Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I supported the amendment in Committee, and I echo the thanks given by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, to the Minister for listening. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who tabled the original amendment. This is a really important clarification, which will help victims and prevent injustices happening in the future.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I apologise for being a little late into the Chamber; things moved much more rapidly than I think any of us anticipated. I spoke about this issue at some length, I fear, at Second Reading, in setting out what I thought were the difficulties legally in this area. In Committee, I invited the Government to give their response to my various submissions, which were effectively that the law, as it existed, provided sufficient safeguards so that claimants could bring their claims much later than the three-year limitation period that applies to a personal injuries claim, provided that they satisfied the various criteria set out in Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.

I agree with the Minister that the clause as originally drafted ran the risk of generating further litigation—and I declare my interest in having been involved in a great deal of this kind of litigation over the years. I thought that would be a mistake. I am glad the substantial prejudice provision has been removed from the clause, because it gives some welcome clarity and should minimise the risk of there being further unnecessary litigation in which the precise meaning of the provisions is probed inevitably by one side or another.

This is not quite where I would have liked the law to be, because I think the law is satisfactory as it is. However, I think that I, or anybody else concerned in this area, would differ with the general aim, which is to make sure that those who, for very good reasons, have delayed bringing claims are sufficiently protected by the law and can invite the courts to take into account their delay. The risk that I was concerned about, which was adverted to in the well-known case of A v Hoare, was the real risk that it would be impossible for there to a be a fair trial in certain circumstances because of the lapse of time. Perhaps witnesses have disappeared, documents have gone missing, and then there are all the other factors that can make it impossible for a fair trial to take place.

Although this is not quite the result I would have preferred, I think I look forward to the Minister’s reassurance that the Government’s position will preserve those twin aims: to preserve a claimant’s right to bring claims, albeit late, if there is a good reason, but also to protect a defendant if, because of the lapse of time, it is impossible for there to be fair trial. I hope that she can reassure me that she thinks that this definition will preserve the observations made by the House of Lords in A v Hoare that there comes a time when it is simply too late to have a fair trial. A fair trial, of course, will concern a defendant who probably was not in any way responsible for the perpetration of any sexual abuse and, because of the operation of the doctrine of vicarious liability, was deemed to be responsible—such as a school or other institution—because I do not think anybody has any sympathy for the actual perpetrators, however late a claim may be brought.

It is my observation that it is not a wholly satisfactory situation, but I am grateful to the Government for at least removing some of the ambiguity that was in the original way that the clause was framed.