Pension Schemes Bill

Torsten Bell Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

This Bill aims to deliver fundamental reforms to our pensions landscape, and it is good to see that the prospect of discussing a long, slightly technical pensions Bill has seen so many Members flooding into the Chamber. These are reforms on which there is a broad consensus across the pensions industry. They also build on at least something of a consensus across the House. In its principal focus on higher returns for pension savers, the Bill also responds to specific responsibilities that we hold in the House.

It is because of decisions of Parliament that something significant has happened over the past decade: British workers have got back into the habit of saving for a pension. Today, more than 22 million workers are building up a pension pot. That represents a 10 million increase since 2012, when Parliament introduced the policy of automatically enrolling workers. The rise is largest for women and lower earners. So there is lots to celebrate as more save, but there are no grounds at all for complacency about what they are getting in return.

The private sector final salary pensions that many of today’s pensioners rely on guarantee a particular income in retirement. If those pension schemes do not deliver good investment returns, that is a problem for the employer and not directly for the saver. But most of tomorrow’s retirees with a defined-contribution pension bear all the risk; there is nothing guaranteed. How well the pension scheme that they save into performs matters hugely, and because pensions are a very long game, even small differences in how fast a pension pot grows can make a massive difference over time.

That is the system that the House has chosen, so the onus is on us to ensure that it delivers. But the pension system that we have today is too fragmented, too rarely does it ensure that people’s savings are working hard enough to support them in retirement, and it is too disconnected from the UK economy. That is the case for change and the context for the Bill.

The UK has the second-largest pension system in the world, worth £2 trillion. It is our largest source of domestic capital, underpinning not just the retirement we all look forward—or at least most of us look forward to—but the investment on which our future prosperity depends. But our big pension system has far too few big pension schemes. There are approaching 1,000 defined-contribution schemes and less than 10 providers who currently have £25 billion or more in assets.

A consolidation process is already under way, with the number of DC schemes reducing by about 10% a year. What the Bill does is add wind to the sails of that consolidation. It implements the conclusions of the pensions investment review, creating so-called megafunds. For the DC market, we intend to use the powers provided for in clause 38 to require multi-employer schemes to have at least £25 billion in assets by 2030, or a credible pathway to be there by 2035. Bigger and better pension funds can deliver lower costs, diversified investments and better returns for savers. That supports the work that the industry is already doing to better deliver for savers.

As the House has discussed before, in May, 17 major pension providers managing about 90% of active defined-contribution pensions signed the Mansion House accord. This industry-led initiative saw signatories pledge to invest 10% of their main default funds in private assets such as infrastructure by 2030, with at least 5% in UK assets. That investment could support a better outcome for pension savers and back clean energy developments or fast-growing businesses. To support this industry-led change, the Bill includes a reserve power that would allow the Government to require larger auto-enrolment schemes to invest a set percentage into those wider asset classes. That reflects the reality that the industry has been calling for the shift for some time, but words have been slow to translate into actions.

[Dame Meg Hillier (Hackney South and Shoreditch) (Lab/Co-op)]

I draw the House’s attention to the fact that I am a trustee of the parliamentary contributory pension fund. Consolidation is absolutely the right direction of travel so that pension funds have better experts who are better able to advise. I still have a slight concern, though, about mandation. There will have to be schemes to invest in, and they will need to ensure that they are getting returns. How will the Minister ensure that the Bill actively delivers on both sides of the equation?

[Torsten Bell]

I thank my hon. Friend for her question and for her oversight of all our pensions, which I think is reassuring. [Laughter.] Sorry; it is reassuring! I will come directly to her point, because I know that is one question that hon. Members on both sides of the House will want to raise. Let me just say that the Bill explicitly recognises the fiduciary duty of trustees towards their members.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

In the last Parliament, a number of us raised concerns about the administration of defined-benefit schemes by, among others, BP, Shell and Hewlett-Packard. It was obvious at that stage—I think this view was held by his right hon. Friend the Minister for Social Security and Disability, who was then the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee—that one of the root causes of the problem was insufficient independence and oversight by defined-benefit pension trustees. What is there in this Bill that will protect the position of pensioners in their retirement under those schemes?

[Torsten Bell]

The right hon. Member invites me to skip quite a long way forward in my speech, and it is a long speech.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Ah.

[Torsten Bell]

That was not the support I was hoping for from the Chair—understandable, but harsh. I will come to some of the points that the right hon. Member raises. I think he is referring particularly to pre-1997 indexation, which I shall come to.

As I said, the Bill includes a reserved power that will allow the Government to require larger auto-enrolment schemes to invest a set percentage into wider assets. That reflects the wider calls that have been made for this change but have not led to its taking place. What pension providers are saying is that they face a collective action problem, where employers focus too narrowly on the lowest charges, not what matters most to savers: the highest returns. I do not currently intend to use the power in the Bill, but its existence gives clarity to the industry that, this time, change will actually come.

Some argue—I will come to some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier)—that this somehow undermines the duty that pension providers have to savers. That is simply wrong. First, the Bill includes clear safeguards to prioritise savers’ interests and is entirely consistent with the core principle of trustees’ fiduciary duties. Clause 38 includes an explicit mechanism, which I have discussed with Members from the main three parties in this House, to allow providers to opt out if complying risks material detriment to savers. Secondly—this is the key point that motivates a lot of the Bill—savers are being let down by the status quo. There is a reason major pension schemes across the rest of the world are already investing in this more diverse range of assets.

Fragmentation within the pensions industry happens within providers, not just between them. Some insurers have thousands of legacy funds, so clause 41 extends to contract schemes the ability that trust-based schemes already have to address that. Providers will be able to transfer savers to another arrangement without proactive individual consent if, and only if, it is independently certified as being in the member’s best interest.

Another point that I hope is of common ground across the House is that we need to do more to realise the untapped potential of the local government pension scheme in England and Wales. We need scale to get the most out of the LGPS’s £400 billion-worth of assets. Again, the Bill will turn that consensus into concrete action. It provides for LGPS assets spread across 86 administering authorities to be fully consolidated into six pools. That will ensure that the assets used to provide pensions to its more than 6 million members—predominantly low-paid women—are managed effectively and at scale. Each authority will continue to set its investment strategy, including how much local investment it expects to see. In fact, these reforms will build on the LGPS’s strong track record of investing in local economic growth, requiring pension pools to work with the likes of mayoral combined authorities. In time, bigger and more visible LGPS pools will help to crowd private pension funds and other institutional investors into growth assets across the country.

Our measures will build scale, support investment and deliver for savers, but the Bill does more to ensure that working people get the maximum bang for every buck saved. To reinforce the shift away from an excessively narrow focus on costs, clause 5 provides for a new value-for-money framework. For the first time, we will require pension schemes to prove that they provide value for money, with standardised metrics. That will help savers to compare schemes more easily, and drive schemes themselves to focus on the value that they deliver. For persistently poor performers, regulators will have the power to enforce consolidation. That will protect savers from getting stuck in poorly performing schemes—something that can knock thousands of pounds off their pension pots.

We are also at last addressing the small pension pots issue. I was out door-knocking in Swansea earlier this spring, and a woman in her mid-30s told me that something was really winding her up—and it was not me knocking on the door. [Laughter.] This is a very unsupportive audience. It was trying to keep track of small amounts of pension savings that she had from old jobs; the only thing that was worse was that her husband kept going on about it. There are now 13 million small pension pots that hold £1,000 or less floating around. Another million are being added each year. That increases hassle, which is what she was complaining about, with over £31 billion-worth of pension pots estimated to currently be lost. It costs the pensions industry around £240 million each year to administer. Clause 20 provides powers for those pots to be automatically brought together into one pension scheme that has been certified as delivering good value. Anyone who wants to can of course opt out, but this change alone could boost the pension pot of an average earner by around £1,000.

Of course, once you have a pension pot, the question is: what do you do with it? We often talk about pension freedoms, but there is nothing liberating about the complexity currently involved in turning a pension pot into a retirement income. You have to consolidate those pots, choose between annuities, lump sums, drawdowns or cashing out. You have to analyse different providers and countless products. Choice can be a good thing, but this overwhelming complexity is not—77% of DC savers yet to access their pension have no clear plan about how to do so.

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

I agree with a lot of what the Minister is saying. Given what was said last week by the Financial Conduct Authority on targeted support, would he look again at what is being resisted by the Money and Pensions Service? It is not prepared to work with the pension schemes to allow automatic appointments so that pension savers can be guided to better outcomes. I realise that MaPS will say that it is too busy, but this is a key moment. If we could get people to engage at age 50, say, we would see vastly different outcomes for them if they invested properly, and in better ways, with their pensions.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the right hon. Member for his question, and for the discussions that we have had on this important topic. He spent years working on this. The priority for MaPS right now is to ensure that we have the system set up to deal with the additional calls that are likely to come when pension dashboards are rolled out, but I will keep in mind the point that he raises. I think he and a number of hon. Members wrote to me about exactly that point. As I promised in my letter, I will keep it under review, but we must not overburden the system, because we need it to be able to deliver when pension dashboards come onstream.

[Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent and Rhymney) (Lab)]

Will the Minister update us on when consumers will see the introduction of the pensions dashboard? [Laughter.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I think recent progress on the pensions dashboard means that that deserves a little less laughter. What we are seeing at the moment is success, driving the first connections to the dashboards. Obviously, all schemes and providers are due to be connected by the autumn of 2026, but I will provide good notice of when we can give a firm date for that. My hon. Friend and near neighbour has secured himself early warning of exactly that happening.

We need to make the choices clearer for people as they move from building retirement savings to using them. The Bill gives pension schemes a duty to provide default solutions for savers’ retirement income—yes, with clear opt-outs. As well as reducing complexity and risk for savers, that will support higher returns because providers will be able to invest in assets for longer if they do not need to secure the possibility of having to provide full drawdown at retirement.

Each of these measures to drive up returns will have an impact on their own, but it is their cumulative impact that matters most, especially when it is compounded over the decades that we save for a pension. To give the House a sense of scale, someone on average earnings saving over their career could see their retirement pot boosted by £29,000 thanks to the higher returns that the Bill supports. That is a significant increase for something that should matter to us all.

The reforms that I have set out will transform the DC pensions landscape, but with £1.2 trillion-worth of assets supporting around 9 million people, defined-benefit schemes remain vital—they have already been raised by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael). Their improved funding position is hugely welcome. Around 75% are now in surplus, which has enabled far more schemes to reach buy-out with an insurer. Many more intend to do so, welcoming the security that buy-out can offer. Others may not be able to reach buy-out or may value running on their scheme for at least a time. The Bill provides those trustees with a wider range of options. Clauses 8 and 9 give more trustees the option to safely share surplus funds, which is something that many can already do.

[Alan Gemmell (Central Ayrshire) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for giving way and the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) for raising this issue. What will the Bill do for my constituent Patricia Kennedy and the members of the Hewlett Packard Pension Association who are asking for more action on their pre-1997 non-index-linked contributions.

[Torsten Bell]

My hon. Friend has raised this issue with me on a number of occasions, and he is a powerful advocate for his constituents who have lost out through the discretionary increases that they were hoping to see on their pensions not being delivered. This is the same issue that the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland raised. One of the things that surplus release will allow is that trustees may at that point consider how members can benefit from any release that takes place. One thing I would encourage them to prioritise if they are considering a surplus release is the indexation of those that have not received it on their pre-1997 accrual. I hope that provides some clarity to the right hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am extremely grateful to the Minister for taking my intervention and for the very helpful letter he sent me on 30 June about schemes of this sort, and in particular the ExxonMobil pension scheme. His letter encouragingly states:

“Following our reforms, trustees will continue to consider the correct balance of interest between members and the sponsoring employer when making decisions about the release of surplus funds. Trustees will be responsible for determining how members may benefit from any release of surplus…and have a suite of options to choose from—for example, through discretionary benefit increases.”

The trouble is that these pensioners have received a letter from the trustees of the ExxonMobil pension fund stating:

“The power to award discretionary increases is held by Esso Petroleum Company Limited (the “Company”). Whether or not any discretionary increase is provided is for the Company to determine: the Trustee has no power to award discretionary increases itself.”

This may be a loophole that the Minister needs to address. If the trustees cannot award the surplus as benefits and the company says no, that is not going to benefit my constituents.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the right hon. Member for raising that specific case. I will look at it in more detail for him as he has kindly raised it here, but he has raised a point that will have more general application, which is that lots of different schemes, particularly DB schemes, will have a wide range of scheme rules. He has raised one of those, which is about discretionary increases. One thing that is consistent across all the schemes, with the legislation we are bringing in today, is that trustees must agree for any surplus to be released. It may be the case that the employer, in the details of those scheme rules, is required to agree to a discretionary increase, but the trustees are perfectly within their rights to request that that is part of an agreement that leads to a surplus release.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

What if it is the other way round?

[Torsten Bell]

In any circumstances, the trustees would need to agree to a surplus release, so they are welcome to say to their employer: we are only going to agree to it on the basis of a change to something that the employer holds the cards over. I am happy to discuss that with the right hon. Member further, and there may be other schemes that are in a similar situation.

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

The way in which the Minister is talking about insurance buy-out suggests that, in the Government’s mind, insurance buy-out is still in some way a gold standard. Can he reassure the House that he is seeking to flatten the playing field, such that the increased choice available to defined-benefit pension schemes will mean that for perpetuals who run on—such as OMERS, which started off as the Ontario municipal employees retirement system and is now worth 140 billion Canadian dollars—there is as much safety in superfunds as there is in insurance buy-out?

[Torsten Bell]

I shall come on directly to the question of superfunds, which I know the hon. Member has a long-standing interest in. There is obviously a distinction between closed and open defined-benefit schemes, which I think is relevant to the point he is raising. It is also important for trustees to have a range of options.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

Obviously that can happen only where there are surplus funds, and there may not be surplus funds in all circumstances. I just want to give the Minister a heads-up in relation to the questions about employee benefits. It would be useful in Committee to have more information about the Government’s analysis of how many of these surplus releases will directly benefit the employees rather than the employers. I understand that the Government, with their mission for growth, want investment in growing the company as well, but what kind of split does he expect to see? I do not expect an answer to that today.

[Torsten Bell]

It is nice to sometimes be able to surprise on the upside. I would expect employees to benefit in most cases, because trustees are in the driving seat and I am sure they will want to consider how employers and employees will benefit from any surplus release. Obviously, the exact split between the two will be a matter for the individual cases, but I am sure we will discuss that further in Committee.

I want to reassure the House that this is not about a return to the 1990s free-for-all. DB regulation has been transformed since then, and schemes will have to remain well funded and trustees will remain in the driving seat. They will agree to a release only where it is in members’ interests and, as I said, not all schemes are able to afford to buy out members’ pensions with insurers.

The Bill also introduces the long-awaited permanent legislative regime for DB superfunds, which is an alternative means to consolidate legacy DB liabilities. This supports employers who want to focus on their core business, and, as the superfunds grow, they will have the potential to use their scale to invest in more productive ways. Crucially, trustees will be able to agree to a transfer into a superfund only where buy-out is not available and where it increases savers’ security.

The Pension Protection Fund is, of course, the security backstop for DB members. It celebrates its 20th anniversary this year, and it now secures the pensions of over 290,000 people. The Bill updates its work in three important ways: first, by lifting restrictions on the PPF board so that it can reduce its levy where appropriate, freeing schemes and employers to invest; secondly, by ensuring that PPF and financial assistance scheme information will be displayed on the pensions dashboard as it comes onstream, which my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent and Rhymney (Nick Smith), who is now not in his place, is keen to see; and thirdly and most importantly, by making a change to support people going through the toughest of times. As several hon. Members have called for, we are extending the definition of terminal illness from a 6-month to a 12-month prognosis, providing earlier access to compensation for those who need it most.

Pensions are complex beasts, and so are the laws that surround them. That complexity is inevitable, but not to the extent that some recent court cases risk creating. The Bill also legislates to provide clarity that decisions of the Pensions Ombudsman in overpayment cases may be enforced without going to a further court. I have been clear that the Government will also look to introduce legislation to give affected pension schemes the ability to retrospectively obtain written actuarial confirmation that historical benefit changes met the necessary standards at the time.

Governments are like people in one important respect: they can easily put off thinking about pensions until it is too late. I am determined not to do that. We are ramping up the pace of pension reform. The past two decades have delivered a big win, with more people saving for their retirement, but that was only ever half the job. Today, too many are on course for an income in retirement that is less than they deserve and less than they expect. The Bill focuses on securing higher returns for savers and supporting higher income in retirement without asking any more than is necessary of workers’ living standards in the here and now.

The Bill sits within wider pension reforms as we seek to build not just savings pots but a pensions system that delivers comfortable retirements and underpins the country’s future prosperity. Legislation for multi-employer collective defined-contribution schemes will be introduced as soon as possible after the summer recess, and we will shortly launch the next phase of our pensions review to complete the job of building a pensions system that is strong, fair and sustainable. It is time to make sure that pension savings work as hard for all our constituents as our constituents worked to earn them. I commend the Bill to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

That may well be true, but that is a different question. There is a question about financial education and the ability of large numbers of our fellow citizens to understand these financial complexities. We have a large and professional independent financial adviser community, and all pension funds are required to have pension advisers who can speak to members, tell them what is going on and explain the decisions before them. I do think that over the years, such steps have disenfranchised the British people from their financial decisions, yet we hold them responsible for their debts, their mortgages and their future. There is a larger question for us in this House about how much we have subtracted from the autonomy of the British people, and therefore how much blame attaches to us as politicians when their financial circumstances are not what they expect.

[Torsten Bell]

The right hon. Member is giving a lucid speech, as he always does—he speaks very well—but I am failing to understand exactly the point he is making. He is talking about a local government pension scheme, which is guaranteeing him an income in retirement, as if it is a defined-contribution scheme where he is the one at risk from changes in the investment performance. It is local taxpayers with their employer contribution who ultimately bear the risk in the scheme he is talking about. It is our job to make sure that those taxpayers have the best possible chance of not having bad returns, leading to bad outcomes for them. He is not at risk in the way he is talking about.

[Kit Malthouse]

But I have paid into that scheme.

[Torsten Bell]

You have.

[Kit Malthouse]

Yes, I have. I paid contributions through my employment at City Hall, as did my employer. Admittedly, it was a scheme based on a defined benefit, rather than a defined contribution, but that was the deal done with me on a settled contract, saying that this was what I would be provided for from my contribution. Every year, I review my pension benefit forecast. I am consulted by the fund about how it should conduct its affairs. I am asked to turn up to my pensioners’ conference to discuss with trustees how they are looking after my future. The point is that the Government are steaming in with absolutely no consultation with me as a pensioner and I have no right to be represented, although I am uniquely affected, beyond other pension schemes. I consider that to be high-handed and, as the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth said, to be solving a problem that does not exist.

My third point was also raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier): who carries the can? What happens when the Minister tells my private pension scheme or the parliamentary pension scheme that it must invest in, for instance, HS2 and it turns out to be a disaster? What happens when whichever ministerial pet project rises to the top of the priority list for pension allocation—what rough beast, its hour come round at last, slouches towards Whitehall to get its finance—and it all goes horribly wrong? I am sorry to quote Yeats to the Minister, but who will pay when that happens? When there is a deficit in defined-contribution pension funds that have been so directed by the Minister, who will pay for that deficit?

[Torsten Bell]

rose—

Pension Schemes Bill (First sitting)

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mark Garnier]

Or, indeed, when they first start to work. As somebody once said, compound interest is the eighth wonder of the world.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

Q I definitely agree about the eighth wonder of the world. Thank you for coming this morning. This is the Committee’s first sitting, and it is great to have both of you before us. One of the features on the DC side of our pension landscape is the two different regimes that we are operating. The Government’s policy intent is that, from the experience of the saver, they do not see a difference between the trust and the contract regime in so far as possible. That will certainly be true for their experience of the measures in the Bill on value for money and decumulation. Could you share a bit about how the FCA and the TPR are working together to make sure that is the case?

Patrick Coyne: Over a number of years, we have worked closely with the Financial Conduct Authority to ensure that when we deliver interventions within the pensions landscape, the outcomes are consistent. One way we have done that is through an update to a joint strategy. We also have almost daily calls with one another to ensure that when we consider interventions and how to enable the system to provide value for money and support people at retirement, we do so in a coherent and comprehensive way. We must really understand the different constituents of our marketplace, whether they be workplace versus non-workplace pensions, or, in the People’s Pension space, pensions analogous to the master trust offer.

Charlotte Clark: To add to Patrick’s point, we meet fairly regularly. There are various different forums and working groups. As you say, Minister, there is that sense that it does not matter where you save. Most people are probably saving in both the contract-based side and the master trust side, given that people have pots in lots of different places. It is important not that people understand where the regulation is, but that the regulation is consistent and there is no arbitrage between the two systems.

[The Chair]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, Steve Darling.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Smith]

Q Are there not going to be too many hoops to jump through to prove that the trustee is correct, if they have to prove it to a regulator? I suppose that is what the safe harbour means. Will the trustees have the benefit of the doubt, or are they going to have to be watertight in their belief that they are right, to make sure that they can stand up to the regulator?

Charlotte Clark: The level of that process would be something that we would put into secondary legislation and rules. We would really have to think through what that process looks like.

Patrick Coyne: Yes, absolutely. Implementation is critical here. This will be something that is done with wide consultation with the industry.

[Torsten Bell]

Q It is not right to say that mandation is at the centre of this Bill. There is one backstop power and there are a lot of clauses that we are going to spend a lot of the next few months—

[The Chair]

Order. We need questions to the witnesses.

[Torsten Bell]

The question to the witness is to expand a bit more on that point. In reality, this provides a “comply or explain” power. In terms of the point Charlotte was just making there, it is absolutely right about the ability of the trustees to say, “This is not in the interest of our members.” It might be worth talking a bit about how when we move forward the consultation will allow us to set out how that would work in practice.

Charlotte Clark: It is an area that we would need to work through in terms of the road map. At the moment, our focus is very much on getting the value for money framework right. How the mandation would work and the process around it—as the Minister says, first, we would consult on it. We would have to have a look to see what information was given and how we would monitor it in the period from now to 2030 or 2035. We would have to work through all of those aspects of the process. We would do that in conjunction with the industry, making sure that what we were asking for was information that it could readily provide and that we felt confident that we could make a good assessment around.

Patrick Coyne: Our engagement with the marketplace so far already shows that many are considering investment strategies that have significant proportions of diversified investments, so the market is already responding based on some of the Mansion House accord commitments.

[John Milne]

Q Do you think that the finance industry has a clear understanding of how to apply its fiduciary duty? Do you think the Bill makes that clearer or muddies the waters, or somewhere in between?

Patrick Coyne: I think that fiduciary duty is a powerful force for good. Across the Bill, this is about giving those trustees the tools for the job. I think there are a number of areas where that is true. Within the value for money framework, at the moment, it is very difficult for employers or schemes to effectively compare performance. As an anecdote, I was speaking to a provider recently. They were pitching for new business. They came in and pitched their investment data, and the employer said, “You’re the third provider today that has shown us they are the top-performing provider.” That cannot be right.

Then, when you are looking across the Bill towards the DB space, because of the funding reality that many schemes are facing at the moment, there is choice in end game options—so, “How do I enhance member outcomes at the same time as securing benefits?” Actually providing a statutory framework for super-funds as another option is a good first step, as is allowing the release of surplus, if it is in the members’ best interests to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

Q Christopher, do you have any thoughts on that, quickly?

Christopher Brooks: We do not work on final salary pensions, so I do not take a view on it.

[Torsten Bell]

Q As we have just heard, there is some cross-party agreement that the main purpose of the changes is ensuring that we drive up the returns to members—particularly financial returns, but also more generally. What do you think will make the most difference, from the perspective of the returns, particularly to DC savers? Balance between VFM; scale metrics; decumulation changes; small pots—all of these are about driving up returns for members. What are you most excited about?

Christopher Brooks: I think they all work together, so I would say it is a combination of them, but scale seems to be one of the main drivers. I am thinking about NEST in particular, which has been leading the way in terms of investing in private assets. It is able to negotiate a good deal, because of its scale. If you can drive that with similar outcomes across the marketplace, it will be really beneficial to members.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Could you explain a bit about what NEST has done in order to do that?

Christopher Brooks: NEST has essentially negotiated with the private finance industry, and is not paying the “two and 20” classic fee structure, so it is not paying the performance fees. It has incorporated it all into its existing charges. If the intention is to drive greater investment in private finance, that is the way to go about it. If that scale is replicated across the industry—across the 15 to 20, or however many, schemes remaining at the end of the consolidation process, which I fully support—then hopefully you would be in a position to replicate those types of outcomes for members across the board, in their DC savings.

Jack Jones: I would say something very similar. As a package, on the DC side, it is scale that potentially has the greatest power. It is probably important to look at the factors that would make sure that the scale results in the changes you want. It is interesting to look at NEST; it has scale, but it also has a business model and governance structure that incentivise it to go and build up its experience in investing in those markets, and to have an understanding of what its fiduciary duty is, which very clearly includes looking at the widest range of assets possible and investing in them. So I think it is scale, as long as you have everything else in place there to make sure that schemes are using that scale in ways that benefit members.

[The Chair]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, Steve Darling.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Can I ask for short answers now, please, because we need to move on to other Members.

Colin Clarke: It is an interesting question. It is not something I am a huge expert on, to be honest, and it needs careful thought, because there could potentially be some unforeseen consequences that I have not considered. If there were going to be any suggestions to change any rules in that regard, there would have to be evidence gathered to understand what the potential implications of that would be.

[Torsten Bell]

Q I want to move to DC pensions, not just DB, given what you do. One of the larger changes in this Bill for your providing to savers is on the default pension benefit solutions. Would you give us an update on your internal thinking about how you plan to operationalise those requirements, if this Bill receives Parliament’s support?

Dale Critchley: Obviously, this is dependent on regulations, but DWP people have been very open in conversations. That has been really welcome, and we have a good picture of where we are headed. We launched a “flex first, fix later” solution called guided retirement. We are now looking at flexing that guided retirement solution to offer different flavours to fit the different cohorts and the amount of risk people can take in terms of fluctuations in their income, dependent upon guaranteed income from elsewhere, or the level of their fund. At one end, you might have a cohort of people who almost need a guarantee. We could go down the route of an annuity, but we are reluctant to do that, because we think that an immediate annuity purchase might put people off. We need to ease people into the idea of an annuity purchase, and that is where we are going. For those people who want more of a guarantee, it might be lower-risk investments and in a drawdown phase for a shorter amount of time. For people who can take more risk, it may be higher-risk investments in the drawdown phase and in drawdown for longer, with an annuity purchase later. That is where our thinking is at the moment.

[Torsten Bell]

Q So when you are thinking about segmenting, your main segmentation is size of pot and other pensions.

Dale Critchley: It is the ability to take risk.

[Torsten Bell]

Your metric for that is just other income sources plus size of pot?

Dale Critchley: It is those main two at the moment. We are also working with a guy called Shlomo Benartzi, who is a behavioural science expert, to look at the whole concept of defaults in retirement. It is one thing defaulting people into taking £120 a month from their salary; it is a very different thing to say, “I am now going to take the biggest amount of money you have ever seen in your life and use that to purchase an income.” That is what we want to test, because if the default is strong and if inertia works, we will get people moving away from the poor solutions they are choosing at the moment, but if people still think, “Well, I do not like the look of that,” they will go on to make the same poor decisions they are making now, and we will not achieve the policy aim. So we think we need to deliver what is right for customers and members, but also what is attractive to them—so looking at their wants as well as their needs.

[The Chair]

Could we have shorter questions and answers? Does Mr Clarke have anything to add?

Colin Clarke: We have been working a lot on the FCA’s targeted support proposals, which are very supportive of the measures proposed in the Bill. We have been doing a lot of research around member segmentation and looking at the different scenarios and outcomes, so potentially going a little bit further than looking just at age and pot value, and also looking at what sort of questions we need to ask people to ensure that they are guided to the solution that is appropriate for them.

I agree with Dale that decumulation defaults and accumulation defaults are completely different things. In accumulation, there is more of a “one size fits all” approach, because it is all about delivering the best returns for members, whereas when you get to decumulation, it is very personalised, and you do not want to put people into something where they cannot change their mind. It needs to be flexible; people have a wide variety of different needs, and we are doing a lot of research on member needs at the moment.

Pension Schemes Bill (Second sitting)

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Luke Murphy]

Q It does not appear to be easily definable. What the financial benefits to members of an investment will be is easier to define through the fiduciary duty, but what is popular locally feels like a bit of a value judgment.

Councillor Phillips: Like a lot of judgments.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

Q Since we have gone to mandation and surplus, I encourage you to clarify that the reserve power and the surplus measures in the Bill do not affect the LGPS in any way. Those are not within the remit of the Bill.

Councillor Phillips: My understanding is that it is a back foot.

[Torsten Bell]

indicated dissent.

Councillor Phillips: It is not a back foot?

[Torsten Bell]

Q The reserve power is about automatic enrolment contributions; it has no impact on the LGPS. It is the same for surplus: the changes do not apply to the LGPS. Could you confirm that I am correct in saying that?

Councillor Phillips: Right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

That is very helpful; thank you very much.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Thank you both for joining us today. I want to ask you to reflect on the internal consistency of some of what you have said. Implicit in what you are saying is that pension schemes should have been investing in a wider range of private assets over the course of the past 10 years, and that that is what they should want to be doing in future—so in some ways we have not been living up to our fiduciary duties in the past, and we are now making changes to do that.

Given that that is your logic, the question is why that has not happened. If you go and ask actual pension providers why that has not happened, they will tell you they have a collective action problem and an industry focused exclusively on cost and not on returns, and that they struggle to deliver against that. If you have a collective action problem, you need to ask how we resolve that.

You then get to the fact that the Mansion House accord is entirely industry led, with numbers set by them—it is not about distortion to the market; you might want to reflect on that, given the comments you have just made. You also spoke about a lack of clarity, but the Mansion House accord provides clarity about the objectives: everyone can see them and they are set by the industry. When it comes to savers’ interests, you know that the Bill includes a carve-out for trustees to say, “This isn’t in my members’ interests, so we won’t be doing it.” Reflect a bit on the consistency of the argument you have made about the real progress you want to see on investment in a wider range of assets—because it is in savers’ interests and should have happened in the past but did not—and the changes in the Bill. I would gently suggest you might want to think about the consistency of that.

Sophia Singleton: We are not a mature industry—the defined contribution industry—and in the past we have not invested in these assets because there have been operational barriers, including the focus on cost.

[Torsten Bell]

That is not the view of the whole industry, which points to the collective action problem of an exclusive focus on cost, as much as it is a barrier—

Sophia Singleton: The value for money framework in the Bill is extremely helpful—

[Torsten Bell]

It is.

Sophia Singleton: —and we have said that we need to move the focus from cost to value, and we are seeing that very much come through in the culture within the industry, to be focusing on value. I have given evidence about funds recruiting investment teams to invest in these assets, because they are not simple to invest in for DC schemes. If you look at the experience in Australia through the covid pandemic, there were some real challenges that those schemes had to face relating to stale pricing, intergenerational fairness and cross-subsidies. They are not simple assets for DC schemes to invest in. The market is moving, going, and will get there. What we are saying is the mandation power is not needed to achieve that, because we are, with your help, getting to the right place.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Again, I would look at the actual history of what happened. The industry committed to private assets under the previous Government, and it is failing to deliver on that because of collective action challenges. You have to face up to this at the level of the sector as a whole; I am afraid you are giving answers that are very happy with the status quo, the way you are describing it. I would reflect that it is definitely a failure of fiduciary duty over the last 10 years not to have made more progress.

Helen Forrest Hall: Just to give my own perspective, there are a number of structural issues with the development of the sector. Defined benefit has been in run-off, which has driven a particular type of investment strategy. DC has not been at scale, and a number of us in the sector have been calling for consolidation for a long time. I think it goes without saying that we are having this conversation in the context of being very supportive of the vast majority of provisions in this Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

I was encouraging you to say that; you got there.

Helen Forrest Hall: Apologies; we are very, very supportive of the vast majority. This is basically the one substantive issue from our perspective. As Sophia has said, the value for money and consolidation elements in particular are incredibly helpful in removing some of the barriers that have existed, including for trustees. They technically have the ability to operate within their fiduciary duty, but sometimes the legislation and the structure of the industry get in their way. Things such as value for money and scale will really help with that. This Bill is incredibly enabling in the vast majority of its provisions. There are just a small number—mandation being one of them—where we have a bit of concern.

[John Milne]

Q Pension scheme funding ladders can go up, and they largely have done in recent years, but also they can go down. Do you think that the proposals and the framework in this Bill for surplus extraction have the right balance of risk versus actually achieving the objective?

Helen Forrest Hall: From a principles basis, yes, and just to address the funding point, they absolutely can. I know there will be a number of us in the room who have either experienced or been subject to the outcomes of what has happened when those significant events have taken place. In the context of where we are with DB now, a significant proportion of schemes are employing investment strategies that really do protect them against the kind of volatile market movements you might see.

The provisions in the Bill strike the right balance between, as I said earlier, giving trustees greater flexibility to exercise their fiduciary duty in discussion with employers, while also ensuring that they are considering the best interests of the members. One of the key considerations for trustees in that conversation is: how confident are we that our investment strategy would withstand significant market movements at the point when we might release a surplus? That is a key consideration.

We have seen that a number of pension schemes did not benefit from September 2022 in the way that others did, and that was because they had decided to protect themselves against that kind of market movement. There are things that schemes can deploy to give themselves that level of confidence.

Sophia Singleton: We were very pleased to see the stringent funding safeguards that are in the Bill in order to allow a surplus to be released. One thing I would say is that, as Helen says, it is giving the trustees the tools to properly exercise their discretionary power and, in a sense, fiduciary duty, but it has created an opportunity for trustees to negotiate and agree a win-win situation, in a sense. The conversations we are having with schemes is that they are now more likely to be able to feel comfortable in paying, and be able to pay out, discretionary benefits than they would have been before the Bill was in place. It gives schemes the opportunity to run on and for the employer to access the service, but also for members to have more access to discretionary benefits and to additional benefits.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

Q I completely agree: I think it is absolutely right that the more money you have, the more negotiating power you have and the more you can diversify risk and all the rest of it. But part of what I am worried about is this: how is anybody going to prove to the regulator that they will have £25 billion of assets under management by 2035? Surely that is an incredibly difficult thing to prove.

Patrick Heath-Lay: I do not want to be flippant in my response, but our scale already means that we are over that limit, so I have not really put too much thought into how they will do it. I believe that there is enough, within the business plans of entities that might be affected, to be able to make some reasonable assumptions as to what ongoing contributions will be coming through the door and how they will respond to some of the opportunities that may arise in this market over the next few years, from organisations that are choosing to move because of the extent of change that is coming.

I emphasise that I still think that the package of measures and that scale test is the right thing to instil that movement, because I think savers will be better off, provided that it is harnessed in the right way. That is why I come back to this: value for money is the proof point, and we need to make sure that we centre on that as an industry. Being able to evaluate how these changes have created a more competitive market in key areas going forward is really quite important.

[Torsten Bell]

Q This morning we heard from Legal and General and from Aviva on how they are planning to operationalise the requirements in the Bill on default drawdown products. I thought it would be good to give you the opportunity to answer the same question: how are you thinking about that within your organisation?

Ian Cornelius: It is one of the elements of the Bill that we very much welcome. I think guided retirement solutions are overdue. Certainly, our members have been opted into a retirement savings scheme, and they end up with a pot of money rather than an income. I think their expectation is an income. In fact, in the research we have done with our members, they say that the most important things for them are to have a sustainable income, confidence that it will not run out and an element of flexibility, because their circumstances can change very quickly in retirement. I think the guided retirement solution moves us in that direction.

At NEST, we have been working on this for some time, as we recognise that it is a core issue for our members. We therefore want to introduce a guided retirement solution—it is very much a work in progress—that delivers that sustainable income, but also gives them a guarantee that it will not run out. That will be some sort of deferred annuity, purchased probably when they are 75, to kick in when they are 85. We are actively working on that and will be looking to introduce it in 2027, aligning with the expectation in the Bill.

Patrick Heath-Lay: It is very similar from our perspective. We should not underestimate how much onus the shift from final salary to DC has put on individual savers, in terms of the decision that they have to make, in a very complex world that they really do not understand. Even if you surface a lot of information, your constituents will still struggle to navigate those decision points. We also should not underestimate the onus they have taken on, in terms of the risk of their own fund, when you think about the productive finance agenda and other things here. I think it is absolutely the right move. It is a good development for us to bring about guided retirement journeys in a way that is either “Do it for me” or “Do it with me” for policyholders.

Similarly, we are thinking about drawdown and how we can facilitate or help people to understand the implications of the actions they may take with accessing their funds, and then, when they get to later life, some sort of deferred annuity as an approach. The really important aspect is the guidance and how we can help, but have certain obligations on ourselves, as providers, to make sure that we are accountable for the help that we are giving as we go through the process.

[Torsten Bell]

Q You have both been involved in the discussions with the industry on the wider move to private asset investments. As you talked about earlier, you are further along the journey than most. You know the numbers in the Mansion House accord. In lots of cases, I know you are planning to be significantly above those de minimis levels. Tell us a bit—for the industry as a whole, not just for your individual schemes—about how we should think about those numbers, as de minimis or as targets, or where people are going to be in 20 years’ time. In the end, that is what we are always thinking about; we are not thinking about the next five years.

Ian Cornelius: It is difficult to speak for the industry, but I can speak for NEST. At NEST, we are very committed to investing in private markets: 18% of our assets are invested in private markets, and 20% of our assets are invested in the UK.

[Torsten Bell]

And that compares to the Mansion House benchmarks of 10% and 5%.

Ian Cornelius: The Mansion House commitment is 10% into private markets, with half of that into the UK, so we are already well ahead.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Are you already doing that because you think that that is what is in savers’ interests?

Ian Cornelius: Absolutely. It is providing attractive returns, it diversifies risk and it also invests in the UK.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Given that you think that it is in savers’ interests to be well above the Mansion House targets, why have some people not got to those targets? Are they failing in their fiduciary duties? Why have they not got there yet?

Ian Cornelius: It is hard to speak for others, but scale is an important factor, as we have talked about. You need scale and sophistication to access these investment opportunities. NEST has that scale and is building that sophistication. It often involves quite innovative solutions and partnering. Partners want to partner with someone who has got scale and assets coming in at pace, and we have those things. There are some unique circumstances that have made it attractive for us. I will let Patrick speak for People’s, but it is on that journey as well.

Patrick Heath-Lay: Yes, we are, although we are much nearer the start of that journey. Again, it comes back to the scale point. Why is £25 billion or £30 billion about the right amount? Because it is about the right part that you can economically start investing in those items.

To answer your question, and to pick up a more general point, it is incredibly important that we work collaboratively on the issue, because, as an industry, there is not much point in us all sailing our own little boats around trying to find the right harbour to invest. There is a degree of collaboration that the industry, together with Government, can do to open up the opportunities where that investment needs to go and how it can be executed in the most efficient manner. The biggest risk with investing in private markets is that they are expensive. If the vehicles that are being used on a commercial basis are not sharing the economics of that investment well enough with savers, it will certainly not be an investment that we are interested in pursuing.

The other point is that putting down the foundations for this to be a pipeline of repeatable investment activity is critical. Because of its scale, NEST has got ahead of where we are today, but that is the phase we are in at People’s at the moment. There is over £1 billion a year from our scheme alone that will be invested in those markets on an ongoing basis. Given the scale that we are both experiencing, in terms of how we are scaling up, that will be an ever-increasing number, so it is important that we have reliable and very cost-effective routes by which we can deploy that capital.

Ian Cornelius: Going back to your original question, I think that the industry is moving in the right direction. The Mansion House accord had 17 signatories and we are seeing the right moves.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

Q Default solutions are an important part of the Bill. I suspect that, for the more modest savers, they will colour the outcomes for a lot of their pensions. How can the final offer in that area be enhanced so that we get the best outcomes? What tweaks would you make to the Bill to ensure that we are looking after those with more modest incomes, around these final solutions?

Ian Cornelius: There is no doubt that there is detail to work through across the whole Bill. One of the really interesting areas will be the interaction of targeted support and default solutions. There is now a consultation on targeted support, being led by the Financial Conduct Authority. That opens up lots of opportunities to provide an enhanced level of support to people who cannot afford to take advice. The fact is that financial advice is only available to about 9% of the population. Nearly all our members cannot afford to take financial advice, so they need that enhanced level of support, either to check that they are making the right choices—“Is the default solution the right one for me?”—or because they might have circumstances that mean that they want to explore something different. Targeted support is very welcome, and we look forward to engaging with the Pensions Regulator and FCA in making that a reality and making it work for low and moderate earners.

Patrick Heath-Lay: I am probably going to sound quite boring, but this is an area in which value for money and making sure the solutions are developed in the right way to support consumers can be really quite effective.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

If I remember rightly, the Bill allows for the detail to come in afterwards, so we will have a bit of work to do when this is all over. Thank you very much.

[Torsten Bell]

Q We all have work to do; it is never all over. Chris, this question is mainly for you, as I am conscious that you have done lots of work over an extended period on the dashboard. Obviously, there are elements of the Bill that relate to that—mainly relating to the PPF—but not many. However, is there anything you want to tell the Committee about the lessons from it for when we come to the small pots work, which obviously is a central part of the Bill?

Chris Curry: I listened with interest to some of the earlier witnesses talk about dashboards, and there certainly are some lessons that we can learn from the pensions dashboards programme, as it has been evolving over the past few years, for small pots in particular.

There are two issues that I would pull out. The first is on the technology front. I think someone suggested that the next five years or so could be quite a tight timetable to build a technological solution and get it in place. You have to be very careful—you cannot underestimate just how much complexity there is and how long it takes to do these things—but I would say that the work that we have done on pensions dashboards is giving us a bit of a head start. That is not to say that we necessarily need to build on or use parts of the system that we have already built, but it has helped us understand a lot about, for example, how you can find pensions—the way you can use integrated service providers rather than having to go direct to all the schemes, and use a syndicated model to find where people might have their pensions.

It has helped the industry get a long way down the path to where it needs to be, as well. One of the big challenges for pensions dashboards is the quality of data. Enabling individuals to find their pensions means data quality: it needs not only to exist and be there; it needs to be accurate and it needs to be up to date. When you are thinking about an automatic consolidator or default consolidator for small pots, that is even more important. You are not just transferring information, but transferring money, so it is really important that the data is high quality. The work that is being done on pensions dashboards will get people in the industry a long way to having part of that in place as well.

There are definitely lessons that can be learned from how we progressed on the pensions dashboards programme. It has got us much closer to where we would be if we had had a completely blank page to start from, but there is still a reasonable amount of work to do, because it is working in a slightly different way.

[John Milne]

Q The Bill makes the notion of using pension money for macroeconomic benefit—investment in the UK—an explicit objective. Other countries seem to have done this already. Did they do so explicitly and deliberately, or was it just an accidental outcome of good investment decisions? Did it take a conscious effort to make it happen?

William Wright: I think it is a mix of both. It very much depends on what sort of assets we are talking about. For example, if we are thinking about the UK stock market or domestic equity markets, we tend to see that markets such as Canada and the Netherlands have an even lower allocation to domestic equities, whichever way you look at it, than comparable UK pensions have to the UK market.

Ultimately, this comes down to what you might call the accidental design of the UK system. It has evolved over 20, 30 or 40 years, whereas the systems with which we like to compare the UK system, or large parts of them, were actively designed anything from 30 or 40 to 50 or 60 years ago. We are now seeing the benefits of that active design in those systems. Their focus on scale enables them to invest in a far broader range of assets at a lower unit cost.

Going back to the value for money point, UK pensions have ended up in the worst of both worlds. Fee pressure, particularly in terms of winning and transferring new business between providers, is driving down fees, but the average fees on DC pensions today are very middle of the pack: 45 to 50 basis points a year. That is much higher than much larger schemes in Canada, such as the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, the big Canadian reserve fund, and much higher than large UK schemes, such as the universities superannuation scheme, but they are stuck in the middle: they are actually paying higher fees, but because of the fee pressure they have a very vanilla, almost simple asset allocation. As Tim Fassam from Phoenix pointed out, that tends to steer people towards the lowest cost investment option. Active design, focusing on scale and sophistication, enables pension schemes to take a much longer term and much broader view of what they should invest in and where they should invest in it, whereas in the UK we have tended to accidentally move from one system to another.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

Q This is tricky, though, is it not? Because there is no geographical definition of those six pools, Cornwall could, as I mentioned earlier, find itself investing in Leeds. That would be lovely for you in Leeds, but it would not be so great for people down in Penzance.

Rachel Elwell: Border to Coast, if we do have those 18, will stretch from the Scottish border to the southern coast. Even today, we have partner funds who are right across England, which is brilliant because those are people who have actively chosen to come together, form a partnership and work together.

Time permitting, if it is of interest to the Committee, we could talk a bit more about local investment and the way of getting investment that is truly local for each individual fund but also a way of crowding investment from other people into the slightly larger opportunities that might be in a region. Every investment we make is local—it impacts local people.

You do not need to only have, for example, Durham council investing in Durham. You want all of the LGPS and all asset owners to feel that they can do that. Some of the ways that we are working through doing local investment with our partner funds have really got an eye to the different ways in which you can crowd in versus something very specific that needs to be addressed in the region or locality.

[Torsten Bell]

Q It is lovely to see you again, Rachel. Thanks for making the time today. A few people have asked questions about the LGPS through the lens of member engagement. There are obviously some implications with the move into greater pooling for that. Given that you are running that and seeing it up close, it would be good to hear your reflections on how that currently operates, as you have seen it over the last few years.

Rachel Elwell: Again, for all of us working in the LGPS, that sense of purpose is really important. I know my partner funds do a huge amount to make sure they are engaging directly with members, running events, as well as the importance of member representation on the pensions committees and on the pension boards, whether that is through union representation, pensioner representation or other scheme member representation.

We also have two fantastic scheme member representatives on our joint committee, which is the body that comes together across all of the partner funds to oversee and engage with what we are doing on their behalf. They are really bringing that voice into our considerations as a board and the wider organisation—the wider partnership.

[Torsten Bell]

Q The other thing to touch on is that all the pools are moving towards FCA authorisation. What is your experience of that? Obviously, you are further ahead than most.

Rachel Elwell: This is before I was employed to bring it to life. This is a decision our partner funds made really early, because they recognised the real benefits that can come from being FCA regulated. This is really important. We will hopefully be managing over £100 billion on behalf of the LGPS, and a good proportion of that is managed directly within my team. We are managing that for, hopefully, 18 different customers—effectively, investors and our owners. We need to have those disciplines in place, and we need to make sure that we are following those regulations. We do not need another regulatory set. There are already some very good, strong regulations that exist, so we, as a partnership and as a company, think that is the right thing to do.

[Steve Darling]

Q Thank you for coming today. Reflecting on the Bill as a whole, what would you particularly like to see weakened or strengthened in the Bill? What particularly leaps out at you?

Rachel Elwell: There are some fantastic provisions in the Bill, particularly around implementing the good governance review, and the clarity of roles and responsibilities between the different parties within the LGPS. About five or six years ago, we, along with some of the other pools, commissioned some work looking at good practice internationally, so talking to about 15 others—from Australia, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Norwegians—and looking at the journey they had been on with this. They are about 15 years ahead of us, really, with that policy. We wanted to learn from what they had done.

There were various success factors, some of which Michelle shared with you earlier, but one of those was real clarity about the Government’s policy intent, and I think the Bill really does help with that. That will help us, in turn, engage with our pensions committees and partner funds to make sure that we are providing a holistic joined-up view. There are some areas in the Bill where, particularly for the LGPS, the detail will be in the regulations. I would just make a plea, given the timelines we are working towards, that we see the regulations sooner rather than later, please. I have already said that I think it would be helpful to maybe get a bit more clarity on the circumstances in which we may be directed by the Secretary of State.