilt or innocence can be determined. With respect, that has never been the position in England and Wales. The vast majority of criminal cases—usually some 90%—are and have always been dealt with by magistrates. I am a supporter of jury trial; it is one of the strengths of our system, but we have to be honest and realistic: it is expensive and time-consuming. That is precisely why, throughout our history, we have reserved it for cases Parliament regarded as sufficiently serious to justify that expenditure of time and resources.

However, what is meant by the most serious cases changes over time, and every Government redraw the line as to which cases require it. That is why we no longer use juries to try breathalyser cases, as we did in the 1970s. The system was adjusted so that drink-driving cases were dealt with by magistrates, and rightly so.

Whenever somebody suggests that only a jury can be trusted to determine guilt or innocence in a fair way, I find myself wondering what precisely it is that they are saying about magistrates. Lay magistrates—a majority—are members of the public, just like juries. They give their time voluntarily; they bring experience, judgment and common sense; and throughout my career, I saw them dealing conscientiously and fairly with difficult cases. Magistrates deserve recognition as a cornerstone of our system, not dismissal as a second-class form of justice.

There is an uncomfortable truth which we owe it to the public to acknowledge: at present, there are too many cases going to the Crown Court. We also have to recognise that delay does not only affect victims and innocent defendants; it also changes behaviour within the system. The question before us is not whether defendants deserve protection—of course they do—but protecting the innocent cannot be at the expense of allowing the guilty to play the system. Every Crown Court judge has encountered cases where one cannot help wondering whether a guilty plea owes as much to the attractions of delay as it does to the merits of the defence. A defendant may calculate that, by contesting the case, they can secure not merely this Christmas at home but perhaps the next one as well, and possibly even the one after that—and perhaps, if they are lucky, in the end the victim will just give up.

A justice system that rewards delay should not be surprised when delay becomes part of the strategy. There were certainly occasions during my time on the Bench when I looked at a case in the Crown Court and found myself asking, “What exactly is that case doing here?” We should trust our magistrates to decide where the justice of the case means that it should be tried—and we can trust them. Even in the system as it operates at the moment, the statistics show that magistrates often err on the side of caution by sending cases to the Crown Court where the eventual sentence was actually lower than the one the magistrates could have passed.

The Bill is not simply an exercise in reducing a backlog; it is an opportunity to address aspects of the criminal justice system that have required attention for years. Take appeals from the magistrates’ court. I have never really understood a process that effectively says, “You’ve had a trial before a properly constituted court. You didn’t like the outcome. So, now you can have another go in front of another court”. That may have made sense in the days when there was no accurate record of what had happened in the magistrates’ court. But in the 21st century, the recording and transcription of magistrates’ court proceedings can—and is—going to happen. So, only those cases where there is an arguable appeal should go ahead, and that is of course exactly what happens in every other court, including appeal from the Crown Court to the Court of Appeal.

My concern about the current system of magistrates’ court appeals is not in fact principally that it is grossly inefficient—even though it is—but that it is also unfair. Behind many of those appeals is a victim: someone who thought that the process had finally ended with the conviction but who will now be required to relive the entire experience again, in all likelihood months, if not years, later. A proper appeals system is not about giving defendants a second bite at the cherry; it is about the convicting the guilty while acquitting the innocent.

This Government have rightly assessed that to improve the criminal justice system requires investment and efficiency, but the modelling makes it absolutely clear that alone these are not enough; there must also be sensible modernisation of our procedures. The question before us is not whether reform is risk-free—it never is. The real danger is not that we change too much, but that we change too little, too late. After a lifetime practising in the criminal courts, I have concluded that the public care far less about preserving our procedures than they do about actually receiving justice in a timely way. So, our duty is to preserve what is best in the system, reform what is not, and leave behind a criminal justice system that works better than the one we inherited.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 1st September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, no one in this country needs reminding of the terrible events which are summed up in that single word: Hillsborough. The pain of the deaths of 97 people remains raw in the communities affected, not least because this was no accident—these people were unlawfully killed. As though that were not bad enough, what followed was a national stain on our public services, which reverberates still and contributes to the suspicion that many of our citizens feel about the state itself—that it is not there to serve the many and, worse yet, that those who work for the state are often contemptuous of many of the ordinary people who just want to go around living their lives in peace and security—because what followed the deaths, terrible enough though those were, was a cover-up. Inquiry after inquiry has shown that the state subjected the families to lies and smears, all so that the people who were in charge would not be held responsible for the deaths.

Members of your Lordships’ House have repeatedly paid tribute to the families because they never gave up. In the end, what was revealed was something which goes far further than just affecting the families. It is about the kind of society we want to be. At the various inquiries and investigations, the police lied, falsified their notes and got away with it, at least in part because they were represented by phalanxes of lawyers paid for by the taxpayer, when the families—the ordinary people—could not get legal aid. It looked unfair because it was unfair. The reason we need a law to deal with this is that, regrettably, what happened after Hillsborough is not an isolated incident, as many others have said. Horizon, Grenfell, Windrush, grooming gangs, infected blood—the list goes on and on. Although successive Governments have wrung their hands, nothing much has happened—but no more, and I am proud that it was a Labour Government who finally did something about it.

I have a particular interest in the criminal law consequences of failures of the state. In my view, the Government are right to abolish the old common-law offence of misconduct in public office, which was too vague and too imprecise, and I welcome the creation of the four new offences. That said, I have some concerns about the drafting, which may make these offences less effective than they ought to be. To give just one example, I am concerned that these offences would not cover paramedics who attend 999 calls and other emergencies. They do not fall within the definition of “those acting for a public authority” as currently drafted. That is one example. I will not go through the others now, but perhaps my noble friend the Minister will meet me so I can tell him of my concerns and see whether we can work together to make this great Bill even better.

This new law will be about the recalibration of the relationship between the state and its citizens—the kind of society we want to be, where it is made explicit through our laws that the state is there to serve ordinary people, including those who are at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale. We believe that everyone counts or nobody counts, and that is why I am proud of the Government for making this happen.

Cohabitation Rights Bill [HL]

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 17th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, who has pursued this issue with—if I may say so—characteristic persistence and conviction over many years, introducing substantially similar Bills on a number of occasions. These Bills undoubtedly raise important questions of law, policy and fairness.

I do not begin from the proposition that there is no problem to be addressed. There plainly are cases in which the breakdown of a long-term cohabiting relationship can leave one party, often the economically weaker party, in circumstances of genuine hardship. There also remains a widespread misconception that common-law marriage exists, and that couples who live together automatically acquire legal rights equivalent to those of married couples. They do not. That misunderstanding has been recognised by Governments of different political persuasions and is reflected in noble Lords’ speeches and the Government’s current consultation. The question is not whether there is an issue, nor whether some cohabitants deserve protection, but whether this Bill provides the right legal and constitutional answer.

I approach this debate not only as a lawyer but as someone who believes that there is an important constitutional principle which underpins much of our private law. That principle is autonomy. I would put it this way: the common thread running through our private law is not paternalism, but autonomy. The law exists to enable adults who are capable to make deliberate legal choices for themselves and not to relieve them of the need to make those choices. That principle runs through countless areas of our law. When two people decide to marry, they voluntarily assume a legal status containing both rights and obligations. If they prefer, they can enter into a civil partnership. If they want to regulate their financial affairs without marrying or without a civil partnership, they can execute an agreement or a declaration of trust governing ownership of property. If they want to decide who inherits, they can make a will. While they still have capacity, people now can determine who makes decisions on their behalf if they one day lose that capacity in the form of a lasting power of attorney. Each of those legal mechanisms expresses a simple but very profound principle. The law provides a framework, but adults make the choice.

This Bill, however, proceeds from a very different premise. In effect, it says that significant legal obligations should arise not because people have chosen to undertake them but because Parliament has inferred them from the existence of a relationship. That is a significant constitutional step. Of course cohabitation deserves respect. Millions of people choose to live together without marrying for different reasons. Some might marry later, some will never marry and some consciously reject marriage; that is entirely a matter for them. The issue is whether Parliament should transform what, at its heart, is a factual relationship into a legal status without the conscious and voluntary agreement of the people whose lives it governs.

That is why the difference between marriage and cohabitation is fundamentally important. Marriage and civil partnership are not simply descriptions of a relationship; they are legal institutions. They arise because two adults consciously decide to assume legal obligations towards one another before the law. Cohabitation is different. It is a factual circumstance. People may cohabit for months or years. They may intend eventually to marry. They may positively decide never to marry. They may have religious reasons for cohabiting. There could be financial reasons or family reasons. Those could also be reasons why they have chosen not to marry. They may simply prefer not to enter into a legal relationship. The reasons ultimately do not matter. The critical point is that the choice is theirs and belongs to them. I listened carefully to the very interesting speech from my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington, who made some of these points very sharply. He also pointed out very clearly that the characteristics of Jewish mothers are not limited to mothers who are Jewish.

One of the themes running through the noble Lord’s Bill is that after a period of cohabitation, or immediately where there is a child, the law should intervene by default unless the parties have taken positive steps to opt out. That reverses what I suggest is the proper constitutional starting point. I understand why the noble Lord has adopted an opt-out model; indeed, the Government’s current constitution proposes a broadly similar approach. But there are issues, and I look forward to the Law Commission’s report, with an opt-out model. The choice between an opt-in and an opt-out model is not a drafting detail but a fundamental issue. I am sure the noble Lord the Minister will have something to say on that. There may be a point between us on this.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

The noble Lord called me “the noble Lord”.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am sorry. I did slip into that. I know that sometimes people say “the noble Lord”; I was not trying to be rude or forget that the Minister is in fact a noble Baroness. I hope she will forgive me; it was entirely accidental and unintended.

My Lords, and the noble Baroness the Minister, there is another reason why I have reservations about the Bill, and this is a serious point. There is a constitutional principle engaged here as well, which is the rule of law. One of the points about the rule of law is that the law has to be certain. People have to know where and when legal rules, rights and obligations arise. The law should not leave people guessing where they have inadvertently entered into a legal relationship carrying significant financial consequence. Marriage does that; you know when a marriage begins and when a marriage legally ends. There is no uncertainty when those legal obligations arise. The same is true of a civil partnership, but this Bill is fundamentally different.

One of the first questions the courts will have to answer is: when precisely did these two people become cohabitants for the purposes of the Act? Was it when they first stayed together most nights, when they gave up one property, when they opened a joint bank account or when they began introducing each other as partners? Those are fact-sensitive questions.

To pick up a point made earlier, if you want to increase the role of lawyers and increase legal costs, you introduce a lot of fact-sensitive questions. The decision in Kimber v Kimber illustrates that there is no single, decisive test for determining whether two people are living together as a couple. I fear the Bill would increase uncertainty by increasing judicial discretion, and that makes outcomes more difficult to predict.

It is sometimes said that these proposals simply recognise the reality of modern life. I agree that, at least at some point, the law should come into some sort of contact with reality. But recognising reality is not the same as creating legal status. The Bill would come close to creating what has sometimes been described as marriage without consent. The state should be slow to impose legal obligations that people might have deliberately chosen not to assume.

Freedom means more than the freedom to make choices. It also means accepting responsibility for those choices. The law should support people in making informed decisions but should not too readily relieve them of the consequences of deciding not to enter into legal relationships carrying defined rights and obligations. That does not mean we should be indifferent to genuine hardship. Where children are involved, in particular, their welfare must be of the greatest importance. I look forward in particular to what the Law Commission says in that regard.

I will take a moment to pick up the points made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, about religious marriage and women being left in a very difficult position if they have had only a religious marriage and not also a civil marriage that gives them civil legal rights and protections. I think I am right in saying that the United Synagogue will not marry you religiously unless, at the same time, it marries you civilly. That is worth looking at; I know it has been brought before this House on previous occasions. It is worth looking at from the position not of treading on people’s religious freedoms but of protecting women in particular and making sure they have the legal rights they ought to as members of our civil society. But we do not need this Bill to do that, and we should not use it to do that.

While I have serious concerns about the Bill, I am also conscious that the Law Commission is looking at this very issue. The Law Commission is one of the unsung heroes of our legal and constitutional settlement. I look forward to its work, which is invariably of an extremely high quality. For those reasons, although I have concerns about the Bill as drafted, I look forward to continuing conversations around this issue and the Bill in light of the work of the Law Commission.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to speak after the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. Of course I accept his apology for what was obviously a slip of the tongue. Before I turn to the points he made, which are interesting and valid as always, I start with the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, whom I congratulate on securing a Second Reading for his Bill. I pay tribute to the noble Lord for his long-standing interest in cohabitation reform, his thoughtful and principled engagement on this important area of family law and his determination in bringing this Bill forward again. He and I spoke yesterday; I hope it was the beginning of a number of conversations on this important topic.

I want to make it absolutely clear from the outset that this Government share his view that cohabitation reform is an important and pressing issue. That is why we committed in our 2024 manifesto to strengthening the rights and protections available to women in cohabiting couples. Broadly speaking, it appears that agreement has broken out all over this House, with the exception of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and to some extent the noble Lords, Lord Wolfson and Lord Bailey. I will come back to them in a moment.

I begin with the case for reform. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, there are currently around 3.5 million cohabiting couples—more than twice the number 30 years ago. Despite this, cohabitants have very limited financial protection when they separate or when their partner dies having not made a will. This lack of protection can leave the most vulnerable, including women, children and victim survivors of domestic abuse, exposed to significant financial hardship. It can also leave victims of domestic abuse with an impossible choice: leaving their abuser but then having no financial security at all or staying in a dangerous relationship. These problems are compounded by the fact that many people do not know they have no rights until it is too late.

The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, agrees with the Government and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, when he says that almost half the population believe that there is such a thing as a common-law marriage—the idea that a person will accrue some kind of financial rights simply by living with a partner for a number of years or having a child together. It is a myth. It is simply untrue. Some of your Lordships, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, have raised the point that many individuals choose not to marry. That is a choice that they are entitled to make, and we respect that. But we must be careful not to assume that such choices are always made with a full understanding of the law and its consequences. Children should not be left in a vulnerable financial position as a result of the decisions made by their parents.

The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, asked, “If they want those financial rights, why not just get married?”, but that risks overlooking the fact that many cohabitants are not aware of their financial rights, as many noble Lords have agreed. Some simply drift into having cohabited. Maybe they thought about getting married but never quite got around to it. I will return in a moment to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, but for some getting married is too expensive and too hard to deal with. I simply disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, that more than half the population understand their rights. All the evidence suggests that public awareness campaigns do not improve this understanding at all.

We are aware that we all risk the state overstepping into what are ultimately deeply personal choices about how individuals choose to live their lives. However, concentrating on the freedom of choice aspect ignores the imbalances of power that can exist within relationships and the point that a perpetrator of abuse may refuse to marry a victim precisely to ensure that they have no rights at the end of the relationship. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, made an important point about religious-only marriages. I will return to that in a moment, because that is something about which the Government are really concerned and about which we intend to do something.

I recognise the concern expressed by a number of your Lordships that offering a framework of protections for cohabitants could undermine marriage. I reassure the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that there is no evidence from other jurisdictions that have cohabitation protections that it has undermined marriage at all. The Government are proposing two very different regimes on relationship breakdown: a regime for divorce that is based on sharing, and a regime for cohabitation that is based on need.

The Government support and value marriage. I hope that your Lordships’ House will forgive me for saying that I am always pleased when I see the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, on the speakers’ list of a debate in which I am taking part. He and I come from very different political parties but he always says something interesting, and I thought his speech gave us things to think about. The reason why we say that we are in favour of and support and value marriage is that yesterday we launched our consultation on reforms to weddings law. This forms part of a piece with the consultations on what happens to finances after the breakdown of relationships. We recognise that marriage can be too difficult and too expensive for many people, so we propose—but we are very interested to know everybody’s views about this—moving from a buildings-based to an officiant-based regulation system. That would, for example, permit those who conduct religious marriages to also conduct civil marriages at the same time, so that those who take part in, for example, Muslim marriages can have the protections afforded to others in that situation.

Although the Government agree with the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on the vital need for cohabitation reform, we do not believe that this Bill is the right vehicle in which to deliver it. I have four reasons for saying this. The first is our ongoing consultation. It will not have escaped your Lordships’ attention that we launched our A Fairer End to Relationships consultation last month, which sets out our approach to cohabitation reform, together with proposals to reform financial remedies on divorce. It represents one of the most significant opportunities in decades for the reform of family law. As part of the consultation, the Government are engaging with a wide range of interested parties to test our proposals and try to achieve consensus about the direction of reform. Legislating at this stage would pre-empt the outcome of that consultation.

The second reason is that the Government are not persuaded that the Bill’s proposed model for cohabitation reform meets the policy objectives set out in our consultation. Our objectives include prioritising a fair outcome for children, protecting the vulnerable, and providing a clear and accessible framework—I take on board what everybody said about lawyers; I think I had better pass on quickly—whereas the Bill proposes a compensation-based approach to cohabitation reform. In broad terms, this means giving the court power to compensate a cohabitant if they have been economically disadvantaged as a result of contributions made during the relationship. The Bill would also allow the reversal of an economic benefit gained in the relationship. This would require the courts to retrospectively assess how contributions create advantage or disadvantage. This would be complicated, it may be hard to evidence, and it would be hugely likely to increase conflict and cost. We know that very acrimonious court proceedings are bad for families and particularly bad for children.

Most importantly, the compensation model does not reliably ensure that needs, particularly the needs of children, are met. For these reasons, the Government prefer a needs-based approach to cohabitation reform which prioritises meeting the financial needs of cohabitants when they separate. For example, this would capture needs which have arisen completely independently of the relationship, such as serious illness or disability, which might not be catered for under a compensation model. Under the Bill, a cohabitee who got a serious illness—for example, ME—shortly after the relationship began and, as a result, could not “contribute” to the relationship would be left unprotected. That cannot be right.

This is particularly important in the cases of families with children, as it is children who are most often affected by the financial consequences of relationship breakdown. A needs-based approach also offers a clearer and more accessible framework, as it respects the choice of people not to marry but is also designed to look after the economically weaker parties in the relationship. I point to the fact that compensation, as a principle, is rarely used even in divorce cases, although we are consulting on whether it should have a place there. We will think about it, but at the moment our view is that the needs-based model is more likely to achieve our objectives.

I note that the Bill reflects the proposals recommended by the Law Commission, but they were made almost two decades ago and things have moved on considerably since then. In particular, there is now much greater awareness of domestic abuse, including economic abuse. It is right, therefore, that we consult on our own approach. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that our approach would benefit not simply victim-survivors of domestic abuse but all cohabitees, once the relationship breaks down, if they are in need of economic support.

Our third reason, which I can deal with very quickly, is coherence across the system. The Government believe that cohabitation reform and the law in relation to finances on divorce should be examined together. Although we propose distinct and separate regimes, we are of the view that we should draw on the Law Commission’s 2024 scoping report on financial remedies, which raised important questions about how the law for divorcing couples could be made fairer and more certain—a topic on which the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has spoken often. I have listened to everything she has had to say, together with the contributions of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on this topic, with great interest.

Our consultation therefore makes proposals aimed at improving the system for divorcing couples who go through financial remedies proceedings. By contrast, the Bill would deal with cohabitation reform in isolation. In our view, that risks missing a wider opportunity. What we want is a coherent, consistent and modern family justice system for married couples who divorce and for cohabitants, whether on separation or on death. We want a system which respects freedom of choice in how families arrange their lives while protecting the vulnerable. That is why we are consulting on all these three areas of reform together.

Finally, the Government have concerns about the Bill’s approach towards intestacy and inheritance claims, because the Bill’s proposed definition of “cohabitant” and its qualifying criteria would create a broader entitlement to intestacy rights than the Government are currently considering.

I hope I have made it clear that the Government are committed to cohabitation reform. We have already begun that work and have committed to legislating when parliamentary time allows, having considered the results of the consultation. Our consultation sets out a clear framework for cohabitation reform that will meet the needs of women, children and those otherwise vulnerable.

Although the Government cannot support the Bill from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for the reasons I have given, I hope he will be reassured by the Government’s clear commitment to reform in this area. We share his objective. He and I have talked over many months about various Bills that have come before the House and about other topics. I profoundly hope that we will continue to do so. We want to deliver vital financial protections for cohabitants, so any difference between us is not about whether reform is needed but simply about how best to achieve it. I therefore respectfully invite all noble Lords to engage with the consultation and to give us their views. We want to get this right and we want to do it in a way that is fair, workable and lasting.

Holding the Line Against Tyranny and Anarchy (Constitution Committee Report)

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Thursday 9th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin, as have so many of your Lordships, by saying a few words about the late Lord Mackay of Clashfern. Many have spoken of his career as having been one of exceptional distinction, and observed that he served this country with great integrity and wisdom. I echo that and add a brief memory of my own. I met Lord Mackay a number of times when he was Lord Chancellor and I was a member of the Bar Council. I say I was a member—I was in fact the most lowly and undistinguished member of the Young Barristers’ Committee, having been called to the Bar about a year before and being still in pupillage at the time. Lord Mackay was unfailingly kind and courteous to me and always asked me what I thought. It really was the mark of the man to notice the least significant as well as the most important. We send the best wishes and great sympathies of your Lordships’ House to his family. He is going to be greatly missed.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, for having chaired the Constitution Committee during its inquiry into this important topic and for securing this very interesting debate. The issues debated today seem to take on ever greater significance in modern times. This has been reflected in the contributions of all those who have participated and it has been, as one would expect, a debate of exceptionally high quality. I am grateful to the noble Lord and the members of the committee for their thoughtful report. The Government recognise the growing public interest in what the rule of law means, not only in principle but in our fellow citizens’ experience as they go about their day-to-day lives.

The report rewards careful reading, together with the committee’s earlier work on the roles of the Lord Chancellor and the law officers, and on relations between the Executive, the judiciary and Parliament. These issues, concerning constraints on how Ministers act and how the different branches of our constitution work together, are fundamental to a healthy democracy and the strength of the rule of law.

In responding for the Government, I am not going to repeat everything we have said in response to the report, but I will highlight a number of key themes. I begin with the Government’s commitment to the rule of law. I want to make this Government’s position clear. We have been unequivocal in our commitment to upholding the rule of law from the moment we were elected. We recognise that this commitment is a constitutional responsibility which must be carried into practice. It requires, among other things, the protection of judicial independence and respect for the institutions that sustain democratic life. The rule of law is not merely an abstract constitutional principle. Laws that are fair and clear, and courts that are known to adjudicate impartially, are among the stabilising features of a functioning democratic society. They provide the framework which allows our citizens to order their affairs, resolve disputes, hold public authorities to account and conduct business with confidence. The Government agree with the committee that this is not something we can ever take for granted. Indeed, as other Members of your Lordships’ House have said, around the world we have seen that the rule of law is weakened, or even breaks down, when Governments act unchecked or judiciaries are put under political pressure. The Government’s evidence to the committee referred to what has been described as a “global rule of law recession”. In that context, vigilance is essential.

This Government have described the rule of law as one of the most enduring of British values. It is not uniquely British, of course, but it has long shaped the constitutional development of the United Kingdom and its constituent nations. Over time, safeguards for judicial independence have developed and the limits of executive power have been settled. Those achievements require constant vigilance, as well as careful and disciplined maintenance. The relationship between the Government, Parliament and the courts is central to the health of our democracy. A strong rule of law depends not only on what statutes say but on the habits of restraint, mutual respect and accountability that govern the way the institutions behave towards one another.

Within that framework, the constitutional roles of the Lord Chancellor and the law officers—I notice that my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General has materialised on the seat next to me—are of particular importance. The committee returned to these questions, and the Lord Chancellor recognised the continuity between this report and the committee’s earlier work on those offices. Their responsibilities form part of the architecture through which the rule of law is upheld within government. Indeed, the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General have led the way in setting out the Government’s commitment to the rule of law—which started in the very early days of this Government with my noble and learned friend’s Bingham Lecture—both within the United Kingdom and on the international stage.

The noble Lord, Lord Norton, observed that many of our fellow citizens are perhaps broadly unaware of what is meant by the rule of law, but it concerns us all. It is a subject not only for lawyers or constitutional specialists; it matters to every person who expects the laws to be applied fairly, decisions to be taken lawfully, rights to be upheld and state power to be exercised within proper limits. Anyone who buys a house, opens a business, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, observed, falls out with a neighbour, is entitled to trust that society is effectively and fairly regulated by law.

Against that background, I turn to a few of the themes that have been raised by your Lordships during today’s very interesting debate. I start with judicial independence. It is one of the clearest themes in the committee’s report, and the Government are clear in their agreement. Independent courts are of fundamental importance. They are a vital protection against overreach by the Executive, and their impartiality gives the public confidence in our justice system and brings stability not only to public life but to social and, importantly, business relationships.

The Government are concerned about the danger posed by baseless attacks on the integrity of judges. We agree with the many noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Strathclyde and Lord Beith, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Burnett, and my noble friend Lady Andrews that in recent times we have seen a regrettable and intolerable rise in reckless criticism of judges. We see their impartiality being called into question and attempts to bring their independent role into the political fray. The Government are very concerned that abuse of the judiciary, on social media and elsewhere, has led to unacceptable threats to judges’ safety. The Lord Chancellor has spoken out against such attacks and has made clear his concern about attempts to erode public trust in the independent judiciary.

Judicial decisions will often be debated, scrutinised and criticised. We agree with the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that that is entirely proper in a democratic society. However, our position is that such debate must proceed with care, accuracy and respect for the constitutional role of the courts. The committee’s observation, echoed by the Lady Chief Justice, that this is a shared responsibility and that we are stronger together is an important one. I am sure we can all agree on that point.

Where the Government do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, is in his suggestion that the requirement that our judges and KCs have understanding of the principles of inclusion is some kind of ideological brainwashing. I think I may speak for many when I say that I am proud that our judges respect, understand and embrace the values of our diverse society. Our diverse society is not just about colour; it is about disability. I think we will all have been moved by what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, about his experience as a wheelchair user recently. We understand that that understanding in our judges is how we preserve their independence.

I turn to the committee’s consideration of issues relating to legislation, legal certainty and the legislative process. We recognise that the rule of law is shored up by the approach that we take to the ordinary business of governing—in the clarity of the laws that we pass, the discipline of legislative practice, the quality of scrutiny and the strength of institutions. The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel publishes materials and drafting guidance designed to ensure that legislation is clear, accessible and consistent. It gives further support to legal clarity by reviewing Bills to make sure that legislation is comprehensible, including to those who do not have a detailed knowledge of the subject. We also recognise and pay tribute to the essential role played by committees of this House, which carry out scrutiny of legislation as it progresses. That is critical to maintaining the integrity of our legislative process.

The issue of delegated powers was raised by my noble friend Lord Stansgate and the noble Lord, Lord Carter. We take seriously and agree that delegated powers should be properly framed and strike the right balance between what is put in primary legislation and the flexibility that can sometimes be offered by delegated legislation. The Government publish a delegated powers memorandum for each Bill that contains such powers, setting out the proposed powers, their purpose and justification. This memo, alongside the Bill, will be subject to rigorous scrutiny by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.

The committee’s report highlights several important challenges relating to the maintenance of an effective justice system. These were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, and the noble Earl, Lord Effingham. These include delays in courts and tribunals and issues in accessing legal advice and representation. The Government are well aware of the scale of the challenge and are committed to reducing backlogs and improving the performance across courts and tribunals. Steps are being taken to increase judicial capacity. Working closely with the judiciary, the Government are also exploring the scope for achieving greater efficiency through the innovative use of technology across courts and tribunals. That includes AI-enabled tools for tasks such as transcription and document summarisation, with a view to supporting more timely case progression.

We also agree with the committee on the importance of a properly functioning system of legal aid. The scope of legal aid provision is under review. I reassure my noble friend Lady Andrews that there has been considerable investment in the legal aid system. For example, in response to the acute pressures in the housing and immigration sectors, the Government have increased fees in these categories for the first time since 1996. We have also increased criminal legal aid solicitors’ fees and invested up to £34 million a year for criminal defence advocate legal aid fees. The Government agree that people and businesses must be enabled to resolve disputes quickly and fairly.

On the subject of delays in the courts, the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, asked four questions. I am looking at the clock, so I will write to him and place a copy in the Library, as there are answers to all of those but I do not have the time now to go into the detail that I think he would want.

I turn to trust in policing, raised by the noble Lords, Lord Waldegrave, Lord Strathclyde, Lord Blackwater and Lord Shinkwin, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy. We acknowledge that confidence in policing declines if there is a perception that the police are not consistently effective in responding to crime. This can be contributed to by a reduced visible presence in neighbourhoods and lower satisfaction among victims with how incidents are handled. Trust is shaped by how fairly and respectfully people feel that they are treated, particularly in the use of intrusive powers such as stop and search, where perceived disproportionality can undermine confidence among some communities. The Government are rebuilding trust in policing by being more effective in tackling the crimes that have the greatest impact on communities. The police have been successful in reducing knife crime, but we recognise that less dramatic crimes such as anti-social behaviour can have a corrosive effect on confidence within communities. That is why we have brought in a number of new orders designed to reduce this.

I agree with my noble friend Lord Foulkes that the term “two-tier policing” is used mainly to drive division and hatred. It undermines the brave work of police officers up and down the country who do their job, as they should, without fear or favour. Irresponsible claims of two-tier justice are not supported by the evidence and risk undermining confidence in the institutions that uphold the rule of law.

The noble Lord, Lord Carter, the noble Baroness, Lady Laing, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, all mentioned the teaching of the rule of law in schools. The Government completely agree that a healthy democracy depends on informed citizens. It is important to present the rule of law as a foundational principle in this context. Work to improve the education given to young people on these points is well under way. For example, the Attorney-General’s office has been working with the Oak National Academy and the Association for Citizenship Teaching to develop new lesson plans on the rule of law for all key stages, and new lesson plans were launched on 2 July. More broadly, the Attorney-General’s Youth Ambassadors Programme recruits young people from across the United Kingdom and plays an important role in ensuring that the rule of law is communicated across the United Kingdom and beyond in a way that is accessible, engaging and rooted in the voice of the youth.

My noble friend Lord Griffiths asked about the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of the Profession of Lawyer. I asked for the answer, and all I can say is that we are working towards ratification. I am afraid it is not what my noble friend was hoping for; I cannot give him any more than that at present. My noble friend Lady Andrews asked about the Legal Support Strategy Delivery Group. I am happy to tell her that it next meets on 28 July. The noble Earl, Lord Effingham, I am afraid to say, turned the debate into rather a partisan attack on the Government. I hope that he and your Lordships will forgive me for not going into the issue of jury trials today.

The Government welcome the committee’s contribution, together with the further thoughts that have been expressed in your Lordships’ House today. We will continue to reflect carefully on the recommendations the committee has made. We should not take our courts and tribunals, or the wider constitutional culture that supports them, for granted. Events in other parts of the world show what can happen when public confidence in these institutions is undermined. The challenge before us is not a theoretical one: it is a practical constitutional responsibility. This Government are dedicated to ensuring that the rule of law remains not only a defining principle of our constitution but a lived reality in the governance of the country. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Waldegrave: Britain is not broken. We are proud of the United Kingdom’s long history of respect for the rule of law, but our pride must be matched by vigilance.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Legal Aid: Anti-social Behaviour and Prevention and Investigation Measures) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2026

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Monday 6th July 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

That the draft Order laid before the House on 1 June be approved. Considered in Grand Committee on 30 June.

Motion agreed.

Imprisonment for Public Protection

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans the Secretary of State for Justice has to meet families of prisoners serving an Imprisonment for Public Protection or Detention for Public Protection sentence.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Deputy Prime Minister recognises the impact that IPP and DPP sentences have on the families of those serving those sentences. My noble friend Lord Timpson meets regularly with families as part of his ministerial responsibilities for these issues, and he values the insight that those discussions provide. The engagement he has ensures that the voices and experiences of families are heard. The Government remain committed to ongoing dialogue, recognising how this informs the action that we take to support progression and rehabilitation.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, there are nearly 1,000 IPP prisoners who have never been released, all of them now way beyond their tariff, and there are another 1,500 or so in the community subject to frequent and capricious recall. What can I say to the mother of the prisoner, whose name I supplied to the Minister in advance, who has been recalled again recently, despite being in employment and having a supportive employer? If the Deputy Prime Minister perhaps feels unwilling to meet the families of the prisoners, will he be willing at least to meet a delegation of noble Lords to come and talk to him about this continuing scandal?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, given his ministerial responsibilities, it is entirely appropriate that my noble friend Lord Timpson leads the engagement in this area. As the noble Lord knows, he holds quarterly IPP round tables with Members of your Lordships’ House to discuss progress and to hear directly from noble Lords about their concerns. Indeed, the next one is due to take place in a couple of weeks’ time, at which the Chief Inspector of Probation will answer noble Lords’ questions. The Justice Secretary also has met parliamentarians and campaign groups, and he remains fully sighted on this important issue. As regards the person whose name the noble Lord helpfully provided me with in advance, I am very much aware that my noble friend Lord Timpson and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, are corresponding about this separately, and I do not think it is appropriate that I say something about the personal circumstances today.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the Independent Sentencing Review chaired by David Gauke recognised the unique challenges posed by the remaining IPP population and recommended further reforms to support progression towards release. What progress have the Government made in implementing those recommendations, and will the Minister commit to publishing regular updates on outcomes for IPP prisoners so that Parliament can judge whether those reforms are actually making a meaningful difference?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to reassure all your Lordships that the Government completely understand and share the concerns about this very troubling cohort of prisoners, but the first duty of every Government is to keep the public safe, and that must come first. So, in order to try and reduce this cohort safely, through the action plan the Government are working on licence reform, progression work, recall improvements and support for those prisoners in order to demonstrate risk reduction. We have now provided those serving the IPP sentence with an earlier opportunity for licence termination and an additional opportunity for those serving these sentences thereafter. The IPP annual report and action plan for 2026-27 will be published in July.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, Ministers are facing three Oral Questions about IPP prisoners within a fortnight, the third being mine. That is because we are determined, co-ordinated and—speaking for myself—an angry bunch. Why are the Government granting early release to a group of prisoners guilty of very serious crimes when, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said, 900 prisoners subjected to the scandalous and ethically outrageous injustice of indeterminate IPP sentences have never been released and are being held in prison three, four or five times longer than their court-mandated sentences for much lesser, non-violent and often minor crimes?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

There is a persistent myth that people got IPP sentences for rather trivial offences, which is in fact not true. It was always required at the time that it was both a serious offence and that they had demonstrated concerns about previous offending. There is this cohort that needs to be looked at, and the Government are anxiously trying to ensure that we make every move we possibly can to make sure that they are helped to demonstrate that they are no longer a risk. However, no Government—and that includes the Government who were led by the party opposite—will release people when the independent Parole Board has adjudged that they remain a risk to the public.

[Lord Woodley (Lab)]

My Lords, the impact of IPP sentences on family members is absolutely devastating, especially with miscarriages of justice, which IPPs indeed are on an industrial scale. On Wednesday 15 July, many of these families will be at Westminster again to protest against this never-ending injustice, marching from the Ministry of Justice at 11 am to the Houses of Parliament to hold one of their regular meetings. Therefore, will the noble Baroness ask the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, whether he will kindly agree to meet the delegation of these family members on 15 July? Maybe he will even join them, bearing in mind that they will be outside his own building.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I will certainly pass that on to my noble friend—I suspect that he may already know. He regularly meets with the families, because we understand the pressures that are upon them and are anxious to hear what we can do to ensure that we can safely release this troubling cohort while protecting the public as well.

[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

My Lords, what are the Government doing to ensure that IPP prisoners are located in prisons close to their families so as to facilitate visits by their families? This must be one of the surest ways of achieving rehabilitation.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises an important point. I am happy to reassure him that we have now reallocated the IPP prisoners. The vast majority—around 95%—are in the appropriate custodial settings, in terms of both the visits and the care that they need, in order to help them to get to a point where we can start looking at release.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will be there on 15 July and urge everybody to go to the MoJ and join in—advert over. The point was made that we see these as trivial offences but some of them are serious, but what is trivialised is the recall. The mother of the prisoner to whom the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, referred recently handed her own son in on a recall after an anonymous malicious complaint. No charges have been made; nothing has happened. The mother says, “This is cruel. It’s torture”. It is a sword of Damocles hanging over families. Will the Minister and her department act with urgency? For IPP prisoners, when recalled for no criminal offences, it is on average 28 months before they can even see a probation officer. That is cruel, that is wrong and the ministry needs to do something about it.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Can I make two things clear? First, recall is not used as a punishment for a minor breach of licence. I am afraid that the noble Baroness is wrong about that. It is a means of protecting victims and the public when the Probation Service assesses that it can no longer manage that offender in the community. Recall is an important and swift public protection measure. Also, HMPPS has strengthened the scrutiny and quality assurance of recall decisions. There is a higher threshold for IPP prisoners in relation to recall. There must be not only a breach of their licence conditions such that there is a concern about the risk that they present but a causal link between that breach and the index offence for which they are serving the sentence in the first place.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I refer to the figure that my noble friend Lord Moylan mentioned—namely, the nearly 1,000 prisoners on IPP sentences who are still incarcerated and are well beyond their tariff. The Minister will know that not everything that is in her brief is necessarily worth reading out. The resort to the mantra of public safety is overused. There may perhaps be a handful of those 1,000 prisoners who are not safe to be released because they are genuinely dangerous or because they have become so institutionalised that they are incapable of living within the community. Can she please invite her noble friend Lord Timpson, whom we all admire, to work a lot harder than he does—and he works very hard—to ensure that at least 950 of those 1,000 prisoners are released on parole this year?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I join the noble and learned Lord in his admiration for my noble friend Lord Timpson, but the fact is that we have an independent Parole Board, which makes the decisions—not the Government—on whether someone can safely be managed within the community, as the noble and learned Lord knows. If they cannot be safely managed in the community and are released, they will be living next door to you—and no responsible Government are going to do that.

Employment Tribunals

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Barber of Ainsdale]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to reduce waiting times for consideration of cases in the Employment Tribunal system.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government recognise that there are significant pressures on the employment tribunal. To try to deal with this, we are maximising sitting days and recruiting more employment judges to ensure swifter justice. We have also now expanded remote hearings through a virtual region, which enables about 2,000 sitting days to take place annually without geographic limits. It is hoped that the Fair Work Agency will also ease pressure on the employment tribunal; it is now enforcing rights such as the national minimum wage and, in due course, will enforce additional ones such as holiday pay.

[Lord Barber of Ainsdale (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for that reply and I very much welcome the work that has been and is being done with ACAS and others to address this challenge. I hope that proposals for change will quickly be developed. The waiting period for employment tribunal hearings is clearly unacceptably high; it is two years or more in many areas. Important new rights and protections have been established by the Employment Rights Act, but they must be delivered in reality and not just on the statute book. Can the Minister give an assurance that, as well as speeding up the handling and determination of cases, attention will be given to ensuring the effective enforcement of tribunal awards without the need for complex and time-consuming county court procedures? The last official survey on this issue showed that less than half of successful claimants had secured the full payment of the award that had been made by a tribunal. This is—

[Lord Barber of Ainsdale (Lab)]

Can the Minister assure me that enforcement of awards will be taken firmly into consideration in developing new proposals to overhaul the whole system?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Will I make myself popular if I simply say yes? I will give a bit more detail than that. The law is absolutely clear that workers should receive the payments to which they are entitled, and we are committed to strengthening enforcement options. At the moment, a claimant can instruct a High Court enforcement officer, and using the officer is free of charge. That is intended to encourage the employer to pay the award. But, as part of the plan for change, we are looking at ways of strengthening enforcement options, including through the employment tribunal penalty scheme, which has moved to the Fair Work Agency. The agency will work closely with HMRC, the Insolvency Service and other relevant enforcement bodies to do this as effectively as possible.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, it is the unqualified duty of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition to hold the present Government to account—not the previous Government.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

With the backlog in the employment tribunal now exceeding 50,000 cases, the Law Society has warned that lengthy delays leave employees and businesses in prolonged uncertainty. What target have the Government set for reducing the outstanding case load, and by what date do they expect waiting times to return to pre-pandemic levels?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Of course I accept that the noble and learned Lord is entitled to hold this Government to account, but I am also entitled to remind noble Lords about the record of the previous Government.

Simply to deal with the question, it is true of all parts of the justice system that we are working hard to help parties to resolve cases before they get to court. Court should be the end of the process, not the beginning. It is the most expensive bit and the bit that is most stressful for all those involved. But for cases which must reach court, we are maximising sitting days; we are increasing judicial recruitment; I have already mentioned the virtual region; we are looking to roll out digital systems and pilot AI transcription; we have invested in centralised telephone support so that litigants get a better service when they ring; and work is being done to see how legal officers can better support the judiciary. Judges are our expensive and scarce resort. We want to see how we can support them better and maximise judicial time.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the House will know that I do not believe that whistleblowing cases belong in the employment tribunal, but that is where they are. Does the Minister recognise that the cost of going to tribunal is a minimum of £50,000 for a primary hearing, and that the delay is at least three years before the case starts, then followed by appeals, often extending cases out to five to seven years, and that these are used as weapons by employers to make sure that individuals are silenced or accept settlement? It very much discourages whistleblowing and accounts for much of the failure to speak out in many of the scandals that many of us are aware of. Will she take action on this issue and create a new whistleblowing framework?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I pay tribute to the noble Baroness for her work in relation to whistleblowers. It is incredibly important. The delays across the employment tribunal generally are unacceptable as far as all litigants are concerned, and that is why we are working to try to bring them down but also to ensure that access to justice is really something meaningful and not just words. For most one to two-day cases, we can still list cases in 2026, but there are very long waiting times in the south-east and London south. I take the point that she makes, and perhaps she and I could meet and talk about it further.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that managers and senior leaders of businesses need greater investment in the skills and ability to resolve workplace conflict at the earliest point, rather than letting those disputes fester and become entrenched? This would give a better impact on productivity, staff retention and business costs. What is being done to encourage that greater investment in skills in the workplace?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I first pay tribute to my noble friend for the work she does as chair of ACAS, and I agree with her about the importance of helping managers resolve issues before they fester. This was the point I was making earlier: we want court to be the end of the process rather than the beginning. I am very grateful to her for the work that her organisation is leading, which is intended to strengthen internal workplace resolution processes, including through an ACAS awareness-raising programme and strengthened internal resolution processes that aim to raise awareness for employers about conflict management and to increase the use of informal resolution before these disputes escalate.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Barber, mentioned the Employment Rights Act. The Minister will be aware that every single employer organisation, from the CBI through to the Federation of Small Businesses, has predicted that not only will it destroy growth and damage jobs but lead to a very large spike in tribunal cases. Can the Minister tell the House specifically about her department’s impact assessment for the Act and what it says about the increase in tribunal cases?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord will understand that I am not going to relitigate the passing of the Employment Act all over again as part of this Question Time. The Government are managing the impact on the employment tribunal. One thing they are doing, commencing in October this year, is extending the time for individuals to make a claim from three to six months. We believe that that will help people to try to work things out beforehand or to prepare their cases better before they come to the employment tribunal. I am not sure if that entirely answers the noble Lord’s question, and I do not have the impact assessment in front of me, but I will write to him.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness’s view is undoubtedly that employment tribunals are intended to provide a cheap, efficient and effective way of resolving employment disputes. If she shares that view, does she not therefore agree that the issues raised by this Question and highlighted around the House are of great importance?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Absolutely—I do not think anybody who is interested in access to justice, whether it is the employment tribunal or anywhere else, can fail to be concerned by an increase in waiting times and in the open case load, which we sometimes call the backlog. There has been a huge increase in the number of cases coming into the system, not just into the courts but through ACAS. We are not entirely sure why that is, and one thing we need to do is to find out why there is an increase, but I definitely share the noble Lord’s concern.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, further to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, I wonder if there is any work afoot to try to triage cases, because it seems to me that, in some instances, what an employer needs is to have his or her head knocked against the wall, and the employee may deserve the same treatment. Is there somebody at an early stage who can do that?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

It is partly the role of ACAS to do that kind of thing, but the Department for Business and Trade and the Ministry of Justice, working together across government, have set up the dispute resolution system taskforce. That is to support the Government in considering options to reform the employment dispute system so that it works better for workers and businesses. The taskforce will consist of unions, businesses, legal representatives and third sector organisations. Using all that combined expertise, it will help us find ways of achieving earlier resolution for some of these troubling cases.