Antisemitic Attacks

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Monday 27th April 2026 Lords Chamber

Antisemitism has existed in its many poisonous forms for centuries, but there is no doubt that we find ourselves at a critical juncture as fellow members of our society feel forced in some cases to live a smaller Jewish life. Our response must be unflinching, and I assure the House that under this Government it always will be. We will work relentlessly to ensure that antisemites and those who threaten the Jewish community here have nowhere to hide, and to show British Jews that we stand with them and will do everything in our power to keep them safe. I commend this Statement to the House”.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I know that the Minister takes this matter very seriously and he knows that I have the highest personal regard for him. However, the problem with taking questions on a Commons Statement entitled “Recent Antisemitic Attacks” a week later is that, since the Statement was made, there have been further attacks and further threats. Indeed, we are approaching a position where one of those electronic counters that measured days since the last antisemitic attack in the UK would struggle to register double figures.

On the same day that the Statement was made in the House of Commons—and at almost the same time—a Jewish man working in Slough was subject to appalling antisemitic abuse and threatening behaviour. That incident, unlike most incidents, was caught on video. The perpetrator has now admitted racially aggravated assault and is awaiting sentence, so I will say nothing more about that specific case, except that, according to newspaper reports, the victim of that attack has now decided to stop wearing his kippah, his religious head covering, in public. No further comment is necessary.

As I have said before, while the Jewish community is grateful to this Government and previous Governments—this ought not to be a party-political issue—for increased funding for security, and especially to the Community Security Trust, the response to the current spate of anti-Jewish violence has to move beyond building ever-higher walls and buying more stab vests for yet more security guards and on to the root causes of the problem.

When asked a very specific question by my honourable friend Matt Vickers in the other place about the link between Islamist extremism and these antisemitic attacks, the Security Minister said:

“The honourable Gentleman also made an entirely reasonable and important point about extremism. As I said in my previous remarks, the Government are doing a lot of work led by the Secretary of State … There is also a lot of work co-ordinated across Government to target the threats we face from extremists”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/4/26; col. 68.]


I find that reply odd. The Security Minister responded by talking only about general extremism. If the Government cannot bring themselves to use the phrase “Islamist extremism” and to recognise that the problem that we currently have is with Islamism, how can we have faith that they grasp the enormity of the challenge?

You cannot solve a problem if you cannot even identify what the problem is. It is clear what the problem is. It is demonstrated on the near-weekly marches where attendees still praise Hamas and Hezbollah, both of which are proscribed organisations. It is the chants of “Globalize the Intifada”. We all now know what “globalising the intifada” looks like in practice. The Metropolitan Police have belatedly said that they will intervene if such chants are made—but why did it take blood on our streets for that change of position, which some of us have been demanding for months?

Last night, I and my daughter were dining at a kosher restaurant on the Golders Green Road. Half way through our dinner, two uniformed police officers popped into the restaurant. They explained that they were “just doing their rounds” and wanted to check that everything was okay. I am sincerely grateful to the rank-and-file police officers for all the work they do. However, I would like to live in a country where I do not have uniformed police officers securing my synagogue, guarding my community’s schools and now, it seems, patrolling kosher restaurants too. I used to live in that country; I would like to live in it again.

The late Chief Rabbi Lord Sacks reminded us that antisemitism is a mutating virus. When I was growing up, most Jew-hatred came from the far right. Today, that has changed. Can the Minister demonstrate that the Government do recognise that Islamist extremism is now the root cause of the majority of rising antisemitism and set out the steps that the Government are taking to address this? We know that a number of groups operating within the United Kingdom are actively stoking antisemitic hatred. I hope that the recent promise to ban the IRGC will be enacted speedily in the next Session, but the Muslim Brotherhood and Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya—the group that has claimed responsibility for the recent attacks—have not been banned and are active.

The United Arab Emirates has warned its citizens not to study at British universities for fear of radicalisation on our campuses. Yesterday, the United States Embassy in London issued an extraordinary security warning instructing American citizens in Britain and elsewhere in Europe to “exercise extreme caution” in the vicinity of Jewish institutions in Britain. Perhaps the most worrying development is the likely influence of the Iranian state in all this. If Iran is found to have co-ordinated these recent attacks, will the Government move to expel Iranian diplomats and step up sanctions against Iran?

There is so much more that needs to be done to stamp out antisemitism in Britain. Walls, guards and stab vests are the equivalent of palliative care. They are not a cure. We need to focus on the cure and, as we all know, the first step to any cure is correctly identifying the disease.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, for his views. As a member of the Jewish community, I am grateful for all the speeches of sympathy that have been and are being extended to the Jewish community. I am personally grateful that between the First and Second World Wars my late mother was able to move to Britain from Szreńsk in north central Poland. Sadly, her mother and other family members were never heard of again after 1945. Many came to this country to escape antisemitism and were welcomed and made able to make good lives for themselves and their children. This makes it even more horrifying that we have seen recently an upsurge in violence, hate speeches and demonstrations against the Jewish population.

Antisemitism is not new, as explained by the noble Lord, but it is now made more obvious by the attacks on Jewish sites in the UK and elsewhere. I could not previously have imagined a world where many British Jews are feeling very vulnerable and even doubting their long-term security in Britain. As has been mentioned, a pro-Iranian group, Harakat Ashab al-Yamin, has claimed responsibility, although I believe that other groups and individuals are involved.

It should influence this debate to list recent attacks. In March there were attacks in Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands and France. Then, nearer to home, there was the arson attack on Hatzola ambulances in my local Jewish community. On 15 April there was an arson attack at Finchley Reform Synagogue, again local to me. Also in April there was an arson attack in Park Royal, a drone attack on the Israeli embassy, an arson attack on a Jewish charity and an arson attack on Kenton shul—that is just in April. We must not forget the October 2025 attack on Heaton Park shul in Manchester, which killed two people. We must ask ourselves whether this can be tolerated.

We in the UK are grateful for all this country has done to enable the Jewish community to thrive here and are horrified by the increase in antisemitism and attacks on Jewish premises, synagogues and charities. The answer we hear seems to be an increase in security, as noted by the noble Lord about his trip to the restaurant, and the community is grateful for the efforts of the police and the CST, including extra funds for this purpose. However, no other community needs to have its kids’ schools, places of worship and community behind security-guarded walls—a world where our kids and teens are afraid to show their Jewish identity and are not safe to wear a Magen David or a yarmulke head covering, as has been stated.

I spoke to Rabbi Ben Kurzer, my local community rabbi, who said:

“Whilst the Jewish community is strong and resilient and continues to flourish, this situation is unacceptable for us as a nation. As with antisemitism throughout the ages, this is not a Jewish problem, it is a societal one. The hate that begins with the Jews will not end with the Jews. Jewish tradition teaches that Moses, in ancient Egypt, looked round and realised that there was no one to stand up against the aggressors and that was why he took the lead—to paraphrase our Sages, ‘In a place where there is no person stepping forward, try to be that person’’.


I say we need to go to the source of and incitement to this violence. I would like to hear what the Minister has to say about what they intend to do about what some call hate marches—I think they are; some people do not—and demonstrations that fuel this antisemitism. I keep waiting for it, but when is that dreadful organisation, the IRGC, actually going to be banned as a terrorist organisation? It has been on the cards for such a long time.

Can the Minister say that the Government will seek to explain what Zionism means? It is a desire for a homeland for the Jews in Israel. Surely the rise in UK antisemitism makes the need for Zionism an absolute must for many in the community. The word “anti-Zionism” is being increasingly used as an acceptable excuse for antisemitic sentiments. There needs to be a line between objecting to events outside the UK and terrorising a section of the UK of which I am part. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Sydney Terrorist Attack

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope the noble and right reverend Lord will accept that I cannot comment on active live Australian investigations. It would be inappropriate for me to do so as a UK Government Minister, but in any UK context it would simply be the same. There has to be a due process to investigate what has happened and why, but, self-evidently, we need to ensure that our security services and police services in the United Kingdom, as well as the work we do in the Home Office and across government, can identify and monitor where there are potential threats, and take action to prevent those threats materialising into the type of action taken yesterday. That is an ongoing challenge but it is something that our security services do daily and will continue to do. I know that they have the support of both Houses of Parliament in that activity.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest because Rabbi Schlanger, who was murdered in this atrocity, was my relative too. Most Jewish festivals are commemorated privately at home or in synagogue, but Hanukkah is celebrated publicly. That is why my response to this atrocity is going to be to go to Parliament Square this evening to light a Hanukkah menorah, proudly and publicly. But so far as the Government’s response is concerned, while we are always grateful for support for the Community Security Trust, the debate about Jewish security needs to move away from being about higher walls around our synagogues and more guards outside our schools and on to the root causes of why we need such security. Will the Minister explain what the Government are actually doing in practical terms to counter the extremist ideologies which are driving this antisemitic violence, and to remove them and their proponents from our social media, out of our universities and off our streets?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I offer my condolences to the noble Lord for his loss. I cannot be with him this evening, because I will be in the Chamber dealing with the Crime and Policing Bill, but if I were not, I would certainly be standing in solidarity with him. The noble Lord asked what we are doing. I have given a range of things that the Government will do, and we are continually open to suggestions as to how we can tackle this scourge. We have already asked the noble Lord, Lord Mann, to review antisemitism in the National Health Service. We are also undertaking a review of antisemitism in universities, and we are demanding action from them to protect Jewish students.

We need to ensure that we encourage tolerance, understanding and knowledge of different religions, because there is a range of them in a multicultural society, and we need to have that tolerance. I reach out to the noble Lord to look on a cross-party basis at how we can ensure that the scourge of antisemitism and intolerance is tackled from very early on, so that we can ensure that people live their lives in an open, tolerant way, where their religion does not require armed guards at synagogues and schools. For the moment, I hope the noble Lord understands that we will support the Community Security Trust and police forces to deliver that safety, given that there are live threats, as evidenced by the recent Manchester attack.

Hezbollah: Threat to the United Kingdom

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Tuesday 5th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Godson for securing this admittedly short debate on such an important matter. I apologise to him and the House for missing the first five seconds of his remarks.

I will make three short points, picking up some of the points made by others. First, who or what is Hezbollah? It is an Iranian proxy. Iran’s recent direct attacks on Israel are a stark reminder of the existential threat that Israel faces. These Benches unequivocally support Israel’s right to defend itself, including in Lebanon against Hezbollah, whose attacks have led thousands of Israelis to be and remain refugees, in effect, in their own country. I hope the Minister can reassure us that the Government will rally the international community to reaffirm its commitment to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701, which is the basis for the peace we all crave.

My second point is on Hezbollah’s threat to the United Kingdom. There is a clear risk that the UK could be threatened through an attack on our sovereign military bases in Cyprus. In April, the then leader of Hezbollah—the leadership of these organisations has recently changed so quickly—issued a threat to Cyprus, which was widely seen as a threat to our bases there. The head of MI5 has warned that the threat of Iran-backed terror activity in the UK itself is very high, confirming that the agency had dealt with 20 Iranian-backed plots on British soil in the last couple of years. Of course, Hezbollah has form for such attacks. Earlier this year, an Argentine court ruled that the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people and wounded more than 300, was carried out by Hezbollah, at the direction of Iran.

My third and final point is on enforcing the law, and there are two parts to this. First, in the UK, as we have heard, Hezbollah has been proscribed as a terrorist organisation in full since 2019—that means that inviting support for Hezbollah is a criminal offence. But we also invite the Government to enlighten us again this evening on the current status of proscribing the IRGC. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, was very vocal about this, as is his wont, and we look forward to the Minister updating us on this issue.

Secondly, Parliament makes the law and our independent police and the independent CPS enforce it. When people chant at a demo, “Yemen, turn a boat around”, they mean not Yemen but the Houthis. When they shout, “Lebanon, turn a tank around”, they mean not Lebanon but Hezbollah. So we as a Parliament are entitled to look to our independent police and CPS to enforce the laws that we have passed. We on these Benches will support the Government in working for peace in the Middle East but also in keeping the peace on our streets here in the United Kingdom.

King’s Speech

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Wednesday 24th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak after the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, the former Lord Chief Justice. One of the many pleasures of this House is that, unlike in my professional life, judges do not always get the last word.

I declare two interests: the first, obviously, as a practising barrister and therefore user of the justice system; the second as a long-time admirer of the Minister who opened this debate. I congratulate him on his new role and his excellent maiden speech. I also very much enjoyed the maiden speech of my noble friend Lord Goodman of Wycombe, and look forward to the maiden speech of the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint. We have a debate bookended by maiden speeches. Without getting into the vexed question of House of Lords reform, it is only in this House as currently constituted that one can hear, in the same debate, some of our nation’s leading repairers of “soles”, both spiritual and now also temporal.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Oh, that’s terrible.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

They are just catching on.

I do not know whether the noble Lord occupies my old room at the Ministry of Justice, but we share a firm commitment to justice and the justice system. There is of course an overlap with yesterday’s debate on the constitution, because the rule of law is not actually a law at all but a constitutional principle. In that sense we should all be declaring an interest, because we all have an interest—a financial one—in the maintenance of the rule of law. Without the rule of law there would be no security in transactions, no enforceable right to property. But it goes well beyond matters financial. Without the rule of law, there is nothing to separate or protect us from despotism on the one hand or anarchy on the other.

That brings me to the first of three short points arising out of the King’s Speech. The first is the safety of public venues and keeping the public safe from terrorism. The Minister referred to what he called the appalling and horrific terrorist attack in the Manchester Arena, which he also called senseless. I am afraid, however, that there are too many people who see in their warped and twisted vision some sense in that sort of attack, and that means our response to terrorism must go beyond merely steps to keep people safe. We must be unyielding against those who commit terrorism, but also those who fund terrorist attacks; those who advocate for them; those who explain them away; those who equivocate about them; or those who fail to assist the authorities in their efforts to thwart them. That means we need to engage with those in all communities—and they are the majority in every community—who support the rule of law and stand against those who seek to subvert it.

The second point concerns leasehold and commonhold reform, the draft Bill on which I await with interest. We must ensure that we have a system of land ownership which is fit for the 21st century. I remember from my university days that in land law, the devil really is in the detail, and it changes slowly. I remember talking about my land law essays with my father, who still referred to the Law of Property Act 1925 as the new property legislation. No doubt any change will be viewed with horror in some parts of Lincoln’s Inn, where they still have flying freeholds—a concept which is too arcane for discussion at any time, but certainly at a quarter to 10 at night. I hope the proposed legislation will be clear, concise, modern and will provide us with a useful system of ownership of land.

Finally, a short word about the Arbitration Bill. I welcome this very much. When I was a Minister, I helped the Law Commission set up its work on arbitration. London is the global centre for international commercial arbitration. The 1996 Act is the gold standard, but like many things made of gold, it does need a bit of polishing from time to time. There is one point which I was going to mention about the Arbitration Act, but my noble friend Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate warned me that if I mentioned again what he regards as the esoteric legal topics of monism and dualism, he might not be responsible for his actions. I do not know how he would react if I more than merely mentioned tonight the difficulties presented by an arbitration agreement having what lawyers call a floating governing law, but I am not minded to find out. I will take that up with the Minister offline, and leave the detail for another day, although I suspect it will be a day on which my learned friend finds he is unavailable to attend your Lordships’ House.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, with his vast experience of Whitehall and the formation of policy.

I want to concentrate on Clause 5 and a legal issue at the very heart of the Bill: whether a Minister should be able to refuse to abide by an interim order of the European Court of Human Rights, made under its Rule 39 procedure. The president of the Strasbourg court, in a media interview given only last week, asserted that her court has the power to grant interim relief and that member states have an obligation to comply. However, the contrary position had been powerfully presented only the previous evening by Professor Ekins, giving the 37th Atkin lecture in this city.

The present Rule 39 dates from 2013 and provides that the full court or a single duty judge may

“indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted”.

That does not sound like a legal obligation, and that is for a simple reason. The 1950 convention contains no provision for a single judge, or even the full court, to grant interim relief to any person. That omission was not an oversight. There was an attempt in 1950 to give the court such a power, and that attempt was rejected. On every subsequent attempt to give the court that power, the member states have refused.

That is not to say, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, that a power to grant interim orders might not be useful, sensible or desirable, but that is not the question. The question is whether the court has that power, and the member states repeatedly decided that it should not. For a time, the Strasbourg court agreed that it did not have a power to grant interim relief. It so ruled authoritatively in 1991, and ruled to the same effect a decade later, in 2001. However, in 2005, the Strasbourg court performed a jurisdictional U-turn. It held that, by failing to comply with an interim measure ordered under Rule 39 to prevent a deportation, Turkey had breached Article 34—that is the article which provides that member states must not hinder the right of an individual to access the court. Perhaps that case was rightly decided on its own facts, although I doubt it. If the deportation was a breach of Article 34 then whether there was a breach of Rule 39 as well does not really make any difference. That decision became the slender basis for the court to assert, in a later case in 2009, that any non-compliance with a Rule 39 order necessarily also amounted to a breach of the convention.

Why the change of heart by the court in 2005? It appears to be what one might call judicial envy: the International Court of Justice had held a few years earlier, in 2001, that states had to abide by its interim measures, and it seems that the ECHR court considered that what was good enough for The Hague was also good for Strasbourg. But there is a critical difference. Article 41 of the statute establishing the International Court of Justice specifically provides for “provisional measures”. In other words, the ICJ statute contains in terms precisely the power that the member states had consistently refused to agree to give to the Strasbourg court.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, explained, there are also severe procedural problems with the approach that the Strasbourg court takes. Those problems are not my concern this evening; I welcome the fact that the Strasbourg court is trying to address those procedural problems. But none of that addresses the underlying jurisprudential issue, which is whether the Strasbourg court has the legal power to issue binding interim relief in the first place.

In the absence of locating that power in the convention itself, it has been suggested that, over the years, state practice has given the court this power. I do not find that argument persuasive. I do not have the time now, but that state practice is neither uniform nor consistent. The details are set out between pages 35 and 41 of Professor Ekins’s paper on this topic for Policy Exchange, which repays reading in any event. I am sure that we will come back to it in Committee.

So far as the UK specifically is concerned, we have said, rightly and for good political reasons, that compliance with Rule 39 orders is our usual policy. All other things being equal, so it should be. But accepting compliance as our usual policy is quite different from accepting a Rule 39 direction as a legal obligation, which we should not do, because it is not.

Asylum: UK-Rwanda Agreement

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Monday 22nd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, it is a particular pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who I know will appreciate, although I think he and I will disagree on this topic, that I always listen to anything he says with real care, and often I learn from it. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and his illustrious committee for the report, which I have read and reread. I am also grateful to the powers that be for providing time for this debate, which the noble and learned Lord opened with his customary skill and persuasiveness. As judges who find themselves in a minority are wont to say, I have the misfortune to take a different view. So, although I will vote for the first Motion if there is a Division on it, I will vote against the second.

Let me clear one point out of the way first, although it is an important point, about the procedure that lies behind this debate. As my noble friend Lord Sandhurst explained, under the current legislation this House cannot block the treaty. That is as it should be: it would be a significant rewriting of the role of this House for it to block a treaty or to do any such thing. Under the relevant Act, the other place can delay a treaty again and again, but this House has no such power. I accept that there is a real debate to be had about the role that Parliament, and especially the other place, should have with regard to the review and ratification of treaties. This all used to be done under the prerogative, but times have moved on.

My friend—not in the parliamentary sense but in the actual real-world sense—Alexander Horne has co-authored a paper with Professor Hestermeyer on this topic, under the aegis of the Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy, and I am grateful to them for advance sight of it. I do not agree with all the paper’s conclusions—Alex will, I hope, forgive me for saying that—but it is a valuable contribution to an important debate. As my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford said, our procedures in this context are not replicated in many other countries and may well require review and perhaps updating. But that is not the issue today; the issue today is not our procedures for ratifying and discussing treaties but the treaty itself. As my noble friend Lord Sandhurst noted, the issue is the treaty, not the Bill, which we will debate at Second Reading next week.

I know that many noble Lords do not like the Bill—I look forward to some vigorous and perhaps lengthy debates on the Bill—but next week’s Bill is not today’s topic. We are looking at the treaty, not the Bill, although it is interesting that I have not so far—I think I am the last speaker from the Back Benches—heard a speech today that says, “I like and support the Government’s policy in this area and I will vote for the Bill next week, but I just don’t like this treaty or the way the Government have gone about it”. For some reason, those opposing the treaty also oppose the policy underlying it and will also no doubt oppose the Bill next week.

I suggest that there is nothing objectionable about the treaty, what it does or what it says. It improves the protections as compared with the previous memorandum, not least by providing that persons can be removed from Rwanda to the UK, and only to the UK, thus directly addressing the risk of refoulement that lay at the heart of the Supreme Court’s judgment.

The thrust of the argument of those in support of the second Motion is, “We can’t be sure that the Rwandan Government will actually do what they say they will do”. That is not the view I take, but it is a position that of course I understand, in which case I respectfully say: put some measures into the Bill to make sure that the Rwandan Government live up to their obligations; or, if noble Lords cannot be satisfied by way of such amendments, vote against the Bill. To pick up the metaphor of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile: if you do not like the foundations, do not build the skyscraper—but let us have the argument about the skyscraper, not the foundations.

Before I sit down, I will respond to an important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, which deserves a proper response. He made the point that my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth was wrong when he informed the House, when he spoke from the Front Bench, that the view of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees as to the interpretation of the refugee convention was not binding. That was the point that the noble Lord made this afternoon; he has made it before as well. His contention was that it is binding. He also said that the Supreme Court has said that it is binding. He quoted from the decision of the Supreme Court—let me reply to it.

The statement he referred to in the decision of the Supreme Court was that the UNHCR is entrusted with the

“supervision of the interpretation and application of the Refugee Convention”.

The Supreme Court did say that, but that shows that the UNHCR is not itself mandated with giving a binding interpretation of the convention. It does not have that right. Its role is to supervise the interpretation of the convention by the signatory states.

Indeed, the Supreme Court goes on to make that point in the rest of the paragraph from which he quotes, paragraph 64 of the judgment. The Supreme Court goes on to say, citing its own decision in the case of Al-Sirri in 2013, that the UNHCR’s guidance—note that word, guidance—as to the interpretation of the convention

“should be accorded considerable weight”.

So it should, but when judges say that something should be accorded considerable weight, they are necessarily saying that it is not binding. The UNHCR does not hold the pen on the interpretation of the convention. That was the point that my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth made, and indeed it is a point that I have made on previous occasions.

I am very happy to give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful, since the noble Lord mentioned me, because I know interventions are unusual in this debate. I quoted the noble Lord, Lord Murray, word for word from Hansard when he said:

“The UNHCR is … a UN body; it is not charged with the interpretation of the … convention”.—[Official Report, 24/5/23; col. 968.]


The Supreme Court disagreed very clearly. I did not insert the word “binding”; Hansard will show that. I quoted like for like, and I think the Supreme Court’s position was perfectly clear that the noble Lord, Lord Murray, was wrong.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I know that this is a legalistic point, but that is the thing about the Supreme Court: it tends to make them. It went out of its way to say that the UNHCR is not interpreting the convention; it is supervising the interpretation of the convention by the signatory states. That may seem to be a subtle distinction, but it is critical, because it remains the right of the states themselves to interpret the convention. At least we have managed to have one intervention in this afternoon’s debate. That exchange has shown that we can all look forward to some interesting and vigorous debates next week and thereafter—but that is not today’s business.

I invite the House not to take a sideswipe at the policy—or, in advance, at the Bill—by way of the second Motion. Of course, we should support the first Motion, but I urge the House to vote against the second Motion.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 18th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Agnew of Oulton (Con)]

My Lords, I support both Motion A1 and Motion B1. I turn first to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier’s Motion and offer three reasons why I believe the Minister is completely wrong.

First, the smallest SMEs include some of the most unscrupulous enablers. Take estate agents, for example: they are a conduit of bad money into this country from all over the world. The gaps that the Minister is proposing to leave in the Bill will ensure that this continues. I have seen one case, for which I had to sign an NDA, of an individual who spent £150 million buying property but is apparently allowed to take only $12,000 a year out of the country. How did he manage that? That is a perfectly good example and no doubt we will hear more like it.

Secondly, on this set of rules, I offer the Minister an example. We do not say to the manufacturers of small cars that they do not need seat belts and that for some reason they are exempted. That would be an absolute nonsense and the same applies here. He mentioned costs—£300 million and £40 million—but they are entirely specious. We have seen no proper analysis of these figures; they are just waved around as a convenient excuse not to do something.

My last reason is that these smaller businesses need to be most alert to fraud. A failure to prevent helps them to make sure that their own systems are able to face these risks. We know that 40% of crime in this country is economic crime, but we deploy less than 1% of our resources on dealing with it. Surely smaller businesses should be equipped to know when they are dealing with crooks. I will have to support my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier if the matter is put to a vote.

In relation to the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, we again pursued this relentlessly for six months. Bill Browder said to me on several occasions that, if this Bill is to go through, we must make sure that we have some cost capping in it. It is a war of very unequal proportions. We know that the agencies have small budgets and that they have to go cap in hand to the Treasury if they need more money, which is never given. They even have to return the costs they recover to the Treasury. All this is doing is sending a message to these bad actors that, if they take on this kind of behaviour, they will have significant risks. We have amended this on several occasions to give more discretion to the courts to ensure that, if an agency overreacts and behaves rapaciously or capriciously against individuals, those individuals are not penalised.

If we are serious about dealing with the tidal wave of economic crime that is coming to this country, the Minister will give us the assurance that this is being dealt with. If not, I will have to support the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in his Division.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, we have heard two different reasons for the proposed Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. He said that it was to give the courts a gentle nudge, but my noble friend Lord Agnew said that it would give fraudsters a significant warning that they might not get their costs. The same words cannot do both. The problem lies in the amendment being entirely unnecessary.

The previous version of the amendment said:

“The court should normally make an order that any costs of proceedings … are payable by an enforcement authority … unless it would not be in the interests of justice”.


We now have a list of factors—proposed new paragraphs (a) to (d)—but a court would always take those factors into account in its general discretion to make an appropriate costs order in a particular case.

My concern with this list is that it appears to be exhaustive and therefore does not include, for example, the result of the case or the effect on the successful party of not getting the legal costs which he has expended. I declare an interest as a lawyer, although not an expensive one in the category identified by the noble Lord. I therefore respectfully suggest that this amendment is entirely unnecessary. It reduces the discretion that we generally give the courts on matters of costs and omits factors that the courts should take into account in particular cases when considering costs. Therefore, I suggest that the House leaves this well alone and does not accept the amendment.

Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 18th September 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar]

That the Bill do now pass.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I assure noble Lords that the shortness of my remarks now does not reflect the importance of the Bill: this is an important, focused Bill and a valuable contribution to the fight against this blight on our society. The genesis of the Bill was a consultation announced to this House by my noble friend the Chief Whip in her previous incarnation. My right honourable friend Greg Clark MP discussed the Bill with me before he introduced it into and steered it through the other place. I am grateful to him and to my noble friend the Minister and his department, both in the other place and here. This Bill has had absolute cross-party support, and therefore I am also grateful to the Opposition Front Bench and other Front Benches. I have received support from all parts of the House and I thank the Clerk of the Parliaments and his staff.

I have benefited, as I am sure other noble Lords have, from reading material sent to me by a number of campaigning groups in this area, but what really brought home the importance of the Bill to me was an email I got out of the blue over the summer from someone I will just call Lauren. When I spoke to her, at some length, she explained to me the appalling behaviour to which she had been repeatedly subjected in a park in the part of the country in which she lives. I hope that the Bill will help her and others in her position.

It will not have escaped noble Lords that although this Bill, with the title it has, applies to men and women, women are overwhelmingly the subjects of this appalling behaviour. This Bill has been taken through both Houses by men. There is nothing wrong with that. I suggest that it is absolutely right, because violence against women and girls is not a matter only for women and girls, but for all of us.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I wholeheartedly endorse the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has summarised the Bill which he has piloted through this House and congratulate him on it. He was right to remind us that its genesis was with the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, in her previous incarnation and in an earlier Bill. Nevertheless, there has been cross-party support for it, which I am happy to reiterate.

It is worth reminding ourselves that 71% of women of all ages in the UK have experienced some form of sexual harassment in public. That rises to 86% of all 18 to 24 year-old young women. I have one question which I hope the Minister can comment on when summing up the Government’s position. How will the impact of this Bill be monitored going forward? It is a very specific and quite controversial Bill, even though it has had cross-party support; the Government should see the monitoring of its impact as a proper part of its enactment, so that we can measure its benefit.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 12th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I support Motion A1 but will speak more particularly to Motion U1 in my name, to which the noble Baroness just referred. It proposes that if an age-assessment judicial review is in progress, removal should be delayed until its completion. I welcome comments from Ministers that those subject to an age dispute will be accommodated in an age-appropriate setting here in the UK, but can the Minister confirm that will be the case in a third country? Will Rwanda, for example, be informed that a young person is subject to an age dispute, and will the Rwandan Government then be required by the UK to keep that person separate from other adult residents and to supervise them properly as a child until the courts have made a judgment?

The Secretary of State has a legal duty to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Can the Minister therefore say how the welfare of a child will be protected by not allowing judicial review to act as a temporary delay to their removal? The Government appear to be arguing that when a child legally challenges an age assessment, it is simply a spurious attempt to use legal methods to postpone removal. However, as we know, the majority of children are found to be children after local authority assessments, so it is more likely that what is happening is an attempt to protect their proper right to be treated as a child. Can the Minister therefore take the opportunity at least to confirm that when an individual’s age is disputed, they will not be subject to removal before having met with a social worker and a child protection team for a more comprehensive age-assessment process?

The determination that an individual may be a child and therefore could deserve all the rights a child is due should and must be reason enough to prevent their removal. When the implications for children are so grave and lifelong, it seems that to not delay a child’s removal from the UK until those questions are resolved is immoral. I plead with the Government to recognise this as a failure of safeguarding, which we are all trying to treat at the highest possible standard. However, in view of the lateness of the hour when we are likely to reach a vote on this matter, and the many other matters your Lordships’ House has to deal with tonight, I am not minded at present to press this Motion to a Division.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I do not know whether I should declare an interest as a pseudo-lawyer, or perhaps as Mickey Mouse. I am not entirely convinced that framing the debate in that way is appropriate.

I have a number of things to say. First, the fact that Motion A1, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has been rephrased as it has been, shows that those of us who argued that the previous version was substantive, and not interpretative, were right. However, the Motion as redrafted is also improper because it does two things—here I again respectfully part company with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. He read the Motion but omitted words in its second line. Let us have a look at what it actually says:

“In interpreting this Act, regard shall be given to the intention that its provisions”—


that refers to the provisions in the Bill—

“and any act and omissions made as a result, are intended to comply”.

Even now, it is not properly an interpretative provision, because it does not just apply to interpreting the words; it is also said to apply to any acts and omissions made under the Act, as it will become. That still has substantive consequences, and the effect is still—this time in an evening rather than in an afternoon—that we are effectively incorporating these treaties into our domestic law.

That is why the words

“and any acts and omissions made as a result”

are still objectionable, but the rest of it, while maybe not objectionable, is unnecessary. As I mentioned on Report, the law of this country has always been that, in the absence of express words to the contrary, all statutes are presumed to be in accordance with our international obligations. That was most recently set out by Lord Dyson, speaking for the Supreme Court in the Assange case, when he said that

“there is no doubt that there is a ‘strong presumption’ in favour of interpreting an English statute in a way which does not place the United Kingdom in breach of its international obligations”.

The fact that we now have to go through the contortions of trying to fit this reformulated amendment into interpretation when it still has substantive consequences shows that this is a road down which we should not be going at all. In so far as the intention is that legislation should be interpreted in line with our international commitments, that is already part of the law. In so far as it says that

“any acts and omissions made as a result”

of this Bill are to be so interpreted, that has substantive consequences.

I respectfully suggest that those points are not those of a pseudo-lawyer, nor are they Mickey Mouse points. If I may finish where I began, it is somewhat unfortunate that that is how they are being described.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I have the misfortune to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. I support entirely what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said. The key words in this reformulated amendment are “In interpreting this Act” and “regard”. It would not write these conventions into our law, as the previous amendment was in danger of doing. This a pure interpretation provision, and it is entirely consistent with the way the courts approach these various conventions. The assumption is that the United Kingdom, having signed up to the conventions, will respect them in the formulation of its provisions in our domestic law. The court applies that principle in finding a meaning of the words before it in statutory instruments and in primary legislation. This is entirely in accordance with the way the courts approach the matter. The key words are, “In interpreting this Act”, and “regard”. It is not binding; it is just that regard will be had. That is the way the provision should read. I support the amendment because it is entirely orthodox and consistent with principle.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, threw down a verbal gauntlet, so let me try to pick it up and answer the central question that she posed. That was this: why should the UK think that it does not have to abide by Rule 39 indications from the court in Strasbourg? The short answer is that the Strasbourg court does not have jurisdiction to grant those Rule 39 indications and certainly not in the manner in which they are currently granted. I will develop that point shortly, but the fact that it is a jurisdictional point—I would say, with respect, that jurisdiction ought to unite all lawyers, even commercial lawyers—means that whether the court has jurisdiction or not is pretty important. I will focus my remarks on Clause 53 and the amendments thereto. I yield to nobody in my respect for the rule of law.

There is a great danger, which happens here and in other places, of the following syllogism being rolled out: the rule of law is a good thing, this—whatever issue you are talking about—is a good thing and therefore this is part of the rule of law. Well, it is not always. Even what is incorporated within the rule of law is a matter of some debate. One can compare the famous work of Lord Bingham, which is expansive to the work of Sir John Laws, which is rather narrower. But this is not about whether we have respect for the rule of law. It is about whether the Strasbourg court in fact has jurisdiction. To put the matter in that way shows respect for the rule of law, because jurisdiction is fundamental to that. Certainly, as far as I am concerned—I am sure as far as the Minister is concerned as well— words such as “game” and “swindle” are not entirely appropriate ways of approaching this topic.

I spoke on this point on Second Reading; we are now in Committee and I am not going to give a Second Reading speech. I expanded on it for those few people who did not read Hansard in the Daily Telegraph a week or so ago. What happened since Second Reading —I touched on it in my piece in the Telegraph—is, as my noble friend Lord Sandhurst mentioned, a powerfully argued paper from Professor Richard Ekins at Policy Exchange. It is unfortunate that in opening the debate on this the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, did not engage with any of the arguments in that paper; I do not think that she even mentioned it. The paper is a fine piece of legal work. You can agree or disagree with the conclusions. I am going to be disagreeing with the conclusions of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. That, I hope, does not indicate any disrespect or discourtesy towards any of the people who sit on that committee; I just disagree with their conclusions. But I am going to deal with their argument because, if I do not, it is difficult to see how the land actually lies. Again, as my noble friend mentioned, we have a preface and a foreword by Lord Sumption the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, two names that, frankly, should make any lawyer sit up and take notice. Even if one does not agree with the conclusion, one has to engage with the arguments.

The main thrust behind the amendments and the clause stand part debate is that the clause breaches international law. That raises the question of whether we have an international law obligation to abide by Rule 39 indications. The short answer is that, no, we do not. Why do we not? Because we have signed up in the convention to abide by judgments of the Strasbourg court against the UK and Article 46(1) where the judgment is of the full court. This is not a final judgment—it is not of the full court—so we have no obligation under Article 46(1).

The Strasbourg court then tries to ground its jurisdiction in Article 34. The reason why it does that— I will not repeat what my noble friend said—is that there is a history to this. There was a suggestion in the draft, back in the 1940s, that the court would have the right to give interim relief. That was deliberately excluded. People tried to persuade the court that it should have that power, but that was rebuffed. The court gave a series of judgments setting out that it did not have that power, but then it did a volte-face and by a majority—I think of one, but I may be mistaken—it held that it did have that power. Of course, the court can change its own jurisprudence, but what it cannot do is to arrogate to itself the jurisdiction. In international law, the court has only the powers that the member states have given to it.

What does the court do? The court seeks to ground its power in Article 34 of the convention. What is Article 34? It is the right not to have your right of access to the courts impeded. I accept that there will be cases where you could justify interim relief and Article 34; a death penalty case would be one of them, as you cannot unscramble that later on, for obvious reasons. However, there will not be many cases like that. The Rwanda case last year was not a case like that. That was a case where the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court had all held that the Government’s promise to bring people back if they were to win meant that there was no impedance of their human rights. That point was decided three times in this jurisdiction, so that was certainly not an Article 34 case.

It also does two other things. First, it shows that if the Strasbourg court is doing a balancing act under American Cyanamid, it is odd that it reached completely the opposite conclusion from that reached by three courts here when applying that approach. Secondly, it belies another point put to the Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in relation to Clause 52. She made the point that if courts here have the ability to grant interim relief, Strasbourg will not interfere. Three courts here heard the Rwanda case and Strasbourg still interfered. I am not sure that that argument works.

Where I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, is that there is a procedural problem as well as a substantive problem. The procedural problem cannot solve the jurisdictional problem but makes it worse. Why is there a procedural problem? There is a procedural problem because the rules and procedures do not cater for this jurisdiction, as it has been created out of whole cloth. That is why we have a system at the moment where there is no effective natural justice, where these injunctions are given and indications are made without the state being heard and, importantly, without there being a proper opportunity for the state to put its case even after the indication has been made. That is why these orders are given by a single judge when—the detail is in Professor Ekins’s paper—under the structure of the Strasbourg court a single judge should not have and does not have the powers to do this.

Does this mean that there are no circumstances in which a Rule 39 order can be justified? No, I do not go so far as that. I have already identified a death penalty case as such a case. However, one needs to have a proper review of the court’s jurisdiction. One also needs to have a proper procedure; again, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who said that it ought to be possible to create such a procedure. It ought to be possible and it must be possible. If one therefore has a Rule 39 indication with a proper procedure which is grounded in Article 34, which recognises the principle of subsidiarity that is now inherent in the court’s jurisprudence and which gives the state an opportunity to come back in a proper timeframe against the order that has been made, I suggest all of that is the way through.

I will take two minutes, if I may, to say something about the report of the JCHR, because it is an important piece of work and I have read it carefully. On page 45, there is a heading before paragraph 129:

“What are the legal implications of this clause?”


This is Clause 53. It goes on to say that some commentators have suggested that

“the UK is not bound to comply with”

Rule 39 orders. It goes on:

“This is particularly because Article 46 of the Convention, which concerns the ‘Binding force and execution of judgments’, only commits the UK to abide by ‘the final judgment of the Court’ and does not mention interim measures”.


I agree with that, except it is only judgments against the UK, but we will let that pass. It goes on to say that the Grand Chamber in Strasbourg

“has held that a failure to comply with interim measures would amount to a violation of Article 34”.

That is right; that is what it has held. It goes on to say, in paragraph 130:

“It is therefore a binding obligation, as a matter of international law, for the UK to act in accordance with interim measures”.


What is the force of that “therefore”? Because the Strasbourg court has held—in the last sentence of paragraph 129—that it would be a violation of Article 34, it is therefore a binding obligation. With the greatest respect to the Committee and whoever authored that part of the report, that is what—before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, banned the use of Latin in our domestic courts—used to be called an ipse dixit. That “therefore” is a conclusory statement; you simply cannot justify the jurisdiction by saying that the court itself says that it has jurisdiction. That is an entirely circular argument. If I could win all my cases with reasoning like that, it would be a very good thing, even though I am only a commercial lawyer.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I beg the noble Lord’s indulgence in standing up and asking him a question. I was piqued by a tweet by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who is not in his place. He intervened on a Question from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, last Tuesday. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, was replying. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out:

“The member Governments of the Council of Europe, including our own, have repeatedly confirmed the binding nature of interim measures under Rule 39—in the Committee of Ministers, and in the Izmir and Brighton declarations. Is the Minister proud of the United Kingdom’s record of compliance with interim measures?”


The noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, replied:

“On the general point about acceptance in practice of the position of interim measures under the convention, there are two legal views”.—[Official Report, 6/6/23; col. 1244.]


The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and others have talked about the paper by Professor Ekins for Policy Exchange and that is a view, but the Minister did not confirm last week that he shared that view. Clause 53 does not actually say that the Government think that interim measures from Strasbourg are not binding. The tweet by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, noticed that the Minister

“declined to commit to the long-standing governmental position that”

interim measures

“are binding in international law. Views can always change, but surely the government has one”.

What we have not established is what the view of the Government, as opposed to that of Policy Exchange and Professor Ekins, is on whether interim measures from Strasbourg are binding. Our long-standing practice has been to comply with those interim measures. That is what is more important. With full respect to Policy Exchange and Professor Ekins, that is all very interesting, but what is the Government’s view? I do not think that what we are getting out of this whole affair is finding, among this thicket of confusion, what the position of this current British Government is on whether interim measures from Strasbourg should be observed. Indeed, on the Rwanda case, they did observe them, so that is quite different from commentary from Policy Exchange.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am grateful for that short intervention. I am now not sure whether I am intervening on the noble Baroness’s speech or she is intervening on mine but she made a couple of points. I do not know whether she has seen my notes because I was going to come to the state practice point in a moment. Frankly, I should not really give this away but that point is probably the best point against the arguments that I am running. I am a little surprised that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, did not mention it but I shall do so; it is the best point. I am not speaking for the Government so I am not going to divine what is in the mind of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, or that of the Minister who will respond; they can speak for themselves and I will speak for myself.

What I was saying is twofold. First, I was not saying that there are no circumstances in which you cannot justify a Rule 39 order. I thought I had made it clear that, if you can justify it properly under Article 34 in the particular circumstances of the case—such as a death penalty case—and there are proper natural justice provisions, it could be justified. That is my first point.

My second point is that the mere fact that states abide by Rule 39 indications will not, I suggest, be enough for state practice as a matter of international law. The fact that a court tells me to do X and I do it does not show that I accept that the court has jurisdiction to tell me to do it. I might choose to do it because I do not want to pick a fight with the court. One has to find a more detailed and forthright statement that is sufficiently unambiguous, and then look at that coupled with everything else.

I have delayed the Committee long enough. On this point, I direct the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to Policy Exchange, on which she is absolutely right. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, was picked up and dealt with by Professor Ekins in that report.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Before I give way, may I make one other short point? I respectfully suggest that state practice cannot give a court jurisdiction when it does not have it. All state practice can do is go to the interpretation of a treaty. It does not go to the creation of a power or a jurisdiction; that point may not be one to discuss as the clock strikes midnight, but now is a good time for me to give way to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I draw his attention to the current, as of today, UK Visas and Immigration guidance, Judicial Reviews, Injunctions and Applications to the European Court of Human Rights. Where it deals with Rule 39, it says that

“a Rule 39 indication is similar to an Administrative Court … injunction but is”,

to state the obvious, made by the European Court of Human Rights. It goes on:

“Where you have been notified that a rule 39 indication has been made, you must … defer removal immediately”


and,

“where the person is detained, make sure this development is considered in relation to any decision to continue with detention”.

In other words, in their current guidance on the subjects that we are concerned with, the Government regard these Rule 39 rulings as binding. That is what the guidance tells the members of the public who have bothered to look at the Government’s own website this evening, as I have.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I think that goes back to the point I was making a moment ago. With the greatest respect—I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is going to intervene; I will give way if he wants to do so, of course.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. It strikes me, in reading this clause, that it proceeds on the basis that the UK is bound by the decision. I greatly respect the analysis that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has given us—I am very much in sympathy with it—but, like it or not, the Government’s position has been that it is binding. That is why the clause is so carefully drafted.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

On that, I entirely agree: the clause is very carefully drafted. The Government’s position—as I understand it and I will stop in a moment so we can actually hear from the person we want to hear from, the Minister—is first that they wish to, and will always, abide by international law. Secondly, it gives the Minister a discretion in some circumstances not to abide by Rule 39 orders. It seems to me that if one puts those together the Government’s position has to be that there are at least some circumstances in which you do not abide by a Rule 39 order without breaching international law; otherwise, the two propositions which I set out cannot be put together.

I hope that is an answer to the noble and learned Lord’s question. I am not sure whether the smile indicates it is or is not—

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I think we really have to hear from the Minister, frankly. The clause does set out the various objections and by our jurisprudence the procedures are very defective and I can well understand why one is very uneasy about the whole structure of the rule. The Minister really has to explain the Government’s position and I very much agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, that that question needs to be answered.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

In which case, I will give one final statement before I finish. On this we all agree—the answer to this issue, I suggest, lies ultimately in Reykjavik. The answer lies in the engagement between this Government and other Governments with the Strasbourg court to improve the jurisprudence, to set the jurisdiction on a proper footing and to improve the procedures. In that way, for those of us—and I include myself—who want this country to remain part of the convention and play a part in its jurisprudence, that is surely the way forward.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

If I understand the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, correctly, he is saying that the solution is not Clause 53 but to engage with the court to ensure that proper processes are followed when it comes to Rule 39 rulings.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My point is that I am supporting Clause 53. It is not inconsistent to say that we will have Clause 53 and will engage with the court.