Unauthorised Fraud and Misuse of Telephone Numbers: Calls for Evidence
Angela Eagle Excerpts(1 week, 6 days ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dame Angela Eagle)
My noble Friend the Minister of State at the Home Office, Lord Hanson of Flint, has today made the following written ministerial statement:
Today the Government are launching two calls for evidence to strengthen the evidence base on two key and evolving fraud threats: unauthorised fraud and misuse of telephone numbers.
Fraud is now the most commonly experienced crime in England and Wales, accounting for around 46% of offences against individuals and costing an estimated £14.4 billion each year. It funds organised crime, erodes trust and harms millions.
That is why in March the Government published a new fraud strategy, which sets out a comprehensive approach to prevent fraud, protect the public and pursue offenders.
The strategy committed to improving the evidence base in relation to unauthorised fraud and anonymous access in the telecoms sector by launching calls for evidence. Strengthening the evidence base on key and evolving threats is key to ensuring that our response continues to evolve and is targeted, proportionate and effective.
That is why today the Home Office is launching two calls for evidence.
First, we are launching a call for evidence on unauthorised fraud. This form of fraud, where criminals act without a victim’s knowledge or consent, is increasing in scale and sophistication, driven by rapid technological change and the growth of the digital economy. This call for evidence will gather data and insight on the scale, drivers and enablers of unauthorised fraud to inform future policy and ensure our response keeps pace with emerging threats.
Secondly, we are launching a call for evidence on anonymous access to phone numbers and call routing for fraud. Telecommunications is a key vector exploited by fraudsters, and the strategy therefore commits us to several actions to identify and address vulnerabilities across the telecoms ecosystem. This exercise will help us better understand risks in the numbering system and consider whether targeted and proportionate interventions are needed.
We are calling on industry, law enforcement, regulators and the public to contribute. The evidence gathered will shape the next phase of our work to disrupt criminals, protect the public and strengthen the UK’s resilience to fraud.
Both calls for evidence have been published today on gov.uk and will be open for responses for 12 weeks.
[HCWS251]
National Security
Angela Eagle Excerpts(1 week, 6 days ago)
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The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)
I beg to move,
That the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved.
I am grateful to the House for its consideration of this draft statutory instrument, which will see three bodies designated: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, and the GRU Volunteer Corps. Threats from foreign powers and their proxies have grown in scale and complexity, and we have just had a debate about one of the areas of the world from where these threats emanate. Designation is a powerful tool for disrupting state bodies and those acting in concert with them, and it sends a strong message about the UK’s commitment to tackling foreign power threat activity globally. The Home Secretary has determined that the three bodies are involved in foreign power threat activity, so we propose to designate them under this new power.
Before I give more detail on the bodies in question, it is worth setting out the legislative basis of the decision. For a body to be designated, the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that it is involved in foreign power threat activity, as defined in the National Security Act 2023. The definition of “foreign power threat activity” covers the most serious offences in the Act, including espionage, sabotage and foreign interference. It also covers broader activity that constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety when carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. If that test is met, the Home Secretary must then consider whether designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. She will take account of considerations such as foreign policy and the impact on human rights.
Once a group is designated, it is a criminal offence within the UK’s jurisdiction to support, assist or obtain material benefits from that designated body, and the penalties for such offences are imprisonment for up to 14 years and/or a fine. Where an individual commits certain espionage conduct or sabotage for a designated body, this can attract sentences of up to life in prison. Designation therefore enables law enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt designated bodies more effectively. Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary will exercise this power only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence, including intelligence material and cross-Government advice. A decision to designate is only taken after great care and consideration, and it must be approved by both Houses.
I turn now to the bodies in question, starting with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The long-standing threat posed by Iran and its proxies is well established; indeed, we have literally just debated it. We know that the Iranian intelligence services have a pattern of targeting dissidents, Persian-language media organisations and journalists, and Jewish and Israeli communities globally. The IRGC Quds Force and the IRGC Intelligence Organisation, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. As a key component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, the IRGC is answerable directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Its role extends beyond conventional military operations and includes intelligence activity, the use of proxy actors, and influence operations that are designed to advance Iranian state objectives. Activity linked to the IRGC has involved threats to life and intimidation on UK soil, including credible plots to target individuals in the United Kingdom. The IRGC also supports militant groups overseas, and has been associated with cyber-attacks and other state threats that are actively aligned with Iranian state objectives.
I will move on to the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right. The IMCR has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities and to Persian-language media, including the antisemitic arson attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March. Sitting behind the IMCR are members of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, who almost certainly directed attacks across Europe by the IMCR. These incidents, including acts of arson and intimidation, have caused real fear and distress, and they have a profound effect on the communities affected. It is clear that this sustained activity directly threatens the safety and the interests of the United Kingdom.
On the GRU Volunteer Corps, Russia’s threat to the United Kingdom extends far beyond conventional military action. The Kremlin increasingly relies on proxy organisations to pursue its objectives, seeking to undermine our security while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The so-called GRU Volunteer Corps is a clear example of that approach. It is not an independent force or a loose collection of volunteers. It is a proxy organisation operating under the direction and control of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service. These formations are directed, supported and sustained by the GRU, and they are already operating across conflict zones, most notably in Ukraine in support of Russia’s illegal invasion.
We are seeing a conscious attempt by the Russian state to blur the lines between military action, intelligence activity and criminality, using deniable forces to carry out sabotage, destabilisation and violence beyond its borders. This is not conjecture; it reflects a pattern of behaviour that underpins Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and has been seen repeatedly across Europe, including here in the United Kingdom. In 2024, two men organised an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned business in east London on behalf of the Wagner Group, another proxy body that acts on behalf of the Russian state, and which is proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the UK. It is notable that large parts of the Wagner Group have been absorbed into the so-called Volunteer Corps, which demonstrates the threat posed to the UK.
With the House’s consent, these bodies will be designated. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary has decided that there is sufficient evidence for her reasonably to believe that each body is involved in foreign power threat activity, and that designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. Designation will strengthen our ability to disrupt these bodies and those who support and facilitate them. More broadly, it sends a powerful message to any foreign power or proxy intent on harming the United Kingdom or our interests. We will do whatever it takes to prevent such activity on our soil.
This debate is a significant moment, because this is the first use of a new power introduced by this Government to answer an urgent need. We are taking action because the three bodies in question, in their different ways, pose a threat to our country, and because designation is a necessary and proportionate response to their activities. With that, I commend the regulations to the House.
Dame Angela Eagle
I am tempted to say hold my beer, as there are 50 minutes left, but I suspect that many people will want to have their beers elsewhere, in front of a larger screen than we have in this House. I am grateful to all colleagues who have contributed to the debate.
The bodies that we have discussed today—the IRGC, the IMCR and the GRU Volunteer Corps—represent different manifestations of a common challenge: foreign power threat activity conducted directly by states through proxies. The hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers) asked why it has taken so long to take this action. This power has been developed specifically to address the growing challenge posed by state-linked bodies where it is not always appropriate to use existing counter-terrorism powers. It provides a targeted and proportionate means of disrupting those involved in foreign power threat activity based on the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of state threat legislation.
To answer the hon. Member’s question, we had to have that review by Jonathan Hall and look at the way in which current terrorism legislation is working. We then had to change the law to create this new designation, which is akin to proscription, but in the different context of states—one cannot proscribe a state and suddenly announce that it does not exist, but one can designate proxies that act on behalf of states, which gives our intelligence and police services very similar powers to deal with the malign influence that they seek to bring to bear on our shores.
Designation will disrupt these bodies and those that support or facilitate them by providing stronger tools to our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. It will mean that anyone who supports, assists or obtains material benefit from these organisations will face sentences of up to 14 years in prison, and will make it easier to prosecute certain offences under the National Security Act 2023. The hon. Member for Stockton West talked about getting that Act on the statute book in 2023. At the time, I was serving on the Intelligence and Security Committee from the Opposition Benches. The ISC brought to the House various amendments to that Act, hoping to make it better. I now see from the other side—from the Government Benches—that it has made it easier to use.
So that the House can take an assessment, I note also that designations for the foreign influence registration scheme are also up and running—something else that this Government have done that makes it easier for us to keep an eye on what is going on on our shores.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) and the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) widened the debate slightly from the threats facing us to talk about the threats to destabilise our democracy and to ask what we can do about social media companies and the disinformation and misinformation that is swirling around us at the moment. In the context of designation, the regulations now introduce offences relating to supporting the GRU Volunteer Corps, the IRGC and the IMCR. We expect platforms to act responsibly and not to provide space for state threat-linked activity, propaganda or recruitment. We will be keeping a close eye on that, as well as liaising with social media companies to tell them about how this law impacts them. We are clear that any harmful propaganda and material has no place on the internet, and we will continue to take robust action in response if we see it there. The designation introduces the supporting offence, which enables us to talk directly to those hosting such material.
Members including the hon. Member for Lewes and my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) talked about how important it is to defend our Jewish communities, and we all understand and support that. We all want to see antisemitism driven out of our country. This Government have introduced support for the Jewish communities who have been threatened and directly targeted by IRGC proxies. Just a couple of days ago, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced an extra £250 million for policing to ensure that we can support and protect our Jewish communities.
In general, the kind of attacks on our democratic way of life that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak talked about have been aimed also at the Muslim community. The rise of hate speech, intolerance, grievance and division is an issue that I, as current chair of the defending democracy taskforce, am only too aware of. We have to tackle this across Government, and I promise the House that we are doing that.
The debate has highlighted the seriousness of the threats posed, as did the debate we had before this one. All the cases that have been mentioned underline the need for a robust response to proxy activity on our streets that is state-directed. The United Kingdom faces a growing and evolving threat from foreign states and proxies acting on their behalf. Through this statutory instrument, we are strengthening our ability to respond effectively. We will protect our national security, support our communities and ensure that those who seek to undermine this country are met with a clear and firm response. I commend this instrument to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved.
Significant Data Breaches: Model Action Plan
Angela Eagle Excerpts(1 week, 6 days ago)
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The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)
Today the Government are publishing their model action plan for responding to significant data breaches.
The model action plan establishes a clear, consistent and co-ordinated approach to managing significant personal data breaches for Government Departments and arm’s length bodies while respecting their own accountabilities and their legal position as distinct data controllers. Publishing the MAP forms part of our commitment to raise information security standards. Implementing the MAP is a visible commitment to the public and to Parliament that the Government have a plan in place to minimise harm from future breaches.
I have placed a copy of the model action plan for responding to significant data breaches in the Library of each House. The model action plan will also be published on gov.uk.
[HCWS250]
Independent Review of Disclosure and Fraud Offences: Part Two
Angela Eagle Excerpts(2 weeks ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dame Angela Eagle)
My noble Friend the Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint), has today made the following written ministerial statement:
I am pleased to inform the House that the Home Office is today publishing Jonathan Fisher KC’s second and final report from the independent review of disclosure and fraud offences, Fraud in the Digital Age. The report examines the effectiveness of the current fraud framework and the barriers that inhibit the detection, investigation and prosecution of fraud committed against individuals and businesses.
I would like to record my thanks to Jonathan Fisher KC for this significant and authoritative contribution, and for his sustained leadership of the review across both phases. This includes his earlier report, Disclosure in the Digital Age, to which the Government has responded.
Together, the two reports reflect extensive engagement across the criminal justice system, law enforcement, regulatory bodies, academia and the private sector, and provide a comprehensive assessment of how fraud is now perpetrated and how the system should respond.
This second report lays bare the scale and seriousness of the challenge. Fraud now accounts for nearly half of all surveyed crime, making it the most prevalent offence faced by the public, including businesses. It is not a victimless or technical crime: it strikes directly at personal autonomy, causes profound emotional harm to victims, imposes significant costs on businesses and the wider economy, undermines public trust, and poses a growing threat to our national security and economic resilience.
The report identifies a set of structural and systemic factors that have allowed fraud to proliferate. It describes an age-old crime that has been supercharged by digital technology: offenders can operate at scale, at distance and across borders; and the likelihood of detection and prosecution remains low. Lengthy investigations, the growing complexity of digital material, limited specialist capability and fragmented responsibilities have combined to weaken deterrence and to create the perception among criminals that fraud is a low-risk, high-reward activity. The report is clear that the Government must match criminals’ innovation with their own.
Against that backdrop, the report emphasises that enforcement alone will not be sufficient. It makes 47 recommendations which collectively argue for a decisive shift in posture: from a system that is predominantly reactive and post-harm, to one that is proactive, disruptive and preventative. The recommendations are grouped around strengthening upstream disruption; improving public-private partnership and data sharing; increasing corporate accountability; responding to emerging technologies; and ensuring that consequences for fraud and fraud-enabling conduct are swifter, more certain and more visible, in order to increase deterrence and reinforce public confidence.
As set out in the Government’s fraud strategy 2026-29, we are already strengthening the tools available to disrupt fraud earlier and at scale, including through the exploration of civil penalties and international sanctions against high-harm overseas fraud actors. We are expanding international co-operation, sponsoring the Global Fraud summit 2026, to tackle fraud as a transnational threat.
Alongside this, through the Online Safety Act 2023, we are ensuring that tech companies are responsible for preventing fraudulent content and adverts from appearing on their platforms. We are deepening public-private partnerships by launching the online crime centre to disrupt online and volume cyber-fraud at scale, and to make the UK a harder place for criminals to commit fraud.
We are also working to improve the sharing and use of economic crime data, including through a recent call for evidence, and will consider the effectiveness of whistleblower incentivisation as part of the Government’s broader approach to strengthening the detection, prevention and enforcement of economic crime. Trusted reporting channels can play a vital role in surfacing information on fraud, corruption, sanctions evasion and other illicit activity, enabling earlier intervention and more effective disruption.
The report’s recommendations cut across the responsibilities of multiple departments, agencies and sectors. The Government will now consider them carefully and will respond in due course.
Tackling fraud requires sustained collaboration between Government, law enforcement, regulators, industry and civil society. This Government are determined to build momentum in the fight against fraud: to support victims, to pursue those who profit from deception, to strengthen deterrence, and to make the UK a safer place to live, work and do business.
The report is being presented to Parliament today as a Command Paper (CP 1600) and will be available on gov.uk.
[HCWS240]
National Security: State Threat Designations
Angela Eagle Excerpts(2 weeks, 1 day ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dame Angela Eagle)
The Government are today laying before Parliament draft regulations under the National Security Act 2023, as amended by the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026, to designate three bodies: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, and the main intelligence directorate of the general staff of the armed forces of the Russian Federation Volunteer Corps, or GRU VC. If approved by Parliament, these will be the first designations made under the new regime.
The National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 provides law enforcement and the intelligence agencies with an additional tool to disrupt and deter foreign power threat activity directed against the United Kingdom and its interests. The Act provides a power for the Home Secretary to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity, where it is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
Designation introduces new criminal offences relating to supporting, assisting, or obtaining material benefit from a designated body. Where an individual engages in espionage, sabotage or foreign interference for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit the designated body, they may also be charged under the National Security Act 2023. The maximum penalty for these offences reaches life imprisonment.
For a body to be designated, the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that it is, or has been, involved in foreign power threat activity and must consider that designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. Having considered the available evidence and taken advice from across Government and operational partners, the Home Secretary is satisfied that the statutory test is met in respect of the following three bodies.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
The IRGC is a central component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, answerable directly to Iran’s supreme leader. Its role extends far beyond that of a conventional military force. It encompasses intelligence activity, the use of proxy actors, and the projection of influence designed to advance Iranian state objectives.
The IRGC Qods Force and IRGC Intelligence Organisation, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. IRGC Qods Force maintains and operates covert intelligence networks around the world and plays a central role in extending Iranian influence across the middle east and beyond.
The United Kingdom has identified activity linked to the IRGC involving threats to life and intimidation on UK soil. In January 2024, the UK announced sanctions targeting Iranian officials responsible for threat to kill on UK soil and criminal gangs who do the regime’s bidding overseas. The Iranian officials designated under these sanctions were members of IRGC Unit 840, which was exposed in relation to plots to assassinate two Iran International TV journalists in the UK.
In 2022, the National Cyber Security Centre issued an advisory alongside international partners exposing malicious activity. The advisory highlighted the threat from cyber proxy actors affiliated with the IRGC targeting a broad range of entities, including entities across multiple US critical infrastructure sectors as well as Australian, Canadian and UK organisations.
The Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right
Between March and May 2026 there were a series of attacks and attempted attacks targeting Jewish communities, journalists and Israeli interests in the United Kingdom and across Europe. These incidents including acts of arson and intimidation, have caused real fear and distress, and have had a profound impact on those communities affected.
The Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, otherwise known as Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyah, has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities, and Persian-language media, including the antisemitic arson attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March.
Sitting behind IMCR were members of Iran’s IRGC Qods Force, which almost certainly directed IMCR attacks across Europe.
While the IRGC has already been sanctioned in its entirety by the UK, designation of both IMCR and IRGC under this framework will strengthen our ability to disrupt and take enforcement action against those supporting or facilitating this type of activity, and reinforces the UK’s position that these malign actions are unacceptable.
Main intelligence directorate of the general staff of the armed forces of the Russian Federation Volunteer Corps (GRU VC)
The Government assess that the GRU Volunteer Corps forms part of a network of volunteer and proxy formations that are controlled, co-ordinated and overseen by the main directorate of the general staff of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), Russia’s military intelligence service. The GRU has a long-standing record of state threats activity directed against the United Kingdom and its allies, including the 2018 Salisbury nerve agent attack, and wider sabotage and intelligence activity across Europe.
In 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defence introduced reforms that mandated that volunteer formations fighting in Ukraine should be brought under formal contractual arrangements with the GRU and the Russian Ministry of Defence. Since these reforms, the GRU has directly supervised and funded these volunteer formations, using them as recruitment and deployment mechanisms in support of Russian military and intelligence objectives. This includes elements of the former Wagner Group, which has conducted sabotage activity in the UK, and which now receive direct GRU tasking and supervision.
These arrangements are part of a broader model by which the Russian state combines conventional military capabilities with irregular and deniable forces, intended to project Russian power abroad and undermine European and NATO security.
As such, the Government assess that the GRU Volunteer Corps is involved in foreign power threat activity, including sabotage and other activity directed against the UK and Europe. This designation will strengthen the United Kingdom’s ability to disrupt activity linked to these formations and protect UK national security.
Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary has concluded that there is sufficient basis to reasonably believe that each of these bodies is engaged in foreign power threat activity, and that each designation is necessary to protect the safety and interests of the United Kingdom.
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Fraud Strategy 2026-29
Angela Eagle Excerpts(3 weeks ago)
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The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)
It is a great pleasure to be in this Chamber with you in the Chair, Mrs Harris. I congratulate the hon. Member for Yeovil (Adam Dance) on securing the debate. I also thank him for how he has set out some of the very difficult problems that all our constituents have faced as technology has provided the wherewithal to industrialise frauds and scams, often from abroad.
There is now no way to get a handle on what they are doing without involving ourselves in international co-operation. As technologies advance, the threat of these kinds of activities evolves, and we have to do what we can to try to keep pace with them and hopefully get ahead, so that we can do some prevention rather than trying to pick up the pieces after terrible things have happened.
At this juncture, I express my empathy and sympathy with the hon. Member’s constituents, some of whom he has mentioned today, including Christopher, who was the subject of a romance fraud, and Jason, who was subjected to fraudulent behaviour and the temptation of wealth creation that was not really there.
One thing that has struck me very strongly since I took up this post three weeks ago, and from my own constituency caseload over many years, is how invidious and difficult it is for the victims of these kinds of behaviours to admit that they have fallen into a trap, because many of them feel a bit silly and embarrassed and do not know where to turn to try to get redress. The way that redress has worked in this country in the past has not kept pace with the industrialisation of fraud, its international aspect and its sophistication. It has been difficult, therefore, as the hon. Member for Yeovil recounted, for systems to keep up.
People feel not only embarrassed, worried and a bit shameful that they have fallen into those traps, according to my constituency caseload, but they do not find it easy to get redress. I congratulate the hon. Member on his constituency work, and the way he has used the systems that we are putting in place to ensure that the money can be refunded in many cases, though obviously not all.
My esteemed colleague Lord Hanson leads on this area of work. Despite all the innovations in our constitution since I have been in this House, we do not allow Lords to speak in Commons debates, thank goodness. I am here, however, and more than happy to talk to Lord Hanson about some of these issues.
Before I come to the points raised, I want to make some simple but important ones of my own. Fraud is high volume and high harm, for the reasons the hon. Member for Yeovil outlined. Hon. Members will know that is true from their experience in advice surgeries. It deprives law-abiding people of their hard-earned money; it hits businesses with sometimes crippling losses; it destroys lives and livelihoods; it destroys confidence and mental health; it drains our economy; and it weakens our resilience and undermines confidence in the rule of law.
This problem is directly linked to my work as Security Minister, because it helps to fuel some of the most serious threats we face as a country, as well as causing the human harm we have heard of today. Our response has to match the scale and impact of the threat. I believe the Government have acted with clarity and ambition, with the new fraud strategy published in March, as the hon. Gentleman mentioned. I thank him for acknowledging that he was happy to see elements of that, such as crucial international action and the replacement of Action Fraud—it was so difficult to see any action coming from it that it would have been better named “Inaction Fraud”. Thankfully, that has been replaced.
As the strategy is put into effect, it will include Report Fraud, victim-support schemes and charters on advertising. In its broadest sense, the strategy brings together all parts of the system, including Government, law enforcement, industry and civil society, and goes further and faster in our fight to disrupt fraudsters and protect the public. The strategy is built on clear principles: to disrupt criminals, to safeguard people and businesses, to respond strongly, to protect victims and to enforce the law.
The Government have invested £250 million and will work with everyone to clamp down on the fraud epidemic. We will try to make that money work as hard as possible in co-operation with other parts of the system to get best value for money. To some extent, that is my answer to the question the hon. Member for Yeovil asked about whether £250 million is enough: it is not a bad start, and we will see how it develops to ensure that we cover the bases that we need to cover in this area as quickly as possible.
At the heart of the new approach is a new online crime centre, which has over £30 million of investment to bring Government, law enforcement, GCHQ and industry together in one place. Its mission is clear: to identify the technological enablers of fraud, which are rapidly evolving and industrialising, as I said before; to disrupt fraud at scale; and to deliver high-impact interventions at speed. The online crime centre is working on those things even as we speak.
Safeguarding and supporting victims is also at the forefront of the strategy. We are strengthening public awareness through an expanded “Stop! Think Fraud” campaign because it is important to remember that, as plausible as some of these people are, the more we can increase the suspicion and resilience of the people who interact in these systems, the more likely we are to be more resilient to fraud. I acknowledge absolutely that the psychological cleverness of a lot of fraud is something to behold. These people are very clever at what they do. They are very sophisticated in how they draw people in. All of us have a duty to try to warn individuals about the kind of dangers out there from those very sophisticated approaches.
Adam Dance
I thank the Minister for her answers. Does she agree that we should fully regulate the property training industry? That is a huge issue across the whole country and affects lots of people. As the Minister rightly said a second ago, people do not come forward because they are embarrassed, which is also why, unfortunately, they take their own lives.
Dame Angela Eagle
We need to look at where the issues are, where the loopholes are and where people are being exploited. We need to see what we can do, both as law enforcers and as regulators, to close those loopholes. I am not going to say yes immediately to the hon. Gentleman’s question, not least because it is not directly in my bivouac, but he can rest assured that we will look at the trends and see how we can harden the target, if I might put it that way. A whole range of individuals can be scammed and fall for very sophisticated frauds without realising—and by the time they do realise, it is too late.
Obviously the private sector, specifically the banking sector, has an important part to play with the warnings that it puts on its electronic banking systems. We need to do an enormous amount of co-operative work in all this, to ensure that our online crime centre can pick up and collaborate with all parts of the system that is there to try to protect people. As I said earlier, “Stop! Think Fraud” is an important part of that. If something looks too good to be true online, it almost certainly is. We have to get that education out there, be it through influencers or other types of people, to the people who are potential victims in this area.
Adam Dance
On banking, one of the biggest issues for Christopher was that his carer was turned away by Lloyds many times and sent online. We often see that issue because banks are shutting and we have banking hubs. Does the Minister agree that the banks should work more with people with neurodiversity and disabilities and work more to see those people face to face? There should also be more support in our banking hubs.
Dame Angela Eagle
The banking hubs are at an early stage of their development. They are a good development. At the moment, they are less sophisticated in the services that they can offer. We have to work with banks, which are—because most of their customers wish it—going online and leaving the high street. That does leave in a more vulnerable situation people who perhaps are more vulnerable to being scammed online. In our work with the banks, we have to try to make the case that they need to have special relationships and ways of dealing with those who are neurodiverse or who may be easier, in some ways, to fool. In my experience, almost anyone can become a victim of this kind of fraud if they get caught at a vulnerable moment or when they are upset about something, so we have to deal with education in a much more holistic way, rather than just categorising people. But I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point.
Using data from Report Fraud, we are improving our ability to identify emerging fraud trends and local fraud hotspots, which enables us to work with police forces and community partners to deliver targeted interventions where we see they are needed most. We are just beginning to get to the stage at which we can start spotting these kinds of trends and trying to prevent them, rather than trying to pick up the pieces after a fraud has happened.
It is equally important to co-ordinate the fraud protect networks, for which City of London police has responsibility. Bringing together local, regional and national law enforcement, the network helps to reduce the threat of fraud and repeat victimisation through consistent prevention messaging, practical safeguarding advice and targeted public engagement. I think that as we see more of these issues developing, we will be able to see what the trends are and be more preventive and ahead of the trends before they cause damage.
An estimated 70% of fraud has an international element: it knows no borders. As part of our effort to counter that, the UK sponsored the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and Interpol global fraud summit in March. That ministerial summit brought together over 1,000 attendees across 115 Governments, over 40 Ministers and senior law enforcement, and over 500 private sector companies, including big tech, with the aim of strengthening international co-operation, raising global standards and agreeing co-ordinated, multi-sector action plans to deal with fraud. We also want to do what we can to try to shut down some of the scam centres that we know are appearing in particular areas of the world; where we can, we will sign memorandums of understanding with countries that may have a particular issue that we see impinging on our citizens.
The international part is extremely important. As the hon. Member for Yeovil mentioned in his speech, working with the telecoms companies and the big tech companies is equally important. I assure him that our new fraud strategy is particularly aimed at being able to ensure that we bring these different strands together and bear down on the current levels of fraud, which are completely unacceptable.
Question put and agreed to.
National Security (State Threats) Bill
Angela Eagle ExcerptsMonday 6th July 2026
(3 weeks, 1 day ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 View all National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 35-I(b) Manuscript amendment for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (30 Jun 2026)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)
I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.
Madam Deputy Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendments 2 to 6.
Dame Angela Eagle
The first duty of any Government is and will forever be to secure this country and keep all its inhabitants safe. It is a mission that has challenged us relentlessly, but it has grown and evolved in recent years. The threat posed by foreign powers will be known by all here: physical threats against individuals and property; theft of trade secrets; attempts to interfere in and influence our democracy; and cyber-attacks targeting both the state and the private sector that disrupt critical infrastructure and compromise sensitive data.
As the House has heard many times before, the source of those threats has come predominantly, though not exclusively, from three countries: Russia, China and Iran. The threats from each present differently, but those threats are very real, and they are evolving. The Bill before us will strengthen the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counter-terrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK. In developing this legislation, we have worked closely with the police, security and the intelligence agencies. The Bill gives our operational partners the powers that they need, and it does so in a way that reflects the differences between state and non-state actors. As Jonathan Hall himself has said, this Bill “does the job”.
As the Bill progressed through its stages, the Government listened carefully to the arguments about legitimate humanitarian assistance, as well as concerns expressed by non-governmental organisations and the International Development Committee. The Government’s position remains that the Bill should not criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid work or the important work of journalists and diplomats.
Kim Johnson (Liverpool Riverside) (Lab)
I welcome Lords amendments 1 to 6, which clarify the Bill. However, as the Bill stands, journalists could still face a prison sentence of 10 to 14 years for working with or even approaching sources in hostile Governments. Will the Minister consider pausing the legislation so that we can go back to the drawing board?
Dame Angela Eagle
I do not agree with my hon. Friend’s interpretation of the Bill at all. The threats that we are facing mean that this Bill ought to be on the statute book sooner rather than later, so that we can begin to deal with them.
As I was saying, the Government’s position remains that the Bill should not criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid work or the important work of journalists and diplomats, and it remains our view that the Bill does not have that effect. However, to avoid a potential chilling effect, the Government felt that it was better to accept amendments to the Bill to put that matter beyond doubt. That is why the Government supported amendments 1, 2, 4 and 6, tabled by Baroness Northover in the other place.
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Your Party)
I am pleased that the Minister is accepting the amendments. This will hopefully give some comfort to journalists in every war zone who are in incredibly precarious situations, where somebody usually accuses them of being terrorists for what they are reporting. The number of journalists killed around the world is rising year on year, so what practical support will the Government be able to give to the journalists or journalists’ unions that face these very real threats?
Dame Angela Eagle
We are very confident that the Bill as it is written does not place journalists in any jeopardy. In fact, these measures allow us to act against those who are conducting harmful activity in the UK, including targeting journalists here in the UK because of their attempts to expose activities in other regimes. The right hon. Gentleman makes a more general point about the jeopardy in which journalists put themselves in war zones, and I would agree that their news reporting is some of the bravest. We all support a free press and journalists’ ability to report in war zones, but I would say respectfully to him that these things are slightly different and he is combining the two issues. We are convinced that this Bill does not and will not put journalists in any more jeopardy in this country—certainly not for reporting.
Baroness Northover tabled amendments 1, 2, 4 and 6 in the other place. They introduce a new defence into the offences at new sections 17B and 17C of the National Security Act 2023, specifically to cover legitimate humanitarian aid activity. This means that non-governmental organisations that have to engage with a designated body in order to carry out legitimate humanitarian activity will benefit from the same protections under the Bill as do UK diplomats.
The Government also supported amendments 3 and 5, which were tabled by Lord Anderson. These amendments were based on the advice of Jonathan Hall KC and also had the support of Lord Carlile. They add a reasonable excuse defence in new section 17C of the 2023 Act for obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from a designated body. This means that where a person has a reasonable excuse for receiving information from a designated body, they benefit from a defence. This might include, for example, a journalist conducting an interview or a charity receiving information on the location of landmines. The Government considered the case for exempting humanitarian NGOs from the offences, but we were advised by our operational partners that this would provide a loophole that hostile actors would seek to exploit, which in turn could make the NGOs themselves a target for infiltration. In fact, that is the case that I made to this Chamber in Committee.
I am grateful to the other place and the International Development Committee for their engagement on this Bill and for the constructive amendments, which have helped strengthen the Bill and broaden its support. The Bill represents an important new addition to our toolkit to address the growing threat from foreign powers. As I said in Committee, my officials have worked closely with operational partners in the creation of this power and the accompanying offences, and our partners are fully supportive of the Bill. It closes a gap, and they have been explicit that it provides them with vital tools capable of addressing the sharpest threats that they are tackling.
Madam Deputy Speaker
I call the Minister to wind up. As I said, an hour and 15 minutes is yours.
Dame Angela Eagle
I am grateful for the contributions of all right hon. and hon. Members. The hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers) was worried that we had changed the Bill in a way that would make it less effective, and my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) still made the case for having an exemption rather than a defence for humanitarian assistance. I confirm that in our view the Bill as originally written would have excluded humanitarian assistance completely, because of the primary purpose rule, but we felt that there was some merit in the argument about the chilling effect of not having a defence. That is why we accepted the amendments in the other place, but that is belt and braces—nothing has changed. We are trying to accommodate potentially legitimate worries and chilling effects that might have an effect on the operational effectiveness of some NGOs, even though the law itself would not have caught them.
Dame Angela Eagle
Yes, my hon. Friend may know her Pepper v. Hart, and I have just put it on the record in this House, but obviously I will take a close look at the guidance as it is developed.
The hon. Member for Woking (Mr Forster) made a powerful speech, particularly about the rising level of threat that we face. That is why the Bill needs to be on the statute book as quickly as possible. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) asked about the designated threats defence. Again, the answer is the same: it is about the chilling effect.
David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)
To return to the point made by the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards), it is clear that this new piece of legislation could allow hostile states to set up shell charities or hide behind humanitarian cover. As a matter of purely operational wording, does the British state have the ability to actually identify whether that is happening and put a stop to it?
Dame Angela Eagle
I do not want us to go into specific examples, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we keep a very close eye on what proxy actors and state actors by proxy are doing in our country. We believe that designation, which is what this quite narrow Bill will allow us to do, will make it much clearer that we know what they are doing. It will make for a harder operating environment for those who wish us ill and are directed by state actors. That is what the legislation is intended to do.
Against a backdrop of growing threat from foreign states and their proxies, including through espionage, interference, sabotage and threats to life, the Bill will strengthen the ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counter-terrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats in the UK. It will create a new power for the Secretary of State to designate organisations involved in foreign power threat activity, backed up by new criminal offences of supporting, assisting or obtaining benefits from designated bodies.
There has been some concern, both in this House and in the other place, regarding potential unintended consequences, but I reassure the House that the Bill was never intended to, and does not, criminalise genuine humanitarian activity by NGOs or journalists or other legitimate activities. We have listened to the arguments, and it is right to put that matter beyond doubt. The amendments do that. We have worked closely with operational partners, and I am satisfied that these narrow amendments do not weaken the Bill.
The Bill will enable proxy organisations to be treated in practice like foreign intelligence services, making it easier to prosecute those acting on their behalf. Overall, this manifesto commitment will strengthen the national security framework so that the UK becomes a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services and state-linked proxies. With that, I commend the Lords amendments to the House.
Question put, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.
Cabinet Office
Angela Eagle Excerpts(4 weeks, 1 day ago)
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The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) on securing the debate. He will, of course, know the importance to this Government of the topics discussed today. Keeping the country safe is the first responsibility of any Government, and as the world changes, the way we uphold that responsibility must change with it. This adaptability is set out in the national security strategy, published last year at the beginning of the NATO summit in The Hague. Alongside it was the commitment to spend 5% of GDP on national security by 2035—3.5% for core defence spending and 1.5% for broader resilience and security spending.
The Majority of the UK’s hard national security capabilities, such as the recently announced 150,000 drones that the Ministry of Defence will supply to Ukraine by the end of the year, are funded and delivered by line departments. The Cabinet Office’s role is ensuring the effective running of government, and co-ordinating cross-cutting policies and operations. More than 90% of the national security and resilience budget for the Cabinet Office is therefore spent on the day-to-day running costs of the National Security Secretariat. That is a vital body that works with Departments to implement the national security strategy. It develops, leads and delivers policy across Government, and aligns, convenes and brokers the collective efforts of our stakeholders and partners on all aspects of national security. It is the nerve centre of our collective cross-Government security response. However, that spending it is not by any means the vast amount that is spent on national security and resilience across Government.
The Cabinet Office does invest in some assets. For example, the National Situation Centre, which is highly regarded internationally, provides situational awareness for crisis response by bringing together data analysis and expertise. The emergency alerts system is one of many public warning and informing capabilities that the UK Government, devolved Governments and category 1 responders have at their disposal. Since its launch, it has become an integral part of keeping the public safe, allowing the quick sharing of lifesaving information, and it is regularly tested to ensure its resilience. The UK Resilience Academy forms an important part of the skills and engagement offer. It was established in April last year to build the skills that are needed across the whole of society to respond to emergencies.
The national security strategy consolidates various reviews and strategies related to national security into a single, coherent framework. It outlines the strategic context, identifies the main challenges we face as a nation in an era of radical uncertainty, and establishes the framework that the UK uses to guide its actions both at home and abroad. It is both a clear-eyed and a hard-edged plan to deal with the breadth of the challenges that we face, setting out a long-term vision for how we will do three crucial things: protect security at home, promote strength abroad, and increase our sovereign and asymmetric capabilities.
The Government have developed an internal implementation approach to ensure the accountability and delivery of the national security strategy, as well as ensuring that we adapt to a volatile geopolitical landscape. That is why our national security is not the remit of one Department or Minister. We have identified specific objectives, and have assigned lead and assisting Departments to deliver them. Departments are responsible for periodic reporting on progress, and taking action to address any deficiencies.
The Government will continue to update the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy on progress, through formal public sessions and confidential sessions where appropriate. As part of the implementation of the strategy, we continue to make ourselves a harder target for hostile actors who seek to exploit our open, democratic society. That includes bolstering our cyber and economic security defences, which are essential to the fostering of innovation and growth.
Additionally, we are strengthening the defence of our borders and territorial waters.
In April the former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), exposed covert Russian undersea activity, paying tribute to the readiness of the UK’s armed forces to respond. In May, Baroness Lloyd, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, outlined DSIT’s plans to present new legislative proposals to modernise and strengthen penalties for malicious activity impacting our undersea infrastructure.
As I am sure events in recent weeks have made clear, our overriding priority is ensuring stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, starting with our unwavering support for Ukraine. In total, the UK has committed up to £25 billion for Ukraine: £16 billion in military support, £5.6 billion in non-military support, and £3.5 billion in UK export finance. We continue to go further, renewing and deepening our key alliances, particularly those with the United States and the European Union. All this work is bolstered by new international partnerships, especially in emerging policy areas such as technology—for example, the UK-India technology security initiative and the UK-Japan frontier technology partnership.
It remains the Government’s intention to publish the defence investment plan before the NATO summit, which will take place on 7 July. The plan will set out much of our future strategy when it comes to how we will protect and defend our country. Let me give Members some idea of its focus. We will rebuild our core defence industrial base, focusing on achieving greater resilience in our stockpiles and supporting warfighting readiness.
Sir Julian Lewis
I am going to ask the rather obvious question. Given that the plan is to be put forward under the existing Prime Minister, does that mean that if the new Prime Minister wishes to change it, it will be changed, or will the commitment that is to be made to the forthcoming NATO Assembly have to stand as it is?
Dame Angela Eagle
As always, the right hon. Gentleman has asked a very important question. I think the key thing to understand is that this work is ongoing, and that there will be co-operation between the current Prime Minister and—I do not want to get ahead of what Labour party members might decide to do—whoever the next Prime Minister will be. I hope that gives the right hon. Gentleman some assurance.
Beyond defence, we will identify, protect and cultivate other sovereign capabilities, such as foundational industries and frontier technologies, that are critical to our industrial base and national competitiveness. I was interested by what my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington said in this connection. We are in close contact and collaboration with states such as Canada to learn as much as we can about how they do resilience, although I might gently suggest that the Canadian landmass is slightly different from the UK landmass when it comes to thinking of organising a defence for it, and slightly different approaches will clearly have to be taken, given the geographical realities. However, there is much on which we can co-operate.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Order. The hon. Member has been here throughout the debate.
Mr Snowden
Thank you very much for coming to my assistance, Madam Deputy Speaker—or to my defence, rather ironically.
The Minister has touched on critical industries as a key part of our defence plans for the future. Does she agree that our sovereign capability to manufacture our own fighter aircraft is critical, and does she share my dismay that our production lines sit empty, with no orders from the Government to maintain that sovereign capability?
Dame Angela Eagle
All I will say is that it is important that we rebuild our industrial infrastructure and make sure that we not only maintain but strengthen our sovereign capabilities, not only for now but with forward-looking tech and investment. The Government are determined to do that.
A foundation of our national security is our ability to assess, mitigate, respond to and recover from the risks that we face, should they manifest. These risks could come from anywhere. They could be natural hazards, as we have all been experiencing over the last few days, or they could be deliberate attacks, disease outbreaks or other civil emergencies.
Dame Angela Eagle
I agree, and it is important for the hon. Lady to understand that we are integrating climate change risks into our work. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is the leading Department on work on climate adaptation, not mitigation. It is important that lead Departments can focus on the issue at hand, and DEFRA is doing adaptation.
Dr Chowns
One of the key points that I tried to get across in my speech is that this has to be a whole-of-Government effort. DEFRA cannot put in place a strategy to adapt the health service to the reality of climate change. It cannot put in place a strategy to adapt our schools, our transport infrastructure or our energy infrastructure to the reality of climate change. Does the Minister not recognise that this has to be a whole-of-Government effort, and that it is not something that DEFRA can hold? That is precisely why we need a Cabinet Office Minister to lead on climate resilience.
Dame Angela Eagle
The hon. Lady points out that adaptation is a cross-Government, cross-departmental thing. The way that the UK Government are organised means that Departments that are responsible for school buildings or transport deal with the adaptation issues that crop up in those Departments. I do not disagree with the hon. Lady’s analysis, but while the Cabinet Office does have a co-ordinating role, I do not necessarily think that having a Minister co-ordinating it would make an awful lot of difference.
Alicia Kearns
Since as early as 2013, when I was working with the Cabinet Office—specifically with the Joint Intelligence Organisation and others—climate change has been included in the matrix that it is required to plan for, respond to and seek to mitigate from a national security perspective. It is very much reflected in the national —I have forgotten the exact words, but it is the one that does not have an acronym. That is what happens when you work on something for too long. Climate change is in there and has been in there for a very long time, even way back when I was a civil servant.
Dame Angela Eagle
The hon. Lady is correct, and she talks about mitigation. There is also an adaptation issue here, which I was addressing, but clearly the cross-departmental nature of co-ordination happens within the Cabinet Office.
Our country’s resilience is front and centre of our approach to national security. Without security and resilience at home, we cannot deliver economic growth or any of our other missions to improve the lives of the British people.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) gave a good speech about what happens if corruption is allowed to get out of hand and people who defraud the public purse of money are allowed to get away with it. I thank him for asking important questions about Tom Hayhoe’s recommendations. I promise to make inquiries with colleagues in Government, and commit to writing to him about the specific issues that he raised in his speech.
The Government inherited a resilience landscape that had too often been neglected, leaving our nation exposed to the shocks of an increasingly volatile world. The resilience action plan, published last July, sets out the Government’s strategic approach to creating a stronger and more resilient UK, and the steps being taken to deliver it. We face a rapidly changing global risk landscape. From severe weather to geopolitical instability, the risks are complex and numerous. We must be honest with the public about the challenges while demonstrating our resolve to address them head-on, and we have to strike a balance by giving an appropriate warning without panicking people. Building a truly resilient society requires a fundamental cultural shift in the way that emergency preparedness is thought about. That includes being clear about the risks we face and the actions that we can all take to improve collective resilience, as the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) said from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench.
In summary, our No. 1 priority is to keep the country safe. The Government are undertaking plenty of work within our own shores to strengthen our stance, which is further bolstered by our unshakeable commitment to Europe-wide security. That responsibility has been spread right across the Government, and it is emblematic of the good work that can come when collaboration is at the heart of planning. Thanks to this work, the risk landscape is not an unknown country; we have made it familiar terrain through rigorous mapping of what could harm us and our citizens, and of what our response should be. It is through level-headed planning that we will create resilience at home and, through that work, create a secure foundation for families, businesses and economies to thrive.
Oral Answers to Questions
Angela Eagle Excerpts(1 month ago)
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Andrew George (St Ives) (LD)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)
Through our resilience action plan, we are driving a whole-of-society approach to resilience, which seeks to integrate the voluntary, community and faith sectors into planning and strengthening the resilience of our critical national infrastructure. The Government are also committed to raising public awareness, with practical advice through gov.uk/prepare.
Andrew George
Nearly six months ago, my west Cornwall and Isles of Scilly constituency bore the brunt of Storm Goretti, which caused death and destruction across the area. Will Ministers work with local MPs in Cornwall and on the Isles of Scilly to review resilience plans to improve co-ordination on the resilience of nationally regulated utilities and telecom providers, including by reviewing the current timetable for the January 2027 digital switchover?
Dame Angela Eagle
I recognise that the hon. Gentleman’s constituents have concerns, as do the constituents of other Cornish Members of Parliament who have talked to me. Hundreds were left without telecom services for days after Storm Goretti, which is clearly unacceptable. It is important that we work with telecoms operators and power suppliers to strengthen comms resilience across Cornwall. I will take a close look at that.
Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent and Rhymney) (Lab)
There is awful news from Venezuela this morning after an earthquake there. Has the Minister had the opportunity to speak to her Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office ministerial counterpart about support for that country at this difficult time?
Dame Angela Eagle
The overnight news of the earthquake in Venezuela, which has caused a lot of damage, is very concerning. I know that my colleagues in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office stand ready, as do we, to help with any recovery that the people of Venezuela may need, particularly in terms of rescue at this stage.
Kerry McCarthy (Bristol East) (Lab)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)
We are delivering our resilience action plan to strengthen national resilience, and we are building a system in which Government, business and society work together to anticipate and mitigate the risks facing our country.
Kerry McCarthy
I am sure that I am not the only one who feels that they are not designed to withstand the current heat—and neither are many of our public buildings and infrastructure. May I urge the Minister to make sure, while also talking to colleagues in other Departments, that we factor in climate resilience when we plan future infrastructure and funding for housing, schools and hospitals?
Dame Angela Eagle
The national risk register includes the effects of climate change. Although the Government are working internationally on mitigation, it is also important that adaptation takes centre stage when the kinds of investment decisions my hon. Friend mentions are made. I assure her that the Government are across that.
John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)
Asbestos is widespread in public infrastructure. Asbestos-related diseases are the No. 1 cause of occupational death, with 5,000 a year —I lost my own father nearly 10 years ago. The right hon. Member for East Ham (Sir Stephen Timms), now the Minister for Social Security and Disability, said just four years ago that the UK needed to move faster to align to standards in the EU that are now significantly higher. I raise this matter because I would like the UK to improve its asbestos resilience, which is critical if we are to save lives.
Dame Angela Eagle
I certainly empathise and sympathise with the right hon. Gentleman’s loss. The loss of a parent in similar circumstances has been felt in many other households because of the toll taken by the legacy of asbestos on our public buildings and our buildings generally—not least this one. I take the point that he has made. We always need to be looking at how we can improve our response to mitigate the very real threat that the remaining asbestos in our buildings leaves people dealing with.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
Having spoken to ambassadors from various nations, such as the Scandinavian and Baltic states, as well as to the high commissioner of Canada, I understand that so many of these countries are now planning for dual-use infrastructure, for instance by expanding the width of motorways so that they can be considered for use by military aircraft in future conflict. Will the Minister update the House on our thinking in that domain?
Dame Angela Eagle
Dual-use infrastructure is an important part of how we do planning, and my hon. Friend is right that we have to be much smarter and more forward thinking than perhaps has been the case, knowing that we face a very volatile and rapidly changing series of threats ahead.
Helen Morgan (North Shropshire) (LD)
Water resilience is very much on people’s minds this week. When a canal embankment collapsed in Whitchurch in my constituency just before Christmas, I found out that the canal network is used for drinking water, and that millions of gallons of drinking water will be being pumped over the breach every single day until it is repaired. Canal embankments are often 200 years old and largely made of sand, yet they are critical national infrastructure. Is the Minister satisfied that the Government are doing enough to retain the canal network in a safe state, not only to keep people safe but to protect our water resilience?
Dame Angela Eagle
When I was first in government in 1997, I discovered that I was the Minister for Canals, which was a particularly enjoyable part of the brief, so I understand what the hon. Lady is saying. My previous Department, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, does a lot on this issue, so I will contact the Water Minister. We can liaise, and I will be in touch with the hon. Lady.
Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)
We are driving a step change in national resilience through our resilience action plan. Central to that is our national security risk assessment, which embeds clear accountability for lead Government Departments across all risks. We are further enhancing this co-ordination by publishing updated guidance this year. That will ensure that every Department is fully equipped to deliver its responsibilities and works seamlessly across the resilience cycle to keep the country safe.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
Space has a crucial role to play in our national resilience. Responsibility for it cuts across Government Departments. With that in mind, and given the Cabinet Office’s role in cross-Government co-ordination, can the Minister confirm when the National Space Council will next convene?
Dame Angela Eagle
I will get back to the hon. Gentleman. I have to confess that I have not had my briefing on space yet.
Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)
I would just say to the Minister: live long and prosper. This heatwave may be considered as much man-made as naturally occurring. I am really concerned about the heat, not just in Westminster but in my constituency of Harlow. What are the Government doing to ensure that the country is resilient when it comes to heat? I know that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has had conversations about water safety, and what we can do to ensure the safety of young people, or others, who take risks in water because of the hot weather.
Dame Angela Eagle
I know that the extreme heat has extended even to Harlow, which has surprised some people; it indicates the nature of the threat. We have had a red alert. I will repeat the advice to drink plenty of fluids, and those who are travelling should take a lot of water with them, and be sensible and careful in these conditions. Clearly, water safety is an important issue. The National Fire Chiefs Council has issued good advice about water safety. If you are too hot, jumping into a very cold body of water is not a good idea, tempting though it may seem.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
Laura Kyrke-Smith (Aylesbury) (Lab)
The threats we face from hostile states are unprecedented in my lifetime, and geography is deceptive; we do not share a border with Russia or Iran, but our critical infrastructure is well within their reach, from hospital networks to transport networks and our banking systems. What are Ministers doing to prepare for these threats and build our national resilience, including making sure that the public know what is at stake?
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Dame Angela Eagle)
My hon. Friend is quite right to identify the threats from hostile foreign actors that we currently face, which evolve and rapidly change. I can assure her that we will continue not only to track those threats, but to give advice and information that helps businesses, communities and individuals to deal with them.
Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)
Food security is national security, and I am glad that the Government recognised that earlier this year. It is critical national infrastructure. As the Government pursue their building of 1.5 million homes, with which I absolutely agree, can we make sure that the Minister’s Department talks to other Departments across Government so that we do not lose valuable agricultural land? We are already importing 55% of our food, and this house building could undermine the UK’s already fragile food sector.
Dame Angela Eagle
I assure the House that, given the Department I was in previously, I am able to join up the “food security is national security” mantra in a stronger way than has perhaps happened. The Government’s land use framework, which was published earlier in the year, demonstrates how we can ensure through multiple land use that we can build the homes we need and grow the food we need. The farming road map published yesterday demonstrates a plan for growth for UK primary production.
Martin Rhodes (Glasgow North) (Lab)
What steps is the Cabinet Office taking to co-ordinate work across Government on national resilience, particularly in relation to supporting SMEs in extreme weather conditions, such as we have at the moment?
Dame Angela Eagle
SMEs, individuals and communities should look at the national advice that is published and check on gov.uk/protect, so that they can take the advice. It is simple and it is up there.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
In Northern Ireland, a 2024 study found that only around one fifth of direct public procurement spend across the wider public sector is awarded to small businesses. Given the reliance on smaller businesses in Northern Ireland, what steps will the Minister take with Cabinet colleagues to improve their access to public procurement?
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
Following the attack on the Prime Minister’s home and car, what measures are being taken to protect recently resigned or other senior leaders of Government?
Dame Angela Eagle
We always assess security risks on a case-by-case basis, and we do not discuss what they are in public.
State Threat Prevention and Investigation Measures: 20 March 2026 to 19 June 2026
Angela Eagle Excerpts(1 month ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dame Angela Eagle)
Section 55(1) of the National Security Act 2023 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of their STPIM powers under the Act during that period.
STPIMs were introduced through the 2023 Act and came into force on 20 December 2023. There have been no STPIM cases imposed to date.
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