All 7 Lord Wolfson of Tredegar contributions to the Nationality and Borders Act 2022

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Wed 5th Jan 2022
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2nd reading & 2nd reading
Thu 3rd Feb 2022
Nationality and Borders Bill
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Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage: Part 2
Tue 8th Feb 2022
Thu 10th Feb 2022
Nationality and Borders Bill
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Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage: Part 1
Mon 28th Feb 2022
Nationality and Borders Bill
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Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage & Report stage: Part 1
Wed 2nd Mar 2022
Nationality and Borders Bill
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Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage: Part 1
Tue 8th Mar 2022

Nationality and Borders Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts
Moved by
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
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That the Bill be now read a second time.

Relevant documents: 7th and 9th Reports from the Joint Committee on Human Rights

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
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My Lords, the United Kingdom has a long history of being open to the world. That includes providing sanctuary to people fleeing conflict, tyranny and oppression. There are countless historical examples of this country extending the hand of friendship to men, women and children in their hour of need and several Members of your Lordships’ House are alive today only because of that.

However, I will not delay the House with a history lesson, not least because this is not only a matter of history; it is also about what we are doing right now. Since 2015, we have resettled more than 25,000 people, half of whom were children, and our family reunion scheme has seen a further 39,000 people settle in the UK. Over 88,000 British national (overseas) status holders and their family members have chosen to apply for the BNO route, with over 76,000 granted so far.

Some 15,000 people were airlifted out of Afghanistan to the UK from mid-August under Operation Pitting, over and above the earlier transfers of around 2,000 locally employed staff and their families under the Afghan relocations and assistance policy. Our Afghan citizens resettlement scheme aims to welcome a total of 20,000 people.

Against that background, and right at the outset, I want to make two important points. First, providing sanctuary and refuge is not inconsistent with a fair asylum and immigration system; such humanitarian measures are possible only if we have a fair asylum and immigration system, capable of providing both welcome and integration. Secondly, an approach to immigration which refuses admission to anyone under any circumstances is obviously inhumane. However, the corollary must also be rejected. Being humane does not mean allowing everyone in, and I remind the House that there are some 80 million displaced people around the world today.

I will start with a basic reality: the current system is not working. It is not working for those people who genuinely need protection and refuge. Those in genuine need and in places of conflict should be our priority, not those who are already in safe countries such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Nor is the current system working for the people of this country—so the status quo is not a viable option.

That is hardly surprising, as there have been radical changes since the current system was put together. The prevailing legal framework was not designed to cope with the type—and certainly not the scale—of the mass migration we have seen in recent years. But some things have not changed: the British public remain generous and kind and there is no question about that.

However, that generosity and kindness does not mean that they are willing to accept uncontrolled immigration—and nor should we expect them to. The truth is that we cannot hope to properly control our borders unless we address illegal entry. That requires comprehensive reform of the asylum system and this Bill is fundamental to delivering the change that is so badly needed.

Some people—and I respect their honesty, although I think they are profoundly misguided—are opposed to any form of immigration control whatever. That position is intellectually coherent, albeit pragmatically incoherent. But for everyone else, who recognises that we have to control our borders, we must also recognise the reality that this means addressing, tackling and reducing illegal entry.

Too many people profess a desire to control our borders but then, when it comes to putting that professed desire into practice, oppose any and every measure designed to do so. That is what one might call a Marxist approach to the problem—not Karl, but Groucho:

“Whatever it is, I’m against it.”


Because, if you will the ends, you cannot oppose all the means, all the time. So I look forward to contributions to this debate which, if they disagree with the Government’s proposals, set out precisely what steps should be taken to achieve the objective of controlled immigration that many profess to support.

When we talk about illegal entry, the illegality does not begin—and certainly does not end—with the migrants themselves, who have often been exploited by criminal gangs. These days, illegal entry is a business. It is run by criminals, who exploit vulnerable people and profit—in the form of hard cash—from human misery. It is a growing business. There were more than 25,000 irregular arrivals in 2021—a fivefold increase over 2018.

Your Lordships have seen the TV pictures. We know all too well that these crossings are often dangerous and sometimes fatal. The loss of those 27 lives in the Channel in November laid bare in devastating fashion why we must do everything possible to make this route unviable. We must reduce the pull factors which lead people to leave other safe countries and risk drowning.

But beyond this, the system is under strain in terms of numbers, time and cost. In the year to March 2021, the UK received more than 33,000 asylum applications, which is more than at the height of the European migration crisis in 2015-16. Because of Covid, efforts to move people through the system, and to remove them from the country, have both been slower.

As a result, waiting times are on the rise. At the end of June last year, there were more than 120,000 cases categorised as “works in progress” in the asylum system, including cases awaiting appeal decisions and some 40,000 failed asylum seekers who are subject to removal from the UK but have not yet left or been removed. This includes foreign national offenders who have been found guilty of serious crimes such as murder, rape and child sex offences. The cost is also considerable. The asylum system now costs more than £1 billion a year to run. So, on any reasonable analysis, the status quo is not sustainable. An overhaul is long overdue. Inaction is simply not a responsible option.

This Bill has three key objectives: first, to increase both the fairness and the efficiency of our system; secondly, to deter illegal entry to the UK; and, thirdly, to remove more easily from the UK those with no right to be here. I shall speak to each of these objectives in turn.

First, it is high time we took action to make our immigration and asylum system fairer and more efficient. Again, fairness and efficiency are not inconsistent. An inefficient immigration and asylum system is fair to nobody. So we will introduce a new form of temporary permission to stay in the UK for those who do not come directly to the UK or claim asylum without delay once here, but who have none the less been recognised as requiring protection. This status will afford only basic entitlements, while still meeting our international treaty obligations.

We will establish accommodation centres for both asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers who require support, so that they have simple, safe and secure accommodation to stay in while their claims and returns are processed.

A new and expanded one-stop process will ensure that asylum and any other protection matters are made and considered together, ahead of any appeal hearing. This will prevent repeated, last-minute claims that are often devoid of legal merit but are designed to frustrate proper removal, with the result that people with no right to be here are still here months and even years later.

At the same time, we will expand provision of legal aid to support individuals who have been served with priority removal notices, so that all relevant issues can be raised at one time. We will also set out in primary legislation for the first time the circumstances in which confirmed victims of modern slavery will receive temporary leave to remain. This will give them, for the first time in domestic primary legislation, clarity on their entitlements.

Lord Davies of Stamford Portrait Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)
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I thank the Minister for giving way for just a moment. On the important matter of accommodation centres, who will be responsible for assigning a particular place or centre to an immigrant or failed immigrant? Will it be possible for the applicant or failed immigrant to leave an accommodation centre, or will he or she essentially be forced to remain in that centre?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I am grateful to the noble Lord. I am setting out the general principles. I have heard his question and my noble friend Lady Williams will deal with both those points in her wind-up speech.

I said that confirmed victims of modern slavery will receive temporary leave to remain. We will be clear through the Immigration Rules and guidance what “temporary” means in this context. Temporary leave to remain will be provided for any length of time necessary to enable victims to engage with authorities to help bring their exploiters to justice. Taken together, these measures will ensure protection for those in need, while weeding out those who seek to abuse this route. We will also bring in a range of age assessment tools, in line with many countries around the world, to ensure that we protect children in need of support, while rooting out adults who masquerade as children under 18. We will also reform nationality law to make it fairer and to address some historic anomalies.

Secondly, as well as making the system fairer and more efficient, we need to send a message that illegal entry will not be tolerated. In the Bill, criminals who engage in people smuggling will face new life sentences. The maximum penalty for entering the country illegally will rise from six months to four years in prison.

We are also providing Border Force with additional powers: to stop and divert vessels suspected of carrying illegal migrants to the UK and return them to where their sea journey to the UK began; to search unaccompanied containers located within ports for the presence of illegal migrants using them to enter the UK; and to seize and dispose of vessels that are intercepted. We will also crack down on other dangerous routes. Drivers will face a fine for every illegal entrant concealed in their vehicle, regardless of the steps that they have taken to secure that vehicle. We will use the electronic travel authorisation scheme, similar to what many noble Lords will recognise—the USA’s ESTA scheme—to stop the entry of those who present a threat to the UK. We will make it possible to remove someone to a safe third country, where their asylum claim will be processed.

Thirdly, failed asylum seekers and foreign criminals cannot be allowed to stay here indefinitely. Such an approach would rightly be unacceptable to the public. It would also undermine confidence in our immigration system. Ultimately, the system depends on the public’s confidence in it. When someone has no right to be in the UK, it is entirely appropriate for the Government to seek their removal. So the Bill contains a number of measures designed to strengthen our ability to do that.

We will confirm that the UK may remove people, including foreign criminals, to a safe third country. Expedited processes will enable the rapid removal of those with no right to be here, while visa penalties could be imposed on countries that do not co-operate on removals. We will also ensure that failure to comply with the asylum or removal process without good reason must be considered in deciding whether to grant immigration bail. We will widen the window in which foreign national offenders can be removed from prison under the early removal scheme for the purposes of removal from the UK.

We will also make a change to the long-standing power—and it is of long standing—to deprive someone of British citizenship in the most serious incidences of terrorism, war crimes or fraud to ensure that the power can still be used when, because of exceptional circumstances, it is not possible to notify the person of that decision. But that is not a policy change: the grounds on which that decision can be taken and the statutory right of appeal from it remain unchanged.

Before I finish, I want to emphasise a point that that should need no emphasis but I am going to emphasise it anyway. We remain fully committed to our international treaty and other obligations, including the refugee convention, the European Convention on Human Rights and international maritime law.

The principle behind this Bill and the New Plan for Immigration is simple. It is based on fairness—first and foremost to those fleeing persecution, of course, but fairness also to the British public, on whose support the legitimacy of the system ultimately relies. Access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need, not on the ability to pay people smugglers, and no one should be able to jump the queue and place themselves in front of people who really need our help. There is no overnight fix. These are long-term problems, but the need for reform could not be clearer. The public are not prepared to accept the current situation, and neither are the Government. Through this Bill, we will deliver a system that works in the interests of the UK. We will keep our doors open to the highly skilled and to people in genuine need, and we will break the business model—because that is what it is—of the evil people-smuggling gangs.

I end on a more personal note. I need no persuasion as to the importance of asylum or the benefits of immigration. There are some in this House who can trace their family’s presence in this country back many centuries; in some cases to a date even before this House first met. Many others, like me, are descended from, or are, more recent arrivals. I hope that my family and others like us have contributed to, as well as benefited from, this country. I want to live in a country where others, yet to arrive, can similarly contribute positively to the UK. My background makes me all the more aware of the importance of providing sanctuary and refuge. I want others to have the opportunities that my family has had, and from which others in the Chamber today have also benefited, but that will not happen, at least not in any fair and proper manner, unless and until we reform the current broken system.

I end where I began. Providing sanctuary and refuge are not only not inconsistent with a fair asylum and immigration system; they are only possible under a fair asylum and immigration system. For those reasons, I beg to move.

Nationality and Borders Bill Debate

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Department: Ministry of Justice

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts
All the previous arguments—about the deadline being arbitrary and how the time taken to put a case together will be different in different cases, particularly in relation to vulnerable applicants—also apply here. Again, a simple caution similar to the PACE criminal caution appears to me to be sufficient. Whether the timing of the submission of evidence has a bearing on the credibility of the claimant should be a matter for the tribunal, not the Bill.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, which has ranged fairly widely. I will try to cover everything in my response. I start with Amendments 77, 89, 90B and 95A, which were spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on behalf of Lord Rosser.

We acknowledge that there may be many good reasons why an individual is not able to comply with either the requirements of an evidence notice or the requirements of a priority removal notice. We also accept that those good reasons may often be linked to the trauma that they have suffered. Where such reasons exist, they will be fully considered by decision-makers on a case-by-case basis and thereafter by the judicial system, should a claimant appeal the refusal of a human rights or protection claim.

The key point here is that every claim is unique; that is trite to say but none the less true. I therefore suggest it is correct that case-by-case scrutiny is given to all individuals. The good reasons test therefore takes into account objective factors, such as difficulties in obtaining evidence, but it would also include subjective factors, such as an individual’s particular vulnerabilities—related perhaps to their sexual orientation, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, mentioned; gender identity; or, indeed, mental and physical health. I suggest that the good reasons test, which I think is appropriate, means that Amendment 77 is unnecessary.

To respond specifically to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, who invited me to parse or gloss what good reasons are and are not, I respectfully say that the test is deliberately open, not circumscribed, to ensure that all relevant factors in the individual case can be considered. Specifically, I can confirm that LGBTQ+ protections will be dealt with in guidance that specifically addresses good reasons and how they may relate to LGBTQ persons and issues, because of course you can have an LGBTQ issue even if you yourself are not LGBTQ.

Further, under Amendment 77, a vulnerable individual who did not fall within the specified groups listed in the amendment may nevertheless be served with an evidence notice. If they provided late evidence, a decision would be needed on whether or not they had good reasons for that lateness; whereas at the same time an individual who happened to fall within the categories set out in the amendment would be free to raise evidence at any time. For reasons that may be entirely unconnected with the reason for their exemption, they would none the less be automatically free from any disadvantage under the system or the consequences in the legislation, based on what is essentially something of a tick-box exercise. I suggest that that would be unfair.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked how the test would apply to children. This was taken up by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, speaking also on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins. Guidance will be published setting out how decision-makers should consider the age of the child in the exercise of their discretion. This should be obvious but let me state it from the Dispatch Box anyway: evidence provided by a child will be considered in the light of their age, degree of mental development, and maturity, currently and at all material times previously. As part of our obligations under the public sector equality duty, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, equality impact assessments have been completed in respect of these clauses. Those assessments incorporate a consideration of the impacts on children.

We are concerned that Amendment 77 could also lead to perverse outcomes, whereby individuals who do not fall into one of the categories identified by the amendment could abuse the process by falsely claiming that they did. That would perpetuate the issues that these clauses are designed to address, to the detriment of genuine claimants, undermining their usefulness.

For similar reasons, Amendments 90B and 95A are unnecessary and would confuse the test to determine the acceptable reasons for something being raised late in response to an evidence notice or a priority removal notice. Unlike the good reasons test, which is fair and is an established principle in the assessment of credibility of an asylum or human rights claim, an unclear and, at least in practice, a rather subjective test of “fairness” risks inconsistent decision-making, which could lead to an increase in uncertainty for both decision-makers and claimants. For those reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to not move her amendments.

Amendment 89 introduces a requirement to publish guidance on good reasons within 30 days of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. This is an arbitrary deadline which is not necessary to include in the Bill. I have already said that good reasons will be set out in published guidance for decision-makers. This will be made available when the measures come into force. The amendment does not assist those in genuine need of protection and would in fact limit the discretion of decision-makers and undermine the effectiveness of the priority removal notices. For those reasons, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to not move those various amendments.

I turn to Amendments 84, 90 and 96. In accordance with the public sector equality duty, protected characteristics must be considered by decision-makers when they are considering good reasons for lateness following service of an evidence notice or a priority removal notice. However, it is not intended that the good reasons are limited to the characteristics listed in Chapter 1 of the Equality Act 2010. For example, mental health issues or past trauma do not amount to a disability under the Act, but they will also be considered. These may be as important, perhaps even more important, than a protected characteristic in determining whether or not someone has a good reason for lateness. Therefore, the amendment is not only unnecessary but could have the unwanted effect of leading decision-makers to believe that they should be prioritising a narrower range of factors than those already intended within the Bill itself. I invite that amendment to be not moved.

I turn to Amendment 85, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington, and my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. Again, I associate myself with the remarks of other noble Lords: we wish her well. Clause 18 adds two new behaviours to the existing credibility provisions in Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. It introduces the principles that providing late evidence without good reason or not acting in good faith should be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. Where there are good reasons for providing late evidence, that will not impact on their credibility.

The concept that certain conduct should be damaging to credibility is not new. Decision-makers must consider egregious conduct by the claimant, and it is then open to the Home Office decision-maker or the court to decide the extent to which credibility should subsequently be damaged. The good-faith requirement is intended to address behaviours such as those mentioned in the amendment, as well as any other behaviours that a deciding authority thinks are not in good faith. Therefore, there is no need, I would suggest, to single out, as this amendment does, particular behaviours to highlight them specifically.

Lord Green of Deddington Portrait Lord Green of Deddington (CB)
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My Lords, is the Minister saying that in practice—I hope he is—if someone has quite clearly destroyed their documents, that will be taken into account when considering their claim?

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Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I really do not want —as I said earlier—to get into a position of glossing the wording of the Bill. It is very important that decision-makers and the courts are able to look at the Act—I hope that it will become an Act—and not my gloss on it. What they will have to do is to ask themselves whether there are good reasons or other circumstances, and whether the claimant acted in good faith. Those are the tests which they will have to apply. Although it is tempting to do so, I am going to resist the temptation to say that this would be included and that would not be included, because my underlying point is that this has to be assessed on a proper case-by-case basis and the statutory tests applied. I am going to leave it there, because I think I have said it clearly enough.

Let me now turn to Amendment 86A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. For the priority removal notice to achieve its objective and operate efficiently, it is essential that those who receive the notice should raise any relevant claims and provide information and evidence before the date specified in the notice. That is to ensure that all claims can be considered sufficiently in advance of the person’s removal, reducing the extent to which removal can be frustrated, and to allow those, on the other hand, in need of international protection to be identified and supported as early as possible. For individuals who have received a priority removal notice, there will be standard timescales for recipients to respond, which will be set out in guidance. Guidance for decision-makers will also set out the circumstances where it would be appropriate for these timescales to be adjusted or extended.

When considering whether to extend the standard timescale, decision-makers will be required to take into account a wide range of factors and will not just be limited to the recipient’s experience of, or alleged experience of, sexual or gender-based violence or torture, or modern slavery or trafficking. The approach is certainly not arbitrary, to use the noble Baroness’s word. The guidance will, therefore, actually go further than these amendments and will require decision-makers to consider a wider range of issues when determining what is a reasonable and fair timescale for an individual to be able properly to respond to a PRN. For those reasons, I invite the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

It should also be noted, while I am on this point, that all recipients of a PRN will receive a legal aid advice offer to support them in responding to the notice. Having experience of sexual or gender-based violence or torture, or modern slavery or trafficking, does not necessarily mean—I underline the word “necessarily”; I do not want to be taken out of context here—that an individual will acquire additional time or a longer period to respond. There are many factors and reasons why an individual may require additional time to respond. Again, each case has to be looked at on its own circumstances. Therefore, we need to adopt a case-by-case approach, and not the approach set out in this amendment.

Turning now to Amendment 87, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, a person who has been issued with a priority removal notice can be subject to the conditions of the notice while it remains in force. That is a 12-month period after the cut-off date or, where a claim is received prior to the cut-off, the 12-month period after they have exhausted their appeal rights. We suggest that that is a reasonable period, which recognises that personal circumstances can change over time.

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Lord Etherton Portrait Lord Etherton (CB)
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Is the Minister able to give an assurance that this guidance, which has been referred to a great deal, rather than putting what I would describe as cautionary provisions in the Act itself, will be ready before the Act comes into force and will be made sufficiently public so that there can be discussion and consideration of it by the general public?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I think I was asked a similar question, in a different context, on the police Bill. I will give the same answer, not least because I am conscious that a lot of these provisions are actually Home Office provisions. I can assure the noble and learned Lord that I will write to him with the answer to that question, so that when this matter comes back he will be in possession of the answer—rather than make an educated guess, which might turn out to be slightly inaccurate, from the Dispatch Box. I hope that is sufficient.

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Portrait Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
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My Lords, on that very important point, perhaps the Minister will take back to the Home Office that this Committee would very much like the guidance to be published in draft form in good time so that Members of the House and others can look at it.

Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick (LD)
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I am sorry for interrupting, but I am becoming a little confused again, I am afraid, probably because we have been at this for a very long time and it is very late and so forth. Is the Minister saying that the deadline that is set for the submission of evidence will be set on a case-by-case basis, for example, if the applicant is particularly vulnerable? If vulnerabilities come to notice that were not initially brought to the notice of the decision-maker, will the deadline then be adjusted and perhaps extended as a consequence of that? Although there might be general guidance about what the deadline might be in every case, is it movable and adjustable in every case and might it be adjusted further as the case progresses? In which case, why on earth is this part of the Bill?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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Let me come to that point in a second. First, let me say that I almost took it as implicit in the request from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that the Committee would like to have the guidance, but I have heard the point made, and I will certainly pass it on. I do not want to go over points I have already made, and I think when the noble Lord looks in Hansard, he will see that I have set out quite clearly why, first, we need to have a system whereby, in particular cases, the date can be extended or adjusted, but also, secondly, why that does not undercut the principle of actually having a date and having this structure. However, I am very happy to look again at what the noble Lord has just said. If, having read it, it seems to me that I can add to what I have already said, I will; otherwise, I respectfully direct him to what I said earlier.

Baroness Chakrabarti Portrait Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
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It may be that, because it has been a long day, I have missed something, or it may be that I have jumped the gun and the Minister was about to come to this point, but I have not yet heard the justification for having Clause 25 at all.

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Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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There are a number of ways of skinning this particular cat because there are separate amendments but common themes. If when I am about to sit down, I have not dealt with it fully, I am sure the noble Baroness will intervene, but I will try to come to Clause 25 head on.

However, I was going to go next to Amendments 82A and 82B, both in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Different elements of Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 have different thresholds in how they are applied to the facts of a case and how credibility is consequently damaged. Clause 18 is drafted to take this into account, so that decision-makers will take into account the relevant thresholds on a case-by-case basis. Clause 18 will encourage claimants to engage with the process in good faith and, along with the measures relating to late evidence in Clauses 17 and 25, to provide evidence in support of their claim at the earliest opportunity. As I said earlier, we think that by encouraging people to bring all their evidence upfront in protection or human rights claims, we can protect those who need protection and identify any unmeritorious claims as early as possible.

Turning to Amendment 82B, the good faith requirement is intended, as I think is obvious, to address behaviours that a deciding authority thinks are not in good faith. Where an individual who makes a protection or human rights claim exhibits a pattern of non-compliant behaviour during their dealings with immigration authorities, their credibility should be damaged to reflect that behaviour. It is also designed to stop claimants deliberately obstructing the one-stop and expedited judicial process—for example, by not taking up our enhanced legal aid offer and then making a last-minute claim based on lack of access to legal advice. The good faith requirement therefore goes further than the behaviours currently described in Section 8 of the 2004 Act. It puts beyond doubt that past behaviour that is deliberately designed to frustrate or delay proceedings should be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. We think that is right, for the reasons I have outlined.

I turn to Amendments 83 and 88, which would remove the credibility provisions in Clauses 18 and 21. For the reasons that I set out earlier, we think that it is entirely reasonable to require evidence in support of a protection of human rights claim, or a claim of being a victim of modern slavery, to be provided in a timely manner, unless there are good reasons why that is not possible.

However, I underline that a person’s credibility is not necessarily determinative of their claim under the current rules and procedures, and the Bill does not change that. Decision-makers will still be required to consider credibility in the round, as they currently do, and, where a person has raised evidence late, which causes delay and wasted resource, it is right that decision-makers consider whether there is any merit in the reasons for that lateness.

I turn now to Amendment 90A, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. We recognise that, due to an person’s individual circumstances, it may be harder for them to provide material in a timely manner. Since this is essentially an amendment to Amendment 90 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I respectfully direct the noble Baroness to the response that I gave to the noble and learned Lord.

As I am on the noble and learned Lord’s amendments, I will now deal with Amendment 91 on reasonable grounds. It is right that, where an individual has been assessed as a priority for removal or deportation, they should avail themselves of the associated legal aid advice offer and provide any matters listed within Clause 19(3)(a) before the cut-off date and they should provide reasons for lateness where a late claim is raised, under subsection (7).

Decision-makers cannot reasonably be expected to speculate on or investigate why an individual who has received a removal notice and associated legal aid advice offer would raise a late protection or human rights claim. If no reasons for lateness are provided, or if the reasons provided are not considered to be good reasons, it would be clear to the decision-maker that any appeal must be subject to the expedited appeals process. In answer to the noble and learned Lord, I say that the good reasons test is adequate and sufficient.

The clause already provides significant safeguards for recipients of a PRN in the form of the legal aid advice provision and the good reasons test for individuals who raise late claims. I set out earlier what those good reasons can amount to. It is a very open-ended test. Therefore, I respectfully suggest to the noble and learned Lord that the amendment is unnecessary and, indeed, would risk complicating an otherwise straightforward and, I suggest, suitable test.

I turn now to Amendment 95 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, but spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. By introducing a statutory requirement to provide evidence before a specified date, the Bill redresses the current balance. It is right that decision-makers should have regard to the principle —I underline “principle”—that minimal weight is given to evidence that is late, following receipt of either an evidence notice or a priority removal notice, without good reason.

I will come to the thrust of Clause 25 in a second, but I will first say that this amendment would place an obligation on decision-makers, not only in the Home Office but also the judiciary, to accept that there were good reasons for late evidence in all asylum and human rights cases where either the claimant or the claim type fell into one of the listed categories. That would remove the requirement that decision-makers should have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence. That would be the case even if the reason for lateness was wholly unconnected to the category of claim or the personal factors. No causal link between the two is set out in the amendment. I respectfully suggest that that is overly prescriptive and would tie the hands of the decision-maker. Of course, in all cases, the decision-maker can take these matters into account—

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Portrait Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
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It is not my amendment so maybe it could be worded better. The noble Lord gave great emphasis to the case-by-case basis earlier, which sounds very reasonable, and he talked about subjective factors. Has he read the recent research from the British Red Cross about women seeking asylum? It found that frequently their claims are met with disbelief and they are not treated very well at all. There is a lack of recognition of gender-based violence that they may be fleeing from, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, talked about earlier. I suggest that the noble Lord and those responsible for this clause look at this research, because I worry about putting so much emphasis on subjective factors and the case-by-case basis.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I think I have received the email from the Red Cross, as I think it emailed everyone. I have set up a folder for all these briefings, so I do not want to say that I have read it, but if I have been sent it I certainly have it and will read it. However, due to pressures of other business, I cannot say that I have read all the material yet.

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Portrait Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
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I absolutely understand—I do not think it was in its general briefing, but it produced a separate report last week or the week before, and it is worth looking at.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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In that case, I will certainly read it over the weekend. I know that those in the Home Office responsible for this area are obviously looking at the debate and will have picked up what the noble Baroness has said.

I was just dealing with Amendment 95, after which I will come to Clause 25 itself. I lost count of how many times the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “tawdry”. It really is not, if I may say so. We obviously disagree, and I will make no comparisons either to parking fines or international commercial litigation. At one point it seemed to me that the noble Baroness was saying that, on the one hand, this clause was terrible and, on the other, that this is what tribunals do in any event and we can trust them to do the right thing.

Baroness Chakrabarti Portrait Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
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I am saying that, if we trust—as I am sure the Government do—immigration officers, the Secretary of State, the First-tier Tribunal, et cetera, to be intelligent, effective operators in the system, they are by definition capable of looking at late evidence on a case-by-case, open-textured, well-reasoned basis and determining those occasions where there is a good reason and those where there is not. That goes without saying, so why do we have to have this diktat in the Bill, with “must” give it “minimal weight”? I suspect it is because, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggested, the Government are trying to dictate to the tribunals in particular what is and is not a good reason. That is the sinister aspect of this. It is also impractical, because you then have to have arguments about what is and is not a good reason. I promise the Minister that this will be litigated ad nauseam. It would be better, as he said to other noble Lords, to leave this to open-textured judgment and decision-makers who are capable of applying it.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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As regards the in terrorem threat that things will be litigated ad nauseam, I am tempted to say that that is not really a change from the current position. More substantively, and with respect, to say that the clause sets out that the tribunal “must give … minimal weight” to the evidence, as the noble Baroness just put it, is not what it does at all.

Baroness Chakrabarti Portrait Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
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It says that they have to have good reason.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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It does not do that either.

It does not say that the tribunal “must give the evidence minimal weight”; it says that the tribunal

“must, in considering it, have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence”.

The tribunal is perfectly entitled to say, “Well, we’ve looked at that principle. Actually, we’re not going to apply it here”—for reasons A, B and C. There is no requirement and no fettering of the tribunal; there is no compulsion that the evidence be given minimal weight. What the decision-maker has to do is have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to any late evidence unless there are good reasons why it is provided late.

Baroness Chakrabarti Portrait Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
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I promise that this is my final intervention on the Minister, but I do not understand why we have to have the provision at all. He is saying that it is perfectly open-textured enough, that good reasons do not have to be specified in the Bill because the Government are not going to put glosses on it or be overly prescriptive, that they can be objective good reasons or subjective good reasons, that it is only about having regard to the new principle that they are inventing et cetera. Why have this at all?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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It is because there is absolutely nothing wrong with Parliament saying to a tribunal, “We want you to have regard to this principle, but of course the final decision is yours”. We do that in other areas of the law as well. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, kindly said, I gave evidence yesterday to her committee in what I hope was an interesting session. One thing we talked about was Section 12 of the Human Rights Act. The layout there was not a million miles away from this. It too gives a very clear direction to the court, but ultimately it is the court’s decision. I find it slightly surprising that, on the one hand, the noble Baroness is saying that this is tawdry and dreadful but, on the other, is saying, “Actually, you don’t need it all because the same result is going to eventuate”. Both points cannot be right at the same time.

As we all know, the asylum and the legal systems in this regard are overwhelmed. We see repeated unmeritorious claims at the very last minute designed to delay removal. This clause is a proper part of an overall system to make sure that we give protection to those who need it—I always put that first; that is the most important thing—and at the same time to identify unmeritorious claims.

Finally, Amendment 137 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seeks to implement a recommendation made by the JCHR in its ninth report. Of course, we welcome the JCHR’s positive comments on Clause 45. Migrants who are subject to removal must be given sufficient opportunity to access justice. The clause improves and enhances the status quo. It gives a statutory guarantee that migrants will receive a minimum notice period of five working days. As a result, some migrants will get more time compared to the current policy. It introduces a separate statutory requirement for a notice of departure details to be provided to the migrant before removal.

On a practical level, Clause 45 will be supplemented by policy guidance that accords further respect to the common-law right to access to justice. I say respectfully that it is not clear to me what deficiency in Clause 45 Amendment 137 tries to address. I would genuinely welcome engagement from the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, to identify what offending aspects of Clause 45 there may be and how Amendment 137 would solve them.

Therefore, having taken probably too much of the Committee’s time already, I invite the various noble Lords to consider not pressing their amendments.

Lord Coaker Portrait Lord Coaker (Lab)
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I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this very important debate. I also thank the Minister. Yes, it was a long reply, but it was an important one and it did not take up too much time. Sometimes long replies are needed, and the Minister was right to take the time that he took to respond. There are a large number of points on which I could reply to the Minister, but it is clear that we will have to come back to some of them on Report.

If the Minister does not mind me chiding him slightly, I will say that that was a bit of a “no worries, no problem” defence: “Everything is fine. It will all be sorted in guidance, although we will not see it until some future time. Do not worry about the children problem that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, raised, because we have all taken into account the sensitivity of children and how old they are. Do not worry about LGBTQI because they will all be very reasonable. Do not worry about the good reasons either—it will all be sorted. Good reasons mean good reasons. Nobody will do anything about it if the reasons are good.”

One example where the Minister was in trouble at the end essentially concerned Clause 25(2). When is a principle not a principle? Is it a principle when it is written down? I love the phrase “have regard to”; it is always put in. The Minister said that we do not have to take X or Y into account. In a sense, he agreed with the JCHR that a better word would be “may” instead of “must”. This is quite a significant change—something may be taken into account, or it may not be. At the moment, it says “must”. This is the problem with which he was trying to wrestle—first, whether there is a principle at all, and secondly, whether “may” or “must” should be used.

The Government are seeking to deal with the problem that the asylum system is in chaos. Half the decisions are overturned on appeal. Panic has broken out. The Government say, “We cannot have this. The public are going mad. Everybody is dissatisfied. We will get more and more of this. Everyone is making late appeals. They are not abiding by the rules. We have to do something.” A whole series of new measures is being taken to overcome a bureaucratic problem. In the end, it needs good—probably trained—decision-making, speedily done, to get a system that works. The Government will not address the very real problem in the Bill, particularly in respect of late priority notices, except on a piece of paper. In a year or two or three, there will be a Nationality and Borders Bill mark 2. If they are not careful, whoever is in government—I hope it will be a different Government—will be panicking in the face of it not working. They will bring in other measures.

Much of what has quite rightly been raised by noble Lords across the Chamber will have to be revisited on Report. I thank the Minister again for his courtesy and for the time and trouble he took to try to respond. Finally, the sooner we have a look at the guidance, the better. It is very frustrating when the Government say that they will publish the guidance and it is published after the Bill is passed. We deserve to see the guidance as soon as possible. I would be very grateful if the Minister could pass this on. I seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Secondly, but still on the point of efficiency, concerns have been raised that far from making the system faster, this will lead to a backlog of cases in the Upper Tribunal. Can the Government say what estimation has been made of the impact of these provisions on the upper tribunal?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, in the last group I spoke at some length. This time I hope to be more brief. The principles have been discussed in some other groups and the points at issue are of relatively narrow ambit, although they are important.

Clause 22 creates a new expedited appeal that will be heard in the Upper Tribunal. Too often, those facing removal or deportation utilise delay tactics to thwart removal action, such as withholding relevant information in their initial claim, which can be used later if they are first refused, resulting in late and repeated claims and subsequent appeals. That is both costly and an unfair burden on the courts and tribunals system. With this clause, appeals in relation to late human rights or protection claims brought by recipients of a PRN are determined quickly, with decisions being final. That removes the incentive for bringing late claims.

Where a person provides good reasons for a late claim, their right of appeal will not be certified as an expedited appeal. Furthermore, the Committee will note in Clause 22(5) that the Upper Tribunal retains discretion and when it considers that the only way that justice can be done in an individual appeal is to remit to the First-tier Tribunal, that is what it will do. Therefore, while I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, that better decision-making is important and certainly part of the answer, I do not accept the implication of their contributions, that it is the only answer. This is also an important thing that we can do to improve the system.

Clause 23 works together with Clause 22 to ensure that individuals cannot utilise the appeal system as a tool for delay. Clause 22 provides expedited appeals to be determined quickly and finally by the Upper Tribunal. There may be additional rights generated by other claims that an individual may want to exercise in parallel with an expedited appeal. Those other appeals might usually be heard in the First-tier Tribunal. Therefore, without Clause 23, an expedited appeal might have concluded but there would be an outstanding appeal in the First-tier Tribunal, which would prevent removal. Clause 23 provides that the other related appeals will be heard by the Upper Tribunal at the same time, so provides a suitable one-stop shop. Again, there is a safeguard to ensure that in cases where the Upper Tribunal thinks that justice can be done only by continuing the appeal in the First-Tier Tribunal, it can do that. That is the burden of Clause 23(7).

For those reasons, which are brief but, I hope, persuasive, I beg to move that Clause 22 stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22 agreed.
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As I say, we support the amendment and the purpose behind it, but our initial feeling is that seven hours is not enough time for a legal representative to take instructions from, advise and represent individuals who are often among the most vulnerable people in society. That, I think, is the cue for the Government, in their response, to indicate how they came to the conclusion that seven hours was sufficient, and how they would argue, even though it may be an equally arbitrary figure, that 20 hours is excessive. I await the Government’s response.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have contributed. These amendments obviously deal with matters of legal aid, and I remind the Committee that LASPO is the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, just to put everybody out of their misery—otherwise they will not be able to sleep when they get home. I will be quick, but I will just make one point: with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, this is not a matter of generosity. This is not about the Government being generous. I do not want to sound high-falutin’, but this is about the rule of law. Abiding by the rule of law is not a matter of generosity; it is simply non-negotiable, and this provision is in the Bill because it is a proper and necessary thing to do.

Amendment 93 and 94 seek to provide up to seven hours of free legal aid to individuals with a slavery or trafficking notice. They are unnecessary because existing legal aid rules will already ensure that individuals can receive more than seven hours of advice if they receive a slavery or trafficking notice. The key point to bear in mind—and I accept that this is complex—is that a slavery or trafficking notice can be issued only to individuals who have made a protection or human rights claim. That is relevant because it means that they are already within the immigration system and legal aid is already available in order to make that protection or human rights claim. So, in a case where an individual is in receipt of legal aid for their protection or human rights claim and they then receive a slavery or trafficking notice, they are already entitled to advice on that notice as part of their protection or human rights claim. Importantly, there is no limit on the number of hours that can be provided on someone’s protection or human rights claim. Legal advice is available until the matter is resolved, and it may well be for considerably more than the seven hours—or, indeed, 20 hours.

Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD)
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I am really sorry, I know we are looking at the clock, but if I have understood it, and I am sure the Minister is briefed to the hilt, the problem is that he who has, gets more, as it were. If you are already in the asylum system and then you get the notice, you will get even more legal aid—but what if you have not already made a protection claim? What about those people?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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The noble Baroness must have had access to my notes, because that was just the point I was going to make. I have written down here that I know the Committee will ask about individuals who are not receiving legal aid for their protection or human rights claim—and sure enough, the Committee did. My answer is that there could be multiple reasons for an individual not receiving legal aid in those circumstances. The individual might not have passed the means or merits test, and those two tests, as the Committee will know, are there to ensure that legal aid is targeted at those most in need who cannot afford advice themselves. That is one possibility, and I will come back to that in a moment. Another possibility—and this does happen—is that the individual has just made an application to the Home Office by themselves and has not sorted out a lawyer. If so, I would strongly encourage them to seek out a legal aid lawyer, who would be able to provide more than the seven hours of advice that could be provided.

Turning to Amendment 94A, the short answer to why we have specified up to seven hours in Clause 24 is that a balance must be struck between giving free legal advice and using taxpayers’ money responsibly. Seven hours is intended to reflect that this is an opportunity for initial legal advice to help individuals understand what the notice is and what it is requiring them to. It is available on a non-means-tested and non-merits-tested basis. That means that anyone with a PRN is guaranteed access to legal aid for up to seven hours, but it does not mean that, after seven hours, there is no further access to legal aid. Some individuals will need further advice; it is not intended that seven hours will resolve every immigration issue. At the end of the seven hours, any individual who has an issue within the scope of the legal aid scheme and who passes the means and merits test will be eligible for ongoing legal advice funded by legal aid until the matter is resolved.

I am conscious that that gets us into the territory of means and merits tests. I answered an Oral Question in this area on Tuesday, when I said that there was a review of the means test under way at the moment, on which I have personally spent a lot of time. I hope very much that we will soon be able to go out for consultation on that. We are conducting a really thorough review of the means test.

Finally, I will address the noble Baroness’s concerns that the exceptional case funding scheme might not be up to standard. Respectfully, I disagree. That scheme is specifically designed to act as a safety net and to provide legal-aid funding to individuals who can demonstrate that, without it, their human rights might be breached. In 2019-20, of the immigration cases that applied for exceptional case funding, 80% were granted legal aid, so that shows that the system works. We are continuing to work with legal aid practitioners and the Legal Aid Agency to improve the scheme if we can.

For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that the noble Baroness, speaking also for the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, will be content to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee (LD)
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Before my noble friend responds, could the Minister at least acknowledge that it is not just a matter of hours? It is a matter of the difficulties of finding a legal aid lawyer and the very clear existence of legal aid deserts and so on? Even when it is not a desert, there are difficulties which are, to a very considerable extent, related to the terms for the lawyers themselves. I do not know whether it ever occurred to the noble Lord that he might pursue a career in legal aid; he probably felt as guilty as I used to, when I was in practice as a solicitor, that my firm did not do legal aid, or at least it gave up doing it. That is partly because you need to specialise in legal aid, as well as the subject that you are dealing with, and that is very difficult for a lot of lawyers. It has led to two classes of lawyers, and that is a very bad thing.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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The noble Baroness’s question is quite broad. She knows that we have had a number of discussions about legal aid, which will continue. I did not do much legal aid in my practice. I do not want to advertise from the Dispatch Box, but my brother-in-law is one of the finest criminal legal aid solicitors in London—I am sure that no one here will ever need his services, but he is absolutely brilliant, none the less.

More seriously, I am very conscious of the need to make sure that people have access to a lawyer with the relevant skill set, because a general right to legal aid is not much use if you cannot find a legal aid lawyer—I absolutely appreciate that. On Tuesday, I explained some of the efforts that we are making in this area. To say any more now might trespass on the Committee’s patience, but I am obviously well aware of this point.

Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD)
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I appreciate the care with which the Minister has responded to these amendments. Although he started by saying that they were unnecessary, he conceded that there is a group of people who do not get legal aid. We might differ in our views on how meritorious they are in any claim for legal aid, but he said that they could find a solicitor and get legal aid that way—but that might not be the easiest thing in the world, for reasons that include what was just discussed. I am afraid that I am not really persuaded.

I will read the Minister’s remarks in Hansard, but I do not think that he denied that there are people who do not get legal aid. The fact that the anti-slavery commissioner was on the case with the JCHR shows that it is not just these Benches over here that think that this is an issue. For the time being, I have to accept that the Minister has given his response and I cannot get any further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser (Lab)
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In this group, I have the Clause 26 stand part amendment, and Clause 26 requires the Tribunal Procedure Committee to create a fast-track route for certain appeals made from detention. The accelerated process would apply where the Secretary of State “considers” that an appeal brought in relation to the decision would

“likely be disposed of expeditiously.”

Of course, that raises the question of the basis on which the Secretary of State will decide that an appeal brought in relation to the decision is likely to be disposed of expeditiously. Will it be done on a whim? Will it be done on the basis that we need to speed things up and this may be the way to do it? Will they be getting legal advice on whether they should consider that it is likely to be disposed of expeditiously? What happens if they do decide that an appeal brought in relation to the decision is likely to be disposed of expeditiously, and they then find that it cannot be disposed of expeditiously? What is the redress in that situation?

The Explanatory Notes state:

“This clause aims to establish an accelerated route for those appeals made in detention which are considered suitable for a quick decision, to allow appellants to be released or removed more quickly.”


As far as the Explanatory Notes are concerned, it is being done for the highest of motives, and nothing to do with simply trying to speed up the process.

The Law Society, Justice, the UNHCR and the Public Law Project have recommended that the clause be removed from the Bill. They raise that the fast-track system largely replicates, as has been said, a system that was already found to be unlawful in 2015 in a Court of Appeal ruling.

We support the amendments and concerns raised in this group, but I intend to speak only to the amendment in my name, which is to oppose Clause 26 standing part of the Bill. The concerns are very clear. As I said, various organisations have recommended that the clause be removed from the Bill. Their basis for saying so is that it amounts to a new detained fast-track procedure that was found to be unlawful in 2015 due to being “structurally unfair”. The Court of Appeal described the timetable for such appeals as

“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.

It held that the policy did not sufficiently appreciate

“the problems faced by legal representatives of obtaining instructions from individuals who are in detention”,

nor did it

“adequately take account of the complexity and difficulty of many asylum appeals”

and

“the gravity of the issues that are raised by them”.

Since that ruling, the Tribunal Procedure Committee has repeatedly taken the position not to introduce specific rules in relation to cases where an appellant is detained. In its report of March 2019, the TPC concluded that

“a set of specific rules would not lead to the results sought by the Government. If a set of rules were devised so as to operate fairly, they would not lead to the increased speed and certainty desired.”

Following the clear and somewhat damning court ruling and the position of the TPC, the Government’s response has been, as we now see, to legislate to reintroduce a fast-track procedure by forcing the TPC’s hand and requiring it to create one.

The questions for the Government are fairly simple. What is it about this scheme that is significantly structurally different from the scheme that was found to be legally unsound? What about this scheme will prevent it having a timetable

“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity”?

Why, and on the basis of what evidence, do the Government disagree with the TPC when it says that such rules should not be brought in since they cannot both operate fairly and achieve the desired result of speed?

One wonders whether the Government are risking further judicial proceedings in replicating a scheme that has been found to be unlawful or, indeed, whether they would care too much anyway if there were such future judicial proceedings. I await the Government’s response.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I will come to the amendments in a moment but, since we have had a number of references to the old detained fast-track scheme, I will start by saying a word about that.

Obviously we considered carefully the legal challenges to the detained fast-track. We are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. It is right to say that the courts have been clear, in upholding the principle, that an accelerated process for appeals made in detention, operated within certain safeguards, is entirely legal. We believe that the new accelerated detained appeals route will contribute significantly to the timeliness with which appeals can be decided. We will be able to remove swiftly people found not to be eligible to remain while those people with valid claims can be released from detention more quickly, which is also important.

So far as the Tribunal Procedure Committee is concerned, the Bill sets out a clear policy intent but, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, says, changes to tribunal procedure rules are for the TPC to draft and are subject to its statutory consultation requirements and procedures. We have already begun to engage with the TPC on the elements of the Bill that will require tribunal rules to be made or amended and will continue to do so as the Bill progresses and passes into law.

I turn to the amendments before the Committee. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and, in his absence, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for Amendment 97. I understand the motivation behind it. It is right that appeals made from detention should be dealt with in a timely way so that, as I have said, people are not deprived of their liberty for longer than necessary, but we recognise that not all appeals made from detention will be suitable for the accelerated detained appeals route. So Clause 26 specifies that if a decision is certified as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal, in those circumstances the Secretary of State must consider that any appeal to the decision is likely to be disposed of expeditiously. Importantly, the tribunal may remove a case from the accelerated detained appeals route if that is the only way to ensure that justice can be done in a particular case.

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Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser (Lab)
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I may not have been listening as attentively as I should have been, but if the Minister has already said it I ask him to repeat the criteria under which the Secretary of State will make the decision that he or she considers that the appeal is likely to be disposed of quickly, which was a question I asked. Another point rises from something he said—that the clause now sets an extremely high bar for an appeal to be released from the scheme, and provides that it can be done only where

“it is the only way to secure that justice is done.”

Am I not right in saying that this has been amended by the Government during the Bill’s passage, and that the original language permitted the release of a case if the tribunal

“is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so”?

Why is it no longer the case that “the interests of justice” are a good enough reason to take action?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I shall reply to the second point first, if I may. The language in Clause 26(5) is essentially the same language as in Clause 23(7).

Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Is it the same or essentially the same? My understanding, and I may be wrong, is that the Bill now says that

“it is the only way to secure that justice is done”,

where previously it said

“that it is in the interests of justice to do so”.

They may be similar but they are not the same words.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
- Hansard - -

My Lords, I think we are at cross-purposes. I was not saying that the language had not changed; I was saying that the test in Clause 26(5) is the same test as in Clause 23(7). On the question of whether the language has changed, I think the noble Lord is right. I will write to confirm the position—I do not want to get it wrong at the Dispatch Box—but I think there was a change in this clause. The test as set out is entirely proper. Is the only way that justice can be done to take the case out of this tribunal? If that is the only way justice can be done, it ought to be done. If this tribunal therefore, by obvious logic, can deal with the case justly, it should do so.

On the first question, I am not sure how much more I can say. The Secretary of State must consider, in order to certify a case as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal, that any appeal to that decision would be likely to be disposed of expeditiously and that the other conditions are met. In coming to that conclusion, the Secretary of State would obviously have to look at all relevant factors. I am not sure that I can take it much further than that, but let me look again at the noble Lord’s question in Hansard. If I can add anything more, I will do so, so he is in possession of everything I can say before we look at it again—no doubt on Report.

Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord again for his detailed responses. On the first point, on Amendment 97, I just hope that we do not find ourselves back in litigation. He asserts that the Bill avoids the pitfalls that the Court of Appeal found in 2015 and that the Tribunal Procedure Committee found later. Let us hope so, because obviously, resorts to litigation will also be something that gums up the system, which the Home Office already says is broken. Time will tell if this is going to stay as it is.

On Amendment 99, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is right. If my memory serves, the wording has changed since the Bill was in the other place. Certainly, the JCHR would suggest that wording that says that the tribunal “must”—not just “may”—if the interests of justice and fairness require it, take an appeal out of the accelerated detained system is stronger than the wording that is there at the moment. It says that the tribunal “must” if—and it is a broader test—it is in the interests of fairness and justice. It is a better test, and a fairer and more just test, so I am disappointed that the Minister does not like that amendment—although I guess I am not terribly surprised. On that note, I can only withdraw my amendment.

Nationality and Borders Bill Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Ministry of Justice

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts
Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser (Lab)
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As has been said, this part of the Bill provides for “interpretation” of the refugee convention. It includes some entirely new provisions and replicates or amends some existing provisions.

On existing provisions, this part of the Bill repeals the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006. These regulations transposed a key EU directive on standards for asylum systems, the qualification directive, into UK law. The Bill repeals the regulations and puts versions of the provisions into primary legislation instead.

The UNHCR noted with concern the Government’s approach to interpreting the refugee convention. I will read an extract from its legal observations on the Bill in full. It said:

“We note with concern the Government’s approach to interpreting the Refugee Convention. Any treaty must be ‘interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ In the case of the Refugee Convention, as the UK Supreme Court has noted on more than one occasion, ‘There is no doubt that the Convention should be given a generous and purposive interpretation, bearing in mind its humanitarian objects and the broad aims reflected in its preamble.’ In addition, the Vienna Convention specified a range of sources that ‘shall be taken into account’ in interpreting a treaty; these all reflect the agreement of the parties, and include other agreements and instruments from the time the treaty was concluded, as well subsequent agreements, State practice and international law. In other words, States cannot, under international law, unilaterally announce their own interpretation of the terms of the agreements they have made with other States. This, too, has been repeatedly recognised by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court of the UK.”


I do not want to repeat what has already been said, but I just ask: do the Government agree with that extract from the UNHCR’s legal observations on the Bill? If they do agree with it, do they believe that they are still abiding by it?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.

The starting point is that we are no longer members of the European Union and, by extension, the Common European Asylum System. In response to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, these provisions are not a direct response to the case of AH (Algeria). They are about having an opportunity to define clearly and unscramble refugee convention terms following our exit from the EU. It is right that, at this time of legal change, we take the opportunity to reassess the operation of our asylum system and reconsider our approach not only to fundamental policies but to processes, so that we can create a clearer and more accessible system.

The fact is that the development of the asylum system through international conventions, European law, domestic legislation, Immigration Rules and case law has created a complex legal web that can be difficult to understand and apply; that goes for claimants, decision-makers and the courts. I do not propose to use props—I understand that that is not permitted—but, for my own assistance on a later group, I brought a book called, rather laughingly, The Immigration Law Handbook. We consider it a desirable law reform to define clearly key elements of the refugee convention in UK domestic law. In response to my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, that is exactly what we are doing. We want to make the position clearer for everyone, including decision-makers and the courts.

A lot has been said that touches on the same point but, with great respect, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, perhaps put it most forcefully. She used a number of metaphors. Let me respond to them. This is not about tripping anybody up. It is not a sleight of hand; it is difficult to do one of those on the Floor of your Lordships’ House. This is about bringing clear definitions before Parliament and having them all in one place. The central point is this: there is nothing wrong—indeed, I suggest that there is everything right—with the UK, through this Parliament, interpreting its obligations under the refugee convention. That is entirely lawful. I use “lawful” in both its narrow and wide senses. It is lawful in the sense that it is in accordance with the law; it is also lawful in the broader sense of being in accordance with the political or constitutional principle that we call the rule of law. Further, it is in accordance with the Vienna convention. Everything we are doing complies fully with all our international obligations, including the refugee convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. I will come back to the question that the noble Baroness asked me in that regard a little later.

With respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, it is not perverse to use domestic legislation to give effect to and interpret international treaties. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that I am not in the business of appeasing the far right; nor am I in the business of deleting obligations under international law. Many of the definitions, which repay careful reading, are very similar to those already used in the UK—for example, those contained in the 2004 qualification directive, which was transposed into UK law via the 2006 regulations.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his kind words. I assure him that I of course give proper consideration to international reputational impacts, but surely there can be no adverse impact by complying with international law and interpreting treaties in accordance with the Vienna convention.

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Portrait Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
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I am sorry, I missed my moment; I should have spoken as soon as the Minister spoke to me. I did not accuse him of trying to appease the far right. I hope I did not say that—I certainly did not mean to—but I do accuse the Government of it. I know that the Minister did not write this Bill, but that is something I see the Government as guilty of.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I did not take it personally. I agree that I did not write the Bill. It would be a far worse Bill, and the noble Baroness would like it even less, if I had written it. But I replied in that way because I take the view that if I am standing here defending government policy, then I will stand here and defend government policy. I certainly would not defend a government policy which was simply appeasing the far right. So, that is why I replied in those terms. I know that the noble Baroness was not making a personal attack; I did not take it that way.

To finish my point to the noble Lord, Lord Alton—

Lord Green of Deddington Portrait Lord Green of Deddington (CB)
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My Lords, can we have a little less talk about the far right? Some 70% of the population think that the present Government’s policy on asylum is a failure.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I do not want to get into the question of whether the Bill is going too far or not far enough, and whether our policy is good, bad or indifferent, on this group of amendments. If I may say so, those are Second Reading-type questions. I was simply responding to the point put by the noble Baroness.

To return to the point on Turkey, whether its acts are in accordance with the refugee convention is really a separate issue. I do not mean to diminish or demean this, but what we are talking about here are not acts, so to speak. We are talking about the fundamental question of whether it is proper—because the charge put against me is that it is not—for this Parliament to set out its interpretation, the UK’s interpretation, of the international obligations we have under the refugee convention.

Lord Alton of Liverpool Portrait Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
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Before the Minister leaves that point, I was not specifically asking him to respond to Turkey’s actions. I was saying that it diminishes our ability to speak to countries such as Turkey or China—which I also referenced—if we are ourselves een to diminish our responsibilities under the 1951 convention. That comes to the question that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, put about how this is seen beyond our shores by international institutions that have examined what we are trying to do. I hope the Minister will address that point as we proceed.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I was going to come to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Let me just say a sentence about it now: the UNHCR is not the interpretive body of the refugee convention. Each state under the convention is there to interpret its obligations, in accordance with the Vienna convention. That is the system which the state parties have set up. When we have a phrase—we will get to one a little later—such as “serious non-political crime”, the state parties have to interpret it. We will get to an example in the next group—this is a little cliffhanger—of where different countries have approached the question differently. There is nothing wrong with that, provided that they are all acting in accordance with the Vienna convention in good faith in seeking to interpret their obligations.

Respectfully, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, essentially accepted that basic proposition under the Vienna convention, and he was obviously right to do so. He sought characteristically carefully—if I might say so—to seek disclosure of the legal advice on which the Government are relying, while recognising the conventions which apply to that. I listened carefully to what he said. I will read Hansard to see whether there is anything more I can say in writing to him; I do not want to rush from the Dispatch Box. There may or may not be anything more I can say, but I will read that point carefully. I think he recognised that there are conventions in this area which do apply.

However, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it is not a question of having to agree with all the other signatories. This is not about amending the refugee convention; it is about interpreting it. That is a very different thing. If you want to amend a contract, you need the other party’s agreement, but interpreting a convention is for each state party.

I will say a few words about the substantive clauses, although I think it is fair to say that those were not really the Committee’s focus. Clause 29 sets out how key terms which are defined in the following clauses will be applied; they are the key components of the refugee convention. Clause 29 also revokes the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006. Those are the regulations through which we transposed our obligations under the EU qualification directive 2004. Because we are out of the EU, we need to do that in a different way.

However, we will continue to grant humanitarian protection to eligible individuals who cannot be removed from the UK to their country of origin if their removal would breach the UK’s obligations under Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR. It is important to clarify—I am sure Members of the Committee know this—that these are not individuals protected under the refugee convention. However, we will make further changes to align the entitlements of permission to stay granted on the basis of humanitarian protection to that provided to group 2 refugees.

In response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, we believe that Clause 33 provides a system of effective protection from persecution. Clause 34 deals with relocation, but I do not think any noble Lords spoke to it directly, so I will just refer to it and move on.

On Clause 35, of course we have a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, but that should not apply to those who commit serious crimes, putting the communities that host them at risk and endangering national security. We believe we are right to define and legislate in this area. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that that is a good example of serious non-political crime. That is a phrase in the refugee convention, but it is not further defined in it. Each state has to look at it and define it, in accordance—always—with the Vienna convention.

Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD)
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The Minister keeps saying that each state will define the refugee convention, and he alluded to the EU qualification directive; there is also the procedures directive. I declare an interest, as I worked on both directives as an MEP. Of course, that was an attempt not for each state in the EU to do its own thing but to have a collective set of laws which interpreted the refugee convention in detail and, as far as I know, complied with it. That prevented each country doing its own thing in a potentially destructive way.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee (LD)
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I have an associated point, to save the Minister bobbing up and down too much. I entirely take the point about non-political crime. I just wanted to make it clear that I was referring only to that bit of the Bill when I mentioned the case. I was not suggesting that it was the prompt for the whole of this part. But can the Minister explain more about the impact of our leaving the EU? Does that give us a legal opportunity, or is this happening because it is a convenient political point in the calendar, as it were?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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On the first point, of course the EU sought to interpret the refugee convention for all its members. But that actually makes my point, because it is only for the members of the EU. All the other states will interpret it in their own way. If you want to hand over your interpreting power to the EU, that is fine if you are a member—but I suggest that that does not cut across my basic point.

As to the effect of leaving the EU, if we have hitherto signed up to various interpretations through EU regulations, we now have an opportunity to look at the matter afresh, as I said when I began. To go further into that point would go way beyond the scope of this group.

Finally, I come back to the question put to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, about “scrapping” —I think that was the word she used last night as well—the Human Rights Act. I said last night, and I will give the same answer now, that the Human Rights Act brings into English domestic law the European Convention on Human Rights. We have reaffirmed— I did it yesterday; I will do it again now—that this Government will stay in as a signatory to the convention.

Baroness Chakrabarti Portrait Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
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I am grateful to the Minister for that, but will he answer my question a bit more specifically? Has he instructed parliamentary counsel to begin the drafting process for the Bill that will replace, repeal or reinterpret the Human Rights Act and/or the convention on human rights?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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As a matter of policy, I am afraid I am not going to get into the discussions I have with government law officers and parliamentary counsel. The Government’s legislative programme has been set out. The Lord Chancellor, the Deputy Prime Minister and I have given evidence on this. We have made it clear that we will be staying in the European Convention on Human Rights. In so far as the burden of the noble Baroness’s challenge was that we have to be careful, because the Government are watering down rights, we are staying in the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore—

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Portrait Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
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I was going to wait until the Minister had finished his sentence but, before he sits down, I revert to the question of the Government’s legal case. The Minister is reticent to disclose government legal advice, which I entirely understand but, before the Committee and others can reach a fully formed opinion on this, they need a worked version of the Government’s legal position. It may be that that takes the form of a position paper or submission, rather than the replication of advice already given. But, until we see in detail what Raza Husain and the UNHCR got wrong, and why these interpretations are fully consistent with the Vienna and refugee conventions, the evidence is all one way. I am sure that I speak for many other noble Lords when I say that I would be very much assisted by seeing something of that nature.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I hope the noble Lord does not take it amiss if I say, with respect, that he makes the same point as he made earlier. and I understood it. I need to be very careful that I do not get inadvertently drawn into disclosing legal advice, but I hear the point from the noble Lord that he and others would like to see a greater fleshing out of the Government’s legal position. I have said that I will see what I can do to assist in that.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Portrait Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
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Very diffidently, am I entirely wrong in thinking that, under Article 35 of the convention, some heed is required to be paid to the UNHCR’s expression of its approach to the convention? My recollection is that Lord Bingham said as much in one of the cases I mentioned last week, Asfaw. Is that not right?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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Respectfully, what I said earlier is that it is not the arbiter of the interpretation of the convention. I do not think that is inconsistent with the point the noble and learned Lord just made.

I was proposing to sit down, after suggesting to the Committee that we should keep these various clauses in the Bill.

Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser (Lab)
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Before the noble Lord sits down, I was wondering whether he would explain some of the changes that are being made or cover them in a subsequent letter. As I understand it, Clause 33 replaces Regulation 4 in the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006, which is repealed by Clause 29. The wording is largely the same but, as I understand it—and I may be wrong—the existing regulations reference

“protection from persecution or serious harm”,

whereas Clause 33 references only “protection from persecution”. Why has that change to the language been made and what will its practical effects be?

There are changes of language in other areas, such as from a “may” to a “must” in Clause 34. What problem is that intended to solve? Is it not the Government’s intention to explain the reasons for the changes they have made where they have made them?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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The “may” and “must” point, to which the noble Lord referred, will come up in a later group because, from memory, there is a specific amendment on it. I was proposing to deal with that when I respond to that amendment. I think we are going to come to the persecution and serious harm point later but, if I am wrong, I will write to the noble Lord and explain it. However, we are coming to “may” and “must” on a later group.

--- Later in debate ---
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I am not sure whether it is the time of the evening that prompted that reference to dinner; otherwise, it is not immediately apparent to me what the relevance of it was. I will come back to that rather less substantive point—if I may say so, respectfully—at the end.

Let me deal first with Clause 31. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. He is right that there are points of principle that underlie these amendments; they underlay the last group as well. I too will try not to repeat the points that I have made. There are points of principle that are at issue between us, and we have set out our respective positions. We believe that the test set out in Clause 31 is compliant with our international obligations. More specifically, we believe that it will provide, and lead to, better decision-making, because it sets out a clear test, with steps for decision-makers, including the courts, to follow. That will lead to greater consistency.

Turning to Amendments 103 and 104, although I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and I agree with the importance of us carefully assessing whether asylum seekers have a well-founded fear of persecution, as required under Article 1(A)(2) of the convention, we do not agree with these amendments because, taken together, they will essentially maintain the current standard of proof system. In so far as my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering said that it was, to a certain extent, a probing amendment, let me try to explain.

First, this is not about setting aside decisions of the court. The courts are there to interpret the legislation as it stands—that is what they do. Parliament is entitled to change the legislative background, in so far as it is consistent with our treaty obligations. Clause 31 sets out a clear, step-by-step process. I hear the point made by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, that it should be—so far as legislation can be—in simple language and a clear test. The problem at the moment is that there is no clearly outlined test as such. There is case law, there is policy and there is guidance in this area, but the current approach leads to a number of different elements being considered as part of one overall decision. What we seek to do here is to introduce distinct stages that a decision-maker must go through, with clearly articulated standards of proof for each. We believe that this will lead to better and more consistent decision-making.

At its core, in Clause 31(2) we are asking claimants to establish that they are who they say they are and that they fear what they say they fear to a balance of probabilities standard. That is the ordinary civil standard of proof for establishing facts, and those are facts in Clause 31(2); namely, more likely than not. It is reasonable, I suggest, that claimants who are asking the UK for protection are able to answer those questions. We have looked carefully, of course, at the often difficult situations that claimants might come from and the impact that might have on the kinds of evidence that they can provide. However, we consider that our overall approach to making decisions, which includes a detailed and sensitive approach to interviewing, allows all genuine claimants an opportunity to explain their story and satisfy the test.

There is international precedent that supports our decision to raise the threshold for assessing the facts that a claimant presents to us to the balance of probabilities standard. Both Canada and Switzerland—highly respected democratic countries, dare I say it—have systems which examine at least some elements of a claimant’s claim to this higher standard. Respectfully and rhetorically, let me ask this of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said that this was confusing and complex. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, said that she had horror at it. The higher standard is used in Switzerland. Does the horror extend to Canada and Switzerland as well? There is nothing wrong in principle with adopting the higher test for some parts—I will come to it in more detail—of the decision-making tree.

Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD)
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Does the Minister recall that I did not just say that it is about the higher standard? It is about having different limbs and different requirements under those different limbs, and switching from “reasonable likelihood” to “balance of probabilities” as part of the composite test, which is not holistic but is in different parts. That is what is confusing, not just a change in the standard of proof.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, with the greatest respect, it is not confusing at all, because Clause 31(2) establishes the facts, and that is all a balance of probabilities. Then, in Clause 31(4), the decision-maker turns to questions of the future. It is at that stage that the reasonable likelihood test is the appropriate test, because the decision-maker is looking to assess what might happen in the future. That is why we have a lower test at that stage. It is quite usual in law to have different stages of a test and different levels of probability at each.

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Portrait Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
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Could the Minister answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser? What is the problem that we are trying to solve here? Who is pressing for this change? The Law Societies have advised against it. It seems to me that the only purpose it serves is to make the task of determining whether the fear exists and is well-founded more complicated and more likely to result in the answer, “No, let’s send him back.” That seems to be what is driving this. I remind him that, in late July and early August, Hazaras from Afghanistan—asylum seekers here—were still receiving letters of rejection, telling them that they were not at risk if they were sent back to Kabul.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful for the question. What is driving it, as I said a few moments ago, is the attempt to have a consistent and clear approach to decision-making. When you have a single test with different elements, and it is all under “a reasonable likelihood”, it is then that you are more likely to have inconsistent decision-making—I will not use the word “mishmash”. What you are doing here is really two things, and Clause 31 sets them out clearly. You are first saying, “Are you who you say you are?” and “Did you, in fact, fear such persecution?” Those are factual questions, decided on the balance of probabilities. Then the question is: “Is there a reasonable likelihood that, if you were returned, you would be persecuted?” That is a question of reasonable likelihood.

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Portrait Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
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My noble friend is, in fact, rewriting the law. I am not an immigration lawyer, but if I were, I think I would be a little confused at the moment. In the case that was decided in 2021, Kaderli v Chief Public Prosecutors Office of Gebze in Turkey, it was clearly said that

“The true test involved the application of a lower standard”


than the balance of probabilities. So now no immigration lawyer could plead the application of the lower standard because my noble friend is raising the bar in this Bill.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I thought I made it absolutely clear when I said earlier that the court in that case made its decision against the legislative background at the time. Parliament is entitled to change the legislative background. We will want to make sure that we remain consistent with the refugee convention, and, as I said earlier, we believe that we are. There is nothing wrong with doing that. It is simply not the case that we are somehow bound as a Parliament by what the Court of Appeal said in the case referred to by my noble friend. Therefore, with great respect, I disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, where he said that a single holistic question was better and that the higher standard was objectionable. With respect, I disagree on both points.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Portrait Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
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Does the Minister agree that, if, under this clause in future, somebody were to fail—they could prove only 45% of the relevant limb of the clause—they nevertheless could not be refouled? Certainly, under Article 3 of the ECHR the test is “reasonable likelihood” and not “balance of probabilities”.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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With respect, refoulement is a separate issue and, with greater respect, I will deal with it separately. What we are establishing here is what you need to do to establish your “well-founded fear”. If you cannot establish, on the balance of probabilities, that you are who you say you are, then yes, under this test, you will not satisfy Clause 31(2)(a).

I will now turn to Clause 32, because otherwise I will start to repeat myself. Article 1(A)(2) of the refugee convention states that a refugee is an individual who has a

“well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”,

and Clause 32 lays out precisely what is meant by each of those characteristics, which are sometimes called “convention reasons”. Again, the purpose here is to make sure that all decision-makers, including both the Home Office and the courts, understand and operate to the same definitions. That is, I suggest, a desirable law reform.

On Amendment 105, there is a mismatch between how the concept of a “particular social group” is defined in current legislation, government policy and some tribunal judgments, and also in how the definition has been interpreted by some courts. There is no authoritative or universally agreed definition of “particular social group” among state parties to the convention and, in particular, there is no universal agreement as to whether the test set out in Article 1(A)(2) of the refugee convention should be applied cumulatively. The UNHCR has issued guidance supporting the view that the cumulative approach is a misapplication of the refugee convention, but, as I said in the last group, that guidance is neither legally binding nor determinative as a matter of international law.

Article 1(A)(2) of the convention does not elaborate on what is meant by

“membership of a particular social group”;

there is no supranational body with authority to give a determinative ruling and, therefore, each state party, including the UK, has to interpret it. We believe that the definition in Clause 32 captures what is meant in the convention by a “particular social group”. We have looked at the broad wording in the convention, the travaux préparatoires—excuse my French—the approach of a number of other jurisdictions, and Article 31 of the Vienna convention, and we believe that setting it out in this way will make it clearer.

The amendment would mean that you would have to satisfy only one of the conditions to be considered a member of a “particular social group”, and that would erode the concept that people deserve and need protection based on fundamental characteristics that go to the core of who they are, such as their faith or sexuality. It would broaden the definition to cover potentially transient factors that could perhaps be changed, such as an individual’s occupation. That is the first point. The second is that our proposed definition accords with the widely used and accepted interpretation of the “particular social group” concept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, noted. It is an EU interpretation; it comes from the approach in the EU qualification directive, which underpins the Common European Asylum System. We are very happy to look at EU interpretations; we do not have a closed mind—when they get it right, they get it right, and being independent means that we can look more broadly. However, with great respect, it is difficult to attack this as something utterly wrong if, in fact, this is the interpretation in that legislation.

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Portrait Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
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I am not a lawyer, so I rise with some trepidation, but it seems to me that it suits the Government’s purpose to interpret it in this way, because it means that fewer vulnerable groups—particularly women—fleeing violence will receive refugee protection as a result. It is no clearer than the interpretation that it is overruling, and it seems odd. It is quite rare for the Government to pray in aid an EU interpretation over that of their own courts. Maybe one of the lawyers opposite will be able to give a better response than I can, but I am afraid I am not convinced, because it seems as though that is why this is being done—it is nothing to do with clarity. If this legislation had clearly put in law Lord Bingham’s interpretation, that would be clear. So why the EU interpretation, which is, as numbers of authorities have said, likely to mean fewer vulnerable people—particularly women—receiving the refugee protection to which they are entitled under the convention?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I set out why we think this interpretation is correct. I am certainly not saying that we are using this interpretation because it is the EU one; I was referring to the EU to make the point that, with respect, it is very difficult to challenge this as somehow an unfair, unworkable or inapt interpretation when it is actually reflected in the EU jurisprudence. I absolutely take, with respect, the noble Baroness’s comments about the importance of the equality impact assessment for the policies being taken forward through the Bill. The public sector equality duty is not a one-off duty; it is ongoing, and I want to provide reassurance now that we will be monitoring equality impacts as we put the Bill into operation and as we evaluate its measures and, indeed, those in the wider new plan for immigration.

I assure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester that we are well aware of the particular issues facing women and survivors of gender-based persecution and, indeed, the asylum system is sensitive to them. The interview guidance contains clear instructions to interviewers in this area. We seek to offer a safe and supportive environment for individuals to establish their claims. Despite references to the decision of this House in its judicial capacity, in Fornah, those comments were obiter. I underline that there is no authoritative definition in case law of what is a “particular social group”, and that is why it is absolutely right for this Parliament to define it in this clause.

Clause 37 amends the definition of a “particularly serious crime” from one which is punished by imprisonment of two years or more to one which is punished by imprisonment of 12 months or more. To be clear, imprisonment means an immediate custodial sentence—I am not sure that any noble Lord made that point, but it is important. Indeed, it is why I brought the handbook: if you receive a suspended sentence, you are not caught by its provisions—going back to the underlying legislation. Furthermore, not only does it have to be an immediate custodial sentence of 12 months or more but the second limb has to apply—namely, whether the individual is a danger to the community—and that is rebuttable.

We cannot accept Amendment 111 because it would potentially allow dangerous foreign national offenders to remain here, putting the public at risk. If somebody has been sentenced to a year or more in prison, we should not enable them to second guess the verdict of the jury or the decision of the court by allowing them to bring into play again whether they were such an offender. We seek to allow only the second bit of it to be rebuttable; namely, whether they pose the relevant danger.

I think I have answered all the questions that have been asked. On the last point put by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, at the heart of this lies not some dinner party conversation but a lack of clarity in the current case law and standards, which make it harder for decision-makers to make accurate and efficient decisions; that is it.

Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That may be the case, but all I asked of the Minister was to tell the Committee who has been making representations for these changes.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I have not been here as long as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, but, with respect, I do not think it fair to ask me that question as I stand here. The Government receive representations on this issue all the time. One might say that we receive representations from millions and millions of people who voted for this Government at the last election when immigration reform was full square in our manifesto. I say with great respect to noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that we are having a very interesting debate on some important legal points. If he wants to make political points, I am happy to respond in a political context.

Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser (Lab)
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Since when has it been making a political point to ask where the pressure has come from to make these changes? Since when has that been a political point?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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The pressure has come from the people of the United Kingdom, who elected this Government with an overwhelming majority.

Lord Berkeley of Knighton Portrait Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)
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In that case, will the Minister accept that, in a way, and given what we have heard from other noble Lords, particularly my noble and learned friend Lord Brown, it is part of the Government’s strategy to toughen up on migration and immigration? That is really what this is about.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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Absolutely, we want to toughen up on illegal migration. We want to make sure that people who have a right to come in are able to do so, and to make sure that people who do not have that right cannot come in. We want consistent and better decision-making. It is really as simple as that.

Baroness Chakrabarti Portrait Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
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I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. In a previous group, the noble Baroness the Minister—I was very grateful to her—sought to make distinctions between immigration and asylum protection; I think that was quite important. To be now almost resiling from that and suggesting, in answer to a previous intervention, that we are going to reinterpret the refugee convention—to respond to the millions of people who voted for Mr Johnson’s Government on the basis of controlling immigration—is a little troubling. I do not think I am alone in the Committee in being so troubled.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I am surprised that anyone in a democracy is troubled by a Government listening to the people and putting forward legislation which, first, delivers on a manifesto commitment, and, secondly—as I have said and I repeat —is entirely consistent with our international law obligations. There is nothing wrong and everything right with each signatory to the refugee convention interpreting its obligations under it; we have now been around that point on several occasions.

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Portrait Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am sorry to keep bobbing up, and I appreciate what the Minister said about monitoring the equality impact of this legislation, but does he accept that Clause 32 means that a woman fleeing gender-based violence with good grounds for being accepted as a refugee is less likely to be so accepted? I do not believe that that is what the British people voted for.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I am not trying to be difficult here. What it means is that a woman, like anybody else, who has a proper claim under the refugee convention will find refuge in the UK. That is what we are seeking to do. By having a clearer set of definitions, we are trying to make sure that it will not depend on the happenstance of who the decision-maker is and the way the test is applied.

Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I do not wish to prolong the Minister’s agony but can he clarify something for me? I think he said that, in the face of court judgments, the Government were entitled to change the legislative background. Does changing the legislative background mean that the Government are raising the standard of proof, thereby making it more difficult for claims for asylum to be accepted—this is in Clause 31—and in so doing, overturning the judgments of the UK’s highest courts? That is the first question.

The second question relates to Clause 37. The Minister says that “particularly serious crime” is not defined in the refugee convention and that it is up to each country to define what it means. My understanding is that the definition is being changed from two years’ imprisonment to 12 months. So, particularly serious crime was defined by this country as entailing two years’ imprisonment and now the Government are changing it to 12 months. That is not about seeking to define or a lack of clarity but a deliberate change. Why is that?

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Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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On the first point, the position at the moment is that you have a reasonable likelihood test; what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, called the holistic test. What is going on here—and what should be going on—is that we have sought to identify a number of discrete questions and we have applied the appropriate standard of proof to each of them. On the second point, the noble Lord is absolutely right in that a serious crime was defined as one that meant 24 months’ imprisonment and we are now defining it as 12 months. We believe that that is appropriate and remains consistent with our refugee convention obligations.

I am not sure whether I should formally have said that I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Dubs Portrait Lord Dubs (Lab)
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I thought we were going to have more Q&A. I am grateful to the Minister for his fairly clear explanation of why the Government are doing what they are doing. I am not totally satisfied that we have heard the full reason. Over the years, we have not had any arguments put to us that the 1951 convention was not working; the arguments have been elsewhere. Suddenly, we are given these different considerations for why we should pass this. However, we will be back on Report, having listened to what the Minister has said. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I begin with Amendment 107, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, whose analysis I listened to very carefully. It seeks to reflect the position in the Adimi case by defining the requirement to “come direct” to include having passed through intermediate countries on the refugee’s way to the UK. I assure the noble and learned Lord that this is something we have carefully considered. Where, for example, a person has taken a connecting flight to the UK, due regard will be paid to the individual’s circumstances in determining whether they came direct. The powers in the Bill enable us to exercise that flexibility, which will be reflected in guidance provided to the caseworkers and decision-makers.

It follows that if a refugee cites a particular protected characteristic as a reason for being unable to comply with the standards set out in the Bill, including to come direct, that will be carefully considered by caseworkers in determining the entitlements attached to their leave. As I said on earlier groups, we will be sensitive to those cases. Flexible powers in the Bill allow it, and that will be set out in guidance in any event.

I will come back to Amendment 106 in a moment, but Amendment 108 links closely with Amendment 107 and seeks to ensure that determination of both “reasonably expected” and “reasonably practicable”, which are relevant standards in determining “come direct” and “without delay” respectively, are interpreted with due regard to protected characteristics. Essentially, this point is answered by the point that I have just made: the Bill has flexibility built into it to take individual circumstances into account. A person may be deemed to have come direct if they could not have been reasonably expected to claim asylum in a first safe country. Similarly, they will be deemed to have claimed asylum without delay if it occurred as soon as was “reasonably practicable”. Therefore, if a refugee cites a particular protected characteristic as a reason for being unable to comply with the standards in the Bill, that will be considered by the caseworker. The Bill is perfectly flexible enough to enable us to do so.

Turning to Amendments 106, 109 and 110, we again tread over the ground of interpreting obligations under the convention. I recognise the importance of taking a sensitive approach to how “come direct” is interpreted and I have already talked about the example of a connecting flight. However, I cannot accept that the definition should be amended as proposed, to enable a refugee to have been in another country “for a substantial period” and still be determined to have come directly. Those in need of protection must claim in the first safe country that they reach, because that is the fastest route to safety. That is an internationally recognised concept. It underpins, for example, the Common European Asylum System, and there are safeguards in the current provision in Clause 36(1). Even if a person stopped in another country outside the UK, they could still say that they came direct to the UK if they can show that they could not reasonably have been expected to seek protection under the refugee convention—for example, because they were under the control of traffickers—although every case would have to be considered on its own merits. Therefore, with respect, and without opening up the wider issue, there are some good underlying points in what we heard from my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts.

Amendment 109 requires a little unpacking. I should be clear that differentiation does not constitute a penalty for the purposes of Article 31. However, I disagree with the analysis that protection under Article 31 of the convention should extend to those who have tried to exit the UK without first seeking asylum, because we must interpret the “first safe country” principle consistently. Therefore, the defence under Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 should no longer be available to those who transit out of the UK.

Finally, turning to Clause 36, the refugee convention is clear that refugees should be protected from penalties for their illegal entry or illegal presence when they have come directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened, they presented themselves without delay to the authorities, and they showed good cause for their illegal entry or presence. This will now be familiar ground. However, the refugee convention does not define what is meant by the terms

“coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened”

or

“present themselves without delay to the authorities”.

This clause sets out how these phrases should be interpreted in the UK. This is the same point that I made in the previous two groups.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, asked me whether we were overturning the judgments in Adimi and Asfaw and, if so, why? I hope I have that question down fairly. With the greatest respect, the courts in Adimi and Asfaw interpreted “come directly” in Article 31(1) more generously than the original intention of Parliament. The Explanatory Note to Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 says:

“This defence, which is modelled on Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention, does not apply if the refugee stopped in a third country outside the United Kingdom unless he can show that he could not reasonably have been expected to be given protection under the Convention in that country.”


What we are doing here is consistent with the refugee convention. There is sufficient flexibility in the proposed powers and the overall policy to enable an individual to demonstrate that during the stopover they could not reasonably have been expected to seek protection under the refugee convention or, where appropriate, to show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.

Turning finally to the point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who said that someone arriving by aeroplane would be arriving illegally, some joys await us in group 8, when we will come to this point. As a taster before the short dinner break, I point out that there is a statutory defence recourse under Section 31 of the 1999 Act if they are genuine refugees and used fraud or deception to get a forged or false entry clearance. We will no doubt come back to this in more detail in group 8.

Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick (LD)
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If every country interpreted Article 31 as the Government want it interpreted by means of the Bill, what would be the consequences for dealing with the refugee crisis that the world faces?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I really do not mean to be flippant. The consequence would be that every country would be interpreting the refugee convention in accordance with its terms. As a country, we are interpreting our legal obligations in the way that we ought to and are allowed to. We are going back—

Lord Sentamu Portrait Lord Sentamu (CB)
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The Joint Committee on Human Rights recommended that this be amended. There must be good reasons for explaining why the Government do not want it amended and I have not heard them.

This is a true story; I can meet the Minister in camera and show him the evidence. A young man aged 17, whom we found in Kenya—

Lord Sentamu Portrait Lord Sentamu (CB)
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I am giving an example of why Article 31, without the amendment, does not work.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I am almost as new, I think, as the noble and right reverend Lord, but my understanding of procedure is that that is meant to be for questions. If the noble and right reverend Lord will write to me or meet me to discuss that particular case, I will certainly discuss it with him. If the case raises a point of principle, I will deal with it. If it raises a point of principle that I think will be helpful for the Committee to hear, I will write to him and provide a copy of the letter. I hope that is helpful for this evening.

Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick (LD)
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My Lords, may I just say that this is Committee? This is not Report. Any noble Lord is entitled to speak after the Minister in Committee.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I really do not want to get into a procedural battle. I was trying to be both helpful to the Committee, given the time and pressure, and respectful, I hope, to the noble and right reverend Lord. I reiterate the offer, which I think is appropriate.

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Portrait Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
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Could the Minister answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick? It was rather a flippant answer that he gave—that everybody would be interpreting the convention according to their rights. I think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, meant: what would be the practical effect? What would happen to the 26 million refugees in the world, three-quarters of whom are in countries contiguous to the one in which they had their citizenship? Would all countries agree, if they introduced this “first safe country” rule, that all refugees had to stay in these contiguous countries—in these encampments in Jordan, Syria, Turkey and so on—and that nobody could move on, under the refugee convention, to another country?

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Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I am certainly not trying to be flippant. What I am saying is that we have a refugee convention that sets out our international obligations. We are abiding by those international obligations. It may—I underline “may”—be that a convention entered into in 1951 is not absolutely suitable for the world of 2022. That might be the answer. At the moment, however, my focus as a Justice Minister is on making sure that this country abides by its international obligations, and that is what we are doing. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD)
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My answer to that last point is that if that is what the UK Government feel, they should convene a conference to renegotiate the refugee convention, but they are not doing that. A large number of noble Lords in this Committee believe that the Government are riding roughshod over the refugee convention in a way that demeans this country and sets an extremely poor example, not least to those countries on the front line, which are taking the overwhelming majority of people seeking protection. We have bandied around the statistics in the last few days in Committee, but we are not in the top category of countries in terms of the numbers, which are manageable. They would be particularly manageable if the Home Office got its act together in the way it decides asylum cases initially—if it invested in the initial consideration of the claims and did not make the law ever more complex, with ever more delays and ever more prospects of litigation. It seems we are banging our heads against a brick wall somewhat, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Nationality and Borders Bill Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Scotland Office

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts
We support all the amendments in this group, but we hope that they will not be necessary because we hope that Clauses 57 and 58 will no longer be part of the Bill by the end of Report in this House. I was wondering why the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, the Home Office Minister, was not in her place today to deal with these issues. I would like to think that it is because she could not face standing up and supporting these parts of the Bill.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
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My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I have listened to all of them with care. With respect to everyone else, I say that I always listen with care to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, in particular, as I think he will appreciate from our exchanges on other matters. I got the impression that voices in support of the Government were a little thin on the ground on this matter, but I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford is not doing these amendments not out of any personal reluctance; it was decided some weeks ago that my assistance on the Bill would include this group, and that is why I am doing it. It is fair to say that she has gone above and beyond on the Bill and others.

Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick (LD)
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My Lords, just on that point, I was clearly not suggesting that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, did not deserve a break from her duties; she has been committed to this throughout. I said that I hoped that these parts of the Bill might be the reason, but I was obviously implying that they clearly were not.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I think it might be best if we just moved on from that because, respectfully, I am not sure that it was a particularly good comment in the first place.

The measures in the Bill build on the landmark—it really was landmark—legislation brought in by the future Prime Minister, Theresa May, in 2015. On this occasion, I am very happy to acknowledge that it was brought in by the coalition Government; it was a joint effort. Notwithstanding that I am not a Home Office Minister, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, reminded me on a number of occasions, I can say that the Home Secretary is committed to bringing forward further legislation in the area of modern slavery as a priority, to ensure an efficient and resilient system in tackling modern slavery. That department, which is obviously not mine, will look to introduce those measures when parliamentary time allows.

Lord Alton of Liverpool Portrait Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
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In that case, why do we not wait for that legislation and do it comprehensively, rather than put into law things to which there is so much opposition? Does the Minister also accept that, in 2015, a number of really positive changes were made to that Act in your Lordships’ House because the Government chose to listen?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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There were two questions there. Why now? I was going to come to that, because that is a point that the noble Lord made earlier. As to listening to your Lordships’ House, the Government always listen to what goes on in this House. They always listen but they may not always agree.

The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, I think with some sympathy, referred to me as the “poor Minister” responsible for responding. I am poor in the sense that you do not take this job for the money, I can say that. I also cannot promise the meeting with the Home Secretary. What I can promise is that I will pass on what the noble Baroness said to the relevant people in the home department.

We have heard a number of arguments for removing Clauses 57 and 58 from the Bill. I will deal with those first, because I think that is really the head-on charge that has been put to me. I suggest that these clauses are important provisions to encourage disclosure of information at the earliest stage so we can identify victims and provide them with direct support as early as possible. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, moving the amendment, asked why the provisions were necessary and quoted the former Prime Minister asking why artificial deadlines were required. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol suggested that the clauses would stop people coming forward. Far from deterring victims, these clauses are intended to encourage genuine victims to come forward and get protection and support on the earliest possible occasion.

Baroness Butler-Sloss Portrait Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
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I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but how does he see what he is saying as compatible with the statutory guidance issued only this month?

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Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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Of course we have considered the statutory guidance, not least because it comes from the Home Department and was issued this month. With great respect, we do think they are compatible. We do not see any contradiction between the aims of the statutory guidance under the 2015 Act and what we are proposing here. As to who will be served with a notice, individuals who will be served with a slavery and trafficking information notice are those who have previously made a human rights or protection claim in respect of removal or refusal of entry. They are therefore potentially subject to removal action.

The noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Alton, asked: why are we doing this? I think that was then refined to: why are we doing this now? That is pretty simple to state. As I have said, we want to identify genuine victims of modern slavery or trafficking within this group as quickly as possible so that they receive both protection from removal and access to the support given during the recovery period.

This may not be the best form of providing statistics, but the number of those detained in the UK following immigration offences in 2020 was obviously affected by the pandemic. However, even prior to this there was a clear rise in the number of referrals to the national referral mechanism, from 3%—501—in 2017 to 16%—1,767—in 2019. In 2019, only a small proportion, about 1%, of individuals detained in the UK following an immigration offence who made a national referral mechanism referral were returned. We published a report last year providing data on some of the concerns we are seeking to address through the Bill and outlining pressures in the system and where referrals of modern slavery are coming from. The reports are available on the government website but, to make it simpler, I will write to the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Alton, with a copy available, with the URL so they can find the relevant material.

I suggest it is right that we reduce the opportunities to misuse the system for immigration purposes and improve the efficiency of the processes, targeting resources where they are most needed to help victims recover from exploitation and rebuild their lives. We want to address concerns that some referrals are being made intentionally late in the process, to frustrate immigration action and divert resources away from legitimate claimants. It is not right that foreign criminals subject to deportation and those who have absolutely no right to remain in the UK can seek to delay their removal by waiting until the very last minute before raising new claims or putting in endless evidence or information relating to their status in the UK. So what Clauses 57 and 58 seek to do is on the one hand ensure that vulnerable victims receive appropriate and timely support, and on the other hand enable investigative and enforcement activities to take place with reasonable dispatch.

I should point out—this did not feature too much in the debate—that Clauses 57 and 58 are underpinned by access to legal advice, under Clauses 65 and 66, to help individuals understand whether they are a potential victim of modern slavery or human trafficking, and to support a referral into the national referral mechanism if that is the case. As I have said before, a constant theme, particularly in modern slavery measures within the Bill, is that decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, taking a needs-based approach. Therefore, turning to Amendments 151D, 152 and 155, it would be wrong in principle to create a carve-out for any one group of individuals, and to create a two-tiered system based either on age or the type of exploitation claimed. I am sure that this is not the intention of those moving the amendments, but, in the real world, which at some point we must think about, it could incentivise individuals to provide falsified information regarding their age or to put forward falsified referrals regarding timings or type of exploitation to delay removal action.

It was interesting, in the course of what was, with respect, a very forceful speech supporting his amendment, that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to 12 or 13 year-olds and not, for example, to a 17 and a half year-old. When it comes to children, if we define children as all under-18s, the approach that we want to take is to ensure that decision-makers have the flexibility to approach the claims of all children of different ages and maturities appropriately, and therefore I suggest that a blanket approach is inappropriate.

By introducing a statutory requirement to provide information before a specified date—we are not talking about neat files here—we hope to identify those victims at the earliest opportunity. Clauses 57 and 58 have safeguards built in, and I assure in particular the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that, when considering the “reasonable grounds” decision, the decision-makers in the SCA are already well experienced in taking into account the specific vulnerabilities of children. I also point out to the Committee something that the noble and learned Baroness will know but other noble Lords may have forgotten: namely, that at the “reasonable grounds” stage the threshold is lower for children due to there being no requirement to show means of exploitation. That position will not change.

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Portrait Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
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I have been biting my tongue, but the Minister talked about the real world, and I do not think that this Government have any concept of what exists in the real world. The Minister has heard examples from the real world, given by noble Lords who understand what is going on. It is not appropriate for the Minister to talk about the real world when he is denying the stories that he has heard today.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I am not denying any stories. I set out statistics earlier on which were absolutely from the real world, and that is the issue that we are dealing with.

Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I apologise for interrupting, but the Minister has cited the statistics that he quoted earlier in answer to the question of why the Government were doing this. He talked about the number of referrals going from 3% to 16%. There could be three explanations for that increase: a rise in modern slavery; more cases being reported, even if modern slavery is not going up; or an increase in misuse. Bearing in mind that the majority of referrals to the national referral mechanism are made by the Home Office, and bearing in mind what he said about very few of the people who are referred being returned— I did not quite get the percentage—it sounds like the majority of those cases are not misuse. What we need are not the statistics that the Minister is relying on but the statistics on how many cases of misuse there are.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I have already said that I will write. I will copy everybody in, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, with the relevant data. We can have an interesting discussion about potential explanations for it, but what it shows is that there is a significant increase. The question I was seeking to meet was: why do something now, why not wait until a future Bill? The short answer is that we have a manifesto commitment to deal with immigration and asylum issues. It is right that we address all issues at this stage, but, as I have underlined, this is not the Government’s last word on modern slavery. Now I really want to make some progress or we will be here until 3 am again.

Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Does the noble Lord not accept that 24% of modern slavery cases are UK nationals and have nothing to do with what the Conservative Party put in its manifesto?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I am certainly willing to accept that a significant number of modern slavery victims are UK nationals. I do not know whether it is 24%, off the top of my head, but I am willing to have a look at that and come back to the noble Lord. I want to make some progress now, because I think we are going round the same points again and again.

Coming back to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, all child potential victims of modern slavery in England and Wales will be provided with an independent child trafficking guardian to support them in navigating the immigration and national referral mechanism systems. Decision-makers are obviously trained in making those decisions, and the particular needs of children are an important part of that. In fact, I hope what I have just said responds also to some of the points made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol.

Moving to Amendment 153, as the noble Lords, Lord Cashman and Lord Paddick, also recognised, we understand that there will be cases where individuals are unable to comply with a deadline. There might be objective reasons, such as being under coercive control of an exploiter, or subjective ones, such as trauma, mental health issues or mental capacity, which can affect somebody’s ability to recall events. The clauses as drafted provide for this. As I have said on previous groups, we will set out in guidance the details of this approach, giving decision-makers the tools to recognise the effects of exploitation and trauma.

Where a person has raised evidence late, I suggest that it is right that decision-makers consider whether there is any merit in the reasons for that lateness. Credibility is not necessarily determinative of the case, should other factors indicate that the individual is a victim or potential victim of modern slavery. Amendment 154 asks what will be defined as a “good reason” for late disclosure. That has deliberately not been defined in the Bill, as setting out a list reduces flexibility. Decision-makers will be able to consider all relevant factors, which may include everything set out in the list in this amendment.

Clause 58 is underpinned by the provision of legal aid, as I have said. Amendment 172A would provide non-means-tested legal advice on all immigration matters to individuals who might not be victims of modern slavery. This amendment is a wide expansion of the legal aid scheme which is entirely uncosted and ignores the Government’s responsibility to use taxpayer funding wisely, in a way that obtains value for money. Such a wholesale expansion of the legal aid scheme would allow anyone claiming that they are a victim of modern slavery, but who might not be, to receive immigration advice with no financial eligibility checks in place. Legal aid for immigration matters is already available for victims of modern slavery who have a positive decision from the national referral mechanism, and the Bill does not change this. This includes ongoing support from the mechanism if required by the victim. Of course, the exceptional case funding scheme is available on top of that.

The intention of Clauses 65 and 66 is to bring advice on the national referral mechanism into scope from the outset. This builds on what is already available by helping unidentified victims who are within the immigration system to enter the mechanism. Without Clause 66, we will miss the opportunity to identify potential victims when they are receiving legal aid on their removal case.

I have two further short points. I listened very carefully to my noble friend Lord Henley, a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Indeed, I appeared before that committee I think only last week. I have read the report carefully. It is on the Bench with me—it is a thumbed copy, not just a copy from the Royal Gallery. I hope I have set out the reasons for the Government’s approach, even if I apprehend that I may not have convinced him of their correctness.

Finally, I will ensure that the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, is passed on. My understanding—and I am newer here than she is—is that a decision on whether and when to repeat an Urgent Question taken in the Commons is for the usual channels. Even if I were a Home Office Minister, and I am not, I could not help on that further.

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Portrait Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am impressed by the Minister’s argument that the intention is benevolent, but how does he square that with the opening point of the powerful speech of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss: that the whole voluntary sector is convinced that this is damaging and unhelpful? As for his criticism that Amendment 154 would limit flexibility, could he reread the amendment and note that the opening line includes the phrase

“include, but are not limited to”

in respect of the list of reasons? In other words, it deliberately retains flexibility.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I hope the noble Lord will forgive me if I reply to his points in reverse order. On the second, of course I appreciate that it is a non-exhaustive list. The point I was making is that even a non-exhaustive list is more prescriptive, when it comes to court, than absolute discretion. When you are arguing a case, even if the statute says A, B, C, D, E on a non-exhaustive basis, you are in greater trouble coming along with F, than if the discretion is free-standing. That is the point I was seeking to make.

Of course, my colleagues in the Home Office engage carefully with the commissioner and other entities in the voluntary sector. Ultimately, it is for the Government to decide what legislation to bring before the House.

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Portrait Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
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My Lords, I want to deal with Urgent Questions again, because the Minister answered a different question from mine. I asked why it was advertised so late. He may not know this, but the Greens are excluded from the usual channels, so we would have no way of knowing.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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At this point, all I can do is pass that on, and I will.

Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick (LD)
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On Amendment 172A, I think the Minister said that victims of modern slavery already have access to legal advice, once the national referral mechanism has made an initial decision. If he looks at that amendment carefully, he will see it is entitled “pre-national referral mechanism advice”.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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The noble Lord is absolutely right, which is why I was making the point about it being a fundamental extension of the legal aid system, which is uncosted.

Lord Coaker Portrait Lord Coaker (Lab)
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My Lords, I thank everyone who has contributed to this incredibly important debate. It lasted just over an hour, so I will be brief to allow us to move on; otherwise, we could have a huge debate again in me responding to the Minister. I am sure many of the same points will, quite rightly, come up in the other groups. I hope noble Lords understand and accept that.

I will reiterate the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. It is interesting to note that, when a Government are in trouble, they defend themselves against everybody. You know when a Government are in difficulty because they resort to exactly the sort of defence—quite rightly; I have done it myself—that the Minister resorted to: “If only you understood the statistics and appreciated the difficulties”. That officialdom then rains on everything. When everybody else thinks you are wrong, you usually are. I gently suggest to the Government that they have got this wrong.

I am pleased the Minister was honest about this and I thank him for his response. It is clear the Government think the system is being abused and that people are claiming to be victims of modern slavery, either straightaway or late in the day. The Government are determined to shut down this loophole in the system. That is what is going on and it is why the danger that all of us raised about including modern slavery in an immigration Bill or the Nationality and Borders Bill—whatever you want to call it—sets a context that is difficult for modern slavery, to put it mildly.

All that I would say to the Minister is that even if the Government are right in saying that there is a problem here, by trying to deal with the issue as an immigration offence, which is essentially what they are doing, they are driving a coach and horses through the principles of the Modern Slavery Act. That is why people are so upset about it, so disappointed about it, so angry about it and so frustrated about it. They accept that the Government have to deal with immigration and that there are difficulties but this country has been proud of the way in which we deal with victims of modern slavery. Treating them, as they will be, as potential immigration offenders will change the dynamic. There are victims who we do not know and have no idea who they are. Children, whether they are 17 and a half or 13 are going to be impacted. As a consequence of what the Government are doing, innocent victims are going to be penalised in the name of tackling the problem of immigration. That is why people are so disappointed.

In conclusion, I say to the Minister that it must come to something when large numbers of the governing party as well as all the other parties that make up this House, including organisations of all faiths, are arraigned against this measure, along with all the voluntary sector, including the Government’s own voluntary organisation, the Salvation Army. I should have thought that that would have given the Government pause for thinking that maybe they have not got this quite right. Let us hope that between now and Report that they do so, otherwise I can foresee real problems on Report with respect to the clause and the other clauses in Part 5. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Nationality and Borders Bill Debate

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Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Portrait Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
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The Greens support the amendment too.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait The Paliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for proposing the new clause. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said that it was a short one; I respectfully agree, and hope that I can be brief in response without any discourtesy to the noble and learned Lord or, indeed, the other proposers of the clause. One point in his speech on which I think the whole House agreed was when he reminded us that, whatever the question, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will always be able to think of an answer.

Turning to the subject matter of the amendment and the proposed new clause, I first underline what was said by my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford as to the Government’s commitment to their international legal obligations flowing from the refugee convention. Not only is it our intention to continue to comply with all of the legal obligations under that convention but we consider that this legislation does precisely that.

Our starting point is that the provisions of the Bill are compliant with the refugee convention but, none the less, the new clause is not something that I can support. Let me set out why.

The refugee convention, as I have said before, and effectively by design, leaves certain terms and concepts open to a degree of interpretation. That is an important feature of international instruments such as the refugee convention, allowing it not only to stand the test of time—some might say that it could now usefully be reviewed, but that is a separate point—but, more importantly, to be applied in and across many jurisdictions with differing legal systems. Necessarily, therefore, there is then a need to ascribe meaning to the terms of the convention at a domestic level. That meaning is determined by each signatory to the refugee convention in accordance with the principles of the Vienna convention, taking a good faith interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the language used in the convention.

Against that background, I suggest that it is absolutely right that Parliament may pass legislation setting out how the UK interprets the refugee convention and the UK’s obligations under it. Having a clear framework of definitions, and setting out unambiguously the key principles, promotes clarity and consistency in how decisions are made; as I have said in previous debates, that is a desirable approach. The mischief that I see in this amendment is that it would risk undermining the clarity and certainty that we are trying to create by effectively giving the courts a chance to look behind the interpretation agreed by Parliament in primary legislation when that interpretation is then applied through policy and subsequent decisions.

On the one hand, we want to give the pen to Parliament, so to speak, to set out a clear understanding and interpretation of the convention; Part 2 of the Bill is very clear as to our intentions in this respect. However, I suggest that this amendment would afford the courts an opportunity to come to a different understanding when looking at the policies and practices which put that system into effect. Of course, I accept that it will be for the courts to interpret the legislation once enacted, and I do not disagree that the courts have a role in overseeing whether policies or decisions comply with the interpretation of the convention as set out in the Bill; that is a given. But it is Parliament’s interpretation that is key here. It is not for the court to set out its own, potentially conflicting interpretation of the refugee convention and the obligations under it.

Therefore, far from creating a certain and consistent approach, this promotes uncertainty with policies and decisions being potentially judged against differing interpretations. If we are content, as I suggest we should be, that Parliament is legislating in compliance with the approach open to all state parties under the Vienna convention—that is, affording a good faith interpretation to the refugee convention—then this clause is not only unnecessary but promotes confusion and uncertainty for all those seeking to apply to, and comply with, the asylum system.

It would also be unusual to put in primary legislation the statement that Parliament, when legislating, is complying with its international obligations. International conventions cover a wide area of legislation, and if we did so here it could create questions as to why we did not do so in other statutes and why other statutes do not provide the same assurances.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, as alerted by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993. That already sets out the primacy of the refugee convention in domestic law. I will repeat what it says:

“Nothing in the immigration rules (within the meaning of the 1971 Act) shall lay down any practice which would be contrary to the Convention.”


Accordingly, if the aim of this proposed new clause is that the policies implemented under Part 2 of this Bill through the rules or connected guidance are meant to be compatible, and not incompatible, with the refugee convention, as interpreted by Parliament in this Bill, that can already be challenged by way of Section 2 of the 1993 Act. Our policies and decision-making will continue to be made in accordance with the Immigration Rules or published guidance.

What, therefore, would this proposed new clause add? My concern is that it adds a means for the court to question the interpretation given by Parliament to the refugee convention. I suggest respectfully that this would be contrary to a fundamental purpose of this Bill: for Parliament to define the nature of our obligations under the refugee convention while remaining compliant with those obligations. The proposed new clause potentially leaves the nature of obligations and terms under the convention open to the interpretation of the courts, removing the certainty that we are trying to achieve.

To put it in two sentences, if the aim is to make sure that the Immigration Rules and guidance are compliant with the refugee convention, that is already done under the 1993 Act. If the aim is any more than that, I respectfully suggest that it trespasses on a fundamental purpose of this Bill: that Parliament, and not the courts, should interpret how the UK implements the refugee convention. For those reasons, I respectfully invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Portrait Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
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Before the noble Lord sits down, do I understand that it is the Minister’s intention that, if this Bill is passed in its present form, in future no court shall look behind its provisions and consider what, under the convention and with the advice of UNHCR, its proper application and interpretation are? Is that the Minister’s intention?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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In so far as the court has been told by Parliament that it can do that in the 1993 Act when it comes to the Immigration Rules, the court can do so. But, with the greatest respect, the courts interpret legislation; they are not there to go behind legislation with an autonomous meaning, so far as the courts are concerned, of what the refugee convention means. What the convention means is a matter for the member states, each interpreting it under the terms of the Vienna convention. With respect, it is not for the courts to second-guess Parliament’s interpretation of the UK’s obligations under the refugee convention.

Lord Judge Portrait Lord Judge (CB)
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My Lords, faced with the problems to which Part 2 gives rise, we end up, on the basis of the Minister’s response, with the situation in which the court will look at provisions that we say contravene the convention and say, “Ah, Parliament has said that this provision must apply. Although it contravenes the convention, it must still be applied.” The court must do so, notwithstanding that the intention of the Government was that the provision should be compliant.

We are going around in circles. We are back to “Oh, yes, it is” and “Oh, no, it isn’t”, and that is no way for us to be on a measure of such crucial importance to many people suffering from the consequences of persecution, war, famine and so many things that afflict other nations and with which fortunately we are not afflicted. The House really ought to decide this. I ask the House to decide and tell us what its decision is.

Nationality and Borders Bill Debate

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Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts
Lord Coaker Portrait Lord Coaker (Lab)
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My Lords, under Clause 18, where an asylum seeker provides late evidence, this should damage their credibility. Amendment 33 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington, would provide that a person’s credibility should also be damaged where that person fails to produce ID documents when they enter the UK or are intercepted at sea. We do not support the clause or believe it should be part of the Bill, so we do not support the addition to it. A person’s credibility should be based, as it always has been, on the full picture and the worth of the evidence that is submitted.

As we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, where people are fleeing the horrors of war and risk to life, they may not bring the right documentation, or it may have been lost or stolen along the route. As we can see from recent horrors around the world, I am not sure that it would be anybody’s first priority to go back to wherever they were to find any documentation they might have—it would be to get out of danger. However, under the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Green, they would be penalised: it would be a failure by the claimant to provide identifying documents. Such a carte blanche failure to produce identifying documents would mean that such people seeking asylum would automatically be excluded from doing so. I do not think that that would be something that the country or, indeed, this Chamber would want.

There are other issues I wish to raise that are more relevant to the next amendment; however, if this amendment is put to a vote, we will vote against it.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for raising the issue and of course I understand the concerns that lie behind it.

Clause 18 adds two new behaviours to the existing credibility provisions in Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. It introduces the principles that providing late evidence without good reason or not acting in good faith should be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. Where, conversely, there are good reasons for providing evidence late, that would not affect the claimant’s credibility.

The concept that certain conduct should be damaging to credibility is not new. Decision-makers must already consider the claimant’s conduct. It is then open to the Home Office or the courts to decide the extent to which credibility should subsequently be damaged. The focus of Clause 18 is, therefore, the Home Office and then the judicial decision-making process. It is intended to address the issue of late evidence raised in unfounded protection and human rights claims and put beyond doubt that behaviour designed to abuse the system will be taken into account. Clause 18, therefore, is intended to apply to those individuals who have made a protection or human rights claim and have been issued with an evidence notice as per Clause 17. It is not intended to apply, for example, to individuals immediately when intercepted in the territorial waters of the United Kingdom.

Against that background, I suggest that Amendment 33 is unnecessary. The destruction, alteration or disposal of a passport without reasonable explanation, or the failure to produce a passport on request to an immigration officer or to the Secretary of State—again, without reasonable explanation—are behaviours to which Section 8 already applies. The good faith requirement in the Bill is intended to address behaviours such as those mentioned in the amendment, as well as any other behaviours that a deciding authority thinks are not in good faith. Specific instances of a lack of good faith are necessarily caught by the broader provision that refers to good faith: the greater includes the lesser. Therefore, there is no need to single out the behaviours prescribed in this amendment.

As to the detail of the amendment, I say that verification of someone’s identity normally takes place on land. However, should a claimant be in possession of their passport or identity document and fail to provide this when requested by an immigration officer, Section 8 will apply, as I said. Moreover, where evidence is provided late following receipt of an evidence notice in a protection or human rights claim—again, without good reason—this should be taken into account as damaging the claimant’s credibility.

As this amendment refers to specific examples of behaviour designed to abuse the system, and that type of behaviour as a whole is already caught by the provisions of the Bill, I respectfully suggest that the amendment is necessarily unnecessary. For those reasons, I respectfully invite my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe to withdraw it.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe Portrait Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
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My Lords, I thank those who have spoken in this brief debate. The very real problems of refugees, noted by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, and of course the fact that some people do not have passports are very well understood by me. That is why my proposal is to add an extra factor that needs to be taken into account, not least to reduce the power and profiteering of the traffickers. As has been said, tribunals and officials can then take a fair view.

Having said that, I think that there seems to be a chink of light in some of the comments from my noble friend Lord Wolfson on how this would work. Perhaps we could discuss further before Third Reading what the Government’s approach will be, the associated regulations and so on. I am very conscious that we need time for many votes today, especially as the electronic system seems a bit slow, so for today I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Lord Coaker Portrait Lord Coaker (Lab)
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My Lords, I do not want to add much to what the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and my noble friend Lady Lister said in support of this important amendment. They outlined some of the problems well.

The amendment relates to Clause 25(2), which says:

“Unless there are good reasons why the evidence was provided late”.


It bedevils any Government that as soon as you state, “Unless there are good reasons”, the argument then becomes, “What do you mean by good reasons?” Then you produce a list and people complain that the list does not include everything. So you state that there will be guidance and then the Government do not produce guidance for people to look at to see whether it is worth it or needs to be improved. I appreciate what the noble Baroness and my noble friend said about engagement with the Minister, but these are real issues because people will be excluded from asylum claims on the basis of late provision of the evidence—and we do not know what the good reasons are that will prevent those claimants being excluded as a result of being classified as having given late evidence. It is not satisfactory.

At this stage, on Report, there is this question for the Minister. The list has been produced. The Minister will say, exactly as the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, said, that by having a list, you will miss people out. That is why the amendment is trying to insert “but not limited to”. This is quite an unsatisfactory situation. Can the Minister not say a little more about what the guidance will say? Can he not give us a little more, in consultation with the Home Office, about whether there could be a draft of some sort, even at this late stage, to give some indication of what the guidance will be on what “good reasons” actually means? I appreciate that this is an ask for the future but the amendment tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Coussins and Lady Lister, is extremely important and goes to the heart of the problem with Clause 25 —notwithstanding the fact that many of us do not agree with the clause anyway. In seeking to improve the parts of the legislation that we do not agree with, what “good reasons” means is absolutely fundamental to our understanding.

As I say, I support the amendment; I appreciate that it seems to be a probing amendment. However, these are important issues and the Minister will need to go further to deal with them, I think.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, for her engagement with me, as the House will have heard, on the amendment, which she has redrafted since Committee, for the reasons she set out in her speech. I am also grateful to the amendment’s co-sponsor, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett.

We have a proud history of providing international protection to those most in need. This is a responsibility that we take seriously, but we need a system that is efficient as well as effective. By introducing a statutory requirement to provide evidence before a specified date, the Bill redresses the current balance. It is right that decision-makers have regard to the principle that minimal weight is given to evidence that is late following the receipt of either an evidence notice or a priority removal notice without good reason. The House will appreciate that Clause 25 is therefore essential to the architecture of this part of the Bill. However, at the same time, it is important not to tip the balance too far. Decision-makers in the Home Office and the judiciary will maintain their discretion as to whether, having considered the principle and in the absence of good reasons for lateness, it is appropriate in all the circumstances of the particular case to apply minimal weight to late evidence, taking into account the claimant’s particular claim and any specific vulnerabilities.

I have been asked to define “good reasons”. This has not been defined in the Bill for, if I may say so, a good reason. We cannot legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for providing late information or evidence in relation to their protection claim. To do so would be impractical and would detract from the important principle that decision-makers are best placed to consider an individual’s particular vulnerabilities on a case-by-case basis. I say this because “good reasons” can include both objective factors, such as practical difficulties in obtaining evidence—for example, where the evidence was not previously available—and subjective factors, such as a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities relating to their age, sexual orientation, gender identity or mental and physical health. Decision-makers must be able to respond on a case-by-case basis.

I contrast that with Amendment 34, which would place an obligation on decision-makers not only in the Home Office but in the judiciary to accept that there were good reasons for late evidence in all asylum and human rights cases where either the claimant or the claim type fell into one of the listed categories. I suggest that this would undermine the principle that we want decision-makers and the judiciary to apply their discretion on a case-by-case basis. By setting out a non-exhaustive list—I appreciate that it includes the words “not limited to”—of potential experiences or categories of claimant, it is true that this amendment does not exclude those not listed in the amendment from having good reasons. However, in any non-exhaustive list, there is a risk of focusing attention on the factors in the list, thus putting other applicants with different issues at a relative disadvantage.

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Baroness Lister of Burtersett Portrait Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
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Just before the noble Lord sits down, can he say whether there will be any consultation on the guidance? Can someone write to me on that point?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I do not have the detail at my fingertips, but I can certainly undertake to write to the noble Baroness. I was just about to sit down after inviting the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, to withdraw the amendment for the reasons that I have set out.

Baroness Coussins Portrait Baroness Coussins (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply and all other noble Lords for their support on this amendment.

I was very happy to hear the Minister’s commitment, having discussed it with the Home Office, that there would be new guidance. Assuming that this new guidance on late evidence is genuinely expanded and strengthened, this has the potential to go a long way towards meeting my objectives. However, I underline the point just made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that it would be very helpful to be consulted on a draft before the two-month cut-off point when the new guidance would come into force. I would be very grateful if Home Office colleagues could take that on board. Although the noble Lord is an MoJ Minister, can he please keep on this as well, and ensure that the Home Office does not lose sight of this guidance in the greater scheme of things?

Assuming that this will be on track, it amounts to a satisfactory way of meeting my objectives and would give vulnerable and traumatised refugees some of the comfort that they deserve. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who propose these amendments: the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, speaking through the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I agree of course with the importance of the UK carefully assessing whether asylum seekers have a well-founded fear of persecution, as required under Article 1(A)(2) of the refugee convention. However, we do not agree with these amendments which, when taken together, will effectively maintain the current standard of proof for all elements of the well-founded fear test.

There are other undesirable implications of the amendments which I will set out briefly. The House has heard short speeches supporting a number of these amendments. I have obviously got to reply to all of them, so I hope that the House will indulge me. I will try to address them in a comprehensible order, because some of the points are related and some are discrete.

I come first to the point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, who asked how Clause 31 would produce clarity. Clause 31 is drafted to introduce a step-by-step process for decision-makers, considering whether an asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution. The central point I would make is that currently there is no such clearly structured test.

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Lord Etherton Portrait Lord Etherton (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have one more point of clarification. Could the Minister explain what the position will be for refugee asylum seekers who are under 16 and for whom any sexual relations would be a criminal offence?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I was coming to each of those points in my speech. I am not going to do so just yet, because I was, it is fair to say, on a different point, but I will come to those points in due course when I deal with the manuscript amendment.

Before the noble and learned Lord’s intervention, I was setting out the definition of “particular social group.” I was making the point that there is no universally agreed definition and no authoritative definition of that phrase. There is, as I have said, conflicting tribunal-level case law. For example, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham referred to the Fornah decision of this House in its former judicial capacity. The point there is that it is obiter. That is really important, because that bit is obiter: it is not part of the ratio of the decision. That really underlines my point that we cannot, with great respect, cherry-pick passages of decisions which are obiter, particularly decisions of the Upper Tribunal. Ultimately, it is for the UK, as a member state and signatory, and, for this Parliament—not the Home Office—to interpret the refugee convention. That is what we have sought to do here.

There are two clear conditions, and let me underline the following point: this is not a change in government policy. These conditions do not change the position—they reflect current government policy. The first condition is that members of the group share either an innate characteristic, a common background test that cannot be changed, or a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it.

The second condition is that the group has a distinct identity in the relevant country because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society. The amendment would mean that a group need meet only one of the characteristics to be considered a particular social group. Obviously, that would significantly widen the scope of people who could qualify as a refugee but, relevantly for this debate, it would erode the concept that people deserve and need protection based on fundamental characteristics that go to the core of who they are, such as their faith or sexuality. It would broaden the definition to cover potentially transient factors such as an individual’s occupation, and that, we say, is incompatible with very purpose of the refugee convention.

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Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Portrait Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
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Will the noble Lord give way?

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I am not sure that one generally takes questions on Report. I am newer than the noble Baroness, and I do not want to be rude; equally, I want to maintain the approach of the House.

Viscount Younger of Leckie Portrait Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
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My noble friend is correct on that. Noble Lords are guided not to speak after the Minister.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I want to respond to the concern expressed in Committee about the impact the clause would have on vulnerable groups—particularly, for example, female claimants fleeing gender-based violence—and to respond to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. Victims of gender-based violence may still be considered to be members of a particular social group for the purposes of making an asylum claim if they meet the conditions in Clause 32(3) and (4). In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, this clause does not therefore mean that women who are victims of gender-based violence are less likely to be accepted as a member of a particular social group: all cases are assessed on a case-by-case basis.

I cannot say, of course, that all women fleeing gender-based violence will always be found to be refugees, if that was the nature of the point that was being put to me. What I can say with certainty is that the structure of the definition does not preclude it. I think I heard, in the way the noble Baroness put the question, that the example was of a woman with “good grounds”. If she is asking, “Will this application be accepted?” good grounds is not the test and therefore, if good grounds is part of the question, I am afraid that that is why I necessarily gave the answer I did. I think if the noble Baroness looks at Hansard, she will see that I have now, again, answered the question directly.

I turn to Amendment 45A from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. It is vital that we provide protection to those in the UK who require it as a result of persecution they would face due to sexual orientation, but I suggest that it goes without saying that protection must not be afforded on the basis of one’s sexual orientation where the acts in question are criminal in the United Kingdom. I shall deal with both his points.

First, I note the explanatory statement on the amendment. For those who have not seen it, I shall summarise it. The obviously well-meaning intention of this amendment is to prevent applicants under the age of consent in the UK being excluded from refugee protection—I hope I have understood that correctly. I reassure the noble and learned Lord and the House that line 9 of Clause 32 does no such thing. That is because, although an asylum applicant may be under the age of consent in the UK, they can still be persecuted as a result of their sexual orientation. For example, a 15 year-old homosexual applicant may still be recognised as a member of a particular social group should they meet the requirements of Clause 32, even though they are not legally able to consent to sexual activity in the UK. I distinguish in this regard—I hope this is helpful to the noble and learned Lord—between sexual orientation and sexual activity. In that context, I come to the other point.

Let me say what should not need to be said—of course this is not the noble and learned Lord’s intention—but we are concerned that, as drafted, the amendment could allow convicted paedophiles and other convicted sex offenders to be granted refugee status in the UK, solely on account of their criminal acts relating to their sexual orientation. Of course, that is not the intention of the amendment: we are concerned that it is an unintended consequence of it. I hope that what I have said already deals with the intention behind the amendment and reassures the noble and learned Lord.

Lastly, I come to Amendment 46. Clause 36 provides the interpretive framework for Clause 11, which sets out Parliament’s position on Article 31(1) of the refugee convention. Clause 36 is still relevant in terms of providing the UK’s interpretation of key terms in Article 31 of the convention, such as immunity from penalties, so it is not just there to serve Clause 11, which was the first point made by the noble and learned Lord. The convention does not define what is meant by coming “directly” or “without delay”. Again, we have taken the opportunity to define those terms. We have taken into account that group 2 refugees will still be protected and not refouled, and will receive relevant entitlements so that the object and purpose of the convention are upheld.

Clause 36 is clear that there is discretion not to grant differentiated entitlements where a person could not reasonably be expected to have claimed in another safe country or where a person made a claim as soon as reasonably practicable. I made points earlier as to discretion and individual assessment. So this does not necessarily rule out the position taken by the House of Lords in R v Asfaw; it will all turn on the particular facts of the case.

Finally, I will prevail on the Home Office, I hope, to write to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on the point she raised. For these reasons, and with apologies that it has taken a little longer than I anticipated, I respectfully invite the right reverend Prelate to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Bishop of Durham Portrait The Lord Bishop of Durham
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My Lords, I thank the Minister for his very full and considered response and all noble Lords for their contributions. The strength of feeling is strong and again I make the point that these clauses are overly punitive towards women and victims of gender-based violence. I fear that that concern was not answered in the very full answer we were given. In particular, I still do not think that the responses given take any awareness of the trauma of so many of the women who come forward. I fear that to talk about “sufficiently detailed interviews”, as the Minister did at one point, would raise hackles on that front.

I have no doubt that my right reverend friend the Bishop of Gloucester will read Hansard very carefully and may well write off the back of that. I thank the Minister for making the promise to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister—I was about to ask him to, but he got in there before us. It is rather regrettable that we have not been able to persuade the Government on these points, and the Bill will not now adequately protect those who are subject to gender-based violence. That is the deep concern. That said, with deep regret, I will withdraw the amendment.

Nationality and Borders Bill Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Home Office

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts
Lord Berkeley of Knighton Portrait Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)
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My Lords, I will make a few comments to amplify the remarks of my noble friend Lady Meacher. I have just been reading a most remarkable book by a doctor, who as an eight or nine year-old child escaped from Afghanistan to try to realise his vision of becoming a doctor and thus being able to support his family back in Afghanistan. In trying to secure a voyage here, the bureaucracy of our immigration system, which I am afraid is outrageously being demonstrated in Calais, meant that this child fell into the hands of traffickers. He arrived here with a forged passport, so was sent to Feltham young offender institution. My point is that unless we improve our ability to admit refugees—particularly at a time like this, as we have heard today—we will play into the hands of these people. Like that child, so many of these refugees are just desperate for a better life; he wanted to support his family.

That child had experienced post-traumatic stress disorder of the most awful sort, having seen friends and relatives bombed and shelled and having walked among mutilated bodies. He had nightmares and flashbacks, but he did not know that he had post-traumatic stress disorder and could not understand why he was finding it so difficult to explain to the authorities that he had come from this troubled background. It was only years later, as the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, mentioned, that he realised that it must be because of post-traumatic stress disorder.

This extraordinary person started the most wonderful foundation, Arian Teleheal, saluted by the Government, which does telemed work with children and victims all over the world. He is a wonderful example of everything which is great in this country and everything that we need to make better. He knew that if he could get here and get training as a doctor, he could change the circumstances of those he had left behind in Afghanistan —and my goodness, he did. However, we must make it easier for people such as him to come here and benefit from our education, and then do wonderful work, such as what he wanted to do, as a doctor.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, the debate has shown that the House is unanimous on two points. The first is that my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford should be congratulated, and the second is that the House did not much like the Government’s Bill. I associate myself wholly with the former, and I will seek to set out the Government’s position on the latter. Let me go through the amendments in turn.

Amendments 65 and 66 seek to remove Clauses 57 and 58 from the Bill entirely. The effect would be to remove modern slavery from the one-stop process and would mean that modern slavery claims would be dealt with separately from the one-stop process that addresses human rights and protection claims. That does not make much sense, for either the victims or the national referral mechanism, for at least two reasons. First, treating the two types of claims as distinct means that a victim might have to describe the same traumatic events repeatedly, which nobody wants to see. Secondly, decisions would be made about their future and their right to protection and support in isolation from, and perhaps in ignorance of, the full facts, which might mean that people who would otherwise get protection are denied it.

Those amendments, and Amendment 70ZA, do not make sense from the point of view of making the NRM an efficient, transparent and fair process. They display a lack of understanding about how the NRM works, where, in line with the low threshold for referral—I will come back to the thresholds later—we simply require relevant information at an early stage, even of a limited nature, to enable key issues to be identified from the outset. That allows early access to support and gives decision-makers a clearer picture of the individual’s experience, which in turn means a more comprehensive decision, to be taken in the round, including, crucially, the victim’s age when the relevant exploitation took place.

Perhaps more than any other group, children will benefit from early identification and protection, and from having decisions made in respect of their status and their support with as full an awareness of relevant facts and context as possible. In response to the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, echoed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, we see no benefit to child victims in them raising modern slavery issues after any asylum or protection decisions have been made. That would only delay their ability to access the support and protection that they need.

I have read widely the briefings which I and other noble Lords have received, and seen that critics have argued, as has been said, that the clause will stop victims from coming forward. We do not see how a clause that encourages early disclosure of information and early identification, where any negative credibility implications are non-determinative and apply only when there are no good reasons for delay, would discourage victims from coming forward. As to evidence, I say again that the measure will allow for early identification, and we do not want victims to have to describe the same events repeatedly.

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Baroness Butler-Sloss Portrait Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
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I am sorry to interrupt but will the Minister deal with why children are going through the NRM? The Home Office, through the Minister, told me that the NRM was not suitable for children, who should be dealt with under the Children Act.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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I do not think I am saying anything inconsistent. I am saying that, for the reasons I have set out—I was just starting on the point and hope I will be able to develop it—we do not want to create a two-tier system. Of course, we recognise the vulnerabilities of children. The modern slavery statutory guidance, which I think the noble and learned Baroness referred to, provides for the specific vulnerabilities of children. This clause does not change that. It is also right that our domestic legislation should align with our international obligations, and that includes ECAT. Children get protection from the NRM because they are recognised as victims of modern slavery; that is why they get protection.

On Amendments 67 and 68, I want to reassure noble Lords that we are currently working with stakeholders and operational partners to develop the guidance in a way that is clear for decision-makers and victims. The reasonable grounds threshold is, and will remain, low, as intended by ECAT, to identify potential victims. The House will forgive me, but we need to be clear about this: ECAT sets out that signatories have certain duties when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person has been a victim or “is a victim” of modern slavery or human trafficking. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans raised concerns that Clause 59 was raising the threshold. Respectfully, it is not. Clause 59 aligns the Modern Slavery Act 2015 with ECAT, but it is already the language used in the modern slavery statutory guidance for England and Wales, under Section 49 of that Act.

Indeed—I have it on my iPad—paragraph 14.50 of the guidance sets out the test of

“whether the statement …‘I suspect but cannot prove’ the person is a victim of modern slavery … is true ... or whether a reasonable person having regard to the information in the mind of the decision maker would think there are Reasonable Grounds to believe the individual is a victim of modern slavery”.

So, in the guidance, the two tests are each used; we are not raising the test at all but aligning it. Nothing will change in practice; we are aligning our domestic legislation to our international obligations. The guidance also uses the phrase “suspect but cannot prove” as part of the test. Both phrases that I have read out are used in the guidance as being indicative of when the threshold is met. We are not raising the threshold and have no intention of doing so, but it is right that we keep setting that out in guidance and not in primary legislation.

Turning to Amendment 70, I thank my noble friend Lord McColl of Dulwich for his continued engagement. We are of course committed to providing support to victims of modern slavery but we believe that this should be provided on a needs basis. We are committed to maintaining our international obligations under ECAT, and this Bill confirms that, where necessary, support and protections are provided from a positive reasonable grounds decision up to the conclusive grounds decision. Indeed, there is a five-year contract, currently valued at over £300 million, which demonstrates that commitment. Importantly, however, support for victims, including safehouse accommodation, financial support and access to a support worker are already available based on need. There is no time limit for that support.

Each individual victim will have different needs. The amendment, however, removes any needs-based assessment and treats all 12,727 victims who entered the NRM in 2021 as being one of a kind, assuming that they will all need the same level of support. We committed in the other place to providing, where necessary, appropriate and tailored support for a minimum of 12 months to all those who receive a “positive conclusive grounds decision”, and I have just repeated that here.

Finally, Amendment 70 would also reduce clarity, because it refers to assisting the individual in their personal situation. There is no definition of “personal situation” within ECAT, and Clause 64 addresses this issue by setting out circumstances where leave will be granted to confirmed victims. However, Amendment 70 requires no link to the relevant exploitation, which means that a victim could be granted leave to pursue an entirely unrelated compensation claim or assist with an unrelated investigation, and that is not what ECAT was all about.

Before I sit down, I should respond to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, as well as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who all mentioned guidance in one form or another. I can confirm that officials would be very pleased to engage on the development of the guidance, to which I have referred on a number of occasions. It will be published over the coming months, but we welcome that engagement. I also assure them and the rest of the House that we will bring forward modern slavery legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows.

I apologise for the length of my response, but there were a number of amendments in this group. For the reasons I have set out, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.

Lord Coaker Portrait Lord Coaker (Lab)
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My Lords, I shall just respond to the Minister briefly. I thank him for his reply and all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate.

The one fundamental point that I wish to make to the Minister is that, in all his responses, he failed to talk about the statistic referring to the dramatic increase of 47% in the number of victims, in the duty to notify process, who refused to consent to their names being put forward to the national referral mechanism. That is 3,190 reports of adult potential victims via that process who did not consent to their names being put forward. The Minister did not refer to that—and at its heart that is because people already, before the implementation of the Bill, are frightened to come forward and interact with the Government. That is the reality of the situation. For all the Minister’s protestations and reassurances, and all the statements that it will be done on a case-by-case basis, it does not alter the fact that already people are frightened of coming forward and being identified.

All the amendments before us seek to do is to address some of that problem. For example, Amendment 66, on which I will wish to test the opinion of the House, addresses the legislation where it says that if the people who do interact are late in providing information, they will be penalised and it must be taken into account and their claim refused. We are told that it does not matter because, on a case-by-case basis, they can be reassured—yet we are going to pass primary legislation to say that that provision must be included.