Investigatory Powers Bill

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Andy Burnham]

I disagree entirely. As I said, we will not oppose the Bill because we will be responsible. I have recognised that the country needs a new law. I have also said, as I will come on to explain, that the Bill is not yet worthy of support. There are significant weaknesses in the Bill. I am sorry, but I am not prepared to go through the Lobby tonight and give the hon. Gentleman and his Government a blank cheque. I want to hold the Government to account. I want to see changes in the Bill to strengthen the Bill. When they listen, they will earn our support. That is entirely appropriate and responsible for an Opposition party to do.

The higher the consensus we can establish behind the Bill, the more we will create the right climate in the country for its introduction. As the Home Secretary said, it could create a template to be copied around the world, advancing the cause of human rights in the 21st century. The prize is great and that is why I am asking those on the Opposition Benches to work constructively towards it.

I repeat today that I do not think our mission is helped by misrepresentation. In my view, it is lazy to label the Bill as a snoopers charter or a plan for mass surveillance. In fact, it is worse than lazy: it is insulting to people who work in the police and in the security services. It implies that they choose to do the jobs they do because they are busybodies who like to spy on the public, rather than serve the public. I do not accept that characterisation of those people. It is unfair and it diminishes the difficult work they do to keep us safe.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the three independent reviewers all agree that our services categorically do not carry out mass surveillance and work within the boundaries of legislation?

[Andy Burnham]

I agree with the hon. Lady. The idea that they have the time to do that is fanciful. They are going straight to the people they need to be concerned about on our behalf, and that is why I reject the characterisation that is often placed on this proposed legislation.

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[Joanna Cherry]

I can only reiterate that I and many others, including more than 200 lawyers who signed this letter, disagree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman on this occasion and about this point. One thing that this issue illustrates is the importance of having very focused language in Bills dealing with such major matters of constitutional importance, rather than having vague language, which is not properly understood and which can on a later day be twisted by those it suits, to expand to cover powers that were not envisaged at the time. We are all well aware that that has happened in the past.

We should not dismiss too lightly the importance of the notion of the rule of law overarching this Bill. If the Government really want this legislation to be world-leading, they cannot have legislation that potentially violates international standards. As things stand, the UK is still bound by the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice; there were no proposals to withdraw from the charter of fundamental rights in the agreement negotiated by the Prime Minister over Europe last month. We are still awaiting proposals for the repeal of the Human Rights Act, but the Government have recently been moving to reassure us that we will not be withdrawing as a signatory from the Council of Europe. We are therefore still going to be bound by the Court in Luxembourg and the Court in Strasbourg. Many distinguished lawyers believe that if this Bill is not significantly amended, the law of the UK will be on a collision course with those European Courts. I remind the Government that an unamended Bill could result in unnecessary and expensive litigation. It could require Parliament to revise the law all over again at some point in the future. That should not happen, provided that we ensure that the law meets international standards. [Interruption.] I hear Government Members shouting at me, “Which parts?” I will come to that when I get into the meat of my speech. [Interruption.] I suggest that they read the report that has come from the UN rapporteur on the right to privacy, and consider the law here. They may prefer to follow in the footsteps of Russia, which last December passed a law allowing its constitutional court to decide whether to comply with international human rights courts, but I would suggest that, on these matters at the very least, Russia is perhaps not the best role model for the United Kingdom.

I want to challenge the premise that the more privacy we sacrifice, the more security we gain, because that is not backed up by the evidence. Indeed, some of this House’s Committees have heard evidence that swamping analysts with data can impede investigation, because they are unable to find the crucial needles in the haystack of information before them. We should be looking at how to achieve security in a really intelligent way, not blanket data retention and suspicionless surveillance.

The Home Office responded to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s recommendations by simply adding one word to the start of the Bill so that the first part now refers to “privacy”. It has not, however, added any detail relating to any overarching principles of privacy. Its response to the ISC seems somewhat cynical.

I have indicated that the SNP is concerned about a number of aspects of the Bill. Time does not permit me to tackle all of them, but I am concerned about four in particular. I will endeavour to keep my comments to a minimum, bearing in mind that I speak on behalf of the third party in the House.

Our first issue with the Bill is the legal thresholds for surveillance; the second is the authorisation process, which the shadow Home Secretary has already talked about; the third is the provision for the collection of internet connection records; and the fourth is bulk powers, which I have already mentioned.

On the legal thresholds for surveillance, the Government essentially want to re-legislate on RIPA’s three broad statutory grounds. The SNP is not alone in its concern that those grounds are unnecessarily broad and vague and dangerously undefined. The Joint Committee on the draft Bill recommended that it should include definitions of national security and economic wellbeing, but that has not been done. The ISC recommended that economic wellbeing should be subsumed within a national security definition, finding it “unnecessarily confusing and complicated”. Those recommendations have been dismissed and the core purposes for which extraordinary powers can be used remain undefined and dangerously flexible.

On the authorisation of warrants, we welcome the move towards greater judicial involvement, and we acknowledge the fact that the Government have moved considerably towards the double lock. However, I agree with the shadow Home Secretary, because we also want an equal lock. Judicial review is not the same as judicial authorisation. Judicial review creates the illusion of judicial control over surveillance, and it does not achieve enough movement away from the status quo.

I want to give some concrete examples of that. The case law of the United Kingdom Supreme Court shows that, in civil proceedings that do not relate to deprivation of liberty, a less intensive standard of judicial review is applied—more Wednesbury reasonableness than strict necessity and proportionality—and that is why many fear that that is what will happen if the Bill is passed unamended. There will be little or no scope for review on the merits.

[Suella Fernandes]

Will the hon. and learned Lady accept that she is simply wrong? In their evidence to the Joint Committee, of which I was a member, Sir Stanley Burnton, senior judicial commissioner, and Lord Judge, senior surveillance commissioner, were clear that the Wednesbury unreasonableness standards had no place in this context. The wording of the Bill is clear, importing a clear judicial review standard involving necessity and proportionality.

[Joanna Cherry]

The hon. Lady will no doubt be unsurprised to hear that I do not accept that I am wrong. She is cherry-picking her way through the evidence that was heard. There was evidence contrary to the position that she has stated. I accept that there is a debate about this point, but I take the side that the review of judicial review principles does not go far enough. Why not go as far as other countries? Why not have one stage of judicial authorisation? That is the norm in comparable jurisdictions, by which I mean the United States, Australia and Canada. Judicial authorisation would help us, because it would encourage co-operation from US technology firms.

On a practical note, a two-stage process—whereby the issue goes to a Minister first and then to a judicial commissioner—risks delay. There is a huge volume of surveillance warrants, and it looks like there will be an awful lot more as a result of this Bill. It is unsuitable for a small number of Cabinet Ministers to deal with them.

I want to deal with another false premise that is often used to justify ministerial involvement in the issuance of warrants. Some people seek to argue that Ministers are democratically or politically accountable to this House on the issue of surveillance warrants, but that is a misconceived argument. Ministers are not really democratically accountable for their role in issuing warrants, because, first, the disclosure of the existence of a warrant has been criminalised and it will remain as such under the Bill. Secondly, all of us know—even those such as me who have been in this House for only nine months—that requests for information concerning such matters in this House are routinely parried with claims about national security. I do not accept that Ministers are practically, politically or democratically accountable to this House on the issuance of warrants. To return to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Courts, they have made it very clear that it is important to have effective supervision by an independent judiciary. We query whether the double lock mechanism meets that test.

We agree with many others that the case for collecting internet connection records, including the claimed benefit for law enforcement, is flawed. That is not just my say-so: there are many concerns across the industry. People who understand the technicalities far better than I do have explained the problem to me. I again associate myself with what the shadow Home Secretary said: the internet is not like the telephone system. An internet connection record cannot be compared to a telephone bill. The phone system consists of a set of records relating to when A calls B. If we collect phone system records, we will see at what time A called B and the duration of the call. As I understand it, the internet is more like a mailbox that collects packets of information and then takes them from A to B.

To take a rather middle-aged example, if somebody uses the Facebook messenger service, all the internet connection record will show is that he or she has connected to Facebook messenger. It will not show with whom he or she then communicated, because that occurs at a higher or lower level or in another unreachable packet. The internet connection record will not show the when, where and who that the Government say they want, and which they already get from phone records.

What the internet connection records will show is a detailed record of all of the internet connections of every person in the United Kingdom. There would be a 12-month log of websites visited, communication software used, system updates downloaded, desktop widgets, every mobile app used and logs of any other devices connected to the internet. I am advised that that includes baby monitors, games consoles, digital cameras and e-book readers. That is fantastically intrusive. As has been said, many public authorities will have access to these internet connection records, including Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, and the Department for Work and Pensions, and it will be access without a warrant. Do we really want to go that far? There is no other “Five Eyes” country that has gone as far. David Anderson QC said:

“Such obligations were not considered politically conceivable by my interlocutors in Germany, Canada or the US”

and therefore, he said, “a high degree of caution” should be in order.

Finally, let me turn to bulk powers. I have already made the point that even the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office says that bulk provides at the outset generalised initial intercept. We became aware of these bulk interception programmes only when they were disclosed by Edward Snowden in June 2013—whatever Members think about those disclosures and whether they were appropriate, that is how we became aware of the matter. This House has never before debated or voted on bulk powers, so we are being asked to do something very novel and very challenging, and we must do it properly.

The power to conduct mass interception has been inferred from the vaguely worded power in section 8(4) of RIPA, which illustrates the danger of vaguely worded legislation. Targeting bulk warrants at a telecommunications system or at entire populations rather than at specific individuals is a radical departure from both the common law and human rights law, yet that is the approach that will be maintained in this Bill. In many respects, that is the most worrying part of the Bill. Indeed, it is the part of the Bill about which the UN special rapporteur on privacy is most concerned. Let me read what he said, because it is very respectful of the tradition of the United Kingdom and it makes some very good points. He said:

“It would appear that the serious and possibly unintended consequences of legitimising bulk interception and bulk hacking are not being fully appreciated by the UK Government. Bearing in mind the huge influence that UK legislation still has in over 25% of the UN’s member states that still form part of the Commonwealth, as well as its proud tradition as a democracy which was one of the founders of leading regional human rights bodies such as the Council of Europe, the SRP encourages the UK Government to take this golden opportunity to set a good example and step back from taking disproportionate measures which may have negative ramifications far beyond the shores of the UK. More specifically, the SRP invites the UK Government to show greater commitment to protecting the fundamental right to privacy of its own citizens and those of others and also to desist from setting a bad example to other states by continuing to propose measures, especially bulk interception and bulk hacking, which prima facie fail the standards of several UK parliamentary Committees, run counter to the most recent judgements of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, and undermine the spirit of the very right to privacy.”

The rapporteur is appealing to the better tradition in this country, and saying that we should look at this Bill very carefully. He is suggesting not that we should throw it out, but that we scrutinise it very carefully, bearing in mind how far it intends to go in comparison with other countries and with existing international case law.

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[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

I am not sure what the collective noun is for lawyers.

[Simon Hoare]

A pain.

--- Later in debate ---

[Suella Fernandes]

It may be a pain, a chorus, a dazzle or an appeal. Whatever it is, I rise to join that group and its collective voice in favour of the Bill.

Although the Bill’s opponents brand it a snoopers charter and criticise the lack of safeguards, I disagree with them. Like several hon. Members in the Chamber today, I had the privilege of sitting on the Joint Committee, and I heard at first hand the evidence of professionals on the front line. I am convinced that they exercise their powers judiciously and carefully, and I have faith that they will apply ethical standards when it comes to employing those powers. As the shadow Home Secretary said, GCHQ has neither the resources for nor the interest in carrying out mass surveillance of innocent people.

On safeguards, warranting has traditionally been the sole concern of the Executive. To echo the sentiments of my right hon. Friend the Member for North Shropshire (Mr Paterson), warranting is an inherently political process. When Ministers take a decision on granting a warrant, they take into account issues of national security, diplomatic relationships and the wider context. Frankly, such factors would not be relevant to a narrow legal and judicial analysis.

The Bill incorporates judicial review as the test to which warrants are subject. As my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) set out, judicial review incorporates a test of proportionality. That test—I speak with 10 years’ experience as a barrister specialising in judicial review in administrative law—involves four stages: first, looking at the objective in mind; secondly, assessing whether the means are directly connected to the objective; thirdly, asking whether an alternative is available; and lastly, carefully balancing intrusion against privacy. The choice is clear: do we trust our skilled professionals, or do we further disable them and let the terrorists and those who seek to destroy our society wreak havoc in this world?

Child Refugees: Calais

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Monday 29th February 2016 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

I would say to anyone in that situation that they should claim asylum in France, which will ensure that there is a direct connection and that we can make the system work. I stress that the fact that different messages are being given does not help the situation. In respect of the whole issue of the clearance of the camps, I understand that the court specifically ruled that it should go ahead with the exception of places of worship and schools. The French Government should therefore adopt that approach in the actions they are taking.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

Before I entered this place, I worked as counsel on hundreds of asylum and trafficking cases. A core principle of the Dublin regulations is that the first country of entry should take responsibility for the claimant, which imports fairness and equity into the system. Will my right hon. Friend reassure the House of his commitment to that principle, and confirm that to discard it without legal basis would be undemocratic and illegitimate?

[James Brokenshire]

I agree with my hon. Friend about the benefits and the strength of the Dublin arrangements. We believe that they should be upheld, not undermined. They include the core principle that those who make a claim should do so in the first safe country in which they arrive. Equally, the principle of family reunification for close family members operates under Dublin III, and the Government stand by that principle.

Police Funding, Crime and Community Safety

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Wednesday 24th February 2016 Commons Chamber

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

I have listened intently to the Labour party’s propositions and arguments, and I am stunned and, frankly, disappointed by the one-sided and misleading portrayal of this issue. The shadow Home Secretary talked about cuts to services, cuts to funding and cuts to the police, but he totally ignored the remarkable cut in crime that this country has seen since 2010. Crime has fallen by about 25% since 2010. He challenged the crime survey statistics, but all the independent reports and all the facts show the same decline in crime, with a fall of more than 25%. The statistics from the Office for National Statistics are clear that the crime rate is now 64% below its peak in 1995.

Those figures are backed up in the regions. For example, in Hampshire, my county, we have seen an 11% drop in crime over the past year alone, making a fall of more than 30% since 2010. A recent study from Cardiff University showed a 10% fall in the number of people seeking treatment for violent crime injuries in hospital accident and emergency departments, which again reinforces the downward trend in violent crime.

The shadow Home Secretary says that those statistics are overshadowed by the rise in cybercrime, so let us look at what the Government are doing to tackle cybercrime. I sat on the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, which had 22 public evidence sessions and received thousands of pages of written evidence. We visited and met professionals on the frontline. The Bill will provide vital powers and necessary transparency and accountability to our online forces. Having talked to the professionals and listened to what they want, I can say that they want more powers to intercept online communications, interfere with equipment and track internet connection records.

Last week we heard about paedophiles using secret Facebook groups to exchange imagery online and terrorists using WhatsApp, text and email to carry out their crimes. Although the technology is welcome, we need to ensure that encryption is not used against our law enforcement services, which are struggling to keep up with the criminals. The Bill will provide vital powers to ensure that they can tackle cybercrime. To echo the sentiments of my hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), it focuses on methodology and technique rather than just throwing cash at the problem. That is what the professionals on the frontline want and what they are asking for, and that is what this Government are delivering.

draft Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Interception of Communications: code of practice) order 2015 Draft Equipment Interference (Code of Practice) Order 2015

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Thursday 7th January 2016 General Committees

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that.

Regarding the remaining tricky or more complicated areas, I shall focus on legal professional privilege and the protection of communications involving confidential journalistic material and other confidential information. Before I do so, though, I highlight the point made by a number of respondents to the consultation on the equipment interference code. The Government’s response to the consultation summarises their point as saying that

“a code of practice was not a suitable vehicle for setting out the power to conduct equipment interference and that it should be provided for in primary legislation. This would offer an opportunity to have an open and transparent debate about the use of equipment interference by the Security and Intelligence agencies.”

That is a point well made in the consultation, although the Government’s response is inevitably constrained by the legislation that is currently in place. Nevertheless, it emphasises the need for a real debate on this issue as the draft Investigatory Powers Bill goes through its various stages.

I will not take up time by reminding the Committee of the importance of legal professional privilege, but the need for reform and further guidance under the code is absolutely clear. In that respect, probably the only quarrel I have with the Minister is that I am not sure that the new codes are simply about the Government doing their job properly. They were necessary as a result of the ruling in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which declared in February last year that the previous approach was not in accordance with article 8 of the European convention on human rights. That position was rightly conceded by the Government, because in that case the IPT ruled that

“the regime for the interception/obtaining, analysis, use, disclosure and destruction of legally privileged material has contravened Article 8 ECHR and was accordingly unlawful.”

It was therefore necessary, for the period that the current regime remains intact, to have further guidance to bring the approach into accordance with the IPT.

I remind the Committee that the previous code simply said that caseworkers

“should be alert to any intercept material which may be subject to legal privilege.”

It did not go on to state what steps should be taken if legally privileged material was identified. There was a deficiency there that the new code is intended to deal with.

Although they do not ring-fence legally privileged material, the new codes do provide much more detailed guidance, which, again, is welcome, particularly in paragraphs 4.5 to 4.25 of the interception of communications draft code and chapter 3 of the equipment interference draft code. I highlight the fact that the latter provides that, prior to any warrant being granted where interception of privileged information is likely, there must be an assessment of how likely it is that such information will be intercepted. So, first, there must be an assessment before the event. Secondly, when the interception of legally privileged information is intended, the threshold, as the Minister said, is that there must be

“exceptional and compelling circumstances that make the authorisation necessary.”

Thirdly, the code makes it clear that the threshold will be met when there is an

“imminent threat of death or serious injury or serious threat to national security”

but it is anticipated that such situations will be rare. In addition, the code states that any communication between lawyer and client or any third party for the purpose of actual or contemplated litigation

“must be presumed to be privileged unless the contrary is established”.

Those are three or four aspects in which the guidance is much sharper and clearer. Time will tell—in the limited life of such codes—whether the regime is robust enough. Over the coming weeks and months, we will obviously keep a beady eye on how matters progress. To some extent, however, such matters will be considered in greater detail as the Bill proceeds.

My only point at this stage is that there is a question mark over whether the protection in relation to dissemination is strong enough under the code. The code simply states that privileged information cannot be disseminated unless a legal adviser has been consulted on the lawfulness of such action and that “all reasonable steps” must be taken to ensure that “as far as practicable” authorities involved in legal proceedings are prevented from seeing privileged information relating to those proceedings. Why does the code not expressly prevent dissemination where legal advice has been received as to its unlawfulness? I accept, however, that that question is probably equally well suited to the forthcoming debate on the Bill.

Moving on, it is noticeable that the protection for journalistic material and other confidential information is a lot weaker than the protection for legally privileged material. In his report, “A Question of Trust”, David Anderson, the Government’s reviewer, points out:

“The Draft Interception Code sets out similar provisions in respect of journalistic or other confidential material but the threshold for access is not as high as that in respect of legal privilege.”

It is obviously a matter of some concern that there are two different regimes for protected information. This matter was raised in the consultation, and I remind the Committee that the News Media Association took the view that the current regulatory framework

“poses a threat to journalism, journalists and their sources”.

The new provisions in the code of course have a chequered history. The National Union of Journalists, in a joint statement with the Bar Council, said that

“access to professional data should be protected in law and should be subject to independent, judicial oversight. Using codes of practice—such as the draft code under RIPA—undermines the rule of law.”

To some extent, their plea is for a change in the law, which is hopefully now forthcoming. The general secretary of the NUJ said:

“The proposals contained in the existing RIPA code of practice simply do not offer the protection to journalists and to sources, and are in fact dangerously inadequate. New legislation is urgently needed—it is vital that judicial oversight is introduced to force police officers and other snoopers to apply to judges in a transparent process before surveillance powers against media and legal professionals can be considered.”

Finally, the Press Gazette and the Society of Editors said that the draft code provides

“wholly inadequate protection for journalists’ sources”

and demanded that communication between journalists and public officials be treated the same as privileged information.

I recognise that the target of some of those comments was new legislation rather than a different code and that the code can only go so far, but not to have aligned in the interim the protection for journalistic material and other confidential material with the protection now given in the code to legally privileged material is a missed opportunity.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

How would the hon. and learned Gentleman define “journalist” in this context given the plethora of people out there, from the occasional blogger to the editor of a mainstream broadsheet newspaper, who would self-describe as journalists?

[Keir Starmer]

That is a good question, and a difficult one to answer. I confronted it when I was Director of Public Prosecutions, because I had to issue guidance on how we would approach the prosecution of journalists. We took a broad view, on the basis that if the protection of journalists’ sources is to have any meaning, one cannot distinguish between different forms of journalism. It is simply not good enough to say that because the definition is difficult, the protection should not be afforded to any.

I acknowledge that it is difficult to define journalism. I gave it my best shot in the guidance that I published and took a broad approach, but I resist the notion that because it is difficult to delineate clearly the limits of what a journalist is, the long-standing and hard-won protection for journalists’ sources and other confidential information must yield to that difficulty. That is a dangerous path for us to go down. It is obvious and inevitable that the regime in this legislation will not involve the sort of judicial oversight that comes with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which is a live issue in the public domain among journalists and others. As I said, I think that it is a missed opportunity, albeit for a relatively short period, not to have aligned the protections in the different sorts of protected category in the codes to give better protection to journalists, their sources and the confidential material with which they deal routinely.

There is, of course, much to focus on in the upcoming debate on the draft Investigatory Powers Bill. We welcome the codes and the tone and manner in which they have been put before the Committee. I have outlined the concerns, but we support the codes.

Counter-terrorism

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Tuesday 5th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I am not protecting any interests.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

Daesh represents such a serious threat largely because of its widespread use of technology and social media to radicalise people in their bedrooms, on their smartphones, covertly but sadly compellingly. Does my right hon. Friend agree that our security services and police need special powers to collect internet connection records and bulk communication data to protect the nation’s security and stay ahead of the terrorists in this complex environment?

[Mrs May]

My hon. Friend puts her point extremely well and she is absolutely right. It is important that we are able to access these internet connection records and to have the powers that we are hoping to introduce in the Investigatory Powers Bill. It is entirely right that the Government should continually look to see what further measures we need to take to enhance the powers of the police and security and intelligence agencies to keep us safe, and that is exactly what we are doing.

Serious and Organised Crime: Prüm Convention

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Tuesday 8th December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

I think that the Home Secretary used the expression “pilot scheme”. She surely concedes that it was a small scale pilot scheme. That is the basis on which I question the extent to which the evidence is sufficiently broad-based to justify this extremely grave extension of powers to the European Court of Justice. The main risks highlighted by the Government are the remaining possibility of false positives, leading to the false incrimination of innocent individuals, cost, conferral of jurisdiction to the Court, and a high volume of requests, bearing in mind the fact that the UK has the largest criminal fingerprint and DNA databases.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s exploration of the issue, but I wish to pick up on the point he made to our right hon. Friend the Home Secretary about the small scale of the pilot. What does he say about the fact that our law enforcement service will have access to more than 5 million fingerprints and DNA profiles? In the pilot, the British police sent out more than 2,500 profiles. When it comes to scale, the evidence is compelling.

[Sir William Cash]

The scale has to be weighed against the extension into the realm of the European Court of Justice. That is the key issue. The European jurisdiction has been conceded by the Government, although they refused to do so before. In addition, this entire exercise represents the most massive U-turn in Government policy since 2013.

Draft Investigatory Powers Bill

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Wednesday 4th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

Yes, that is important. The police have been very clear that they need these tools if they are going to be able to continue to do the job we want them to do in relation to serious and organised criminals and particularly in relation to paedophiles. On the first point my hon. Friend made, that is why I particularly welcome the comment made by the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham): across this House we can send out a message today that this Bill is not about mass surveillance.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

I congratulate the Home Secretary and her team on introducing into what has been an incomprehensible regime much-needed transparency and coherence, informed deeply by three independent reports and, importantly, enabling our intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies to have the powers they need to deal with the unprecedented scale and character of the threat this country faces. On warranting, does my right hon. Friend agree that the judiciary are well placed to deal with their new involvement? As a barrister, I made urgent applications on the phone late at night on an emergency basis to senior judges, so they are experienced in these matters. Can my right hon. Friend confirm that the double lock strikes the right balance between public accountability and appropriate checks and balances?

[Mrs May]

I thank my hon. Friend, particularly for her reference to her own experience. Sometimes people have a vision of judges taking a very long time to do all this, but as she says, there are many occasions on which they have to react very quickly to requests, and they have to be available to do so. I expect that they will do that in these circumstances as well. I believe that this Bill will strike the right balance between public accountability and the independence of the judiciary, which will give the public that extra confidence.

Immigration Bill

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Tuesday 13th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

Thank you for calling me, Madam Deputy Speaker.

My father came to the UK to escape the Kenyan Asian crisis in 1968. His arrival probably saved his life. My mother was recruited in Mauritius as a girl of 18, and she has just passed her 45th year of service as a nurse. More passionate patriots cannot be imagined. It is clear that immigration has brought huge benefits to this country. We have a proud tradition of offering refuge, opportunity and a better life to those who take the risk of leaving their homeland.

I echo the sentiments of my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) about how compassion is the golden thread running through our approach to immigration. In fact, my parents’ experience has informed my strong belief that the immigrant story is a Conservative story—one of risk, starting from scratch, working hard and living frugally, all in the name of aspiration, endeavour and self-responsibility. That is why I am proud to be a member of the party proposing this Bill, which is aimed at tackling the root problems inherent in the broken immigration system that we inherited in 2010.

Little is more contentious: last year, immigration overtook the economy as the most important concern of British voters. The aspiration to reduce net migration is sensible, and the Bill goes to the heart of the existing problems in our system. It deals with the loopholes exploited by illegal immigrants, meets the need for greater enforcement and investigation powers, and reduces appeal rights to streamline the system.

Before I came into Parliament, I worked as a Treasury counsel, defending the Home Office in immigration cases, and I saw how the system has been improved over the past five years. The Immigration Act 2014 did much to tackle the pull factors that draw people here. It made it easier to deport foreign criminals by enacting the principle of “deport first, appeal later” and ending the abuse of the right to family life.

Prior to the 2014 Act, I saw at first hand how that right was stretched so far as to make it laughable and pitiful. I was involved in a case that involved the removal of a foreign criminal. One would have thought that it would be straightforward to justify the removal of a convicted class A drug smuggler, but because of the huge number of appeal rights, activist claimant lawyers and technical loopholes, as well as the backlog of cases in the courts system, it took nearly two years and thousands of pounds of taxpayers’ money finally to persuade the Court of Appeal that the public interest in deportation outweighed the human right to a family life in Britain. Thankfully, the number of such cases is diminishing, as is reflected by the Court of Appeal jurisprudence in cases such as MF (Nigeria) and SS (Nigeria).

I worked on many cases involving sham marriages, bogus colleges and overturned detention decisions. I saw the practical effect of the huge backlog of 800,000 asylum cases on the Home Office. We have brought that number down to just over 20,000.

[Lady Hermon]

I have listened intently to the hon. Lady’s interesting speech. With her experience and expertise, can she explain how the provision on strip searching to look for identification and nationality documents can be justified for those who are detained in a removal centre, a prison or a young offenders institution, because I cannot understand why it is in the Bill? Bearing in mind how sensitive the issue of strip searching has been in Northern Ireland, I caution the Government to give more consideration to this very offensive provision.

[Suella Fernandes]

I was involved in a professional capacity in cases of immigration detention and saw at first hand how limited the powers that were afforded to immigration officers and border control police were. They fell short of allowing them the appropriate powers to gather the evidence to justify a successful prosecution. The facts were plain, but because of those limited powers, it was difficult to gather the evidence to justify litigation. I therefore welcome the increased investigation and enforcement powers for immigration officers.

[David T. C. Davies]

I have carried out a number of strip searches as a police officer. I assure all Members that it is something that no enforcement officer ever wants to do and that it is only ever done under the strictest of circumstances and with a great deal of respect for the people who are searched. I am certain that that will be the case if it is ever done by immigration enforcement officers.

[Suella Fernandes]

I welcome that comment whole- heartedly. My professional experience endorses that.

I worked on people smuggling cases. Again, I saw that the regime needed more robust powers in respect of inspection and evidence gathering so that prompt removals could be effected through the right channels.

The new power in clause 30 allows the Secretary of State to cancel what is called section 3C leave. That will go far in widening the removal power when taken with the extension of section 94B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 in respect of the certification of human rights cases. That will enable more prompt removals after a refusal decision has been made. The absence of an in-country appeal right will remove the opportunity to exploit the appeals process extended to individuals in the UK. A reality of the previous regime was that the extensive number of appeal rights protracted the time that people spent in this country unlawfully.

More widely, we must talk about the impact of immigration. I applaud the courage of the Government in dealing with this matter in a compassionate, proportionate and fair way. The cultural impact of immigration cannot be ignored. The pace of immigration, the damaging predominance of multiculturalism, and the lack of integration in some parts of this country are having a damaging effect on social cohesion. A well-integrated immigrant must speak fluent English because that is crucial for developing relationships and gaining employment, and it connects us deeply with others. I therefore welcome the requirement for fluency in English in part 7 of the Bill.

We as a community of parliamentarians must be more courageous when speaking out about matters of integration and what is happening in this country, and when talking about the challenges we all face. The Bill deals with the problem of illegal immigration and tightens up the problem of exploitation, and that is the only way that we will command more confidence in the system and ensure its credibility. Our country is neither open nor closed, but striking the balance is hard. In doing so, it is perfectly reasonable to introduce legislation that encapsulates proportion and compassion. Speaking as the child of immigrants and the beneficiary of immigration, and as a professional, I commend this Bill to the House.

Border Management (Calais)

Suella Braverman Excerpts

Wednesday 24th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

Before I first came to this place, I represented the Home Office in several people-smuggling cases, and I echo the comments of other hon. Members in commending Border Force officers. Will my right hon. Friend say more about investigatory powers for police officers, the duties of investigation for haulage companies and sanctions for breach?

[Mrs May]

These are areas where, in respect of human trafficking, we have been able to bring offences together in one Act of Parliament, increase sentencing and make extra powers available to the police to deal with those responsible. In the immigration Bill, which will be forthcoming later this year, we will look at the responsibilities on hauliers and other parties to make sure that our border is as secure as possible.