(11 years, 7 months ago)
Written StatementsHM Treasury is today laying before Parliament a copy of the report of Peter Bloxham’s review of the Investment Bank Special Administration Regulations 2011.
Those regulations, made under the Banking Act 2009, came into force on 8 February 2011. In accordance with section 236 of the Act, the Treasury arranged for a review of the effect of the regulations to be completed within two years of the date on which those regulations came into force. Mr Bloxham was appointed on 28 November 2012, and reported to the Treasury on 7 February 2013.
The Act requires a review of investment bank insolvency regulations to consider, in particular, how far the regulations are achieving the objectives specified for the special administration regime, and whether the regulations should continue to have effect. The specified objectives are:
identifying, protecting, and facilitating the return of client assets;
protecting creditors’ rights;
ensuring certainty for investment banks, creditors, clients, liquidators and administrators;
minimising the disruption of business and markets; and
maximising the efficiency and effectiveness of the financial services industry in the United Kingdom.
Mr Bloxham’s terms of reference set out a two-stage process. The first stage asked him to answer the statutory questions set out above in a report to Treasury. The second stage asks him to consider further possible changes to the special administration regime to improve its operation, as well as wider changes which might provide for a better administration process beyond the narrow bounds of the regime itself.
He concludes that the special administration regime does fulfil a useful purpose and should therefore be retained, but subject to amendment. His report goes on to make a number of recommendations for possible improvement.
The Treasury welcomes this report and accepts the conclusion that the investment firm special administration regime should be retained. The Treasury also accepts that amendments to that regime will be necessary if it is to be better able to fulfil the objectives set for it.
I have therefore asked Peter Bloxham to consider further possible changes to the regime, as recommended in his report. I expect him to report to the Treasury over the summer. The Treasury will also lay that report before Parliament and make a further statement.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House approves, for the purposes of section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993, the Government’s assessment as set out in the Budget Report, combined with the Office for Budget Responsibility’s Economic and Fiscal Outlook, which forms the basis of the United Kingdom’s Convergence Programme.
I welcome this opportunity to listen to Members’ views on the British Government’s submission to be made this year under section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993. It is nice to see the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) in his place. I think we have spent more time opposite each other than we have with our respective spouses in recent weeks.
As in previous years, the Government will provide information to the European Commission on the UK’s economic and budgetary position in line with our commitments under the EU stability and growth pact. This submission, known as the convergence programme, is a legal requirement under agreements this country has entered into, and of course the British Government take such commitments seriously. One must also say, however, that its very name represents something of a relic from a past age—a time when Britain was still ruled by a Government committed in principle to joining the single currency. I can assure the House that that era is well and truly dead and buried.
Members might well ask what purpose is served by this annual exercise and the associated debate in the House. [Interruption.] I thought that this might find an echo in the Chamber. Without wishing to anticipate Members’ contributions, which I look forward to, I would like to suggest three areas for this afternoon’s discussion. I wish first to debate British economic policy within the still relevant context of Europe; secondly, to consider the co-ordination of national economic policies across the EU; and thirdly to reflect on our great good fortune in not having joined the single currency, despite the siren voices heard in this place and elsewhere—thanks, in no small measure, to those who had the courage and foresight to speak against British involvement at a time when their warnings were subject to such derision.
I remember a time when all three major parties, the TUC and just about every good and great person across the land supported joining the exchange rate mechanism. I was one of those who from the beginning said that we should not do so. At the moment, we are all against the single currency, but I remember a time when even the Minister’s party was moving in that direction.
I do not think that that is entirely right, although I happily acknowledge that the hon. Gentleman was on the side of right throughout. I remember working for the Foreign Secretary when he was leader of our party. In November 1997, when, as the hon. Gentleman said, the received opinion was that our joining was inevitable, my right hon. Friend made the courageous decision to set out in a lecture to the conference of the CBI, which then was in favour of joining, the forensic reasons why it would not be in our interests. He committed then, right at the beginning of the parliamentary process that resulted in these measures, to campaign for Britain to stay outside it. While I acknowledge the hon. Gentleman’s distinguished record, I think he would acknowledge that the Conservative party was the first party to commit itself to oppose these measures.
The Government plan to make their submission by 30 April, with the approval, we hope, of both Houses of Parliament. It explains the Government’s medium-term fiscal policies, as already set out in the 2012 autumn statement and Budget 2013, and includes the Office for Budget Responsibility’s forecasts. We think it right and proper to draw from previously published documents presented to Parliament, rather than incur the cost and time to produce bespoke documents for this purpose.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that the very document to which he refers states:
“The IMF forecasts UK GDP per person to grow faster than the rest of the G7 between 2012 and 2017, with the exception of the US”?
Of course, he will have read the comments made by Madame Lagarde only yesterday. Does he not find them a little incongruous, given that the IMF is now taking rather a different view?
The IMF is considering its view, and we will see what it has to say in the months ahead, when it issues its review. We have always been clear that, as we have advised all EU member states, keeping control of finances is an important precondition for growth. That is an important matter.
As I said, we have been parsimonious in not generating excess quantities of paper. Members will be aware—certainly my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) will be—that we did not follow the advice that other countries followed and align our financial year to fit in with the norm in Europe. We think it right to stick with our financial year and make use of the documents presented.
With the Budget announcement having taken place on 20 March, shortly before Easter, I appreciate that the timetable was tight, but we made every effort to provide early copies of the convergence programme to the House and the other place in advance of this debate.
What was going on with the Order Paper before the debate? I think that the Leader of the House, or perhaps the Minister, tabled a motion not to have this debate, but to kick it up to a Delegated Legislation Committee. I understand that some hon. Members, including the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), objected, and now we are not debating whether to have the debate upstairs. What was going on? Why did the Government try to shove this out of the line of sight?
The hon. Gentleman is aware that I am always happy to debate with him, especially on the Floor of the House, which I very much prefer. He will know that at this time in the parliamentary Session, as we approach the end of the Parliament, the business managers—the Leader of the House is here—are particularly jealous of the Chamber’s time, including in respect of the sorts of debate we have had today. They had the foresight, however, to anticipate being fortunate enough to have some time today on the Floor of the House. It was right, therefore, that we agreed with the proposal, and here we are today.
As I said, we have economically re-versioned the Budget 2013 document to set out the Government’s assessment of the UK’s medium-term economic and budgetary position. As confirmed by the independent OBR, the UK economy is still recovering from the biggest financial crisis in generations, one of the deepest recessions suffered by any major economy and a decade of hollow growth built on unsustainable debt levels. In June 2010, the Government set out a comprehensive strategy to deal with the deficit, protect the economy and provide for the foundations of recovery. This economic plan combines monetary activism with fiscal responsibility and supply side reform.
The Government are making progress. We have restored fiscal credibility, thus enabling an activist monetarist policy and the automatic stabilisers to support the economy. The deficit has been cut by a third over three years and is projected to fall in every year of the forecast. The OBR has judged that the Government remain on track to meet the fiscal mandate one year early, while 1.25 million private sector jobs have been created. Employment is just below record levels and we have kept interest rates at near-record levels, helping families and businesses.
However, there is much more to do. It is important that we understand why the road to recovery has been more difficult than was first anticipated. Although Opposition Front Benchers profess an internationalist outlook, they sometimes debate economic policy as though Britain’s economy was closed off from the rest of the world and invulnerable to other countries.
Given that we have faithfully submitted convergence programme documents every year for a number of years, is the Minister as surprised as I am that some of our continental neighbours have not taken a bit more notice of the path that this Government have pursued or taken a bit more action to get their spending in line, as this Government have?
In fact, some countries are recognising that, but we want to set an example. It is important that we stick to our plans and continue to benefit from the confidence that the markets have shown through the level of interest rates. We also say in our deliberations in Brussels, as well as making the point in budget discussions, that when times are difficult, belts need to tightened.
I must say that I am astonished. It is almost as if no one in the Chamber has read the newspapers over the weekend and seen the IMF report that it got the premise for austerity completely wrong. Owing to a mistaken figure in a spreadsheet, we are all going for austerity, which is a terrible mistake. Is that not the reality?
I do not agree with that. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the IMF recommends to many countries around the world, not least in Europe—this is the point my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) referred to—that they should get their public finances in order.
When the Office for Budget Responsibility revised its forecast for global economic growth—and eurozone growth in particular—and world trade downwards, that had an inevitable impact on UK growth, given that the euro area is the destination for 40% of UK exports. Over the past year, net trade was the key factor in the underperformance of the economy relative to earlier OBR forecasts, as well as in the downward revision of the forecasts this year and the year after. Fiscal consolidation, on the other hand, has not had a larger drag on the economy than the OBR expected in June 2010. Indeed, the UK’s fiscal situation argues strongly in favour of maintaining our commitment to deficit reduction.
Opposition Members sometimes accuse us of going too far, too fast, but there is further to go and we must get there as fast as we sensibly can, not least because so much rests on the market-tested credibility earned by this Government. The near historic low gilt yields that underpin the low interest rates that are so important to millions of households and businesses cannot be put at risk. As shown by global developments, the consequence of losing market confidence can be sudden and severe. A sharp rise in interest rates would be particularly damaging to an economy weighed down by the burden of so much public, corporate and personal debt, built up during a time when it should not have been.
The OBR’s executive summary states:
“Public sector net debt…is forecast to peak at 85.6 per cent of GDP in 2016-17, rather than 79.9 per cent a year earlier as in our December forecast.”
In reality, debt is simply out of control, although much of it is the responsibility of the previous Government.
Of course my hon. Friend is right that the inevitable consequence of running a deficit is that debt increases. It continues to be our purpose to reduce the deficit and return the economy to a balanced budget in order to start to pay down debt, and it is important that we should do that.
Budget 2013 also set out measures to equip the UK to compete in a global race. The Government will give every business and charity a £2,000 allowance towards their national insurance contributions from April 2014, benefiting more than 1 million businesses. We will achieve the ambition for the UK tax system to be one of the most competitive in the world, which includes a further cut in corporation tax to 20%—the joint lowest in the G20—from April 2015. We will increase capital investment plans by £3 billion a year from 2015-16. Public investment will be higher on average over this Parliament and the next than under the previous Government. We will devolve a greater proportion of growth-related spending to local areas from April 2015, in response to Lord Heseltine’s review.
As well as action in the UK to tackle the economic challenges that we face, progress needs to be made to tackle the crisis in the euro areas. However, the growth challenges in Europe continue to be serious, as every Member is aware. We have seen a welcome fall in borrowing rates, particularly for Spain and Italy, from the high levels that they reached last summer, but recent events in Cyprus remind us—and leave us in no doubt—that the euro area continues to be a fragile environment. Only a sustained period of successful reforms and improvements in financial markets can lay the foundations for growth. Economic activity in the European Union remains subdued. In the euro area, most of the so-called peripheral economies are in pronounced recessions, with weak labour markets, adverse credit conditions and an ongoing process of deleveraging all weighing on growth.
Structural reforms at the national level should be supported by the co-ordination of progress towards freer markets at the EU level. The improvement of the single market, regulatory reform and free trade agreements can all help to improve the growth prospects of every country in the EU at a minimal cost. This is a critical agenda that the UK and other like-minded states have advanced at successive European Councils, including in March, and we will continue to push.
My right hon. Friend says that it is critical that we enter into EU free trade agreements. I hope he appreciates that under the majority voting system, the power of the European Commission under the Lisbon treaty means that at present our influence is only 8% at maximum—although it will shortly rise, albeit to only 12%. The whole policy will effectively be driven by the European Union and its objectives, which are largely dominated by Germany. It will not be in British interests.
It is possible for our influence to go beyond our voting weight, just as there are Members of this House—I might include my hon. Friend in this—whose influence goes beyond their proportional representation in this place. I hope he agrees with that.
It is important to maintain momentum on bilateral EU free trade agreements. Ninety per cent of global growth will come from outside Europe after 2015, so the EU needs an outward-looking trade agenda. A free trade agreement with the United States of America is, and must be, a major opportunity that should be pursued with all vigour. It is estimated that EU free trade agreements that are currently under way or in the pipeline could add £200 billion to EU GDP and create 2 million jobs across the EU. We welcome the European Commission’s stated commitment to bringing forward concrete proposals to reduce regulatory barriers for small and medium-sized enterprises. That is long overdue and we look forward to seeing those proposals in June.
It is estimated that removing all barriers in the single market would increase UK GDP by about 7%, while prices could fall by 5% due to increased competition. The single market already adds €600 billion a year to the EU’s economy. Further progress is possible. Ambitious implementation of the services directive by all member states could result in increased national incomes. Service liberalisation would be particularly beneficial to the UK, as services are an area of enormous comparative advantage, as we know, and the UK has had a trade surplus with the EU in services since 2005.
The Financial Secretary cites a number of reports that credit apparently enormously large gains to the single market and, potentially, other trade arrangements. May I ask him to look at the original reports with a certain scepticism? When I used to work with him, I think he would have been disappointed if I had done my analyses in the same slapdash way.
One of the reasons why I was pleased to employ my hon. Friend was his forensic and questioning eye. He is absolutely right that when we look closely at the measures and their estimated impact, we should make our own assessment. However, I think that all of us, including my hon. Friend, would agree that a genuine single market in, for example, energy—an area in which he and I have an interest—could help to increase competition in the EU. As we know, competition is one way we can drive efficiency, which is very much in the interests of all citizens in this country and across the EU.
In addition to structural reforms involving each EU member state and the co-ordination of free trade policies at the EU level, we need reforms in the way the EU works. In his speech of 23 January, the Prime Minister proposed certain principles for reform. He said that the EU had to improve its competitiveness, to become a more flexible organisation, to ensure that its rules were fair for all members and to allow power to flow from the EU to its members and not just the other way around. He also said that the EU had to improve its democratic accountability and to re-engage with voters across Europe. It is national Parliaments that provide the true source of real democratic legitimacy and accountability in the EU. The fact that this debate tonight is being held at the behest of the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee serves only to underline that important fact.
Those objectives are complicated by the presence in the EU of the eurozone. Britain has an immediate interest in the stability of the single currency, and we need to be aware of the changes that a more tightly integrated euro area will bring to the EU’s present structure. It is important that we ensure that the EU continues to work for all its members, and that the interests of those outside the single currency should be acknowledged and, more specifically, protected. In particular, it should be understood that whatever binding surveillance eurozone members might agree on, Britain will not be bound by it.
As I said earlier, the convergence programme is, by its very nature, something that harks back to the days when it was simply assumed that Britain was on a one-way route to monetary union across the EU. As the hon. Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) has suggested, hindsight is a wonderful thing, but let us not forget that, at that time, he and many Conservative Members had the foresight to see any such convergence as the wishful thinking that it was—and, to a certain extent, still is. Those Members included my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Mr Hague), now the Foreign Secretary. As the newly elected leader of the Conservative party in 1997, he had this to say about the idea of dragging Britain into the single currency:
“What are the chances that we will converge in the near future? What are the chances we will converge for ever, without ever diverging again? And would it be wise to run our economy so as to make it converge rather than prosper in its own right?”
Those were wise words, and I look forward to hearing many more in this debate.
Unfortunately, we are not likely to have a general election until 2015. I would be grateful if hon. Members did whatever they could to bring that forward a little, but heaven knows what state the economy will be in—even by the time we get to 26 June, which I believe encompasses the spending review period. I am sure that yet further revisions of these figures, which keep changing like shifting sands before us, will be made. We simply do not know what a future Labour Government will inherit—hopefully in 2015. I will get back to the right hon. Gentleman nearer the time. One thing seems clear to me: we have to take some bold action to stimulate the economy, rather than adopt this laissez-faire, arms-folded, non-interventionist approach. Even the Financial Secretary used to disparage that, but he has now signed up wholly to it.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree with the right hon. Member for Morley and Outwood (Ed Balls), who said:
“Long-term interest rates are the simplest measure of monetary and fiscal…credibility”?
Long-term interest rates reflect a number of factors. Government Members would like to think that low bond yields were a reflection of fiscal policy measures alone—[Interruption.] The Minister should hear me out. He likes to think that that is the one test. As I say, it used to be retention of the triple A credit rating, but that has gone, so something else has had to be found. Long-term bond yields, however, are also a reflection of who is purchasing them. I do not know whether the Minister can help us out by elaborating on who exactly is purchasing the Government bond yields, because the Bank of England seems to be doing an awful lot. One branch of the UK Government institutions is helping out the other branch of Government institutions—depressing, of course, that yield. The Minister should not be too proud of market expectations that things are going to be so bad for so long that our interest rates are at the ultra-low level. It is not a reflection of fiscal policy; it is a reflection of expectations of future economic performance and of the interventions in monetary policy by the Bank of England.
That is why some in the bond markets in the City and even the IMF and other economic commentators and business leaders are increasingly saying—as PIMCO did today in its intervention on these issues—that we have to do something about this. Demand in the economy is cripplingly bad; we have to do something to take a different course. The Chancellor’s plan is not just failing; it is adding to our problems with the public finances. We will see the state of the deficit reduction plan and what is happening with this trajectory when we see the figures tomorrow. We hear of blaming the snow, blaming the royal wedding, blaming all sorts of other players including the European Union; it is amazing how we never hear that it is the fault of those who currently occupy the Treasury.
I have a genuine question for the hon. Gentleman again. Was the shadow Chancellor wrong when he said:
“Long-term interests are the simplest measure of monetary and fiscal policy credibility”?
When he said that, interest rates were at 4.75%. Was he wrong?
The Minister can ask me the same question as many times as he likes, but I will give him exactly the same answer. There are a number of reflections and metrics for judging economic performance, but in these particularly stagnant economic circumstances, I do not think that he should wear as a badge of honour those ultra-low bond yields because they actually reflect low and depressed expectations about the future performance of the economy. He knows that that is true. It is also a reason why not just Moody’s but Fitch have taken out the legs from beneath the UK’s triple A credit rating after three years of stagnation, rising unemployment and billions more borrowing to pay for economic failure. It is time that the Treasury woke up and realised that its plan is causing long-term damage not just to the public finances, but to British families and businesses as they pay the price. When even their biggest allies—the IMF and the credit rating agencies—abandon the Government, it is time to put political pride aside and finally act to kick-start the economy.
Most independent forecasts suggest that on Thursday the GDP figures will show small positive growth, but growth of just 0.3% would simply mean that the economy was back to where it was six months ago. After three years of stagnation, we need to see decisive evidence this week that a strong and sustained recovery is finally under way—otherwise the Chancellor will definitely be in real trouble. We cannot seriously be expected to ratify this Budget Red Book as our representation to the European Union, or anyone else, of how our economy is performing.
Are we supposed to ignore the double downgrading of the UK’s credit rating, first by Moody’s and then by Fitch? Are we supposed to skim over the new figures from the Office for National Statistics, which show that the average weekly pay packet was £464 in February and £480 in the same month last year? That is the worst set of data since the ONS started recording such facts. Are we supposed to turn a blind eye to the fact that youth unemployment rose by more than 20,000 last month? The total figure is now just under 1 million. Should we just forget about the risks of that lost generation?
The Red Book is a staggering work of deception wrapped in the heroic conceit of a Government who are trying to fool people into thinking that they are on track. They are losing control of the public finances because they have lost the plot when it comes to the relationship between economic growth, jobs, the economy, and the revenues that we need in order to get the deficit down. It would be far simpler for the House to reject the motion and return the Government to the drawing board to get their act together and work on an alternative plan that might actually give us the bold action that we need, rather than the stagnation that we are suffering.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Written StatementsSection 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993 requires the Government to report to Parliament for its approval an assessment of the UK’s medium-term economic and budgetary position. This assessment, which has been prepared annually since 1994, currently comprises the Budget report and the Office for Budget Responsibility’s (OBR’s) economic and fiscal outlook.
This then forms the basis of the UK’s convergence programme, which is therefore based entirely on information already presented to Parliament. The UK is obliged to submit a convergence programme annually to the European Commission under article 121 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union.
Article 121, along with article 126, is the legal basis for the stability and growth pact, which is the co-ordination mechanism for EU fiscal policies and requires member states to avoid excessive Government deficits. Although the UK is bound by the stability and growth pact, by virtue of its protocol to the treaty opting out of the euro, it is only required to “endeavour to avoid” excessive deficits. Unlike the euro area member states, the UK is not subject to sanctions at any stage of the European semester process.
Subject to the progress of Parliamentary business, debates will be held on 22 April for the House of Commons and 25 April for the House of Lords in order for both Houses to approve this assessment before the convergence programme is submitted to the Commission. While the convergence programme itself is not subject to parliamentary approval or amendment, I will deposit advanced copies of the document on 19 April that will be made available to Members through the Vote Office and Printed Paper Office.
The Budget report and the Office for Budget Responsibility’s economic and fiscal outlook were laid in Parliament on 20 March 2013. All of the information the convergence programme will contain has therefore already been published and made available to Members.
The UK’s convergence programme will be published in late April and will be available electronically via HM Treasury’s website after publication. It will be submitted to the EU by 30 April as required by the European Commission.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThat is an option, and we certainly need to go back to the drawing board and make sure that we design the bank levy in a way that actually works. The proposition we have made in the amendment is to repeat the bank bonus tax that worked very successfully in 2009. That could be incorporated into the bank levy process—that is one option—to ensure that we get a fair share for the taxpayer, who has suffered as a consequence of the requirement to bail out the banks.
Will the hon. Gentleman clarify whether his policy is for a one-off payroll tax or a permanent one?
This is where we need to look at the interplay with the bank levy. Clearly the levy should be a permanent way of ensuring that we net the right level of resource for the Treasury in recompense for the deficit that the banks created. It is possible to have a bank bonus tax that is more sustainable, but I am open to discussion with the Treasury about how that might work. Even if we netted less than the £3.5 billion that the first bank bonus tax brought in, it would still be considerably more on top of the bank levy, which clearly needs to be topped up. It is important that we look at that—
Given that the hon. Gentleman clearly does not know whether it would be permanent or temporary, can he at least give an assurance to the Committee that he will not commit any spending to be funded by that levy that goes beyond any particular year?
I can tell the Minister that in this financial year it would be necessary for us to repeat that bank bonus tax. We will set out our tax and spending proposals when we write the manifesto for the general election. Heaven knows what kind of mess we will have to untangle after a further two years. It would be invidious to make decisions at this point in the cycle when the Minister will not tell us what is in the spending review in just two months’ time. We will make an assessment in two years’ time. I can certainly tell him that, from our point of view—this is a serious policy distinction—a bank bonus tax would be necessary now, particularly to help fund a compulsory jobs guarantee for young people. That is a necessity, given the unemployment figures we saw earlier today.
We feel that £2 billion could be raised this year from a repetition of the bank bonus tax. That would be an important contribution from those who are doing particularly well. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman moves in those circles and whether he has seen, as though nothing much has changed in the world, how high bonuses continue to be. Yes, changes from the European Union and elsewhere are being forced on to the bonus culture, but bonuses are still excessively generous to the very lucky few. There are a number of reasons why the bank bonus tax would be good not just for the taxpayer, but in changing the culture in the sector itself. The tax raised £3.5 billion when it was last tried in 2009.
At what rate would the bonus tax be to raise that amount of money this year?
I was anticipating that question from the Minister. This is the Minister who has tweaked and changed the rate, I think, five or six times in various Finance Bills, all to fit the £2.5 billion figure that he has totally failed to address. We need to go back to the drawing board on the bank levy and find a way of calculating it so that it properly yields the sums that we envisage. Of course, the bank levy has to be thought through, so that we get that resource in. It is totally unacceptable to have lost nearly £2 billion for the taxpayer in the past two financial years. Just think what that £2 billion could have achieved in that period. This is not small money. There is the classic chancellorial phrase, “A billion here, a billion there and very soon it starts to add up to real money”, but this is significant resource. It is to the great shame of Ministers that they have allowed that money to slip away from them.
The study commissioned by the Financial Times which showed the massive impact of the extreme austerity being pursued by the Government will bring home to many communities where some of the poorest people live the fact that that money and those resources are being taken out of their local economies.
I am sorry to press the hon. Gentleman on this point, but can he answer a conundrum for me? He has helpfully said that he wants to raise £2 billion this year through his payroll tax. The Centre for Economics and Business Research estimates that this year’s bonus pool would be £1.6 billion in total. How will he raise £2 billion from that?
I do not recognise that figure. [Interruption.] The Minister is making various projections about the bonus pool, but even if the changes meant that we did not manage in years to come to yield what we now feel we can yield—he could equally make the argument that said, “Well, the European Union is making changes to limit bonuses,” which would obviously mean changes to salaries and elsewhere—what we are proposing would add considerably to the bank levy revenues that he has managed to generate. As we have set out in the amendment before the Committee, we need to incorporate a repeat of the bank payroll tax. It is important to recognise that, although I am happy for the Treasury to commission further research on the issue. If the Government are interested in this agenda and are starting to move in that direction, that might be useful.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he said earlier that he would do so.
The hon. Gentleman said that he had based his assumption on calculations. The authoritative source on these matters is the CBI, which has published figures consistently over time. It says that the bonus pool was £6.5 billion in 2010 and is £1.6 billion in 2013. Will he share with the Committee the calculations on which he has based his assumption about the bonus pool, and the source that he used? If he cannot do that, I hope he will desist, both in this debate and in future, from making any spending commitments that rely on a source that is fanciful.
I would be happy to enter into correspondence with the Minister about the matter. However, we feel that, according to a conservative estimate —I use the term, on this occasion, in a relatively pleasant way—£2 billion could be netted for the Exchequer, as opposed to the £3.5 billion that was netted in 2009.
Our amendment would require the Chancellor to
“review the possibility of incorporating a bank payroll tax within the bank levy”.
I am delighted that the Treasury has conceded that it wishes to engage in such a review. I am delighted that there has been a bit of movement in that regard. I would quite like to ask where the Liberal Democrats are on the issue, but then I would quite like to ask where the Liberal Democrats are generally—although I shall not dwell on that.
I would like the hon. Gentleman to be more precise about the figures. He said that last time the payroll tax raised £3.4 billion—
The hon. Gentleman says that it was £3.5 billion. I am sure he will confirm that he has read the analysis published last year by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, which clearly states that £3.4 billion is a gross receipts figure and that the net yield was £2.3 billion. He will agree with that, I am sure.
No. The figures given in the HMRC study were estimates—and, incidentally, it was not a study by the Office for Budget Responsibility. For “HMRC”, read “Ministers”. They may well pooh-pooh the payroll levy and the bank bonus tax, but we feel that there is ample evidence to demonstrate how it operated before and how it could and should operate again. If only Ministers would adopt a more “can do” attitude, rather than trying to deflect attention from the massive embarrassment of having promised to raise £2.5 billion from a bank levy and having brought in only £1.6 billion in the last financial year. Although we said year after year that the levy would not be strong enough, they turned a blind eye, and indeed they have turned a blind eye to their banker friends for far too long.
The Government have provided tax cuts amounting to £19 million in the last week by reducing the 50p rate to 45p. A massive number of bank executives are earning more than £1 million this year. A cursory study of the annual reports and accounts of some of the banks concerned—Opposition Members may wish to listen to this rather than talking among themselves—reveals that this year’s bonus results created a staggering number of millionaires. In the Royal Bank of Scotland, 93 bankers were given bonuses of more than £1 million. Given the tax cut, they will benefit to the tune of more than £6 million in the current financial year. Barclays originally reported that it had 428 millionaires, given bonuses. I have been told that only a third are UK-based, but that would still mean that 140 Barclays executives are benefiting from nearly £23 million in tax cuts granted by the Minister because of the reduction in the top band of income tax. Seventy-eight millionaires at HSBC have received a combined tax cut of £3.3 million. Nineteen individuals at Santander are receiving a giveaway of more than £800,000. Twenty-five millionaires at Lloyds are receiving from the Treasury a combined tax giveaway in this financial year of £1.3 million. So they are doing very well, thank you very much, from this Government.
That is precisely right, because the creative challenge is how to get the banking community to invest in jobs and small business, and one way is to take some money from them and create some jobs and small businesses. If they cannot work out how to do it, that seems a reasonable thing to do.
Through the hon. Gentleman, perhaps I may express the dilemma that was raised by his hon. Friend the Member for Ogmore (Huw Irranca-Davies). I fear that a cruel deception is being perpetrated on the unemployed. They feel that a sum of money will be available to them, but it simply is not possible to raise £2 billion when the total bonus pool is less than that. I think they should know that.
Yes. Well, obviously, we clearly need to look at aggregate sums, but what is being debated here is—[Interruption.] What is being debated here is, is whether it is right that a community of people—I am talking particularly about people in the upper echelons of the banking community—who are making obscene bonuses should be given more and more money for doing no more work and having the taxpayers covering their backs in terms of risk, at a time when we are seeing an escalation of unemployment in various communities, including some that I represent, and when the very poorest are being asked to deal with obscene levels of pain in order to reduce the deficit problem.
I will conclude on that basis. I hope that I have addressed some of the points made by coalition Members. The amendment should be supported on grounds of fairness, of improving the banking system and of ensuring that the money that the Government raise from this provision could be used to help to stimulate the economy.
I am grateful to you, Ms Primarolo, for allowing me to get a word in edgeways in this debate. It has been a most illuminating debate. We have discovered that it is the policy of the Opposition to raise £2 billion from a bank bonus tax when the pool of bank bonuses this year is forecast to be £1.6 billion. The Opposition Front-Bench team was commended for proposing an imaginative measure. It certainly is imaginative. Indeed, it is the stuff of fantasy that more could be raised in revenue through a tax than is contained in the tax base to which it applies.
The Opposition have done this before, as I shall say later, and this is a familiar debate. We had this debate in 2011 and in 2012, and now the Opposition have tabled a more or less identical amendment on a policy that was introduced in the dying days of the last Labour Government for one year only—a payroll tax on banks. When the then Chancellor introduced it in December 2009, he insisted that it would be a one-off tax. Indeed, it was not even for a full year, but from December 2009 to April 2010. But in the Finance Bill Committee of the whole House almost exactly a year ago, the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Owen Smith) revealed:
“If Labour had won the election, it may have changed its view and continued the bank bonus tax.”
On reflection, he said,
“I think a Labour Government would have continued it”.—[Official Report, 18 April 2012; Vol. 543, c. 391.]
The annual reappearance of this temporary Labour tax should remind us all that whenever Labour proposes a temporary tax, it is best to assume that it is for life—
The hon. Gentleman spoke for 45 minutes and I have about seven or eight minutes. I shall make some progress and try to give him an opportunity later.
The bonus tax raised a net amount of £2.3 billion for the Exchequer, and that was supposed to be that. Amazingly, the Labour party had no other plans to make the banks make any further contribution to the costs they imposed on taxpayers. I agree with the hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) on that point. After that £2.3 billion, it appeared that the banks had discharged their responsibility to the taxpayers. To be fair and to acknowledge the consistency of the Labour Government, they showed no indication during their 13 years in office that they wanted to extract a contribution from the banks, even when the Centre for Economics and Business Research estimated that bonuses amounted to £11.5 billion in 2007.
As we know, the Labour party was “intensely relaxed” about people getting filthy rich. We have taken a different view. We believed from the outset that it was right for banks to contribute more to the taxpayer than other companies which did not pose a risk to the Exchequer and to the taxpayer. We agree with the point about fairness, and that is why the Government introduced a permanent levy—not a one-off—on the balance sheets of banks in the first Finance Bill of the new Government.
As we intended that it should be permanent, rather than—as Labour preferred—for a single year, it was important to design it in a way that would raise money every year. The trouble with a bonus tax, as the former Chancellor eloquently put it, was that
“frankly, the very people you are after here are very good at getting out of these things and...will find all sorts of imaginative ways of avoiding it.”
That was why it could work only for a single year.
Has the Minister looked down the back of the Treasury sofas to find the £900 million a year that is missing? What has gone wrong?
I will come on to that point, and the hon. Gentleman will be satisfied with my answer, as I hope he will acknowledge.
Balance sheets, unlike bonuses, cannot be hidden. They are more stable than bonus pools and so offer a far better way to collect a levy to benefit the public. Moreover, balance sheets are a better reflection of the risks, to the banking sector and to taxpayers, than remuneration, as set out by the International Monetary Fund in its 2010 report to the G20. That is why France and Germany quickly joined us in applying bank levies. They have subsequently been joined by Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and others. It is fair to say that those countries have not chosen to charge as much as we have. Relative to the size of our financial sector, our levy raises five times that raised by the French levy and two and a half times that raised by the German levy, but not one of these countries has thought fit to introduce a permanent bonus tax.
A permanent bonus tax would, of course, have been a catastrophically unreliable source of revenue, which is why I am very concerned that the spending commitments proposed by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) seem to be based on it. When the Labour tax was imposed, the Centre for Economics and Business Research estimated that the total pool of City bonuses was £6.7 billion. As I said earlier, it estimated that last year bonuses were £1.6 billion—less than a quarter of the 2010 level. With regard to the proposals from Europe, there might be some expectation that the levels will fall further.
A balance sheet tax is obviously a more stable, sustainable and sensible revenue base. However, to address the points made by the hon. Member for Nottingham East, balance sheets are not entirely invariable, which is why we have introduced a second element to the policy. We have specified that the bank levy should raise at least £2.5 billion a year, which is why we have clauses 200 and 201. The clauses increase the bank levy from 0.088% to 0.142% from 5 January 2014. The reason for these increases is simple: the forecast published by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility in December implied that without amendment receipts for future years would fall short of the £2.5 billion required and to which we are committed.
We announced in the autumn statement, as soon as these forecasts were published, an increase in the rate, which the Bill implements, to correct the shortfall. The March 2013 forecasts made by the OBR show that the levy is now forecast to raise more than £2.5 billion this year, and in all subsequent years. When the bank levy was first set, in Budget 2010, it took account of the planned reductions to corporation tax that were announced at the same time. Since then, as hon. Members know, the Government have been able to make further cuts to corporation tax. We have taken the view that this should not be passed on to the banks. Accordingly, clause 201 increases the bank levy to recover the benefit that would have been received from the cut in corporation tax.
To answer the point made by the hon. Member for Ogmore (Huw Irranca-Davies), the effect of these changes would be to cause the bank levy to yield not £2.5 billion in future, but £2.7 billion this year, and £2.9 billion for every year into the future. This extra revenue more than makes up for the shortfall in revenues experienced during the first two years.
Let me say something about clause 202, the other measure in the Bill relating to the bank levy. The clause removes an anomaly that would have been exploited, whereby banks could have claimed both a tax credit and a deduction for the same foreign bank levy. The view of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is that the existing corporate tax rules prevent such a deduction, but the case law is old and we saw fit to put the matter beyond doubt.
I fear the Opposition have made a mistake in preferring a payroll tax to a bank levy. As countries across the world demonstrate, a bank levy is a better reflection of systemic risk: it is permanent, it raises more money and it is sustainable, not being undermined by avoidance. If the Opposition persist in basing their spending plans on such a flimsy source of revenue as the bonus tax, which actually exceeds what is paid in bonuses this year, then I fear that they have not learned the lesson that they surely must: jeopardising our public finances would take this country back to the edge of ruin from which this Government have hauled it back. If the hon. Member for Nottingham East had any embarrassment or rigour, he would withdraw this ridiculous amendment. I commend clauses 200, 201 and 202.
The Minister’s smile could not be stifled by the ridiculousness of his last comments. This is déjà vu all over again. We have heard it before from this Minister time after time, year after year. “Our bank levy,” he said, and the Prime Minister has said from the Dispatch Box, “will always raise £2.5 billion.” Last year, however, it was £1.6 billion; this year it is £1.8 billion. The amount of money lost is staggering. We will, therefore, want to test the view of the Committee. The Minister has to get a grip on this issue. He has been haemorrhaging money, and the £2 billion that has been lost should have been put to the better purpose of helping young people get off the dole and back into work. That is what we on the Labour Benches believe.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Written StatementsI previously committed to keeping the House up to date on the events in Cyprus as the situation developed, in particular the structure of the final bailout package, and the implications for the UK.
As I previously outlined, the Republic of Cyprus requested a programme of financial assistance from its fellow members of the eurozone and the International Monetary Fund. On 25 March 2013, the Eurogroup reached an agreement on Cyprus, which included the resolution of Cyprus Popular (Laiki) Bank and the restructuring of Bank of Cyprus, imposing losses on senior unsecured creditors and some uninsured deposits, including in the case of Bank of Cyprus the exchange of some deposits over €100,000 for equity stakes in the bank.
Britain is not part of the eurozone and was not party to the negotiations. There is no contribution from the United Kingdom through the European financial stabilisation mechanism (EFSM) or bilaterally.
The Eurogroup agreement welcomes a contribution by the IMF to the programme, but no formal proposal has yet been put forward to the IMF’s executive board. The UK will assess and vote on any programme put to the IMF’s executive board on the basis of its own merits, as it has always done. UK support for the IMF does not add to our debt or deficit, and no one who has provided money to the IMF has ever lost that money.
The financial envelope agreed by the Eurogroup is €10 billion, which will cover bonds coming to maturity, deficit financing and the recapitalisation of the other domestic banks. The Greek branches of Hellenic, Bank of Cyprus and Laiki were sold to Greek banks as part of the deal. There will be no contribution from the programme to the recapitalisation of Bank of Cyprus. This will instead be funded by using existing debt holders and some uninsured deposits. Cyprus Popular (Laiki) Bank has been put into resolution and split into a “good” bank, which has been transferred to Bank of Cyprus, and a “bad” bank which will be wound down.
Cyprus is an important and longstanding ally of the UK and a member of the Commonwealth. Therefore, while not part of the eurozone negotiations, HM Government immediately offered to make available technical assistance to the Government of Cyprus during what was a very difficult period for them, which they accepted. This included a team of UK officials going to Cyprus to provide this assistance first hand. The Government of Cyprus have since conveyed their appreciation for this assistance which they found to be very helpful. Officials have since returned to the UK.
In addition, my officials also worked with the Cypriot authorities to develop a solution for deposits held in the UK branch of Cyprus Popular Bank. There was very close and effective co-operation between the Treasury, the Bank of England and its new regulatory arm the Prudential Regulation Authority, and the Financial Conduct Authority. This reflects the working of the new regulatory system that came into legal existence during the management of the crisis in Cyprus.
On 1 April, Cyprus Popular Bank reached an agreement with Bank of Cyprus UK to transfer all customer deposits in their UK branch to the UK subsidiary of Bank of Cyprus. This included some 15,000 accounts with approximately £270 million of deposits. The transfer was accompanied by matching cash assets.
The transfer agreement between Bank of Cyprus UK and Cyprus Popular Bank was given effect by a transfer decree made under Cypriot law. It was subsequently approved by the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority under our new regulatory system. HM Treasury officials assisted in discussions with the Cypriot authorities and also provided some assistance in the legal processes around the transfer.
Unlike Bank of Cyprus UK, which is a UK supervised subsidiary, Cyprus Popular Bank UK operated here as a branch of its Cypriot parent company. Under EU law, primary responsibility for the supervision and resolution of Cyprus Popular Bank UK therefore rested with the Cypriot authorities. Had the transfer not been agreed, the deposits in the UK branch of Cyprus Popular Bank would have been included in the Cypriot bank restructuring with all of the uncertainty that this would have brought with it. That will not now be the case.
The deposits are now with Bank of Cyprus UK, which will continue to operate as a UK subsidiary, regulated and supervised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority. All eligible deposits, including those transferred from Cyprus Popular Bank, will now benefit from the coverage of the UK’s financial services compensation scheme up to £85,000.
This has all been achieved without any material recourse to public funds.
More widely, state benefit payments to accounts in Cyprus, which were previously on hold while the banks in Cyprus remained closed, have resumed following their reopening.
As was previously stated, those who have been sent to Cyprus to serve our military or our Government, and their families, will be protected in full from losses on their personal deposits. Ministers from the Ministry of Defence will keep the House updated on this issue.
The Government continue to monitor the situation in Cyprus closely.
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Written StatementsToday the Government are publishing their response to the Heseltine review, copies have been laid in the House. Lord Heseltine set out an ambitious vision in his review and the Government have responded, accepting the overwhelming majority of his recommendations.
At the centre of the Government’s response is action to tackle excessive centralisation. The Government will create a new single local growth fund from 2015 that will include the key economic levers of skills, housing and transport funding. Full details will be set out at the spending round. The Government will negotiate a local growth deal with every local enterprise partnership (LEP)—with the allocation of funds and flexibilities reflecting the quality of the LEP’s strategic economic plan and the capacity of the local area
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Written StatementsMy noble friend the Commercial Secretary to the Treasury, Lord Deighton, has today made the following written ministerial statement:
Paragraph 38 of schedule 7 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 requires the Treasury to report to Parliament after each calendar year in which a direction under the schedule is at any time in force. This report provides details of the Treasury’s exercise of their functions under schedule 7 during the calendar year 2012.
The Schedule 7 powers
Schedule 7 provides HM Treasury with powers to implement a graduated range of financial restrictions in response to certain risks to the UK’s national interests. The risks it addresses are those posed by money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.
Direction given under the powers in Schedule 7
The Financial Restrictions (Iran) Order 2011 (“the 2011 order”) came into force on 21 November 2011. The order contained a direction by the Treasury requiring all UK financial and credit institutions to cease business relationships and transactions with all banks incorporated in Iran, including all subsidiaries and branches of such banks, wherever located, and the central bank of Iran.
The 2011 order was issued on the basis that activity in Iran that facilitates the development or production of nuclear weapons posed a significant risk to the national interests of the UK. The decision was made because of the risk caused by the activity of Iranian banks in facilitating the development or production of nuclear weapons. Iranian banks play a crucial role in providing financial services to individuals and entities within Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Iranian banks can be exposed to the risk of being used by proliferators in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
In accordance with paragraph 15(4) of schedule 7, the 2011 order ceased to have effect at the end of the period of one year beginning with the day on which it was made, on 20 November 2012.
The Financial Restrictions (Iran) Order 2012 (“the 2012 order”) was made and came into force on 21 November 2012, immediately on expiry of the 2011 order. The 2012 order contained a direction by the Treasury in the same terms as that in the 2011 order. The decision to give the direction in the 2012 order, in effect maintaining the restrictions in the 2011 order in place, was made because of the continued risk to the national interests of the UK caused by the activity of Iranian banks in facilitating the development or production of nuclear weapons. The direction mitigates the risk to the financial sector of being involved in proliferation financing.
Licensing
Under paragraph 17 of schedule 7, the Treasury can exempt acts specified in a licence from the requirements of a direction requiring the cessation or limiting of transactions or business relationships between UK and Iranian banks.
In operating the licensing regime in respect of the 2011 and 2012 order, the Treasury’s aim was to minimise the impact of the restrictions upon third parties, without compromising the objective of the direction.
Six general licences were issued by the Treasury exempting certain activities from the requirements of the 2011 order:
General Licence 1—permitted existing and new transactions involving transfers of under €40,000 for humanitarian purposes;
General Licence 2—allowed personal remittances under €40,000. (This licence included cover for payments of up to €40,000 to students studying in the UK);
General Licence 3—permitted existing or new transactions related to the provision of insurance permitted by EU regulation 267/2012;
General Licence 4—allowed UK banks to continue to hold accounts for asset-frozen Iranian banks and credit payment to those accounts in accordance with EU regulation 267/2012;
General Licence 5—allowed UK banks to continue to hold accounts of non-frozen Iranian banks, although they could not process any transactions on these accounts; and
General Licence 6—provided a seven-day grace period to allow payments in progress under existing contracts to be completed.
On 21 November 2012 the Treasury issued six general licences exempting certain activities from the requirements of the 2012 order. General licences 1 to 5 replicated the provisions of those issued in respect of the 2011 order. The new general licence 6 permitted transactions or business relationships already authorised under the 2011 order.
Applications for licences in respect of transactions that fell outside the scope of the six general licences were assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2012, 142 licences were issued and none were refused:
Seventy-two licences were issued under the 2011 or 2012 order, and 70 licences were issued in relation to transactions that were caught under both the UK order and EU regulation 267/2012 (or EU regulation 961/2010 which it replaced in March 2012).
Over half of the licences were issued in connection with payments due by an agreement or contract concluded before the prohibitions. Licences were also issued to facilitate UK banks exiting their relationships with Iranian banks in accordance with the order and the winding down of frozen Iranian banks in the UK, for business relationships, and to permit specific transactions such as humanitarian payments, personal remittances, legal expenses and the repayment of loans.
The Financial Restrictions (Iran) Order was revoked on 31 January 2013. The Treasury will report further on the revocation in the 2013 report.
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith your permission, Mr Speaker, I shall make a statement about banks in Cyprus.
In the light of the financial difficulties faced by the Republic of Cyprus, that country’s Government have requested a programme of financial assistance from its fellow members of the eurozone. Britain is obviously not part of the eurozone and was not party to the negotiations, and there is no contribution from the United Kingdom, either through the European financial stabilisation mechanism or bilaterally.
At the end of a meeting of eurozone Finance Ministers at the weekend, it was announced that it had been agreed with the Cypriot Government that a programme of assistance worth up to €10 billion would be provided, subject to the following measures: a fiscal consolidation amounting to 4.5% of Cyprus’s gross domestic product over four years; a privatisation programme to raise €1.4 billion, or 8% of GDP; an increase in corporation tax from 10% to 12.5%; a gold and assets swap from the reserves of €1.5 billion, or 8.5% of GDP; a withholding tax on interest of €1 billion, or 6% of GDP; and a levy on deposits of €5.8 billion, worth 33% of Cyprus’s GDP, which, it has been reported, will consist of a 6.75% levy on deposits below €100,000 and a levy of 9.9% on deposits above €100,000. In return, the assistance package will allow €5 billion-worth of bond redemptions, excluding the Russian loan which will mature in 2016; €2 billion-worth of deficit financing, less privatisation proceeds; and an injection of €4.5 billion into the banks’ balance sheets.
The agreement established terms of reference for an independent evaluation of the implementation of the anti-money-laundering framework in Cypriot financial institutions.
Those are the main features of the agreement, but parts of it, including the deposit levy, require legislation in the Cypriot Parliament, and that is expected to be considered tomorrow. Accordingly, the situation in Cyprus remains uncertain and is subject to change. What is clear from the proposal so far is that the levy will not apply to foreign branches and subsidiaries of Cypriot banks, including those operating in the UK. Indeed, the two Cypriot banks in the UK, the Cyprus Popular Bank and Bank of Cyprus UK, have been open for business today.
Of course, there are British nationals who have accounts with Cyprus-based branches of Cypriot banks and who would be affected by the proposed levy if it were agreed by the Cypriot Parliament. They include serving British servicemen and women who are required to be based on the island and so, in order to go about their day-to-day activities, maintain local bank accounts. Approximately 3,000 members of the armed forces are on overseas postings serving our country in Cyprus. The Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary have made clear that, should these measures be approved, the British Government, as their employer, will compensate those personnel for reasonable losses incurred as a result of the situation.
Several thousand UK pensioners are resident in Cyprus. Today is a bank holiday there, and, to ensure that any payments made by Her Majesty’s Government to banks in the country reach the intended recipients, all future pension payments made by the Government to British citizens there will be temporarily put on hold until at least tomorrow. That will allow us to take stock of developments in Cyprus. All UK pensioners in the country can be assured that their future pension payments are being held safely, and that a normal payments service will resume as soon as the situation has become clear. However, recipients of these payments can switch the bank account into which payments are made with immediate effect by contacting the international pensions centre, the details of which are available on the website of the Department for Work and Pensions.
As soon as more information on the final measures taken is available, I will arrange a briefing for Members whose constituents have been caught up in the situation. I understand that this is a worrying time for other British nationals who have deposits in banks in Cyprus, but, as Members will be aware, deposits in Cypriot banks are subject to the laws and regulations of the Republic. Ministers from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Work and Pensions will update the House as soon as they have information that is relevant to their areas, and will keep the House updated.
This is a worrying situation, not only for the people of Cyprus but for many of our constituents. It is a situation that is uncertain and subject to change, and I will return to the House with updates as events become clearer. However, I wanted Members to have the opportunity to be informed from the outset of what is known so far.
The terms of the Cypriot bank bail-out are extremely concerning, and the market reaction today may be only the beginning of the fallout. While it is, of course, important for the Cypriot banks to be put on a secure footing, it is extremely dangerous to wider economic confidence for the fundamental trust of retail depositors to be undermined in such a way. This was a very risky decision, and we would expect the British Government to caution against such a sequestering of the funds of ordinary bank customers.
The so-called bail-in of banks in jeopardy does not always need to punish savers and depositors in this way. It is essential that the trust and confidence of ordinary bank customers across the European Union is immediately restored, with guarantees that no future bail-in arrangements will operate in this way. Surely one of the lessons from recent history is that rock-solid guarantees for depositors are a prerequisite to stability and recovery. EU Finance Ministers would not have countenanced a move such as this in larger members of the EU, yet somehow it is acceptable for smaller ones. It is never a good message to send to the public in any country that they would have been better off keeping their life savings under a mattress than in a bank.
It is particularly concerning that international institutions with UK input, including the EU and the International Monetary Fund, have adopted this precarious strategy, so I have to ask the Minister some specific questions. First, were the UK Government made aware of this proposal beforehand and, if so, when? Was the Chancellor consulted and, if so, what view was expressed? The UK may not be able to attend the meetings of the Eurogroup of Finance Ministers in a non-voting, observer capacity, but any informal decisions taken there still need referring to ECOFIN, so would it not be sensible, in future, to secure a right for observers, including the UK, to attend such crucial decision-making meetings, given the ramifications of eurozone decisions for the whole of the EU?
The Opposition welcome the decision to compensate UK armed forces personnel stationed in Cyprus who are affected, but can the Minister set out the estimated cost to the Exchequer of that policy? Are British consular officials providing assistance to other affected UK nationals? What is the Government’s estimate of the number of UK nationals affected by this decision in Cyprus? What will happen if the Cypriot Government and Parliament do not actually go along with this proposal? They are obviously between a rock and a hard place, as the further two days of impromptu bank holidays go to show, but surely such public brinkmanship by the EU and the IMF just creates even more uncertainty. What is the extent of British banking exposure and British business exposure to the Cypriot banks? How much does the Treasury estimate that UK investors will lose under this arrangement?
Many EU citizens expected that their deposits were guaranteed up to €100,000, or £85,000, under the deposit guarantee scheme directive, but we now learn that there was a caveat excluding special taxes such as this one. Should consumers be aware of any other aspects of the small print in the deposit guarantee scheme? Does this whole episode not show that we should clarify our own banking bail-in rules in this country as soon as possible, rather than, as Ministers are saying in the Banking Reform Bill process, waiting for the European Union to draw up the bail-in directive in several years’ time? Waiting years for the EU to tell us how a bail-in arrangement might operate suddenly looks like an unwise course to take. Surely we should get these issues sorted out here at home as soon as possible. This is not a matter where the UK Government can just sit on the sidelines, because issues that could fundamentally affect our own stability, growth and prosperity are involved, and we expect Ministers to take firm steps within the EU to reduce these risks now.
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s points and questions. Let me say at the outset that we will have the chance to discuss these things in more detail, but the situation is very fluid; we understand that tonight there will be a meeting of the Eurogroup members—a video conference—to discuss some aspects of it, and the Cypriot Parliament is meeting tomorrow, so I think it would be unwise to assume that the information that has come out over the weekend will necessarily represent the shape of things to come. However, I will make sure that the hon. Gentleman and, indeed, all hon. Members are kept abreast of things.
The hon. Gentleman’s point about fundamental trust needing to be established in the banking system goes to the heart of the matter. It is crucial that that applies not just in this country, but across the eurozone. It is one of the reasons why we have been supportive of the efforts being made by the eurozone to stabilise the financial system there, including by the introduction of a single supervisory mechanism. Cyprus, as I think he would acknowledge, is in a particularly acute situation, as a very large proportion of its GDP is exposed to international financial transactions and its domestic fiscal situation also leaves a lot to be desired. I think all hon. Members would recognise that the importance of maintaining fiscal discipline as well as adequate supervision of the banking system is exemplified by what has happened.
In terms of the negotiations so far and the parties to them, the hon. Gentleman should know and is, I think, aware that the discussions are among the members of the eurozone, who bear financial responsibility for bailing out Cyprus, and the Cypriot Government. They have negotiated with each other and the plan can be approved only if the Cypriot Parliament endorses it. The UK understands and has intelligence about what went on in those discussions, but was not part of them and had no influence and no votes. Ultimately, this is a matter for the Cypriots and the eurozone.
The cost of the protection that my right hon. Friends have offered to UK serving servicemen and women will depend on the final state of the arrangements, which, as I say, are not certain at this stage. I mentioned in my statement that about 3,000 UK military personnel and their support staff are employed, which gives us a limited ability to estimate the context.
On the question of the supervision of UK banks and any potential exposure, the Bank of England, as the hon. Gentleman would expect, maintains close involvement and is supervising all the banks that might have any exposure to the Cypriot authorities. The hon. Gentleman is quite right that it is necessary at both a European and domestic level to agree a means of bailing in the contributions of holders of capital so that the banks can be resolved without the types of problems we are seeing in Cyprus. We have been very clear that we want to see that and the Irish presidency is making good progress with the recovery and resolution directive. We have said that if that progress does not proceed at the pace we hope and expect to see, we can use the banking Bill to make the necessary amendments.
This looks to be very poorly thought through, possibly dangerously so, not least because it risks triggering a run on the banks of other indebted countries. Is it not also the case that this could be a breach of EU deposit regulation, which requires a full guarantee of up to €100,000? It is not supported entirely by a tax but by shares—which clearly and demonstrably are not a tax. A minute ago, the Minister described the situation as fluid, but a fluid bail-out does not sound like a very robust policy to me. Does that not illustrate the gulf between the rhetoric and reality of the so-called banking union? Does it not illustrate that the eurozone’s problems are unresolved and blighting the UK economy?
I agree with my hon. Friend to the extent that I think that it underlines the importance of having arrangements across the eurozone to anticipate and provide robust measures to ensure that resolution plans for such problems are agreed in advance so that there will not be this fluidity of negotiation. I completely agree with that. The measures that are being taken for banking union are designed to resolve precisely that set of circumstances. As for the legality of the situation, we will need to be assured that the arrangements proceed in accordance with the treaty.
The lack of effective supervision of the Greek Cypriot banking system has been notorious for many years and it has become a haven for Russian money laundering. What steps, either through this package or through other measures, are being taken better to control the banking system in Cyprus?
The right hon. Gentleman will know that the agreement reached at the weekend includes action to address the reputation Cyprus has established as a potential home for money laundering and that is part of the conditionality for the package.
Given the importance of the euro’s stability to the London banking system and the wider world, will the British Government be lobbying the European Central Bank to ensure that it provides sufficient liquidity at all times should a run develop in a weaker bank or a weaker country, given the invitation to people to withdraw their deposits from any difficult institution?
The pace of negotiations, thanks to the fact that today is a bank holiday in Cyprus and that that could potentially be extended, is meant to resolve the matter before a run on the banks is possible. My right hon. Friend is right that the situation is unsatisfactory and it is necessary to establish a more orderly system for anticipating or managing potential bank failures in the future. It is in everyone’s interest to ensure that there is no such collapse of the banking system in Cyprus.
Does the Minister realise that we have reached a sorry state of affairs when the eurozone—we are not members, thanks to the Labour Government last time round—[Interruption.] Oh yes; that is when it happened. I know Conservative Members like it, but we did it at the time. Is it not a sorry state of affairs that the eurozone can implement a poll tax, and that the Government were made aware of it at some point or other and have not told us at any time that they condemn this move? I am giving the Minister a chance now: condemn it!
It was the policy of the Labour party to be committed in principle to joining the euro, and it was our right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks), now the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, who was the first in the House to say that the Conservative party would campaign against the euro and would not join. As a result of being outside the eurozone, we are not responsible for the arrangements there. We are not part of those negotiations. This is a negotiation between the Government of Cyprus and members of the eurozone.
The amounts involved are eye-watering as a proportion of the Cypriot economy. We are used to bail-outs involving a haircut for creditors. This is the first time I have ever seen a complete scalping of depositors in order to finance a bail-in. Given that we are outside the various institutions of European decision making, how will the Government safeguard British depositors against future scalpings of this sort?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. To put it into context, the European Central Bank said this morning that the situation of Cyprus and the Cypriot banking sector is unique. I think Members will reflect that it has unique problems that have required a unique and very difficult solution.
Surely the Minister agrees that we have been in this situation before. Taking emergency measures that cause alarm is not the same as making fundamental reforms which are necessary. Will the Minister be pressing for more responsible tax and financial controls? For example, the corporation tax is to increase from 10% to 12.5%. Surely he would agree that a responsible financial policy would mean a much bigger increase.
I do not think anyone is suggesting that the measures that have been taken are not rigorous and exacting. The reaction in Cyprus and across the eurozone indicates that these are regarded as very tough measures, including on the transparency of the banking system, particularly to avoid the reputation for money laundering. However, this is a matter for the Cypriot Government. They have had to convince their partners in the eurozone that this programme represents a credible set of conditions which can give confidence to those who are helping to bail them out.
The Minister will no doubt appreciate that Mr Draghi’s comment that the European Central Bank will do whatever it takes clearly includes daylight robbery of British pensioners, among others. Does he agree that this is symptomatic of the dysfunctionality of the European Union? Will he also note that Germany has very much driven the measures itself, and furthermore that it has a surplus of £29 billion with the rest of the European Union, whereas we have a deficit of £48 billion?
Clearly, it is a matter of regret, and lessons should be learned from the situation that Cyprus finds itself in. One of the clear lessons is that it should not have been allowed to descend into this state of indebtedness, and the banks should not have been allowed to get into their present position of vulnerability. It is in our interests, as well as in the interests of other members of the eurozone, that we have a much more soundly based banking system right across Europe.
I welcome the action that has been taken to protect the deposits of members of our armed forces in Cyprus, but to follow on from what has just been said, is not the lesson of this whole episode to spell out very clearly to anyone who advocates in future any greater European integration or any joining of the euro, “Hands off our money”?
I am sure that our constituents in this country will be relieved and reassured that we are not part of these arrangements and not exposed to the consequences of the failure that is sought to be averted in Cyprus.
This is a truly shocking development, impacting very unfairly on savers who are already feeling the impact of the very low interest rates brought about by quantitative easing; it is acting as a real disincentive to save for one’s older age. I congratulate my right hon. Friend on protecting members of the armed forces, but will he clarify his intentions for British pensioners, having put on hold pension payments? Can anything more be done to reassure British pensioners living in Cyprus that they will not be affected?
It is open to British pensioners to have their pension paid into another account. They can nominate that account from now on through the Department for Work and Pensions’ website. Their pensions are safe; we will make sure of that. The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Thornbury and Yate (Steve Webb), will update the House. Once the details of the final package become known, in so far as they have implications for the payment of pensions, we will update the House.
My Cypriot constituents are shocked and angered that the much-publicised deposit guarantee scheme appears to be worthless. They are further outraged that the reason given for that is that the banks have not gone bankrupt, therefore the deposit guarantee does not apply. What action will the Minister take to speak to his EU colleagues to see what can be done, even at this late stage, to repair the damage to trust and confidence in our banking system?
The hon. Gentleman and I had a conversation this morning. I know that he has many constituents who are very worried at this time, and I have said that I am happy to meet them so that we can understand their particular situation. It is clearly an unsatisfactory situation in which the Government of Cyprus, as I understand it, faced a choice between a measure such as this and contemplating the collapse of the banking system. That is a choice that no one would want to make. It is a choice that they made and that they are putting to the Cypriot Parliament, but just as this Parliament is sovereign, so that is true in Cyprus, and the debates that they will be having during the next two days will determine whether what has been proposed over the weekend is what pertains.
The Government are right to protect the position of members of our armed services, but the Minister knows that many pensioners are exposed and I hope that he will consider extending the guarantee to British pensioners living in Cyprus. On a practical note, I believe that the Cypriot Parliament is due to vote on Tuesday evening and that the bank holiday in Cyprus has been extended until Thursday in order to keep the banks shut. Does that apply to branches of Cypriot banks in other countries, and what will happen if the vote in Parliament on Tuesday does not go the way that the Cypriot Government wish it to go?
Discussions are continuing with the eurozone members as well as the Cypriot Parliament, so it would be wrong to speculate on the outcome. I can confirm that Cypriot bank branches in this country are open and operating normally today.
The public will be outraged that British nationals are having their money stolen from them on the orders, let us be frank, of the German Government. Can we now move forward with legislation in this Session of Parliament to put on the statute book the power to have a referendum in this country on our relationship with the European union?
The hon. Lady will know that these matters have been discussed in the House. The Prime Minister has made a speech in which he said that if he is re-elected there will be such a referendum. As to whether the legislation should come before the House before the general election, that is for others.
The Minister will no doubt sympathise with a new Government picking up an appalling financial legacy and having to make tough decisions, but the raid on deposits was extraordinary and unprecedented. Will he provide assurance to my constituents that not only are the Laiki bank branches and the Bank of Cyprus, the headquarters of which is in my constituency, open for business, but the deposits are guaranteed, and that that deposit guarantee scheme applies and will continue to apply whatever the decision of the Cypriot Parliament?
I applaud the work that my hon. Friend does as chairman of the all-party group on Cyprus. The proposal that has been made would certainly protect his constituents who have deposits in those banks, and the final terms are being discussed in the Cypriot Parliament. Certainly, those banks that have subsidiaries in the UK are governed by the UK regulators and subject to the UK financial compensation scheme.
The Minister has mentioned members of the armed forces, but clearly no scheme is yet in place. What advice is being given to members of the armed forces currently serving in Cyprus, and has the Ministry of Defence stopped the payment of wages and expenses into Cypriot bank accounts?
The arrangements for advice on implementation of the commitment to compensate members of the armed forces cannot proceed until the Cypriots have decided on the final arrangements, which will be in the next few days. Having made the commitment to ensure that pensions are not paid into bank accounts to which access might be questionable, I will discuss the hon. Gentleman’s point with my right hon. and hon. Friends to ensure that similar arrangements are considered for the MOD.
The Minister is presumably unable to say how many of the 3,000 members of the armed forces serving in Cyprus will be affected, but does he agree that serving military personnel who have Cypriot bank accounts, even if they are not in Cyprus, should also be included in the scheme? Also, why will the Government be compensating only for “reasonable” losses and not full losses?
I know that many of my hon. Friend’s constituents will be in that situation and will have bank accounts in Cyprus. We have made a commitment, but these are very early days—we learned only over the weekend that these matters are being discussed. I think it is appropriate for the Government to make an immediate commitment of reassurance to those members of the armed forces. They have no choice about being sent to Cyprus, and when they go on this country’s business it seems to me to be reasonable to make that commitment.
Does the Financial Secretary have a view on how it looks to the world that ordinary savers are losing proportionately more of their deposits than institutional investors are? Is there not a strong case for the eurozone to get on and complete arrangements to create a single resolution mechanism so that banks can be resolved in an orderly way?
As the EU has now arbitrarily abandoned its £85,000 deposit insurance scheme, what advice would my right hon. Friend give British subjects in other European countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy, whose deposits might also be at risk in future? Would it be best for them to repatriate their funds?
The ECB made a clear statement today that the situation in Cyprus is unique, and I think that a study of the situation there would confirm that.
The ECB action was supposed to create stability, but it has created instability. The Minister has made it clear that the Chancellor was not consulted on that beforehand, but has the Chancellor made it clear to the ECB that, although this particular deal may be renegotiated, the instability will linger in precisely the way the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) suggests?
The whole House has an interest in ensuring that right across Europe, in countries that are members of the eurozone or those that are not, there is confidence in the banking system. This period of several days of uncertainty is undesirable. We need to get arrangements in place, as the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) said, to have clear resolution plans in advance. It needs to be sorted out quickly, because the situation is undesirable. I think that it is in everyone’s interests that it is resolved very soon.
I am grateful to the Minister for the conversation he and I had about the issue earlier today. I am also grateful to Councillor Andreas Tambourides, who has discussed it with me, and to my constituent Wayne Boothroyd, who e-mailed me to ask specifically about British service personnel on the island. What assurances can the Minister give me to pass on to my constituent that members of the armed forces will be compensated for their total losses, not their “reasonable” losses, as the Minister said in his statement?
The Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary have given a voluntary commitment to making sure that we do right by our armed forces, and their intentions are absolutely clear—that we should not be putting at a disadvantage the men and women who serve our country overseas, in this case in Cyprus.
I am a bit surprised by the lack of moral outrage from the Minister on behalf of the people who live in Cyprus. He calls the measures vigorous and exacting, but are they not actually immoral and unfair? Will he simply say that it is wrong for the Cypriot authorities to pilfer the savings of ordinary people living in Cyprus?
Not having been part of the negotiations, it is difficult for any Member of this House to know what the alternative was. The elected representatives of the Cypriot Government clearly accepted what was proposed in contemplation of a fate that they considered to be worse, which was the collapse of the Cypriot banking system. This is a situation that none of us wants to be in. Thank goodness that in this country, as a result of being outside the eurozone and having introduced discipline into our finances, we are not going to be.
We may well find that some of the biggest British losers are people who are in the process of buying or selling property in Cyprus. Can the Minister offer any reassurance to people who may have lodged money with a solicitor in an escrow account, for example, that the solicitor will be responsible for the losses and not the person who is trying to buy a property?
My hon. Friend raises an important point. I have made a commitment to the House to provide further statements once we have more detailed information on how all these arrangements are likely to apply.
This is clearly deeply worrying for the people of Cyprus, and we have to condemn what is being done to them, but it is also worrying for millions of working people across the whole eurozone. Is this not just the beginning of a situation in which Cyprus and other countries withdraw from the eurozone and, indeed, the euro itself may be wound up? Are the Treasury, the Government and the Bank of England making preparations for that eventuality?
The Treasury and the Government always make contingency plans for many eventualities. It is important to reflect on the statements made by the German Government and by the ECB that the situation in Cyprus is very dissimilar to that prevailing in other countries. It would not be right to draw a parallel between what is happening in Cyprus and the situation that exists elsewhere.
Many British citizens who move themselves or their assets to Cyprus will have done so believing that going to another EU country offered them some protection. This theft clearly shows what a pup we have been sold on Europe over the years. Will my right hon. Friend take up the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) and ensure that proper advice is offered to British pensioners in other eurozone nations on how they can protect their pensions or return their deposits to this country?
The agreement that was reached at the weekend was an agreement between the Government of Cyprus and the eurozone members. The ECB has said clearly:
“It’s the Cyprus government’s adjustment programme. If Cyprus’ president wants to change something regarding the levy on bank deposits, that’s in his hands. He must just make sure that the financing is intact.”
The Cypriot Parliament will, quite properly, be discussing and debating this matter. It has some influence, and indeed some control, over how these measures are levied.
As the Minister made clear, whether in the eurozone or not, what affects one country in Europe affects us all. Will he therefore answer the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mr Skinner) and give us his view on this levy on deposits?
The Government of Cyprus agreed to this proposal. The spokesman for the German Government was very clear that how Cyprus makes its contribution—how it makes the payments—is up to Cyprus. If the Government of Cyprus, recently elected by their people, make this decision, it is for them to justify it to the Cypriot Parliament.
Is this not proof positive, if any were needed, that if a country signs up to the euro it is effectively abandoning its economic sovereignty and national independence?
My hon. Friend makes a point that finds an echo throughout the Chamber. As the days go by, I think we are all reassured and relieved that we did not make the decision that the Labour party made in principle to join the euro.
One of the fundamental rules of banking has been broken, in that the deposits and savings of ordinary people have been, in effect, taken over in part by the state. That is a fundamental breach. What assurances can the Government give us that this precedent will not be followed by other countries in the near future?
As I said, we need to get resolution arrangements in place, but the ECB and the spokesmen for different members of the eurozone have been clear that the decision to impose this kind of levy was taken by the Cypriot Government with the eurozone. They could have done it in different ways, but that is the mechanism they chose.
Although it is absolutely right that the Government should support our armed forces personnel, I share the sense of moral outrage expressed by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) that ordinary pensioners who have retired to Cyprus, who are citizens of ours and who do not think of themselves as members of the eurozone but as British citizens, will feel abandoned. Will the Minister assure me that he will fight hard, particularly for those pensioners who have less than €100,000 on deposit, to try to protect their money?
Yes, but discussions and negotiations are taking place between Cyprus and the eurozone—and, indeed, in the Cypriot Parliament—on whether the proposals that were agreed over the weekend will be enacted. We have some way to go before we get to that stage and I will, of course, update the House if and when we get to that final stage.
I am amazed that the Minister is not more scandalised that thousands of ordinary Cypriots, in this country and in Cyprus, are going to lose money. Money will be filched from them when, frankly, the people who caused the problems—the Government of and the bankers in Cyprus—will not lose anything. Leaving that aside, how much British Government money from the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will be lost in Cypriot banks?
I am scandalised that the situation in Cyprus was allowed to happen in this way. It should not have happened in terms of the supervision of the banking system or the country’s fiscal performance. We will not be able to make an assessment of our guarantee to the armed services until we see the final shape of the negotiations, but when we do I will make sure that the House knows about it.
Further to the question asked by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), it is undoubtedly true that the Ministry of Defence has funding in the Bank of Cyprus for operational expenses on our bases, including pay. Are we likely to be scalped? In other words, is it likely that our Government will bail out the Government of Cyprus?
It is too early to make that assessment, but we should know in the next few days and I will, of course, update the House when the situation is clear.
Having visited our sovereign bases on Cyprus and seen the training facilities and some of the excellent decompression facilities for our troops returning from theatre, I am very concerned about the effect this proposal could have on our bases. Although I welcome what my right hon. Friend has said about compensating service personnel, will that include family members who have relocated to Cyprus with servicemen and women during their overseas posting?
Yes, that is the intention. Clearly, if the family of a serving member of the armed forces has to relocate to Cyprus and maintain a bank account for everyday living expenses, it seems reasonable to include that in the proposed compensation arrangements. That seems to be the just thing to do.
What is the Minister’s assessment of the exposure of London financial markets to the potential crisis that may follow from this?
The Bank of England keeps the arrangements under constant review. I think it is fair to reflect that Cyprus is an infinitesimal part of the European banking system and an even smaller part of the world banking system. Although this is an extremely worrying time for citizens of Cyprus and our constituents who have investments or connections in Cyprus, in the wider context Cyprus does not have the systemic importance of other countries.
Whatever the Cypriot Parliament decides this week, this has been a torpedo across the European banking system. What advice would the Minister give to pensioners who live in Spain and Portugal about whether they should maintain large deposits in eurozone banks?
I agree that this is a warning and that it is necessary to have more robust financial arrangements in place to prevent this sort of crisis from happening in other countries. However, I reinforce the advice of the ECB that this problem is unique to Cyprus, which is particularly exposed and is in a state of particular indebtedness.
Does the Minister agree that what we are witnessing in Cyprus is yet further evidence of the disastrous consequences of what happens when a country loses control of its economy by giving up its own currency?
It is perfectly clear that the problems in Cyprus are related to its membership of the euro. Thankfully, we are not part of the euro, we do not have those problems and we have control of our own arrangements in this country—and long may that continue.
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Commons Chamber3. What progress he has made on supporting victims of interest rate swap mis-selling.
On 31 January, the Financial Services Authority published the findings of the pilot review into interest rate swap mis-selling. The full review of 40,000 cases is now under way, and the FSA says it should be completed within six months. Small business organisations played a major role in exposing the scandal, so I can announce to the House that from today bodies representing consumers, including small businesses, will be able to apply to make super-complaints to the Financial Conduct Authority, giving them fast-track access to the regulator. That important power should help to ensure that any future misconduct is detected quickly and put right.
I thank the Minister for that answer. My constituent, Mr James Boyle, has a contract with Clydesdale bank, which seems to be excluded from the review. The main banks—RBS, HSBC, Barclays and Lloyds—are all included. Why are the Clydesdale bank, and my constituent, excluded from the review?
I can confirm that the Clydesdale bank has now become part of the review, as have all the other principal banks. The hon. Gentleman has raised the case of his constituent with me before; even though the product was not within the review’s terms of reference, Clydesdale has agreed to consider it as part of the review.
I have constituents who are concerned that the FSA may come under pressure from the banks to water down its findings and reduce the scope of the redress scheme, to their disadvantage. What can my right hon. Friend say to reassure my constituents about that important issue?
My hon. Friend raises a very important point. The review is under the auspices of the Financial Services Authority, and each bank has had to appoint independent reviewers who are themselves accountable to the FCA. It is absolutely crucial that the objectivity they bring to bear cannot be compromised, and I have given the FSA clear feedback that it should have that in mind during the review.
4. What steps he has taken to increase the amount of (a) lending and (b) equity financing to the real economy.
11. What recent estimate he has made of the extent to which the rate of increase of average earnings has kept in line with the rate of consumer price inflation.
The average gross weekly earnings of full-time employees rose by 2.8% between the last quarter of 2011 and the last quarter of 2012, while consumer prices rose by 2.7%. As a result of the increases in the personal tax allowance and rising employment, average household disposable income has increased by 2.8% more than inflation.
Clearly the Chancellor has no understanding of what it is like to get by on a low income when increases in prices such as VAT mean debt and hardship for many families. Equally, last week the Office for Budget Responsibility confirmed that the Prime Minister has no understanding of his economic policies either. Is that why the Chancellor is implementing a tax cut for millionaires—because he does not understand real life or economics?
If the hon. Lady had a grasp of economics, she would understand the need to take people out of taxation, which is what we have done through the increase in the personal allowance. In fact, that increase affects the lowest paid most of all and is equivalent to a pay increase of 4.5% since the general election. A higher personal allowance is a better policy than the shadow Chancellor’s plan to introduce the 10p rate, which the Financial Times described as “a pretty basic howler”.
The shadow Chancellor is a very gracious chap and, I am sure, would wish to commend the Government for taking 25 million people out of tax by the simple measure of increasing the personal allowance. Can my right hon. Friend share with the House what that means for an individual’s annual budget?
Yes. By next month it will be worth £600 a year for every basic rate taxpayer, which is an enormous increase. For someone on median earnings, it is equivalent to a pay rise of 4.5%. I would have thought that the shadow Chancellor, who professes to be interested in helping the low-paid, would endorse the policy.
12. What estimate he has made of what the annual value of his planned reduction in the additional rate of income tax to 45% would be to a person earning £1 million a year.
Although article 153(5) of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union may be esoteric to some, it is rather important because it prohibits the European Union from running an incomes policy. It seems to me that the bonus limit is an incomes policy; it is not a power of the European Union and therefore ought to be resisted by the Government by all possible means. Will the Chancellor take it to the European Court of Justice?
I am delighted to answer my hon. Friend’s question. We are looking carefully at the provisions of the treaty and at every aspect of the proposals. We think that this country has a particularly rigorous set of arrangements, and we do not want to see them diluted.
T4. Companies are telling me that with demand at rock bottom and infrastructure projects failing to get away from the starting blocks, they see little incentive for investment in UK industry. When drawing up the Budget, will the Chancellor consider expanding the scope of enhanced capital allowances to cover a broader range of investment, and therefore encourage companies to invest in the UK rather than take their money elsewhere?
House building approvals are up by two thirds. Does that reflect the success of the Government’s funding for lending schemes, the Financial Secretary’s successful planning reforms, or the sustained period of record low interest rates?
T7. My weekend surgeries were dominated by constituents facing backdated payment demands from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, despite the fact that they had discharged their responsibilities and had been assured that their tax affairs were in order. Does the Minister think it is right to put people through financial stress and misery because of HMRC mistakes and staff cuts?
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The Bill has a simple objective at its heart, which is to answer what the Chancellor has called the British dilemma: how can Britain be one of the world’s leading financial centres without exposing ordinary working people in this country to the terrible costs of banks failing?
Let me illustrate both sides of the dilemma. The financial services sector is one of our most important industries. Together with related services, it employs around 2 million people in this country, two thirds of whom work outside London. Even in the recession, financial services contribute about £1 in every £8 of government revenue to pay for public services. The industry is by far our biggest exporter, generating last year a £47 billion surplus from overseas trade and providing us with vital foreign exchange earnings.
The Chancellor is on record as saying that this is a critical piece of legislation if we are to get the banking system right, yet he chooses not to appear before us today. There has been no explanation of why the Chancellor is not in the Chamber. Could the right hon. Gentleman give us one?
I should have thought it was reasonable for the Financial Secretary to the Treasury to introduce a Bill on financial services.
Let me continue to make my point. The financial services sector is of great importance to Britain, but that importance carries risks for this country. At their peak, the banks’ balance sheets amounted to 500% of UK GDP, compared with 100% in the US and 300% in France and Germany. In 2008, for example, the Royal Bank of Scotland was the biggest bank in the world and, as we all know, Britain also witnessed the first bank run for more than a century, with depositors queuing in the streets to get their savings out of Northern Rock. RBS and HBOS had to be bailed out, with £65 billion of taxpayers’ money needed to shore up the banks.
The system of regulation failed, as did the culture of the banking sector, in not preventing and resolving the crisis without recourse to taxpayers’ money or otherwise putting people’s deposits at risk. That is why fundamental reform was needed, the first pillar of which has been put in place through the passage of the Financial Services Act 2012, which received Royal Assent in December and establishes a clear and distinct role for prudential regulation and conduct regulation, a role that was blurred and ineffective.
The Bill is the second pillar of those reforms and it reflects the considered views of no fewer than two expert commissions. The first, chaired by Sir John Vickers, was the Independent Commission on Banking, whereas the second, chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), was the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, on which many Members of the House have served.
Let me say something about the process we followed, briefly summarise how the Bill reflects the recommendations of each commission and then explain in some detail the rationale for the few remaining areas in which the Government’s proposed approach differs.
In his discussion of the process, will the Financial Secretary explain why, given that the crash in 2008 to which the Bill is a response was one of the most momentous economic events in my lifetime and the lifetimes of many people, and given the importance of its proposals, the Chancellor did not see fit to lead the debate today?
I am disappointed that my presence here does not satisfy the hon. Lady. The Chancellor trusts his Financial Secretary to speak at the Dispatch Box. I do not know how it is in the Opposition.
Will the Minister at least tell us where the Chancellor is? Is he watching on television? Is he doing some shopping or knitting? What is going on? Where is the Chancellor right now?
I should have thought that the hon. Gentleman would reflect on the fact that the Chancellor has many serious responsibilities and he is discharging them at the moment.
Let me talk about the process that we have followed, then I will address in some detail the particular aspects of content. The process that we have followed has sought to come up with the best possible way to address the dilemma that I described, and to do so by building, as far as possible, a broad consensus. That may not be there—yet—on every particular, but I think most Members would concede that Sir John Vickers’ commission has come closer to achieving that than many people thought possible.
The Independent Commission on Banking was established as soon as possible after the general election, in June 2010. It took extensive evidence before publishing an issues paper in September 2010 and an interim report in April 2011, on which it consulted, before publishing its final report in September 2011. The Government gave, and consulted on, an initial response in December 2011, before issuing a White Paper for consultation in June 2012. In the light of the responses to the consultation, a draft Bill was published last October and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards was asked to subject it to pre-legislative scrutiny. The parliamentary commission’s report was published on 21 December last year and many of its recommendations were accepted in the Bill published in February and laid before the House.
At the time of introduction, I made it clear from the Dispatch Box that we would table further amendments in response to the commission’s future recommendations as the Bill proceeds through both Houses. I hope that Members on all sides would agree that this has been an exceptionally extensive process of both policy development and scrutiny of emerging proposals, and I repeat what I said to the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) last month, that I will personally insist on taking a constructive and open-minded approach to the views of this House throughout the Bill’s passage. To the extent that the Bill reflects the unanimous views of Parliament, it is immeasurably strengthened.
Does the Minister accept that one of the major factors in the 2008 crisis was the complete failure of the auditing sector to get a grip on what banks were doing? Will he be putting forward proposals for strengthening audit for the future?
That was not a set of particular recommendations in the reports that were commissioned, but I know that it is of some interest to members of the parliamentary commission and, as I will go on to say, we stand ready to consider their further recommendations, and I dare say they might have something to say in that respect.
I want to pick up on the Minister’s statement that he wants to take this parliamentary process seriously and listen to the debates. If that is the case, why on earth has he ignored the clear recommendation of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards that there should be a three-month gap between the publication of the Bill and the Committee stage in the House of Commons? We will not have a Committee stage at a time when we can fully take account of the final recommendations of the commission. Is that not totally contemptuous of the Commons parliamentary procedures? Perhaps that is why the Chancellor has not turned up for the debate.
I just said that I intend to be constructive and to pursue the approach that we have taken. If the hon. Gentleman will be patient, I will respond shortly to that particular recommendation.
Let me summarise the principal contents of the Bill where they reflect the advice of one or both of the commissions, before I set out the areas in which we take a different view. One of the central recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking is that the UK banks should ring-fence
“those banking activities where continuous provision of service is vital to the economy and to a bank’s customers.”
That recommendation has attracted widespread support, and the Bill creates the basic architecture of the ring fence by making it an objective of the regulator—the Prudential Regulation Authority and, if necessary, the Financial Conduct Authority—to secure the continuity of core services by preventing ring-fenced bodies from exposing themselves to excessive risks, by protecting them from external risks, and by ensuring that, in the event of failure, core activities can carry on uninterrupted, the so-called resolution objective. The core activities are defined, as recommended by Vickers, as the taking of retail and small and medium-sized enterprise deposits and overdrafts, but they can be added to if required through secondary legislation.
In response to the parliamentary commission’s recommendations, the Bill is now clear that to be ring-fenced means that the five so-called Haldane principles of separation should be followed, namely that the ring-fenced bodies should have separate governances, including boards; remuneration arrangements; treasury and balance sheet management; risk management; and human resource management. As the parliamentary commission has also recommended, directors of banks will be held personally responsible for ensuring that the ring-fence rules are obeyed. The parliamentary commission also made a recommendation that the ring fence should be electrified. That is to say that, if the rules are breached, the banks should be forcibly split.
While the Bill is before the House, the Government will bring forward amendments to provide a power to require the full separation of a banking group, where, in the opinion of the regulator and the Government, such separation is required to ensure the independence of the ring-fenced bank. As hon. Members know, the parliamentary commission made a further recommendation for a power to trigger separation of the entire system, which I will come to shortly.
How confident is the Minister that over the coming years the all-powerful financial lobby will not water down the ring fence and return to a business as usual scenario?
That is a principal source of concern. Sir John Vickers, the author of the report, has given evidence in public that he is confident that the arrangements are robust, but we reflected on one of the recommendations of the parliamentary commission to provide this electrification so that there are consequences for a bank that tries to game the system. That is right and it is a valuable contribution from the commission.
Sir John Vickers has in evidence to us also endorsed in full our proposals for electrification, part of which the Government are rejecting.
I will deal with the important recommendation made by my hon. Friend’s commission very shortly.
For the sake of completeness, let me summarise the Bill’s other main provisions.
The Minister said that electrification would work because the regulator—the PRA or the FCA where a financial institution is not PRA-regulated—will be given the power to ensure core services. Does he see any issues arising if the PRA and the FCA perhaps take a different approach to what they might do to the same institution? Is there a concern about two different regulators looking at different institutions on the same matter?
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, which we considered in drafting the Bill. We would expect all of these activities and institutions to be regulated by the PRA. The FCA was included in the Bill as a means of ensuring that if some other activities were to take place in the future—although we do not envisage that happening—it would not be necessary to come back to the House. That is our clear intention.
Let me summarise what the Bill does include before I go on to talk about what it does not. As proposed by the independent commission, the Bill provides that deposits protected by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme—the deposits of individuals and small businesses up to £85,000—will be preferential debts in insolvency. The Bill provides the regulator with the power to require ring-fenced banks to maintain a buffer of at least 17% of what is referred to as the primary loss absorbing capacity—that is, equity, other non-equity capital instruments, and debt that can be written down or converted into equity in the event that a bank fails. This allows losses to fall on the bank’s wholesale creditors—sophisticated financial investors—rather than on ordinary taxpayers, as was the case with RBS.
A legitimate question arises as to whether additional loss absorbency requirements should apply, in an international financial centre such as the United Kingdom, to the overseas operations of UK-based global banks. This has been much debated in the House, both before the parliamentary commission and elsewhere. It is obviously right that where the overseas businesses of a UK-based bank could pose a threat to UK financial stability, or to the British taxpayer, that bank should issue loss-absorbing debt against the entirety of its group operations. Equally, where overseas units do not pose such a threat they should be exempt from loss-absorbing debt requirements, not least to avoid creating a false impression that the UK somehow stands behind those overseas businesses.
The question that has exercised the commission is this: who should decide? The Government have listened to the Financial Services Authority and the parliamentary commission on how that should work. We agree that the requirement should follow the strategy for managing the failure of each group, known as the resolution strategy. Where a UK parent company will provide support to resolve failing overseas operations, the regulator must ensure that the parent company issues loss-absorbing debt against the entire group. However, where a bank’s overseas subsidiaries would be resolved locally by overseas regulators without reliance on the UK parent, the parent company should not be required to issue loss-absorbing debt against those overseas subsidiaries. Crucially, it will not be the bank’s call but the decision of the regulator and the Treasury as to whether group primary loss-absorbing capacity—PLAC—should be held.
Of course, the UK regulator will have to know whether the third-country regulator will accept responsibility for the subsidiary. How does the Minister intend to ensure that the UK regulator can be reassured that the third-country regulator will accept responsibility for the subsidiary should it get into trouble?
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. That will be one of the requirements—the regulator, and indeed the Treasury, will need to be satisfied by the bank that the overseas regulator has accepted, and credible arrangements are in place, to ensure that no liabilities will fall on the UK taxpayer.
The resolution plans have to be agreed between the regulator and the Treasury, so both will have that responsibility.
Just to get some clarity on the previous point about the relationship with overseas regulators, if both the Treasury and the regulator are required to be convinced of the plan, how will that work in the relationship with, say, the single supervisory mechanism in Europe? Will it, too, not be required to be convinced, or at least will discussions not have to take place, to determine first where liability might lie and then whether the resolution plans are adequate?
The reason for arranging this through the resolution plans is that they should be agreed in advance and everyone should be clear who will be responsible. It is no good the Treasury or the regulator in this country thinking that an overseas jurisdiction will pick up the bill if they were actually blissfully ignorant of it, so the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that there has to be that clarity.
As I promised on 4 February, I have provided Parliament with drafts of the principal statutory instruments so that the House, while scrutinising the Bill in detail, can understand more clearly how the powers that the Bill grants are intended to be used. As a further aid to scrutiny, I will also make available to the House, in advance of consideration in Committee, a so-called Keeling schedule giving a consolidated text of those parts of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 that will be amended by the Bill, including the amendments the Bill will make.
Let me turn to some of the relatively few recommendations of either the Independent Commission on Banking or the parliamentary commission on which the Government have not been persuaded. There are four main areas to consider. The first is the timing of scrutiny, which the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) mentioned. I hope that hon. Members will accept, from the process I described earlier, that these proposals have already benefitted from an exceptional degree of consideration, both in the amount and, if I may say so, in the august quality of its scrutineers. It will soon be three years since the Vickers commission began its work, and it is less than two years until all the secondary legislation must be enacted if this work is to be completed in this Parliament, as I think we all hope it will be. The Bill is comparatively short—20 clauses— and the time envisaged for its Committee stage is not unreasonable for consideration of all the amendments proposed by the parliamentary commission in its report published today.
However, I know that the parliamentary commission has other advice to give, and I welcome its commitment to produce its final report by the middle of May. Once we have received the commission’s advice, we will of course want the chance to be able to take it. I therefore give this commitment: subject to the usual channels, I will make sure that this House has enough opportunity to consider and debate whatever further recommendations the commission makes in its final report.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that commitment. Another issue that made life more difficult for the parliamentary commission was the lack of any knowledge of the delegated legislation that he has said will go through the House. Will he give some indication as to when that will be published so that although the parliamentary commission might not have that information available to it, the Public Bill Committee may?
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s point. As I said, I have published some of the principal statutory instruments and more will be available before the Bill goes into Committee. I will make sure that the House has access to the principal measures; as he knows, minor measures will sometimes follow. I repeat that it is absolutely my intention that the Bill should be properly considered and scrutinised by this House. The strength of these arrangements will benefit from their being exhaustively considered and enjoying the full confidence of the House.
I apologise for interrupting for a third time, but I want to clarify the scrutiny question. The Government intend to get the Bill out of Committee before the date that the Banking Commission had proposed that it should go into Committee. Therefore, this all boils down to how much time we are going to get on Report. Will the Minister now, at the Dispatch Box, give a commitment to two days on Report?
I cannot do that, but I repeat my commitment that this House will have the opportunity fully to consider the amendments proposed by my hon. Friend’s commission. He has not yet produced his report, so we do not know what he has in mind, but I have been as clear as I can at the Dispatch Box that there is no intent to avoid scrutiny; quite the opposite.
The Minister talks in very emollient tones, because he likes to sound moderate, but this is a series of instances of contempt for the House of Commons’ powers and our ability to scrutinise the Bill. The Government ignore the recommendation of the parliamentary commission, they then try to whisk the thing out of Committee before we have even had a chance to consider the recommendations of the commission, and now, when asked for a mere two days on Report, the Minister will not even give that commitment. The Chancellor is not here, either. In what seriousness do the Government hold this Bill? There is a sense that it is just part of a rubber-stamping exercise for them.
The hon. Gentleman will discover that through our debates in Committee he will have plenty of opportunity to scrutinise the Bill. When we have the commission’s recommendations, if we think that they need more than a day on Report then I will make the case for that. Whatever happens, I will ensure that this House has the opportunity fully to consider these matters.
I am afraid that I want to press the Minister further on the same point. He said that the Government would ensure that there was full consideration in this House of further recommendations from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, yet the timetabling motion that he will move later says:
“Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall…be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 18 April”.
That is before the date of the parliamentary commission’s final report. How meaningful will be his commitment to full consideration of those proposals, given that he is rushing the Bill through Committee before the commission, which I remind the House was set up by the Chancellor, has even issued its final report?
The right hon. Gentleman will find that he is satisfied with the scrutiny that is available. It is a question of chickens and eggs. We have not yet had the recommendations of the commission, on which he serves. When it makes its recommendations, if we think that they require more time then we will certainly make sure that there is plenty of opportunity for the House to scrutinise these matters.
I remind the Minister that, around the time of the LIBOR scandal a year ago, a serious proposal by the Opposition for a full, open public inquiry into these issues was rejected by the Chancellor in favour of a parliamentary commission. The commission’s recommendations on process as well as substance and the House of Commons’ scrutiny of its recommendations —which will not even have been made by the time the Committee stage is complete—are being treated in a way that is very much against the spirit of the Chancellor’s announcement last summer, when he rejected a full public inquiry. If the Minister can get hold of the Chancellor before the vote at 10 pm, he should tell him that the Government should reconsider the contemptuous way in which they are treating the House of Commons and the all-party parliamentary commission of both Houses. It is not in line with the spirit of the discussions that the Chancellor had last summer with the chair of the commission, the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie).
The right hon. Gentleman will find that he will be perfectly satisfied with the degree of scrutiny that the recommendations, which have not yet been made, will receive. I have made that commitment and he will see it in time, even if he is not very trusting at this stage. I hope he will change his view.
One of the parliamentary commission’s policy recommendations was for a general reserve power to split up the entire banking system if it were considered to be appropriate in future. The Chancellor, the chairman of the commission—my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester—and, indeed, the Archbishop of Canterbury had a learned and erudite discussion about the origin of the sword of Damocles metaphor. The Government’s view is that such a power would, in effect, introduce a different policy—one that was considered and rejected by the Independent Commission on Banking, which concluded that full separation would have higher costs for a gain
“that might not even be positive”—
without anything like the three-year period of scrutiny and analysis that this policy has enjoyed.
The proposal would, in effect, legislate for two policies at the same time—ring-fencing and full separation. We must legislate for the policy that the Vickers commission proposed. If a future Government were to consider that ring-fencing was no longer the right solution—which they would be perfectly entitled to do—they should conduct a full analysis of the case for alternative reforms and, in the light of that analysis, introduce new legislation to Parliament.
In addition, the parliamentary commission has proposed that the exercise of the reverse power by the Prudential Regulation Authority should include safeguards, including a Treasury veto, to ensure that the regulator behaves in a non-discriminatory way. The Government agree that there should be such a veto and will table an amendment to provide for a firm-specific power to require separation while the Bill is before the House. In addition, a further safeguard is available for any bank that believes it has been treated unfairly—namely, recourse to the courts.
One very important point that both the Vickers commission and the parliamentary commission agreed is that, in addition to the enhanced capital requirements on ring-fenced banks, there should be a minimum leverage ratio and that it should apply to unweighted assets of 4.06%, rather than the Basel III standard of 3%.
Let me be clear: this Government support the introduction of a minimum leverage ratio. It provides a simpler measure than risk-weighted assets, the calculation of which can be complex and disputed. Furthermore, it has been established empirically that a rise in the leverage ratio often preceded credit booms in this country and overseas.
The question remaining is about the precise level of the leverage ratio. I referred earlier to the British dilemma of how to maintain an internationally competitive financial sector without imposing risks on domestic taxpayers. This is a case in which that dilemma is, to be frank, most acute. When it comes to capital requirements, international agreements have already established that different countries will have different requirements. The European Union capital requirements directive, CRD4, provides for member states to have discretion to go beyond agreed capital requirements.
In the case of the leverage ratio, the 3% Basel III recommendation was for the requirement to be binding only from 2018, and it is not clear yet whether there will be the flexibility in European law to increase it as Vickers and the parliamentary commission recommend. The Vickers commission did not recommend that the higher leverage ratio should apply before 2019, in order, for reasons that I think we all understand, to minimise the impact on lending in the short term while the economy is still recovering.
Furthermore, during our repeated consultations, concerns have been raised by institutions such as building societies that they could be caught by a 4% leverage ratio despite having a relatively low-risk portfolio of assets, thereby restricting lending to home owners. Moreover, it would lead to assets in Spanish property, for example, being viewed as equal to US Government bonds for the purposes of the calculation. Our view, therefore, is that at this time we should follow the international approach and press for countries to have power to set a higher ratio from 2018, following a review in 2017.
Having said that, in the interests of transparency, we agree with the recommendation of the Financial Policy Committee that banks should disclose their leverage ratios from 2013. I confirm that they will do so from this year.
Does the Minister perceive there to be a problem for very small building societies, because they are more disadvantaged than large institutions and could be swallowed up, thereby reducing competition in the market rather than increasing it?
I have taken to heart the need to allow into the market smaller players, whether they be building societies or banks. I will say something about that shortly which I hope will satisfy the hon. Gentleman.
I suggest to the Minister that he has just ducked the British dilemma that he set out at the beginning of his speech by saying on the one hand that we have a huge financial services sector, but on the other hand that we are going to go at the speed of the slowest ship out of Basel on the capital and leverage rules. Is not the proper response to having a huge financial services sector relative to our economy to ensure that we have adequate rules to protect the UK taxpayer, rather than always going for the lowest common denominator internationally on such standards?
I think that the right hon. Gentleman would concede that what Vickers recommended will advantage us and protect the British taxpayer in a number of respects, including through ring-fencing and higher capital requirements. We are already doing those things. He will know that Vickers did not recommend an early increase in the leverage ratio. I have been candid with the House that we would like to see one. However, in line with what Vickers advised and given the discussions that are taking place in other jurisdictions, we think that it is right to have the consideration in 2017, with a view to introducing the higher leverage ratio later.
The Minister said earlier that capital requirements and the leverage ratio were protections for the UK banking sector. However, capital is based on risk-weighted assets, which, as he has accepted, are controversial and, to many people’s minds, do not provide the level of protection that is required. It therefore becomes acutely important that the leverage ratio provides that protection. As has been said, given the size of the UK banking industry, it is critical to prioritise safety and soundness. Those things will be delivered by a higher leverage ratio.
I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s analysis. A higher leverage ratio is important. However, we have reflected the view of the Vickers commission that a higher leverage ratio is not necessarily required immediately. It is our intention to bring it in following the review in 2017. That is a reasonable time frame. I repeat that it is our intention that there should be a backstop ratio.
The final major difference between the Bill and what was recommended by the parliamentary commission is that it does not include proposals on how creditors, rather than taxpayers, will be expected to bear the costs in the event of a bank failure. We are working with other European countries to develop a credible and effective bail-in tool as part of the European recovery and resolution directive, reflecting the recommendations of the global Financial Stability Board.
The Irish presidency of the EU has set out plans to make rapid progress towards concluding the recovery and resolution directive. The RRD is due to come into force in 2015 and the bail-in tool by 2018. Given that progress, we have not included clauses on the matter in the Bill, but if agreement cannot be reached, which we do not expect to happen, we will consider tabling amendments later in the Bill’s passage to allow the UK to act alone.
Does my right hon. Friend agree with me and Andy Haldane that bank account number portability could make a positive contribution to the prospects of easy resolution in the event of a future bank failure?
My hon. Friend is a passionate advocate of that, and I think that what I will say about it will please her. I hope that she will be able to contribute to the debates on it in the weeks ahead.
The Government intend to go further on the matter of competition than was suggested in the reports of the two commissions. I strongly believe that the concentrated nature of the UK banking industry is unacceptable. I want to see far greater possibility, and indeed reality, of entry into the market by new banks and building societies. One of the barriers to that has been access to the UK payments system. Potential challengers have to win the permission of incumbents to be able to use the system. The Government will therefore shortly consult on a proposal to make access to the payments system regulated, to ensure that it is available on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. Subject to the findings of the consultation, the Government will consider tabling amendments to the Bill to give the regulator the necessary powers. I think that would address my hon. Friend’s ambitions.
I welcome the Minister’s comments. Will he also table an amendment to recreate the Halifax building society out of the state-owned Lloyds-TSB bank? That would immediately create a major competitor on the high street that would be hugely popular, as it was before it was bought out.
We want to see greater competition and more entrants. The hon. Gentleman will know that in the case of the banks in which we were in the unfortunate position of having to take a shareholding, the arrangements that govern that shareholding require us to operate at arm’s length of the interests of other shareholders. No doubt he will be able to make his points throughout the passage of the Bill.
This is a Bill, and it can become an Act, so the Minister could table a Government amendment to do precisely what I said. Why is he not taking the opportunity to recreate the Halifax building society, which hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions—of consumers across the country would greatly welcome?
All I would say is that that is not one of the Government’s proposals. We operate at arm’s length, but if the hon. Gentleman is a member of the Bill Committee he will be able to table such an amendment, and I am sure it will be vigorously debated.
I hope that in years to come the Bill will be viewed as a landmark piece of legislation in the history of our economy. I readily concede that a Bill entitled the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill does not set the heart racing, but important legislation can have a profound effect on our economy and come to represent a particular approach. That is shown by our familiarity even today with an American Act, the Glass-Steagall Act, the common name for the US Banking Act of 1933. I am modest and realistic enough to hold out no hope or expectation that this Bill will be referred to in 80 years’ time as the Clark-Javid Act, but if the House’s scrutiny is as thorough and constructive as I hope it will be, the names of Vickers and, dare I say, Tyrie might find a place in the history books. The hon. Member for Nottingham East and even myself might get a footnote.
The real test of the Bill is for it to establish once and for all the conditions in which the British banking system can be a global success story for decades to come while contributing to, not detracting from, the prosperity of the British people. I commend the Bill to the House.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing. All I say to the Father of the House is that we are now in a situation where we have a new Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Policy Committee and the Monetary Policy Committee. The Bank of England is of course still involved, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer will still have a number of powers. He may not have realised it, but the Government’s changes have not exactly simplified the regulatory environment. I digress. That was the Financial Services Act 2012, but we are addressing the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill in 2013.
When I took over my role, I read the Hansard report of the November 1997 debate. I commend it to the hon. Gentleman because it makes it absolutely clear that we opposed the creation of the FSA in the form proposed because we predicted it would be a mess. The then shadow Chancellor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr Lilley), said:
“The process of setting up the FSA may cause regulators to take their eye off the ball, while spivs and crooks have a field day.”—[Official Report, 11 November 1997; Vol. 300, c. 732.]
That is exactly what happened.
Conservatives have a tendency to try and rewrite history, but this really takes the biscuit. If the Minister is seriously saying that he would have preferred to have stayed with a non-statutory regulatory arrangement, which was the option available, he should stand up and admit it. He often asks where the apologies are, but we have accepted that we should have adopted a more prudential approach to regulation than the arrangements in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It is now equally important, however, that Conservative Members recognise that regulation is a good thing, that we need regulation of the financial services sector and that they were wrong to prefer a self-regulatory, non-statutory environment. Until they do that, they will never really confront the demons that still exist within the Conservative party’s philosophy.