Section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993

Kelvin Hopkins Excerpts

Monday 22nd April 2013 Commons Chamber

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Greg Clark)]

I beg to move,

That this House approves, for the purposes of section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993, the Government’s assessment as set out in the Budget Report, combined with the Office for Budget Responsibility’s Economic and Fiscal Outlook, which forms the basis of the United Kingdom’s Convergence Programme.

I welcome this opportunity to listen to Members’ views on the British Government’s submission to be made this year under section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993. It is nice to see the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) in his place. I think we have spent more time opposite each other than we have with our respective spouses in recent weeks.

As in previous years, the Government will provide information to the European Commission on the UK’s economic and budgetary position in line with our commitments under the EU stability and growth pact. This submission, known as the convergence programme, is a legal requirement under agreements this country has entered into, and of course the British Government take such commitments seriously. One must also say, however, that its very name represents something of a relic from a past age—a time when Britain was still ruled by a Government committed in principle to joining the single currency. I can assure the House that that era is well and truly dead and buried.

Members might well ask what purpose is served by this annual exercise and the associated debate in the House. [Interruption.] I thought that this might find an echo in the Chamber. Without wishing to anticipate Members’ contributions, which I look forward to, I would like to suggest three areas for this afternoon’s discussion. I wish first to debate British economic policy within the still relevant context of Europe; secondly, to consider the co-ordination of national economic policies across the EU; and thirdly to reflect on our great good fortune in not having joined the single currency, despite the siren voices heard in this place and elsewhere—thanks, in no small measure, to those who had the courage and foresight to speak against British involvement at a time when their warnings were subject to such derision.

[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

I remember a time when all three major parties, the TUC and just about every good and great person across the land supported joining the exchange rate mechanism. I was one of those who from the beginning said that we should not do so. At the moment, we are all against the single currency, but I remember a time when even the Minister’s party was moving in that direction.

[Greg Clark]

I do not think that that is entirely right, although I happily acknowledge that the hon. Gentleman was on the side of right throughout. I remember working for the Foreign Secretary when he was leader of our party. In November 1997, when, as the hon. Gentleman said, the received opinion was that our joining was inevitable, my right hon. Friend made the courageous decision to set out in a lecture to the conference of the CBI, which then was in favour of joining, the forensic reasons why it would not be in our interests. He committed then, right at the beginning of the parliamentary process that resulted in these measures, to campaign for Britain to stay outside it. While I acknowledge the hon. Gentleman’s distinguished record, I think he would acknowledge that the Conservative party was the first party to commit itself to oppose these measures.

The Government plan to make their submission by 30 April, with the approval, we hope, of both Houses of Parliament. It explains the Government’s medium-term fiscal policies, as already set out in the 2012 autumn statement and Budget 2013, and includes the Office for Budget Responsibility’s forecasts. We think it right and proper to draw from previously published documents presented to Parliament, rather than incur the cost and time to produce bespoke documents for this purpose.

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[Greg Clark]

In fact, some countries are recognising that, but we want to set an example. It is important that we stick to our plans and continue to benefit from the confidence that the markets have shown through the level of interest rates. We also say in our deliberations in Brussels, as well as making the point in budget discussions, that when times are difficult, belts need to tightened.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I must say that I am astonished. It is almost as if no one in the Chamber has read the newspapers over the weekend and seen the IMF report that it got the premise for austerity completely wrong. Owing to a mistaken figure in a spreadsheet, we are all going for austerity, which is a terrible mistake. Is that not the reality?

[Greg Clark]

I do not agree with that. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the IMF recommends to many countries around the world, not least in Europe—this is the point my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) referred to—that they should get their public finances in order.

When the Office for Budget Responsibility revised its forecast for global economic growth—and eurozone growth in particular—and world trade downwards, that had an inevitable impact on UK growth, given that the euro area is the destination for 40% of UK exports. Over the past year, net trade was the key factor in the underperformance of the economy relative to earlier OBR forecasts, as well as in the downward revision of the forecasts this year and the year after. Fiscal consolidation, on the other hand, has not had a larger drag on the economy than the OBR expected in June 2010. Indeed, the UK’s fiscal situation argues strongly in favour of maintaining our commitment to deficit reduction.

Opposition Members sometimes accuse us of going too far, too fast, but there is further to go and we must get there as fast as we sensibly can, not least because so much rests on the market-tested credibility earned by this Government. The near historic low gilt yields that underpin the low interest rates that are so important to millions of households and businesses cannot be put at risk. As shown by global developments, the consequence of losing market confidence can be sudden and severe. A sharp rise in interest rates would be particularly damaging to an economy weighed down by the burden of so much public, corporate and personal debt, built up during a time when it should not have been.

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[Chris Leslie]

These Benches are not massively more empty than those on the Government side of the House. She will have to accept that this can, at face value, appear to be quite an obscure issue. [Interruption.] There are not many people on her side of the House, but I do not want to get into a contest on that matter.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I want to pay my hon. Friend a compliment by saying that Labour Members do not need to turn up because they have such confidence in our shadow Minister and they know that he will speak for us.

[Chris Leslie]

That is one way of looking at it.

The point that concerns me is that the Government have in recent days tried to shove this issue off the Floor of the House and sweep it upstairs to a Delegated Legislation Committee. The Minister has said that this is a busy time of year and that the Government do not want to waste the House’s time with these questions, but we are already faced with an opaque description of the legislation, so it is no wonder that they are trying to push it out of parliamentary time. It is, in fact, the kind of legislation that ought to be advertised more to hon. Members.

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[Chris Leslie]

Long-term interest rates reflect a number of factors. Government Members would like to think that low bond yields were a reflection of fiscal policy measures alone—[Interruption.] The Minister should hear me out. He likes to think that that is the one test. As I say, it used to be retention of the triple A credit rating, but that has gone, so something else has had to be found. Long-term bond yields, however, are also a reflection of who is purchasing them. I do not know whether the Minister can help us out by elaborating on who exactly is purchasing the Government bond yields, because the Bank of England seems to be doing an awful lot. One branch of the UK Government institutions is helping out the other branch of Government institutions—depressing, of course, that yield. The Minister should not be too proud of market expectations that things are going to be so bad for so long that our interest rates are at the ultra-low level. It is not a reflection of fiscal policy; it is a reflection of expectations of future economic performance and of the interventions in monetary policy by the Bank of England.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Is it not simply the case that bond markets can get things terribly wrong as well? We know of the 1929 crash and the 2008 crash, for example. I have no doubt that some have great optimism about the future of the world and national economies, but they can get it wrong, too.

[Chris Leslie]

That is why some in the bond markets in the City and even the IMF and other economic commentators and business leaders are increasingly saying—as PIMCO did today in its intervention on these issues—that we have to do something about this. Demand in the economy is cripplingly bad; we have to do something to take a different course. The Chancellor’s plan is not just failing; it is adding to our problems with the public finances. We will see the state of the deficit reduction plan and what is happening with this trajectory when we see the figures tomorrow. We hear of blaming the snow, blaming the royal wedding, blaming all sorts of other players including the European Union; it is amazing how we never hear that it is the fault of those who currently occupy the Treasury.

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[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

I rise to speak briefly in support of my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) about the nonsense of presenting the fiction of the Red Book as though it represented the truth about our country. Another organisation—perhaps the Institute for Fiscal Studies—would do a better job.

Last week, in a speech in the Chamber, I reminded colleagues of an organisation that used to get forecasts right: the Cambridge Economic Policy group. But it was a left-leaning Keynesian group and the Conservative Government of the time withdrew its funding, because they did not like its answers and chose to follow the London Business School, which always got the forecasts wrong. The Sunday Times always gave it nought out of 10. Let us not pretend that all forecasts speak the truth. Officials will never present the Chancellor with a gloomy picture; they try to put as big a gloss on things as possible so that the Chancellor can say nice things to us in the Budget speech.

I only wish that the colour of the Red Book represented some of the policies inside, but I am afraid it does not. The antiquated language is nonsense. The Minister drew our attention to the fact that the reference to convergence was born of the past assumption that all countries would be in a single currency, we would all be growing nicely together, and poorer countries would become rich countries. That has all been washed away; it is all complete nonsense. It seems the only convergence we seek now is with an area that might be in terminal decline—the European Union. It is in serious economic difficulty, so do we want to converge with it? I suggest we want to diverge from it and make our economy work.

Although there are areas where we would have definite disagreements, the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) often says things I agree with. He said we were talking about a German European Union. In 1989, the Institute for Public Policy Research published a document called “The German Surplus,” which was quickly suppressed because it was too explosive. The whole political establishment was moving towards a pro-euro, “Let’s join the single currency and the exchange rate mechanism at the wrong time” approach. I still have a copy of the document and I think it can still be found on the internet. It said that Germany had built an economy around itself, such that it could sustain low parity for its currency against all the others. Building that low parity for their currency into the euro meant that the Germans would always have a competitive edge over the other countries and could export to them freely. What they did not appreciate was that over time those countries would run out of money and Germany would have to lend them money to buy German products, which is what has been happening. Germany either has to dissolve the whole arrangement or carry on giving vast sums of money to other members of the eurozone to help them buy German goods.

[Mr Cash]

The hon. Gentleman may find it interesting to read the book by the Institute of Economic Affairs on that very subject.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I shall certainly look it up.

Ministers go on and on about the importance of exports to the rest of the European Union—our Ministers did too—but they rarely talk about imports. We have a gigantic trade deficit, which is getting worse and worse every year. Even between January and February, the goods deficit with the EU rose from £4.8 billion to £5.1 billion. It now looks as though the trade deficit this year may be £60 billion. That is enormous; it is more than £1 billion a week. We are buying £1 billion more goods from the EU every week than the EU buys from us. That is not a sensible way to run an economy.

[Mr Nuttall]

Does that statistic not put the lie to all the people who claim that 3 million jobs would be lost if we left the EU?

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Indeed. If we just maintained balance, we would gain a million jobs overnight. If we go back to the Bretton Woods arrangements following 1944, Keynes was concerned about trade imbalances and he wanted arrangements to be put in place across the world that would avoid big deficits and big surpluses. Also, he wanted to require those with big surpluses to appreciate their currencies, as Germany should have done a long time ago. We are just going through the motions of arrangements made years ago which no longer have any serious meaning.

Germany is now in trouble. It has faced a savage reduction of 17% in car production in the space of one month. It is in difficulty and will have to look to itself to solve that problem. George Soros has suggested that one of the ways out of all the present problems is for Germany to leave the euro and to recreate the deutschmark, which would naturally appreciate. All the countries now tied into the euro would then have difficulty. Denmark, for example, would want to devalue straight afterwards. Others are now talking about what George Soros said. There are people in Germany who want to leave the euro.

There was an extremely interesting article in The Guardian this morning, suggesting that the only way out of this is for all the countries of the European Union to recreate their own currencies and to find appropriate parities for those currencies. If a country has its own currency, it can borrow and it can print money. It may be forced into a devaluation but it manages its own economy nationally and it can adjust the shock absorbers of separate currency, which are vital. The example used is Japan, which has had serious problems but is managing its economy internally.

I draw Members’ attention to the one country that has come out of the current crisis rather better than all the others—that is, America. It is surprising, but American growth is at 2%, whereas ours is well below 1%. Although America still has serious difficulties and serious unemployment, it is doing better than Europe because it is pursuing growth policies, which necessarily mean more borrowing.

I know that hon. Members on the Government Benches are horrified at the thought of more borrowing, but I urge them to read the great book by John Kenneth Galbraith, “The World Economy since the Wars”, where he pointed out that during wars—classically, the second world war—America borrowed vast sums from its own citizens. They finished up with lots of war bonds which they cashed in, and the American economy started off as the strongest economy in the world, stronger than it has ever been because of the massive investment in manufacturing that took place during the war. Its debt was based on borrowing, which was paid back over time, as the American economy grew, with full employment.

I could go on, but I will not. Debating the motion every year is a nonsense. We ought to be looking at more sensible ways of running our economies.