Rape Victims: Disclosure of Evidence

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Monday 29th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hurd]

The hon. Gentleman lets himself down by trying to make cheap political points on this issue, because we are talking about a very serious matter in our criminal justice system and its integrity. He and other Opposition Members know that the problem of disclosure has run for a very long time, going way back into the 1990s, and I would have hoped that there would be cross-party support for what is being done to make radical improvements to that process.

The hon. Gentleman will also know that one of the big game changers in recent decades has been the exponential growth in the volume of digital data and the challenge that that brings to the police. He continues to give the impression that what has been announced today is a new process, but the police have been taking and requesting access to mobile phones for some time. What today represents is a well-intentioned attempt by the police to bring together best practice in a national form so that there is consistent practice across the country and so that consent is as well informed as possible—that is the intention of this form.

[Suella Braverman (Fareham) (Con)]

I was never a specialist in criminal law, but my time as a barrister taught me that, during litigation or prosecution, both sides come under an ongoing duty of disclosure. That is a vital principle of our justice system, made all the more important in this context where we have seen a number of rape and serious violence cases collapse upon the emergence of subsequent evidence. Does my right hon. Friend agree that what has been proposed is proportionate, reasonable and sensitive, and therefore is not anti-victim but pro-justice?

[Mr Hurd]

I believe so. We have to be clear that there is some risk, but there is also a counter-risk, to which my hon. Friend alludes, that continued disclosure failures would lead to more cases, such as that of Liam Allan and others, collapsing at the last moment, which is disastrous for everyone involved. No one should pretend it is easy, but we are very clear, and the House should be very clear, that we need to make material, rapid improvements to the disclosure processes, because they are the heart of the integrity of our criminal justice system.

Windrush Compensation Scheme

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sajid Javid]

I thank the right hon. Lady for her comments and also for what she said about Martin Forde QC and the work he has done to make this scheme a reality. She started by saying that this should never have happened. I absolutely agree with her and always have. I think the whole House agrees on that. Of course none of the people who were caught up were here illegally; they had every right to be here.

The right hon. Lady has referred to the compliant environment. Sadly, she talks about it as though it were an environment that had been put in place since 2010. However, she knows that the right to check whether someone is here illegally and a number of other rules and regulations were put in under the previous Labour Government. She talks about how people were affected, and we are all trying to deal with this issue and to provide justice, but it is worth reminding the House that when the historical review was done and it was determined that 164 people were the most likely to have suffered detriment, almost half of them had suffered detriment under the previous Labour Government. It is worth keeping it in mind that successive Governments have in effect caused this problem, and it is no good trying to point the finger at one particular Government.

The right hon. Lady talked about the EU settlement scheme. It is precisely because of the lessons of Windrush that we need a scheme that cannot just be declaratory in approach. We need to ensure that our EU friends who are here in this country are properly documented. The abiding lesson from Windrush is the lack of proper documentation. She has rightly talked about those who want to have UK citizenship, and she knows that we have set up a special route for that. Approximately 4,000 people have taken advantage of that, at no cost to themselves. She is also right to say that the scheme is not just open to people of Caribbean origin, and I am glad we agree on that. She asked about the urgent exceptional payments fund. This is not just another compensation scheme; it is supposed to deal just with urgent exceptional payments. It is not capped, and I understand that nine payments have been made so far.

The right hon. Lady also asked about the compensation scheme, and how much it was likely to cost. There is no cap on the scheme, so no one knows what the eventual cost will be. It will be based on people’s needs and the claims that are made by eligible people, but the baseline estimate from my Department is that it will be approximately £200 million. She also referred to legal fees and private healthcare costs. I can tell her that in both those cases, although there is a tariff structure, both allow for actuals being paid in certain circumstances where proof is provided.

[Suella Braverman (Fareham) (Con)]

My parents came to the UK in the late 1960s from Mauritius and Kenya, both of which are Commonwealth countries. They came with no one and with nothing except a desire to make their lives in Britain and to serve our country, like the parents of many in this room. They could have been caught up in this episode, so I welcome the Home Secretary’s commitment and action and his statement today. Does he agree that the compensation scheme represents real progress towards securing justice for the Windrush generation and that the independent Wendy Williams lessons learned review is the vital next step in the process?

[Sajid Javid]

I agree with my hon. Friend, and I want to take this opportunity to thank her parents and the parents of millions of others for their contributions to this country. I agree with her about the importance of Wendy Williams’s work, which will be a vital step to ensuring that we right the wrongs.

EU Nationals

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Wednesday 29th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)]

The International Trade Secretary told the Tory party conference last year that the Government

“would like to be able to give a reassurance to EU nationals in the UK, but that depends on reciprocation by other countries”.

He said any other strategy

“would be to hand over one of our main cards in the negotiations and doesn’t necessarily make sense at this point”.

That is using the EU nationals here as bargaining chips—that is the Government’s approach. This could have all been resolved quickly if the Government had made a unilateral guarantee of rights, as Labour Members were pushing for, and it would certainly have been reciprocated by the EU. At the start of the negotiations, the EU tabled an offer that opened the doors to a reciprocal arrangement. Had the UK accepted it and worked with the EU on the details, we may have settled the issue by now. But the UK did not take that course and instead has created a climate of uncertainty and confusion. That uncertainty has already led to discrimination against EU citizens.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

rose—

[Afzal Khan]

I am going to make some progress, as we have limited time. Labour and the EU citizens’ rights group the3million found more than two dozen examples of job, housing and other adverts that illegally prevented applications from EU nationals. Those adverts have been reviewed by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which has written to a number of the advertisers. How can EU nationals who have been here for decades continue to feel welcome if we allow discrimination of that kind?

Even the Home Office is finding it hard to deal with the confusion. Over the summer, it sent hundreds of letters to EU nationals living in the UK, ordering them to leave the country or face deportation. The letters were intimidating and unsettling, especially given the fact that the recipients were in the UK perfectly legally. Instead of providing assurances from day one, the Government made their own offer on EU citizens’ rights. Their so-called settled status offer has been extensively criticised by the3million. The Government must urgently improve their offer and stop acting as if this settled status is a settled matter.

The problem with settled status is that the Government seem to think that assimilating EU nationals into our existing immigration system is sufficient. That was the vision set out in the leaked Home Office White Paper, but it is not sufficient. The Government will have to realise quickly that both our non-EEA and EEA immigration systems need a total overhaul. Moreover, although this debate focuses on EU nationals in the UK, let us not forget British citizens living in EU27 countries. Despite the pensioner stereotype, some 80% of them are working, often on a cross-border basis. What are the Government doing to secure their right to freedom of movement and the recognition of their professional qualifications? What assurances can the Minister give today that those rights will be guaranteed before we proceed to phase 2 of the negotiations?

Another problem is the attitude of some Government Members, who seem to imply that EU nationals are lucky to be in this country, rather than acknowledging the value they bring and the contribution they make to our economy and communities, particularly our public services and not least the NHS. There are 58,000 EU nationals working in NHS hospitals and community health services in England alone.

[Suella Fernandes]

The Prime Minister has said clearly,

“we want you to stay”

and that we value their commitment. What part of that does the hon. Gentleman not understand?

[Afzal Khan]

It is clear that things are still confusing for everyone. What part of this does the hon. Lady not understand—that we need to give a simple offer so that we can move on?

In total, there are 2.4 million EU migrants working in the UK, and a far greater proportion of them are in work than of the population as a whole. They make a huge contribution. What they desperately need now is certainty before the conclusion of phase 1 of the talks. This is what the hon. Lady needs to understand: we need certainty for EU citizens in the UK, for UK citizens in the EU and for the businesses and communities in which they have built their lives. The Government have provided none, as they are still busy negotiating with themselves.

It seems to be an alien concept to the Government, but citizens have rights. EU nationals came here in good faith when their rights were guaranteed under freedom of movement rules. Rather than guaranteeing those rights, the Government are offering them the opportunity to reapply for them, charging them for the privilege, and then pretending that nothing much has changed. That is transparently false. No wonder the EU negotiators seem to believe that the Government are incompetent. The Opposition value EU nationals; it is high time that the Government did, too, and followed up their warm words with action.

Calais Children and Immigration Act

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Wednesday 16th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Goodwill]

I was in Jordan last week, where I visited the Azraq refugee camp and met some of the people who had been transported from the berm. The Jordanian Government have concerns about some of the security aspects in the berm, particularly following the recent attack on their police forces. We continue to work with the Jordanians and others in the region to ensure that we can put people into a place of safety and, at the same time, maintain security. We have allocated £2.3 billion to assistance in the area, and I am proud of what we as a Government are doing as the second-biggest humanitarian donor in that region.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

Running through the Home Office guidance on the interpretation of section 67 is the legal test of the best interests of the children. Does my hon. Friend agree that in addition to that legal test, there is a wide-ranging assessment of the children, including their age, health needs, emotional needs, whether they have been victims of trafficking or trauma and any other family links? That is a reflection of the compassion and pragmatism that this Government are showing to these vulnerable children.

[Mr Goodwill]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The priority is to ensure that the best interests of the children are served. We need to demonstrate to the French authorities that, by bringing these children across to the UK, their best interests will be served. A number of criteria, including the ones that she mentioned, are taken into account.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

I am pleased to note that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and I have made similar sartorial choices today. Although we disagree on many other things, it seems we agree on the important things. Does she agree that the legislation is essential, because without it the expiration of existing legislation will create a legal vacuum?

[Joanna Cherry]

I agree that the legislation is essential. The SNP believes that it is important to give the security services and, indeed, law enforcement necessary and proportionate powers. I welcome, as I have said repeatedly in this House, the attempt in the Bill to codify the law and to provide an enhanced oversight regime. However, I will not demur from the position that I have held throughout, which is that in some respects the Bill does not provide sufficient safeguards.

The SNP and many other stakeholders mentioned by the shadow Home Secretary remain very concerned about allowing significantly unfettered collection of, and access to, communications data including internet connection records. We also oppose far-reaching bulk powers to acquire the personal and private data of our constituents when a proper case for the necessity and proportionality of those powers has yet to be made.

I consider it a matter of deep regret that the review of bulk powers by David Anderson, QC reported not to this House, but to the House of Lords. This House—the democratically elected and accountable Chamber—has not had an opportunity to debate that review. It is an excellent review as far as it goes, and I would not dare to undermine much of what it says. It is what is missing from the review that is important. It makes out a case that bulk powers can be of use to the state, but it does not address the necessity and proportionality of those powers. Those matters are yet to be addressed, and we will not get to debate them here. As the shadow Home Secretary said, they are very likely to be the subject of litigation in the future, and they are likely to be addressed by courts in the United Kingdom and in Europe—for as long as we have the sense to remain part of those European systems.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

Indeed, but the fine detail on the double lock—that is what enables the Solicitor General to get up and say that it goes as far as it does—was inserted by way of amendment during the Bill’s passage.

[Suella Fernandes]

Will the hon. and learned Lady give way?

[Joanna Cherry]

I will make a little progress, and then give way again, because I do not want to take up too much time.

During the Bill’s passage, SNP Members were pleased to offer our support to the Labour party on its amendment to protect trade unionists going about their lawful activities, but what about protections for other activists and campaigners going about their lawful activities and what about non-governmental organisations and whistleblowers? We should not have unjustified spying on trade unionists, and we should not have unjustified spying on other activists either. Whistleblowers can sometimes be very inconvenient to the Government and to the private sector, but they fulfil an important function and the Bill contains insufficient protection for them.

On the protection of journalists, it is true that significant amendments have been made in the Lords, but it is important to put on the record today that journalists have continued concerns about the provisions in the Bill. They feel that safeguards for journalistic sources should apply across the various powers in the Bill, rather than in their current limited form.

In parallel, although great progress has been made in the Lords on the question of legal professional privilege, some in the legal profession still have concerns about the way in which the Bill approaches it. The way the Bill is drafted may have undermined the central premise on which legal professional privilege is based. However, credit where credit is due: significant progress has been made. I spoke this morning to the Law Society of Scotland, which recognises that the Government have come a long way but is still concerned about these somewhat controversial measures and is very anxious to have post-legislative scrutiny of how legal professional privilege will work in practice.

[Joanna Cherry]

I read with interest the debates in the Lords about legal professional privilege. I noted carefully the approval granted to the measures by Lord Pannick, but I also noted that Lord Paddick made the point that the Bar Council of England and Wales is still not entirely happy about the provisions. That is a matter for the Bar Council, but we should adhere to the Law Society of Scotland’s suggestion of careful post-legislative scrutiny of how legal professional privilege will work in practice.

The two huge concerns I still have about the Bill relate to internet connection records and bulk powers. I have already spoken about the limitations in how we have dealt with the bulk powers review and the fact that, in my opinion and that of many others, it does not deal with the issues of necessity and proportionality.

On internet connection records, I welcome the limited safeguards introduced by the Lords, in particular, the threshold increase on serious crime, judicial approval for data retention notices and prohibition of the retention of third-party data, which we were quite agitated about in Committee. But it is a matter of regret that the Bill still includes provisions dealing with the collection of internet connection records that go beyond anything that any other western democracy has on its statute book and that, as the shadow Home Secretary said, may be of dubious legality.

The fight for our civil liberties concerns about the Bill has been lost in this House, but, as the shadow Home Secretary suggested, it is likely to continue in the courts. Liberty is representing the hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson) in a legal challenge to existing surveillance laws. As the shadow Home Secretary said, the Government have ignored the opinion of the advocate-general in the Court of Justice of the European Union on these issues, which was that current provisions lacked vital safeguards. To my mind, that means that when this Bill becomes law it will be open to immediate challenge.

The Bill is certainly the better for its passage through the Lords, although it pains me slightly to say that, as someone who does not approve of the House of Lords—not because I do not approve of a second Chamber but because I think that it should be democratically accountable in some way. However, I do not believe that what was promised of the Lords, and expected by some on the Opposition Benches, on the protection of civil liberties has come to fruition.

It is a matter of the greatest regret that peers supported the internet connection record powers just hours after the Investigatory Powers Tribunal had ruled that the security agencies had been unlawfully scooping up personal confidential information on a massive scale for more than a decade. I was repeatedly told regarding my objections to the Bill that our security agencies are the best in the world and never break the law. I suspect that it is close to the truth that the British security agencies are, if not the best, among the best in the world; but they do sometimes break the law. No one is infallible. We must have safeguards that are real. It is noteworthy, and an indication of the inadequacy of the scrutiny of the Bill that, only hours after the Investigatory Powers Tribunal ruled that unlawful action had taken place, the Lords supported the provisions on internet connection records in their totality.

It seems that the battle has been lost in this House. But given the very real concerns I and others have about the lawfulness of aspects of the Bill, I suspect the battle may be won elsewhere.

[Suella Fernandes]

This landmark legislation enables our security, intelligence and law enforcement services to continue the intelligence gathering, analysis and code-breaking that are essential for the security of our country in a digital age. I was pleased to support the Government on Second Reading, and am even happier to do so today.

The Investigatory Powers Bill has been subject to intensive scrutiny. Along with many Members in the Chamber—including my hon. Friends the Members for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) and for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer) and the Solicitor General—I was privileged to sit on the Committees for that scrutiny. I was a member of the Joint Committee responsible for pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill. We considered 1,500 pages of evidence, interviewed numerous experts and campaigners, and made 86 recommendations to the Government.

Following that, there was a refreshingly collaborative cross-party approach during the Bill’s passage through Parliament. The Bill has benefited from the expertise and constructive criticism of many hon. Members, including the then Labour party spokesman on the issue, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), a former Director of Public Prosecutions.

Throughout that process it has emerged that our intelligence and security agencies depend upon the acquisition of bulk data—that is, information acquired in large volumes and used, subject to special restrictions, to acquire vital and unique intelligence that they cannot obtain by other means. They need the power to intercept messages and will not be able to do their job without contextual intelligence, provided in the form of internet connection records.

Calais

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Monday 24th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Amber Rudd]

The hon. Gentleman raises an important point, and if that were the case, it would not be a successful outcome. Our information is that a lot of the local authorities are choosing to work together, and we have a lot of examples of good practice in which four or five local authorities are getting together to make a joint offer rather than competing with each other.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

I welcome the Home Secretary’s statement. Prior to my election to this place, I regularly defended the Home Office in immigration and asylum cases. It is widely accepted by many judges and practitioners that age assessment of undocumented children is notoriously difficult and not an exact science. Indeed, the rise in the number of cases in the administrative court reflects that fact. Will my right hon. Friend confirm that dental checks are not an appropriate method of age assessment? Does she agree that considerable guidance exists in case law and as a result of the practices of the London Boroughs of Croydon and Hillingdon, which have now been adopted throughout the country, which suggests that listening to a child’s history, observing their behaviour and hearing their live evidence are much better indicators than physical maturity?

[Amber Rudd]

I know that my hon. Friend has substantial experience in this field, having acted as an immigration lawyer before coming into Parliament. She is absolutely right to say that the best way to assess age is to use experienced assessors, and we will continue to do that. The British Dental Association has said that dental checks are not the way to go, because they are ineffective and unreliable. The best way is to use the type of assessment that we are using, which is based on experience.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 7th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Tom Elliott]

I welcome the opportunity to speak in this debate and to follow the hon. Member for South Ribble (Seema Kennedy). I fully support this legislation. If anything, I am beginning to worry that it is already being watered down. I want to make it even stronger. That is why I oppose the Scottish National party’s amendments. I heard the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) about health records; I appreciate that thought process and will support it if relevant amendments are proposed.

I have to say that I and some of my colleagues from Northern Ireland, and indeed on other Benches, have lived through the troubles and seen what terrorism has done. But we face a different type of terrorism now, and a different type of world criminality, much of which is conducted through technology—for example, via mobile phone signals and satellites and on the internet. We now have a totally different perspective. We therefore need a different mechanism, and we need it to be proactive, which is what I believe the Bill will do. It is about being much more proactive.

With regard to bulk capabilities, I do not see what the problem is. We have to have trust and faith in the people doing that surveillance and collecting that intelligence. If we do not have trust and faith in them to have the bulk capabilities, why do we have trust and faith in them to do other things? I think there is a real challenge out there for the wider public to realise what is actually going on in society. I do not realise everything that is happening, and I know that the wider public do not. That is why I have to have trust in those people who are carrying out these actions.

I am also aware that there needs to be a balance; I accept that. There needs to be a balance for the public, to avoid snooping and going into too much detail with these investigatory powers. However, that must be balanced against the wider public information that is required to deal with terrorism, criminality and the fraudsters in our society. For me, the priority in that balance is to deal with those people effectively. If that means people using those investigatory measures to look into some of my details, so be it. If I have nothing to hide, then I have nothing to fear. I have no difficulty with people looking at the details that are held on me, and that should be the same for the wider public if they have nothing to hide. There must be real opportunities here for the Government and the people who are carrying out the investigatory work to deal with those details. That is why I think the amendments we are debating overstep the mark and would reduce the effectiveness of the people dealing with those causes. My speech has been brief, but I think that it has dealt with the amendments succinctly.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

It is a privilege to speak in this debate, and indeed to have participated in the Committees that have considered the Bill: I was a member of the Joint Committee that scrutinised the draft Bill in February, and I was also a member of the Bill Committee earlier this year. I want to put on the record my appreciation of the Labour party’s constructive and fruitful contributions. This vital legislation has come far since its first iteration. It is an example of cross-party collaboration, so I am glad that party politics has been put aside in the name of national security. I urge all Members of the House to act in such a manner when we go through the Lobbies later today. However, judging by the words of the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin), I do not think that will be the case.

I rise to speak against amendment 309 and the others relating to bulk powers. The Scottish National party Members says that those powers are disproportionate, that they have no utility and that they are therefore unlawful. The amendments propose removing most of parts 6 and 7, from clause 119 onwards, and with them the three types of bulk power afforded to our security and intelligence services—bulk interception, bulk acquisition of communications data and bulk equipment interference. Those powers allow for the collection of large volumes of data and are set out in clause 119 onwards. Further warrants are required before those data can be examined. The purposes of such examination, which are set out in the Bill, may be to pursue more information about known suspects and their associates or to look for patterns of activity that may identify new suspects. Crucially, those powers are not afforded to law enforcement services.

I have a few points to make. First, these powers are founded on a clear and robust legal basis. They are all available to the agencies in existing legislation. Bulk interception is covered in section 20 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Bulk communications data are covered in section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984. Bulk equipment interference is covered in sections 5 and 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994. If amendment 390 and the others were passed today, we would remove the vital powers on which our agencies rely to do their jobs and we would prevent them from acting on those powers.

Secondly, these powers are not novel or a quirk of the modern age; they have been around for decades. Back in world war one, our intelligence services tracked the worldwide network of German cables under the sea by using secret sensors. They were able to intercept telegraph messages on a bulk basis, looking for patterns in communications and signals from the enemy.

When cables ended, radio surveillance was necessary to break codes during world war two. That involved bulk interception of data by hand. That work was famously based at room 40 of the Admiralty. Alan Turing and his team at Bletchley Park would never have cracked Enigma were it not for the bulk interception of cyphers. That advanced cryptanalysis changed the course of history by enabling the allies to pre-empt enemy planning, saving countless lives and shortening the war.

[Joanna Cherry]

Does the hon. Lady agree that the difference is that, in the days of Bletchley Park, we were at war? We are not at war now. What we are concerned to do here is not to assist this country’s enemies, but to protect the privacy of the people who live here, who include her constituents.

[Suella Fernandes]

I am astonished by the hon. and learned Lady’s suggestion that we are not at war. Paris, Brussels, Jakarta—I do not need to go on. We are engaged in a worldwide conflict against Daesh, and it is a threat to our security every day and every night.

[Simon Hoare]

My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the terrorists, but let us not forget those who wish to wage war on the safety of our children through paedophilia and those who wish to wage war on the safety of women through people and sex trafficking. Those important elements are at the nub of the Bill, alongside terrorism, and we should not forget them.

[Suella Fernandes]

I totally agree. We are waging a foreign policy and international security war, but we are also waging war on the online fraudsters and the paedophiles. We are in a constant state of threat, and it is easy to delude ourselves if we do not face that threat directly.

Big data are presented to us as a modern phenomenon, but they are actually something that has been used before and that is quite old, and they lie at the heart of our heritage on national security.

Thirdly, the utility of bulk powers is clear. In its report, the Joint Committee made that clear after taking extensive evidence. At paragraph 340, we reported:

“We are aware that the bulk powers are not a substitute for targeted intelligence, but believe that they are an additional resource. Furthermore, we believe that the security and intelligence agencies would not seek these powers if they did not believe they would be effective and that the fact that they have been operating for some time would give them the confidence to assess their merits.”

The Committee concluded:

“we are content that the safeguards proposed by the Home Office, buttressed by authorisation by Judicial Commissioners and oversight from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will be sufficient to ensure that the bulk powers are used proportionately.”

Therefore, after taking evidence from all sides of the debate, and from all the coalitions involved in this discussion, that was the considered conclusion of the cross-party Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy Burnham]

I said at the start that I was looking for considerable comfort, and I think I have just received it from what the Minister has said. To be clear, I was saying that there should be a threshold of six months for the use of communications data, and a higher threshold on top of that for internet connection records. As the Minister just acknowledged, there is a qualitative difference between the two. If that is what we are agreeing, and if we are also agreeing that there should be no restriction on the use of internet connection records for the other serious purposes that I have outlined, the Opposition can probably move forward on that basis without pressing our amendments to a vote.

This is the area in which the Bill has the ability to lose public trust if we do not get it right, because it could affect every single citizen in the land. I am sure that as constituency MPs many of us have dealt with situations where an individual falls out with the police at a local level, and they perceive that they are being investigated for all kinds of things and that all aspects of their lives might be turned upside down. We have to put in place appropriate protections that would not allow personal information to be handed over freely in relation to more trivial offences.

[Suella Fernandes]

The provisions on ICRs are designed to resolve two problems. First, our law enforcement and security personnel cannot carry out IP address resolution—identifying which device is communicating with which device—without the new powers. Secondly, even with the originating and destination IP addresses, it may not be clear which website or communications service has been accessed. The evidence from the professionals to the Joint Committee was clear: ICR retention is imperative to enable IP address resolution for investigations.

[Andy Burnham]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making a point that will enable me to be absolutely clear about what I am saying. I am not arguing against the retention of the data, as I think I made clear at the beginning. I am not arguing against ICRs per se. I acknowledge that they could be a very important tool. In an age when communications have migrated online and people have fewer voice telephone calls, this information could be crucial in detecting serious crime. I am saying that while we should legislate to allow the data to be held, we must also legislate to put in place a very precise threshold, so that the circumstances in which those data can be accessed are explicitly clear. There is not a broad reasonableness or necessity test. What I am saying is that we need a very clear definition of what level of crime permits the authorities to access those records.

I believe that if we find that definition—I feel that the Minister has given a commitment that we will get it—it will enhance public trust in this legislation. In my view, it will knock out completely that lazy label of “snoopers charter”. That is why it is so important that the Government nail this point before the Bill concludes its passage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

For the remaining one and half minutes, I call Suella Fernandes.

[Suella Fernandes]

I will be short and to the point, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I rise to speak in support of this Bill, as it is a hard-won fight for all of us, and something of which this whole House can be proud. The nature and scale of the threat that we face today differs from the one that we faced even 12 months ago, as it is rapidly evolving and complex. I am proud to have contributed to this Bill as a member both of the Joint Committee and the Bill Committee. We made more than 100 recommendations, many of which have been adopted by the Government.

It is vital for our constituents that we pass this Bill today, and it will get my vote. I wish to put on record my thanks to the Front-Bench team, which was led by the Home Secretary and ably assisted by her turbo-charged team of the Solicitor General and the Minister for Security who brought style, eloquence, professionalism and panache, and to our Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Simon Kirby). I am proud to support this Bill, and it has my vote tonight.

Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Monday 6th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Stephen McPartland]

I totally agree with my right hon. Friend’s point. As a Master of Science and Technology, I, of course, have never hacked anything in my life and would never dream of doing so, but it is not a particularly difficult thing to do at the moment. Many people do not appreciate that the measures in the Bill are authorising the state hacking of equipment. Combined with other measures in the Bill, this is not just about hacking the equipment of somebody who may be of particular interest as part of a terrorist organisation; we are talking about every man, woman and child with an electronic device inside the UK. That is where my concerns arise.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that explanation of his amendment, but surely there are clear limits to the powers relating to equipment interference set out in clause 91. The action needs to be necessary, proportionate and in the interests of national security, so it is really not fair to say that this is a sweeping power to which any man, woman or child could be subjected.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her intervention, but the reality is that schedule 4 to the Bill will give a range of other organisations the ability to access this power if they choose to do so. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority could do so in circumstances relating to the stability of the markets. A whole variety of organisations will be able to use these powers, not just the intelligence services. Police services up and down the country already use equipment interference to target criminals, for example. A whole range of powers such as these is already being used. I appreciate that the Bill is trying to put them on a statutory footing, and I understand the need to keep people safe, but we have to balance this with resources. Let us remember 9/11 in the United States, when many different agencies and organisations had information but were not sharing it. I believe that we are getting ourselves into a situation in which we will have so much information on so many people that it will be of no value to us whatever. It will be like the internet: you can put anything in, and you get 3,000 pages back.

We need a stronger legal framework if we are going to authorise the state hacking of equipment in the United Kingdom. My amendments 187 and 188 simply seek to ensure that all targets of hacking are properly named or specified. We need a more specific legal framework. Amendments 173 to177 would eliminate the power of the Government to compel third parties to assist in carrying out equipment interference. As the Bill stands, this compelled assistance will not be subject to any judicial authorisation process. The relevant organisations will be able to turn up at a company and say, “We have this warrant, so you now have to help us to hack your devices.” The company will have no choice. Clause 114 contains strict non-disclosure provisions, which are effectively gagging orders that will prevent anyone from being able to say whether they have been involved in such procedures. The Science and Technology Committee documented widespread concerns regarding company compelled hacking and concluded that

“the industry case regarding public fear about ‘equipment interference’ is well founded.”

The draft equipment interference code of practice indicates that no company in the United Kingdom, no matter how small, is exempt from these obligations.

My amendments 196 to 205 are, like the rest, probing amendments to try to get these issues debated and to make people aware of them. They would provide that national security and technical capability notices be subject to a double-lock authorisation by the Secretary of State and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I appreciate that new clause 10 and other Government amendments are moving some way towards achieving that, which might make what I am about to say obsolete. I do not fully understand those amendments yet, as I am not a lawyer, as I have said.

My understanding of the Bill as it stood this morning was that only the Secretary of State had the power to authorise a retention notice, a national security notice and a technical capability notice. That was not in keeping with the rest of the Bill, which requires a judicial commissioner to be involved in the review and approval of those areas. Those notices in effect enable the Secretary of State to demand that private companies act as a facilitator, depository and provider of people’s communications. We need independent oversight, and as I have said, the Government have come some way towards establishing that, in new clause 10 and elsewhere. However, technical capability notices will have an impact on UK businesses with 10,000 or more users, in that they will require those companies to build systems to store user data for use by the intelligence agencies, the police and the Home Office. That is what is written into the code of practice.

Looking at the codes of practice, one thing that jumped out at me and which I found very difficult as a Conservative was the fact that the communications service providers—CSPs—will be subject to a technical capability notice. They will have to notify the Government of new products and services in advance of their launch in order to allow consideration of whether it is necessary and proportionate to require the CSP to provide technical capability information on a new service. So, in English, and from a Conservative point of view, that will effectively mean that UK-based companies launching new products will now have to get permission from the state before they can go to market, in order to identify whether or not the state will require an ability to hack those products. Why on earth would a small business launch a new service here in the United Kingdom if those conditions remain in the codes of practice?

Investigatory Powers Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Committee Debate: 13th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 28th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

I rise to speak in favour of clause 196 as drafted and against the amendments. It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Owen.

Part 8 and clause 196 cover the oversight functions for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the judicial commissioners. Clause 196 sets out the functions of and legal basis for oversight relating to the interception of communications, the acquisition or retention of communications data and secondary data, and equipment interference. That review power includes audit, inspection and investigation of the exercise of the powers; it also relates to the use of data acquired, and taken with subsections (2) and (3) it extends to cover bulk personal datasets, section 216 notices and functions under section 80 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. That constitutes not only wide-ranging powers of oversight, but duties, which means there will be constant watch on how the powers are implemented on the ground, which is vital to ensuring public trust.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Committee Debate: 14th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 28th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for the way in which she has sought to persuade the Committee of her case. She is quite right that the IPT has an inquisitorial procedure rather than an adversarial one, but it still needs a claimant. It would be wholly inappropriate if the commissioner ended up being the complainant and therefore a party to the proceedings. With respect to her and those who proposed the amendment, although I appreciate their intentions, they mischaracterise the process. There will indeed be a claimant, but that will be the individual or body that is the subject of the error. Where the error is serious, the judicial commissioner will inform that person or body of their right to apply to the IPT for a remedy. As all authorities are already required to provide the IPT with all the information it needs in the course of its investigations, it is difficult to see the benefit of the amendment.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that the heavy common law duty of candour on the authorities that will be the subject of such inquiries is applicable to these jurisdictions? Those authorities will have to disclose everything, even if that militates against the applicability of their evidence. That position was endorsed by the divisional court in the case of Chatwani.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding us about the duty of candour that applies to public bodies, which is of course material.

In addition, the clause has already been amended, pursuant to the Joint Committee’s recommendation 59, to make it clear that a commissioner does not need to consult the Secretary of State before sharing information with or providing assistance to the IPT. That is provided for in clause 199(4) and may well address many of the concerns raised by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West about the Secretary of State being some sort of bar to proper disclosure and sharing of information. That is not the case under the Bill as already amended. As for providing the IPT with all information relating to relevant errors, as I have said, courts and tribunals cannot and will not consider those issues without a party first having brought a claim.

Within the framework of the clause, we have the necessary structure for proper and frank disclosure to the IPT by the commissioners of relevant material that will assist any party in bringing an action where they have been subject to an error or some form of wrong. To conflate the two would lead to more confusion and would be unnecessary. With respect, I urge the hon. and learned Lady to withdraw the amendment.