Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twentieth sitting)
Tuesday 11th March 2025
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesTerminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill 2024-26 View all Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 March 2025 - (11 Mar 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 20 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 20 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 15 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I have a few housekeeping announcements. Will everybody ensure that electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent. I remind hon. Members that tea and coffee are not allowed in the Committee Room.
We are due to continue line-by-line consideration. I am asked to remind Members that interventions should be short, and should raise points of clarification or ask questions; they should not be speeches in and of themselves. Members who do wish to give a speech should bob, please—we are not mind readers—and continue to do so throughout the debate in which they take part unless and until they are called.
When Members say “you”, they are referring to the Chair. “You” should not be used to refer to each other in any circumstances. Debate should be through the Chair.
Members may find it convenient to know that the Committee will be sit this afternoon and until 8 o’clock this evening. Please bear in mind that if there are Divisions on the Floor of the House and the sitting is not adjourned, then it will be suspended for the Division, which means that Members will have to come back even if the witching hour of 8 o’clock has passed. At that point, Members will sit again until the adjournment is moved formally. That can be done only when the floor is vacated, not in the middle of a speech.
Tomorrow morning, I shall be in the Chair; I shall also take the Chair at 5 o’clock tomorrow afternoon. Divisions in the House are expected tomorrow evening. There are six hours of protected business tomorrow evening, so those votes could again come up until and including 8 o’clock, or possibly even later if there is a statement or two. I have also indicated that I am willing, if necessary, to sit through the night. If the Committee chooses to sit very late, as a courtesy I expect to be notified in order that the people who really matter—the Clerks, the Doorkeepers and the Hansard writers—have a chance to be informed and organise their lives accordingly. I hope all that is clear.
We will now continue our debate on amendment 301 in the name of Rachael Maskell.
Clause 8
Second doctor’s assessment (independent doctor)
Amendment proposed (5 March): 301, in clause 8, page 4, line 39, leave out “7” and insert “14”.—(Naz Shah.)
This amendment would increase the period of reflection to 14 days.
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 317, in clause 13, page 9, line 12, leave out “14” and insert “28”.
This amendment would provide 28 days for the second period of reflection instead of 14.
Amendment 314, in clause 13, page 9, line 17, leave out
“48 hours beginning with that day”
and insert
“7 days beginning with that day and the person must be referred immediately for urgent specialist palliative care.”
This amendment would increase the second period of reflection in cases where the coordinating doctor reasonably believes the person will die within a month from 48 hours to seven days.
Amendment 315, in clause 13, page 9, line 17, leave out “48 hours” and insert “7 days”.
This amendment would increase the second period of reflection in cases where the coordinating doctor reasonably believes the person will die within a month from 48 hours to seven days.
Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Sir Roger. I am looking forward to this week’s debating.
I want to draw the Committee’s attention to further evidence that has come in since the debate got under way. Since we started the Committee, we have had more than 400 pieces of evidence, so I apologise for not having got to this earlier, but it is relevant. I do not want people who have submitted evidence to us to feel that their submissions have fallen into a black hole and are not being considered, and I think this is significant evidence. We are talking about the necessity of a proper period of reflection, which is acknowledged in the Bill—it is understood that it is inappropriate for people to be able to request and receive an assisted death in very short order. The debate is about the extent of that reflection period. I am supporting amendments that suggest that we need slightly longer in some cases.
I want to refer to two pieces of the evidence that has come in. One is from six palliative care doctors who wrote that
“our experience is that many patients experience a period of adjustment to ‘bad news’ and may say that they cannot live under these conditions. However, after a period of reflection and adjustment, the majority come to find peace and value in their altered life circumstance, in a way they would not have believed possible. This may often take many weeks and sometimes short months. It is our profound concern that the two ‘periods of reflection’…would not allow time for this adjustment. This is even more so the case where these periods of reflection are reduced for patients predicted to have an even shorter prognosis. It is thus a reality that patients and their families may miss out on a period of life they would have valued by seeking to end their lives prematurely, and these days, weeks and perhaps even months will never be regained.”
The other piece of evidence is from Tom Pembroke and Clea Atkinson, who are experts in hepatology and palliative care in Cardiff. They raised the problems of the seven-day reflection period where there is alcohol misuse. I do not think this topic came up in last week’s debate, but it is worth acknowledging because liver disease is the most common cause of death for people in middle age. It is also worth noting that liver disease disproportionately affects the people who are most disadvantaged in our society. These experts say:
“Prognostication in advanced liver disease is challenging as management of the underlying causes, including abstinence from alcohol, potentially reverses advanced liver failure…The neurocognitive and depressive effects of alcohol misuse disorder frequently requires more than seven days to resolve following abstinence. Advanced liver disease frequently manifests with hepatic encephalopathy which can affect the ability to make informed decisions.”
Their concern is that
“A seven-day review period is not sufficient to ensure that there is an enduring wish to die which is not influenced by alcohol misuse.”
Considering the prevalence of alcohol misuse in our society, the extent to which so many people tragically die of it and the difficulties in prognostication, I suggest to the Committee that there is a particular argument to be made for extending that short period at the end for the expedited process that is being considered. I beg the Committee to consider accepting the amendment.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Sir Roger.
Amendment 301 would prolong the first period of reflection, after which point the independent doctor can conduct the second assessment. In the original draft of the Bill, the first period of reflection is seven days, but the amendment would extend that period to 14 days. That means 14 days would have to pass between the time that the co-ordinating doctor has made their statement following the first assessment, and the independent doctor carrying out the second assessment.
Amendment 317 would increase the duration of the period of reflection before a person may make a second declaration from 14 days to 28 days. It relates to cases where a person’s death is not reasonably expected within one month of the date of the court’s declaration.
Amendments 314 and 315 would increase the duration of the second period of reflection before a person may make a second declaration, in cases where a person’s death is reasonably expected within one month of the date of the court’s declaration, from 48 hours to seven days. They would also introduce a requirement for a mandatory immediate referral for urgent specialist palliative care. The requirement would be introduced into the definition of the second period of reflection. It is unclear what impact it would have on the duration of the period of reflection. The amendments do not say who should be responsible for making the referral or where it should be recorded. The drafting is also ambiguous as to what happens if a person does not consent to such a referral or care.
I hope these observations are helpful to the Committee in considering the Bill and the amendments put forward by various Members. Whether these amendments should form part of the Bill is a matter for the Committee to decide.
Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)
I have nothing to add on this group of amendments. I am confident that the Bill as drafted already includes significant periods of reflection. Bearing in mind that we are putting dying people through a very lengthy process already, I remain confident that the periods of reflection are adequate as set out in the Bill.
Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)
I have a couple of additional comments. We talked last week about the reflection periods. I referred to the fact that when even someone buys something from a shop, they have 28 days to return it; when they are deciding on whether to have an assisted death, there is a great deal more at stake. During that debate, someone asked, “What if someone had a prognosis of just one month?”, but clause 13 has an option for a fast-track process in that situation—the person would be able to access the service in 48 hours.
I beg to differ with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the Bill’s promoter, who said that we have enough reflection periods in the Bill. Yes, there are reflection periods, but they come after the panel’s decision. The reality is that the NHS is under so much duress, with patients waiting weeks to see their GP for anything other than urgent treatment, that getting an appointment with another GP in seven days is unlikely; it is unlikely to happen given how uncommon that is at the moment. It is right that doctors are able to triage their patients to prioritise those who require medical intervention to keep them well, to prevent hospital admission, or to stop them deteriorating or even dying.
The Government are trying to protect the NHS, and the best way of achieving that is to ensure that medical interventions are provided at the earliest opportunity before a patient deteriorates. In some cases, a medical appointment may need to take priority over an appointment for an assisted death. If someone who is dying has longer—even just a further week—in which to reflect, it removes the pressure from GPs and consultants, and enables them to prioritise properly their patients. It does not build up false expectation in patients that they have a right to a rapid consultation process. Likewise, we know that it can currently take a few weeks for patients to see another consultant, if not months or even over a year. It is therefore more helpful for the patient to have a more realistic period of reflection before moving to the next stage of their assessment.
Issues of such intensity as someone planning to take their own life should not be rushed. We know from all the work that has been undertaken on suicide that other interventions and conversations can help with reflection and reconsideration. It is important that people are given this opportunity. In their first raising the matter with a doctor, the doctor would have provided a lot of information about alternatives to the patient, such as what treatment options would be available. Perhaps they would have had a discussion with a palliative medicine consultant to review their options. There needs to be time for a patient to really reflect on all this new information. If the patient does want to explore assisted dying, there will also be all the conversations about drugs and their impact, which we will come to when we discuss later clauses.
Amendment 317 to clause 13 seeks to increase the reflection period from 14 days to 28 days. I gently suggest that we should have the reflection period before the decision, whether it be by the judge or a panel, to give people the right amount of time to consider; currently, the reflection period is afterwards. This is such a monumental decision that people should be able to contemplate all other options available. As it is, the process is rushed, and a patient could be caught up in the moment of concentrating on getting through the stages. I appreciate that others have suggested that once we have got past that stage, with the paperwork and all those things out of the way, then there is time to reflect. During the process, however, the patient has not had time to consider the options in making their decision. I am not convinced that there is enough reflection during, as opposed to after, the process.
Amendment 314 seeks to increase the reflection period from 48 hours to seven days for patients who have been given a month to live. In that case, seven days is quite adequate time to reflect on the information they have received to make informed choices. If this is about autonomy, which my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has talked about many a time, it is important for people to have choices. To have that autonomy is surely to have the options in front of us and be able to consider them in detail.
In considering whether to sit on this Bill Committee, I slept on the decision. I can usually make instantaneous decisions, but knowing the amount of work, knowing that I was new to the subject, and knowing the things that I knew then—not the things that I know now—it was a big decision for me. I was even thinking about how I would manage the workload. We are talking about something that is not at all comparable. We are talking about somebody who will be taking a decision to potentially exercise the right—if the Bill becomes law—to an assisted death. That is really important for me.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 195, in clause 8, page 4, line 40, leave out “statement” and insert “report”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 420.
Amendment 421, in clause 8, page 5, line 4, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) After carrying out the second assessment, the independent doctor must—
(a) make a report about the assessment (which must meet the requirements of regulations under subsection (5A)), and
(b) give a copy of the report to—
(i) the person who was assessed,
(ii) the coordinating doctor,
(iii) if neither the independent doctor nor the coordinating doctor is a practitioner with the person’s GP practice, a registered medical practitioner with that practice, and
(iv) any other person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(5A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the content and form of the report.
(5B) The regulations must provide that the report must—
(a) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) to (e);
subsection (2)(a)
(b) contain an explanation of why the independent doctor is, or (as the case may be) is not, so satisfied;
(c) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to the following—
(i) that a record of the preliminary discussion has been included in the person’s medical records;
(ii) that the person signed the first declaration;
(iii) that the making of the first declaration has been recorded in the person’s medical records;
(iv) that the first declaration has not been cancelled;
(d) be signed and dated by the independent doctor.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment provides that the independent doctor must make a report about the second assessment, and makes provision about the report.
Danny Kruger
I beg to move amendment 348, in clause 8, page 5, line 10, at end insert—
“(c) inform the person’s usual or treating doctor and, where relevant, the doctor who referred the person to the independent doctor, of the outcome of the assessment.”
This amendment would ensure that the independent doctor communicates the outcome of their assessment to the referring doctor as well as the usual or treating doctor.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 303, in clause 8, page 5, line 12, at end insert—
“(aa) has confirmed that no other practitioner has undertaken a second assessment for the same person.”
This amendment would prevent a patient from seeking multiple assessments from different doctors.
Amendment 458, in clause 10, page 6, line 45, after “declaration” insert “and if there has been a material change of circumstances,”
Amendment 459, in clause 10, page 7, line 3, at end insert—
“(2A) (a) Where a referral is made to a registered medical practitioner under subsection (1), the coordinating doctor must provide that new registered medical practitioner with the report by the independent doctor setting out their reasons for refusal.
(b) If the new registered medical practitioner reaches a different conclusion from the original independent doctor, they must produce a report setting out why they disagree.
(c) Those two reports must be made available to any subsequent decision maker under this Act and to the Commissioner.”
Amendment 460, in clause 10, page 7, line 9, leave out “particular”.
Danny Kruger
This is a key group of amendments. I shall specifically speak to amendment 303, which would prevent a person from seeking multiple assessments from alternative doctors if a second assessment had already been undertaken. I am not sure that I will press that amendment to a vote, but it is important to explore this issue. I will take the view of the Committee on it.
Last week, my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire said that it was important to avoid doctor-shopping. He made that point in reference to the suggestion that there would be a list of professionals that would administer the procedure. I respect that view; I think it is absolutely right. It needs to be clear in law that we avoid doctor-shopping. For that reason, it is important that the independent doctor should seek to establish whether the patient has previously had a second assessment. That could be very material.
Clause 10 states:
“In consequence of a particular first declaration made by a person, the coordinating doctor may make only one referral for a second opinion under subsection (1).”
This only limits the number of times that a person can seek another medical assessment. Amendment 303 to clause 8, in the name of the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) , would further strengthen the current safeguards against doctor-shopping, by placing a duty on the doctor to confirm that there had not been previous assessments.
Doctor shopping is not a hypothetical concern. We have seen it take place in other jurisdictions. An understanding develops that some doctors are more likely to grant an application for an assisted death. That is totally natural. Professor Preston said in oral evidence to us:
“People go doctor shopping—they are going to multiple doctors until they get the right answer.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 245, Q315.]
According to an official report in 2021, one Oregon doctor wrote one eighth of all the prescriptions for assisted death. I met a doctor in Canada who had performed hundreds of assisted suicides. It was her whole practice; that was what she did, and people knew to go to her.
Doctors who are reluctant to grant an application may instead refer a person to doctors they know are more likely to grant the person’s application for an assisted death, so those practitioners become the go-to when other doctors deny applications. Over time, the safeguards can become weakened and circumvented by a system of doctors who apply the criteria quite loosely, as was found in Ontario. The Ontario review committee found evidence of patients doctor shopping for approval. Some 8% of non-terminally ill people who died by assisted dying had made previous requests. People do try again, naturally enough, if they do not get the answer they wanted.
Danny Kruger
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. We will address in later debates the point that insufficient attention will be given to the reasons why an application has been refused. If an application has been refused on the grounds of coercion, a future doctor will not necessarily know that that was the reason. As the hon. Lady says, in cases of coercive control there is a very real danger that if a person has been unduly influenced to seek an assisted death and the doctor declines their application, possibly because they detected coercive control, the patient can then be coerced, or influenced, into starting again with a new doctor. There is nothing to stop that in the Bill. We have a real problem, and I hope the Committee will consider the amendments.
Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I will speak to my amendments 458 to 460, which would tighten the process around seeking a determination from a second independent doctor if the first has refused to say that the criteria are met. The amendments relate to clause 10, which I will say more about when we come to it, but they have been selected for debate in this group.
The risks of abuse in seeking a second independent doctor’s opinion are well illustrated by the evidence we have received from Dr Sharon Quick, the president of the Physicians for Compassionate Care Education Foundation, who tells us about the experience of Dr Charles Bentz, who refused to provide a second opinion for a physician-assisted suicide for a patient he had referred to an oncologist for cancer treatment. The co-ordinating doctor persisted and clearly found a compliant second opinion, as two weeks later his patient was dead.
Dr Charles Bentz said in his testimony:
“I was caring for a 76 year-old man who came in with a sore on his arm. The sore was ultimately diagnosed as a malignant melanoma, and I referred him to two cancer specialists for evaluation and therapy. I had known this patient and his wife for over a decade. He was an avid hiker, a popular hobby here in Oregon. As he went through his therapy, he became less able to do this activity, becoming depressed, which was documented in his chart.
During this time, my patient expressed a wish for doctor-assisted suicide to one of the cancer specialists. Rather than taking the time and effort to address the question of depression, or ask me to talk with him as his primary care physician and as someone who knew him, the medical oncologist called me and asked me to be the ‘second opinion’ for his suicide. She told me that barbiturate overdoses ‘work very well’ for patients like this, and that she had done this many times before.
I told her that assisted-suicide was not appropriate for this patient and that I did not concur. I was very concerned about my patient’s mental state, and I told her that addressing his underlying issues would be better than simply giving him a lethal prescription. Unfortunately, my concerns were ignored, and approximately two weeks later my patient was dead from an overdose prescribed by this doctor. His death certificate, filled out by this doctor, listed the cause of death as melanoma. When I reviewed his chart, the radiation oncologist documented a clear diagnosis of depression.
My patient did not die from his cancer, but at the hands of a once-trusted colleague who failed to recognize and treat his depression. This experience has affected me, my practice, and my understanding of what it means to be a physician. What happened to this patient, who was weak and vulnerable, raises several questions that I have had to answer.”
I appreciate that, under the Bill, Dr Bentz could not have been the independent doctor as he already knew the patient and was treating him, but in that case that contributed to enhanced safety. Dr Bentz’s example illustrates the real risks of abuse in a person being able to seek the opinion of a second independent doctor. The starting point is that the task of the independent doctor is not that of a normal doctor. It is not to cure the patient or to provide advice about medical treatments: it is to check whether the eligibility requirements are met. It is a decision-making function, not a medical one—albeit, of course, a decision-making function that is informed by medical expertise.
In the light of that function, it is not appropriate for someone to seek another decision simply because they do not like the answer that has been given. The independent doctor is asked to apply an objective set of criteria against the evidence in front of them in order to make an assessment. It is not the case—or it should not be—that a different doctor would come to a different assessment based on the same criteria and the same evidence. If we are doing our job properly in the Committee, we should not expect that a second opinion could be arrived at.
I have no objection to provision being made for a person to see a second independent doctor if the first did not manage to finish the task. Nor do I object in respect of cases in which there is a change of circumstances—for example, if the patient’s condition deteriorates to such a degree that although the first independent doctor thought the six-month prognosis test was not met, it becomes clear that it is met—which is the point of my amendment 458. In such circumstances, it would make sense to allow the patient to go to a second independent doctor. Although my preference in such a situation would be to go back to the original independent doctor and ask them to reconsider in the light of the change of circumstances, that may not always be possible. Amendment 458 is an attempt to find a middle ground.
Amendment 459 seeks to reduce the possibility of abuse by ensuring that the second independent doctor has available the reasons why the first independent doctor concluded that the person was not eligible. That would allow the second independent doctor to approach the assessment with open eyes. Such a report would be particularly useful when it comes to the detection of coercion or pressure, as the first independent doctor might have spotted something that the second independent doctor might not easily see.
Let us consider the evidence of Dr Tim Howard, who has been deeply involved in end-of-life palliative care and assisted dying for many years. He has been a non-exec director of a health authority, a member of an ethics committee, a postgraduate teacher and, finally, chair of the General Medical Council fitness to practise tribunals, dealing with complex medico-legal principles and decisions in public. He also helped to set up the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service, which separated medical standard setting and investigation from adjudication.
Dr Howard says:
“I remain uncomfortable that when either doctor, the assessing doctor or the independent doctor, declines to agree with a request for”
assisted dying,
“they take no further action. I feel that the reasons for their refusal should, as well as being given to the patient, be recorded in the patient’s notes, and given to any ‘second opinion’ independent doctor. This is not an attempt to bias; it is a value judgement that criteria are not being met, and as such, is sharing an early warning to be extra careful.”
The Committee should note that he has, in his own words,
“been a strong proponent of medical assistance in dying…and a member of Dignity in Dying for many years.”
Danny Kruger
It does seem an extraordinary gap in the Bill, but I am afraid it is not unique to this Bill. In countries where assisted dying in some form is legal, there are remarkable failures to insist on the proper recording of applications that are declined or about which there are concerns. This speaks to the general cloud of unknowing that we are operating in. Does the hon. Lady agree that were we to pass the Bill, it would be great if, at least in this country, we kept proper records?
Sarah Olney
The hon. Member is exactly right. An assessment of whether somebody should qualify for assisted dying needs to be based on objective criteria. If those are not met, the only way that a second independent doctor should have a role is if either the circumstances have changed or, for whatever reason, the first doctor is unable to reach a conclusion. There must not be a situation in which the first doctor has made one decision and a second doctor arrives at a different decision, because that would imply a variability in the way the objective assessments are made. Not tightening this loophole would imply that we are prepared to allow such a variability across the medical profession, and I do not think we should allow that.
My final amendment in this group is amendment 460. I am concerned that the word “particular” in clause 10(3) negates the subsection’s purpose of ensuring that only one second opinion from the co-ordinating doctor can be sought, because a person could withdraw their first declaration, make a new one and start the process afresh; that declaration would then not be the “particular” first declaration. By removing “particular”, the loophole would be closed, and the safeguard would be made more effective. This concern was brought out well in Disability Labour’s written evidence:
“We are concerned that whilst 10(3) only allows for one second opinion to be sought, there appears to be nothing in the bill that stipulates a waiting period before a new application can be made. This risks applications being repeated until a supporting opinion can be obtained, thus negating the purpose of 10(3).”
I hope the Committee will accept my amendments.
Dr Simon Opher (Stroud) (Lab)
I thank the hon. Member for Richmond Park for her considered amendments. I would like to go through all the amendments in the group.
Amendment 348 is about the doctor communicating the outcome of the assessment, but I understand that that is already covered in clause 8(5)(b), which states that, having carried out the second assessment, the independent doctor will
“provide each of the coordinating doctor and the person who was assessed with a copy of the statement.”
I therefore do not think the amendment is necessary—it would be doubling up.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
I just point out that the amendment states that the independent doctor would
“inform the person’s usual or treating doctor”,
and that is not covered by the paragraph the hon. Gentleman just mentioned. I hope that is helpful.
Dr Opher
I do not see what that would add to the Bill. The co-ordinating doctor would have a result and the patient would have had the report back. I do not feel the amendment is necessary—it would over-complicate the Bill—but we can see what the Government’s legal position is on that.
Amendment 303, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, suggests that the independent doctor should have to check that there has not already been a second opinion. We need to step back a bit and remember how the Bill will work. Basically, a doctor will refer to a co-ordinating doctor, who will make a full assessment of the patient. If, having carried out the first assessment, the co-ordinating doctor is satisfied that the requirements in the Bill are met, they will refer the person for the independent assessment. That doctor will therefore need to see a report, because he is the co-ordinating doctor. He cannot then get a second opinion from a different doctor; that would not be part of the process under the Bill. I do not feel the amendment would make the Bill any safer.
Dr Opher
Actually no, I will not. I will go on, if that is okay.
Amendment 459 states that the second-opinion doctor “must produce a report” outlining their reasons for reaching a different opinion, but the whole nature of this is that the doctor is independent. As we have heard, if it is suggested that someone either is or is not allowed to get an assisted death, that might affect the assessment of the independent doctor. It would not be good medical practice to have that assessment in front of the independent doctor—that would lead to poor assessments. We need a right to a second opinion and we should have a truly independent doctor.
Amendment 460, which is the last in the group, would allow a patient only one declaration in any part of their lives, even if circumstances change. Although there will be vanishingly few instances where that would be relevant, I do not feel that such a provision would make the Bill any fairer or safer.
Amendment 143, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe, would allow a second and a third opinion. It is my opinion, and the opinion of many of us, that we do not want doctor shopping. We want to allow one second opinion from an independent doctor, but not more than that.
Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger.
I rise to speak to a couple of the amendments. Amendment 348 is likely unnecessary. I would have been minded to support it had it referred to a registered GP, but the language of “usual or treating doctor” is unconvincing. I am not sure what those terms refer to. The registered GP absolutely should be informed, and both normal practice and the provisions in the Bill about entering information into medical records would mean that that is the case. For me, “usual doctor” is not the right terminology; it does not achieve what I think some of its proponents want. With reluctance, I will vote against that amendment because it does not refer to a registered general practitioner.
On amendments 303 and 458, I believe there must be provision for a second opinion. However, I am persuaded by the points made by the hon. Member for Richmond Park about amendment 459. I slightly disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud: although the independence of the second opinion is important on matters such as the terminal prognosis, when it comes to the detection of coercion, the more information, the better. It is one thing to be independent in a medical assessment, but the amendment speaks to a psychosocial assessment. We are trying to detect coercion, so it is important that every decision maker gets further information as the process progresses.
The provision for five different touchpoints of assessment is one of the strengths of the Bill. Each assessment should be done in a way that can be progressed with more information. It is not just five different independent points of information; because of the Bill’s record-keeping provisions, the assessment should become increasingly informed throughout the process. I certainly think that the panel, or whatever we get to, should have sight of any negative assessment from an independent doctor, as well as any positive one. The panel will then be able to do its job of scrutinising the two decisions, potentially weighing them up, and calling the different doctors who have given different decisions. I am, then, persuaded by amendment 459.
Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
It came up in the debates last week that we heard some evidence from medical practitioners on how decisions and assessments were better made when done collaboratively. That means that we need to keep them independent but that, where possible, doctors should be working together in this process. Does my hon. Friend agree that amendment 459, tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park, may assist in that?
Lewis Atkinson
Yes, I do. I recognise the importance of independent assessment for prognosis and capacity. However, particularly with the issue of coercion, healthcare is a team sport, as anyone who has worked in healthcare knows. The more information and the more viewpoints we can get in those instances, the better. One of the strengths of the Bill is the team sense around it, which we will further in the amendments to clause 12 that we will come on to in due course.
I will finish briefly on amendment 460. I do not see the loophole that has been described. I think we would all want someone to be able to cancel their first declaration, and they are more likely to do so if they feel they have the option of going back and making a future first declaration. My worry with amendment 460 is that, by removing the word “particular”, it suggests that people are only able to make one first declaration in the course of their life. With the periods of reflection built into the Bill, which Members spoke about earlier, if someone changes their mind, they should cancel their first declaration. They are absolutely free to do so and the Bill, as currently drafted, makes good provision for that. To me, amendment 460 would remove the ability for that person to come back to that decision at a later point and go through the assessment process again. While I understand the motivations behind amendment 460, I am cautious about it for those reasons.
Stephen Kinnock
Amendment 348 seeks to add an additional requirement to clause 8(5). This would mean that, where the independent doctor is satisfied that the requirements under clause 8(2) have been met, they must
“inform the person’s usual or treating doctor and, where relevant, the doctor who referred the person to the independent doctor, of the outcome of the assessment.”
Some elements of amendment 348 duplicate requirements that already appear in the Bill, such as the requirement in clause 8(5)(b) for the doctor to inform the co-ordinating doctor of the outcome, including providing a copy of the statement.
The amendment would also overlap with the requirements in clause 16 for the co-ordinating doctor to make entries in the person’s medical record that must include the original statement or declaration. Where the co-ordinating doctor is not with the person’s GP practice, they must also give notice to a registered medical practitioner with the person’s GP practice of the outcome of the assessments.
Amendment 303 seeks to prevent a person from seeking multiple second assessments from different independent doctors. It places a requirement on the independent doctor to confirm
“that no other practitioner has undertaken a second assessment for the same person.”
This amendment creates the risk of a medical practitioner inadvertently committing an offence if there is no centralised record-keeping. It may also have the impact of preventing the person seeking assistance from obtaining a second opinion, as provided for in clause 10. Under the amendment, as drafted, it is unclear how this is intended to interact with the possibility of an independent doctor’s becoming unable or unwilling to continue to act as the independent doctor following the second assessment, when an alternative independent doctor may therefore be required.
On amendment 458, as the Bill stands, clause 10 provides that if, following the second assessment, the independent doctor refuses to make the statement confirming that they are satisfied that matters in clause 8(2)(a) to (e) are met, the co-ordinating doctor may refer the person to a different registered medical practitioner who meets the requirements of clause 8(6), and is able and willing to carry out an assessment mentioning clause 8(2). The effect of the amendment is to restrict the circumstances in which the co-ordinating doctor can make a referral under clause 10(1) to a different registered medical practitioner to only when there has been a material change of circumstances. It is not clear from the amendment who is required to establish that there has been a material change in circumstances and/or how that will be proved. That may cause some uncertainty for the co-ordinating doctor.
I now turn to amendment 459. Clause 10 provides that if, following the second assessment, the independent doctor refuses to make the statement that they are satisfied that the person meets the criteria in clause 8(2)(a) to 8(2)(e) when conducting the second assessment, the co-ordinating doctor may, if requested to do so by the person who made the first declaration, refer that person to a different registered medical practitioner who meets the requirements of clause 8(6) and is able and willing to carry out an assessment of the kind mentioned in clause 8(2).
The effect of the amendment is that, where such a referral is made to the registered medical practitioner under clause 10(1), the co-ordinating doctor is required to provide them with the report by the independent doctor setting out their reasons for refusal. If the new registered medical practitioner reaches a different conclusion from the original independent doctor, they must produce a report setting out why they disagree. The two reports must be made available to any subsequent decision maker under the Bill, and to the commissioner. This additional requirement for reports on the reasons for refusal or differences in opinion may make the process of seeking assistance longer and add to capacity demands on co-ordinating and independent doctors.
Turning to amendment 460, clause 10(3) provides that if, following the second assessment, the independent doctor refuses to make the statement mentioned in clause 8(5), the co-ordinating doctor may make one referral for a second opinion. The effect of the amendment is to remove the word “particular” from clause 10(3), which says that only one second opinion may be sought
“In consequence of a particular first declaration made by a person.”
The amendment is unclear and could have several possible effects in practice. For example, it could have the effect of limiting the circumstances in which a referral can be made under clause 10(1) to the first time a person makes a first declaration.
I hope that these observations were helpful to the Committee.
Kim Leadbeater
I associate myself with the Minister’s comments regarding the other amendments in the group; however, I listened carefully to the debate on amendment 459 and the points made by the hon. Member for Richmond Park, my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and the Minister. My view on that amendment has changed: I do think independence is really important in the doctor’s opinions during the normal process that the Bill sets out. However, it is a really fair point to make that if the independent doctor refuses the patient, there needs to be transparency about that, and it is important that everybody involved in the process can see how that decision has been made. That is a really valid point. It is a good example of how this Bill Committee is operating, and should be operating, in that we have been listening to different views and opinions.
I take on board the Minister’s point on capacity. We need to be aware of that. We will hopefully debate the third layer later today. That layer may be a panel of experts who are there to oversee the full picture of the patient journey. For them to see what has happened with the doctors that they have interacted with is very important. Therefore, I am minded to support amendment 459.
Danny Kruger
I want to respond to a point made by the hon. Member for Stroud. It is relevant to the whole debate about whether we are talking about a medical treatment at all. He made the point, in respect of the question of a second or subsequent referral to an independent doctor, that it is appropriate in medicine to have second opinions; he said that that is normal in medicine, and he is absolutely right. Indeed, there is nothing to stop a patient seeking a third, fourth or any number of opinions if they want to do that and can get a doctor to consider them. The fact is that what we are discussing here is not a medical diagnosis—that is not what is being asked for when someone goes to see the second doctor, or indeed the first. What they are asking for is permission to proceed with the process.
The Chair
I am satisfied that the items contained within the clause have been adequately debate. I do not therefore propose to permit a clause stand part debate.
Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Doctors’ assessments: further provision
Kim Leadbeater
I beg to move amendment 201, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, leave out “and their medical records” and insert
“, examine such of their medical records as appear to the assessing doctor to be relevant,”.
This amendment provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records is limited to records appearing to the doctor to be relevant.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 422, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, after “records” insert
“make such enquiries of professionals who are providing or have recently provided health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate,”.
This amendment requires an assessing doctor to make such enquiries of professionals who are providing, or have recently provided, health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate.
Amendment 468, in clause 9, page 5, line 37, at end insert—
“(aa) ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death.”
Amendment 423, in clause 9, page 6, line 20, at end insert—
“(2A) To inform their assessment, the assessing doctor must—
(a) consider whether they should consult a health professional or social care professional with qualifications in, or experience of, a matter relevant to the person being assessed;
(b) consult such a professional if they consider that there is a need to do so.
(2B) Where an assessing doctor consults a professional under subsection (2A)(b), the assessing doctor must give a written record of the consultation to the other assessing doctor.”
This amendment requires the assessing doctor to consider whether they should consult specialist health or social care professionals, and to consult them if they consider there is a need to do so. A record of any consultation must be shared with the other assessing doctor.
Kim Leadbeater
Amendment 201 provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records is limited to records appearing to the doctor to be relevant, which makes sense. Amendment 422 requires an assessing doctor to make such inquiries of professionals who are providing, or have recently provided, health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate. Amendment 423 requires the assessing doctor to consider whether they should consult health or social care professionals, and to consult them if they consider there is a need to do so. A record of any consultation must be shared with the other assessing doctor.
The amendments seek to emphasise the importance of taking a holistic and multidisciplinary approach to the assessments by both doctors. The Bill as drafted provides that the assessing doctor must
“make such other enquiries as the assessing doctor considers appropriate”
when making the first and second assessments. With the amendments, I have sought to strengthen that language, by being much more explicit and making specific reference to consulting health and social care professionals. I have done so in response to the evidence we have received from professionals such as nurses and social workers, who often spend a significant amount of time with terminally ill adults.
It is clearly right that the assessing doctors should have access to all relevant details of a person’s medical records. If the records show that the person has recently been receiving health or social care, that may impact their application, so the doctors have to consult the providers of that care. As is the case at all stages in the process, records should be kept of any and all such discussions, and reports should be shared where appropriate.
Taken together, the amendments would ensure that the doctors’ assessments are thorough and comprehensive, and have taken into consideration the views and opinions of any wider health and social care team that may be working with a patient.
Danny Kruger
I will speak briefly to each of the amendments in this group. I will allow my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate to speak to the amendment in her name, but I state clearly that I very much support it. In my view, it is very important that the doctor asks the simple question of the patient, “Why do you want an assisted death?” The question is not being asked at the moment.
I respect the points that the hon. Member for Spen Valley has just made about amendment 201, and that the amendment may be intended to focus assessments on the information that is relevant. Nevertheless, it would introduce subjectivity into what is deemed relevant, and by narrowing the scope of the review of patient records, it could unintentionally allow for incomplete assessments, thereby undermining the safeguards that we all want to see. The risk is that potentially crucial medical history, including past mental health concerns, poor coercion indicators or undisclosed diagnoses, might be overlooked.
I call the Committee’s attention to the evidence from the British Geriatrics Society, which raised concerns that the definition of terminal illness in the Bill is often vague and risks misclassification, especially for older patients. Limiting the review of medical records could exacerbate that issue, as doctors may not have a full picture of the patient’s long-term prognosis and their mental health history. The General Medical Council has called for strong regulatory oversight to ensure that eligibility assessments are thorough.
Allowing doctors to determine which records are relevant, without standardised criteria for that judgment in the Bill, risks inconsistency and potential misdiagnosis. The criteria should include diagnosis and prognosis, treatment history, consultation, second opinions and mental health history. Consideration should also be given to disclosures of domestic violence and abuse, or patterns in medical records that might indicate domestic abuse without explicit disclosure, such as frequent visits for unexplained pain, chronic pain complaints, mental health concerns such as anxiety and depression, inconsistent explanations for injuries, and multiple visits to different healthcare providers. All of that should be properly considered by the assessing doctor.
I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that in the Netherlands, 1% to 2% of assessments annually—a significant number when we consider the volumes we are talking about—are deemed “not careful” under the law. Other countries do not have adequate ability to look into the data, but that is significant, and it is often due to inadequate consultation or documentation. I also draw attention to the fact that in our country, I am afraid to say, the cause of death listed by doctors is too frequently inaccurate. Analysis of postmortems suggests that one in 20 deaths have been wrongly recorded. Clearly, mistakes are made in medical records, and therefore it is particularly appropriate to require doctors to give complete consideration to the full medical history of the patient.
I recognise very much that we are trying to create a Bill that works in practice; nevertheless, I think we can emphasise streamlining and efficiency at the expense of patient safety, and we are doing that here. If we tell doctors that they are only required to sift through records that appear relevant to them—a quick skim of recent notes, a glance at the obvious items in a medical history—that may sound efficient, streamlined and practical, but it is likely to leave the vulnerable exposed, in particular when social workers and psychiatrists are not involved at this early stage, as they plainly should be. No multidisciplinary team is looking at the patient at this stage.
Lewis Atkinson
Does the hon. Member share my concern that the wording in medical records has no duration over a person’s lifetime? For example, consulting all the medical records of someone in their 70s or 80s at the end of their life would surely include the records from when they were a child—childhood vaccinations, the removal of tonsils and so on—and that would clearly be impractical. Does he not agree that amendment 201 would clarify that element?
Danny Kruger
What the amendment clarifies is that the doctor does not have to look at any records at all unless he or she considers them relevant. It gives total discretion to the doctor to disregard huge swathes of the patient’s history. Yes, I do expect the doctor to review the entirety of a patient’s record—obviously, the record of a childhood broken leg can be skipped over quickly. What I do not want to do, as the Bill currently does, is allow the doctor to say, “Oh, I missed this evidence of a mental health condition” or “this indication of coercion from five or 10 years ago, because I didn’t consider that aspect of their records to be relevant.” It places a significant obligation on the doctor, but that is, I am afraid, what we are doing in the Bill. We are placing huge obligations on doctors and we should do it properly.
Dr Opher
As the amendment states, it is about examining medical records for things that are relevant. If we are talking about coercion or capacity, these sorts of items will be relevant. I do not know if Members have ever seen medical records. Some people have extremely large medical records, and we have summaries for that, but if a part of that summary indicated something that we were suspicious of, we would look into it. As my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central has just said, the complexities of childhood tonsillitis do not really need to be examined in this case. We have to, and we always do, specify what we look into doctors.
Danny Kruger
As I have said in my many exchanges with the hon. Gentleman, I want to see the good practice that he claims—absolutely accurately, I am sure—to perform is applied across the system. He says that if doctors see in the summary some indication of concerns, they will look more closely into it. Well, I jolly well hope they would. The problem is that the summary might not be complete. I suppose the distillation of my point is that we should say, “Don’t rely on the summary. Proceed with a proper analysis. Take responsibility for making sure that you have reviewed the entirety of the patient’s record.”
We have to address throughout our consideration of the Bill the workload that we are placing on busy professionals. Nevertheless, if we consider that this matters—and it is a question about knock-on effects on the NHS, which we could discuss in due course—it is appropriate to expect proper time to be taken. A specialist with two hours and a full record in front of them might spot the misdiagnoses, question the prognosis, flag the depression and catch the abuse. If given half the time and a licence to skim the record, as the amendment would give them, they could very easily miss something, so I think the word “relevant” is a great gamble.
Lewis Atkinson
The hon. Member is discussing amendment 201, but there is also amendment 422, which indicates that the professional should make inquiries of other healthcare professionals who have been involved in treatment recently. Does he not agree that that would mitigate against the sort of scenario he describes?
Danny Kruger
I will come on to that. I agree with him: amendment 422 is a very helpful amendment, and I support that. It is a very good suggestion that wider consultation should be made, and it is a point that we have been trying to make with amendments throughout. I recognise that that would enhance the safeguards in the Bill—I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman.
Amendment 422 seeks to introduce an additional requirement that the assessing doctor must consider whether to consult health or social care practitioners who are providing, or have recently provided, care to the patient. The amendment is presented as addressing previously expressed concerns, but I regret to say that I feel it is excessively weak. It is a positive step in recognising the issue, but it does not ensure a broader and more informed assessment of a patient’s condition and external influences.
Patients with terminal illnesses often receive care from palliative care teams, social workers or community nurses who might have crucial insights into their wellbeing and the potential external pressures on them. The British Psychological Society has highlighted that mental health and social pressures are often overlooked in assisted dying requests in other countries. Social workers and allied health professionals play a key role in assessing whether a patient feels pressurised due to financial, social or familial burdens. As I have repeatedly said and we will debate further in due course, in my view it is very important that that assessment comes earlier in the process.
We have evidence from doctors—I will not cite it at length—pointing out that independent doctors who refuse assisted dying requests are often ignored, and patients are simply referred to another doctor willing to approve the request, as we have discussed. Consultation with health and social care professionals could act as an additional safeguard against that practice. Although the amendment introduces an obligation to consult other professionals, it leaves it to the discretion of the assessing doctor. It relies on the doctor’s subjective judgment
“if they consider that there is a need”.
I think that is too weak for assisted dying, where consistency is so critical. One doctor might consult a palliative care specialist to explore pain relief options, while another might not, assuming that they understand the patient’s suffering sufficiently. The variability in the Bill—this discretion—undermines fairness and safeguarding.
There is also a lack of accountability in what is a very sensitive process. There is no requirement to document the consideration process, which weakens oversight in a context where errors could be fatal. I respect the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire that we must not police conversations and that being prescriptive may encourage a tick-box approach. I am afraid that we risk that tick-box approach if this amendment is all that we do on this subject. We can imagine a scenario in which a doctor simply makes a note in the record with little underpinning substance.
There is also no obligation to act on the specialist input, so the duty ends at the consultation. There is no requirement to integrate the findings of the additional input that the doctor has received, which is a glaring flaw in what is an irreversible procedure that is being authorised. Finally, there is insufficient rigour for the ethical stakes. This discretionary duty is too weak to catch the difficult cases.
Kim Leadbeater
On the hon. Member’s point about recording those consultations, amendment 423 states in its proposed new subsection (2B):
“Where an assessing doctor consults a professional…the assessing doctor must give a written record of the consultation to the other assessing doctor.”So the consultation is recorded.
Danny Kruger
The hon. Lady is absolutely right, and that is very welcome. My concern is that there is no obligation to do anything about it. There is no obligation for the doctor to integrate the conclusions of the additional professionals that they have consulted into their treatment. I recognise that that provision is valuable and I welcome the amendments, but I suggest that they do not go far enough.
Let me use a hypothetical example to bring my point home to the Committee. Imagine a woman with terminal lung cancer asking to end her life. Her assessing doctor considers consulting a palliative care specialist for symptom control or a social worker to check on her home life, but decides, “My notes are enough. There’s no need for that.” What if the patient’s pain could be eased with a new approach that the doctor does not know about? What if her family’s pushing her to spare them the burden of her care goes unnoticed without a social worker’s input? The lady might die needlessly or be denied treatment unfairly.
The discretionary duty that the amendment would introduce essentially collapses because it does not force the broader scrutiny that patients deserve. The amendment sees the problem, but it is too feeble: it is too discretionary, too vague and too unenforceable for a choice as profound as assisted dying. While I will support it, I do not think it goes far enough.
Amendment 423 builds on amendment 422 by requiring that if the assessing doctor consults a specialist, a written record of that consultation must be shared, as the hon. Member for Spen Valley just mentioned. It is critical for transparency, consistency and accountability in decision making. In high-stakes cases, such as assisted dying requests, paper trails matter. Without a formal record, one assessing doctor might dismiss concerns raised by another professional without accountability—a point made by the hon. Member for Richmond Park.
As I pointed out in an intervention on the hon. Member for Richmond Park, it is remarkable how few jurisdictions around the world have such safeguards. The American model in Oregon, Washington and California does not track how many doctors a patient consults before finding one willing to approve an assisted dying request, so we do not know the extent of doctor shopping abroad. Canada’s system does not require refusals to be formally documented, making it difficult to assess the patterns of approval. Ensuring that records are available to both assessing doctors would add an extra layer of scrutiny and help to prevent doctor shopping.
However, while the amendment is a step in the right direction, it does not require an independent review of the records. Sir James Munby, the former president of the family division of the High Court, has criticised the lack of procedural rigour in oversight mechanisms, warning that assisted dying laws risk becoming a rubber-stamp exercise if refusals and approvals are not documented with transparency. The Royal College of General Practitioners has called for independent oversight of the entire process, not just a reliance on individual doctors. These amendments would partially address that, but would not fully resolve it.
Amendments 422 and 423 are welcome but otiose: they would simply give doctors permission to do what they should be doing anyway. If they are conscientious, they will do it anyway, and if not, they will not. It is slightly like an illegal gun amnesty: the good guys will not have illegal firearms in the first place, and the bad guys with guns are not going to hand them in voluntarily. I fear that we are requiring good behaviour of good people, and not requiring it of doctors who are not doing their job properly.
Several hon. Members rose—
The Chair
Order. Rebecca Paul has an amendment tabled in this group, so I shall call her next. I have had indications from Rachel Hopkins and Dr Opher that they wish to speak, and I see two others, of whom I shall make a note.
Rebecca Paul
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I rise to speak to my amendment 468 to clause 9, which would ensure that the assessing doctor must
“ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death.”
We have heard a lot in this Committee about the importance of the patient-doctor relationship. My hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said that we should be
“trusting in the judgment of clinicians, who know their patients well”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 26 February 2025; c. 634.]
He also said that patients
“may want to speak to their GP because they have had a relationship with them over 30 or 40 years”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 481.]
It is therefore worth asking how the Bill shapes the patient-doctor relationship.
The Bill asks doctors to do many things to and for patients. It asks doctors to consider whether to raise the subject of assisted suicide; personally, I wish we had agreed to the amendment that would have ensured that it was the patient who brought the subject up first, but we are where we are. The Bill asks doctors to explain the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis and to lay out options for treatment and palliative care, if there is any available; if there is not, the doctor can only state that point and move on. Nevertheless, we are asking the doctor to look into the matter and lay out possibilities.
The Bill asks doctors to check for capacity and for coercion, to ascertain whether the patient has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, to witness declarations and, eventually, to give the patient a substance and oversee the patient taking it. In other words, it makes doctors absolutely central to the process, as the facilitators of the process, as the people who accompany the patient and as the professionals with the biggest responsibility for ensuring that the safeguards are followed, yet it never asks doctors to make a simple but vital inquiry: why?
That is all that my amendment would add. It would simply require the assessing doctors to ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death. I hope that the Committee will agree that that would be a reasonable and not overly burdensome change. Some hon. Members have suggested that certain amendments embroider the Bill too much, but in this case, the patient-doctor conversation is already embroidered. The Bill makes some very specific demands of the doctor as to what the conversation should cover. Surely it is only natural, amid all the conversations, for the doctor to take a moment—perhaps more than a moment, but a moment at the very least—to help the patient to talk through their reasons. This is a very vulnerable moment in somebody’s life.
The simplest of questions can often unlock the most information. In some cases, for the small number who would benefit from the Bill, the answer would probably reassure the doctor, but for those others we worry about, the question would provide another important safeguard. It would be another opportunity to check that this really is in the best interests of the patient.
How would the conversation go? I do not think that we can generalise. It might be the briefest exchange or it might lead to a really searching discussion. Doctors know how to take their cue from the patients in these things. Crucially, the doctor’s role is not just to offer advice or information. Even if the doctor says nothing, it may make all the difference for the patient to be able to speak aloud their concerns, their confusion and their hopes and fears. I absolutely accept that many doctors, if not most doctors, would ask the question why anyway, but given its importance, I still urge the Committee to set that out in the Bill. In doing so, we would be affirming that this is more than a bureaucratic exercise; it is about a person and about getting to the truth of what they want and need.
I do not think we should not make the mistake of assuming that every doctor has the time, or will take the time, to have the in-depth conversations needed to really understand what is driving a patient’s request. It is up to us to make legislation that keeps standards high at all times. There is currently nothing in the Bill that will guarantee an in-depth conversation. I am afraid that not all doctors believe that that is even a likely outcome. In written evidence, the GP Edward Tulloch states:
“To conduct the required assessments outlined in 7.2 and 8.2 of the Bill within a standard GP appointment (lasting 10-15 minutes) is completely unrealistic. It will require multiple appointments to properly carry out such detailed discussions and complete the associated legal paperwork.”
We all know what pressure the NHS is currently under. Many of us cannot get a GP appointment. So, how certain are we that adequate time can be allocated to the assisted dying process to ensure the criteria are truly met?
By putting the “why” question on the face of the Bill, my amendment would bring us closer to the possibility of real, serious and honest conversations about a patient’s reason for seeking an assisted death. That would be especially helpful for those who have just received a terminal diagnosis. We have received some important written evidence from six palliative care doctors, who state that
“our experience is that many patients experience a period of adjustment to ‘bad news’ and may say that they cannot live under these conditions. However, after a period of reflection and adjustment, the majority come to find peace and value in their altered life circumstance, in a way they would not have believed possible.”
The consultant psychiatrist Jennifer Bryden provides an especially interesting perspective, as someone who has seen this from both sides:
“Having gone through several long episodes of illness, I now know that feeling entirely useless and a burden to everyone is a phase that will pass. For many people a terminal diagnosis will be their first time through the cycle and they will believe those thoughts represent reality. In coming to terms with a severe illness, depression is an expected phase and learning to accept all humans need each other takes time”.
Dr Bryden goes on to say that the current cooling-off period is not enough time for people to come to terms with such a diagnosis. Clearly, people may need all the help they can get to understand their new situation. Asking the patient for their reasons is only the beginning of that process, but one that may help them come to terms with their situation and validate, or not, their initial inclination.
Finally, asking why can identify those patients who are being coerced or pressured. Nobody should think that that is easy to spot. According to the charity SafeLives, which counters domestic abuse, it takes the average person who experiences violent abuse 2.3 years to access effective help. In the year before they finally get help, 85% of victims will have sought help of some kind from an average of five professionals. Often, sad to say, those who missed the signs will have been healthcare professionals. That is for physical abuse; psychological abuse will be far harder to spot. We cannot put in enough safeguards to ensure that doctors have all the tools they need and all the opportunities they can, to spot those signs.
Jack Abbott (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)
For clarity, at what point in the conversation does the hon. Member expect the question to be raised? In reference to an assessing doctor, do I take it that the question must be asked twice, at different times, by both the co-ordinating and the independent doctor?
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Member for his very good questions. I suggest that it be asked twice, because it makes a lot of sense to ensure that the patient is given the chance to really explain what is driving their decision. It is the simplest of questions, but it is amazing what can sometimes come out of the simplest question.
I return to the safeguard against coercion. In a sense, this is not a new safeguard; rather, it confirms and bolsters the other safeguards in the Bill, which are there to explore the reasons for assisted dying. Asking why will help doctors to better understand what is driving a patient’s decision and to give that patient an opportunity to validate that they are truly eligible. It is the simplest of questions, driving the most significant conversation that a doctor and patient can have. I hope that hon. Members will support my amendment.
Rachel Hopkins (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I rise to speak in support of amendments 201, 422 and 423, which stand in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, and against amendment 468.
On amendment 201, a point was made earlier about the relevance of records. It was mentioned that it might well not be relevant to look at a childhood tonsillectomy. However, I wish to speak in slightly more specific terms, in support of women and their reproductive rights, and to highlight the risk of unconscious bias if all records are to be looked at.
If a woman had a termination in her teenage years, that will be highly irrelevant to her decision, many decades later, whether to choose an assisted death. Relevance is very important, because there will be a high level of record keeping in the process. It is not only the doctors working with the patient on the assessment who will read the records and reports; ultimately, it will also be the panel. I make the point again that so many parts of a patient’s medical records are highly irrelevant to the diagnosis and prognosis of a terminal illness, and to the six months under the eligibility criteria. Indeed, there is a risk of unconscious bias in the judgment. It is about the professionalism of the doctor in respect of understanding the records that are relevant for the process.
Rachel Hopkins
I will continue, if I may.
I turn to amendments 422 and 423. The importance of a rounded, holistic assessment and discussion with the patient has been pointed out in many of our discussions, as has the importance of the multidisciplinary team and the other health and care professionals who support the patient with health and social care. That would all have to be recorded—the conversations that have been had, and why the assessing doctors and other health and social care professionals were involved. In oral evidence, many doctors in other jurisdictions said that they worked in multidisciplinary teams. The amendment would firm that up. It is about being clearer, because the clarity that the amendments provide would make for a stronger process.
On amendment 468, the hon. Member for Reigate pointed out that it asks a very simple question. However, I return to the point about the professionalism of the doctors involved in the process, who will be working within the legal requirement under the Bill that the individual have a clear, settled and informed wish. The doctors will have to check individuals’ eligibility under the requirements, for example that they are over 18 and have a terminal illness with a six-month prognosis. The doctors will use their expertise and professionalism, and that of the multidisciplinary team, to make assessments about coercion. They have strong rules about assessing for capacity.
The requirement to ask why someone wants an assisted death is a requirement to police the conversation that the doctor has with their patient. Setting it out in primary legislation would lead to a tick-box exercise, with doctors saying, “You’ve told me a number of times already in our conversation that I’ve been having with you, but I’m sorry: I have to officially ask this question and tick the box.” That could lead to an insensitive conversation and relationship between the relevant people in the process.
To a certain degree, the patient may think, “So what? Do I have to tell you why? It is none of your business why I want to pursue this legal course of action down the line.” I appreciate where the hon. Member for Reigate is coming from, but with the best of intentions, her amendment would actually lessen the individual’s autonomy and their right to choose what if the Bill passes will be a legal course of action. I am content that the stringent training that will be required for any of the assessing healthcare professionals will enable a good holistic conversation so that good judgments can be made. Adding this extra sentence would detract from that, so I cannot support the amendment.
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
I support amendments 422, 468 and 423, which I think would strengthen and safeguard the Bill. However, as someone who worked in mental health for many years, I have grave concerns about amendment 201, which would restrict access to medical records. Health professionals work in environments with great confidentiality of records; I have no concern about health professionals or doctors having access to health records. Some Committee members have talked about doctors not needing to know whether a person had tonsillitis, but most medical records or GP summaries will note whether someone has had tonsillitis, along with details about vaccinations and infections. I do not think that those records will necessarily be relevant or that a doctor would look in detail at what medication they have had in that respect.
What is relevant, however, are records for people who have a mental health disorder or are vulnerable. For example, people with serious mental illnesses such as chronic treatment-resistant schizophrenia may be on treatments such as clozapine that, if stopped, will have an impact on their mental health. The treatment that they may undergo during terminal illness may have an interaction, and medication that they have been using for many years to treat their mental health condition may have to be stopped. Doctors need to know why the person wanted to choose that route, and whether it will have an impact on their mental health.
Restricting access to important medical records by the doctor who makes the decision will have an impact on very vulnerable people. As we have discussed before, people may be homeless or may not have any family members, and it will all have an impact on why they decide to seek the assisted dying route. People may feel that they are a burden to society and the system. If there is any documentation from six months or a year ago, it will be relevant for the doctor. Removing access to medical records for doctors will have an impact on people with mental disorders, intellectual disabilities and neurodevelopmental conditions, so I oppose amendment 201, although I support the other amendments.
Naz Shah
I will try to keep my remarks brief. I first speak to amendment 468, tabled by the hon. Member for Reigate, on the asking of the question why someone wants to have an assisted death. When I originally came to this debate, Dermot, a humanist who was also my election agent—a lovely guy—came to me and said, “Now that this Bill is going through Parliament, will you support it”? I said, “Explain it to me.” He never once mentioned the word “autonomy”. If I remember correctly, what he talked about was suffering, pain and horrible deaths, which many hon. Members have referred to. We have heard lots of examples during this Bill Committee.
My hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire said that the decision was none of a doctor’s business and that the issue was about autonomy. However, if a woman was being coerced into an assisted death, the idea that it was none of the doctor’s business would not quite wash with me. We talk about autonomy, but if someone does not have autonomy in their lives—if they are in an abusive relationship, are a victim of coercion or have a vulnerability—they might not have the choice.
When we ask a question, it is often about something else. I have experienced this myself. I am very passionate; when I am talking about things, somebody might just stop me and say, “Naz—what’s this actually about?” That is all it takes to make me stop, take a step back and a breather, and think for a deeper minute about whether the issue could actually be about something else. We do not always stop to think.
Dr Opher
The amendment is good practice; I do not in any way deny that. The hon. Member for Reigate is obviously coming from a really good place. However, the amendment is almost like specifying that when someone goes to see a doctor, the doctor has to say, “How can I help? What is wrong?” It is just unnecessary; that is my only feeling about it. If someone came in and said, “I would like to request an assisted death”, the doctor would not just say, “Okay”—they would ask how the patient was feeling. It is normal medical practice to ask what is going on in someone’s mind, so that does not need to be specified in the Bill.
Naz Shah
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. There is a medical model and a social model of intervention. If I walk into a GP surgery with a really bad headache, I am prescribed paracetamol. If the headache gets worse, I am prescribed something stronger—maybe co-codamol or codeine. Doctors are really busy. We have had to add another 40,000 appointments just for people to get through systems, so we know how hard it is to get a GP appointment.
If the person who turns up at the GP’s with a headache is usually quite healthy, the doctor might not take a minute to ask about what has actually happened. If I say, “I have a headache because I am banging my head against the wall—I have that much stress”, that is a whole different conversation. Having that conversation with the patient—probing a little more—is, for me, very important from a holistic point of view.
Rachel Hopkins
I want to check that my hon. Friend was not implying that I had not thought deeply—for more than a minute–in the course of making my comments earlier.
Rachel Hopkins
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reiterating those points. Does she accept that it is a patient’s right to say, “It’s none of your business” in the course of the conversation?
Naz Shah
I absolutely accept that it is the patient’s right to say, “It’s none of your business”, with the really clear caveat that they could well be a vulnerable patient. They might say that it was none of the doctor’s business, and that doctor might then not be able to explore the other things going on with that patient. That is why, for me, this does not wash.
The point that I am trying to make is that, in the course of a normal consultation, it is presumed that every doctor will know their patient and be able to have these conversations. In most cases, they probably will because we have amazing doctors; I have amazing relationships with my doctors. But does that mean that the doctors will ask that one question: “Why?” That is the crux of the whole Bill.
Rebecca Paul
The right to say, “It’s none of your business” might be fine when no one else is involved, but if someone seeks an assisted death, that involves multiple members of NHS staff. There is an impact on all those people, who need to be comfortable with what they are doing. Maybe the person needs to accept that they do need to provide some information so that the medical staff feel comfortable about the question of eligibility.
Naz Shah
That opens up a whole different debate for me. Some clinicians will not sign up to this process and some will. That is a whole different debate, but I take the point that there has to be a reason.
We talk about the option for referral to palliative care. I have previously moved amendments that would have meant a referral, without the option; however, when considering that option, a doctor needs to understand that if a patient says, “I do not have to explain myself—full stop”, or, “I do not want to talk about palliative care”, that should raise alarm bells. If a doctor says, “You’ve got this terminal illness. These are the options—let me spell them out for you. You have the option of referral to palliative care and the option of these drugs, so why do you want to kill yourself?”, and the patient turns around and says, “It’s none of your business”—
Naz Shah
Sorry, I will just finish my point.
From a common sense perspective—I am not medically qualified—that situation should make me, as a human being, want to understand more. As a human being, I would like to understand whether something else was going on, such as anger towards—
Rachel Hopkins
The Bill already sets out a number of things that a doctor has to assure themselves of, with regard to coercion and capacity. They would do that having had a significant amount of training to establish, in the round, after consulting others, that one way or another the legal requirements have been met. The “Why?” question appears to me to bring in a judgmental element—
Rachel Hopkins
Indeed: subjective, as the right hon. Gentleman said. That is the point that I am trying to get at. There is an objective assessment, which is wholly appropriate, but a subjective assessment would lead down a different route and muddy the objective assessment.
Naz Shah
I absolutely see where my hon. Friend is coming from and appreciate her concern, but we will have to agree to disagree as we have a difference of opinion. A subjective assessment might reveal that something else is going on for that patient.
I hate to put myself in this position, but imagine I have just received a diagnosis and I am going to die within six months. I could have a whole load of anger about that happening to me and I could say, “I don’t want this. I don’t want to talk about it. It’s none of your business. I’m angry—this is what I want.” At that point, does the doctor stop? In most cases, my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire is absolutely right, but in some cases she might not be. I might want to shut the conversation down because I am angry or because other things are going on in my head and I do not want to explain. Amendment 468 would allow the doctor, from a compassionate point of view, to have another conversation with the patient.
Jake Richards
Does my hon. Friend agree that she is making a powerful case against amendment 468? A multitude of conversations and different circumstances will need to be taken into account; it is wholly inappropriate to have a mandated question in primary legislation. We should go back to clause 1, which I think the Bill is actually about. It states that the person must have
“a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”.
Does my hon. Friend agree that that is what is at the heart of the Bill, rather than decisions about what is in the person’s best interests?
Naz Shah
I respectfully disagree. I am making the case that there is a conversation to be had. Yes, there is informed choice but is my hon. Friend suggesting that the question should not be asked at all? I take the point that with an informed choice there would have been an exploratory conversation, but sometimes just calling something out, or stating the obvious, makes a huge difference.
Rebecca Paul
I wish to clarify that the amendment is about not an additional assessment but merely a simple question. Like many who have spoken, I hope that most good doctors would ask the question anyway and take the answer. It may inform them or it may not but sometimes, as the hon. Member for Bradford West has just discussed so powerfully, it is helpful to remind medical staff, who are under lots of time pressure, that sometimes it is worth stepping back and asking why.
Jack Abbott
I appreciate that my hon. Friend has given way a number of times, but I gently suggest that we already know the crux of the Bill and what we are debating. The “why” is that people with a terminal diagnosis, with six months to live, would like a course of action to end their lives in a pain-free way and to have the autonomy to do so.
We are in danger of over-legislating for a range of different permutations that could potentially happen in conversations. I agree that these kinds of questions are absolutely crucial, but it may satisfy my hon. Friend that amendment 21, to which we agreed a few moments ago, requires medical practitioners to take training on
“domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse”.
That sort of protection and safeguard has already been agreed to.
We will rely on highly specialised individuals to pick up on these issues. They may want to explore, through further questioning, why people are making these decisions but we cannot legislate for all the different sorts of conversations, and all the emotions that may be going through people’s minds. If someone comes back and says, as my hon. Friend put it, “Well, it’s none of your business,” or whatever the answer may be, we will rely on the specialised professionals to pick up on danger signs. However, that would not necessarily lead them in every single conversation to have a suspicion of the patient’s motives. Life and conversation do not work like that and we cannot legislate in that way.
Naz Shah
I absolutely agree that life does not work like that. Life is very complicated and that is why I want the conversation to happen. My hon. Friend referred to amendment 21, which we have just agreed to. I spoke extensively about why that is a brilliant amendment that moves us towards much more safeguarding, but I also think that it does not go far enough for women, marginalised communities and people from ethnic minority backgrounds. I genuinely do not feel that amendment 468 is about over-legislating. It is just stating an obvious fact: sometimes, even in normal life, we go around the houses to get to a conversation and get to the right point. That is what I want to get to.
Jack Abbott
To follow up on the example my hon. Friend gave earlier, if—to be glib—someone said, “None of your business”, she would want the doctor to keep probing. At what point does that end? If someone genuinely does not want to have that conversation and says, “I want to end my life because I have a terminal diagnosis. I live in fear of the pain that could await me and I don’t really want to go into much detail,” where does that end? Where does that conversation continue to?
Danny Kruger
I completely agree with the hon. Lady’s point. The conversation goes on in the way the doctor would want it to, but they have at least asked the question. Is it not very simple? The Bill already requires doctors to look for signs of external coercion. As we have acknowledged, there is no way to determine internal coercion—the influence people have on themselves. There is no way in the Bill at the moment to identify whether somebody feels that they want an assisted death because they fear that they are a burden to others. This question is the only opportunity we have to tease out that answer: does she agree?
Naz Shah
The hon. Member for East Wiltshire makes an important point. Where are the opportunities? When doctors are doing the assessment.
The other issue that speaks to me is the question of internalised bias. We will have professionals with subconscious bias or affirmed bias. They will be clinicians who have chosen or agreed to take part in the process; fundamentally, the majority of clinicians will not take part in this process because of their beliefs. It changes the relationship between doctor and patient from a societal perspective.
I know that a number of times I have been stopped during a process and asked a different question, and at times that opportunity for reflection—even without the pressure of knowing I have only six months to live—is of benefit to me. I am sure that others would benefit from it, too, particularly because the decision is so momentous. For that reason, I will certainly support amendment 468.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for tabling amendment 201. I have mixed views on it. I appreciate what my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire said about medical records, especially when it comes to women and their past, but I also appreciated what my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford said about his experience from a mental health perspective.
I am still thinking about the amendment and I am not sure whether I will support it or not, but further thought needs to be given to the subject. There are the issues of mental health and women’s rights, but another issue applies, too. If someone has experienced trauma in childhood but that trauma has come out much more recently, even though it does not necessarily affect the decision at hand—whether to choose an assisted death—is there some kind of historical post-traumatic stress disorder that would then need to be explored? I do not have the answer, but I look forward to hearing the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on that point. I would value hearing whether she has thought about that and what her understanding of it is.
Stephen Kinnock
As I have mentioned before, the Government have worked closely with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on some mutually agreed amendments, including amendments 201, 422 and 433. The amendments that the Government support aim to ensure the legal robustness and operability of the legislation, should it pass, and I will offer a technical explanation for them.
Amendment 201 will clarify the wording in clause 9 on the doctor’s assessment. It provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records applies only to records that appear relevant to the doctor. The effect of the amendment is to make clear as part of the assessment process that the assessing doctor is required only to review medical records that are considered by the doctor to be relevant to the person’s request to seek an assisted death.
Amendment 422 would add an additional requirement on an assessing doctor to make inquiries of professionals who are providing or who have recently provided health or social care to the person and make such other inquiries as the assessing doctor considers appropriate. This applies to—
Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Seventh sitting)
Tuesday 11th March 2025
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBorder Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill 2024-26 View all Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 March 2025 - (11 Mar 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 11 / Noes: 3 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 10 / Noes: 4 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chair
Would everyone please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode? We now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, as well as on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on the declaration of interests, as set out in the code of conduct.
Clause 37
Repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)
It is a pleasure once more to be in this delightful room doing line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill.
The clause repeals in full the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. The Act, which requires that decision makers treat Rwanda as a safe third country for the purposes of removing individuals there, and disapplies sections of the Human Rights Act 1998, was passed by the previous Government in an attempt to facilitate removals to Rwanda under the migration and economic development partnership. Despite that, the Act has served no practical purpose since it became law: no decisions were made that were affected by its provisions, and, as we have stated repeatedly, only four individuals were ever relocated voluntarily. No enforced removals to Rwanda ever took place under the partnership.
The Government have been clear from the outset that we will not proceed with the partnership. There is no evidence that it was successful in deterring small boat arrivals, nor has it delivered value for money for the British taxpayer. On the contrary, nearly 84,000 people arrived on small boats between 14 April 2022, which was the date the partnership was announced by the former Government, and 5 July 2024, which was the day after this Government were elected.
The Government have been clear that we will not make further payments to Rwanda, saving £100 million in upcoming annual economic transformation and integration fund payments, and a further £120 million that the UK would otherwise have been liable to pay once 300 individuals had been relocated to Rwanda. That is without even considering the additional staffing and operational costs, which would have been substantial. We will also exit the UK-Rwanda treaty as part of ending the partnership. It is therefore appropriate for the Government to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act so that the legislation, which relies on the provisions of the treaty, will no longer be on the statute book. That is what clause 37 achieves.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
Clause 37 repeals the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. In doing so, the Government are removing the only deterrent, and indeed the only place where we can send people who have arrived from a safe third country. It is well established that it is extremely difficult to return people to some countries. In addition, the lack of documentation can frustrate the process of removal to someone’s home country. That is why a third country deterrent is needed: if people cannot be removed to their home country, they can and will be removed to a third country.
The logical consequence of repealing the Safety of Rwanda Act is that a greater number of migrants will arrive from countries that are harder to return them to. Without some form of agreement to send the migrants to a safe country, they will continue to come and to stay. Section 80AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 contains a list of safe countries, but the list is limited to countries that contribute very few illegal migrants, save for Albania. The last Conservative Government cut the number of Albanian illegal migrants coming to the UK by small boat crossings by over 90%, showing that our returns agreement with Albania worked. As the former director general of Border Force said:
“If we cannot send them back, we could send them to another safe country—ergo, Rwanda—where they could be resettled safely without adding to the continuing flow of arrivals by small boat from France.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 41, Q43.]
Channel boat crossings are up 28% since the election, with more than 1,300 people crossing in the week commencing 1 March 2025. This Labour Government have smashed farmers, small business owners and pensioners, but it seems that the people-smuggling gangs are the only ones who are safe. The only thing that will stop the gangs is a strong deterrent that means that people do not board small boats because they know that they will be deported if they reach the UK, and they will not be allowed to stay.
The additional offences and powers in this Bill are welcome as far as they go, but, with the scrapping of the Conservatives’ deterrent—that if someone has no right to be in this country, they will not be able to stay—this Bill is just window dressing. It will not, and cannot, stop people crossing the channel in small boats. The Government know that, because their own impact assessment shows that only a handful of people each year would be imprisoned because of the new offences created by this Bill.
Since the announcement that our deterrent would be scrapped, there are almost 8,500 more people in asylum hotels. That is the Government’s failure.
Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)
I was trying to count the number of times the hon. Member used the word “deterrent”, and I ran out of fingers. Could he please define what a deterrent is?
Matt Vickers
Does the hon. Gentleman want me to use my fingers to help him to count? The deterrent is preventing people from getting in those boats. If people know that they will be detained and removed when they arrive in this country, they will stop coming.
Mike Tapp (Dover and Deal) (Lab)
Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that the crossings have risen from 299 in 2018 to more than 150,000 since then, the majority of them on the Conservatives’ watch? Does he also acknowledge that deportations have increased by 24% under this Government?
Matt Vickers
Does the hon. Gentleman know what has happened with global migration? If we compare the movements that have been made in the last week, those into Europe and those into this country seem to be slightly misaligned. The number of people arriving in this country is up 28%. The number of people put into hotels in communities across this country is up 29%; that is 8,500 more people. The number of people who have arrived in this country illegally and been removed is down significantly since this Government came to office.
It is clear that a new approach is needed. The National Crime Agency said that stopping channel migrants is not possible without a Rwanda-style scheme. It was a terrible mistake for Labour to cancel our deterrent before it had even started. The Labour Government like to point out the cost of the Rwanda plan, but a deterrent that stops illegal migrants from making the crossing and settling in the country will save the state billions in lifetime costs.
As Karl Williams from the Centre for Policy Studies pointed out,
“the Office for Budget Responsibility’s analysis last summer…estimates that a low-skilled migrant, or low-wage migrant as the OBR puts it, will represent a lifetime net fiscal cost to the taxpayer of around £600,000.”
Williams then pointed to
“analysis from Denmark, the Netherlands and other European countries that asylum seekers’ lifetime fiscal costs tend to be steeper than that” ––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 43, Q49.]
The evidence therefore suggests that if 35,000 people cross the channel a year—that is roughly where we were last year—at that sort of cost range, the lifetime costs will probably be £50 billion or £60 billion.
Tom Hayes
I ask the hon. Member to desist from referring to that report. In oral evidence, I asked two experts whether they thought it was possible to make such assessments on the basis of the available evidence, and they declined. In fact, the author of that report said that the available evidence was fairly lacking in robustness and integrity. When I asked him whether he had considered certain key counterfactuals, he admitted that he had not. Later, in response to my question about whether it was appropriate for MPs to brandish such research, Professor Brian Bell said that it would be “foolhardy” to do so because the report itself made “very brave” assumptions.
Will the hon. Member now desist from using that report, given that we are in a democracy, we are striving for accountability and truth, and we should not be using fake information?
Matt Vickers
I will not desist from using those figures, but I would be happy to hear the hon. Member’s alternative figures when the time comes. I am sure this is not cost-neutral; I am sure it is very expensive.
As I was saying, that is why an effective removals and deterrent agreement is needed. I ask the Minister whether the Government are looking at a removals and deterrent agreement. If not, why are they repealing the UK’s only deterrent? How does she think we can control our borders without one, when it is clear that this Bill will not be effective in doing so? Does she agree with the National Crime Agency that a removals agreement is the only way to stop channel migrants, as happened with Operation Sovereign Borders in Australia?
The Government say that they are clearing the backlog and returning people who arrived on small boats. That is just not the case. The most recent immigration figures show that the asylum backlog is higher than when Labour came into office, and returns of small boat arrivals were down again in the most recent quarter, with only 4% of arrivals being removed. In fact, of the total returns between October and December 2024, only 16% were enforced; in the three months before, only 13% were. Does the Minister think that allowing 96% of illegal immigrants who arrive by small boat to stay in the UK is a deterrent?
Tom Hayes
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart, and I promise that I will be briefer. Does the hon. Member agree that the overwhelming trend under the last Conservative Government in the balance between enforced and voluntary returns was in favour of voluntary returns? In fact, in 2023, only 24% of returns were enforced, in 2022, 25% were and in 2021, 27% were. Does he not agree that the trend over the last years has been one of voluntary returns?
Matt Vickers
I would say that the big issue around deterrence is how many of those who arrive in small boats are removed. Despite the fact that the number of those arriving illegally is up 28%, the number who are being returned is down significantly. That is the big question at play here.
Tom Hayes
I thank the hon. Member for his patience. Does he agree that he is moving the goalposts slightly to manufacture a political argument that, as he knows, would not be supported by the evidence available? Furthermore, will he look back into history at the record of the last Labour Government? I invite him to comment on their success—I know that he will want to jump at that. In 2004, 85% of people reaching our country were removed through enforced returns; in 2005, 73% were. Where there was a trend of enforced returns, it was actually under the last Labour Government.
Matt Vickers
In terms of the political arguments, what people out there want to see is the number of people arriving illegally in this country going down. They are not seeing that; it is up 28%. They want to see the number of hotels in communities across the country going down. It is not, although it was. The number of people arriving was also going down, but it is now up 28%, and there are 8,500 more people in hotels. That is the reality of the situation.
Dame Angela Eagle
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he is being very generous. Of course, that is what Committee debates are meant to be about; it is easier to have a bit more to and fro in Committee than it often is on the Floor of the House, when we have two and a half minutes and we have had to rewrite our speech and discard most of what we were going to say.
Will the hon. Gentleman admit that the way in which the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act meant that nobody could be processed at all; they were just stuck, and there was a build-up in hotels of small boat arrivals and other asylum claimants who could not be processed? That meant that there was a big backlog, and we have had to restart decision making. That inevitably means that there will be a slowdown in sending back people who have arrived by small boat until we can get on top of the backlog that the Conservative Government created.
Matt Vickers
The principle at stake is that if someone arrives in this country illegally, they will be removed. We were not processing people who had arrived illegally and were meant to be removed, but we were returning more of them before the election than we are now. However, I will get through my comments, and there will be plenty of time then for debate—we have a full morning ahead of us.
Does the Minister think that allowing 96% of illegal migrants who arrive by small boat to stay in the UK is a deterrent? At the moment, people know that if they come here on a small boat, they are 96% likely to be allowed to stay. That is a strong pull factor. The only way to remove that pull factor is to reinstate a strong deterrent. People need to know that if they arrive here on a small boat, they will not be able to stay. Can the Minister explain how she will increase the number of removals without a third country to which migrants can be sent? If it is not Rwanda, where will they go? Will it be Redcar? Will it be Romford? Will it be Richmond? Where will these people who cannot be removed to a safe country go?
As Alp Mehmet said,
“repealing the Rwanda Act will encourage illegal immigration… 240,000 people were declared to have entered”
the EU “illegally last year” and will likely end up coming to the UK. The Government have confirmed with this Bill and the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda Act that there is no deterrence, because once people arrive here, the likelihood is that they will be able to stay. Mehmet also echoed the comments from the National Crime Agency, saying,
“the only deterrent is to restrict arrivals, and to contain and remove quickly. That will send the right message.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 39-40, Q43.]
As he pointed out, there is not “anything in the Bill” that would suggest that people will be removed quickly. Why has a removals agreement not been included in the Bill? The EU is now looking at offshore processing and deportation centres. There is also a growing consensus in the EU that the 1951 refugee convention is not fit for purpose. What assessment has the Minister made of the impact of these changes on the UK? Why have the Government scrapped the Rwanda plan, leaving the UK as an outlier? We wish to oppose the repeal of the Act by way of a Division.
Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)
I welcome the opportunity to examine the failed Rwanda scheme. The Israeli scheme, which was set up more than a decade ago, provides stark evidence that the previous Government should have considered before recycling an idea that has cost taxpayers £700 million. In Israel, asylum seekers were given a stark choice: be sent home, go to a migrant detention facility or take $3,500 on a one-way flight to Rwanda. One such asylum seeker quickly found that he was not welcome on arrival. No sooner had he landed in Kigali than he was told he had to leave again for Uganda, and for a fee. He said that he quickly left for Greece on a small boat and then travelled over land to Switzerland, where he is now settled. Another used a $5,000 payment that he received to catch a flight to Amsterdam, where he then claimed asylum status.
The previous Conservative Government entered into the agreement with Rwanda with full knowledge of the previous failings there and offered individuals a personal payment of £3,000 to resettle their lives. Figures have been bandied about on how many asylum seekers Rwanda was willing to take, with the previous Government saying 1,000, and Rwanda saying between 100 and 200. It is not clear who was right, but a question that has often been repeated to me is: how can that be regarded as a deterrent? Indeed, our witnesses from the refugee support organisations made the point that people will continue to come and try their luck, and 84,000 took that risk. I welcome the fact that we have our common sense back and we are repealing the Act, but I despair at the waste of taxpayers’ money on pursuing a fantasy that had already failed elsewhere.
Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)
Good morning to you, Mr Stuart, for week two of our fascinating journey into the depths of the Bill. There will be absolutely no argument from me about this one, and I wholeheartedly agree that the Bill must go through. When we look back at the whole sorry Rwanda debacle, we will wonder how on earth such a crackpot scheme was not only conceived, but actually constructed and delivered. A few words will be forever on the gravestone of the last Conservative Government: “stop the boats” and “Rwanda”. It was the first time, in my experience, that an Act decreed a new reality. Through sheer willpower alone, the Conservatives declared that Rwanda was a safe place, and in true Orwellian style, they even called the legislation the Safety of Rwanda Act. It was the most blatant political attempt ever to try to convince us that black was white.
Rwanda is so safe that it is currently accused of supporting the M23 militia, which is claimed to be recruiting child soldiers and carrying out killings and rapes of civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Saying all that, Rwanda played an utter blinder. It milked this for all it was worth. It saw these mugs coming. So far, Rwanda has made £240 million—money that will not have to be paid back. The Bill was described by the Law Society as “defective” and “constitutionally improper”, and it was declared unlawful in the Supreme Court. All those rebukes did nothing for the Conservatives other than to encourage them to ensure that the idea became a reality.
We just have to look at the sheer waste and the sheer stupidity that was the very essence of the Rwanda policy. The headline was that it cost taxpayers £750 million and failed to deport a single asylum seeker against their will. There was £270 million to support economic development in Rwanda, £95 million for detention and reception centres and £280 million for other fixed costs. Fifty million pounds was spent preparing for flights that never took off.
Then there is the farce of the Kigali four—the four volunteers sent to Rwanda, who were the only people who actually made it through the whole scheme. Tortoise did us a favour by unearthing the script that was used when the Home Office tried to persuade people to take up a “generous one-time offer” of a relocation package to Rwanda. One source said that demonstrated an
“insane level of resource that went into just proving the concept”.
Mike Tapp
I thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for his creative statement. The chaos in our asylum system and the dangerous rise in illegal small boat crossings is, of course, one of the greatest challenges facing our country, and for years the British public have been promised solutions. They were told that the previous Government’s Rwanda policy would fix the problem, but instead it proved a costly failure. It got stuck in legal battles, was riddled with operational flaws and was utterly ineffective. I will go into detail about that soon.
In 2018, 299 people crossed the channel on small boats. By 2022, the number had surged to 30,000—a hundredfold increase on the Conservatives’ watch. Despite their grand claims that the Rwanda scheme would act as a deterrent, more than 80,000 people crossed the channel after the scheme was announced, and not a single asylum seeker has been successfully removed under it—not one. It is clear that this policy failed.
Let us start with the legal reality. The Rwanda asylum scheme was not just controversial but unlawful. In November 2023, the UK Supreme Court struck it down, ruling that Rwanda was not a safe country to send asylum seekers. The reason for that was systematic defects in Rwanda’s asylum system: almost no claims from Afghans, Syrians or Yemenis were ever approved. The Court found a serious risk that genuine refugees could be sent back to danger, in direct breach of international law. Let us not forget that Rwanda has a track record here: a previous deal with Israel, mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw, led to refugees being secretly deported back to their home countries, in clear violation of human rights protections. This policy depends on breaking the law, and that is no policy at all. It is a legal and moral dead end.
That is why the Bill repeals the Rwanda scheme and replaces it with a system that upholds the rule of law. It will focus toughness where it belongs: not on desperate people, but on the criminal gangs who exploit them. Instead of wasting years in court, we will implement a legally sound system that actually works.
Further, the Rwanda scheme was not just unlawful; it was an economic disaster. As of mid-2024, at least £318 million had already been spent on this failing policy. What did taxpayers get in return? Nothing—no removals or deterrent effect, just an ever-growing backlog of cases and ever-rising hotel bills, which we have inherited. Even if the scheme had gone ahead, it would have been staggeringly expensive. The National Audit Office estimated that removing just a few hundred people could cost up to £2 million per person, yet we are expected to believe that this was a serious solution to the problem of tens of thousands arriving each year on the Conservatives’ watch.
This Government are putting an end to that waste. Instead of throwing money at a scheme that does not work, we are investing in practical measures. This approach is already delivering results: since taking office, the new Government have increased enforced removals by 24%. That shows that when we have a working system, we do not need gimmicks like the Rwanda plan; we just need competence.
This is not just about law or economics. It is also about how we treat people. A core British value is strength, but another is decency. Strength without decency is weakness, as the previous Government demonstrated. The Rwanda scheme was not just ineffective; it was cruel. It was based on the idea that people fleeing war and persecution should be someone else’s problem, no matter the risk to their safety.
Let us be clear that many of those crossing the channel are genuine refugees—they include people fleeing the Taliban in Afghanistan, dictatorship in Iran and war in Syria—but the Rwanda policy, and, it would seem, the Conservatives, did not care. The policy made no distinction, lumped everyone together and treated them as a problem to be shipped off 4,000 miles away, out of sight and out of mind—although of course it did not work.
That is not the British way. This country has a proud history of offering sanctuary to those in need, and we do not abandon our humanitarian duties for the sake of a headline and a gimmick. Of course, those who should not be here will be deported, as we are already seeing, and those who genuinely need help will receive it under this Government. A true deterrent is taking out the smuggling gangs and deporting those who should not be here. The truth is that we do not stop the boats by shouting slogans; we stop the boats by giving people an alternative.
Finally—I thank hon. Members for their patience—the Rwanda plan was never operationally viable. Even if it had survived the legal challenges, the logistics were impossible. To make it work, the Government would have had to detain nearly every small boat arrival indefinitely—a task for which we simply do not have the detention space, the staff or the legal authority. Rwanda itself had agreed to take only a few hundred people a year, which is a drop in the ocean—excuse the pun—compared with the scale of the problem. Meanwhile the real criminals—the smuggling gangs—continued to operate freely. The Rwanda plan did nothing to target them. It was an illusion of control, rather than a real solution.
This Government take a serious, workable approach. That is how we secure the border: not through wishful thinking, but through real enforcement. The Conservatives have tried gimmicks. They tried grandstanding; they tried expensive, legally dubious, headline-chasing policies, and they failed. It is time to move forward. We will uphold the rule of law, protect those in genuine need and take real action against the criminals exploiting them.
Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)
These are difficult problems and challenging questions. Practically every country in the western world is struggling with this and, with the notable exception of Australia, effectively none has solved it. The basic logic of the situation is that, if someone comes here illegally from a place to which it would be dangerous to return them, there are only four options.
First, they could be sent back to the country they came from. That is not legal in our current framework—even before getting to the morality of doing such a thing. Secondly, they could be put in immigration detention indefinitely. That is also not legal; a person can be held in immigration detention only if there is a realistic prospect of removal, which there would not be in this case. Thirdly, they could stay here indefinitely. That is not fair, and it is not what the public want. Finally, they could go somewhere else—a safe third country. Such an agreement was very difficult to broker; indeed, until the Rwandans agreed, many considered it to be impossible.
Clearly, the Government have little time for the Rwanda scheme and destroying it was one of the first things they did in office, but the basic logic problem remains. The last Conservative Government did not get everything right—that is for sure—but the Rwanda scheme was a genuine attempt to solve this truly hard problem, and it remains the only solution that we can see.
Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)
Does the hon. Lady accept that there is a fifth option? Just because someone does not have the right to be in the UK, it does not mean that they do not have the right to go to any other country in the world. The programme of voluntary returns, which massively went down under the Conservatives but has gone up massively under this Government, is part of the solution to that.
Katie Lam
But they do not. There will always be people who come to this country illegally from dangerous places. They are human beings responding to obvious incentives. Could the Minister please tell us which of the four options she thinks is the right one? Is it sending someone back to a dangerous country, which will entail a change in the law and probably leaving the European convention on human rights? Is it holding someone in immigration detention indefinitely, which has the same conditions? Is it allowing people to stay here, or is it sending them to a third country?
Becky Gittins (Clwyd East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure, once again, to serve under your chairpersonship, Mr Stuart. I was disappointed but not surprised to hear that the official Opposition want to keep the Safety of Rwanda Act on the statue books. I was disappointed for a number of reasons, which I will set out shortly, but I was not surprised. I have seen the way in which the Tories continue to position and conduct themselves on immigration policy. It is clear to me that they simply refuse to learn the lessons of the last 12 months. The public saw right through their Rwanda plan. They could see it for exactly what it was: a gimmick that was both unworkable and unaffordable.
Before today, I thought I would familiarise myself with the Report stage and the Third Reading of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. At the time, a good number of Committee members, including me, had yet to be elected, but reading the debates really brings home the sense of chaos that had engulfed the Conservative party at the time. The then shadow Home Secretary, now Home Secretary, summed it up:
“What a farce…We have a Prime Minister with no grip, while the British taxpayer is continually forced to pay the price. Former Tory Cabinet Ministers and deputy chairs from all sides have been queueing up to tell us it is a bad Bill. They say it will not work, it will not protect our borders, it will not comply with international law and it is fatally flawed.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2024; Vol. 743, c. 966.]
A previous Attorney General, the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), stated that
“to arrogate to oneself the right to declare one’s own compliance with international law runs the risk of, first, other states finding comfort in our example and, secondly, undermining our own messages in other situations. That makes this not just bad law, but bad foreign policy.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2024; Vol. 743, c. 855.]
This is an example of utter chaos. The Law Society, in welcoming the repeal of the Rwanda Act, said in its evidence to this Committee that the Act
“set a dangerous legal and constitutional precedent by legislating to overturn an evidence-based finding of fact by UK courts that Rwanda is an unsafe country to send asylum seekers to.”
However, the measure made it on to the statute book. The Rwanda plan ran for two years and, as we know and have heard several times this morning, a grand total of four volunteers were sent to Rwanda at the not insubstantial cost of £700 million to the UK taxpayer—quite a remarkable feat.
While hundreds of millions of taxpayer pounds were sent to Rwanda, the legislation’s effect was felt in the UK. As a result of the fantastical Rwanda plan, huge backlogs of asylum claims were building, with tens of thousands of people in hotels unable to leave because of the design of the Illegal Migration Act. We know that the use of hotels does not represent value for money and we are moving away from it. When it comes to the idea of the Rwanda policy being a deterrent, from its inception to the announcement it was to be scrapped, 84,000 people crossed the channel in small boats. It is always difficult to measure a deterrent’s effectiveness, but that is a pretty clear indicator that a deterrent it was not.
Margaret Mullane (Dagenham and Rainham) (Lab)
Good morning, Mr Stuart. It was interesting to hear from the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire that he considered the Rwanda scheme a crackpot scheme. Another opinion is that it was “un-Conservative and un-British”—the opinion of John Major, the former Conservative Prime Minister. We have to acknowledge that the basic principle of this Bill is to address the failures of past legislation. Indeed, the Minister explained during an earlier debate that it is not possible to make the suite of legislation involved in the Safety of Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act work together coherently. Not to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act would undermine confidence in the credibility of the Bill. We are moving away from reliance on expensive gimmicks, hotel use, the flaw that is the Rwanda Act, with its price tag of £700 million of taxpayers’ money, and failure to effectively process the people arriving on our shores. Do we really believe that clinging to a piece of dead legislation is the way to protect our borders and put the safety of our country in focus and at the front?
Tom Hayes
May I start by saying that it is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship, Mr Stuart? I am particularly enjoying the opportunity to have these debates in a free-flowing way—while sticking to parliamentary etiquette, obviously.
I commend the hon. Member for Stockton West, with whom I have some sympathy. He has been sent here to defend the impossible. I half wondered, when he came in wearing that fetching yellow tie, which I slightly covet, whether he had come to hold his hands in the air, make an apology and perhaps stand on the side of classical liberalism, but no: he stood true to the 2024 manifesto on which he was elected. I hope that in addressing how he would define a deterrent, I will add something new. When I asked him for a definition, he said that a deterrent would prevent people from coming and that it would do so by detaining and removing them. I shall make a case that challenges his assumptions on that basis.
A deterrent is a strategy aimed at preventing external actors, targets and adversaries in the military sense from taking unwanted actions. For the Rwanda asylum policy to be a deterrent, the Conservative Government would have needed to achieve certain things: to maintain the capabilities required to deter and be highly resolved to deploy them—as the hon. Member said, to be able to detain and remove—and to effectively communicate their resolve to act. In any communication, one needs to be understood to be highly resolved and capable of following through.
For the Rwanda asylum policy to be a deterrent, the Government would have needed to persuade potential migrants of their capabilities and resolve to send them to Rwanda to process their claims after they had illegally entered the country, and to have stopped migrants from paying significant sums of money to smuggler gangs facilitating illegal migration. In short, from what the hon. Member said, it feels as though the principal target of deterrents was migrants. The Rwanda asylum policy was always doomed to fail on those key conditions, because it was not able to achieve detention or removal.
On detention, Professor Brian Bell, the chair of the Migration Advisory Committee, told us that the numbers given by the Government
“are certainly not consistent with a story of a very significant deterrent effect from the Rwanda Act.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 56, Q84.]
Dr Peter Walsh of the Migration Observatory cited concerns about
“where people would be detained”,––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 14, Q13.]
as the UK immigration detention system had capacity for only 2,200 people, with roughly 400 spaces free. Moreover, he said that Rwanda would struggle to process more than “a few hundred” asylum claims a year.
That takes me to the question of removal.
Dame Angela Eagle
Does my hon. Friend realise that the detention estate was used by the Conservative party to empty some prison places and try to relieve pressure there? I think it highly unlikely that there would be even 400 spaces.
Tom Hayes
I thank my hon. Friend for that important reminder that when the Labour Government took office after our historic win, we inherited an awful mess in our prison system, which was described by independent experts and organisations as near to collapse—so near that there were just a few hundred spaces left at a time when the country was rioting.
Chris Murray
Is my hon. Friend also aware that under the previous Government, the Home Office tried to secure additional detention estate for asylum seekers but catastrophically failed to do so? For example, at Northeye, they spent hundreds of millions of pounds to secure the site—far more than the previous owners had paid—yet found that it had contaminated ground and could not be used, and the Bibby Stockholm in Dover closed very swiftly after opening.
Tom Hayes
I thank my hon. Friend for those important points. In fact, the Bibby Stockholm was moored just off a place near my constituency in Dorset. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton) for campaigning so quickly and efficiently to have the Bibby Stockholm closed, and I thank the Government for responding so constructively to that request. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh about how we have seen significant challenges to the state’s ability to detain. As a consequence, in one of the two conditions set out by the hon. Member for Stockton West for an effective deterrent, it is clear that the Conservative Government failed.
For the next component of an effective deterrent—removal—we need only look at the ultimate proof: who went to Rwanda? What deportations actually happened? I can anticipate some of the ways that the Conservatives may challenge that, so I would like to take them on. First, they may blame this Labour Government for cancelling the policy, without also saying that the Conservative party controlled the timing of a general election that they seemed certain to lose. That they believed they were certain to lose is perhaps why they called the election before they could begin deporting asylum seekers to Rwanda. In fact, the first flight was set to take off on 24 July. If the Conservatives had delayed the Dissolution of Parliament by just 20 days, to 19 June rather than 30 May, the first planes could have taken off.
The last Prime Minister could have waited out those 20 days, if he did not have anything else to do. With a zombie Government that were not showing any ambition, if he had wanted to show ambition, he could have spent a nice 20 days watching all 90 hours of the TV show “Lost”. If he wanted to go at a more leisurely pace—and the Conservatives were excelling at going at a leisurely pace—rather than binge watching something, he could have watched all 30 hours of the TV show “Stranger Things”. Instead—and this is where the “ba-dum” comes in—the Government manifested signs of being lost, and the last Conservative Cabinet just comprised stranger things.
Tom Hayes
I thought I would to and find a moment of humour in the dispiriting debate on this topic.
The Conservatives may progress to blaming successful legal and judicial challenges to the policy. The Rwanda policy was, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dover and Deal said, unlawful and deemed to be so by the courts. If they do, His Majesty’s Opposition should confirm whether they respect the independence of our judiciary in adjudicating such challenges on the one hand, and respect the international human rights laws, under which challenges were made and were successful, on the other. That is important, because one of the hallmarks of the new Government is to be lawful and to respect our judiciary. We need to embrace that change. The Opposition could also reflect on the probability of further legal challenges being undertaken because of the human rights concerns about Rwanda, which my hon. Friend highlighted so effectively.
Last, the Conservatives may want to blame political challenges for undermining the credibility of their Rwanda asylum policy. In a democracy, it is of course right that Members of Parliament raise concerns on behalf of their constituents—indeed, that is what we have been doing—but the Conservatives overcame those political constraints by passing the Safety of Rwanda Act to address judicial concerns, and they signed a legally binding agreement with Rwanda. So the idea that the deterrent was not able to function because of legal or political challenges is actually farcical, because the previous Government held the cards in their hands.
I have heard it said that the Conservatives could have followed the Australian asylum policy, which has been described as a successful model—perhaps it even inspired the Rwanda asylum policy—but there is good reason to believe that UK could not have achieved the deterrent effects of the Australian offshore asylum processing model. Indeed, Professor Brian Bill, chair of the Migration Advisory Committee, said in oral evidence that it was inappropriate to draw comparisons between the Rwanda scheme and the Australian policies.
Were we to be generous and accept the view of the hon. Member for Weald of Kent that the Australian policy stood out in the world as being successful, there would be challenges to assessing the efficacy of that policy. As the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, an expert and independent institution, has said, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that the Australian offshoring policy was the reason for a drop in numbers of people going to Australia. Put bluntly, if migrants were paying attention to the last Government’s policy, they had no reason to believe that they would be barred from staying in the UK.
That takes me to my third and final definition of what would make an effective deterrent. Yes, the state must be understood to be highly resolved to deter, detain and remove, and capable of doing so, but it takes two to tango. Britain can only be understood if asylum seekers are able to understand, which in turn depends on several key factors. It means migrants being able to do at least three things: to pay close attention to the last Government’s actions—I struggled to do that, so I cannot see how asylum seekers would—to stay fully informed about the many twists and turns in the Safety of Rwanda Act asylum policy, which again I struggled to stay abreast of, and to behave as rational actors who weigh up the costs and benefits of action.
We have heard in testimony and oral evidence that migrants are typically unaware of Government policy and actions, because they are too busy being asylum seekers and migrants. Moreover, it can be said that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the chaotic and difficult circumstances that they are forced to inhabit prevent them from being the rational actors that they would otherwise be, calmly and objectively assessing the trade-offs between the perceived costs of illegal entry, the probability of those being incurred, and whether those are outweighed by the potential benefits of migration.
Kenneth Stevenson (Airdrie and Shotts) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. I rise to put on the record my support for the Government’s decision to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act. It is important to remember that this Act was passed by a Conservative Government who knew that they were on their way out—a Government who had run out of road and run out of ideas. The Safety of Rwanda Act was nothing more than a gimmick, as has been pointed out many times this morning. It was a waste of taxpayers’ money and only reaffirmed the widely held view that the Conservative Government had lost control of our borders.
The Bill brought forward by the Labour Government aims to tackle an extremely challenging issue—one made far more challenging by the incompetence shown by the previous incumbents. It marks a welcome shift from wasting taxpayers’ money on projects such as the Rwanda scheme to a plan that genuinely aims to smash criminal gangs and stop small boat crossings at the source, with a consistent approach of respecting the vulnerability of the human lives involved. That is why we must reject Conservative attempts to continue their failed schemes.
For those now in Opposition, one would have thought the lessons of July last year were to look outwards, consider what went wrong and reassess their positions on key matters such as immigration, but clearly, they are carrying on as they have done for years, insistent on making the same mistakes that cost the public purse millions that could have been spent on supporting the working people of the United Kingdom. I reiterate my support for the repeal of the Rwanda scheme and look forward to supporting this Government’s plans for restoring control to our borders and delivering on the priorities of the British people.
Chris Murray
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart, especially after we have had such an interesting debate with some very thoughtful contributions. I will respond to some of the issues that have been raised.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East mentioned that I keep quoting Peter Walsh, and I am going to again, because the point he made in the evidence sessions was one of the most critical points on immigration policy in Britain overall. He said that demand for Channel crossings is “fairly inelastic”. The demand will not wax and wane hugely in response to Government policy, which tells us that deterrence will have only limited use. That is the conceptual flaw at the heart of the Rwanda plan. It put all the country’s cards and money on a deterrence-only approach. Deterrence has to be real and believable, which the scheme clearly was not.
I listen closely to what the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire says about the role of deterrence in migration policy. The exchanges we are having are helping to clarify the thinking. It is clear from the Bill that deterrence can only ever be a component. We must focus on the supply—the ability for people to cross the Channel—and not just the demand. That requires the measures in the Bill, but also diplomatic work and upstream work.
The repeal of the Rwanda legislation was inevitable and written in the stars from the very beginning of that hare-brained scheme. Before it passed, the European Council on Foreign Relations said that the scheme was doomed to failure and a “floundering disaster”, because it was unlikely to deter illicit migration, it would damage the UK’s standing in international law, it would endanger refugee lives and it would come at huge financial cost. Every single one of those predictions came to pass, so it is no surprise that we are having to deal with this today. I would also say that it presaged the Conservatives going down in an historic election defeat, so it was clearly a failure politically for them as well.
On the point about removal to third countries, before we left the European Union, the UK had the capacity to remove people to safe countries in the EU that they had travelled through. The Conservatives manifestly failed to avail the country of that power we had, and then failed with the Rwanda system. Clearly, the Conservative track record on third countries is very poor. There is a component in the immigration system for people going to third countries when they have no right to stay here, which is something we need to look at further ahead.
The hon. Member for Stockton West made reference to the Albania relationship and returns increasing to Albania, as if that somehow proves that the Rwanda scheme would have worked if we had just let it take its course, but it is a completely spurious parallel. The returns to Albania happened before the communiqué was signed with Albania, so the two are not related—perhaps he was arguing that the prior readmission agreement was the variable that led to the increase, but it came after the spike, so it cannot be held responsible. The Albania agreement was not just about illegal immigrants; it also included a huge number of foreign national offenders—a different group of people entirely. It was also about people from Albania returning to Albania, not third-country nationals. The idea that the Albania scheme is somehow an alibi for Rwanda can be completely rejected.
That is not actually the point, however, because the Rwanda scheme would never have worked at the scale required, even if it had been able to work at all. The Minister was correct when she talked in her initial remarks about the interaction between the Illegal Migration Act and the Safety of Rwanda Act. That meant that nobody was getting processed, so the country ended up with a perma-backlog of asylum seekers with nowhere to go; they could not return to the country they came from through a voluntary returns agreement or be recognised as refugees. The Rwanda scheme would never have worked at a meaningful scale, and it would never have been able to deal with the backlog. We were on track to having to take over half the hotels in the country to accommodate asylum seekers.
We can have a debate about how best to manage an asylum system—voluntary returns, swift processing, meaningful decisions and removals are clearly components of that—but we can surely say in debating this clause that the Rwanda Act was not the solution. Some £240 million of our constituents’ money was wasted on the scheme, which the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire was quite correct to call “crackpot”. Passing legislation to assert that reality is not what it is will never be an effective way to govern anything, never mind the asylum system, so I am pleased that the Act will finally be off the statute book.
Dame Angela Eagle
We have had an interesting debate about taking the Safety of Rwanda Act off the statute book, as clause 37 does. I am distressed that the Conservative party continues to assert without evidence—in fact, contrary to most evidence—that that Act and the Illegal Migration Act were about to work. Apparently, those Acts were on the cusp of being a great success when the evil new Government came along and cancelled them.
I speculate that many Conservative Members are secretly pleased that they can assert that, because it gets them out of an embarrassing, expensive farrago; the Safety of Rwanda Act will go down in this country’s history as one of the most catastrophic pieces of legislation that Parliament has ever dealt with. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham and Rainham rightly pointed out, it was not ordinary or normal for Conservative ex-Prime Minister John Major to pronounce the Act to be “un-Conservative”. The Act is many things, unconservative being one of them.
Government Members, and the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, assert that the Act was not a deterrent. This is the current discourse: we are saying that it was not a deterrent and that we can prove it, and the Conservative party, which was responsible for the Act, is left asserting that it was a deterrent, despite there being absolutely no evidence for that despite all the years since the policy was announced and all the years the Act was on the statute book.
That reminds me of discussions I used to have as a student—a very long time ago—about whether communism in its pure sense had actually ever existed. It was obviously a failure, but when one came across the ideologues, they simply asserted that the communism that had been tried to date just was not pure enough, and it was therefore still likely to succeed if ever it was tried properly. Does that sound similar to the discussions we are having about this iteration of fantasy asylum policy as gimmick? I think it does.
Matt Vickers
I have asked this question a few times and never quite got to the bottom of it. We were sending people to Rwanda who could not be returned to their home country because it was not safe. Where will those people go now, if not Rwanda? Does the Minister fear that, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said, the Government might end up coming back to this issue in a few years when they realise that things are continuing to go the wrong way?
Dame Angela Eagle
First things first: the hon. Gentleman was not going to send to Rwanda only those whom we could not return to their own country; in theory, he was going to deport to Rwanda absolutely everybody who arrived to claim asylum after March 2023—that was what we were told. In reality, those people all ended up in hotels, unable to be processed and growing in number, while the Conservative party indulged in its expensive gimmicks and fantasies of how the world should be.
As many Committee members have pointed out, the day job was not being done while that parallel universe policy was being developed. It took all the attention away from running what is a complex enough system as it is. Many resources were diverted to try to create that new reality, resulting in the neglect of the system, and huge backlogs were built into the system because of how the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act. That made it impossible to run the current system or to move to a new system that was remotely workable, thereby landing this country with a huge, dysfunctional series of backlogs, and a system that we have had to literally start up again from scratch to try to get working coherently.
Pete Wishart
The Minister may have been coming on to the second part of the question asked by the hon. Member for Stockton West, but will she be brave enough to tell the Committee that this Labour Government will never consider sending asylum seekers and refugees to a third country?
Dame Angela Eagle
The Home Secretary has said that she does not rule out third country processing; that is not the same as the Rwanda scheme, which was deportation to a third country permanently. I think the hon. Gentleman is talking about third country returns, such as reviving the Dublin system. When the previous Government negotiated the EU withdrawal agreement, they perhaps should have included something about returns to Europe. Had they done so, perhaps we would be in a different situation, but those would also have been third country returns. He asked a wide-ranging question, and I have been as honest as I can in answering it at this point.
We could spend all day, and probably many more days, talking about the failure encompassed in the interaction of the Safety of Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act. Our job today, though, is to tidy it up. Clause 37 will take the Safety of Rwanda Act off the statute book and put it in the dustbin of history, where it belongs.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
The Liberal Democrat spokesperson is not here to move amendment 9, so we move to clause 38 stand part.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 2—Repeal of the Illegal Migration Act 2023—
“The Illegal Migration Act 2023 is repealed.”
This new clause would repeal the Illegal Migration Act in full. In combination with Amendment 8 to leave out clause 38, it would replace the selective repeal in the Bill with a full repeal.
Dame Angela Eagle
As always, the Lib Dems are keeping us on our toes. I hope there is a benign reason why they are not in attendance today—perhaps my horrible cold made its way over to them and they are not well.
Clause 38 repeals the vast majority—not all—of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. We decided not to take a blanket approach to repealing it all, and we will have that debate when the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire speaks to new clause 2. He has given us the choice whether to repeal the Illegal Migration Act as a whole. Our view, which I will explain in response to his speech, is that there are a few useful clauses in the Act that we have decided to keep on the statute book.
In general, we all know that the Illegal Migration Act was a flawed piece of legislation that made it impossible for us to process and run asylum claims. It was on the statute book in the context of the Safety of Rwanda Act, which assumed that anyone who arrived after March 2023 would not be allowed to become part of an asylum claim in this country. It contained the so-called duty to remove, which placed a statutory duty on the Home Secretary to remove everyone who came to this country after that time. It was flawed in many ways, but it made it impossible for us to run asylum claims in this country lawfully. Therefore, it is important that the vast majority of this flawed legislation should be removed from the statute book, and that is what clause 38 does.
I will set out in detail why we have decided to keep six clauses of the Act. I will try to explain to the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and the rest of the Committee our thinking behind each case, but I will do so when the new clause has been spoken to.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
Clause 38 repeals sections 1 to 6 and schedule 1, sections 7 to 11, sections 13 to 15 and schedule 2, sections 16 to 28, sections 30 to 5, sections 53 to 58, section 61 and section 66 of the Illegal Migration Act.
Section 2 of the Illegal Migration Act placed a duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements to remove persons to their home country or a safe third country who have entered or arrived in the UK illegally. Let me point out to those people who are concerned about genuine asylum seekers that section 2(4) of the IMA makes it clear that the provision does not apply if someone comes directly from a place of danger, which is consistent with article 33 of the 1951 refugee convention. However, people who come here directly from France, a safe country where no one is being persecuted and which has a perfectly well-functioning asylum system, should not illegally enter the United Kingdom.
I ask the Minister why the Government are repealing this duty. Is it because they do not think they are able to remove those who have arrived illegally? Is it because the Government think people who arrive in this country illegally should be allowed to remain?
Section 5 of the Illegal Migration Act provides that asylum claims are automatically deemed inadmissible for those who have arrived illegally. One of Labour’s first actions in government was to allow illegal migrants to claim asylum. Can the Minister explain how allowing illegal migrants to claim asylum is providing any deterrent? Surely it will help the smuggling gangs, by providing a stronger incentive for people to make those dangerous crossings of the Channel in small boats.
Matt Vickers
There is a lot to do in the way of commencement; the Bill is there and could be commenced at any time, if the Government felt it was of help. In fact, in a few years’ time, when they come back to the drawing board to try to find a deterrent, they might well want to do that.
Sections 31 and 32 of the Illegal Migration Act prevented people who have entered the country illegally from obtaining British citizenship. The Labour Government are repealing this provision. Their position is hardly surprising when the Prime Minister does not think that British citizenship is a pull factor, but that does not mean it is the right thing to do. Why are the Government repealing this clause, allowing illegal migrants to get British citizenship?
Do the Government not believe that British citizenship is a privilege rather than a right, especially for those who have entered the country illegally? If so, why have the Government not included measures to stop illegal migrants obtaining British citizenship, and instead only issued guidance stating that
“applications made after 10 February 2025 that include illegal entry will ‘normally’ be refused citizenship, regardless of when the illegal entry occurred.”?
Section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act states:
“The Secretary of State may make regulations about the effect of a decision by a relevant person (“P”) not to consent to the use of a specified scientific method for the purposes of an age assessment…where there are no reasonable grounds for P’s decision.”
This means that, if a migrant refused to undergo an age assessment, they would be considered an adult. Labour have removed age assessments for illegal migrants who claim to be under 18, resulting in the risk that grown men may end up in schools with teenage girls. In fact, the most recent data on age disputes shows that more than 50% of migrants claiming to be under 18 were actually adults. How do the Government therefore intend to ensure that migrants claiming to be under 18 actually undergo age assessments, and why is that not included in the Bill?
The SNP’s new clause 2 would repeal the Illegal Migration Act entirely, so the SNP must be agreeing with the Labour Government that illegal migrants should be able to get British citizenship and should not have to undergo age assessments. Therefore, I ask the same questions: does the SNP not believe that British citizenship is a privilege rather than a right, especially for those who have entered the country illegally? How would the SNP ensure that migrants claiming to be under 18 actually undergo age assessments, and why is that not included in new clause 2?
By repealing the Illegal Migration Act in its entirety, the SNP want to stop the seizure of mobile phones from illegal migrants, something that helps to establish identities and obtain evidence of immigration offences. As Tony Smith said:
“Passport data, identity data, age data and travel history data are often held on those phones—all data that would be useful when considering an asylum application.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 40, Q43.]
The Liberal Democrats’ amendment 9 would have repealed section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act, which requires the Secretary of State to remove people who have sought to use modern slavery protections in bad faith. Do the Liberal Democrats think that people using modern slavery protections fraudulently should be allowed to stay in the UK? If so, do they believe that people who make fraudulent immigration claims should be allowed to stay in the UK? We believe that the effect of repealing the majority of the IMA and the entirety of the Safety of Rwanda Act will be an increase in the number of people arriving in this country illegally and remaining.
I have therefore asked the Government whether they would be prepared to be transparent about the numbers. If they are convinced that the approach set out in the Bill will be successful, let us measure it. Will the Minister commit to publishing all the numbers, and the nationalities, of all those who might have been excluded from the UK asylum system on grounds of connection with a safe third country or a late claim, but have not been—with reasons why not—and to setting out the obstacles to returning them to their country of origin and what steps are being taken through international agreements to overcome that, as recommended by Tony Smith in evidence to this Committee? We will oppose the inclusion of this clause in the Bill by way of a Division.
Pete Wishart
I must say to the hon. Member for Stockton West that he really does not want to know my views on British citizenship, because they are likely to blow his head—but we will leave that one at that.
It is disappointing to note the absence of our Liberal colleagues. Back in the day—the good old days, Mr Stuart —when we had an effective, efficient, diligent and conscientious third party, there would always be someone present to ensure that the views of the third party were represented. I am sure that the Liberal Democrats have good excuses, but I hope they start to take a bit of interest in this important Bill, because it has been disappointing thus far.
I say to the Minister, “‘Useful clauses?’ Come on!” We are talking about sections 29, 12, 59, 60 and 62, some of the nastiest and most pernicious parts and aspects of the Illegal Migration Act. I cannot believe that this Government want to continue that horrible and heinous Tory set of proposals and clauses in this Bill. This was their great opportunity to wipe the slate clean of the previous Government’s hopeless and useless crackpot Rwanda scheme and their heinous and horrible Illegal Migration Act.
I will give the Minister a few quotes from some of her colleagues, some of which I wish I had come up with myself. The now Prime Minister said at the time that the Illegal Migration Bill would drive “a coach and horses” through protections for women trafficked to the UK as victims of modern slavery. The now Home Secretary said that that IMA does the “total opposite” of providing support for those who have been trafficked, and that it was nothing other than “a traffickers’ charter”. There are other prize quotes from the Home Secretary and various Ministers within the Home Office—absolutely and totally correct, right and true—about the horrible Illegal Migration Act. Now we have a Labour Government inconceivably standing by large swathes of an Act that they so rightly and widely rubbished and wanted rid of only a short while ago.
It would be different if the Government were maintaining some benign, useful or helpful parts of that Tory Act, but they are maintaining some real, pernicious nasties. Provisions that were damaging, dangerous and contrary to human rights under the Tories are just as damaging, dangerous and contrary to human rights under this new Labour Government. I remind the Minister what the then Home Secretary said on that Bill when introducing it:
“I am unable to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Illegal Migration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights, but the Government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill.”
The previous Government could not care less about our obligations under international law or about human rights, and they were quite happy to set them aside. Now we have a Home Secretary who stands by certain provisions of that Act, with all its difficulties concerning its relationship with convention rights.
Dame Angela Eagle
The hon. Gentleman will have noted on the front of the Bill that we are debating the statement from the Home Secretary on the European convention on human rights:
“In my view the provisions of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights.”
Pete Wishart
I am glad that the Home Secretary stated that, as she always does when it comes to our relationship with, and compatibility with, human rights. I want to raise a couple of issues and ask a couple of questions about just how very loosely this Bill is connected with the Government’s obligations and about some of our real concerns on human rights. I will come to that in the course of what I hope will be a short contribution.
It is completely incomprehensible that the Government have chosen to repeal only some aspects of the IMA rather than the whole Act, particularly since so many members of this Government have been so vocally opposed to the IMA in the past. Can we please just have a look at some of the stuff that they want to retain? The one that concerns me most, and the one that concerns the range of organisations, groups and charities associated with refugees and asylum seekers, is the retention of section 29.
Let us remind the Committee what section 29 does. It extends the public order disqualification originally introduced by section 63 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and mandates that victims of trafficking and modern slavery who have criminal convictions or are considered a threat to public order be disqualified from support and protection. To me, that provision is deeply concerning, as it means that victims of trafficking, many of whom have been coerced into committing crimes as part of their exploitation, could face detention, deportation or removal rather than the support and recovery that they need.
Pete Wishart
I do not know where the hon. Member gets his figures, but let me give him some in return. Home Office statistics from 2024 revealed that 70% of the individuals disqualified under the provision had elements of criminal exploitation in their case. What is so wrong about this particular measure is that it stops us giving the necessary and relevant support that we should give—that we owe—to people who have been victims of human trafficking.
Pete Wishart
This is where we start to get back into very uncomfortable and dangerous territory, where it is going to be up to the individual to prove that they are not guilty of such crimes. This is a blanket clause that will entrap them and leave it to them to make their way through the courts to prove their innocence when they have been innocent all the time, or particularly when they have been victims of trafficking and forced into criminal activity. The system could punish vulnerable individuals who were coerced into committing crimes, often by their traffickers, thus reinforcing the power dynamic that allows traffickers to exploit their victims further.
The retention of section 29 increases the likelihood of re-trafficking and re-exploitation as victims might fear coming forward to the authorities due to the threat of detention, removal or criminalisation. That has issues for us in Scotland. Quite rightly, I suppose, immigration is totally and utterly reserved, but we have responsibility under our devolved powers to ensure that victims of modern slavery who come to Scotland are looked after and tended to by Scottish legislation. There are powers that we have within Scotland.
In retaining section 29 of the IMA, the Bill also restricts the ability of the Scottish Government to support the victims under the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015. The Scottish Act places a duty on Scottish Ministers to secure immediate support and recovery services for victims of human trafficking and exploitation. In Scotland we have tried to design a system that, unlike this Bill, places an emphasis on victim care and rehabilitation.
That is the approach that we take in Scotland, and that is what we want to try to deliver within our range of devolved power, but it relies on the national referral mechanism identifying and supporting victims of trafficking. The disqualification provisions in section 29 could result in vulnerable individuals in Scotland being detained or deported without being properly identified and supported as trafficking victims, thus weakening the Scottish Government’s ability to implement their own modern slavery protections.
Chris Murray
Like the Safety of Rwanda Act clause, this clause is an inevitability, because it was clear from the outset that these sections of the Illegal Migration Act were never going to work. I know that the Conservatives tend to think that everybody who works in the migration sector set out to thwart their plans at every turn, but that is not the case. I was working for the strategic migration partnership in Scotland when the Illegal Migration Bill was introduced two years ago. I remember sitting down with local authorities, the police and other key stakeholders to look at the legislation, and all of us collectively said, “How is this going to work? This is never going to be feasible in reality.”
I draw people’s attention to one component of the Act that is being repealed, which brings its failure to the fore. The IMA placed on the Home Secretary a duty to remove that applied to all asylum seekers regardless of their case. For anyone under 18, the duty to remove kicked in at the age of 18, but when we were working with local authorities, unaccompanied asylum-seeking children came across and sought asylum in this country. These children are among the most vulnerable people in the world. They have lost their loved ones, they are on their own and they are in a strange country. In the UK, we have a national transfer scheme to disperse them around different local authorities. I worked with the officers who were trying to help those children to get themselves together after a really traumatic experience.
The Illegal Migration Act meant that, at the age of 18, in theory those people would be eligible for immediate removal. What does the Committee think that did to those children in terms of their attempts to secure any services, learn English or get any education? It made it impossible for them and it had a direct impact: they did not leave the country, but they disappeared. Some of them are probably out there being exploited right now, as a direct consequence of clauses in the Illegal Migration Act. The Act did not just put those children at risk; it put incredible pressure on overstretched local services around the country. For the previous Government to set out to use immigration legislation to put further pressure on overstretched local services was only going to have negative consequences in communities, and it should never have happened.
More broadly, the duty to remove, which this clause repeals, essentially shut down the asylum system and created what IPPR has called a “perma-backlog”. We have talked about deterrents and incentives, but I do not see any greater incentive for someone seeking to exploit the asylum system in this country than shutting it down overall, which is what that duty to remove did. It created a vicious circle, which frankly was bad for asylum seekers themselves, because genuine refugees had to spend years in hotel accommodation, which is not a particularly nice thing to do, and for the taxpayer in the UK, because costs soared from £18,000 per asylum seeker per year in 2019 to £47,000 in 2024. It was also bad for communities, because people could not be moved through that process, which clearly put pressure on an already febrile immigration situation. It is good that we are repealing this duty; as I said, it was inevitable, because it was never going to work.
Finally, I understand the points that the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire made about human trafficking. It is really important that we offer the victims of modern slavery proper protections, especially when they are forced to commit crimes in the course of being trafficked. This legislation does not completely take that power away, but again, I have to draw on my experience of the last couple of years. There was an increase in the number of exploiters—those who were perpetrators of trafficking—using the trafficking system to evade prosecution. I worked closely with Police Scotland and the Crown Office, including in the Perth and Kinross council area. We saw, particularly in the Vietnamese community, the growth of that development.
We must not see the world in black and white. I am by no means saying that every victim of trafficking is somehow an imposter and we must stop them getting any protection, but it is happening, so it is proper that we keep the clauses in place so that we can tackle that. If we do not have that component, the system will break down. Just as we saw with the asylum system, if we do not have clauses to make the system functional, it will break down and everybody loses.
Tom Hayes
It is an honour to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh, who, in an outstanding speech, set out the major challenges with the Illegal Migration Act, part of which will be repealed.
I want to knock on the head four things that were said by the hon. Member for Stockton West. The first was in reference to section 23 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. That provision, which the Opposition have talked about, was never implemented by the last Government, so in effect he is opposing a repeal of something that his last Government never started. That feels to me like the worst kind of politics. Between the Royal Assent given to that legislation and the Dissolution of Parliament, 315 days passed, yet no effort was made to implement that provision.
Secondly, sections 9 and 10 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 were, as we have heard, unworkable. They allow people to arrive, claim asylum in the UK, get support, and be put up in a hotel, which as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh described, will often be in the some of the most dire conditions that somebody can go through after fleeing some of the worst experiences that people can have, be it trauma, famine, disease or poverty—the list goes on. Applications were not processed, so people were not able to leave their hotel. The consequence of that is not just an expensive asylum backlog, but people living with serious psychological scarring for a significant amount of time.
That brings me to my third point. I will talk more about this when we reach new clause 26, which relates to scientific age assessments, but I really do not know how the Conservative party can talk about the welfare and protection of children when we heard oral testimony from the Children’s Commissioner about children who were subject to, and vulnerable to, organ harvesting, rape, sexual assault and disappearance from hotels and into wider society, where, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh said, they are likely to continue to be abused, exploited and victimised. I will make those points when we reach that debate.
Lastly, on the point about France, I wish the Conservative party would stop throwing stones at one of nearest neighbours and most important strategic allies, particularly when we are in such a volatile international climate. It is really important that we properly scrutinise legislation, but do not indulge in the petty politics that defined the last Conservative Government, disrupted so many of our international relations, and actually made us less secure.
Dame Angela Eagle
This has been a small but perfectly formed debate on clause 38, which repeals all but six sections of the Illegal Migration Act. As Government Members have pointed out, despite the amount of time that has lapsed since the Act got on the statute book, the vast majority of its provisions have never been commenced. In fact, we had to commence one tiny bit of it so that we could restart asylum processing; that is probably the most it ever had any effect.
Let us be clear: the Illegal Migration Act meant that thousands of asylum claims were put on hold, because of the duty to remove, increasing the backlog, putting incredible pressure on the asylum accommodation system and creating what has been called the “perma-backlog”. We all know what that was, and how big it was when we came into Government. The Act has largely not been commenced, nor will it be under this Government. We need to sort out the chaos created by the unworkable and contradictory provisions in the Act. Despite the bravado of the hon. Member for Stockton West in his earlier contribution, I suspect that most Conservative Ministers knew that the Act was unworkable, because it was not commenced when they had the ministerial capacity and power to do so for all the time between when it was put on the statute book and when we formed a new Government a year later.
The system had been left in chaos but, were the Government to accept new clause 2 and simply repeal the entire Act, it would lead to a missed opportunity to improve our immigration system. I will go through some of that with the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. Clause 38 will repeal section 2 of the 2023 Act, which provides for the duty to remove. The Government are committed to ending the migration and economic partnership with Rwanda, so section 2 will be repealed to deliver that by repealing the duty to remove and associated provisions.
On sections 22 to 28 of the Illegal Migration Act, we are not retaining the vast majority of modern slavery provisions in the Act because they are connected to the duty to remove irregular migrants. These sections were never commenced and provided that where a duty to remove was applied for an individual, that individual should be disqualified from the national referral mechanism unless certain limited exemptions applied. We are removing sections 30 to 37 relating to permanent bans on entry, settlement and citizenship, which, while held up as a success by others, were unenforced and unworkable. Sections 57 and 58 of the Act are also repealed. They relate to age assessments, but both sections are unworkable and irrelevant without the duty to remove.
Matt Vickers
Is there any reason we cannot introduce provisions in this area as part of the Bill, and when can we expect to see them?
Dame Angela Eagle
Work is going on in the Department to assess the accuracy of the various methods of age assessment, which ministerial predecessors from the hon. Gentleman’s party commenced, but which has not yet been finished. As soon as we have more idea about how reliable scientific age assessment can be, how expensive it is and all those things, I will either come to Parliament or make a statement about how we intend to proceed. The hon. Gentleman must not assume that because these sections have been repealed we are not interested in scientific age assessments and their potential per se. They were simply unworkable because they were attached to the duty to remove, which was such a feature of the Illegal Migration Act.
The six measures that the Government intend to retain, including where provisions are in force, have been identified as having operational utility and benefit. These powers are all ones that the Government see as important tools to allow for the proper operation of the immigration system and to achieve wider priorities alongside the powerful measures set out in the Bill.
The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire talked about section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act. The public order disqualification under the Nationality and Borders Act is currently in operation. It enables decisions to disqualify certain individuals from support and protections afforded by the national referral mechanisms on grounds of public order and bad faith. Public order grounds include serious criminality and threats to national security. Such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, considering the individual’s vulnerabilities. That is the sole modern slavery measure in the Illegal Migration Act that is being retained. It would, if commenced, amend the public order disqualification to allow more foreign national offenders to be considered for disqualification from modern slavery protections on public order grounds. Disqualification will continue to be assessed on an individual basis.
Pete Wishart
I am glad that the Minister got to that last sentence, because it is quite clear from section 29 that victims of modern slavery only have to be considered a threat to public order. It is quite likely that many victims of modern slavery will get caught up in this; in fact, they already have. Is the Minister happy that those who were probably coerced into criminal activity will now almost be blanket-banned from any opportunity to go through the asylum process in the United Kingdom?
Dame Angela Eagle
There will not be a blanket ban. Individuals who have been subject to public order disqualification will have been disqualified for things such as multiple drug offences, possessing a firearm and ammunition, multiple counts of sexual assault and assault by beating, grooming and engaging in sexual communication with a child. Those are the kind of things that currently lead to public order disqualifications. Nothing in the retention of section 29 will mean that individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis cannot be taken into account. It is important to understand that that will still happen. If it were commenced—it has not yet been—section 29 would introduce a duty to apply the public order disqualification, unless there are compelling circumstances that the disqualification should not apply. That still ensures case-by-case consideration.
The citizenship ban is removed from the Bill because it was unworkable and unenforced; that is, again, attached to the duties to remove. We have updated the good character guidance to prevent people from gaining citizenship if they arrived illegally by dangerous journeys. The idea is to emphasise that citizenship is not a right, but a privilege. We will continue to make those decisions on a case-by-case basis.
The other sections that we have retained are thought to be useful. The six measures in section 12 emphasise the right of the Secretary of State to determine what constitutes a reasonable time period to detain a person for the specific statutory purpose of effecting removal from the UK. Section 52 allows flexibility in our judiciary by making first-tier tribunal judges eligible to sit in the upper-tier tribunal. I cannot imagine anyone in the Committee would worry about that.
Section 59, if commenced, would extend the inadmissibility provisions to asylum and human rights claims from nationals in a list of generally safe states. Section 60 requires an annual cap to be set on the number of individuals admitted to the UK by safe and legal routes. Section 62 adds failing to provide information, such as a passcode to an electronic device, to the behaviours that could be considered damaging to the credibility of an asylum and human rights claim. All those issues are thought to provide utility, but outside the context of the duty to remove.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Eighth sitting)
Tuesday 11th March 2025
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBorder Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill 2024-26 View all Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 March 2025 - (11 Mar 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 3 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I congratulate everyone on their very prompt arrival.
Clause 39
Sections 37 and 38: consequential amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)
It is a great pleasure to see you, the fourth Chair of our Committee, Dame Siobhain. I welcome you to the Chair. It is a pleasure to serve with you directing us.
The clause is a simple consequential one: it removes references to and amendments made by the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 when they no longer serve a purpose. During the passage of those two pieces of legislation it was necessary to amend existing Acts of Parliament, to cross-reference them and to enable enactment of the provisions within them. Few, if any, of those provisions were ever properly commenced or enacted but, since this Government intend to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act and large parts of the Illegal Migration Act, which we spent most of this morning discussing, those references no longer serve any practical purpose. They should therefore be removed from the four existing Acts of Parliament.
Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Dame Siobhain, as it was yesterday afternoon. It is good to see you two days in a row.
The clause, as the Minister said, makes consequential amendments necessary as a result of the two clauses that we discussed this morning: clause 37, which repeals the Safety of Rwanda Act 2024, and clause 38, which repeals provisions of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. As we do not support either of those repeals, we do not support these revisions or agree that the clause should stand part of the Bill.
Dame Angela Eagle
We have had our debates about the contents of those Acts. The clause concerns truly miscellaneous aspects, although I understand the logic of the hon. Lady’s argument. I certainly hope that we will press on and agree clause 39.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Angela Eagle
The clause introduces schedule 1, which will allow the governance arrangements for the Immigration Services Commissioner and deputy commissioner to be made more flexible. That will bring them in line with other public appointments by allowing for interim or shorter appointment lengths.
Schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner and deputy commissioner are to hold office for a term not exceeding five years. That allows the appointments to be for less than five years; currently, there is a fixed five-year term. Schedule 1 will make it discretionary to appoint a deputy commissioner, allowing for the governance arrangements to remain flexible to meet the demands of the organisation. It will enable the Home Secretary to appoint a senior, experienced member of staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances. It is to be used, for example, to ensure that cover is in place during a public appointment process where there is a vacancy in the commissioner and deputy commissioner posts. It does not replace the provision to appoint a deputy commissioner and will ensure continued regulatory oversight of immigration advisers, which is the point of this organisation.
The schedule will mean that the work of the Immigration Services Commissioner will continue and will operate more flexibly to ensure that good immigration advice is readily available. That is critical to the effective running of a coherent, efficient and fair immigration system.
Katie Lam
As the Minister has outlined, clause 40 inserts schedule 1 into the Bill. That provides that the Immigration Services Commissioner is not to hold office for a term exceeding five years. The current regime is based on there being a commissioner and deputy, so schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner may appoint a deputy. There is also a provision to enable a member of the commissioner’s staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances, such as the roles of commissioner and deputy both being vacant. That effectively allows for the appointment of an interim commissioner.
As was said in evidence to the Committee, these amendments do not seem to us to have operational consequence. We will not oppose them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 41
Detention and exercise of functions pending deportation
Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 7, clause 41, page 35, line 32, leave out subsection (17).
This amendment would leave out the subsection of this clause that applies subsections (1) to (13) (relating to detention and exercise of functions pending deportation) retrospectively, i.e. as if they have always had effect.
Pete Wishart
It is great to see you in the Chair, Dame Siobhain; it makes a pleasant change from what we have had in the past couple of weeks. I say that in the nicest way to Mr Stuart.
Pete Wishart
Clause 41 introduces a significant expansion of detention powers, allowing individuals to be detained from the moment a deportation is considered rather than waiting for a formal order. However, my main concern with the clause is that it is to apply retrospectively, meaning it would legally validate past detentions that were previously unlawful. As would be expected, the provision has sparked serious concerns among legal experts, human rights organisations and advocacy groups, raising critical questions about the rule of law, human rights and judicial oversight.
We had the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association with us as part of an evidence session. They have expressed great concern with this provision, saying:
“We are concerned with the dangerous precedent which would be set if unlawful deprivation of liberty were to be treated as lawful—such retrospectivity undermines the rule of law and remains wholly unjustified in the materials accompanying the Bill.”
I have looked at this issue and there does not seem to be any sufficient justification for this exceptional measure. The ILPA warns us that it could rewrite history, denying justice to individuals who could have sought remedies for unlawful detention.
Amnesty International, which again gave very good evidence to the Committee, has also voiced strong objections. It has highlighted how detention powers have expanded significantly while judicial oversight has weakened, leading to risks of serious injustice.
Bail for Immigration Detainees has stressed that clause 41 risks
“further criminalising migrants and refugees”.
It urges instead for a system that upholds human rights and dignity.
Combined with the Illegal Migration Act, the clause could lead to longer, more expensive and potentially unlawful detentions in breach of article 5 of the European convention on human rights. The Government’s own impact assessment acknowledges that clause 41 effectively makes lawful past detentions that were not compliant with due process at the time, yet the European convention on human rights memorandum does not properly address whether that retrospective validation aligns with the fundamental legal safeguards of article 5. I would particularly like the Minister to address those concerns.
Clause 41 therefore undermines accountability, weakens judicial scrutiny and risks setting a dangerous precedent through which the Government can retroactively legitimise actions that would otherwise have been unlawful. Given the weight of these concerns, there is a strong case for leaving out the retrospective provisions from clause 41, and that is what my amendment 7 seeks to do. Upholding the rule of law means ensuring that detention powers are subject to proper legal safeguards and that individuals are not denied their fundamental rights through legislative backtracking.
Dame Angela Eagle
The purpose of clause 41 is to clarify the existing powers of detention pending deportation set out in schedule 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. The clause ensures that the Secretary of State can detain individuals once they have been notified that deportation is being considered. It also aligns the power to detain with the power to take biometrics and to search for nationality documents. That is because the taking of biometric information and any other searches will ordinarily take place at the point that somebody is detained. The effect of clause 41 is to make clear that a person subject to deportation may be detained at any stage of the deportation process. It strengthens an existing power; it does not create a new power. It clarifies a power that has always existed and been used for this purpose.
Another effect of the clause is to confirm that the Secretary of State may take biometrics and search for those documents. Since clause 41 clarifies existing powers, the detention provisions it contains are regarded as always having had effect. It is extremely important for Members to understand what the clarification of the powers of detention means. If a person is subject to deportation on the basis that the deportation is conducive to the public good, they may be detained at any stage of the deportation process. It is extremely important that the Home Office should be able to detain those it is seeking to deport on that basis. Some of these foreign national offenders pose a high risk of harm to the public. Therefore, inability to detain them could have a direct impact on public safety.
The clause makes it clear that it is lawful to detain a person once they are notified that the Home Office is considering whether to make a deportation order against them, but that is not a new detention power; it has been misunderstood in some of the commentary from outside of this place. The clause clarifies an existing power to ensure there is no ambiguity about when someone subject to a conducive deportation can be detained. The accurate identification of such people is very important.
The clause also makes consequential amendments to existing powers to search detained persons—potential deportees—for documents that prove their identity or nationality, and to take their biometrics upon their being detained. Clause 41 sets out the power to detain pending deportation, as the Home Office has always understood it to operate. It is therefore right that the provision applies retrospectively. That deals with amendment 7, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and seeks to remove the retrospective element of the clause.
Clause 41 clarifies the existing statutory powers of detention. There are important public safety reasons why these powers need to be put beyond doubt. Clause 41 clarifies the powers as the Home Office has always understood them to operate. There will be no operational impact that we can assess, or increased use of the power, and no effect on people in relation to whom this power has been exercised. It is entirely right that these provisions should apply retrospectively in these circumstances.
Pete Wishart
I hear the Minister’s justification for the powers and why she feels they are necessary, but I do not hear any compelling reason for why they have to be introduced retrospectively. What on earth is that supposed to help with? She knows the range of concerns raised by a number of legal organisations. I wish she would address their concerns about the consequences of the clause.
Dame Angela Eagle
The clause seeks to put beyond any doubt that the Home Office has the power to detain, in conducive deportation cases, at the earliest point. It has been doing that for many years. The clarification in the clause applies retrospectively to ensure that those who have been detained in the past have not been detained unlawfully. We do not believe they have, but this puts it beyond doubt. To clarify, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is putting beyond doubt in the Bill the understanding of how and when these powers can be used—at the earliest opportunity, if it is a conducive deportation. The powers, including to detain at the earliest opportunity, have always existed.
If the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire were agreed to, it would cast doubt on many of the arrests and detentions ahead of deportations that have happened in the past, which I do not think the hon. Gentleman would want to do. To reassure the hon. Gentleman one final time, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is a clarification of the way that they have always been understood to work. The clause puts beyond legal doubt that if somebody is being detained pending deportation, they can be detained lawfully at the earliest opportunity. That understanding has always been the case, but the clause puts it beyond any legal doubt.
Katie Lam
Clause 41 confirms that the Home Office may detain someone subject to deportation from the point at which the Home Office serves the notification that deportation is being considered, when that deportation is conducive to the public good. We support this provision to allow for detention before a deportation order is signed, but that only applies if the Secretary of State has notified the person in writing. Can I seek reassurance from the Minister that the requirement for a written notice will not build any delay into the process? We also support the provision in clause 42 to allow the Home Office to capture biometrics at the new, earlier point of detention.
Pete Wishart
I will not detain the Committee for long. I do not like clause 41 anyway—I think the extension of deportation powers is overwhelming and I do not believe they are required—but I do not like this retrospection one bit. I have not secured an adequate explanation from the Minister about why that is necessary. I would therefore like to put my amendment to a vote, Dame Siobhain.
The Chair
Thank you for clarifying, as that was going to be my next question. Does anybody else wish to contribute?
Dame Angela Eagle
I am happy to give the hon. Lady the assurance that she sought. If somebody is going to be detained, it will always be done with written notice, and that should not delay anything—it has not in the past.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Dame Angela Eagle
You are getting a lot of practice with locking and unlocking the doors and having Divisions, Dame Siobhain—it is quite exciting this afternoon.
Clause 42 modernises our powers to capture biometric information, so that we have greater flexibility over who can take that information. It will enable a wider range of appropriately trained people to take biometric information, strengthening processing resilience following instances of small boat crossings or unexpected arrivals. In a situation where it is essential to capture biometrics at the earliest opportunity and through streamlined processes, we will be able to utilise our resources more effectively. For example, the measure will enable contractors working at a short-term holding facility to capture biometrics in the same way as other contractors based in detention centres currently do. The clause also includes a power to make secondary legislation where there is a need for others to be able to capture biometric information. That is a future proofing of the legislation.
These are sensible and necessary measures to ensure that we can identify people quickly and establish whether they pose a threat to public safety if they have arrived in an irregular or illegal way.
Katie Lam
We are essentially supportive of clause 42, which among other things allows a person employed by a contractor in a short-term holding facility to be an authorised person to take fingerprints. The clause also includes a regulation-making power to allow other types of people to be authorised for this purpose.
May I ask the Minister how the regulation-making power is intended to be used? Are there currently other categories of people whom the Secretary of State or others in the Department would like to authorise to take fingerprints, or is this essentially a future-proofing measure, as the Minister mentioned?
Dame Angela Eagle
This is essentially future proofing. If another category or range of people became available, we may future proof this power and use the regulation-making power to ensure that they are taking biometrics lawfully.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
Articles for use in serious crime
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Angela Eagle
Clauses 43 and 44 cover the creation of two new offences concerning articles for use in serious crime. Law enforcement agencies are increasingly encountering individuals in possession of, or supplying, articles suspected to be intended for serious crime. However, proving intent or knowledge for a prosecution is often difficult, as the connection to a specific crime may not be immediately clear and facilitators frequently go undetected.
To address that challenge, clause 43 introduces two new criminal offences. The first criminalises the possession of specified articles; the second targets the importation, manufacture, adaptation, supply or offer to supply of those articles where there is a reasonable suspicion that they will be used in a serious offence. The specified articles include templates for 3D-printed firearms components, pill presses and vehicle concealments. Those concealments are particularly concerning in relation to smuggling operations, as they are often used to hide individuals for irregular immigration purposes.
The accused will need to prove that they did not intend for the article to be used in a serious offence, or that they could not have reasonably suspected it—given the few, if any, legitimate uses for the articles I have just mentioned. Those offences will be triable either way, with a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, a fine or both.
Clause 43 defines “serious offences” broadly, to include drug trafficking, firearms offences and assisting unlawful migration, as outlined in schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007. The clause strengthens the ability of law enforcement agencies to target those facilitating serious crime. It does that by closing legal gaps and addressing emerging criminal tools.
Clause 44 defines the specific articles to be included in the new criminal offences in clause 43. As I said, the articles are templates of 3D-printed firearms or their components, pill presses and encapsulators, and vehicle concealments. Law enforcement agencies have been clear that those articles are being increasingly used by organised crime gangs, and they will continue to be used unless we take action now. 3D-printed firearms templates are increasingly being used by organised criminals, and they are at present not illegal to possess. Pill presses are being used to manufacture illicit drugs, particularly benzodiazepines. Similarly, vehicle concealments have become a significant concern for law enforcement agencies, and they are used as aids in people smuggling and irregular migration.
Clause 44 also provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the list of specified articles, allowing the law to adapt to emerging threats. Any changes will be subject to the affirmative procedure. The Home Office will continue to work closely with law enforcement agencies and other partners to monitor and update that list, ensuring that it remains relevant as criminal tactics evolve. By capturing those articles, the aim is to disrupt the enablers and facilitators who profit from supplying tools for organised crime.
Katie Lam
The clauses seem broadly reasonable, but we have a few questions on which I would appreciate some clarification from the Minister. Clause 43 creates two new offences: the possession of articles for use in serious immigration crime, and the importation, manufacture, and supply or offer to supply of articles for use in serious immigration crime. Could the Minister explain whether she feels that UK Border Force currently has the right capabilities to identify and intercept the harmful materials captured by the clause?
Clause 43 reverses the evidential burden of proof, in that a person charged with offences under it can successfully prove their defence if they provide enough evidence in court to raise a question about the issue, and the prosecution cannot prove the opposite beyond reasonable doubt. Could the Minister please explain why the decision has been taken to do that? The maximum penalty for the offences created under the clause is imprisonment for five years, a fine or both. Could the Minister please explain how and why those penalties were decided on?
Clause 44 defines “relevant article” for the purposes of the offences created in clause 43. Could the Minister please explain whether clauses 43 and 44 provide any operational benefit in terms of tackling smugglers operating abroad, and if so, how?
Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship, Dame Siobhain. I want to dwell briefly on clause 43 because it embodies a significant theme in the Bill: preparing our country for the challenges we face today and those we will face to a greater extent in the future. In that context, it is so important to talk about the risk posed to our country’s security by 3D-printed firearms.
I commend the campaigning of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill), who has done an enormous amount of work on this issue. 3D-printed firearms are a serious threat to our security, and present a new challenge to law enforcement because they can easily be made at home and are untraceable and undetectable. Indeed, files containing IKEA-like step-by-step guides to 3D print firearms at home can be downloaded from the web in as little as three clicks. That is terrifying. If we can tackle that through the Bill, that feels like a significant contribution.
Dame Angela Eagle
The hon. Member for Weald of Kent may be familiar with the provisions in clauses 43 and 44, because they were in a Bill introduced by her predecessor, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who is now the shadow Home Secretary. That Bill was interrupted by the general election. Oddly, I chaired that Bill Committee in the last Parliament and listened to him make a speech about this issue. I therefore hope that there will be no real objection to the powers we need to take in clauses 43 and 44 to make it easier to disrupt and prevent harm from serious organised crime, some of the tools used in it and the facilitators who enable it. Such people might not have been at the scene of the crime, but they have enabled a lot of harm by supplying or importing the goods that I mentioned.
There are two sets of offences, which are designed to target different types of activity. The hon. Member for Weald of Kent asked about the evidential burden. These articles do not have ordinary, normal uses that I would consider legitimate. Printing 3D guns, or having pill presses in order to produce drugs for street sale, does not seem to be as legitimate as, say, purchasing a boat engine or indeed a boat. Given that there are no real, legitimate uses for such items, we think that placing the evidential burden on the defence to explain why on earth the person charged with possessing them has them is wholly reasonable.
Clauses 43 and 44 are intended to disrupt serious organised crime efforts to penetrate our border with paraphernalia for producing drugs or guns, or any of the things that go along with serious organised crime activity in this country, and thereby to keep people safe. I hope that the Committee will support them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Confiscation of assets
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Angela Eagle
Clause 45 amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to include offences related to the possession and supply of articles intended for serious crime, as outlined in clause 43. It will enable law enforcement agencies to seize the assets of individuals convicted under clause 43.
Specifically, the clause adds:
“Offences relating to things for use in serious crime”
to the criminal lifestyle schedules for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. A defendant convicted of an offence listed in those schedules will automatically be deemed to have led a criminal lifestyle and to have benefited from criminal conduct over a period of time. That means that assets obtained or spent in the six years prior to conviction are presumed to be derived from criminal conduct and are subject to confiscation unless the defendant can prove otherwise. However, the court is not required to make that assumption if it would result in injustice or is shown to be incorrect.
Confiscation orders are calculated based on the defendant’s monetary gains from crime—known as the benefit—and the assets they have available to them when the order is made. Orders are made to reflect the amount gained from crime and can be increased if the defendant’s finances improve. Non-payment of orders can lead to the defendant returning to prison.
By including these offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act, we can target financially criminals who profit from facilitating crime, disrupting both the crime and the financial gains that support it.
Katie Lam
Clause 45 allows the relevant articles listed under clause 44 to be confiscated under the Proceeds of Crime Act. We support this measure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Electronic monitoring requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Angela Eagle
The purpose of clause 46 is to remove any ambiguity about the court’s power to impose electronic monitoring as a condition of a serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order.
As currently drafted, the clause applies in England and Wales for any serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order, and in Scotland and Northern Ireland in terrorism-related cases only. However, since the Bill’s introduction, further legal complexities have come to light regarding the devolved Governments’ powers to impose an electronic monitoring condition. Pending agreement from the Scottish Cabinet Secretary, an amendment will be tabled to remove that express provision for Scotland. Northern Ireland’s position is still to be determined. I point that devolution complication out to Committee members and will keep them informed as those discussions develop.
Electronic monitoring serves as a deterrent, but it also improves the detection of any breaches. If the subject violates the conditions, it enables quicker intervention by law enforcement agencies. The clause outlines specific requirements for both the courts and the individual, including the obligation for the subject to consent to the installation and maintenance of monitoring equipment and to avoid tampering with it.
Additional safeguards are included. For instance, electronic monitoring can be imposed only for up to 12 months at a time, with the possibility of extension. A further safeguard requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice on handling monitoring data, ensuring consistency and clarity for law enforcement.
This clause on electronic monitoring for those subject to serious crime prevention orders will enhance the effectiveness of such orders and interim SCPOs, supporting efforts to disrupt serious and organised crime, reduce harm and protect the public. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Katie Lam
Clause 46 allows the courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of a serious crime prevention order. The clause is helpful for investigating suspects who are already in the UK, and we broadly support it. Will the Minister confirm that the requirement for electronic monitoring will apply to those who are on immigration bail? What value does the Minister feel serious crime prevention orders might have as a deterrent for those operating abroad?
Clause 46 specifies that there will be a code of practice to outline the expectations, safeguards and broad responsibilities for the data gathered, retention and sharing of information on these orders. When will that code of practice be issued, and can the Minister please outline what the Government expect to be included?
Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I would like the Minister to define electronic monitoring for us, if she can. I do not believe that there is such a definition in the Bill or in other Acts of Parliament. As a result, I worry that there is confusion, so I would welcome her thoughts.
Dame Angela Eagle
We are talking about electronic monitoring in the context of serious crime prevention orders; we are not talking about monitoring simply in connection to being an asylum seeker or migrant. I would not want Opposition Members to worry or mix up those two things.
This part of the Bill is about dealing with serious and organised criminality, some of which will involve people smuggling, and some of which will involve drugs, firearms or other serious organised crime. This is electronic tagging in the context of the granting of serious and organised crime orders, or interim serious and organised crime orders, which are designed to disrupt and prevent the activities of serious organised crime groups, not just general asylum seekers or migrants. Obviously, there may be some connection between the two, but it is not direct in this area.
Those orders and their conditions, such as electronic monitoring, therefore will not apply to migrants generally. Law enforcement agencies use serious crime prevention orders to manage individuals who have been convicted of, or are suspected of, serious criminality, where the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting the person’s involvement in serious crime.
Serious crime prevention orders can be imposed on offenders for a range of offences relating to people smuggling. The specific conditions of the order will be a matter for the judge in the High Court who makes it, and for the law enforcement body that makes the application. This is very focused, and it is all about the context of the individual who has been served with such an order. For that to happen, there has to be evidence of their involvement in serious and organised crime.
Clearly, tagging is about being able to check where people are, while electronic monitoring can also apply to other activity. It will apply in a particular context to a particular person for disruption reasons, so there is not one definition of electronic tagging. I hope that helps the hon. Member for Woking to understand the monitoring that we are talking about. On that basis, I hope members of the Committee will agree to clause 46.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47
Interim serious crime prevention orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Angela Eagle
Clause 47 introduces interim serious crime prevention orders as part of the wider regime of serious crime prevention orders established under the Serious Crime Act 2007. Interim serious crime prevention orders are designed to protect the public while a full serious crime prevention order application is considered. The Court can impose an interim serious crime prevention order within hours, imposing a range of conditions and restrictions to disrupt further criminal behaviour. For example, anyone suspected of being involved in people trafficking or other serious crime could face bans on travel, using the internet and mobile phone use.
Katie Lam
Clause 47 introduces a new provision for interim serious crime prevention orders. These allow the High Court to impose immediate restrictions, pending the determination of a full serious crime prevention order application. The Court can do that if it considers that it is just to do so. Can the Minister explain a little more by what process the Court will decide whether it is just? Is the criterion that it is necessary for public protection?
Proposed new section 5F of the Serious Crime Act makes provision for without notice applications. That is where the application for an interim serious crime prevention order, or the variation of an interim serious crime prevention order, is made without notice being given to the person against whom the order is made, in circumstances where notice of that application is likely to prejudice the outcome. Subsection (2) of proposed new section 5F makes provision for the Court to allow the relevant person to make representations about the order as soon as is reasonably practicable. Can the Minister explain whether that will always happen after the order is granted?
Dame Angela Eagle
The High Court will be empowered to impose an interim serious crime prevention order if it considers it just to do so. In other words, it is not an evidential test, because the Court does not apply a standard of proof. Rather, it invites the Court to impose an order before it has heard and tested all the evidence in instances that require fast-paced action to prevent and disrupt serious and organised crime. It is therefore an exercise of judgment or evaluation. There is a precedent for this approach in interim sexual risk orders and interim slavery and trafficking risk orders, which are currently a feature of the system and work reasonably well.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 48
Applicants for making of orders and interim orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Angela Eagle
Currently, the High Court can make a serious crime prevention order only upon application from the Crown Prosecution Service, the Serious Fraud Office and the police in terrorism-related cases. However, High Court serious crime prevention orders have not been fully utilised; between 2011 and 2021, only two applications were made, and only one resulted in a successful order. Clause 48 extends the list of agencies that can apply directly to the High Court for a serious crime prevention order, or an interim serious crime order, to the National Crime Agency, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the police in all cases, including the British Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence Police. The clause also specifies who within each agency is authorised to apply for these orders.
This extension will simplify and expedite the application processes for serious crime prevention orders, making it easier for agencies that are directly involved in tackling serious crime to make an application where appropriate. It gets rid of a gateway process that has proven to be so tight that it has not allowed very many of these orders to go forward at all. Those agencies are often best placed to apply for a serious crime prevention order as they already have an in-depth knowledge of the case.
The clause also requires the CPS to be consulted by the applicant authority, as it will continue to have responsibility for ensuring that the order is not used as a substitute for prosecution. That is a very important part of ensuring that these orders work appropriately. In practice, this clause will make serious crime prevention orders more readily available to the agencies that are most likely to use them, to ensure that this powerful tool is used to best effect to protect the public by preventing and disrupting serious and organised crime.
Katie Lam
Clause 48 details who can apply to make orders and interim orders, and it replaces and extends the previous list in section 8 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Can the Minister please explain how long an application for an interim serious crime prevention order might take when made to either the High Court or the Crown court?
Tom Hayes
I want to reflect on where we have got up to. We have moved through the clauses at quite a pace, and that is very pleasing to see. The Bill responds to the requests of operationally and frontline-focused people in law enforcement and border security, and it is an attempt to give them the tools and powers that they need. I particularly wanted to mention that in the context of interim serious crime prevention orders, which we have spoken about in clauses 47 and 48.
That cuts such a sharp contrast with what has happened over recent years. In 2022, one Home Secretary introduced the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. At the time, the Government said that that would deter people from crossing in small boats, but it did not. In 2023, another Home Secretary brought in the Illegal Migration Act 2023. At the time, the Government said that that would turn people away from crossing the channel in small boats, but it did not. In 2024, another Home Secretary brought in the Safety of Rwanda Act, which happily we have just repealed today. At the time, the Government talked about the prospect of sending people to Rwanda, and they said that alone would be sufficient to deter people from crossing the channel in small boats. It is no wonder that that failed, too.
I wanted to set out how in 2022, 2023 and 2024 we had three separate Acts, which all aimed to do something and failed to do so. They have not delivered what operationally focused people have requested. We really need to look at how, just eight months into this new Government, we are turning the page on our asylum system and giving enforcement powers to the people who need them. We are also tidying up the statute book and ensuring greater co-ordination across the key agencies that can secure our border. I commend clause 48 to the Committee, as I do the series of clauses before it and the Bill overall.
Dame Angela Eagle
The idea behind the creation of interim serious crime prevention orders is to ensure that they can be brought into use ahead of a longer lasting serious crime prevention order. The widening of the range of organisations that can apply for them is designed to empower organisations such as the National Crime Agency, HMRC and the MOD police to apply, because they are much closer to the evidence that could enable the disruption of a particular serious organised crime group.
The hon. Member for Weald of Kent asked how long it would take to get such an order, and that would vary from case to case. It depends on the evidence. As I pointed out in relation to the previous clause, this is about the High Court reviewing the papers. It is not about a trial or a pre-trial; it is just about issuing an order that will prevent something that might cause damage from happening. We think that the changes made by the clauses that we have just debated, up to and including clause 48, make it more likely that serious and organised crime orders will be used and will be effective.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49
Notification requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Angela Eagle
Clause 49 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to introduce a standardised list of notification requirements for individuals and bodies corporate that are subject to serious crime prevention orders. This is a process of standardisation. Currently, notification requirements are added at the court’s discretion on a case-by-case basis. The clause will standardise those requirements for all serious crime prevention orders, improving the consistency and monitoring of the orders across police forces.
We have worked closely with law enforcement partners to identify appropriate requirements. The standard list will include monitoring legitimate income, checking addresses or communication methods for signs that criminal activities are being re-established, and monitoring foreign travel to assess potential indications of a return to crime. The courts can then impose additional requirements and conditions as part of the serious crime prevention order.
For bodies corporate, a designated individual must be named to liaise with the police and provide the notifiable information—including personal details, employment, financial data and contact information—which is essential for law enforcement to ensure compliance and assess risk to public safety.
The clause includes a delegated power to add to the list of notification requirements, ensuring flexibility to meet operational needs as technology evolves. The statutory instrument will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Individuals who are subject to a serious crime prevention order must provide the notifiable information within three days of the order coming into force. Failure to provide information, or providing false information, will be a criminal offence punishable by a fine or up to five years’ imprisonment. The standardisation of notifications will improve consistency in managing serious criminals and improve law enforcement agencies’ ability to assess risk and therefore more effectively protect the public.
Katie Lam
Clause 49 sets out a prescribed set of notification requirements, so that a person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order is required to provide the police or the applicant authorities with certain information. We support the clause, although can the Minister explain why three days has been given as the deadline to respond with the notifiable information requested?
Dame Angela Eagle
Three days seems a reasonable amount of time to allow the individual or body corporate concerned to gather the information, but also to ensure that the authorities get it in a timely way, so as to prevent any potential harm that might come from delay.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Orders by Crown Court on acquittal or when allowing an appeal
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Angela Eagle
Currently, the High Court has the authority to impose a serious crime prevention order without a conviction, provided that the Court is satisfied that the person has been involved in serious crime and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting their involvement in serious crime.
Clause 50 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to grant the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on individuals who have been acquitted of an offence, or in circumstances where the appeal has been allowed, if the same two-limb test is met. There may be cases where a person is acquitted but a serious crime prevention order is still needed. This can happen if the threshold for a criminal conviction is not met but there is still enough evidence to show that the person is involved in serious crime, and that the order would protect the public.
The Crown court would have just heard the evidence of the case and would be in the best position to assess whether an order is necessary to protect the public. Again, this approach is not new; similar provisions are found in other laws, such as domestic abuse protection orders under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and restraining orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, where orders can still be issued even after an individual has been acquitted. The effect of this clause is to streamline the process, enabling serious crime prevention orders to be applied more regularly and effectively in appropriate cases.
Katie Lam
Clause 50 allows the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on acquittal or when allowing an appeal. Subsection (2) provides that in order to impose a serious crime prevention order in these circumstances, the court has to be satisfied both that the person has been involved in serious crime and that the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by that person in serious crime in England or Wales. Why do both tests need to be satisfied for a serious crime prevention order to be imposed? Where these cases involve acquittal, as the Minister outlined, it might be hard to satisfy the first test. It seems to us that the second test of protecting the public is sufficient grounds to impose a serious crime prevention order.
Dame Angela Eagle
It is a two-limb test. Obviously, the evidential test for criminal proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt. There is a lower evidential test in other court instances, and it may very well be that someone who did not pass the “beyond reasonable doubt” test in a criminal trial would still be considered by the court to be involved in criminal activity, and therefore they would pass the first limb of the test. They would pass the second limb as they would still be likely to be involved in criminal activity in the future. We think that the two-limb test is an appropriate response to protect civil liberties, while protecting the public from the behaviour of those who are involved in serious and organised crime. We think that that balance is about right.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Martin McCluskey.)
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Ninth sitting)
Tuesday 11th March 2025
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 View all Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 March 2025 - (11 Mar 2025)
The Chair
I remind Members to send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk and to switch all electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are of course not allowed during sittings.
Clause 75
Eligibility verification: independent review
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 75, page 41, line 25, at end insert—
“(1A) Prior to appointing an independent person, the Minister must consult the relevant committee of the House of Commons.
(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A), ‘the relevant committee’ means a committee determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.”
This amendment would ensure further oversight into the appointment of the “Independent person”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 38, in clause 75, page 41, line 29, leave out “person” and insert “board”.
This amendment would replace the “independent person” with an independent board.
Amendment 39, in clause 75, page 41, line 32, leave out “person” and insert “board”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.
Amendment 40, in clause 75, page 42, line 19, leave out subsection (7) and insert—
“The Secretary of State may by regulations appoint persons to, and confer functions upon, an independent board for the purposes of securing compliance with subsections (1) to (6).”
This amendment is related to Amendment 38.
Amendment 41, in clause 75, page 42, line 23, leave out first “person” and insert “board”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.
Amendment 42, in clause 75, page 42, line 24, leave out “person” and insert “board”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.
Clause stand part.
Steve Darling
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. We have touched previously on having an independent overview of the activities that will take place under the Bill, and this is another opportunity to have the checks and balances I have alluded to on a number of occasions. Of course, all Members in the room are reasonable people, but we see in world politics what happens when people are unreasonable. Given that the United Kingdom’s constitution is unwritten, beginning to build those checks and balances into legislation is important. Amendment 37 would hardwire them into the Bill, and I ask that the Minister give it serious consideration. I have heard hints that it may be taken into account in one way or the other when the Bill goes to the other place, but I would welcome some reassurance, if possible, that that is the case.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. As my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay said, the amendment is about checks and balances. We appreciate that the Bill has been introduced in the context of the Government’s desire to cut the benefits bill, but the Treasury deeming something to be financially necessary does not necessarily make it right.
The percentage lost to fraud and error is relatively modest, but of course the sums are huge because the overall number is huge. We need to remember that these measures will not get anywhere near recovering all that money, so the question is: is the action proportionate, considering the sacrifice we are making in terms of civil liberties? It is vital that we get the best value from public money, but the amount expected to be recovered is just 2% of the estimated annual loss to fraud and error of £10 billion, and just a quarter of what is lost to official error at the Department for Work and Pensions.
As drafted, the clause empowers the Minister to appoint an independent person to carry out reviews of the Secretary of State’s function under schedule 3B to the Social Security Administration Act 1992. There is no external oversight, and that undermines the credibility of the role. Our amendment states:
“Prior to appointing an independent person, the Minister must consult the relevant committee of the House of Commons”,
which means
“a committee determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.”
Without proper scrutiny, the role’s independence is undermined, potentially damaging trust in the process.
The Committee previously heard evidence from Dr Kassem of Aston University, who stated:
“I would recommend a board rather than an individual, because how sustainable could that be, and who is going to audit the individual? You want an unbiased point of view. That happens when you have independent experts discussing the matter and sharing their points of view. You do not want that to be dictated by an individual, who might also take longer to look at the process. The operation is going to be slower. We do not want that from a governance perspective—if you want to oversee things in an effective way, a board would be a much better idea.” ––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 13, Q15.]
A board would ensure that the appointment is truly independent and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. We therefore propose that the Minister must consult the relevant House of Commons Committee before making such an appointment. That simple steps would ensure genuine independence and parliamentary scrutiny, and would strengthen transparency and public confidence.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Western. As we have just heard, Liberal Democrat amendments 37 to 42 would mean that, before appointing an independent person, the Minister had to consult a Committee of the House of Commons nominated by Mr Speaker. Amendments 38 to 42 seek to replace an independent person with an independent board, and therefore to allow the Secretary of State to appoint persons to, and confer functions upon, the board.
I have a couple of questions for the hon. Member for Torbay. What greater independence do the Liberal Democrats think will be gained by changing the requirement, given that both the independent board and the independent person would be appointed by the Secretary of State? What practical difference will the amendments make to improve the review process and ensure that it is high quality?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Western. With your permission, I will speak to amendment 37 before speaking to amendments 38 to 42. I will then speak to why the unamended clause 75 should stand part of the Bill.
Before I begin, I will respond to a couple of the comments made by the hon. Member for Horsham on the relatively small amounts of fraud and error we see. With this particular measure, as he is aware, we are initially targeting the three benefits with the highest levels of fraud and error. To take universal credit as an example, it is £1 in every £8 spent, which is a tremendously high number and one we must do everything we can to bring down. However, it is worth recognising and explaining to colleagues that the measures in the Bill are part of a broader package to tackle fraud, which reached £8.6 billion across the relevant period. This is not the beginning and end of the Department’s work on fraud across that period, but it is the part of that overall package that requires legislation.
Returning to my substantive notes on the question of a “board” versus a “person”, I think there may be some misunderstanding of definitions here. Amendment 37 seeks to oblige the Secretary of State to consult a relevant Committee of the House of Commons before appointing the independent overseer of the eligibility verification measure. I believe that the amendment is unnecessary and I will be resisting it.
We recognise the importance of appointing the right person or body to oversee the use of the eligibility verification measure. That is why we have made it a requirement that the overseer report annually on the use of the power directly to the Secretary of State, who will then lay the report before Parliament. We have included that key safeguard to ensure the effective and proportionate use of this power and to introduce greater transparency in the use of it. The person or body will be appointed following a fair and public recruitment process, which will be carried out under the guidance of the Commissioner for Public Appointments.
I assure the Committee today that we will abide by the governance code on public appointments throughout the process. Whether this role is subject to pre-appointment scrutiny will be governed by the code, and we will follow its guidance at all times. The final decision on who will oversee this measure will, in all cases, be made by the Secretary of State. That is because the governance code on public appointments points out:
“The ultimate responsibility for appointments and thus the selection of those appointed rests with Ministers who are accountable to Parliament for their decisions and actions.”
We will keep the House informed about the process at all key stages, including when the process is set to begin and on the proposed final appointment.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Am I right in thinking that the Work and Pensions Committee will be entitled to call any witness, including whoever is appointed to this role, to give evidence to it and to be scrutinised by its members?
Andrew Western
My hon. Friend is entirely correct. The Select Committee always has that power, and were it to have any concerns whatever, it would look to exercise that power at the earliest opportunity.
I recognise that the amendment has been tabled with good intentions. However, because of our commitment to an open and transparent recruitment process, and because we will be abiding by the requirements of the governance code on public appointments, it is unnecessary and I will resist it.
I will now turn to amendments 38 to 42, which seek to remove the term “person” and insert the term “board” in reference to the appointment of an independent reviewer of the eligibility verification measure, as set out in clause 75. I recognise the intent behind the points raised, but the amendments are unnecessary and I will resist them. It is probably useful to clarify that, legally, the term “person”, as referred to in the clause, can refer to an individual person, a body of people or a board, as per the Interpretation Act 1978. I therefore reassure the Committee that any reference to “person” in the Bill includes a body of persons, corporate or incorporated, that is a natural person, a legal person or, for example, a partnership.
I reassure the Committee that the Secretary of State will appoint the most appropriate and suitable independent oversight for the measure. That might be an individual expert, which is consistent with the approach taken for oversight of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, or it might be a group of individuals who form a board or committee. As the Cabinet Office’s governance code on public appointments clearly sets out, Ministers
“should act solely in terms of the public interest”
when making appointments, and I can assure the Committee that we will do just that.
To offer further reassurance, I confirm that the appointment process for the independent person or body will be open, fair and transparent, adhering strictly to the governance code on public appointments, which ensures that all appointments are made based on merit, fairness and openness. The Government will of course notify the House of the appointment. I therefore resist these amendments.
I will now turn to clause 75. Independent oversight is one of several safeguards for the eligibility verification measure, and I remind the Committee of the others that we discussed on Thursday. First, we are initially pursuing the measure with just three benefits in scope. Others can be added by regulations, but not, in any circumstances, the state pension, which is specifically excluded from the Bill. Furthermore, limits on the data that can be collected are set out in the Bill. For instance, no transactional data or special category data can be shared. Finally, as we discussed at length on Thursday, a human decision maker will be in place to determine whether any fraud has been committed.
Clause 75 provides a vital safeguard for the eligibility verification power. By inserting proposed new sections 121DC and 121DD into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, it establishes a requirement for independent oversight of the power, to ensure accountability, compliance and effectiveness. We recognise the importance of safe and transparent delivery of the eligibility verification measure, which is why we are legislating to make it a requirement for the Secretary of State to appoint the independent person to carry out annual reviews.
As per proposed new section 121DC(2), the person must prepare a report and submit it to the Secretary of State. And as per new subsection (3), the Secretary of State must then publish the report and lay a copy before Parliament. New subsection (4) outlines that the first review must relate to the first 12 months after the measure comes into force, and new subsection (5) outlines that subsequent reviews must relate to each subsequent period of 12 months thereafter. Those annual reviews and reports will ensure transparency in the use of the measure and its effectiveness.
To ensure that the eligibility verification measure is exercised in a responsible and effective manner, in accordance with the legal framework, new section 121DC further details what each review must consider during the review period. That includes compliance with the legislation and the code of practice, and actions taken by banks and other financial institutions in complying with eligibility verification notices. The review must also cover whether the power has been effective in identifying, or assisting in identifying, incorrect payments of the benefits covered during the review period. In new subsection (7), there is provision for the Government to bring forward regulations to provide relevant functions to the independent reviewer to enable them to perform their duties under the clause.
In order to ensure that the independent reviewer is able to fulfil their duties, clause 75 also provides a legal gateway for the Secretary of State to disclose information to the independent reviewer, or a person acting on the reviewer’s behalf, for the purposes of carrying out the review. That can be found in new section 121DD, which is inserted by clause 75. Data protection provisions in new sections 121DD(2) to (4) make it clear that such sharing must comply with data protection legislation and other restrictions on the disclosure of information.
In conclusion, the clause represents a key safeguard in relation to the new power and confirms a previous commitment to Parliament to establish oversight over it and ensure its proportionate and effective use. On that basis, I propose that clause 75 stand part of the Bill.
Rebecca Smith
Apologies, Mr Western, because I probably should have spoken to clause 75 stand part when I made my earlier remarks—it was just 9.20 am. Thank you for letting me speak now.
As we have discussed, clause 75 amends the Social Security Administration Act 1992, adding provisions for a review of the powers given through clause 74, which we debated last week. The Secretary of State must appoint an independent person to carry out the reviews, and a report must be submitted, published and laid before Parliament. I am grateful to the Minister for his assurances that, by definition, a “person” could be a body, a board or a panel. That has precluded quite a lot of the notes I was going to read out this morning, but it is good to hear that that definition is included in the Interpretation Act 1978.
However, it is worth again putting on record some of the evidence that we heard, and the fact that that definition caught the attention of some of those who gave evidence during our initial sittings. Some experts were concerned to have the eligibility verification reviewed by, potentially, a panel to ensure that it was both sustainable and auditable and that an unbiased viewpoint could be presented. Dr Kassem said:
“Personally, I would recommend a board rather than an individual, because how sustainable could that be, and who is going to audit the individual? You want an unbiased point of view. That happens when you have independent experts discussing the matter and sharing their points of view. You do not want that to be dictated by an individual, who might also take longer to look at the process. The operation is going to be slower. We do not want that from a governance perspective—if you want to oversee things in an effective way, a board would be a much better idea.” ––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 13, Q15.]
Clearly, the Minister addressed that in his comments, but it does raise the question of what volume of work he envisages the independent person, panel or body having to assess. I appreciate that that could well be a “How long is a piece of string?” exercise at this point, but does it have any bearing on whether the Secretary of State will appoint one person or several people at the point at which this body is instituted? I ask that question to reflect the concerns about volume, speed and the ability to get the review produced in the right amount of time, and also to provide clarification to those who gave evidence.
Finally, we heard from Helena Wood that she had concerns that the Bill is a “very blunt instrument”, specifically in relation to its powers on eligibility verification. What consideration has the Minister given to those comments, especially about the proportionality and reasonableness of the measures in the Bill, to ensure that it does not get used as the blunt tool it appears to be? What more information about how the powers in the clause are to be exercised will be set out in the code of practice in due course?
Andrew Western
I acknowledge what the hon. Lady said about the evidence we heard and the preference for a board. If I am being absolutely transparent with the Committee—as I would be expected to be—I am entirely open-minded at this point about where we may end up. I do not have a person, body or group in mind. That is why I hope that the open and transparent process yields the best possible result in terms of the qualifications and specialisms of the individual or individuals who may ultimately be appointed. A range of skills would be of use to us—specialisms in data and human rights, and in welfare, obviously—so I am open-minded about where we end up in relation to who takes this work forward for us.
On the question as to the volume of work, the hon. Lady is correct that it is something of a “How long is a piece of string?” question. However, in terms of the bare essentials, the requirement is to produce an annual report to be laid before Parliament, so I would not expect the volume of work to be at the extreme end in terms of how onerous it would be.
Steve Darling
I am pleased to have had the debate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 75 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 76
Entry, search and seizure in England and Wales
Andrew Western
I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 76, page 43, line 38, leave out from “the individual” to end of line 1 on page 44 and insert
“is an official of a government department and—”.
This amendment clarifies that to be an authorised investigator an individual must be an official of a government department and be of the specified grade.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 77 stand part.
Government amendments 4, 5 and 33.
Schedule 4.
Clause 78 stand part.
New clause 3—Application of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to investigations conducted by the Department for Work and Pensions—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, introduce regulations for the purpose of applying certain powers of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, subject to such modifications as the order may specify, to investigations of offences conducted by the Department for Work and Pensions.
(2) The powers to be applied must include—
(a) the power of arrest;
(b) any other such powers that the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(3) Regulations made under this section shall be made by statutory instrument.”
Andrew Western
Clause 76 will insert a new section 109D to the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to make provision for specialist DWP staff to apply to the courts for a warrant to enter a premises for the purposes of search and seizure. That is one of the five overarching powers that we are looking at in the Bill. It is a new power for the Department, but not uncommon across Government more broadly. These actions may be exercised only by an authorised investigator—an individual who has received authorisation from the Secretary of State and completed industry standard training.
As drafted, subsection (6) of proposed new section 109D could be interpreted as requiring an authorised investigator to be either an official of a Government Department or of at least higher executive officer grade. Amendment 34 makes it explicit that an authorised investigator must be both an official of a Government Department and an HEO, for the purpose of these powers in England and Wales. That is an important clarification and is in line with our original policy intent. I trust that the amendment is welcome, as it ensures that there are clear criteria in place and that only those who hold the right office and grade may be authorised to exercise the powers in clause 76 and schedule 4.
I turn to clause 76 itself, and the substance of the powers of entry, search and seizure for the DWP. The clause will insert new section 109D and schedule 3ZC into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, which will provide DWP-authorised investigators with the power to apply for warrants, enter a premises, search it and seize items. It will also give authorised investigators power to apply for an order to gain access to certain types of materials that refer to business or personal records, defined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 as “excluded material” under section 11 or “special procedure material” under section 14.
The ability to undertake this activity will play a crucial role in gathering and securing evidence to bring serious and organised benefit fraudsters to justice. Currently, DWP investigators must rely on the police to undertake all this activity—securing the warrant from the court and exercising it—on their behalf. The clause changes that. It means that DWP-authorised investigators will be able to apply directly to a court for a warrant to enable them to enter, search and seize items from premises, but only during a serious and organised criminal investigation.
I can assure the Committee that DWP-authorised investigators will be required to meet the same legal requirements when submitting an application as the police. That includes undertaking all activities in compliance with the Home Office code of practice on entry, search and seizure. In addition, independent inspections of the DWP’s use of the power may be conducted by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services in England and Wales or by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary in Scotland. That is addressed in clause 87, which we will consider later, and will be in addition to the internal safeguards, including clear processes for signing off warrants, that the DWP will have in place to ensure that the powers are used appropriately, safely and lawfully.
Clause 77 will insert new section 109E and new schedule 3ZD into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and will provide equivalent entry, search and seizure powers for DWP-authorised investigators carrying out investigations of serious and organised fraud in Scotland. The powers enabling entry, search and seizure in England and Wales are primarily provided by PACE, and that is addressed in clause 76; however, there is no equivalent Act in Scottish law to provide the basis for these powers, so the powers in relation to Scotland are set out in this Bill. New schedule 3ZD to the 1992 Act —inserted by clause 77 and schedule 4 to the Bill—provides the basis for applying for a warrant for entry, search and seizure and exercising that warrant in Scotland. Those powers are similar to those set out in clause 76 and schedule 4 for England and Wales.
Clause 77 enables a DWP-authorised investigator to apply for and execute a warrant or a production order—a court-authorised directive requiring an individual to promptly disclose information relevant to a criminal investigation—in Scotland. It also provides for the DWP to search premises and seize items when that action is authorised by a sheriff in Scotland. The clause is intended to achieve parity between the nations, and I commend it to the Committee.
Government amendments 4 and 5 are minor and technical and aim to deliver the original policy intent of schedule 4, relating to entry, search and seizure for the DWP in Scotland. Their effect is to provide that where an authorised investigator who is exercising a search warrant identifies materials or items that have a bearing on any offence under investigation, they should seize them only if taking a copy or record, such as a photograph, is deemed to be not appropriate. That will ensure that items or materials are seized only where necessary, and will apply the same safeguard in Scotland as is currently the case in England and Wales.
As the Bill is drafted, the requirement to take a copy where possible, rather than seizing something, would apply only to an item and not to material. The amendments will deliver the original policy intent, which was not to differentiate. They will also ensure that no seizure, copies or records should be made where an item or material is subject to legal privilege or defined as “excluded” or “special procedure” material. I hope that my explanation assures Members that the amendments are minor and technical, and will ensure that schedule 4 works correctly and is in line with the existing approach taken by the police. I commend Government amendments 4 and 5 to the Committee.
Government amendment 33, which is very similar to Government amendment 34, makes it clear that an authorised investigator must be both an official of a Government Department and of HEO grade, but this time in relation to the use of these powers in Scotland, under schedule 3ZD, which is set out in schedule 4 to the Bill. I trust that the amendment will be welcomed like amendment 34.
Schedule 4 outlines modifications to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for entry, search and seizure operations in England and Wales, and includes equivalent legislation for operations that take place in Scotland. The schedule sets out the essential modifications and practical details needed for DWP-authorised investigators to fully execute powers of entry, search and seizure. It outlines new schedule 3ZC to be inserted into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, to modify certain provisions in PACE to provide the relevant policing powers to DWP-authorised investigators in England and Wales.
The schedule sets out the minimum grade required to be an authorised investigator, which is the minimum civil service equivalent of a police constable. The DWP will require 250 authorised investigators to be trained to industry standards, and they will be subject to internal management checks. The schedule also restricts the use of the powers so that they are exercisable only for the purpose of investigating a DWP offence, as defined in clause 84 of the Bill. It permits others to accompany an authorised investigator on to the premises named in the warrant and limits a DWP-authorised investigator’s authority so that they can conduct searches only of “material” and not of people. The schedule also makes technical modifications to PACE, to allow the DWP to carry out entry, search and seizure activity in the same way as the police.
Schedule 4 also outlines new schedule 3ZD to the 1992 Act, which makes provision for entry, search and seizure in Scotland. As far as possible, this replicates the approach taken in England and Wales, except where an alternative approach is needed to account for the different legal system in Scotland. The primary differences between schedule 3ZC and 3ZD are the process that must be followed when executing a warrant in Scotland, which includes providing a copy of the warrant to persons on the premises; the process for issuing receipts for items seized; the legal requirements for making applications for Scottish production orders and Scottish warrants for special procedure material.
Clause 78 replicates the approach taken in legislation governing police actions in respect of the Crown and Crown premises. It sets out how the law applies in the unlikely event that the DWP needs to obtain a warrant to enter Crown premises. It provides for a DWP-authorised investigator to apply for a warrant to search the locker of a suspect who works in, for example, a Government Department, but it prohibits the use of these powers in the interests of national security once the Secretary of State has certified that this is the case, and with regard to any private estates belonging to His Majesty and the Houses of Parliament. The package of measures in the Bill will leave very few places for organised criminals and the gangs who attack the DWP to conceal the evidence of their crimes, but clause 78 keeps us in line with other similar legislation.
Rebecca Smith
The DWP has fewer powers than other organisations, such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, which are tasked with investigating economic crime. We know that it does not have the power to arrest or to conduct search and seizure. Clause 76 will allows DWP-authorised investigators to apply for and execute a court warrant with or without police involvement in England and Wales. The aim is to help the DWP investigate and disrupt serious and organised fraud by giving investigators the power to make searches and seizures. That will allow them to deal with, for example, cases where universal credit claims are made using false identity documents.
We in the official Opposition want the Bill to work and the DWP to be able to successfully identify and tackle benefits fraud. DWP estimates of fraud and error in the welfare system exceeded £8 billion in each financial year from 2020-21 to 2023-24, with a combined total of £35 billion overpaid. For the financial year 2023-24, the DWP’s central estimate is that benefit overpayments totalled £9.7 billion, which is 3.7% of all benefit expenditure. Of that overpayment figure, £7.4 billion, or 76%, was due to fraud, £1.6 billion, or 16%, was due to claimant error, and £0.8 billion, or 8%, was due to official error, or 8%. It is clear that fraud costs the DWP the most, yet we worry that the Bill will be more effective at tackling error than fraud. We therefore support the powers in clause 76 to tackle fraud.
Steve Darling
The power to seize items, down in the weeds of an investigation, is essential to ensuring that we hold the right people to account. However, I am alive to the fact that seized items are often kept for a long time. Our mobile phones often contain our whole lives. Not that long ago, a resident in Torbay who was accused of a criminal offence and was under investigation had his mobile phone seized by Devon and Cornwall police for a very long time—a matter of months. What assurance can the Minister give that when the power of seizure is used—particularly when it is used to seize a mobile phone—items will be returned in a timely manner? What timescale does he plan to set for civil servants to return such items?
Andrew Western
Let me begin with some of the questions from the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon. Her comments setting out the challenge and her commitment to wanting the Bill to work are incredibly welcome. She is right to set out the scale of the challenge. That is why we are taking the powers that we are proposing.
On whether the requests and the use of the powers of search and seizure will be reserved to members of our staff working in serious and organised crime only, the answer is yes. On the level of seniority of team members executing those powers, it is HEO-grade officers that do that. In terms of salary equivalent, salary can be quite a crude comparison for a number of reasons. Police officers undertake shift work and an element of their salaries is higher as a result. Obviously, as members of the emergency services, there is a level of risk to their work. The National Crime Agency suggests that an HEO grade is the equivalent of a police sergeant, although in salary terms, it is probably more akin to a police constable.
On training, they will receive the industry standard training, equivalent to the training that police receive in this area. On safeguards more broadly, for the power in the Bill, a lot of the safeguards in place relate to the fact that a warrant is granted by a judge. There is always that specialist person making a determination in terms of appropriateness and proportionality. All warrant applications and all warrants would be exercised in compliance with the Home Office code of practice for entry, search and seizure. That is specifically limited to serious and organised crime only—that is multiple people working together to commit complex fraud, typically resulting in higher value overpayments.
As I said, everybody executing this power would be of HEO grade. They would have had the industry standard training. Investigations will also be subject to independent inspections, which will report on the DWP’s use of the powers, and any serious complaints can be reported to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. A range of safeguards is built into the proposals.
If I may, I will come later to the question from the hon. Member for Torbay about the return of information. There are specific provisions to enable us to keep items for as long as is needed, but there is a desire to return things as soon as possible. Elsewhere in the Bill, we speak to the specific powers that would be required were we wanting to go further and not return an item. There is a commitment to return, unless specific powers are required to prevent further criminality based on evidence found on phones. I cannot give a specific timeline—something would be kept for the length of time necessary for the purposes of the investigation—but I hear the point, particularly about mobile phones.
I stress again that this is about serious and organised crime. If I think of some of the cases I have seen—Operation Volcanic, for example—we are talking about going into buildings where there are several dozen, if not hundreds, of pay-as-you-go mobile phones set up expressly for the purposes of fraudulent activity and criminality. I would perhaps be less sympathetic to the swift return of those phones, and I hope the hon. Gentleman understands why.
I turn to new clause 3. I appreciate the explanation of the rationale from the hon. Member for South West Devon, but I do not share her view. I gave great consideration to the question of whether to take powers of arrest when first having discussions about the scope and shape of the Bill. The Bill enables trained DWP investigators to apply for a search warrant to enter a premises, search it and seize items or material that may have a bearing on the DWP case being investigated. Put bluntly, it gives us the right tools to do the job effectively.
Crucially, it enhances police efficiency by allowing the DWP to handle warrant applications and carry out search and seizure activity, freeing the police from those administrative and investigative tasks that they currently undertake for the DWP. No longer will DWP investigators always need to rely on the police for search warrants, take up police time briefing them on the specifics of the warrant applications or always be restricted to simply advising the police as to what items may be relevant during a search, only for them to then be seized by the police and later transferred to the DWP.
On efficiency, we are taking the powers we need to smarten up our processes. The current process is clearly imperfect. It is inefficient for both the DWP and the police, as well as burdensome in terms of resource, and the Bill resolves that situation. There is a clear rationale for the powers set out in the Bill, but the same cannot be said for the amendment.
To close, I will explain why it is not appropriate for the DWP to undertake arrests as well. I am concerned about the safety impacts; the police have expertise that equips them to carry out arrests. The policy intent is to facilitate more effective investigations and smoother administration, striking the right balance between activities undertaken by the DWP and the police. A power to arrest would require the DWP to take on roles that go beyond those that are administrative and evidence gathering in nature.
Not only that, but it is common for a serious organised DWP offence to involve other types of serious and organised crimes. As a result, a suspect is likely to be involved in wider criminality than just a DWP related offence, such as firearms, drugs or being involved in people trafficking. It makes sense that the police would conduct the arrest in such a situation and, after that, DWP investigators could focus their time on searching the scene for relevant evidence related to the DWP offence.
In addition, for the DWP to be able to operate independently of the police would require the DWP, for example, to have appropriate vehicles for transporting an arrested person and custody suites for detaining them. Currently that is not the case and, to be clear, we are not moving in that direction. We do not operate extensively in that area and allocating resources there is unlikely to be efficient or make sense.
The powers in the Bill promote effective collaboration between the DWP and the police, bring some genuine efficiencies and allow each team to focus on its strengths, which is the right approach. This amendment would not serve the same purpose and it would add a layer of complexity to the DWP’s work that we are not equipped to deal with, either in terms of the expertise of our team or the equipment that we have. For this reason, I must resist new clause 3.
Amendment 34 agreed to.
Clause 76, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4
Social security fraud: search and seizure powers etc
Amendments made: 4, in schedule 4, page 91, line 28, after “item” insert “or material”.
This amendment clarifies that paragraph 2(3) of new Schedule 3ZD of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (as inserted by Schedule 4 of the Bill) applies in relation to any item or material.
Amendment 5, in schedule 4, page 91, line 31, after “item” insert “or material”.
This amendment clarifies that paragraph 2(4) of new Schedule 3ZD of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (as inserted by Schedule 4 of the Bill) applies in relation to any item or material.
Amendment 33, in schedule 4, page 93, line 32, leave out from “individual” to end of line 33 and insert
“is an official of a government department and—”.—(Andrew Western.)
This amendment clarifies that to be an authorised investigator an individual must be an official of a government department and be of the specified grade.
Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 78 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 79
Offence of delay, obstruction etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
I am sure colleagues will be pleased to know that this speech will be brief.
Cases of serious and organised fraud against the DWP can amount to millions of pounds being stolen from the taxpayer. Clause 79 provides for consequences when those suspected of serious and organised fraud intentionally attempt to delay or obstruct an investigation. A suspect can be prosecuted if they intentionally try to frustrate a DWP investigation, and if convicted, they can be fined up to £1,000. Without this important provision, DWP fraud investigations into serious and organised criminal attacks on the social security system could be wilfully manipulated by those suspected of carrying out the fraud, which would be an untenable situation.
Rebecca Smith
I am sure the Committee will be pleased to hear that I will also be brief.
It is an offence under section 111 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to intentionally delay or obstruct an authorised officer, and conviction for a failure to comply may result in a fine of up to £1,000. Clause 79 means that obstructing an authorised investigator will be treated in the same way as obstructing an authorised officer, which means that obstructing an authorised investigator will be a criminal offence carrying a fine of up to £1,000. We are happy for the clause to stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 80
Disposal of property
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
This clause gives the DWP a clear legal path to seek court approval to dispose of property that has come into its possession when executing a search warrant. In most cases, the seized items will be returned to their rightful owner as soon as they are no longer required by a criminal investigation. However, as I alluded to in responding to the hon. Member for Torbay, there are certain circumstances in which this may be either not possible or not desirable.
An order may be sought when a seized item does not belong to the suspect and where it is not possible to identify the rightful owner, where there is a high risk that returning the seized item means it could be used for the furtherance of crime or where information needs to be deleted before the item is returned to prevent a further offence. This will prevent the risk of, for instance, returning a seized smartphone that contains data relating to hijacked or stolen identities that may enable fraud and the distribution of information that could be used for criminal gain. With the increasing use of technology, it will be ever more critical to ensure this does not happen. This clause allows the DWP to act in the same way as the police.
To avoid the risk of incorrect disposal of seized items, applications for any action of this kind must be made to, and must be approved by, a court. In addition, there are restrictions on how quickly seized material can be disposed of. In all cases, six months must elapse from the approval of an application by a court before a seized item can be destroyed.
Finally, any person with an interest in an item can make an application to the court. This could be the DWP, the item’s rightful owner or the person from whom it was seized. The clause sets out specific criteria in relation to any challenges that may be brought and the procedures that apply. If an order has been given for the item to be destroyed, the order cannot be revoked. However, the timeframe for the item to be destroyed may be challenged.
This clause creates a legal and proportionate gateway for the DWP to deal with seized items appropriately. This ensures that the DWP can act in the same way as the police when concluding fraud investigations.
Rebecca Smith
Where DWP investigators seize items from a premises, they will generally be returned to the owner if they are no longer needed for an ongoing investigation. As we have heard, it may not be appropriate to return an item in certain cases, such as if the person from whom the item was taken is not the actual owner or if the owner cannot be traced. In some cases, there may be a risk that a seized item could be used for a criminal purpose if it were returned. We acknowledge that clause 80 gives the DWP a lawful basis for disposing of the items. Clause 80 stipulates that items cannot be destroyed until six months have passed from when the magistrate approved the application to destroy them. Why is six months the chosen timeframe, and what are the precedents for other evidence seized in criminal investigations?
We support the provision allowing someone with an interest in the item to request the court to alter an approved action in relation to the item. We believe that is sensible. Can the Minister give an example of the sort of scenario that might refer to, just for the benefit of the Committee? What will the timeframe be for such applications? Finally, how will interested parties be made aware of items they may wish to take court action over? I assume it will not be a police lost property office, but ultimately it is one of those questions of how someone will know that there is something in which they might have an interest.
Andrew Western
I will briefly answer those questions. The period of six months is the same as set out in the Police (Property) Act 1897. We want to ensure alignment where we can to make the process between the police and the DWP as seamless as possible, so that serious and organised fraudsters do not recognise any difference.
On the question of how someone will know if we were intending to destroy their items, the clause does not require the DWP to inform any relevant person of any intended action in relation to the seized item. That is commensurate with how the 1897 Act works for the police in similar circumstances, but anyone who has an interest in the seized goods will have the same access right as the Secretary of State to apply to a court for a particular course of action to be taken. That could include seeking an extension before the seized item is destroyed. In all cases, a notice to occupier information notice will be left at the property, which will provide information about the search, the items seized and relevant points of contact.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 81
Amendments to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Clause 81 applies only to Scotland and amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to enable DWP-authorised investigators to seize an item from a premises and scrutinise it off site to determine its relevance to the investigation. This will apply in circumstances where it is challenging or even impossible to determine the relevance of an item to an investigation while on site. In some cases, large volumes of documents could be found that may comprise valuable evidence, but that will take a long time and need detailed scrutiny to assess. A locked electronic device may be found that could have evidence stored on it. This clause gives DWP-authorised investigators the ability to deal with those kinds of situations in the same way as the police by seizing items and taking them off site for sifting or further examination elsewhere. Without the authority granted by this clause, vital evidence could be missed, lost or even destroyed if left on site. In all instances, the DWP will seek to return seized items as soon as possible to the owner, where they are no longer needed or found to be irrelevant to an ongoing investigation. Those are the main provisions in clause 81, and I commend it to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 81 amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to deal with situations where authorised investigators cannot ascertain whether an item or material contains information relevant to that search, such as when dealing with large volumes of materials or files or electronic devices. That material therefore may need to be taken to be examined elsewhere, and we recognise that the clause allows for material to be seized and then sifted, rather than sifted and then seized. For that reason, we are happy for the clause to stand part of the Bill.
Steve Darling
I seek the Minister’s guidance as to how DWP officers, when they undertake these acts, will ensure that seize and sift will not be the standard modus operandi and that it is used only in appropriate cases. When will the Government publish a code of conduct? What guidance will be given? It might be tempting to undertake trawling operations for information rather than taking the spear-fishing approach that would garner the evidence more easily. I would welcome the Minister’s reassurance on that.
Andrew Western
I am grateful to the hon. Member for South West Devon for her support and to the hon. Member for Torbay for his questions. By way of reassurance, the DWP cannot just seize anything and everything from a place it has entered with a warrant; it can seize only items that are directly relevant to the investigation. Other oversight is built in, given the ability to make complaints to the IOPC and the oversight powers we are affording to HMICFRS, and people will be trained to the industry standard and so on, but fundamentally they must be able to demonstrate that a seizure is directly relevant to the investigation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 82
Incidents etc in England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Clause 82 amends part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 and will insert proposed new section 26H, which provides for the IOPC to investigate any serious complaints or serious harm related to the use of the powers of entry, search and seizure. There are multiple safeguards—including industry-standard training for all authorised investigators—to minimise the risk of the Bill’s entry, search and seizure powers being used incorrectly. I assure Members that the likelihood of a serious complaint, particularly anything that involves death or serious harm, is extremely unlikely. However, an effective and independent complaints process is essential when it comes to powers of this nature.
Whenever a search warrant is executed, information will be provided setting out how to raise a complaint and what to do in the unlikely event that the complaint is serious or involves death or serious harm. The clause aligns the DWP’s approach to serious complaints and incidents relating to entry, search and seizure with that of other bodies with similar powers, including the police. That is why we have agreed with the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner that they will investigate serious incidents that occur in Scotland related to the use of the powers of entry, search and seizure by the DWP under clause 83.
If a complaint is not of a serious nature, as defined in IOPC guidelines, it can still be raised via the existing departmental complaint procedures. It will be investigated internally, and if an individual is not happy with the complaint response, they can ask for their complaint to be reviewed by a more senior manager. If an individual remains dissatisfied with the Department’s final response, they may escalate their concern to the independent case examiner.
Clause 83 amends articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2013. It mirrors the provisions of clause 82, which applies to England and Wales, and provides for similar independent investigation arrangements for serious incidents in Scotland. I again reassure Members that robust safeguards will be in place, including investigators having comprehensive training, robust internal governance with clear processes for signing off warrants, and the external independent authorisation of all warrants by the courts.
In the very unlikely event that a fatality is associated with the DWP’s use of the powers, the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner can be directed to investigate by the Crown Office Procurator Fiscal Service, which is Scotland’s public prosecution service and death-investigation authority. We expect that, in almost all cases, incidents relating to the DWP’s use of the powers will fall outside of the scope of being serious in their nature. In such cases, the Department’s existing complaint procedures will be used, as I set have out.
It is crucial to build trust in the Department, especially when serious incidents happen. The public must know that their concerns will be handled with importance and impartiality. Clauses 82 and 83 provide that assurance by establishing a transparent and accountable investigation process that is independent of the Department. Having outlined their main provisions, I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 82 specifies that the Independent Office for Police Conduct—which oversees complaints, professional conduct matters and serious incidents involving the police and similar bodies in England and Wales—will handle serious complaints relating to the DWP’s use of the powers under proposed new section 109D in relation to DWP offences. That will be done through a regulation-making power, so will the Minister explain what modifications might be made to how the IOPC oversees complaints when its functions are extended to DWP investigators? How much additional funding does the Minister anticipate the IOPC will need to take on those functions?
Andrew Western
On the question of funding for the IOPC and the PIRC, we are in ongoing discussions with them about what the exact costs will be. We clearly do not expect the costs to be excessive because it is not a massive shift from the work they undertake already.
On the question of what modifications are required to the IOPC role, the regulations will set out how the functions will work for the DWP. It is important to remember that we envisage that the IOPC will look at cases only where there have been serious complaints and deaths, so we are not talking huge numbers.
There could be a range of ways in which people can refer. It may even be that we would self-refer if there has been a death. One of the principal reasons why I did not consider it prudent to take the power of arrest is that that minimises the likelihood of our finding ourselves in that position. Where arrests are undertaken, clearly the police will be on site with us and responsible for that.
I do not envisage the process for making the complaints to be set out explicitly in the code of practice, but clearly if someone contacted the Department and wanted to make a complaint of that nature about something very serious that was outside the scope of internal complaints—for instance, if there had been harm or death—we would immediately refer the person and the case to the IOPC. As I say, the costs are not expected to be excessive, but we would expect to meet them ourselves.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 82 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 84
DWP offence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
The clause creates a new definition of “DWP offence”, expanding on the existing definition of “benefit offence” set out in the Social Security Administration Act 1992. The DWP must have the power to respond to the different types of fraud we find. We know that, for example, the misuse of national insurance numbers can be a gateway to wider fraud. If criminals steal the identities of honest people and misuse their details to make false benefit claims, that is unacceptable and we need the power to act.
Fraud is not just contained to the most claimed benefits, like universal credit—as we saw with kickstart, grant payments intended to support people when they need extra help can also be abused—yet DWP investigative powers are limited when investigating other types of crime. By providing a new definition of a DWP offence, the clause ensures that fraudulent activity relating to grants, loans, national insurance numbers and other financial support issued by the DWP is explicitly captured in the law. It allows any offences linked to the payments to be met with firm action. The new definition works hand in hand with our enhanced investigation and entry, search and seizure powers in the Bill, thereby giving the DWP the ability to obtain critical evidence needed to prove or disprove allegations of fraud, in a fair and proportionate way.
The clause is about ensuring that every pound lost to fraud, and taken away from those who genuinely need support, is pursued with all the powers we have, whatever the nature of the payment may have been. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
I thank the Minister for outlining the plans around the clause, which would establish the definition of a “DWP offence” to allow any offence relating to a benefit payment, credit or grant that the DWP administers to be included under the new information-gathering powers. It would also include offences related to national insurance numbers.
We support the clause, which should hopefully allow DWP to gather information more holistically and lead to more successful prosecutions, but I have a couple of brief questions. What assessment has been made of the scale of prosecutions that could be made? What assessment has been made of the cost of exercising the new power?
Andrew Western
I thank the hon. Lady for her support and her questions. I would not want to put a specific number on the prosecutions—as I said, we have not had the powers to investigate these crimes in full before—but we think that by bringing these areas it into scope not only will we find significant offences that we need to clamp down on but there will be a deterrent effect. Having both levers together makes this an important tool to have in our arsenal.
On the costs, they would be broadly similar to those we already bear for investigating any other type of offence. They would not be materially different in terms of the implications for our budget.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 85
Disclosure of information etc: interaction with external constraints
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
The clause is an important safeguard for the DWP’s information-gathering powers. It sets out the kinds of information that a DWP-authorised officer cannot compel from an information holder. The exemptions are similar to those set out in the Social Security Assistance (Investigation of Offences) (Scotland) Regulations 2020. They are designed to prevent information from being obtained that is particularly sensitive, or if it would be inappropriate for the DWP to do so. For instance, as with the existing legislation, exemptions apply to legally privileged material and to information that could lead to the self-incrimination of the person or their spouse or civil partners.
In addition, the clause sets out exemptions for excluded material and certain special procedure material, as defined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This includes material such as medical records, records about counselling that an individual may have received, and journalistic material. The clause also prevents information notices from being issued for personal information about the use of organisations that provide free advice and advocacy services—including, for example, charities that provide refuge from abuse—thereby ensuring that vulnerable people can seek help without fear that their information will be disclosed.
Any use of the powers must be compliant with obligations set out in data protection legislation, which requires that personal data is kept secure and is not misused. The powers cannot be used to obtain communications data. If the DWP seeks communications data as part of its investigation, it must follow the authorisations and processes under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Further detail on the safeguards will be in our code of practice, which will be consulted on before being laid before Parliament, and to which all authorised officers will be required to adhere. Having outlined the main provisions of clause 85, I commend it to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 85 sets out that DWP’s actions under part 5 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 must comply with existing laws relating to the use of data and with the existing protections to protect confidential data and data prohibited under the Investigatory Powers Act. I have a brief question before I move on to subsection (8). Does the Minister envisage that clause 85 will provide much practical constraint on how the DWP is able to share information?
Subsection (8) states:
“A person who provides services on a not for profit basis in relation to social security, housing (including the provision of temporary accommodation) or debt, may not be required under the provision to give personal data about the recipients of the services.”
I acknowledge what the Minister just said about the particularly vulnerable, who may be in refuges or places like that, but the provision feels quite broad, particularly in relation to debt recovery and support. Many organisations might have quite a lot of information that would be helpful to the DWP—I think particularly of, for example, Citizens Advice, which sees the records of quite of a lot of people. Why has that carve-out been included and what purpose does it serve, beyond protecting particularly vulnerable groups that we do not want to put in danger?
My other question is about whether the provision excludes local authorities, which often provide temporary accommodation, for example. Does the subsection mean that local authorities will not be part of the group that could be asked for information?
Andrew Western
First, I am not of the view that the protections overly constrain our ability to gather the information we need and execute fraud operations as effectively as possible. The provision significantly broadens the overarching information-gathering package, the number the organisations from which we can compel information and the nature of the information that we can receive, but it is important that we take the steps needed to rule out some of the obvious kinds of information that people would expect us to remove, such as medical records and journalistic material.
It will probably help if I clarify the matter of the special protection status for certain organisations—I apologise if I was not clear when I said this before. The clause does not exempt charities or any specific organisations; it exempts certain types of information, such as that from organisations that provide services free of charge in relation to social security, housing or debt. We can still ask them for information, but not in relation to the advice they have provided. The measure is therefore perhaps not as restrictive as it may seem. It is not that the organisations can never be asked for information; it is just that certain types of information, of the nature I outlined in my principal contribution, will be protected.
Local authorities are not exempt, and they will have a part to play in much of our investigatory work, as the hon. Member for South West Devon suggested.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 85 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 86
Giving notices etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
The information-gathering powers set out under clause 72 will be amended to ensure that information can be compelled from third parties digitally. That is an important step forward for us. The updated information-gathering powers create a single, clear legal gateway so that the DWP can compel information from third parties, it is more straightforward to respond, and that information can be provided digitally.
The Department must ensure that provisions are in place so that, in the event of a failure of digital systems, investigations are not impacted. Therefore, under such rare circumstances, the DWP will retain the power to compel information in writing, as set out in clause 86 —[Interruption.] I think Jennie likes this one. The clause also confirms that the DWP giving an administrative penalty notice by post is sufficient to effect service, and also applies to the eligibility verification measure, enabling the DWP to issue a notice to financial institutions by post, if necessary.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 86 inserts the provision for the DWP to retain the ability to issue an information notice and receive relevant documents by post. The Minister will be pleased to hear that he has answered my questions. The only thing I would ask is: how often does he expect information notices to be issued digitally? I suppose the flip question is: are you expecting the system to work perfectly and the post option to be used very rarely? For example, with vulnerable and older groups, might the post option need to be used more broadly than digital in certain cases?
Andrew Western
Clearly, in individual cases, if someone were to request contact by post, we would want to bear that in mind, but without wishing, as the Minister for transformation, to sound over-confident about the digital capability of some of our systems, in my view we would need to use these powers extremely rarely. It would be digital by default, except in the instance of, for example, system failure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 86 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 87
Independent review
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Clause 87 introduces an important safeguard by providing that all the criminal investigation powers in the Bill are independently inspected. As the Committee would expect, the DWP will make every effort to ensure that its criminal investigations are carried out to the letter of the law—through effective training, internal guidance and, for our entry, search and seizure powers, independent authorisation by the courts. However, it would not be right for the Department to simply mark its own homework. That is why the clause provides for an independent person to be commissioned by the Secretary of State to undertake inspections. This will ensure that there is a formal provision in place to establish that arrangement, and that it can be done in a way that is suitable for both the DWP and the independent person.
The independent person will be responsible for impartial inspection of the Department’s effectiveness, and compliance with relevant codes of practice and guidance in its criminal investigations. That aligns with other Government bodies such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority and the National Crime Agency, which also use investigatory powers at different levels and are also subject to independent inspections.
I am pleased to say that the independent person the DWP intends to commission is His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services for matters relating to investigations in England and Wales, and His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary in Scotland for investigations in Scotland. Those well-established bodies are experts in conducting such inspections and independently assessing the use of criminal investigation powers. Their reports will be published and laid before Parliament, including any recommendations for improvements.
The clause ensures that the Department’s criminal investigations will be conducted with transparency and accountability, demonstrating its commitment to fairness and transparency when exercising its criminal powers.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 87 provides for DWP investigation activity to be inspected and evaluated by an independent person or body. The Secretary of State will be able to appoint someone to inspect DWP criminal investigations, and to provide written reports and recommendations to the Secretary of State, which must be published and laid before Parliament. That review will also consider the DWP’s compliance with the codes of practice, which we have not yet seen, as was much discussed in earlier sittings.
We welcome the transparency that clause 87 will bring to how the DWP is using these powers; however, unlike clause 75, the clause does not state how often reviews would have to be conducted. Is there a reason for that? The Secretary of State would give “directions” as to the period to be covered by each review, having first consulted the independent person. Can the Minister confirm how frequently the Secretary of State will ask the DWP investigation activity to be reported on, and will the independent person or body be able to carry out reviews on their own initiative or will they have to wait until directed to do so by the Secretary of State?
The Minister has already given the Committee an indication of who may be appointed to lead those reviews, and I assume the layout of the police and fire authorities relates to that particular question, so I will not restate that for the record, but can I also ask the Minister how quickly reviews are expected to be concluded once they have been initiated—referring back to the wording of clause 75? For these reviews to be meaningful, there must be a way for the DWP to learn lessons and improve practice, so how can the Minister reassure the Committee that there will be a process in place for that to happen?
The Chair
I remind Members to bob if they wish to catch my eye to speak, and to refrain from using the word “you”, which refers to me as opposed to the Minister.
John Milne
My colleague has just partially asked my question. While we broadly welcome the clause, we are concerned by the absence of the code of practice. Could the Minister give any indication of the kind of guidance that it might contain? Also, at what stage of the parliamentary process will there be scrutiny of it, given that it will not be during this Committee?
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Western. I want to raise the comments made by the Information Commissioner in relation to the Bill and the updates to the previous Government’s proposals. I understood that they were more content with this Bill than the previous Bill. They were pleased that it brought data protection more tightly within the measures, and that it talked about data protection in a much more consistent way with the law. They said that the Bill more tightly scopes the types of information that can and cannot be shared. I understand that our debate on clause 85 covered some of those improvements.
However, at the end of their comments, the Information Commissioner talked about the review process, and said very clearly that they would like to explore with the Government the role that the Information Commissioner’s Office can play in assisting with the review process. This clause does not set out the different offices and people with whom the independent reviewer needs to liaise in preparing their report. I wondered whether Ministers could comment on their thoughts surrounding that process, and consider setting out in the code of practice or further guidance how the independent reviewer might engage properly with data protection in their review.
Andrew Western
There were a number of questions there—I was scribbling at pace—so if I miss anything, please intervene. In terms of when and how often investigations will happen, it is expected that the period for each review will be set and carried out in mutual agreement with each of the bodies. On whether they can ask to undertake a review, it would need to be in consultation with the Secretary of State, but it is fair to say we would be doing ourselves no favours by refusing to bear their request in mind. Likewise, on timescales, it is all in collaboration with the Secretary of State.
On when we can expect to see the codes of practice, for search and seizure the Home Office’s existing codes of practice will apply, but for information-gathering powers it will be the updated code of practice, which will be consulted on and laid in Parliament before being used. We anticipate that new codes of practice will be available before Committee stage in the House of Lords.
In relation to the response to inspections and how we would learn from them, once the independent body has produced its report the Secretary of State must publish it and lay it before Parliament. Although no legal obligation is placed on the Secretary of State to implement recommendations, we will respond to all recommendations promptly and, as a learning organisation, always look to make continuous improvements.
Rebecca Smith
I thank the Minister for answering those questions. The lack of stipulation on timeframe, frequency and so on begs the question of why this provision is in the Bill. Ultimately, what will trigger a review? That is the bit we probably have not touched on. Who will say to the Secretary of State, who no doubt is an incredibly busy woman, “This is what we need to be doing at this time”? I appreciate that it would be her officials, but this provision is buried in the middle of the Bill and there is no stipulation that a review has to happen after a 12-month period, every six months or whatever. How do we ensure that this transparency, which we welcome, will actually take place, and that the benefits of having a review come to pass?
Andrew Western
That is a reasonable question. Clearly, if there are incidents such as those that would bring into scope the IOPC powers, that would attract significant attention and it would be obvious and—dare I say it?—necessary for the Secretary of State to refer there. In relation to timescales and so on, much of that would depend on what has happened in a period. Were we to say that this was something that will be done every year or every other year and then something happened immediately, we would lack the flexibility to utilise the powers in the agile way we hope to do so. I appreciate that it may appear vague when compared with some powers that we have previously discussed, but that is so we can respond to events, rather than seek to dodge the use of the power.
Clearly, to an extent we will always work in collaboration. As I say, I would not intend at any point to resist a request from HMICFRS or any other body to look into work that we had undertaken, in particular in response to anything that may be considered controversial, not least because search and seizure powers are totally new for the DWP. We need to land them appropriately and build trust that we are able to execute the warrant powers properly.
The Information Commissioner’s comments related primarily to the eligibility verification measures, as they pertain to a direct comparison to the third-party data powers in the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. Obviously, the Information Commissioner has fairly wide-ranging powers to involve himself in any investigations. It is not something that we would look to resist. I think the channels are already in place for him to engage wherever he feels that it is appropriate.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 87 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 88
Enforcement of non-benefit payments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Clause 88 sets out the details of how an overpayment of a non-benefit payment, such as under the kickstart scheme that was used after the pandemic, will be made recoverable. This is necessary if we are to use the administrative penalty in connection with such cases to enable us to improve fairness, allowing the Department to address fraud wherever it occurs in the welfare system. As the Bill specifically seeks to extend the use of the administrative penalty—a penalty that is considered only after a criminal investigation of a suspicion of fraud—we are specifically extending the recovery of overpayments to cases of fraud against a non-benefit payment.
This means that, before we can recover overpayments of non-benefit payments, the DWP will need to have completed a thorough criminal investigation into a suspicion of fraud and either an administrative penalty is accepted or there is a court conviction. Once that has happened, the process for recovery of non-benefit overpayments will be the same as the long-established processes for social security overpayments. As with social security overpayments, a notice must be sent to the person who received the non-benefit overpayment. The notice sets the right to challenge the overpayment decision.
The overpayment decision can be challenged first by requesting a review by the Secretary of State, and if the decision is maintained, they can appeal to the first-tier tribunal. Individuals have one month to apply for a review and one month after the notification of the outcome of the review to appeal, as outlined in proposed new subsections 71ZK(2) and 71ZK(6). These time limits are the same as those for challenging benefit overpayment decisions. If the decision is not disputed or is upheld following a review or appeal, the non-benefit overpayment becomes recoverable in the same way as social security overpayments.
Clause 88 is fundamental. It ensures that there is fairness in the DWP’s response to fraud, meaning our investigators and decision makers treat cases of fraud against any DWP payment in the same equitable way.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 88 sets out the mechanism for the recovery of non-benefit payments. This applies when a person misrepresents or fails to disclose a material fact, and as a consequence they or another person receives a non-benefit payment, or an amount of a non-benefit payment, that they would not otherwise have received. Subsection (2) provides a power to recover the overpayment.
Clause 88 also sets out what the Secretary of State must do before an overpayment can be recovered. This includes providing an overpayment notice, the detail that must be included in that notice, and that the person must have had the opportunity to challenge the overpayment. The Secretary of State can issue an overpayment notice only if the person has been convicted of an offence set out in the legislation, or if it appears possible to institute proceedings against a person for an offence. The only grounds to appeal a notice are if there has been no overpayment of a non-benefit payment or if the amount stated in the notice is not correct. Any appeal must be made before the end of the period of one month, beginning the day after the day on which a person was given the notice.
This question has probably been answered in an earlier debate, but I will ask it anyway to get it on the record: will the notices be sent in the post or electronically? That links back to our debate on clause 86; how the Government ensure that the notices get to the right people is going to be particularly important. Finally, why is there no ability to extend the one-month period, and on what basis was one month decided?
Steve Darling
I just want some assurance on how it was decided that one month was long enough. For my sins, I served the people of Torbay in elected of office for 30 years before getting elected to Parliament. I am alive to the fact that some people have chaotic lives. I am only too aware of how sometimes people turn up to the citizens advice bureau with a couple of carrier bags full of unopened envelopes because due to their mental health challenges the only way they are able to deal with their world is by putting their head in the sand, sadly.
I wanted an assurance on whether there was a level of flexibility. It appears from the clause that there is a drop-dead proposal here. What flexibility is proposed? I look forward to hearing the Minister speak about those people who are perhaps more vulnerable than the rest of us.
Rebecca Smith
I was hasty in putting down my notes and I realised I left out a bit, so thank you for humouring me, Mr Western. Clause 88 also sets out that there is a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal against the notice, unless it has been revoked on review. We welcome the ability to appeal to the first-tier tribunal, but can I ask the Minister whether any amounts recoverable will be paused during the appeal process? Again, there is only one month to appeal to the first-tier tribunal, so can he explain on what benefit this timeframe was chosen?
Andrew Western
On whether notices will be sent in the post, it will be a mixture, as in the case for benefits rather than grants. The means of communication may be electronic or by post—there is always a blend. When we follow up in instances where debt recovery is required, we always use a range of mechanisms, such as telephone, digital and post, to attempt to get hold of somebody when we need to.
On the question from the hon. Members for South West Devon and for Torbay regarding how we came up with the one-month period either side of the appeal, that is the existing practice in the case of benefits, and we feel that it is therefore appropriate for non-benefit grants. To give some assurance on flexibility and vulnerability, the characteristics of claimants that might make them vulnerable, such as mental health difficulties, disabilities and other mitigating circumstances, will always be factored in by the decision maker when deciding whether to opt for an administrative penalty in the first place. At present, that happens in the case of benefits, and we would be extending that practice to grants and other non-benefit issues.
If the customer is suspected of being vulnerable at any stage of the investigation, the team leader or higher-investigations leader, in consultation with the investigator, will decide on the appropriate next steps. On the question of the timeliness of recovery, recovery will not start before an appeal was made. If there is an appeal, there will have been no recovery.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 88 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gerald Jones.)
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Tenth sitting)
Tuesday 11th March 2025
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 View all Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 March 2025 - (11 Mar 2025)
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 89, page 55, line 6, leave out from “unless” to the end of line 14 and insert—
“(a) the liable person agrees, or
(b) there has been a final determination by a court or tribunal that it is necessary and proportionate to exercise a power under Schedule 3ZA.”
This amendment would mean that the Secretary of State can only exercise powers to recover amounts from a person where the person agrees or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate.
Siân Berry
It is a pleasure to have you back in the Chair this afternoon, Sir Jeremy. The amendment covers direct deduction orders relating to social security payment debt of individuals who are no longer on benefits and not employed within the pay-as-you-earn system, as well as the use of powers to disqualify debtors from driving—a power I oppose, and we will debate that when we come to schedule 6.
The clause introduces the power for the Department for Work and Pensions to recover funds directly from a person’s bank account without a court warrant. The Secretary of State may make a direct deduction order in respect of a recoverable amount, where the debtor is no longer on benefits and is not employed within the PAYE system. As I understand it, the powers apply to all benefits under sections 71 to 78 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, including universal credit, and employment and support allowance. The powers apply to not only overpayments caused by deliberately fraudulent behaviour, but negligent oversight, incorrect statements and failure to disclose information. A DDO may be issued in relation to a joint account, if that is the only account that the debtor has.
The amendment would replace the conditions for such powers under proposed new section 80A(5) of the 1992 Act and would mean that the Secretary of State can only exercise powers to recover amounts from a person where the person agrees that the payment is due, or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate. The language and wording almost exactly mirrors that in clause 12, on page 9 of the Bill, which provides that protection for debtors to public authorities. If the likes of potential covid fraudsters and corrupt company directors get the protection of a court or tribunal decision, it is difficult to understand why a benefit recipient should not get the same.
It is worth noting that we already have powers to address the scenario where a debtor is no longer on benefits and not in PAYE employment. In such cases, the DWP can recover overpayments through county court enforcement proceedings. I am aware that the DWP argues that the county court method of enforcement is slow and resource-intensive. However, that is not a good reason to jettison judicial oversight from a process that allows the Government to take money directly from individuals’ bank accounts.
My amendment 7 seeks to address the concern that those powers hand an extraordinary amount of discretion to the Secretary of State, as there is no threshold to determine what constitutes hardship or what would be fair in all the circumstances. Furthermore, as far as I can see, no floor is defined for the amount of money that must be left in the debtor’s bank account.
I understand that the DWP maintains that the power is like those used by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Child Maintenance Service, but that is not comparing like with like. Child maintenance is money owed—already defined to be affordable—by one parent to ensure provision for their dependant who does not live with them. That differs from an individual claiming money from the social security system who has been overpaid, potentially through no fault or a simple mistake of their own, where restitution may be extremely difficult to manage fairly and affordably.
Furthermore, I understand that HMRC powers have safeguards: before the powers are exercised, debtors must receive a face-to-face visit from an HMRC agent; and HMRC must retain at least £5,000 across the debtor’s accounts. By contrast, the Bill leaves those protections to the DWP’s discretion, based on the debtor’s representations and covertly obtained bank statements.
The amendment is also needed because the direct deduction powers as drafted would not be powers of last resort. For example, there is no requirement for the minimum number of times a liable person has failed to engage with the DWP before the powers can be exercised; there is no definition of whether someone has been given a reasonable opportunity to settle the debt; and there is no requirement for an in-person visit from the DWP. Such safeguards matter, because benefit recipients may not be engaging due to incapacity, illness, mental health problems or other genuine reasons. If those circumstances are ongoing, this will be an ineffective deterrent to force people to engage and repay their debts.
The amendment would mirror protections in part 1 of the Bill by limiting the availability of direct deduction order powers to cases where the debt is accepted, either by the debtor or by judicial determination. That would prevent the DWP from lowering the legal threshold at which funds can be removed directly from an individual’s bank account. I hope that we will come back to this issue at a later stage, as I really do want some action on it.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Sir Jeremy. Amendment 7 would introduce a new requirement for the direct recovery from account power, restricting its use to cases where the debtor agrees or where a court or tribunal determines that the exercise of the power is necessary and appropriate. I am not clear whether the amendment would do exactly what the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion intends, which I believe is to place the restriction on all the new DWP recovery powers proposed in the Bill, but I will address the amendment as I think it was intended.
Although I share the view that there should be protections in place to ensure that the direct recovery power is used proportionately and appropriately, I do not agree that the amendment is necessary. In my view, the Bill already contains sufficient safeguards. The amendment would also introduce unnecessary burdens for courts and tribunals, create avoidable inefficiencies and, ultimately, reduce the amount of taxpayers’ money that the power would bring back into the public purse.
The Department has long-standing powers under sections 71 and 71ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to recover public money wrongly paid in excess of entitlement. Those provisions include a strong framework, including rights of reconsideration and appeal against the overpayment decision. The DWP already has powers to recover such overpayments through deduction from benefits and PAYE wages under sections 71, 71ZC and 71ZD of the 1992 Act.
The power in the clause is aimed at recovering taxpayers’ money owed by debtors who persistently evade repayment and refuse to engage with the DWP to agree affordable repayment terms, even though they have the means to do so. It is highly unlikely that those debtors, who, until this point in the debt recovery process, have ignored all reasonable requests by the DWP to work with it to agree repayment terms, would suddenly willingly agree to the DWP recovering the money they owe directly from their bank account. It is therefore highly likely that, under the amendment, the DWP would be required to seek a determination from the court or tribunal that a direct deduction order is necessary and appropriate.
The DWP can already seek lump sum recovery from a debtor’s bank account through the courts by applying for a third-party debt order. The very rationale for introducing this power is to recover more than £500 million of public money over the next five years without using court time unnecessarily. The amendment would create entirely avoidable inefficiencies.
The Bill already makes sufficient provision for a debtor to challenge a direct deduction order if they do not agree with it, first through the right to make representations concerning the terms of the order prior to any deductions being made and, following that, through a right of appeal to the tribunal. That is in addition to the debtor’s existing mandatory reconsideration and appeal rights concerning the decision that there is a recoverable overpayment that must be repaid.
In addition to those safeguards, the Bill includes sufficient provisions to ensure that the power is used appropriately and proportionately. Specifically, it provides that it is a last-resort power that can be used only if recovery is not reasonably possible by deductions from benefit or PAYE earnings. The debtor can avoid the power entirely at any point by working with the DWP to agree affordable and sustainable repayment terms.
Separately, the disqualification from driving power can be exercised only at the discretion of the court. Again, that provision includes necessity and proportionality considerations by requiring disqualification to be suspended provided that the debtor makes the payments ordered by the court, and ensuring that an order cannot be made if the court considers that the debtor has an essential need for a licence.
Lastly, the amendment would be likely to reduce the expected deterrent impact of the direct deduction power. Although the DWP will take the appropriate action, in line with legislation, to address debtors who persistently evade repayment of taxpayers’ money when they have the financial means to repay, the power is expected to encourage debtors to agree affordable and sustainable repayment with the DWP without the need to proceed with an order.
Making such an amendment would lessen the power’s effectiveness, meaning that the DWP would have to take this action more frequently than envisaged and potentially subject debtors to court proceedings where the DWP would not have as the Bill is currently drafted. I hope—but I suspect possibly not—that I have reassured the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion that the Bill contains sufficient provisions and safeguards.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Is it fair to say, for the reasons that the Minister outlined on the removal of the deterrent, that this amendment would not only assist some who seek to commit fraud but cost the DWP in its internal legal responsibilities and duties, as well in what it has to contribute to the court process to pay for what the amendment would require, in the sum of tens of millions of pounds?
Andrew Western
I would not put a specific value on it, but my hon. Friend may well be right with the sort of figures that he suggests. Yes, there would be additional costs from the preparation in advance of court appearances, as well as the administrative costs of applying to the court itself. I think we would bear a significant burden, were we to agree to this amendment. Having outlined my reasons, I will resist amendment 7.
Clause 89 inserts proposed new section 80A into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and it sets out which debts can be recovered by the new DWP recovery powers introduced in part 2 of the Bill. The new recovery powers are, firstly, the power to recover from bank accounts via direct deduction orders and, secondly, the power to disqualify a person from holding a driving licence.
The introduction of this clause ensures that the DWP can apply the new recovery powers to relevant social security debts. The clause is crucial to ensure that the new recovery powers in clauses 90 and 91 are used proportionately, appropriately and as intended by making them a power of last resort. By that, I mean that the DWP can use the new powers only after a debtor has been given all reasonable opportunities to repay the money owed, and only where recovery by existing powers is not reasonably possible.
The DWP debt stock stands at over £9 billion. As set out in the impact assessment, there is approximately £1.7 billion of off-benefit debt where individuals are able to avoid repayment, as the DWP is currently unable to recover effectively and efficiently in these cases. The Department’s current recovery powers are limited to deductions from benefits or PAYE earnings, meaning that those with other income streams and capital can choose not to repay their debt. The powers are vital to tackle those who repeatedly and persistently evade repayment, bringing £565 million of taxpayers’ money back into the public purse over the next five years.
These powers are expected to have a deterrent effect and to encourage many debtors to agree to repay without the powers being used. Debtors will be notified of the powers and their potential to be used to recover the money owed, should the individual continue to evade repayment. Let me be clear: where someone keeps money to which they are not entitled and repeatedly refuses to repay, the DWP will recover that money through these new powers. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Jeremy. Clause 89 sets out how money is to be recovered. It specifies that the Secretary of State cannot recoup the money from someone’s bank account or disqualify them from driving until they have given the liable person a reasonable opportunity to settle their liability, notified the liable person that the Secretary of State may exercise the power to recover the amount, if the liability is not settled, and the Secretary of State must also have given the liable person a summary of how the power would be exercised.
We support the recovery of money that has been fraudulently claimed, and I believe it is pretty clear that we need to do it. However, when the money has been given out in error, particularly to vulnerable claimants, as has been mentioned this afternoon, will the Minister explain how those vulnerable claimants will be communicated with? How will the DWP ensure that funds can be managed in a way that is sustainable for the individual who has to make those repayments? I hope that would also reassure the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion.
Green party amendment 7 would mean that the Secretary of State can exercise powers to recover amounts from a person only where the person agrees or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate. We in the official Opposition question why the Secretary of State should be prevented from recovering amounts that have been fraudulently claimed, unless the person in question agrees. The amendment seems to us to entirely frustrate the purpose of clause 89, which may well be its intent.
Siân Berry
Would the hon. Member care to comment on the fact that in clause 12, actual fraudsters are given the option to either have a court agree, or for them to agree to repay the amount?
Rebecca Smith
In terms of the Cabinet Office powers that we debated under part 1 of the Bill, I think we are not comparing apples and apples; we are comparing apples and pears. I am not the Government, so it is not my Bill, but ultimately we have heard the figures—indeed, I have shared the significant amount of fraud we are talking about—and if I were in the Minister’s shoes, I would say that the number of cases is not comparable. I continue with my view that this is different from the first part of the Bill.
I would be interested to hear an explanation from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about why she does not believe that money that has been fraudulently claimed from the DWP should be paid back. However, I have a question for the Minister off the back of amendment 7, which is similar to the question I asked him about clause 89. Regarding the concerns about the definition of hardship and vulnerability that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned, what might those levels be? I appreciate that that is potentially difficult to include in the Bill, but it would be interesting to know what is defined as a level of hardship that would have an impact on repayment, and how that would be determined.
Andrew Western
I will spend a moment setting out the process around the establishment of communications prior to deduction from a bank account and the affordability considerations that we undertake.
A person who is not paid under PAYE, or is in receipt of benefits, is identified and referred to the DWP’s debt management team initially to recover the debt. The debt management team makes multiple attempts, by letter or phone, to contact the person over at least four weeks to agree a voluntary repayment plan. If no contact can be made at that point, the case is referred to the DWP debt enforcement team, who will make at least four further separate attempts at contact, by letter or phone. That will include, at a minimum, two written notifications setting out the debt amounts owed, how the DWP may enforce the recovery of the debt, and with signposting to debt support to ensure that support is offered to vulnerable people.
If there is still no contact made, the person has repeatedly refused to engage and agree a voluntary plan. At that point, the DWP will check that the person has not made a new claim for benefit or entered PAYE employment, to check the person is suitable for this sort of recovery action. The person’s bank can then be contacted by the DWP to provide three months of bank statements from their accounts to check the affordability for any deduction, and to help the DWP work out the right amount, and frequency, of any deduction. The deductions must be line with caps in legislation. For regular deductions, that must not exceed 40% of the amounts credited into an account over the period for which bank statements are obtained. This will ensure that no one is forced to repay more than they can afford, so no one is pushed into financial hardship due to the recovery of debt.
Once that affordability assessment is complete, the DWP must write to the person to outline the debt that is being recovered—in other words, what has been overpaid and what is owed—the amount and frequency of the deduction, and how the deduction will be made, which in this case is from their bank account. The letter must outline the opportunities for the person to make representations to the DWP about any circumstances that the Department should consider before making the deduction, and it must also outline their right for the deduction decision to be reviewed. The person has a month to make representations or request a review. The letter must also outline appeal rights, including that if a person has made representations or asked for a review and the deduction order has been upheld, they may appeal the decision to the first-tier tribunal.
If there is no contact, one month after notifying the person of the proposed deduction the DWP will instruct the bank to deduct money, and repayments will be made directly to the DWP from the person’s bank account until the debt is repaid. That shows that it is quite a rigorous process, with a number of attempts to make contact with the person and a number of safeguards in rights to object and rights to appeal. In addition, for particularly vulnerable people, we have the vulnerability framework; part of that process supports people through referrals to advice services. We work with the Money and Pensions Service in particular, and frequently refer people to its services frequently.
For specific vulnerabilities and in particular cases, there is discretion to consider waiving the debt. That is unusual, but it is clearly an important safeguard for extreme cases—for instance, where domestic violence or financial coercion is involved. That is applied very much on a case-by-case basis; it is not a power or a policy that we would expect to use regularly.
I hope I have given the Committee an indication of the support and process for vulnerable people, and the number of humps in the road, as it were, before we get to the point at which we make a deduction.
Siân Berry
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 89 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 90
Recovery from bank accounts etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Clause 90 inserts proposed new section 80B into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, adding the direct deduction order power to recover public money owed to the DWP directly from a debtor’s bank account. Direct deduction orders are vital to recovering funds owed by debtors who have the means to repay a debt but refuse to do so. This is essential to bolster the DWP’s ability to recover more of the public money owed by those who persistently evade repayment, to minimise losses to the taxpayer and to redirect the funds recovered to essential public services.
The powers also make DWP debt recovery fairer. At present, the DWP can recover debt directly from people on benefits by making deductions from benefits; it can also recover debt directly from those on PAYE through a direct earning attachment, but for those who are neither on benefits nor on PAYE, the DWP has limited options for recovery if they refuse to pay. That cannot be fair. For those not on benefits or PAYE, where all attempts to agree an affordable and sustainable repayment plan have failed, the option available to the DWP is to seek a third-party debt order via the court. Such action is restricted to lump-sum recoveries and can lead to debtors facing challenges securing credit due to the court judgment. Introducing the new power will allow the DWP to return taxpayers’ money to the public purse more effectively through affordable and regular deductions, without using court time.
There are important safeguards. First, the powers are to be used only as the last resort; multiple attempts at contact must be made, and those must be of different types—for example by letter and telephone. Secondly, all direct deduction orders will be subject to an affordability assessment based on the three months’ bank statements obtained. Thirdly, before any recoveries are made, individuals must be notified of the proposed action; they will have the right to present information to the DWP about their circumstances and the proposed terms of the order, in response to which the DWP may vary or revoke the order. Fourthly, if an order is still upheld after a review or consideration of information presented, the individual has a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal. These are important safeguards to ensure deductions do not cause undue hardship. In addition, the Department will always signpost to debt management advice. In the oral evidence session, we heard from the Money and Pensions Service about how well that partnership is operating.
Direct deduction orders are essential to increasing the amount of debt that the DWP can recover. They are balanced measures, with robust safeguards to protect those who are vulnerable or experiencing financial hardship. Having outlined the main provisions in clause 90, I commend it to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 90 makes provision for recovery of social security debts directly from the liable person’s bank account. That power is broadly similar to powers contained in the Child Support Act 1991 and the Finance (No. 2) Act 2015, which enable deductions to be made directly from the liable person’s bank account without a court order. We support the inclusion of the power in the Bill, but further to our debates on part 1, I should be interested to know whether any other measures beyond bank account recovery and disqualification from driving were considered. Reference was made earlier to the ability to seize assets, particularly in relation to part 1 and the Public Sector Fraud Authority, but as that is not on the face of the Bill I would be grateful for further details about if and where that is allowed for within part 2.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Jeremy. I am again raising concerns about a serious power to make direct deductions from people’s bank accounts.
Life does not always come in neat paragraphs; it is messy. I have had a number of letters from constituents in Horsham setting out the kind of errors that can happen. A lady called Marianne, who is a universal credit recipient, received a small inheritance, which she tried to report by phone and email, but that still resulted in her wrongly losing her UC for a period. Another constituent, Hannah, said:
“I have zero hours contract and work between 9-11 hours a week at just over minimum wage. At times I have had a back dated pay rise which pushed me over the allowance limit (I wasn’t informed in advance this was happening). I’m also at the mercy of someone else submitting my hours, so if they aren’t submitted on time they roll over to the next pay period causing me to exceed the allowance limit.”
At no time did she ever come anywhere near the allowance limit in real earnings; nevertheless, she was caught up in the rules.
Does the Minister feel that we have sufficient safeguards to avoid that kind of inadvertent administrative error? Mistakes have happened in the past and will continue to happen, but this is a very strong power that could cause real distress.
Andrew Western
We have not considered the seizure of assets under this Bill; nor are we are looking at forcing the sale of a home. We want to ensure that the powers we take are proportionate. We are not seeking to cause further hardship, and clearly the loss of their home would likely move a person into that category. Those decisions would ultimately remain with the court were we to take particularly serious case through the courts.
The hon. Member for Horsham raised some examples from his casework of people in receipt of universal credit who found they were inadvertently in receipt of overpayments. If they are still in receipt of universal credit—I think they are, going by what the hon. Gentleman said—they would be out of scope for the debt recovery powers that we are considering, so this provision would not apply in those specific examples.
If someone tells us of a change of circumstances, we always seek to action that as swiftly as possible. In cases such as the second example that the hon. Gentleman cited, where the mistake was the employer’s, there is not a tremendous amount that the Department can do. I have sympathy with his constituent, but it does not sound like that case would fall under the umbrella of departmental error. I assure him, however, that as both his constituents were still in receipt of benefits, they would not face a deduction from their bank accounts. That does not mean that an overpayment would not be recovered through other means, but recovery would be out of scope of this power. The treatment of overpayments from universal credit as recoverable was determined by Parliament a long time ago—I believe in 2012.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill..
Schedule 5
Recovery from bank accounts etc
Siân Berry
I beg to move amendment 8, to schedule 5, page 98, line 10, leave out from beginning to end of line 24 on page 99.
This amendment would remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the Secretary of State for the purposes of making a direct deduction order.
My amendment 8 is related to our debate about direct deduction orders and safeguards for people with social security debts. The amendment would remove the requirement for banks to routinely provide information to the Secretary of State for the purposes of making a direct deduction order. It is important to note that before the Secretary of State can make a direct deduction order, they must submit an account information notice to the bank with which the debtor has an account requesting copies of the debtor’s bank statements covering a period of at least three months prior to the notice being issued.
I understand that the disclosure’s intended purpose is for the Secretary of State to consider whether the debtor can afford to have the funds deducted, but the schedule states that the bank must not inform the debtor or joint account holders if it receives an AIN. I am concerned that powers to request granular information from banks about their customers, without the customers’ knowledge, to decide whether an individual can afford to pay back an overpayment are intrusive and potentially authoritarian. Bank statements can reveal sensitive and private information about an individual’s movements, associations, political opinions, religious beliefs, sex life, sexual orientation and trade union membership. Since an AIN can also apply to joint accounts, individuals who are not themselves benefit recipients can have their private financial information disclosed to the DWP in a similar way.
The powers will affect individuals who have been overpaid because of mistakes and oversights. The Secretary of State should not be able to covertly demand a person’s financial records without suspicion that the person has committed any criminal offence. I sincerely hope that the Minister will consider amendment 8. It would remove the powers that require banks to hand over bank statements and account information, and thus it would prevent direct deduction orders being issued on the basis of covert financial surveillance. As with amendment 7, I hope we will come back to the issues raised by amendment 8 at a later stage, and that we will see some changes in this area.
Andrew Western
I will resist amendment 8. It is challenging to receive an amendment such as this after a conversation about what we are doing to protect vulnerable people. Having stressed the need to do that and to ensure that debts can be repaid in a way that is affordable, it would be wrong of me to agree an amendment that would entirely remove our ability to ascertain that.
The amendment seeks to remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the Department in response to an account information notice and a general information notice for the purpose of making a direct deduction order. That removes a critical safeguard on direct deduction orders.
Siân Berry
Will the Minister consider the covert aspect of the requirement? The information is not given voluntarily by the person concerned. That is the authoritarian surveillance aspect and that is what concerns me the most; it is not merely that the Secretary of State is seeking useful information.
Andrew Western
The challenge is that, by that time, we will have made repeated and sustained attempts to contact the person to ask them to engage with us to agree an affordable repayment plan, to assess their ability to agree that plan and to encourage them to pay back what has already been established as a recoverable debt. The requirement is part of a power of last resort. I am not convinced that we would be able to secure engagement from such a person, as the power applies in relation to someone we have repeatedly tried to contact. Without it, I fail to see how we could both have a conversation with someone whom we have not previously been able to contact and assure ourselves that we would not be putting somebody in a particularly challenging financial position.
Neil Coyle
Is it fair to say that the impact of this amendment, if made, would be to require the DWP to ask people that they suspect of committing fraud for their permission to investigate whether they are committing fraud? Is it not likely that the number of potential fraudsters willing to give that information would be the roundest of round numbers?
Andrew Western
Not quite. We would not be contacting banks to establish whether fraud had been committed under the amendment. We would already have established that a debt is owed, so that investigation would already have been completed. The debt, whether it was the result of fraud or error, has been established. However, I agree with my hon. Friend on the number of people who, having previously not engaged with us at all, will concur on the need to check bank statements to assess affordability. That may well be the roundest of round numbers.
Under the Bill, before any direct deduction order is actioned, the DWP must issue an account information notice to a bank to obtain bank statements. The AIN must contain the name of the debtor and identify the targeted account. This is a necessary and important safeguard so that the DWP can gather sufficient financial information to make informed decisions on fair and affordable debt recovery. Obtaining this information is also vital to the effectiveness of the direct deduction power, as the Bill is clear that a deduction cannot be made until this information has been acquired. Without the information from bank statements, the DWP will not understand a debtor's financial circumstances and will not be able to establish an affordable deduction rate and commence recovery.
I remind the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion that the reason the information is not known is the sustained lack of engagement by the debtor in efforts to agree a voluntary and affordable repayment plan, and that the power is aimed at recovering taxpayers’ money from debtors who persistently evade repayment and refuse to engage with the DWP. The information gathered will make it clear whether they have the means to do so. Finally, I remind the Committee that these powers will be used as a last resort, and that by working with the DWP to agree affordable and sustainable repayment terms, debtors can avoid the application of the powers altogether.
Siân Berry
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move amendment 48, in schedule 5, page 101, line 17, leave out from “exceed” to the end of line 18 and insert—
“(a) in a case to which sub-paragraph (3A) applies, the amounts credited to the account in the relevant period, or
(b) in any other case, 20% of the amounts credited to the account in the relevant period.
(3A) This subsection applies in a case where the Minister is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the payable amount to which the regular direct deduction order related is recoverable from the liable person because the liable person committed fraud.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 22, in schedule 5, page 110, line 29, at end insert
“to which paragraph 6(3A) does not apply”.
Rebecca Smith
As hon. Members can see, amendment 48 would change the percentage of collections made, to bring them in line with what we have debated previously, so taking it down from 40% to 20%. It is fairly self-explanatory, but we felt that this decrease would make sense and tidy things up a bit. We are interested to know whether the Minister is in agreement.
Rebecca Smith
Amendment 22 is self-explanatory and I assume it is not something the Minister will be interested in, but we thought it was worth seeing what conversation could be had around it. Ultimately, it is as it is written and we are interested to hear the Minister’s response.
Andrew Western
Amendments 48 and 22 seek to limit the amount that can be deducted via a direct deduction order in any month to 20% of the amount credited to the account in the relevant period in non-fraud cases, and to set no limit in cases where the Department considers it more likely than not that the debt is the result of fraud.
The hon. Member for South West Devon will know I have sympathy with the idea of quickly collecting debts that arise due to fraud, but the measures in the Bill already allow the Department to collect higher amounts through a lump sum deduction order, rather than through a regular deduction order. This important flexibility in the application of these powers will allow us to seek a higher level of deductions. A lump sum deduction order can also be followed with a regular deduction order, if deemed appropriate.
The Bill currently states that, where recovery is made under a regular deduction order, the deduction must not exceed 40% of the amount credited into the account during the relevant period. Forty per cent is the maximum and is in line with other maximum rates for the DWP’s existing recovery powers, such as the direct earnings attachment power and the Child Maintenance Service’s deduction from earnings order power.
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
Perhaps the Minister can correct me if I have misunderstood, as the drafting obviously relates to the parallel provisions we debated in clause 22. My understanding is that, as currently drafted, if the Minister or the Public Sector Fraud Authority is satisfied that a loss is the result of fraud, they can impose a lump sum deduction up to 100% of the credited amount in an account. However, if they were to use a regular deduction order, each sum can be only 40%. Is there any reason, in principle or for welfare, why it is okay to take 100% of someone’s account on day one but not okay to take 50% today and 50% the following month?
Andrew Western
Put simply, my understanding is that if an individual debtor has sufficient money in their account to pay 100% on day one without financial hardship, we will apply that power. Where that is not possible—for example, if a person’s debt exceeds their means to repay it in one go—we will look at a regular deduction order. It is on that basis that we came to the 40% figure, which is based on the income going into an account each month.
We have set the cap to ensure that ongoing living costs can still be met on a month-by-month basis. It may not be that the figure used is 40%. We are simply seeking to give ourselves flexibility up to that amount. We are not saying that we will never recover more than that. If someone has £10 million in a bank account and owes the Department £1 million, it is reasonable to assume it will not cause them undue hardship to recover all of it in one go through a lump sum deduction.
The two powers are complementary but separate—one deals with ongoing recovery from a person who does not have sufficient means for recovery in one go, and the other deals with people who have savings or means significant enough to do just that. I hope that answers the question. I am happy to take another intervention if not.
The Bill currently states that when a recovery is made under a regular deduction order, deductions must not exceed 40% of the amount credited into the account during the relevant period—month by month is the obvious example. Forty per cent is the maximum and is in line with other maximum rates for the DWP’s existing recovery powers. The Department intends to set lower rates for regular deductions in non-fraud cases, allowing those rates to remain in line with existing recovery powers. Paragraph 24 of proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Social Security Administration Act 1992 therefore makes provision for regulations to be brought forward to set a maximum percentage deduction that is less than 40% in these cases.
Andrew Western
My argument is that the amendment is not required. The intention is to align deduction rates with other recovery methods used by the Department, and therefore the maximum rate of deduction is expected to be limited to a maximum of 20% in non-fraud cases.
I stress that these are maximum regular deduction rates; the actual deduction rate will depend on the level of income and other affordability considerations, based on the Department’s experience when applying deduction caps using existing recovery guidance outlined in the benefit overpayment guide, which can be found on gov.uk. In non-fraud cases, the amount regularly deducted will likely range between 3% and 20%. Similarly, not all fraud debt will be recovered at 40%. Regular deductions in fraud cases will range between 5% and 40%, depending on the debtor’s circumstances.
How the new debt measures operate will be clearly set out in the forthcoming statutory code of practice. These powers will enable the Department to apply the most appropriate debt recovery method to ensure efficient recoveries are made. Having outlined why I feel amendments 48 and 22 are unnecessary, I will therefore resist them.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Andrew Western
I beg to move amendment 6, in schedule 5, page 107, line 2, leave out from “review” to end of line 7.
This amendment leaves out provision that is not needed; paragraph 13(5), (6) and (8) of new Schedule 3ZA of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (as inserted by Schedule 5 of the Bill) makes the necessary provision.
Andrew Western
This amendment seeks to remove unnecessary repetition in the Bill, specifically removing part of paragraph 18 of proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Social Security Administration Act. This concerns the provision for the Secretary of State to notify the bank, the liable person and any other account holders, where appropriate, of the outcome of a review where a direct deduction order has been varied by the DWP.
This amendment does not change or remove that provision, as the DWP has a key obligation to ensure that all affected parties are notified of any changes to a direct deduction order following a review. This amendment simply removes a provision that is not needed; paragraphs 13(5), (6) and (8) of proposed new schedule 3ZA already makes the necessary provision. This amendment will simplify the Bill and prevent unintended confusion and duplication.
Schedule 5 introduces proposed new schedule 3ZA, which contains the substantive provisions of the new direct deduction orders, introduced in clause 90. The ability to recover directly from bank accounts is vital to recover public money owed to the DWP by those who have the means to repay but refuse to do so. As I outlined in my speech on clause 90, these powers will bring greater fairness to DWP debt recovery. At present, the DWP can recover debt directly from people on benefits only by making deductions from their benefits, and from those on PAYE through a direct earnings attachment.
For those who are on neither benefits nor PAYE, the DWP has limited options for recovery. Currently, there are an estimated 885,000 debtors off benefit who are not in repayment, with an estimated £1.74 billion not in recovery from this group. This schedule outlines powers to make lump sum and regular direct deductions from bank accounts through the use of a direct deduction order, as outlined in paragraph 1 of proposed new schedule 3ZA. Paragraph 3 outlines the information notices that the DWP can give to a bank, how the bank must comply, the information it must provide and how this information can be used.
To determine whether to make a direct deduction order, the DWP can give a bank an account information notice or a general information notice. An account information notice must be given to a bank, prior to any direct deduction order, to obtain bank statements. It must contain the name of the debtor and identify the targeted account. It is a necessary and important safeguard so that the DWP can gather sufficient financial information to make informed decisions on fair and affordable debt recoveries. A general information notice can be issued at any time for the purpose of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. It requires the bank to provide information on all the bank accounts held by the debtor, including any joint or unincorporated business accounts.
A bank must comply with an information notice, and may be liable to a penalty for failure to comply without a reasonable excuse. The information provided by the bank is necessary and proportionate to ensure that the DWP considers a debtor’s financial situation before making a direct deduction order. As set out in paragraph 4, the schedule also requires the DWP to presume that any moneys in a joint account belong equally to the debtor and the other account holder, unless there is evidence to the contrary. That ensures that only the portion of funds reasonably attributable to the debtor can be recovered from joint accounts, protecting the rights of other account holders.
Before seeking to recover debt, the DWP must give the debtor notice. The notice must identify the account to be subject to the proposed order, state the terms of the order and identify the recoverable amount to which the order relates. It must also invite the debtor to make representations. It must set the time for representations to be made, which must be at least one month. The Secretary of State must consider those representations and uphold, vary or revoke the order. Only after any representations have been considered can the direct deduction order be made. If no representations are received, the order can be made but the account holders are given a further month to request a review.
To ensure that funds necessary for debt recovery are not deliberately concealed or withdrawn, a bank may be required to take steps, in response to the notice, to ensure that the amount proposed to be deducted is not removed while the account holders are given time to make representations or request a review. That is vital to ensure that funds necessary for debt recovery are available in the debtor’s bank account so that the direct deduction order cannot be evaded.
If an order is made, it must be given to the bank and account holders. If the account holder is still dissatisfied, having made representations or sought a review, they can appeal to the first-tier tribunal, as I outlined previously. That allows disputes between the DWP and the debtor to be worked through quickly, while providing fair opportunities for the use of the power to be challenged.
When making a direct deduction, a DWP official will assess the bank information and determine the most appropriate deduction. As set out in paragraph 6, the schedule limits regular direct deductions to no more than 40% of the funds entering the account over the period in which the bank statements have been supplied. Regulations can lower, but not raise, the maximum percentage in some or all cases. That safeguards against excessive deductions and brings the powers in line with existing DWP recovery method legislation.
There is no legislative cap on lump sum deductions, as we expect to use them only where someone has large available savings. However, the DWP must be satisfied that neither lump sum nor regular deductions will cause the debtor, the other account holder or their dependants hardship in meeting essential living expenses. The Secretary of State may also vary direct deduction orders in the light of a change of circumstances—for example, if the debtor has a change of income or makes a new benefit claim.
In addition, paragraph 8 includes provision for a bank to deduct from the debtor’s account the administrative costs it has reasonably incurred by complying with a direct deduction order. That provision is essential to ensure that banks are compensated for the administrative efforts required to comply with the orders, thereby facilitating the efficient operation of debt recovery processes while protecting account holders from undue financial strain.
The schedule also contains provisions to ensure flexibility in direct deduction orders. Paragraphs 12, 13 and 16 allow the Secretary of State to vary, suspend or resume a regular direct deduction order. That provides the Secretary of State with the necessary flexibility to take appropriate action in relation to an order where a debtor’s circumstances change. Paragraph 9 requires that no deduction be made where the amount in the account is lower than the amount to be deducted. It is an important further safeguard to ensure that no one is pushed into hardship by a direct deduction order. Paragraph 17 makes provision to revoke a direct deduction order upon notification that the debtor has died.
Overall, the measure represents a significant part of the Bill, enabling the recovery of public money owed from those who persistently refuse to repay effectively, proportionately and fairly. Through this measure, the DWP estimates that it will realise benefits of £565 million in recovered debts over the forecast period.
Rebecca Smith
Schedule 5 makes provision regarding direct deduction orders from bank accounts. These can be regular or lump sum. The Secretary of State may make a direct deduction order in respect of a joint account only if the liable person does not hold a sole account in respect of which a direct deduction order may be made that would likely result in the recovery of the recoverable amount within a reasonable time. I would be grateful if the Minister explained what criteria will be used to decide whether a person has such an account. This came up last Thursday in relation to the main bank account of a claimant and the fact that the DWP will not be able to ascertain what other bank and savings accounts may be held. Is the same true here? Is this relevant only if the joint account is the account into which the benefits are paid? For the record, I am referring to column 238 of Hansard on 6 March.
The schedule will give the Secretary of State a power to request bank statements that is not time limited. It will also give the Secretary of State the power to request from banks details about the accounts that a person holds with that bank. The Secretary of State can set out how and when the bank must comply with the notice, and explain that the bank may be liable for a penalty under it if it fails to do so without a reasonable excuse. Can the Minister reassure the Committee about his planned engagement with banks—indeed, has he already had such engagement? Do banks think that this is a manageable requirement, and what will the costs of administering it be? Should that engagement with banks be due to happen, what might be done to reflect their views?
We have discussed that there is quite an onerous expectation on banks. The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, the hon. Member for Queen’s Park and Maida Vale, made a comment, in terms of the Cabinet Office powers, that it was almost the banks’ civic duty to make sure that they do this. I am intrigued to know whether they agree with that. It would be interesting to know what engagement Ministers have had, and what they will do about it. Lastly, how long will banks have to comply with notices, and what level of penalty will be levied on them if they do not comply? I think those are fair questions.
John Milne
The hon. Member raises the issue of the burden on banks; there is also the potential burden on the claimant. Banks sometimes have very large administrative charges, well in excess of the actual costs of whatever it is they do. Can the Minister give any assurance that there is some upper safety limit on excessive charging by banks? For instance, will a bank be able to charge for its corporate cost centre—a contribution towards its head office or functions—as can be the case with other charges? Basically, I seek clarity on the balance of how the charges will be administered.
Rebecca Smith
That relates to what I was going to say on amendment 43, had we got to it. I entirely appreciate what the hon. Member says about dealing with the vulnerable and protecting them from undue expectations, but is it not right that, if someone’s bank account goes overdrawn, they pay those charges regardless of their financial situation? Are we potentially seeking to give claimants more rights than they would ordinarily have with their own bank account simply because it is the DWP that is trying to recoup the money, rather than their bank?
John Milne
I am simply concerned that there should be some control of, or protection against, excessive charging. In the past, institutions have inflicted disproportionate charges that bear no relation to the actual cost of servicing whatever action had to be remedied. I am therefore seeking confirmation from the Minister that there is some protection in that direction as well with regard to the costs on the banks, as we said earlier.
Andrew Western
On the question raised by both the Opposition spokesperson and, substantively, the hon. Member for Horsham on the amounts that banks will levy in administrative charges on customers who are subject to a deduction order, paragraph 8 of schedule 5 makes provision for banks to deduct sums from an individual’s account for the purpose of meeting reasonable costs. Paragraph 23 makes provision for the Secretary of State to make regulations to set and maintain a cap on the charges that the banks may deduct. That is in line with the approach taken by the Child Maintenance Service, which sets maximum rates that the debtor can be charged for lump-sum or regular deductions.
To give an indication of the maximum amounts, that is £55 for a lump-sum deduction and £10 that the bank may charge for each regular deduction. It is worth stating, for the benefit of Members, that banks do not necessarily charge that amount; it can be significantly lower, but that is the most that someone can expect to pay.
On banks more generally, the exact costs to banks of this are still being worked through, for obvious reasons, but they have the ability to claim back administrative costs, as we have just discussed. On engagement, I have met UK Finance and a number of banks on a number of occasions. I think that the overarching theme of those conversations is that they would not want anything too onerous placed on them, but that they welcome the thrust of what we are trying to achieve and want to be helpful in working with us to achieve that. Speaking of costs to banks is probably a natural point for me to mention the penalty that can be placed on banks for not complying, which is £500.
On the question of multiple accounts and the determination of which accounts to look into and so on, we would make multiple orders if we wanted to look at more than one bank account. We would send information notices to each of those. We can use those notices to see other accounts that are held and relevant. Were someone to have a number of accounts, they would not be able to evade this provision, as was the case perhaps when we were discussing the eligibility verification measure.
I think I have probably answered everything that I had noted. Please let me know if there is anything else. I was about to repeat myself—
The Chair
No need for that.
Amendment 6 agreed to.
Schedule 5, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 91
Disqualification from driving
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
The clause inserts proposed new section 80C into the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to enact the disqualification-from-driving power. The introduction of the clause will allow the DWP to apply to the court to disqualify temporarily a person from driving, if they persistently and deliberately fail to repay their debt. The power is vital to boost the DWP’s ability to recover public money.
In accordance with clause 89, the power will be used as a last resort in the most serious cases, where the outstanding debt is at least £1,000 and where the debtor has persistently and deliberately evaded repaying their debt, such as by moving their capital out of reach of a direct deduction order, introduced under schedule 5, despite having the financial means to repay.
Schedule 6 inserts proposed new schedule 3ZB into the 1992 Act and it contains the substantive provision of the disqualification-from-driving power introduced under clause 91. The schedule sets out when the power may be used and how it will operate, including rules on the operation of suspended and immediate disqualification orders, variation and revocation of orders, as well as the grounds on which an order may be appealed. Appeals may be made to the appropriate appellate court on points of law, including the terms of an order or the court’s decision to make, not make, vary or revoke an order.
Only when all attempts at recovery, including the new direct deduction power, have failed will the Department for Work and Pensions be able to apply to the court for a suspended DWP disqualification order. If the court agrees that the debtor had the means but did not repay without a reasonable excuse, it will order the debtor to make what it assesses to be affordable repayments. The debtor can avoid being disqualified by making those repayments; it is only if the debtor does not comply with the court’s repayment terms that the DWP can apply for an immediate DWP disqualification order. It is at that point—again, only if the court agrees—that the debtor can be disqualified from holding a licence for up to two years.
Before either a suspended or immediate order can be made, the debtor will have opportunity to be heard by the court. We recognise that stopping someone from driving is a serious step, so my Department has built in several safeguards to give debtors every opportunity to avoid that. For example, missing a single instalment will not result in an immediate disqualification order. Even when someone is disqualified, they can get back the right to drive when they start making the repayments and the court considers that repayments are likely to continue.
However, persistent evaders who have the means to pay their debts will no longer be able to evade paying; it is against them that we would utilise this power. It is important to note that the court cannot make either a suspended or immediate order if it considers that the debtor has an essential need for their licence, such as if they need to drive as part of their job or to care for a dependant. That important safeguard in schedule 6 ensures a balance between taking robust action against those who deliberately evade recovery and preventing undue hardship.
The powers are key to recovering funds from those who deliberately evade repayment of public money owed to the DWP. Having outlined the main provisions in clause 91 and schedule 6, I urge the Committee to support them.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 91 makes provision for a liable person to be disqualified from driving. Any disqualification from driving will always be suspended in the first instance, subject to the liable person complying with what the court has assessed to be affordable and reasonable payments. When disqualification does occur, it is temporary and the liable person can have the disqualification lifted by satisfying the court that they are now making and will continue to make repayments.
We support the clause in general, but I have a few questions for the Minister about the practicalities, which are worth debating. First, however, will he clarify whether the clause is for cases of fraud, error or both? From what he said, it feels as if it is for both, and it is worth getting that on the record. What safeguards will the Department put in place to ensure that someone is not disqualified unnecessarily? Again, it sounds as if there is a long process before getting to that point. Is there a right of appeal or can the process be stopped before the disqualification takes place?
A few additional questions came to mind as I listened to the Minister just now. What role are the DVLA and the police expected to play in the wider disqualification? Who is responsible for the enforcement of that disqualification? I certainly know of a neighbour of mine who was disqualified for two years but continued driving; it was frustrating when I knew what he had done. Who would be responsible for that enforcement? In that instance, I knew that I could ultimately go to the police, but the scenario could be different in this case.
Likewise, will the decisions to disqualify from driving be publicised as they are when someone is disqualified for speeding or drink-driving? Again, that is part of the punishment; it also enables other people to know when somebody is in breach and promotes enforcement. It is also worth querying what measures might be put in place when somebody cannot be disqualified. The Minister said that some people would not be disqualified because of their jobs or family situations. What would be the deterrent for those people?
Furthermore, what if the person were not a driver or in possession of a driving licence? Obviously, recovery will be attempted from bank accounts, but if losing a driving licence is the final stop point it will be in the interests of fraudsters to divest themselves of theirs. We need to make sure that whatever it is that we are trying to achieve in the Bill, there are no shortcuts or opportunities for people to evade the repayment that the Department seeks.
John Milne
I am uncomfortable with this proposal, because it seems unfair that one group of people should be liable to a punishment and not another. If someone cannot drive or they do not have a car, this punishment means nothing to them, whereas another group who do drive are affected—and some of them very deeply, depending on their lifestyle, such as living in the country or other necessary means. I am fundamentally uncomfortable with what seems to be a punishment that falls on only one group of people, when it should be levied equally.
Siân Berry
As we have been discussing, schedule 6 and clause 91 make provision that, where all other methods of debt recovery have failed, including the direct deduction order measures we have been discussing, the DWP may apply to a court to have the debtor disqualified from driving. Like the hon. Member for Horsham, I have real concerns about these new powers. I cannot see how this specific novel civil penalty of removing a driving licence is at all appropriate to the particular group of people we are discussing, nor do I see the equivalence to the people being enforced upon by HMRC and the Child Maintenance Service, which have similar powers.
Legitimate benefit claimants who are overpaid through error, make a mistake or for any other reason owe money to the DWP are, almost by definition, in need of help. They might often make mistakes or fail to disclose information through an oversight, and their failure to engage with the DWP to date might be due to genuine incapacity and health issues. I am therefore very concerned that there are ineffective safeguards in the court process for these powers.
Although the DWP must apply to the court for the disqualification order, the court does not have discretion to refuse unless the debtor needs a driving licence to earn a living or has another essential need for one. It is unclear the extent to which this will protect vulnerable benefit claimants who have not engaged with the DWP due to incapacity, illness or mental ill health, or for whom driving is not essential for their work, but may be essential for their wellbeing or family life. I am not sure that the proposed legislation is clear enough about what will be deemed essential or what will be reasonable for the court to object to.
I also have concerns, as outlined a moment ago, that these powers cannot be exercised unless the people concerned have tried every other method, from benefit deductions or deductions from earnings to the direct deductions from bank accounts—the measure we have just discussed, which is extraordinarily intrusive on people’s financial information and privacy. Given that these powers would only be used where it appears that those other powers cannot be, is it not true that they are basically only for when a debtor cannot physically pay back what they owe? In effect, this measure of removing the driving licence is a punishment. It is a poverty penalty for those who do not have the means, despite all the intrusion that Ministers have gone through to establish that, to return what they have been overpaid.
I cannot support this power. It is incredibly punitive. I do not think it will create the conditions in which debtors are encouraged to engage with the DWP, but it could create dire consequences for individuals who are already struggling and least able to afford repayments.
Andrew Western
I will attempt to answer those questions, and hon. Members are free to intervene if I have missed anything. The Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon, asked whether this would be a power that is implemented in response to just fraud, or fraud and error. Because it is in response to a failure to repay a debt, it could be utilised for either. The criteria for its use is not how the overpayment came about, but whether the person has engaged to pay it back.
The safeguard around whether somebody is disqualified unnecessarily is all the various measures that we have attempted previously, plus the determination of the court. Responsibility for enforcement would lie with the Courts and Tribunals Service and the DVLA. However, if somebody was driving without a licence, that would clearly also be a legal issue. On the question whether we would advertise that somebody had had their licence suspended, we would not, because no crime has been committed; the suspension is just as a result of somebody failing to repay a debt. That is distinct from somebody who has had their licence removed because they have broken the law through drink-driving or some such crime.
John Milne
In the light of the Minister’s confirmation that this power does refer both to error and fraud, I am all the more concerned. Removing a driving licence can mean the removal of a means of income. It is almost like the old-fashioned debtors’ prison: someone is in debt, so they are put in prison, and then they cannot get out of their debt. It is a Catch-22 situation.
I understand that the power has been used regarding the Child Maintenance Service. I have a case in Horsham where a constituent feels that he is being unreasonably demanded of; he is in trouble because he will potentially lose his job because of just such an order. Therefore, this power could be applied inaccurately or incorrectly—it is inevitable that in a large organisation there will be mistakes—so I am concerned that the power seems both very extreme and, as I said before, not generally applied. It should be generally applied in order to be legitimate.
Andrew Western
On the point about a debtors’ prison, if somebody requires their vehicle for work, that is a criterion that a judge can consider in terms of whether a licence should be disqualified. It is also worth remembering that, in all cases, the initial move would be to suspend the suspension of the driving licence to give somebody the time to engage with us and start to pay. While, as I say, this is baked in as a last resort, we have put a number of break points in this process for people to engage. Indeed, even after we have suspended the licence, if somebody starts making repayments, they can have their licence reinstated. However, we have explicitly stated that caring responsibilities and the need for a car for employment purposes are criteria that would mean that we would not look to pursue that suspension.
Turning to the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, I understand where she is coming from. She is consistent in her view of an erosion of civil liberties coming about as a result of many aspects of this Bill. However, I must say to her that the idea that we have exhausted everything, including deductions from benefits, fundamentally misses the point about the cohort of people who would be in scope for this power. Benefit claimants and people who are paid through PAYE would not be in scope of the driving licence power; it would be people who are no longer on benefits. Indeed, if they were on benefits, we would be able to deduct from those benefits directly, without needing recourse to such actions.
I therefore take a fundamentally different view from the hon. Lady on whether this amounts to a poverty penalty. Clearly, the poorest people would not be impacted by this power; it is for people who we know have the means to pay. Usually, we know they have the money, but they have moved it out of our reach, so we have ascertained their ability to pay, but it is not possible to lay our hands on those funds. This power—like wider mechanisms for people who do not drive, such as charging orders—is the initial lever to bring people to the table.
As I said in response to the hon. Member for Horsham, before we suspend a licence, we will ask people to engage with us. After agreeing the right to suspend that licence, we will give somebody a further opportunity to engage with us and to begin making regular repayments. After the licence has ultimately been suspended, there will again be the opportunity to commence regular payments and have the licence reinstated. All that is a power of last resort.
I will give the Child Maintenance Service statistics for context. The CMS utilised this power on seven occasions last year; six of those were suspensions of suspension and only one was an actual suspension of a driving licence. That tells us that this power is important as much as a deterrent as in practice. It is for that reason that it forms a part of this Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 91 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)