(2 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsToday the independent inquiry into the mistreatment of individuals who were detained at Brook House immigration removal centre (IRC) between 1 April 2017 and 31 August 2017, as shown in the BBC Panorama programme “Undercover: Britain’s Immigration Secrets”, has published its report.
The report can be found on the Brook House inquiry website from noon today.
The report sets out failings in both oversight and governance to protect the welfare of detained individuals within Brook House IRC during this period.
The Government take the welfare and safety of those we detain very seriously and has made significant improvements to immigration detention since the dates covered by the inquiry.
I would like to thank Kate Eves and the inquiry team for their work to establish the facts of what happened at Brook House IRC, to identify learning and to make recommendations that will help to prevent a recurrence of such events.
We will carefully consider the findings of this inquiry in its detailed report, including the recommendations in relation to the management of the immigration detention estate and the welfare of detained individuals.
I have today laid the inquiry’s report before the House, and it will also be published on www.gov.uk.
[HCWS1052]
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsThe vast majority of officers are brave and hard-working individuals but serious concerns persist regarding standards and culture in policing, particularly in light of recent cases and the concerning findings of Baroness Casey’s review into culture and standards in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). The Government are committed to ensuring the police discipline system is fair and effective at removing those officers who fall seriously below the high standards we rightly expect of them.
It is for this reason that we launched a review into the police dismissals process in January of this year. The review considered evidence from stakeholders, as well as the results of a national data collection. The core recommendations from this review were announced on 31 August and today we are publishing the report of the review, setting out the evidence collected and full list of proposals we intend to take forward. These proposals include:—
Creating a presumption for dismissal where gross misconduct is proven. This change will ensure that—unless exceptional circumstances apply—officers found guilty of gross misconduct can expect to be dismissed.
Ensuring officers who fail vetting can be dismissed. We intend to make it a statutory requirement for officers to hold vetting—and support a legislative routeway to dismiss those who are unable to do so.
Specifying that certain criminal offences automatically amount to gross misconduct. We intend to introduce a list of barred offences, meaning that conviction of certain criminal offences—including sexual offences—automatically constitutes gross misconduct.
Returning responsibility for chairing misconduct hearings to senior officers. To ensure chief constables are afforded a stronger role in the system—while retaining necessary independence—the responsibility for chairing hearings will now sit with senior officers. A legally qualified person (LQP) and independent panel member (IPM) will sit alongside the senior officer.
Streamlining of the unsatisfactory performance procedures (UPP). We intend to streamline the current statutory performance system for police officers to make it easier to use—identifying under-performing officers and, where there is no improvement in their performance, effectively dismissing them.
A number of other changes are expected to improve the efficiency of the system and ensure greater transparency.
The Government are committed to delivering these important reforms, the majority of which require changes to secondary legislation, and will work with stakeholders to deliver these as soon as practicable.
The review report will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses and published on www.gov.uk.
[HCWS1035]
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe asylum accommodation support contracts ensure the provision of safe, habitable, fit-for-purpose and correctly equipped accommodation for destitute asylum seekers. The contracts also require compliance with the law, local authority licensing and best practice guidance. We have been working with the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities to minimise the potential impact on homelessness, and have agreed an asylum placement funding for local authorities.
We hear the Government talking about £6 million per day being wasted on hotels, but we do not hear about the billions being forked out on private companies such as Serco and Clearsprings Ready Homes, both of which have seen scores of complaints, including about unsanitary conditions, a lack of safeguarding, and sexual abuse. Does the Home Secretary think that it is appropriate to entrust those companies with taxpayers’ money to run asylum accommodation in hotels and former Ministry of Defence sites?
The safety and wellbeing of asylum seekers in our care is of paramount importance at the Home Office. We expect high standards from all our providers, and we have robust governance frameworks in place to manage the service delivery of asylum accommodation. What we definitely do not do, and do not propose to do, is willingly accept thousands more illegal migrants into the UK from the EU, housed presumably in more hotels across the country, as Labour is proposing. I campaigned for Brexit to take back control of our borders, not for Labour to surrender our sovereignty to the EU.
One of the justifications for using service accommodation such as RAF Scampton was that it was supposed to be cheaper, but we now know the figures: it is more expensive over two years, and over three years the savings are absolutely derisory. The figures are, frankly, being fiddled by overcapitalising the value of the base, and are not based on surveys. The Home Secretary’s officials are now ripping out services. The council has issued a stop order on it. I give notice that I will report the Home Office to the Comptroller and Auditor General for misapplying and wasting public money, because using the base will cost more than hotels. The base is Crown land, so the local authority cannot enter it. Does she accept that she would be acting illegally and is liable to be sued if her officials disobey the stop order?
I have had several discussions with my right hon. Friend about the proposed asylum accommodation at Scampton. I thank him for his very energetic campaigning on behalf of his constituents. I very much appreciate the challenges that this nationwide mission poses for us all. I do not agree with his assessment; we have assessed the proposal at Scampton to be value for money. Ultimately, it is not right that we continue to house tens of thousands of migrants in hotels, in towns and cities across the country, costing the taxpayer £6 million a day. That is why our work to roll out large sites is moving swiftly, and we propose to move asylum seekers on to them as soon as possible.
It has been more than a month since all 39 asylum seekers were hauled off the 500-capacity Bibby Stockholm because of the detection of legionella, but the Home Secretary is yet to give a date for when the barge will actually be ready for use. We still do not know why she chose not to wait for the legionella results before ploughing ahead, and why her Minister was so slow to act once the results came in. We are still yet to hear a denial from the Home Secretary that it is one of the most lethal strains of the bacteria, as reported in the media. Today, will she set out her responses to those questions and confirm the exact cost of the barge? Half a million pounds per month to house zero asylum seekers on this floating symbol of failure feels utterly extortionate. Why is it that the only boat this Government have managed to stop is their own?
I am somewhat surprised by the hon. Gentleman’s change of tune: he is on the record in the media as supporting our use of the barge, so a change of heart is welcome. We have assessed the barge—it has been under constant scrutiny—and we will be re-embarking people on to that barge as soon as is practical and possible. What is clear is that the hon. Gentleman simply has no answers for how to solve the broader problem. The truth is that Labour’s policy has not survived contact with reality: it has been denounced by the EU, its shadow Ministers are making it up as they go along, and the leader has had to backtrack—and it has not even been a week. Only the Conservative party has a plan that is based on reality, deterrence and delivery, and it will stop the boats.
OpenDemocracy recently revealed the extent of self-harm and suicide in immigration removal centres—in particular, Harmondsworth and Colnbrook, where 24 self-harm incidents occurred in March, which is more than over the three previous months combined. Emma Ginn, director of Medical Justice, has said:
“We are not confident that the Home Office considers the value of the lives of those in its care in detention as fully human.”
What is the Home Secretary doing to ensure that those in Home Office immigration removal centres do not face such desperate circumstances that they seek to take their own lives?
As I said, the safety of all of those in our care is a priority for the Home Office, and the standard of habitation—whether that is in our asylum accommodation estate more broadly, or specifically in our immigration removal centres—is one that always, as far as the law requires, meets high standards. Those standards are rigorously scrutinised and monitored, and those who have concerns have avenues to make complaints via the migrant helpline.
Our communities are safer than in 2010, with overall crime on a like-for-like basis down by 54%. We have put 20,000 more police officers on our streets—a record number—which is enabling us to take action across the board to bring more offenders to justice, to better protect victims and to equip our police with the powers they need to prevent crimes.
The fall in crime is welcome, but does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the police would deter and solve even more crimes, such as burglaries, the use of quad bikes and general antisocial behaviour in places such as Hatfield, Doncaster, Rossington and Thorne in my constituency, if they started putting more bobbies on the beat and stopped promoting unscientific ideologies?
My hon. Friend is quite right. We pay the police to fight crime. Whether that is to focus on the antisocial behaviour, the nuisance bikers or the burglaries he mentioned, they are there to keep people safe. We do not pay them to wave flags at parades, to dance with drag queens or to campaign. That is why I finally ended all association with Stonewall at the Home Office and why I expect all police and crime commissioners and chief constables to focus on cutting crime and rebuilding confidence, not playing politics.
I thank the Home Secretary, who recently came to Warrington to meet the chief constable, Mark Roberts, and our police and crime commissioner, John Dwyer. We are now at record numbers of police officers, and alongside that we are at record numbers of arrests. Cheshire had the second-highest charge and summons rates in England and Wales for all crime in the last 12 months. One of the concerns raised by constituents at a recent surgery was the increase in cyber-crime. What steps is the Home Secretary taking to bolster action against fraud and online scams?
My hon. Friend has been an indefatigable champion for his community, and I very much enjoyed joining him at his local police station to meet his excellent chief constable, Mark Roberts, with the PCC. Cheshire is an example of common-sense policing and protecting the public. With those arrest rates and a focus on domestic abuse, on which Cheshire constabulary has achieved some excellence, it deserves all the praise that it gets.
When it comes to tackling online scams and online fraud, which are a feature of modern-day crime fighting, earlier this year, with the Prime Minister, I announced our fraud strategy. One hundred million pounds from the 2021 spending review has gone towards tackling fraud. A portion of that will fund a new national fraud squad of 400 specialist fraud officers across policing and the National Crime Agency, who will investigate the most harmful fraudsters targeting the UK public.
Since 2015, the proportion of crimes that result in a perpetrator facing a punishment has gone down by two thirds. Is that because the Government had a policy of cutting 21,000 police officers?
I am incredibly proud of the increased resources for policing, the increased powers for policing, with the 20,000 new officers on the frontline that the Government have delivered for the British people—a record number; we are at historic levels—and the overall fall in crime since 2010. Yes, there is more to do, but on all those measures, how did Labour vote? It voted against them and against the British public.
The Home Secretary talks about tackling online and telephone scams, and she is right to do so. Age UK recently came out with research that showed that 43% of people aged over 65 have been victims of online or telephone scams of some kind. Will she talk about how she will use that research and extend the resource she gives to police authorities such as in Cumbria, as well as working with banks and other outfits, to ensure that more people are not victims of this outrageous uptick in scams?
The hon. Member is absolutely right—online crime and fraud has become a grave feature of today’s criminality. That is why our fraud strategy is all about targeting this emerging threat. Whether that is through the national fraud squad that I just mentioned, banning SIM farms, increasing specialism on the frontline, or our police forces working with the National Crime Agency, other agencies and, importantly, the tech and banking sectors, we will prevent fraud from becoming a reality as well as detecting it and enforcing against it further down the line.
The Home Secretary seeks to paint a rosy picture on crime. In reality, retail crime is, as described by the Co-op, “out of control”, and with 10,000 fewer neighbourhood police and police community support officers, that is no surprise. Across all retailers, there are more than 850 acts of violence or abuse every single day. The Co-op also reports that even when it detains someone suspected to have committed a crime, 80% of the time it has to let them go again because the police are stretched too thinly to come and make the arrest. When will the Home Secretary drop this pretence that things are going well and actually stand up for our shop workers?
We take these matters incredibly seriously. That is why my right hon. Friend the Policing Minister met the Co-op and other major retailers recently to discuss this issue in detail. Shoplifting and retail theft have become a challenge for retailers and our community, which is not right. That is why, a few weeks ago, we made a nationwide commitment whereby all police forces have agreed to follow every reasonable line of inquiry. That will mean that CCTV footage, online evidence of resale and other actionable evidence will be followed up by the police, leading the investigations and justice process.
On 27 March, the Government announced the antisocial behaviour action plan, backed by £160 million of new funding. Police and crime commissioners are being supported to increase hotspot policing and to run immediate justice pilots. In July, we announced round 5 of the safer streets funding to deliver a range of ASB and crime-prevention measures.
I thank the Home Secretary very much for her recent visit to Southend, where she met the excellent police, fire and crime commissioner Roger Hirst and our excellent chief constable B-J. Harrington. She heard about how Southend’s revolutionary Operation Union has driven down antisocial behaviour across our city by over 50%. That will be assisted by the Government’s steps last week to tackle nitrous oxide—I thank her very much for tackling that menace. However, constituents are raising with me antisocial behaviour in and around pubs, including drug-related incidents, so can my right hon. and learned Friend tell me whether she has any specific plans to help local police deal with that particular problem?
I was very pleased to join my hon. Friend in Southend, and to meet her chief constable and the office of the PCC. She is right that the success of Operation Union has helped to drive down ASB, but there is more to do to tackle the ASB that blights communities. That is why I am pleased that her force, Essex, has the most police officers ever and is doing very well with its progress on the hotspot policing pilot.
My hon. Friend talks about drugs. Part of our plan on ASB is to expand drug testing on arrest, so that police can now test for more substances, class B and C, when they arrest someone on suspicion of drug possession.
Unfortunately, there are instances of antisocial behaviour in the centre of Keighley—mostly around the bus station, but of course there are other hotspot areas. The police and the local community are having to deal with this issue on an ongoing basis. I am very pleased that the Government made extra resources available to our West Yorkshire police via the antisocial behaviour action plan, but will the Home Secretary join me in urging our Labour West Yorkshire Mayor, who is responsible for setting local police strategy and our crime reduction action plan in Keighley, to be more laser-focused on antisocial behaviour, so that we can all ensure that the issue is tackled once and for all?
I urge the PCC to take heed of my hon. Friend’s warning and advice. The Government, through our safer streets fund, have awarded the South Yorkshire police area over £4 million in recent years—funding that has gone towards tackling ASB and reducing crime. It is up to the PCCs to apply in the next round for funding to put forward projects that can have a focus on reducing crime, protecting victims and securing safety for communities.
On occasion, people using Wrexham bus station have been subject to antisocial behaviour perpetrated by a small band of disaffected youths. I would like to compliment Inspector Luke Hughes and the Wrexham city police team for their appropriate use of dispersal orders. Will the Home Secretary join me in praising North Wales police, despite being slowed down to 20 mph by the Welsh Labour Government, for their pragmatic and no-nonsense approach to upholding public safety?
I am afraid the litany of ridiculous policy announcements by Labour is reaching record levels. I mean, we only have to look at the last two days. A period of silence from the Labour party would be welcome. The 20 mph zone is ridiculous. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Dispersal orders are a regrettable but necessary power that the police have at their disposal. We are going even further with our antisocial behaviour action plan by expanding police powers such as public space protection orders and community protection notices, enabling the police to take rapid and effective action to disperse people and to stop nuisance and criminal antisocial behaviour.
Over the summer, I have spoken to many people in Leyland who, although we have managed to get the police station reopened, are still reporting problems involving antisocial behaviour in Broadfield, Worden and Seven Stars. I have been out with the local bobbies, who are benefiting from the Government’s police uplift, to see what is being done to tackle those problems. Operation Centurion—our police and crime commissioner’s attempt to use money seized from criminals to boost local policing temporarily in order to address antisocial behaviour—is about to hit Leyland, but does the Home Secretary agree that we need a whole-agency approach, and that councils should use the powers at their disposal to issue community protection notices and work with the police to end this blight on the people of Leyland?
I am delighted that my hon. Friend has been able to work closely with her excellent police and crime commissioner, Andrew Snowden, who is another example of effective leadership at the police force in Lancashire and whom I have had the pleasure of meeting. It is also good that Lancashire is one of the pilot areas for hotspot policing: it is currently delivering 2,000 hours a month of additional patrolling in antisocial behaviour hotpot areas, and that is set to increase. However, I urge the Labour council to listen to my hon. Friend’s sensible words and ask the police and local authorities to use all the powers at their disposal to tackle antisocial behaviour through, for instance, public space protection orders and community protection notices.
Constituents, including pupils at Lliswerry High School, constantly raise with me the antisocial and dangerous use of e-scooters and e-bikes. I held a debate on this last December, but little has happened since, and legislation needs to catch up with the growth in their sales. Will the Home Secretary talk to Ministers at the Department for Transport to see what can be done to address the problem?
The behaviour of nuisance riders, or boy racers—whatever we want to call them—is antisocial behaviour plain and simple. It is criminal, it can be harassing, it can bring fear to communities, and it can cause criminal damage. The police, working with local authorities, have the necessary powers to end these problems, and forces around the country have organised pilots that have led to success. I encourage the hon. Lady’s local police force to look at the good practice that is currently taking place around the country.
Let us get this exactly right: over the next four years, police numbers in Scotland are due to fall by 2,000. The highlands and islands police chief has said that “something has to give.” I had thought that Barnett consequentials would lead to an increase in Scotland’s police numbers rather than a decrease. When it comes to antisocial behaviour, what a grim message this is for some of the most vulnerable in society.
Unfortunately—it is incredibly tragic—the Scottish National party’s obsession with separatism has led to the highest number of alcohol and drug-related deaths in Europe on their watch. Falling police numbers in Scotland when numbers are rising in England and Wales—that is what the SNP brings us, and only good government from the Conservatives can stop crime and protect victims.
We remain determined to stop the boats and deter people from making these dangerous journeys to the UK, and we are making progress. We have by no means reached the finishing line, but the number of arrivals is 20% down, the legacy backlog has nearly halved, and the number of Albanian arrivals has fallen by 90% this year. While Labour proposes to take thousands of illegal migrants from the EU every single year, letting Brussels decide who comes here, we are determined to stop the boats with our Rwanda plan and our Illegal Migration Act 2023, which Labour opposed.
A hotel in my constituency is housing illegal migrants. They receive local NHS dentistry services and hospital access, and, of course, their living costs are met. Constituents write to me pointing out that they do not have access to all those services. What can my right hon. and learned Friend tell them about how soon the use of hotels for illegal migrants will end?
It is totally unacceptable that too many towns and cities around the country now house the 45,000 asylum seekers who are in hotels, costing the British taxpayer £6 million a day. That is why we are standing up large sites and vessels around the country. We are also maximising the use of hotels, so that we can open fewer hotels. It is not right that the British taxpayer is forking out the cost. What we are not doing is the ridiculous plan set out by Labour Members. They are either grotesquely naive about the problem or they have a betrayal plan to rejoin the EU. After all, most of them wanted a second referendum. Either way, we can all see it for what it is: a plan for open borders, unlimited migration and rejoining the European Union. It is the same old Labour on the wrong side of the argument.
It is good to be back, Mr Speaker. The number of people arriving on dangerous small boats is now 150 times higher than it was five years ago. Meanwhile, convictions of people smugglers are 30% down. Our border security is not working. The Home Office has already spent £140 million on a flawed Rwanda scheme, but would not taxpayers’ money be better spent recruiting hundreds more police and investigators to defeat the criminal gang networks and prevent the dangerous boat crossings?
The reality is that we need a robust and honest approach to dealing with this problem. Opening our doors to thousands of migrants from the EU is not the solution. We need a deterrent, and that is why our agreement with Rwanda will work. It is based on what has worked in other countries such as Australia, and I am confident that we will be able to deliver our Rwanda plan as soon as possible. What is clear is that the Labour party does not even seem to know what its policy is on small boats. Previously, it had no plan; now it has tried to put a plan together, but half its shadow Ministers do not even know how it works. It is only this Government that have a plan, will deliver Rwanda, have delivered our groundbreaking legislation and will stop the boats.
I will make a short topical statement. The range of threats our country faces is ever evolving, so I want to set out what we are doing to get ahead of it. We have refreshed our counter-terrorism strategy, especially by overhauling the Prevent strand so that it recognises and can counter the driving force of ideology. Our counter-terrorism operations centre is truly world class and fit for the 21st century. However, the security threat is wider than terrorism, and that is why we have passed the National Security Act 2023, which also addresses the evolving nature of the threat and contains several measures to modernise counter-espionage laws. Our comprehensive economic crime plan and legislation have cracked down hard on the Russian oligarchs upon whom Putin relies. We will give our courageous and capable intelligence and security services all the powers they need to keep us safe.
I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for that statement. She will know that there is continuing widespread concern about the threat to our national security from the whole-of-state approach that the Chinese are taking to espionage activities in our country. I urge her to ensure that our response will mirror that, and that China is in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme.
National security is our overriding priority as a Government, particularly at the Home Office. As Home Secretary, it is my job to oversee the protection of the UK from all types of threats to our national security. As the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report has said:
“The Chinese Intelligence Services target the UK and its overseas interests prolifically and aggressively.”
I will not shy away from calling out the threats from China for what they are or from making it clear that its agencies regularly engage in hostile activity towards the UK. We are currently reviewing the countries that should go into the enhanced tier of FIRS. There is a strong case to be made for China being put into it, but I do not want to prejudice the process by which those determinations will be made, and—
Order. We really do have a problem, don’t we? Home Secretary, I am talking to you. I am bothered, because these are topical questions and there are people here who want to catch my eye. You cannot carry on making statements to every question. Topical means topical. We are going to be here for some while, so I hope you understand. I call the shadow Home Secretary.
On 7 March, the Home Secretary emailed Conservative supporters saying
“today we’re changing our laws—and bringing the small boat crossings to an end.”
Since then, 20,000 more people have arrived. She is not applying her own law, because it does not work. The use of asylum hotels is up, with no date to end their use, and foreign criminal returns are down. The independent chief inspector of borders and immigration has said:
“This is no way to run a government department.”
He is right, isn’t he? Is that why the Home Secretary is getting rid of him?
I am incredibly proud of the landmark legislation passed by this House, which was opposed by the Labour party every step of the way. This will allow us to detain those who arrive here illegally and remove them to a safe country like Rwanda.
The point is that at least we have a policy. I am not sure that anyone on the Labour Front Bench knows what Labour’s plan is for stopping the boats. Shadow Ministers certainly seem to be making it up as they go along. There were quotas and then no quotas. The EU has made it clear that we would be expected to take thousands more migrants from the EU. Will there be family reunion? We already have a scheme for family reunion. They are making it up because they do not have a plan. I think the British people can see exactly what Labour’s plan is—
Order. I do not think the Home Secretary understands what “topical” means. Could the Whips please explain to their Front Benchers that we have to get through the Order Paper? You are not helping me, and I do not know why.
What the Home Secretary said is total waffle. She has no answer on the inspector because she is afraid of scrutiny. There was no answer on her failure, just invented garbage about Labour. The Home Office’s immigration director, asylum director, borders director and accommodation director are all going or gone because the only people she removes are the people she needs to do the job. There has been a 40% increase in the use of asylum hotels since she became Home Secretary. When will she end the use of asylum hotels? When will she deal with this shambles, stop the gimmicks and get a grip?
The right hon. Lady talks about a shambles, but the last four days have been a great example of a shambles. The EU has called her party “delusional” when it comes to its grand plan for stopping the boats. Labour disagrees with the National Crime Agency on how to solve the problem. The reality is that Labour is on another planet on how to stop the boats. It is not based in reality, it is not grappling with this challenge and it is not being honest with the British people.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsToday I lay before Parliament the unexplained wealth order report for the period 2022-2023. The UWO report details the number of UWOs made by the High Court in England and Wales during that period, and the number of applications made to that Court by enforcement authorities for such an order during that period.
In total, one UWO was applied for during the reporting period. This was obtained in June 2023. One other UWO was applied for since Royal Assent of the Economic Crime Transparency and Enforcement Act 2022 but before the reporting period began. This case has been adjourned to a date outside of this reporting period.
The number of UWOs applied for and obtained for the period is low but this must be understood within the wider context of the UK’s asset recovery system. Enforcement authorities have a number of powers available to them to investigate, search for and seize assets. Even a single UWO may have a high impact. A UWO used in one investigation resulted in civil recovery proceedings that led to the recovery of almost £10 million.
While law enforcement agencies remain committed to using UWOs where they will add value to an investigation, they are operationally independent from Government and cannot be tasked to use UWOs. We will continue to keep the UWO regime under review.
Copies of the report will be available in the Vote Office.
[HCWS1034]
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2023, which was laid before this House on 6 September, be approved.
Before getting into the detail of the order, I take this opportunity to apologise to the House and to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, for the fact that news of my decision, which we are here to debate, became public before the order was laid.
I am grateful to hon. Members for their consideration of the order, which will see the Wagner Group, a truly brutal organisation, proscribed. Having just met Ukrainian Interior Minister Klymenko, I am proud to reiterate the United Kingdom’s commitment to Ukraine, as it resists and defeats Putin’s war of aggression.
Some 78 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Proscription is not only a powerful tool for degrading terrorist organisations; it sends a strong message about the UK’s commitment to tackling terrorist activity globally.
Wagner Group are terrorists, plain and simple. I therefore propose amending schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 by adding Wagner Group, also referred to as the Wagner Network, to the list of proscribed organisations. In referring to Wagner Group, the order encompasses all Wagner’s activities across the globe.
For an organisation to be proscribed, I as the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that it is currently involved in terrorism, as set out in section 3 of the 2000 Act. If the statutory test is met, I must then consider the proportionality of proscription and decide whether to exercise my discretion.
Proscription is a powerful tool with severe penalties. It criminalises being a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation and wearing articles of a proscribed organisation in a way that arouses suspicion. Penalties are a maximum of 14 years in prison and/or an unlimited fine. Proscription also supports other disruptive activity, such as immigration disruptions and terrorist financing offences. The resources of a proscribed organisation are terrorist property and therefore liable to be seized.
The order builds on sanctions that are already in place against Wagner Group. Terrorist financing incurs criminal rather than civil penalties, which allow the Government ultimately to forfeit terrorist property, rather than just freezing an individual’s assets. I am supported in my decision making by the cross-Government proscription review group, and a decision to proscribe is taken only after great care and consideration, given its wide-ranging impact. It must be approved by both Houses.
A great deal of carnage and blame can be laid at the feet of Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, which emerged following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and Putin’s first illegal invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. Wagner have acted as a proxy military force on behalf of the Russian state, operating in a range of theatres including Ukraine, Syria, Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Mozambique and Mali. They have pursued Russia’s foreign policy objectives and those of other Governments who have contracted their services.
In the hours following Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine, Wagner Group were reportedly tasked with assassinating President Zelensky. They failed in that task, thanks to the heroism and bravery of the Ukrainian security forces. Wagner Group describe themselves in heroic terms, even suggesting, revoltingly, that they are saviours of Africa. That private military companies remain illegal under Russian law has never particularly concerned Putin.
Putin can distort the truth to suit himself all he likes, but Wagner Group are terrorists. Wherever they go, instability, misery and violence follow. With the House’s consent, Wagner Group will therefore be proscribed. Having carefully considered all the evidence, including advice from the cross-Government proscription review group, I have decided that there is sufficient evidence to reasonably believe that Wagner Group are concerned in terrorism and that proscription is proportionate.
Although I am unable to comment on specific intelligence, I can provide the House with a summary of Wagner Group’s activities, which supports the decision. Wagner Group commit and participate in terrorism. That is based on evidence of their use of serious violence against Ukrainian armed forces and civilians to advance Russia’s political cause.
Wagner Group played a central role in combat operations against Ukrainian armed forces to seize the city of Popasna in May 2022 and during the assault on Bakhmut, which was largely occupied by Russian forces this year. The horrific assault on Bakhmut resulted in the virtual destruction of a city that was once home to 70,000 people. Those are 70,000 innocent civilians whose homes happened to be in the way of Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions.
Wagner employed the same inhumane and senseless tactics that Russian forces had previously used in Chechnya, killing innocent civilians and destroying an entire city in the process. They barely showed any more concern for the lives of their own side. Defence intelligence has assessed that up to 20,000 convicts, recruited directly from Russian prisons on the promise of a pardon and early release, were killed within a few months of the attack on Bakhmut. Wagner’s relentless bombardment of Bakhmut was one of the bloodiest episodes in modern military history.
Hon. Members will also be aware of multiple reports that allege unbelievable brutality by Wagner Group commanders against their own troops who retreat, desert or otherwise refuse to carry out their leaders’ murderous orders. The most notorious of those events, the killing of a purported deserter, who was murdered by a sledgehammer blow to the head, has even been glorified by Wagner’s leaders and Russian ultra-nationalists. That macabre culture and brutality are indicative of an organisation that is more than just a private military company. There is a reason for that: it is a terrorist organisation.
Ukrainian prosecutors have accused Wagner Group fighters of war crimes near Kyiv. The tortured bodies of civilians were found with their hands tied behind their backs in the village of Motyzhyn. I visited Ukraine last year in my role as Attorney General and I saw at first hand those prosecutors’ unrelenting commitment to seeking justice. We stand with Ukraine in that mission.
Wagner Group have also been implicated in serious acts of violence in several countries in Africa. A UN report published in May this year implicated Wagner in the massacre of at least 500 people in the central Malian town of Moura in March 2022, including summary executions, as well as rape and torture. In June 2021, a panel of experts convened by the UN Security Council detailed atrocities in the Central African Republic, including excessive use of force, indiscriminate killings, the occupation of schools and looting on a large scale, including of humanitarian organisations.
Despite their mutiny in June of this year and the reported death of their leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, last month, Wagner remain a violent and destructive organisation. Proscription sends a strong message of the UK’s commitment to tackle terrorist activity and builds on our existing cross-Government work to counter Wagner’s destabilising activities. Their leadership’s recent feud with senior Russian military figures is a predictable consequence of Putin’s disastrous decision to invade Ukraine, but it is fundamentally a distraction from the fact that Wagner continue to commit violent acts around the world. While Putin’s regime wavers over what to do with the monster that it created, Wagner’s destabilising activities only continue to serve the Kremlin’s political goals.
I am listening carefully to what the Home Secretary is saying about the timeline for all this. Although I certainly welcome this proscription, the frustration is that it did not happen sooner. Although she cannot go into the detail of the intelligence that she has heard, could she perhaps expand on why it has taken this long, because much of what she has said refers to 2021 and early 2022. Why did we not we do this sooner?
The decision has not been taken in isolation; it builds on a strong response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and Wagner’s wider destabilising activity, including extensive sanctions. Decisions on whether and when to proscribe a particular organisation are taken after extensive consideration and in the light of a full assessment of the available information. Significant events have taken place recently, including the mutiny in June, the alleged death of the core Wagner Group leadership in August, and it is right that we consider the impact of those key events when taking the decision.
The real fact remains that this group present a serious risk to security around the world, and their increasing activities in Ukraine affect European stability and our security, which is why the case for action is now stronger than ever. Wagner are vulnerable. A leadership vacuum and questions about their future provide a unique opportunity to truly disrupt their operations and the threat they pose. That is why this House must proscribe Wagner now.
This decision comes after public calls from President Zelensky for international allies to take action and list Wagner as a terrorist organisation. In doing so, we stand alongside our allies in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and France, whose Parliaments have all called for Wagner Group to be labelled as a terrorist organisation on the EU’s list of terrorist groups. We continue to work in close co-ordination with the US, which designated Wagner under its transnational criminal organisation sanctions programme earlier this year.
In formally proscribing, we will be leading the international effort by taking concrete legal action against Wagner. I urge our allies to follow suit. This decision demonstrates that the UK will maintain its unwavering support for Ukraine, in co-ordination with our allies. It shows that we stand with the people of Ukraine against Russia’s aggression.
To conclude, wherever Wagner operate, they have a catastrophic effect on communities, worsening conflicts and damaging the reputations of countries that host them. Wagner may be at their most vulnerable and Russia’s military leaders may be grappling to regain control of the organisation, but the brutal methods they have employed will undoubtedly remain a tool of the Russian state. Let there be no misunderstanding: in whatever form Wagner take, we and our allies will pursue them. We will expose them and we will disrupt them. Wagner are a terrorist organisation and we must not be afraid of saying so. We will hold Russia to account for its use of these malign groups—these international gangsters—and the destruction they bring around the world. We will continue to support Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression, and we will confront and challenge terrorism however and wherever it occurs.
Several hon. Members rose—
I am grateful to all who have contributed to this debate. Many important issues have been raised, and I am encouraged by the supportive atmosphere in which the discussion has taken place. We all agree that Wagner Group are terrorists plain and simple, and I am confident that this House recognises, as the British people recognise, that we have a moral responsibility to act. We must and we will confront terrorism wherever and however it occurs, and that is why we are taking this action.
Hon. Members have all made very powerful points, and let me attempt to take them in some kind of logical order. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), raised the issue of comparisons with other international allies. I gently say that we have been working intensively to build international consensus, but also to work closely in a cohesive way with our allies.
The US designation to which the hon. Gentleman refers is equivalent to the sanctions that the UK imposed in March last year. It was not equivalent to our proscription power that we are taking right now. The French Parliament supported a non-binding resolution to call Wagner terrorists, but it has not formally proscribed. That is why I emphasised that we are taking a leadership role in formally proscribing Wagner as a terrorist organisation. I will continue to work with international partners to create a broader consensus.
I agree with everything that the Home Secretary has said. We are taking a lead, and that is brilliant. Has she had specific conversations on this matter with her counterparts and also with the EU? The EU can also proscribe and designate Wagner as a terrorist organisation, which itself has financial implications. Will she bring that up with the European Union, too?
The threat posed by terrorist organisations, including Wagner Group, has been on the agenda in many of my dialogues with international partners because of its wholesale destructive nature and the enormity of the threat that it poses.
The shadow Minister also asked about our broader strategy on Russia and our approach to state threats. What I turn to first is our integrated review, which sets out in the most pressing terms that the most urgent national security and foreign policy priority in the short to medium term is to address the threat posed by Russia to European security. We will continue to work with our allies and partners to defend the rules-based international order, and we stand united in condemning Russia’s reprehensible actions, which are an egregious violation of international law and the UN charter.
When the integrated review was published, it made clear that we are dealing head-on with the threat posed by Russia. We take it extremely seriously, and we have responded to it. We have called out Russian aggression wherever it occurs. The National Security Act 2023—a landmark piece of legislation that overhauls our outdated espionage rules—already creates a wide range of new offences, tools and powers to counter state threats and their activities. In many respects, those cover similar grounds to a proscription-like power of the kind that the shadow Minister was referring to, but the Act will give us and, importantly, equip our agencies with wide-ranging tools to specify a foreign power, or part of a foreign power, or an entity controlled by a foreign power, under the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, for example. It will mean that persons in those arrangements will have to register their activities or risk prosecution. That is a groundbreaking tool that we will be equipped with thanks to the passage of that landmark legislation.
The defending democracy taskforce, to which the shadow Minister referred, is leading cross-government work. It is chaired and led by the Minister for Security, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), but that cross-government work is taking place to drive forward the taskforce’s priorities with Parliament, our security and intelligence community, the devolved Administrations, local authorities, the private sector and civil society. It has been incredibly extensive in its coverage so far, and we look forward to its having a tangible impact on those agencies to which I referred.
Several Members asked about sanctions, and in particular the sanctions in place against Wagner Group. In 2020, the UK designated Prigozhin through the Libya sanctions regime. That was for his and Wagner Group’s involvement in activities that threatened the peace, stability and security of Libya, including defying the UN arms embargoes. In March 2022, the UK also designated the Wagner Group for their role in actions that destabilised Ukraine. Asset freezes were imposed on funds identified as belonging to the Wagner Group in the UK, as well as travel bans on any of their members.
In July this year, the Foreign Secretary announced 13 new UK sanctions targeting a range of individuals and businesses linked to the actions of the Wagner Group in Africa. That included individuals from the Wagner Group associated with executions and torture in Mali and the Central African Republic, and threats to peace and security in Sudan. Those sanctions have had an impact: they constrained the ability to utilise assets and limited the ability to travel. As I said, the framework has constrained the freedoms and abilities of these organisations and individuals. Of course, the broad-ranging set of sanctions has been one of the largest sets of sanctions imposed on a modern economy.
Several hon. Members asked what more the Government are doing to monitor the risk that the Wagner Group and other Russian private military companies or mercenaries fragment and reform in different moulds. Our approach to tackling Wagner and other Russian PMCs has three core strands: military, sanctions and state building. The extensive military support we have given to Ukraine seeks to counter the threat that Wagner pose there, and our sanctions constrain their ability to utilise assets and to travel.
Our diplomatic engagement with partners around the world focuses on supporting fragile states to build their own capacity and discourage Wagner from taking root. Several hon. Members referenced how Wagner trade in violence and benefit through Governments, para-governments or paramilitary groups plundering resources, assets and other forms of wealth in those nations. If those states are robust and resilient in the first place, groups such as Wagner will not be able to take root. That work relating to private military companies is extensive, and our cross-Government Russia unit brings our full range of capabilities to bear against the malign influences of these contractors, in concert with our allies.
Several hon. Members referenced Africa. For many years, Wagner have had a destabilising effect on the African continent. They have been reportedly responsible for multiple breaches of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, including numerous reports of indiscriminate killings of unarmed civilians, summary executions and rape. We have again sought to take a leading role in reducing opportunities for Wagner to operate in Africa and holding them to account for the atrocities they commit.
Lastly, several hon. Members—notably my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox)—referenced the IRGC. It is clear that Iran continues to pose a persistent threat to UK-based individuals, which is unacceptable. There has obviously been significant parliamentary, media and public interest in a potential proscription decision on the IRGC. Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords have discussed IRGC proscription, with the House of Commons unanimously passing a motion in January to urge the Government to proscribe it. It is clear that the Iranian regime continues to occupy a serious and worrying role in our global order. We continue to condemn Iran’s role as one of the top military backers of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Since August last year, Tehran has transferred hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles to Moscow, in violation of UN Security Council resolution 2231. We work tirelessly with our international partners to hold Iran to account for the sale of drones to Russia, and we have imposed three rounds of sanctions on Iranian individuals and entities involved in the illegal transfers to Russia. They add to the already extensive sanctions on Iran’s drone programmes. We have also publicly raised this matter twice at the UN Security Council, alongside France, Germany and the US, and we support Ukraine’s request for a UN investigation.
It is clear that Iran continues to pose a persistent threat to UK-based individuals, which is unacceptable. The Department keeps the list of proscribed organisations under review. I know I will frustrate colleagues to say that our policy is not to comment on the specifics of individual proscription cases, and that I am unable to provide further details on this issue. I have heard the comments of Members here and the sentiment of the House. Ministers previously confirmed to this House that the decision was under active consideration but that we would not provide a running commentary. I know that will disappoint Members, but we are cognisant and open-eyed about the threat that the IRGC poses to the UK.
I am very grateful for this House’s support for the decision to proscribe the Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation. The brutality and the enormity of destruction and devastation wreaked by this group is unspeakable. It is right that we act now. I commend this order to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2023, which was laid before this House on 6 September, be approved.
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker, I seek your advice. Recently, Cumberland Council, which incidentally happens to be Labour-led, wrote to me about the impact of the EU’s nutrient neutrality rules on house building in my constituency and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (John Stevenson). As well as a number of new businesses and business expansions being held up, I am told that more than 2,500 new homes that have gone through the planning process and are awaiting granted permission have been blocked, and a further 1,450 homes as part of St Cuthbert’s garden village have been blocked. At least one national house builder has effectively withdrawn from the region. The forecasted turnover reduction runs into millions of pounds, with the inevitable impact on local jobs and the supply chain.
The council also says that the impact of the small amount of mitigation that may be found for some developments will be a reduction in section 106 agreements for affordable housing. Hundreds of jobs in my constituency are at risk. The Government found a solution and we have now found out that the Opposition plan to block it, after previously signalling agreement. I wonder if a Minister might signal their intention to come to the House to set out the impact that the flip-flopping of His Majesty’s Opposition might have on constituencies such as Workington.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I would like to make a statement about the Prevent programme.
The terrorist threat to the UK is unrelenting and evolving, and, as I noted earlier this year in announcing our refresh of Contest, it is rising. To combat that, the tools to counter terrorism must evolve. Contest, our counter-terrorism strategy, has four pillars: prevent, pursue, protect and prepare. Prevent aims to stop people becoming involved in terrorism by tackling radicalising ideologies at their root. It is an early intervention programme that relies on frontline public services across society, including healthcare, education, local authorities, the police and civil society.
I am delivering wide-ranging reforms, following the reappraisal of its effectiveness by the independent reviewer of Prevent, Sir William Shawcross. Prevent needs to better understand the threats we face and the ideology underpinning them. Ideology is the lens through which terrorists see the world. Our agencies work closely with leading experts, practitioners and former extremists. They all say that ideology is pivotal.
Terrorism is fundamentally an attack on our ideas and freedoms, so we must attack the threat at its source and disrupt those who seed and spread extremist ideology. Non-violent extremism can certainly lead to violence, but it is a problem even where it does not. It undermines our values and divides communities by diluting our sense of shared belonging. That is why I have been so disturbed by the sorts of incidents we have seen recently in Batley, Wakefield and elsewhere. We do not have blasphemy laws in Great Britain and we must never succumb to their de facto imposition by a mob. Individuals under the Prevent duty must challenge those who enable “permissive environments” for radicalisation, where grievances, identity politics and disinformation are used to whip up fear and division.
Six months on from the publication of the independent review of Prevent, I am pleased to report significant progress to the House. We are on track to deliver our commitment to implement each of the independent review’s recommendations in full. So far, working closely with the Minister for Security, we have completed 10 out of 34 recommendations, and 68 out of the 120 tasks. I expect to have implemented at least 29 of the 34 recommendations a year after the review’s publication, and the rest shortly thereafter.
Today I am publishing the first major revision of the Prevent duty guidance since its introduction in 2015. Subject to the approval of Parliament, it will come into force on 31 December this year. The guidance is the key text underpinning the way in which Prevent is delivered by the range of partners most central to its success. The changes reflect the spirit and the detail of Sir William’s recommendations.
I accepted the review’s recommendation for thresholds to be reset to ensure proportionality across all extremist ideologies. RICU, the Research, Information and Communications Unit, which provides analytical and analysis products on behalf of the Home Office, was identified by Sir William as a concern. In the past, it has failed to draw clear distinctions between mainstream Conservative commentary and the extreme right. People such as my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Sir Jacob Rees-Mogg) and Douglas Murray express mainstream, insightful and perfectly decent political views. People may disagree with them, but in no way are they extremists, and Prevent must not risk any perception of disparaging them as such again. From now on, all RICU products which report on extremist trends, and in future themes, will clearly state the purpose of such reporting and be proportionate.
Our new Prevent duty training, available on gov.uk, will highlight the importance of ideology and enhance understanding of the drivers of Islamist and extreme right-wing terrorism. We will pilot and roll out new face-to-face training alongside the new guidance so that organisations across the sector have the appropriate skills to spot genuine radicalisation. A new security threat check will ensure that strategic decision making related to Prevent is informed by the current threat landscape and local threats, and that activity is directed accordingly.
The review recommended great care over terminology. The term “susceptibility to radicalisation” should be used where appropriate, and the word “vulnerability” only where necessary. Many people who embrace extremism are affected by a range of complicating factors in their lives, but there is almost always an element of personal decision making in the choices they make. They must not be absolved of responsibility when they choose this path.
I have strengthened the operational delivery of Prevent by switching to a regional delivery model that provides support for all local authorities in England and Wales. The 20 areas in England and Wales with the highest risk ratings will receive multi-year funding. I have also provided Home Office Prevent expertise to Scotland. It is vital that Prevent does nothing actively to undermine its mission, for instance by supporting groups that work against the freedom and values that we stand for. Due diligence checks on partners delivering Prevent in local communities have been strengthened following input from the Commission for Countering Extremism and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities.
Prevent, and public authorities such as the police, should not fund or work with those who legitimise extremism, such as CAGE or MEND—Muslim Engagement and Development. That is completely at odds with Prevent objectives. Extremist and anti-Prevent groups have waged mendacious and malicious campaigns to try to discredit Prevent as anti-Muslim to undermine its work. Through the work of a new specialist unit, we are now working to rapidly rebut and counter inaccurate information about Prevent when it appears.
The independent review found that Prevent had not taken antisemitism seriously enough, so specialist intervention providers have now been recruited to better address the prevalence of antisemitism in those referred to Prevent. They will work directly with those susceptible to radicalisation to deconstruct their extremist mindset and tackle it head-on. This approach is complemented by new research allowing Prevent to explain the pernicious and often subtle indicators of antisemitism.
Like any public service, Prevent needs independent oversight, and I expect the new standards and compliance unit to be operational and publicised online early in 2024. It will process complaints from both the public and practitioners, and will take instruction from Ministers to conduct investigations and publish findings. The unit will be delivered by the Commission for Countering Extremism, and will be answerable to Ministers on the Prevent oversight board, chaired by my right hon. Friend the Security Minister.
Extremists of whatever disposition, be they neo-Nazis or Islamists, must know that in our fight against them, we will never be hampered by doubt or cowed by fear. Ensuring that Prevent is fit for purpose is critical to delivering that message, and to winning that fight. I commend this statement to the House.
I thank the Home Secretary for her statement. I join the Government in paying tribute to the work of our security services, our counter-terrorism police, the myriad different agencies—local communities, councils and education bodies—that work on the Prevent programme, and all those who work so hard to keep us safe.
Extremists try to divide us and to undermine our democratic values and our respect for one another. Extremist ideologies are a stain on our society: they feed on fear and vulnerabilities to promote hatred and violence. We have seen appalling terror attacks, from the attack on children in Manchester and the attack in Fishmongers’ Hall to the attacks on our own Jo Cox and David Amess. A strong and determined response to extremism and terror threats and threats to our national security, wherever they come from, is immensely important to our safety.
The Contest strategy rightly includes “prevent”, “pursue”, “prepare” and “protect”, and it was right for the Home Secretary to update the House on the approach to extremism and to the Prevent programme. However, on a day when there are grave unanswered questions about how a terror suspect could possibly have escaped from prison, before trial, hidden on the bottom of a food van, I am astonished that she said nothing about Prevent and prisons. We have unanswered questions about how on earth the escape could have happened, and also about staffing levels. There have been repeated warnings of 30% staff absences and shifts not being covered. Those staffing issues are a matter for Prevent as well. The independent review highlighted an issue about which countless other reports have warned: the lack of sufficient action on deradicalisation and Prevent in our prisons. Prisoners are actually leaving prison more radicalised than they were when they went in. Referring to extremism-related training for staff, Sir William said:
“it became clear during the review that this training was frequently cancelled due to staff and resource shortages…I was further told that there have been delays to staff beginning Prevent training and to extremist prisoners beginning rehabilitative programmes. These delays are attributed to staffing and resourcing issues”.
The Government have been warned repeatedly about this, and I am concerned about the complete lack of reference to it in the Home Secretary’s statement. Will she please tell us what action is being taken, and also what action is being taken for those due to be released from prison—those who are due to be deliberately released, that is, as opposed to those who escape? Contest has warned that
“four of the nine declared terrorist attacks since 2018 were perpetrated by serving or recently released prisoners.”
The joint inspectorate warned just a few months ago that there were not enough senior officials in place to oversee the 120 prisoners with terror-related convictions who are due to be released by next March. What deradicalisation and Prevent work have those 120 prisoners undergone in prison, and what provisions are in place in the community to ensure that there is no risk to the public? We cannot afford any suggestion of failure by the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice to take national security treats in prison seriously.
Today’s report from the borders inspectorate is highly critical of Border Force’s failures on insider threats, saying that organisational structures for addressing
“insider threat were found to be confused, with complex inter-relationships and unclear lines of accountability”.
What action is the Home Secretary taking to deal with insider threats?
There is also no mention of any action on online radicalisation or the use of artificial intelligence. Online radicalisation was raised by the independent review, and we know that generative AI raises further challenges and questions. We have identified potentially serious legal loopholes in our ability to take action against those who choose to use generative AI to try to radicalise people. What action is being taken on that? We have asked the Home Secretary about this before. Will she agree to Labour’s proposal to tighten the law?
The majority of the extremist threats our security agencies deal with are Islamist extremism, followed by far-right extremism. Other warped ideologies have also driven violent threats, but the main focus must continue to be on Islamist extremist threats. I welcome the emphasis on antisemitism, but the agencies, the police and the Prevent programme need to follow the threats of violence and hateful extremism wherever the evidence goes, rather than having to follow any political hierarchies that have been set.
Neil Basu, the former counter-terror chief, has said that we also need to make sure there is earlier intervention and prevention. He said:
“If we set the bar for Prevent so high that it can deal only with those who are already radicalised, we will have more terrorists, not fewer.”
Finally, what action is being taken in response to the former countering extremism commissioner’s report on hateful extremism, published some years ago? Are the Government ever going to respond to that or update the countering extremism strategy, which is now eight years out of date? We need that action. Prevent is not a whole countering extremism strategy. We need broader action if we are to keep our democratic values safe.
I thank the right hon. Lady for her response. She raised several points to which I will respond.
First, I pay tribute to all the professionals and experts in our agencies who work day and night to keep the British people safe from the evolving, changing and, indeed, increasing risk we carry when it comes to terrorism. They work in many ways of which we will not be aware, but they make huge sacrifices. I am very proud of the progress that they and this Government have made in recent years. That includes the opening of a new counter-terrorism operations centre that is now up and running and delivering state-of-the-art counter-terrorism work between all the agencies—be they the police or others—working in one place in a co-ordinated and streamlined way. I was pleased to visit CTOC recently. Our Contest strategy was relaunched earlier this year and, since 2018, 39 attacks have been disrupted by the brave men and women working in law enforcement and other agencies. That huge amount of work is going incredibly well.
Of course, the threat remains substantial, which means an attack is likely. There is no room for complacency on this issue, which is why I am wholly committed to focusing on the effective delivery of Sir William Shawcross’s recommendations. That is why I have come to update the House today.
The right hon. Lady mentioned prisons and, of course, William Shawcross referred to the threat of terrorism, extremism and radicalisation within the prison estate. In fact, recommendation 27 makes it clear that better and more training is required for prison officers, which is why I am very pleased that there has been significant progress on the roll-out of the new terrorism risks behaviour profile. This new prison-based product is led by the Ministry of Justice, building on the recommendations made by Jonathan Hall and reiterated and built on by Sir William. That roll-out will be completed by the end of the year. The value of this new tool is that prison officers will be better trained. They will have more skills and more tools at their disposal to better identify terrorism and the risk that it poses within the prison estate. That is a direct response to recommendations and concerns that have been raised.
I refer the right hon. Lady to the previous statement made by the Lord Chancellor on the broader issues. I am receiving regular briefings on the circumstances leading to the escape of Daniel Khalife yesterday and on the wide-ranging operation involving the police, Border Force and the agencies to track him down.
The right hon. Lady also mentioned resources. Let me be clear that funding for counter-terrorism is as high as it has ever been, and Prevent funding has not been cut. However, we are redirecting resources to better reflect the evolving threat picture, so that our resources are directed at the priorities informed by the intelligence picture. For example, I am very pleased that all local authorities now have a dedicated Home Office point of expertise and contact. That has been rolled out throughout England and Wales. It will properly equip those in the local authority sector to have proper training and a connection, a dialogue and a meaningful relationship with the Home Office so that they can be better tooled up to respond to radicalisation and the risks relating to Prevent in the community.
The right hon. Lady also said there should not be a hierarchy of threats. Of course, there is no such hierarchy. Prevent is ideologically agnostic, but we must always be clear about the facts. When I last updated the House, for example, 80% of live investigations by the counter-terrorism police network were Islamist in nature, and MI5 is clear that Islamist terrorism remains our predominant threat, accounting for 75% of its case load, yet only 16% of Prevent referrals in 2021 were Islamist. That is a fundamental problem that Sir William identified and that I am addressing right now through these robust and wide-ranging reforms.
Prevent is a security service, not a social service. The role of ideology in terrorism has too often been minimised, with violence attributed to vulnerabilities such as mental health or poverty and to the absence of protective factors, rather than focusing on individual responsibility and personal agency in the choices that these people are making.
I am implementing all the review’s recommendations, and I have committed to reporting back to the House on progress. I am clear that Prevent must focus solely on security, not on political correctness or appeasing campaign groups. Its first objective must be to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism. We will not be cowed by fear, and we will not be hampered by doubt. I am very grateful to the House for hearing this update.
It is welcome that the Home Secretary has come to the House today to update us on the report. I am sure the whole House and the country will be grateful that all the review’s recommendations have been accepted. She is absolutely right to say that it is about individuals making individual choices and that there can be no excuses relating to their background or the indoctrination that has taken place. This is about freedom of speech, too. People should not be frightened that Prevent intrudes on freedom of speech. It is about keeping this country safe from terrorism.
I could not agree more with my right hon. Friend. He is absolutely right that this is about national security and public safety. It is not about appeasing campaign groups or the fear of offending particular minority groups. It is not about putting community cohesion ahead of the interest of national security. I am absolutely clear that our Prevent professionals in all the relevant agencies must work without fear or favour and in the interest of national security first and foremost.
I call the Scottish National party spokesperson.
The Shawcross review has found that the Prevent strategy has failed and lost its way. The very system that aimed to identify would-be terrorists has allegedly funded a group whose head was sympathetic to the Taliban. That failure is why the Home Secretary is coming to the House today to make a statement. I am sure she will agree that public confidence in the Prevent strategy has been shaken to its foundations. We know that those previously referred to Prevent went on to commit terrorist acts and that the terrorist threat across the UK remains substantial, which means that an attack is likely. What long-term work is being done to monitor those who leave prison after serving sentences to ensure that they do not remain a threat to our communities and national security?
Islamist terrorism is the primary terrorist threat, but it is not the only one. The fact that the Wagner group is to be declared a terrorist organisation has to be welcomed, but there must be ongoing concern and vigilance in respect of extreme and far right incel movements. Questions about how to tackle online radicalisation remain. Will the Home Secretary assure us that there will be full co-operation with the devolved nations as we seek to tackle the scourge of terrorism? What guarantees will she provide that Prevent will have the necessary budget and resources to fulfil its central aim and mission of preventing terrorism across the UK?
Finally, the Home Secretary talked about better training for prison officers, but staffing crises in our prisons are rife. Training is all well and good, but it is important that the prison estate has the proper manpower levels to play its part in deradicalising and rehabilitating those who have been convicted of terrorist offences, so that when they are released they can go back to their communities without causing alarm. What action is she taking to address the staffing crisis in our prisons, as part of this strategy?
The hon. Lady talked about historical Home Office funding of groups linked with extremism, an issue identified by Sir William in his landmark report. I was appalled when I read that Prevent had historically funded groups that have legitimised extremism or has worked with groups whose values totally contradict our own. That is not a proper use of public money, it undermines Prevent’s objectives and it is potentially a threat to national security. I will ensure that that never happens again. As a result of that issue identified in the report, we are running a full-scale audit of all counter-extremism funding arrangements and we will immediately terminate all agreements that fall below our standards. We are working closely with the Commission for Countering Extremism to ensure that we strengthen our oversight and vetting procedures to ensure that taxpayers’ money always goes to the right groups.
I welcome the Home Secretary’s statement and her strong leadership on this issue. The additional measures taken by the Ministry of Justice earlier this year to crack down on the activities of terrorist prisoners were very welcome. Is she able to provide an update on any assessments the Home Office, in conjunction with the MOJ, has completed on the success of those measures so far?
The Prevent duty applies to those working in the prison estate. Sir William identified a particular concern relating to the threat of radicalism and terrorism occurring and evolving within the prison estate, which is why he made a recommendation. I am pleased that we have made significant progress on rolling out the terrorism risks behaviour profile, which will now enable prison officers to have better training so that they can better spot, and are more confident and knowledgeable about, the signs of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism within the prison estate and are thereafter empowered to take steps to mitigate and eliminate that risk.
In ensuring that Prevent is fit for purpose, the Home Affairs Committee looked at the Prevent review and we were concerned about the under-representation of the Islamist threat in Prevent referrals when compared with right-wing extremism referrals. Some 22% of the 4,915 referrals related to Islamist radicalisation and 25% related to right-wing extremism. However, 75% of those who ended up on remand for terrorist offences were categorised as Islamist and 22% were categorised as extreme right-wing. When the Security Minister appeared before our Committee, he said that the Government needed to look at the reasons for that, and that they were going to look at the misallocation and seek to make sure there was better representation of the actual threat. Will the Home Secretary therefore set out what work has been done to ensure that we have that proper representation in those initial Prevent referrals?
We saw exactly that incongruity and disparity between the intelligence picture and the security threat picture, and what was happening on the ground among the Prevent community in the referrals that they were making. That is a problem, which is why today marks an important step forward in rectifying that erroneous approach. The new statutory guidance will focus increasingly on ideological causes of terrorism, and there will be much more stringency and robustness in looking more rigorously at the ideology behind extremism. Importantly, we are also adopting Sir William’s recommendation of including the security threat check, which consists of specialist questions that are directly informed by the intelligence and Home Office analysis of the security and counter-terrorism picture. That will form a series of principles that will help to ensure that Prevent referrals on the ground properly reflect the threat picture.
Coming from Greater Manchester, I know tragically what the end result of Islamist indoctrination can be for a community, so I welcome very much the re-emphasis on tackling Islamist indoctrination. In the Home Secretary’s reset of the Prevent system, will she explain to the House how she is going to take local communities with her? She knows that one criticism of the Prevent system as it stands is that it also stigmatises whole communities, not just those who are extremists. What confidence is she going to give to diverse communities across the UK?
It is not right to say that Prevent is anti-Muslim. Prevent is about ensuring that Islamism, extremism, radicalisation and violent ideology about hatred, evil and values totally at odds with ours are stamped out. The vast majority of British Muslims make a valuable contribution to the UK, but we must be courageous in calling out permissive environments and tolerance for extremism among some parts of our community. That requires a fearless approach, one that is not cowed by political correctness or fear of upsetting particular groups in the name of community cohesion. If we want to save lives, we need to take a united approach, but a robust and fearless one to calling out Islamism when we see it.
I thank the Home Secretary for her statement, and for the strength of character and delivery of purpose as well. She referred to discussions about possible support for Scotland. She is right to be strong on radicalisation. Steps have been taken to combat that in Northern Ireland, where the rewriting of history is leading to the glorifying of terrorism for a new generation—that must be combatted. Will she confirm the effectiveness of Prevent in all areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland?
As I mentioned when we refreshed our Contest strategy, we are seeing a concerning level of terrorism related to Northern Ireland. That is a very sorry reflection of unacceptable behaviour, which must be condemned in the strongest possible terms. Our agencies work UK-wide and we are always working closely with the Police Service of Northern Ireland and other authorities at the local level, to ensure that all leads are followed in the fullest possible way and measures are put in place to mitigate risks as they emerge. However, as we saw earlier this year, that threat is a concern and we must remain vigilant to it.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsI am pleased to announce that Professor Owen Bowden-Jones has been re-appointed to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) both as a member and as its Chair. This reappointment is for a three-year term, which started on 1 January 2023. Professor Bowden-Jones is an experienced clinician who provides assessment and treatment for people experiencing harms from emerging problem drugs.
The ACMD was established under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and provides advice to Government on issues related to the harms of drugs. It also has a statutory role under the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016.
[HCWS993]
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Written StatementsI am today laying before the House a statement of changes in immigration rules.
Imposition of a visa regime on Dominica, Honduras, Namibia, Timor-Leste, and Vanuatu
We are today imposing a visa requirement on all visitors from Dominica, Honduras, Namibia, Timor-Leste and Vanuatu. Nationals of these countries will also be required to obtain a direct airside transit visa if they intend to transit via the UK having booked travel to another country.
Careful consideration of Dominica’s and Vanuatu’s operation of a citizenship by investment scheme has shown clear and evident abuse of the scheme, including the granting of citizenship to individuals known to pose a risk to the UK. From Honduras and Namibia there has been a sustained and significant increase in the number of UK asylum applications being made by these nationals, who have abused the provision to visit the UK for a limited period as non-visa nationals in order to claim asylum. As such, Namibians and Hondurans rank first among non-visa nationals for asylum claims. These high numbers are unsustainable, contributing significantly to operational pressures which have resulted in frontline resource being diverted from other operational priorities. Lastly, there has been a sustained increase in the number of Timorese nationals arriving at the UK border as non-genuine visitors, often with the intention to fraudulently claim EU settlement scheme status as dependants or to work illegally in the UK.
Arrangements are in place so that the nationals of these countries can apply for visas. We are also publicising the changes so travellers are aware and can plan accordingly. There will be a four-week, visa-free transition period for those who hold confirmed bookings to the UK made on or before 1500 BST 19 July 2023 where arrival in the UK is no later than 16 August 2023. We have arrangements in hand to provide visas for diplomats from these countries currently working at the embassy in London.
The decision to impose these visa requirements has been taken solely for migration and border security reasons and is not a sign of poor relations with these countries. Any decision to change a visa regime is not taken lightly and we keep our border and immigration system under regular review to ensure it continues to work in the UK national interest.
The changes to the immigration rules will come into force at 3 pm today.
[HCWS979]
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if she will make a statement on Contest, the United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism 2023.
Yesterday, the Government published an update to our counter-terrorism strategy, Contest. A written ministerial statement was laid alongside the Command Paper in Parliament.
Contest has a clear mission: to reduce the risk from terrorism to the United Kingdom, our citizens and our interests overseas, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. The terrorism threat level, set independently by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, has not changed, but the threat from terrorism is enduring and evolving. Despite a prevalence of lower-sophistication attacks in the UK, the threat we see today and in the coming years is more diverse, dynamic and complex: a domestic terrorist threat that is less predictable, harder to detect and harder to investigate; a persistent and evolving threat from Islamist terrorist groups overseas; and an operating environment in which accelerating advances in technology provide both opportunity for, and risk to, our counter-terrorism efforts.
It is within that context that we judge that the risk from terrorism is once again rising. By far the biggest terrorist threat comes from Islamist terrorism. It accounts for 67% of attacks since 2018, and about three quarters of MI5’s caseload. The remainder of the UK terrorist threat is largely driven by extreme right-wing terrorism, which accounts for approximately 22% of attacks since 2018 and about a quarter of the MI5 caseload. Our counter-terrorism response will be even more agile in the face of an evolving threat—more integrated, so that we can bring the right interventions to bear at the right time to reduce risk, and more aligned with our international allies, to ensure that we continue to deliver together against that common threat.
Through this updated strategy, we will place greater focus on using all the levers of the state to identify and intervene against terrorists. We will build critical partnerships with the private sector and international allies to keep the public safe, and we will harness the opportunities presented by new technology. There is no greater duty for this Government than to keep the British people safe, and I will not rest in delivering that mission.
The Contest update has very much been a sobering reminder of the threats we face. Our agencies, to which we are so grateful, have prevented 39 late-stage terror attacks in the past six years. The majority of them, as we have heard, were Islamist-motivated, with extreme right-wing terrorism making up the remainder. However, we are concerned by certain omissions from the update, and the disparity between the threats outlined and the responses proposed.
On artificial intelligence, the update recognises the challenge, saying that
“terrorists are likely to exploit the technology”.
We have called for new offences criminalising the training of chatbots to radicalise individuals, but concrete measures are woefully lacking in the update, so how are the Government going to tackle that? The update says that the threat from Daesh and al-Qaeda is on an “upward trajectory”, so can the Home Secretary tell us how we are working urgently with international partners to mitigate that risk?
The desperate situation in prisons is laid bare. With four of the nine terrorist attacks in the UK since 2018 perpetrated by serving or recently released prisoners, we are told individuals may develop
“a terrorist mindset…during their time in prison.”
Not only are we failing to de-radicalise people in prison, but people are being radicalised in prison, and failures to manage those prisoners on release are putting the public at risk. Can the Home Secretary tell the House how many terrorist prisoners are due to be released in the next 12 months, and whether every one of them has been engaged in intensive de-radicalisation programmes and assessed for terrorism prevention and investigation measures?
Finally, perhaps the most glaring omission is on state threats, despite the fact that the director general of MI5 made it clear in his annual threat update in November that Iran is
“the state actor which most frequently crosses into terrorism.”
In February, our agencies said that they had to disrupt 15 attempted kidnap and assassination attempts here in the UK. Remarkably, the report makes no reference to the resources, the approach or the powers necessary to respond to that form of terrorism. The Home Secretary knows that we have advocated for proscription powers on multiple occasions, so why do the Government continue to reject those proposals and why have they not finally proscribed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps?
I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. I know that she recognises the gravity and the sensitivity of this subject, and she will share my view that we must face the threat of terrorism united as one unified country.
Since March 2017, our agencies and law enforcement have disrupted 39 late-stage terrorist plots in the UK, as the hon. Lady said. These have included the targeting of public figures such as Members of Parliament, specific communities and events such as Pride, and public locations such as iconic sites in London. I want to put on record my profound thanks and admiration of all the professionals who work day in, day out under pressure for all they do to keep the British people safe every day. Many of us will never know the lengths to which they go in applying their expertise, dedication and public service attitude to put our safety above their own.
I am very proud of this Government’s track record when it comes to keeping the country safe. As Martyn’s law makes its way through Parliament, I expect the Opposition to be responsible and to support us in our efforts to provide this extra layer of protection for venues. We have seen significant reforms in our National Security Bill, now enacted. The hon. Lady mentioned terrorism in prisons. We take a very tough approach to managing terrorist prisoners, limiting their interactions with each other and restricting their communications. We have developed a new counter-terrorism assessment and rehabilitation centre for expert psychologists and specialist staff to research and implement specialist programmes to draw offenders away from terrorism. Indeed, the independent review of Prevent made extensive recommendations related to those in custody.
The hon. Lady referred to the use of artificial intelligence and technology. Foundation-model AIs undoubtedly hold vast potential, and they are crucial to the UK’s mission to become a science and tech superpower, but there are still many unknowns with this class of technology and many other forms of emerging technology that pose significant, but not yet fully understood, public safety and national security risks. I am particularly concerned about the rapid development and public deployment of generative large-language models like ChatGPT, and we are alert to the exponential pace of their development, the emergent capabilities which make the exact risks difficult to anticipate or control, and the relative ease with which safeguards can be overwritten. Those at the forefront of these technologies are explicit about the seriousness of the risks if proper safeguards are not developed quickly.
We look forward to promoting and enabling an open and constructive dialogue and deepened collaboration with tech company leaders, industry experts and like-minded nations as we seek to ensure that the gifts of this technology are delivered and that society is protected. Indeed, at the recent Five Eyes security meeting in New Zealand, where I represented the UK, we discussed the emerging hostile use of technology and collaborative ways in which we may work at the international level to mitigate those risks.
To conclude, I am very clear that we need to face the threats united as one country. I hope that the Opposition understand the heavy weight of that responsibility and that we will work together constructively to keep the British people safe.
One of the most effective ways to disrupt, identify and reduce the terrorist threat is to bring together the disparate and disjointed data sources that exist to link organised crime group activity to terrorists. Will my right hon. and learned Friend detail how the Contest strategy will help make that happen?
As I mentioned in my statement yesterday, there is huge interaction—a blurring of the lines, if you like—between terrorist organisations and groups, hostile state actors and serious organised crime groups, acting on a transnational basis with sophisticated and well-resourced networks and a heightened level of elusiveness. That is exactly why our Contest strategy has been refreshed to realign our priorities, resources, technological capabilities and co-ordination across agencies to properly respond in a swift and robust way to these emerging threats.
May I start by expressing my party’s deep gratitude to all those who are working to protect us from despicable terrorist attacks? Of course, our thoughts remain with all those who have suffered as a result of such evil crimes.
On that note, while I welcome the strategy’s focus on victims, may I raise the recent reports of survivors of terrorism who have been deeply upset by poor treatment by the criminal injuries compensation scheme? What discussions has the Home Secretary has had with colleagues about fixing those problems?
The strategy’s commitment to engage across the tech sector is welcome but, like the shadow Minister, I was surprised by its very limited reference to the use of artificial intelligence for radicalisation and instruction. The Windsor castle crossbow attacker is a perfect example of someone being radicalised in that way. Does the Home Secretary believe that legislation is required, and what concrete steps are being taken to address the use of AI in that way?
What extra funding will support the refreshed strategy, especially given the reports that later this year a significant number of convicted terrorists will complete their sentences, which will require the most careful management? The strategy recognises the critical importance of the closest partnership working with the devolved Governments and agencies that have responsibility for delivering various aspect of Contest. Can we have the Home Secretary’s assurances that that close working will continue?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his observations. He talked about support and compensation for victims of terrorism. More can and must be done, which is why the Government are reviewing the support available to better address victims’ needs. We are absolutely committed to ensuring that victims of terrorism get the full compensation to which they are entitled, in line with schemes administered by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. Those schemes deliver for victims of terrorism. The truth is that no amount of compensation can ever make up for the ordeal suffered by victims of terror. That is why it is right that survivors get all the support they need, in whatever form it may be required, through the publicly funded CICA, which paid out more than £158 million to victims of violent crime last year alone.
I welcome the update of the strategy. It would be helpful if the Home Secretary told us whether it will get the big tech companies to do more to prevent terrorists from exploiting their platforms—an issue highlighted in the Intelligence and Security Committee report, “Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism”.
The technological aspect of terrorism is very real. Our enemies are using more and more sophisticated tools against us for hostile purposes. That is plain from an intelligence point of view. That is why Contest makes a deliberate point of addressing the technological features of this kind of work. A huge amount of investment and operational capability has been put into mitigating and dealing with that threat, most notably in the form of the counter-terrorism operations centre—a new collaboration centre that I had the honour of visiting recently.
A few weeks ago I met Travis Frain, a founder member of Survivors Against Terror, who explained how his life had been changed forever by the Westminster bridge terrorist attack and how he did not get the support he needed in the aftermath. This week, a survey of 130 survivors of 11 major terrorist incidents found that more than two thirds felt that the compensation scheme overseen by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority was unfair and unreasonable. The Home Secretary talked about a review. It is unacceptable that these people are in that position at the moment. When will the review actually be published?
As I mentioned, there are no words and there is no amount of money that can adequately reflect the pain and suffering experienced by victims of terrorism. That is why it is absolutely right that we provide victims of terrorism with full compensation and the fullest support possible and available to enable them to move forward from these tragic events. As I said, we know that more must be done. That is why we are reviewing the support available. We need to better address victims’ needs through the current schemes and ensure that they are properly meeting the needs of victims.
Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)
There are people in Ukraine who found their territory illegally occupied and annexed by Russia, their children disappeared into Russian custody and their land settled by ethnic Russians. Under international law, we recognise the right of victims of the criminal actions of the Russian state to resist. How can we ensure that we do not end up characterising the legal actions by the victims in that conflict, and in other analogous conflicts around the world, as terrorism?
I am very proud of the UK’s track record of supporting Ukraine and the Ukrainians both in Ukraine and abroad through the devastating illegal conflict that Russia and Putin have waged upon them. It is right that we provide military support, it is right that we rolled out an extensive set of sanctions against Russia, and it is right that we continue our international and diplomatic support for Ukrainians.
I add my comments to those of the Home Secretary on our security services and thank them for the work that they do. The Intelligence and Security Committee report last year on right-wing terrorism found that 30% of disrupted plots were from right-wing terrorism, and that they mainly involved young people who aimed to join either the armed forces or the police. We made recommendations on tightening up the vetting of police officers and proscribing membership of right-wing organisations for members of the armed forces. Will the Home Secretary update the House on what progress has been made on those two issues?
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to refer to the emerging threat posed by extreme right-wing terrorism. The director general of MI5, in his annual update, referred to the ideologies that are emerging and increasing in activity, and the independent review of Prevent focused on work that can be better done. It is absolutely right that we take robust action. That is why I am acting on the recommendations set out by Sir William Shawcross on upgrading and updating Prevent, so that it better responds to the risk of extreme right-wing terrorism, as well as to the risk posed by Islamist terrorism.
In updating the UK’s counter-terror strategy, what work are the security services doing with UK Border Force to identify those entering the United Kingdom, particularly by irregular means?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Terrorists and those who have malign intent for our nation will exploit all sorts of vulnerabilities, including at the border—that is obvious. That is why the Contest upgrade deals specifically with this issue. We need to further strengthen the UK border as a critical line of defence against terrorism, taking advantage of new immigration tools—detection, targeting and biometric capabilities—to identify and block threats from entering the UK illegally in the first place.
This is a policy area that throws up some of the most difficult cases ever to be found, so I welcome the Home Secretary’s determination to build political consensus and ensure that we work with our strategic allies. Some of the most difficult cases around counter-terrorism involve UK citizens, especially children who were trafficked by ISIS and are currently in north-east Syria. That is an area where we risk becoming an outlier, because all our allies have repatriated their citizens. It risks causing friction between ourselves and our allies. Indeed, we have our own responsibility, given the fact that these are UK citizens who were trafficked. Is there anything in the strategy that will help to tackle those very difficult cases?
The right hon. Gentleman is right to refer to this very regrettable feature of modern day counter-terrorism. Paragraph 26 of the Contest strategy states:
“In recent years there has been a small increase in the number of minors investigated and arrested by Counter Terrorism Police. Most adverse activity conducted by minors has occurred online; over half of under-18s convicted of terrorism offences over the past five years were charged with non-violent offences (the collection or dissemination of terrorist publications).”
It is vital that we are cognisant of this emerging threat, and that we have the right resources, services and professionalism in place to mitigate and intercept the threat at source as soon as possible, but it is clear that wherever criminality has occurred there will be a robust response from the appropriate agencies.
Technology brings huge benefits, but it is also exploited by terrorists. Is my right hon. and learned Friend confident that the updated strategy will ensure that technology companies do far more to prevent their services being used by those who wish us harm and to co-operate with our security and law enforcement services, particularly given the approach that some have taken on encryption and child abuse imagery?
My hon. Friend has spoken about an issue that is close to my heart: tackling online child sexual exploitation, which is rising at an exponential and horrifying pace. About 32 million instances of online child sexual abuse were recorded by the global recording centre last year alone. In this country, we arrest 800 individuals a month involved in this heinous crime, and we safeguard about 1,200 children a month. It is horrifying, and that is why we are taking steps to work constructively with the tech companies. In terms of Contest, I refer him to the extensive sections on page 21 onwards and in other parts of the strategy that talk about the technological aspects, how it is emerging and our actions and response. Notably, our world-leading counter-terrorism operations centre, newly established, will bring together the right data, technology and expertise to investigate and disrupt these types of threats.
I welcome this statement. Although it was much delayed, it was much awaited. One of the key things missing from the strategy is the use of covert human intelligence sources—the people who used to be known as informants to the police. Increasing numbers of people caught under this network are people with mental health issues. Will the Home Secretary provide a detailed account of how many CHISs are used, what the results are and how many of those reported are people suffering with their mental health?
I cannot get into details that relate to operational independence and decisions made by the agencies in live investigations, but what I would say is that I expect all agencies and law enforcement organisations to use the full breadth of powers that we have afforded them.
The current situation, whereby tens of thousands of young men are arriving in small boats on our shores—primarily young men from unstable parts of the world—is frankly an accident waiting to happen. Does the Home Secretary agree that the British people expect our borders to be robustly enforced, and that is just as important when it comes to defending our nation from terrorism as it is for anything else?
A strong border is critical to counter-terrorism. The Contest 2023 strategy clearly sets that out. In the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, the Government revised schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, expanding powers to prevent illegal entry, including via small boats. Our migration and border system provides a critical opportunity to identify and manage individuals and goods that pose a terrorist concern. That is why rigour and robustness in our borders is essential for national security.
In the Government’s response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s “Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism” report—I thank the Home Secretary for referring to the scale of that threat earlier in her remarks—they said that
“our counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, remains threat agnostic so that rather than targeting specific ideologies, our tools, powers and overall CT approach can adapt to changing threats while also ensuring our approach is still able to identify and assess what are inherently ideological threats.”
Can I simply ask her to confirm that nothing she has said today and nothing that has been published changes the underlying philosophical basis of how the Contest strategy operates?
As the Contest strategy refresh makes clear, a broad range of ideologies and narratives draw people into supporting terrorism. That includes, as I have said, Islamist terrorism, which is by far the largest proportion of MI5’s case load, but there is also an increasing threat from extreme right-wing terrorism that we must confront, eliminate and do everything in our power to stop. Wherever it comes from, and however people are radicalised into extremist and violent behaviour, it is unacceptable, and we take a robust approach, ultimately, to keeping the British people safe.
In June this year, the borders inspectorate said that not every arrival into the UK at Manston was having security checks done as part of their interview or having their property checked. Can the Home Secretary guarantee now that every arrival is being fully checked, and if not, why not?
Having visited the reception centres at Western Jet Foil and Manston, and having been working closely on ensuring that the right facilities, resources and mechanisms are in place to ensure that those who arrive illegally are appropriately accommodated, I can say that we ensure that those who arrive are checked. They go through biometric checks and any other appropriate checks, and then they are put through our processing centres, generally at Manston. They are then put on a track, effectively, to other onward accommodation if they have an asylum claim. That is the general scheme that we have been carrying out for some time.
The UK police and security services used to conduct more than 600 million real-time security checks on a shared EU platform before we lost access after Brexit. At the time, the Government informed us that we would have access to a shared platform within two or three years. Now, the permanent secretary has advised that we will not have access to a shared dataset until 2027 or 2028. Can the Home Secretary confirm just how much of a damaging effect the loss of this vital intelligence and security mechanism is having on our ability to tackle terrorism and cross-border crime?
I know the hon. Gentleman is on his Brexit bandwagon, or whatever it is, but the reality is that from a security point of view, we have never had stronger collaboration with international partners than today. We have continued to develop our global reach and insight through sustained working with allies. That is particularly with the Five Eyes, where we share an enormous amount of common approach and strategic development, but also with European partners. I have met many of my European counterparts, and we share the common goal of national security. In many instances, the UK is seen among European allies as a leader and a nation valued for its contribution to pan-European national security.
As the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), rightly stated, the Government’s update acknowledges that when it comes to AI,
“terrorists are likely to exploit the technology to create and amplify radicalising content, propaganda and instructional materials, and to plan and commit attacks.”
However, there are no concrete plans in the update to address those growing risks. Beyond pointing to the Government’s own Online Safety Bill, which has been delayed yet again and watered down, and other than the rhetoric we have heard today from the Secretary of State, what are the Government actually doing? What concrete plans are in place to tackle this growing problem, because we have seen little to no action thus far?
The hon. Lady obviously has not read the document. If she had, she would see our actions, our achievements and what our plans are. First—I will save her the trouble of reading the document—we are realising the full potential of our newly established, world-leading counter-terrorism operations centre. I do not think she has visited, but I recommend she tries to, because it is an incredibly impressive, world-leading operational centre established recently that brings together the right teams, data and technology to more effectively identify, interrupt and disrupt terrorists. We are also ensuring a broader range of expertise from non-law enforcement interventions to mitigate the evolving terrorist threat. We are maintaining our investment in the critical threat assessment capabilities through the world-class joint terrorism analysis centre. I could go on, but in the interests of time, she would probably do better to read the document first.
The new Contest counter-terrorism strategy mentions that incel threats
“could meet the threshold of terrorist intent or action”.
The person behind the shooting in Plymouth in 2021, where we lost five people, could have had their actions informed by incel culture and violent misogyny. Incel violence currently largely falls out of the scope of all the Prevent strategy tactics. Does the Home Secretary agree that it is now time to develop a cross-Government incel strategy, so that we can not only prevent people from going down that path towards violent misogyny, but help rescue those who are doing so? That would provide a greater level of community safety for women and our entire community, and we would never again see the violence we saw in Plymouth repeated on our streets.
The hon. Gentleman is an incredibly powerful advocate for his constituents. Let me put on record my thoughts and prayers for the loved ones of all of those who were tragically lost or affected. Incel culture is not strictly within the Contest apparatus, but it does need work. I readily accept that it is a violent trend and a radicalising influence that is promoting a culture that is totally at odds with the free, safe and democratic society that we all love and want to cherish. I am happy to speak to him about what further steps we can take as a Government.
In March, the security threat level in Northern Ireland was increased from substantial to severe in the aftermath of the attempted murder of DCI John Caldwell. Since 2016, the additional security funding that the Government provide to the Police Service of Northern Ireland has been flatlining in cash terms at £32 million a year. Will the Home Secretary undertake to review that level of funding to ensure that the PSNI and the Security Service have the tools to continue their good work in combating both dissident republican and loyalist terrorism?
Northern Ireland-related terrorism remains a serious threat, particularly in Northern Ireland. The Contest strategy does not address the threat from Northern Ireland in Northern Ireland; that is managed by a separate strategic approach led by the Northern Ireland Office. At the Home Office, our Contest approach covers the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism in mainland Great Britain. It is important that we do not decouple those two threats, which are very interlinked. We know that some dissident republican groups continue to carry out terrorist attacks, as the hon. Member referred to, so we need to ensure that all the resources are available, and we want to ensure that we support partners in Northern Ireland so they are readily equipped to mitigate and respond to the threat.
In June, the national security adviser to the Canadian Government—a key Five Eyes member—listed Russia, China and Iran as key state actors that pose a threat to Canadian life. They then added India to that list due to the rise of Hindu nationalist activity specifically targeting Canadian Sikhs. Is that anywhere in the Home Secretary’s thinking on extremism? If not, why not?
As I said, general ideologies are set out in our Prevent approach and our Contest approach. We are actor-agnostic, but we note where these threats are emerging based on a casework analysis, as confirmed by MI5 and other agencies. The predominant threats relate to Islamist terrorism, but of course it is right that there are robust law-enforcement responses for any kind of violence or extremism that meets the criminal threshold.
I welcome very much the Secretary of State’s answers to the questions posed. Further to the question from the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry), will she outline what steps have been taken to allocate additional funding to local police forces in areas with higher threat levels such as Northern Ireland, where republican terrorism is a real threat to the democratic process? Bearing in mind that the police budget in Northern Ireland has been cut in real terms in a time of crisis, will she confirm what discussions have taken place with the Chief Constable and the Policing Board to ensure that the commitment to ringfencing funding for the battle against terrorism in all of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is maintained?
I made some reference to the specific nature of the threat posed by Northern Ireland-related terrorism. It is clear that it is primarily concentrated and directed against targets in Northern Ireland. I regularly discuss with UK Government colleagues how we can ensure robust defences across the whole piece, but I am happy to see what more can be done through a conversation.
Margaret Ferrier (Rutherglen and Hamilton West) (Ind)
The rapid proliferation of end-to-end encryption and anonymous messaging services allows terrorist groups to communicate freely without the risk of detection or identification. Of course, personal privacy must be upheld for ordinary citizens, so how are the Government looking to work with tech experts to find alternative ways of accessing the communications of members of such groups?
This is something that really does concern me. The proposed roll-out of end-to-end encryption without enabling lawful access or without safeguards will pose a danger not just to national security, but to children and to all our people. It is vital that the technology companies work with us to roll out the available technology—I am confident that it exists—to enable and protect privacy rights, but at the same time to enable law enforcement access and interventions to take place so that we can safeguard children online, prevent radicalisation online and prevent criminality online.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Written StatementsThe first duty of this Government is to keep the United Kingdom and its people safe. I am therefore pleased to today publish an updated version of CONTEST, the United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. The strategy has been laid before Parliament as a Command Paper (CP 903), and copies are available in the Vote Office and on www.gov.uk.
This year marks 20 years since we launched CONTEST. The core framework that underpins the strategy—Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare—has stood the test of time and remains a strong foundation on which to base our counter-terrorism efforts.
However, the threat we face from terrorism is enduring and evolving and it is right that we update our strategy to stay ahead. I have already announced an overhaul of the Prevent pillar in response to the Independent Review of Prevent, to ensure that it recognises the central role of ideology in encouraging people to turn towards extremism and that Islamism remains our greatest threat. Since the last version of CONTEST was published in 2018, nine terrorist attacks have been declared in the UK, in which six people died and 20 people were injured. Overseas, 24 UK nationals have been killed in 11 terrorist attacks. The majority of these attacks were Islamist in nature. We judge that the risk from terrorism is rising, and we must do everything within our power to reduce it.
We must also review our counter-terrorism efforts in response to external scrutiny: since 2018 there have been numerous inquests, inquiries, reviews, and exercises which have helped us learn lessons and improve our counter-terrorism system. Most recently we have received and are implementing recommendations from the Independent Review of Prevent and the Manchester Arena Inquiry.
The Home Office has updated CONTEST via comprehensive evidence-gathering and thorough consultation. This has included input and challenge from other Government Departments, devolved administrations, the police, the security and intelligence agencies, frontline practitioners, independent advisers and commissioners including the Commission for Countering Extremism, victims of terrorism and their families, the private sector, academia, and our international partners and allies.
The strategy sets out a need to respond to a domestic terrorist threat which is less predictable and harder to detect and investigate, a persistent and evolving threat from Islamist groups overseas, and an operating environment where accelerating advances in technology provide both opportunity and risk to our counter-terrorism efforts. It also includes a greater focus on the pivotal role of ideology in encouraging extremism.
In response, building on its established foundations, the updated version of CONTEST sets out how we will place greater focus on using all the levers of the state to identify and intervene against terrorists, build critical partnerships with the private sector and international allies to keep the public safe, and harness the opportunities presented by new technology.
Through this updated strategy, and by taking a more agile, integrated and aligned approach, we will do everything within our power to keep the public safe.
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