Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateKelvin Hopkins
Main Page: Kelvin Hopkins (Independent - Luton North)Department Debates - View all Kelvin Hopkins's debates with the HM Treasury
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI should have thought that the hon. Gentleman would reflect on the fact that the Chancellor has many serious responsibilities and he is discharging them at the moment.
Let me talk about the process that we have followed, then I will address in some detail the particular aspects of content. The process that we have followed has sought to come up with the best possible way to address the dilemma that I described, and to do so by building, as far as possible, a broad consensus. That may not be there—yet—on every particular, but I think most Members would concede that Sir John Vickers’ commission has come closer to achieving that than many people thought possible.
The Independent Commission on Banking was established as soon as possible after the general election, in June 2010. It took extensive evidence before publishing an issues paper in September 2010 and an interim report in April 2011, on which it consulted, before publishing its final report in September 2011. The Government gave, and consulted on, an initial response in December 2011, before issuing a White Paper for consultation in June 2012. In the light of the responses to the consultation, a draft Bill was published last October and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards was asked to subject it to pre-legislative scrutiny. The parliamentary commission’s report was published on 21 December last year and many of its recommendations were accepted in the Bill published in February and laid before the House.
At the time of introduction, I made it clear from the Dispatch Box that we would table further amendments in response to the commission’s future recommendations as the Bill proceeds through both Houses. I hope that Members on all sides would agree that this has been an exceptionally extensive process of both policy development and scrutiny of emerging proposals, and I repeat what I said to the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) last month, that I will personally insist on taking a constructive and open-minded approach to the views of this House throughout the Bill’s passage. To the extent that the Bill reflects the unanimous views of Parliament, it is immeasurably strengthened.
Does the Minister accept that one of the major factors in the 2008 crisis was the complete failure of the auditing sector to get a grip on what banks were doing? Will he be putting forward proposals for strengthening audit for the future?
That was not a set of particular recommendations in the reports that were commissioned, but I know that it is of some interest to members of the parliamentary commission and, as I will go on to say, we stand ready to consider their further recommendations, and I dare say they might have something to say in that respect.
The hon. Gentleman neglects to mention RBS, a universal bank, which needed major intervention to bail it out.
The Minister has said that he does not want wider separation because the Bank of England does not want it. It is true that the Bank of England has expressed some reservations about the power if it were to be wielded by the regulator. I took the opportunity to ask the Governor about it last week when he appeared before the commission. He replied that
“a provision so important that it affects the entire sector is one that both de facto and de jure will and should be taken by Parliament.”
When I explained to him that it had never been the commission’s recommendation that this be a policy decision taken purely by the regulator, and that all along we had been clear that it was a decision for Government, he said:
“As long as the decision is taken by Government, we would have no objection to that.”
I hope that we will no longer hear Ministers saying that they are rejecting this power because the Bank of England is opposed to it. This should of course be a decision taken by Government. As for the Chancellor’s point that it would be “undemocratic”, what is undemocratic about holding a proper review into legislation passed by this House as the Banking Commission suggests, or about taking a reserve power the exercise of which would involve the parliamentary process of debate and approval? The truth is that it would not be undemocratic at all.
I am afraid that I want to make some more progress.
This is not, as the Minister argued, about introducing two policies at once; it is about introducing a policy and making sure that it is adhered to. As the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) said in this House a few weeks ago, the banks have nothing to fear if they adhere to the spirit and letter of the Bill. It need not introduce uncertainty, as some have argued; in fact, it ought to provide certainty that we are serious about the ring fence.
On capital and leverage, it is absolutely true that in the run-up to the crisis banks were over-leveraged, and that is because they held too little capital against the risks that they had. The Vickers commission was very clear about that. It recommended a future leverage ratio of 25:1, which is still quite high in historical terms, while the Government are recommending 33:1 because that is the internationally accepted Basel outcome. Without going into any more detail, I just say to the Minister that this goes back to the one-way trade to which I referred. It is a really important question running through all these reforms. If, every time we rub up against an issue, we say that we cannot damage the industry because it is so big here in the UK and we therefore have to stick to the lowest common denominator of international reforms, we will not be doing our duty to the UK economy or to UK taxpayers. If we have learned anything from the crisis of 2007 and 2008, it ought to be that there is a case for taking particular measures here in the UK precisely because of the size of the sector in relation to our wider economy. That is the basis on which we should judge the correct degree of leverage for the banks that operate in the UK.
Then there is the question of resolution and bail-in: in other words, what happens when a bank fails, and who is on the hook for that failure? In 2008, it was the taxpayers, not the bondholders, because a resolution mechanism was not in place in law that could allow for normal insolvency procedures were those to whom the banks owed money to take the risk. A very important part of the reforms is to change that situation. Bail-in is signed up to by the Government, but, like my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie), I am very curious as to why the Government are pursuing this through the European resolution and recovery directive. I would have thought, particularly after last week, that the Government might be somewhat nervous about pursuing a major financial services reform through a European directive. I return again to the one-way trade argument. Surely, because of the importance of this industry here in the UK, we should legislate to make sure that bondholders take a future risk and not UK taxpayers, and we should not leave it to the very uncertain process of a European directive negotiation. That might work out fine; there might be spontaneous agreement among the 27 member states. However, I am sure that the Minister agrees that that there is a very real possibility—this is not uncommon—that that would not be the case. I ask him to think again on the bail-in regime and to ensure that a proper UK decision is taken rather than leaving it all to a European directive. I would have thought that Government Members would support such a suggestion.
In conclusion, I want to reiterate the point about time. The parliamentary commission, which was set up by the Chancellor, has spent six months taking in—the chairman, the hon. Member for Chichester has done more totting up than me—60-odd oral evidence sessions and much written evidence. It is simply not good enough for the Minister to say that he will take the Bill out of Committee by the end of April, before we issue our final report. The Opposition supported the establishment of the parliamentary commission after the House had voted on the issue. We expect its recommendations to be properly considered by the Government, not swept out of the way by the timetable. I hope that the Minister will think again, because the structural issues under discussion are not the only issues. Important changes still need to be made to banking culture, standards and corporate governance, so that this very important industry contributes positively to the UK and does not put the economy and taxpayers at risk.
Yes, but if we are to get the changes we need, we also need to change the culture in both sectors.
The banks have never competed with one another, or at least not in trying to get customers. Rather, they have tended to compete by copying one another. When one bank comes up with a wheeze that swindles money, the bosses of the other banks say, “Why are they getting all this money in through this swindle? Can’t we do the swindle as well?” That is presumably how PPI started off at one bank and then went to all the others. Interest rate swap agreements certainly started at one bank and were then taken up by the others, because people in those banks felt they had to compete with the other swindlers down the road.
These people—this collection of money launderers, gun runners, drug money launderers, people who swindle small businesses and people who lose billions in their normal day-to-day business—are still paying themselves huge amounts of money. I know that the Prime Minister has a difficulty with facts, but I did not realise that he had a problem with adjectives, because when the Royal Bank of Scotland announced that it was paying £600 million in bonuses this year, he commended it—this bank of losers —for its restraint. That is not my definition of restraint. “Excess” is probably a better word in the circumstances. Restraint involves cutting the benefits of poor people and the pensions of the police, the nurses and the teachers. Restraint involves capping the pay of public employees. They have certainly been losing out. In 2009, I said that the two banks that were being semi-nationalised should have the normal public sector pay policies applied to them, and I think most people in this country would agree with that.
I am greatly enjoying my right hon. Friend’s speech, and I agree with every word of it. Does he not find it interesting that Lord Lawson has recently suggested that the Royal Bank of Scotland should be brought completely into public ownership? That would involve only a small amount of money, and we would then have a bank that was publicly accountable and responsible.
I entirely agree with that. I also agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw that it would be good to see the Halifax building society separated out from Lloyds HBOS, so that what was the country’s leading firm could be relocated and its decisions could once again be made in Halifax, rather than in the City of London.
Let us remember that while the people who are nursing the sick and carrying out operations in hospitals, the people who are teaching our children, the people who are policing our streets and the people who are risking their lives to fight fires are being restricted, HSBC is paying 204 people more than £1 million a year, Barclays is paying 428 people more than £1 million a year and RBS is paying 95 people more than £1 million a year. They are being paid those sums to play with other people’s money. That is all they are doing; if they lose but cannot go broke, they are clearly not playing with their own money. But not everyone at Barclays is getting £1 million a year; 100,000 people working for that bank are paid at a level that entitles them to child tax credit. What is more, it is people such as them all around the country who have been losing their jobs while that collection of losers at the top carry on.
Then we have the Prime Minister and the Chancellor, whose top priority in Europe is to prevent those horrible Europeans from imposing a limit on bankers’ bonuses. We used to be told that if we imposed such limits, the bankers would go elsewhere. We were told that they would go to Switzerland. Well, they will not be doing that since the referendum in that country, because they would now be worse off there than they would be here. Would they perhaps go to the United States? Some of them would have to think very carefully about that, because money launderers can be locked up over there, and that has indeed happened, even to Brits.
What all this boils down to is that the banking industry does not need mild tinkering; it needs a total worldwide transformation. Instead of acting as the back marker in the convoy, we ought to be out there banging a drum and getting a grip on the world banking industry, for the benefit of ordinary people in virtually every part of the world.
That was a fascinating speech by my good friend the hon. Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker). I cannot compete with his erudition; I have a much smaller speech on a smaller issue.
In 1983, I stood for Parliament on a manifesto that called for the public ownership of large sections of the banking system. It is an irony that large sections of it are now in public ownership, having been put there by people who profoundly disagree with and disbelieve in that process, but who were forced to do so or to let the system collapse. That is interesting. I certainly wish to see public ownership go further, as well as public regulation and accountability, as the risk in banking is being underwritten not by the borrowers but by the Government, by the state and by the citizen, and if risk is not and cannot be transferred, the ownership and accountability should be in public hands as well.
During the Minister’s opening speech, I mentioned audit and the appalling failures of the audit industry during the banking crisis. The hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) said that more needs to be done, and much more certainly needs to be done. I hope that some component of the Bill, when it is amended, might deal with audit.
There is a need for radical reform of the rules governing audit. The Financial Reporting Council is undertaking a consultation on the new rules that will compel auditors to write what is called a commentary, flagging problems, risks or disagreements with management at audited companies and institutions in clear and comprehensible language so that shareholders can understand. That will be seen as controversial by company management, but will be welcomed by shareholders and, by the same token, by bank depositors and customers.
We should of course remind ourselves that auditors, above all, represent shareholders—or at least they should. In reality, however, they are taken on by managers so power is effectively in the hands of managers and shareholders, or bank depositors, and customers simply have to trust them. When an audit contract comes to an end, auditors are unlikely to be critical of managers for fear of failing to be re-engaged. The inevitable cosy relationship between auditors and managers lies at the heart of what has gone wrong in the banking sector.
If auditors had been doing their job properly and their audit reports had not been so opaque and impenetrable, the financial crisis would not have happened as it did. The fact that banks were gambling with worthless bits of paper based on sub-prime mortgages was the fundamental cause of the banking crisis, and it is not over yet. Auditors did not do their job in relation to the practice of bankers such as those at Northern Rock before and until it collapsed. If they had, we might have prevented that catastrophe.
Does my hon. Friend agree that it is a trifle irksome to listen to the radio or watch television and to hear someone from PricewaterhouseCoopers telling us what we ought to do for the future when PricewaterhouseCoopers audited Northern Rock and did not spot anything going wrong, or to hear about the famous Ernst and Young ITEM Club when the biggest item in the firm’s history is that it did not spot that Lehman Brothers were broke?
I thank my right hon. Friend for that intervention, and I am just about to mention those great companies.
As if to reinforce the case for radical reform, on 22 February the Competition Commission published a report that was deeply critical of PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst and Young, Deloitte and KPMG—the big four—for a deep “misalignment” with shareholder interests. The commission made it clear that auditors and company executives had acted as a cabal to their mutual benefit and to the exclusion of the interests of investors. Under the definition of investors, we can include depositors and retail customers in the banking sector.
The commission concluded that the relationship between auditors and management has been too cosy and must be overhauled. The big four audit nearly 90% of all blue chip companies. One suggested remedy has been for the mandatory rotation of tendering so that after, for example, five years or so an audit company would have to relocate to other companies and could not be re-engaged. The companies engaging auditors would then be required to ask new auditors to compete for business. That would go some way towards breaking the unhealthy link between auditors and the companies they are supposed to be auditing.
Whatever new rules might be introduced, it is vital that auditors are compelled to ensure that their loyalties are to shareholders, depositors and customers and not to banking and company managers. Auditors failed to raise the alarm before the financial crisis and that must never happen again.
I most probably will not even take 10 minutes.
I am very pleased that the plane of the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (John Thurso) did come in, because he always makes complex issues simple and entertaining. There is a consensus in the House around regulation as the approach to take towards resolving the banking crisis and ensuring that, if we do not prevent a future crisis, we at least stave it off for, as the hon. Gentleman suggested, possibly another 70 years. The degree of positioning is around Glass-Steagall-type full separation, a ring fence, and then, as he said, the novelty of an electrified ring fence. There must be different power levels of electricity on this ring fence, as well.
I stand outside that debate, because I do not think that regulation will work. I was the first Member to raise the issue of Northern Rock in this House. At that time, I completely underestimated what Northern Rock was up to. I thought that it was all about an offshore tax scam that was part of its link with the organisation that it called Granite; I had no idea of the scale of the problem that would be unravelled. I can remember the then Chief Secretary to the Treasury, I think, leaving the Chamber after I had talked about Northern Rock, to obtain a briefing about what I was talking about. I realised that what I was talking about was a crisis that was being created in the City by greed, primarily, and by speculation and casino banking. I remember being at the Labour party conference in the 1980s, around the time of big bang, and organising the launch of a book called “Big bang: the launch of a casino economy”, authored by the then Member for Hackney and my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mr Skinner), which predicted some of the outrageous potential that there was for speculation as a result of big bang.
When I raised Northern Rock, I completely underestimated the levels of casino banking and the corruption that was taking place. In the previous debate a few weeks ago, I described the City as a “cesspool of corruption”, which it was. However, what was also revealed was the absolute incompetence. It was like “The Wizard of Oz”—when the curtain was pulled back, there was not a wizard but someone scrambling with various levers. We discovered then that the hierarchy of British banking did not even understand the instruments with which they were working because they were so complex. Then it all started to unravel, and we discovered scales of greed, incompetence and corruption that none of us expected.
At that time, we were assured that the regulatory system was not at fault, but we soon discovered how inoperable it was. The result, as we all know, is that the then Government intervened to borrow and they used taxpayers’ money to bail out the system. At its peak, taxpayers’ exposure to the bank collapse was on the scale of £1.2 trillion. I understand that so far we have retrieved only £14 billion of that taxpayers’ money. The second wave was the austerity programme introduced to pay for the Government intervention to save the banking system. Mervyn King estimated the cost of that to be £1 trillion. Anthony Haldane, who is probably more accurate in his assessment, estimates that we have lost the equivalent of between one and five years’ GDP. Those absolutely staggering sums are the result of a crisis brought about by incompetence and greed. The majority of people are 7% poorer than in 2007, and their living standards have fallen, according to the latest estimate, by 13.2% since 2008. The median household income in 2015-16 will be the equivalent of that in 2002-03. These are the implications of what this wealth of greed brought about: mass unemployment, welfare benefit cuts, food banks, and parents missing meals so that children can eat. It is absolutely staggering.
I find it extremely difficult to come to terms with an issue that was raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Frank Dobson). Since the crisis occurred—since I first stood up in this House and mentioned Northern Rock—and we went on to the nationalisation of banks, and then to quantitative easing on a scale that we had never seen before or could even comprehend, the scandalous practices have not gone away: they have continued. As my right hon. Friend said, the bonuses have continued, fraud has continued, LIBOR interest rate fixing has been investigated, and we have seen tax evasion and money laundering. This is happening even when the bankers are in full public sight. At a time when the eyes of the country are on them, they are still manipulating the system.
I find it astounding—I have raised this in the House three times, and 10 days ago I received a letter from the Minister about it—that when quantitative easing was introduced, we discovered through press reports that bankers even then sought to profiteer from it. The letter from the Minister confirmed that at one point the Bank of England had to intervene and withdraw from the market because there were suspicions of price fixing and manipulation of the market during quantitative easing.
I am very interested in and admire what my hon. Friend is saying. There is a suggestion that the recent surge in share prices is simply the effect of quantitative easing and that it bears no relation to what is happening in the real economy.
Exactly. I accept that point, but the relatively simple point that I am trying to make is that a group of people who have, in effect, been caught with their hands in the till are trying to use the money that has been used to bail them out to profiteer at the taxpayers’ expense. That is staggering and it says to me that regulation will not work with these institutions. Even when they are absolutely shamed, subject to public opprobrium and under the acute gaze of the public eye, they still try to profiteer.