Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Etherton]

68: Clause 14, page 17, line 41, at end insert—
“(c) fails to protect its nationals, including in particular those who have a protected characteristic within the meaning of Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Equality Act 2010 which is innate or immutable, from persecution by third parties who are not agents of the member State.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that there are exceptional circumstances where, even though there is no overt persecution by the State or state agents, the conduct of others towards a person which the State has failed to prevent can amount to persecution within the Refugee Convention.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

In moving the amendment in my name, I should say that I have also put my name to the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to exclude Clause 15 from the Bill—but I will wait to hear him and support him when he proceeds with that.

I will make a relatively short point in relation to Amendment 68. The provision relates to Clause 14 and the section of the Bill that deals with inadmissibility. Clause 14 is concerned with amending the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the exclusion in that Act, by way of amendment, of asylum claims by EU nationals. I am not certain why they have been selected for exclusion, but I assume it is because EU member states are bound by the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, the provisions of which, for the most part, mirror the European Convention on Human Rights and, in some respects, go beyond it. In Article 1A(2) of the refugee convention, persecution is obviously tied to the question of human rights.

The point I wish to make is simply that, under the new clause proposed by Clause 14—headed “Asylum claims by EU nationals”—to amend the 2002 Act, the Secretary of State

“must declare an asylum claim made by a person who is a national of a member State inadmissible.”

Proposed new Clause 80A(4) states:

“Subsection (1) does not apply if there are exceptional circumstances as a result of which the Secretary of State considers that the claim ought to be considered.”


Proposed new subsection (5) states:

“For the purposes of subsection (4) exceptional circumstances include”—


and then it lists a series of matters under proposed new paragraphs (a) and (b), with three proposed sub-paragraphs under (b).

Basically, short the point is that there can be persecution for the purposes of entitlement to refugee status under the convention even where the state itself is not the protagonist of the persecutory conduct but allows citizens, residents or others present within its territory to persecute particular groups or persons who otherwise fulfil the requirements of the convention’s definition of “refugee”. My amendment proposes adding to the exceptional circumstances in proposed new Clause 80A(5) the circumstance when the EU member state

“fails to protect its nationals, including in particular those who have a protected characteristic within the … Equality Act 2010 which is innate or immutable, from persecution by third parties who are not agents of the member State.”

This is not a fanciful matter. If we take the case of Hungary, which has been moving more and more to the right in political terms, we see a campaign that is based on undisguised anti-Semitism against George Soros’s support for universities there, and a constant encouragement by the Government there of homophobia and attacks on LGBTQI+ people. So it is not a fanciful point, and I suggest that it should plainly be added as one of the exceptional circumstances. That is the point. On that basis, I beg to move.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, notwithstanding the fact that we have touched on some of these issues before, we have to face them head-on in this group of amendments. The issue is whether an asylum seeker has to claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach, and we might as well deal with that head-on because it is fundamental to many of our criticisms of the Bill. Bearing in mind the Chief Whip’s request that we keep our speeches short, I shall endeavour to do that, but this issue is so important.

First, there is a practical issue in all this. If we had demanded that asylum seekers should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach, the result would have been that every Syrian who reached Europe would have had to have stayed in Greece, Italy or Malta. That is clearly not a practical way for the world to function. If we make demands on where asylum seekers should claim asylum, so of course can other countries. It is quite wrong in practice.

The principle is perhaps more important; that principle being the Geneva convention of 1951. I would have thought it would be widely acceptable to say that the UNHCR was the guardian of the 1951 convention, and if the UNHCR has a view on that convention then that should surely have some influence on the Government—after all, the convention has been fundamental to human rights for asylum seekers over the last 70 years or so. The UNHCR has made it very clear that it disagrees with the argument that refugees should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach, saying that:

“Requiring refugees to seek protection in the first safe country to which they flee would undermine the global humanitarian and cooperative principles on which the refugee system is founded”.


No country close to the main countries of origin of refugees would ever have considered signing a convention if it meant that they would assume total and entire responsibility for all refugees. These are responsibilities that the international community has to share, and that is implicit in the 1951 convention. Therefore, some of the amendments, although they are in my name, probably seem to be compromising a fundamental objection in principle to what the Government are seeking to do. For example, my explanatory statement on Amendment 70 says that

“asylum seekers should not be removed to a safe third State other than the one with which they are considered to have a connection.”

One can argue about that. The Bill says clearly what it means to have a connection, and some of its definitions are okay but some are not.

Amendment 71 says that there must be a return arrangement in place. Clearly, unless we have a return arrangement in place with other countries, we cannot even begin to consider returning people. I say to the Minister: do we have a return arrangement with any country? If people come from France, across the channel—we all deplore the people traffickers and how they endanger lives, and the tragic loss of life that we have seen in the channel—unless there is an agreement with France, what do we do? If they have come from France, can we send them back to France or not? The French will not accept that. Incidentally, judging from this morning’s papers, our relationship with France is getting worse and worse; that is something that should be put right anyway, regardless of other considerations. Surely there must be a return arrangement in place, otherwise we cannot even consider this.

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Finally, providing sanctuary to those fleeing war and persecution and to those trying to get their loved ones to safety, is an international effort. We are proud of that effort, but we by no means do more than our share. I simply ask the Government: what would happen if every state were to pass a clause absolving them of responsibility for months at a time in the hope that someone else might be able to deal with it?

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I support the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to exclude Clause 15 from the Bill, for a wide variety of reasons.

First, if a claim is deemed to be inadmissible but to satisfy the convention, that seems effectively to be saying that the person is not a refugee within the convention. That does not make sense. If they satisfy the definition of refugee within the convention, they have a claim. It can be dismissed, and then there will be a right of appeal. What cannot be said—which is effectively what is being said here—is “We’re not going to hear you at all, even though you are a refugee within the strict terms of the convention”. So I take issue with the very idea of inadmissibility with no right of recourse at all by way of an appeal.

Secondly, the terms of Section 80C to be inserted into the 2002 Act in relation to four and five seem completely contrary to both the wording and principle of the convention. My understanding of Clause 4 is that it is, in some way or other, intended to be made analogous to the Dublin III regulation.

There are a number of points to be made about that. First, we are no longer part of the EU or of the Dublin regulation. Perhaps more importantly, EU member states themselves have recognised that the Dublin regulation has failed. On 23 September 2020, the European Commission adopted what they called the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, following consultations with the European Parliament, member states and various stakeholders. The PR notice from the European Commission, which is available on the internet, states:

“The new pact recognises that no member state should shoulder a disproportionate responsibility and that all member states should contribute to solidarity on a constant basis.”


It has failed because the effect of the Dublin regulation, when strictly applied, means that certain states are overwhelmed with refugees because they are inevitably the first state on the way through to somewhere else. What is happening at the moment is that the Commission is proposing to replace the Dublin III regulation with a new regulation on asylum and migration management. So, frankly, there is no point in referring to the Dublin III regulation. It has failed in practice, and we should not be emulating it.

Furthermore, proposed Section 80C(4) is inconsistent with the terms of the convention itself. There is nothing in the convention, in Article 31 or anywhere else that makes this “connection” mean that a refugee claim would fail.

I have another point about condition 4, and I would welcome clarification from the Minister on it. The description that would render a connection with the state, and therefore the claim, inadmissible is exactly the same as the definition of arriving “directly” for the purposes of Clause 11. Clause 36 effectively amplifies Clause 11 and paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the convention. It says:

“A refugee is not to be taken to have come to the United Kingdom directly from a country where their life or freedom was threatened if, in coming from that country, they stopped in another country outside the United Kingdom, unless they can show that they could not reasonably be expected to have sought protection under the Refugee Convention in that country.”


On this particular approach, you are never going to get anywhere near Clause 11 because you will be knocked out under Clause 15—so I do not understand that contradiction. Once you fall within condition 3, which is the same as condition 4—which is the same as not arriving directly under the definition in Clause 36 —you are knocked out. So which is it—are you knocked out or do you still have some right under Clause 11, admittedly, to show that you could with good cause fall within either group 1 or even group 2? I am left confused by that.

Condition 5, on which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and others have eloquently spoken, provides

“that, in the claimant’s particular circumstances, it would have been reasonable to expect them to have made a relevant claim to the safe third State (instead of making a claim in the United Kingdom).”

Nothing in the Dublin regulations says that, even if they were to apply—and there is certainly nothing in the convention that would make such a condition apply to exclude a claim.

So I support the suggestion that Clause 15 should be excluded because, with respect, it seems to be a muddle in a whole series of different respects—legally, practically and in principle.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords again for speaking to this group of amendments. I appreciate the thoughtful and well-meaning intent of Amendment 68, but we cannot accept it. The definition of “persecution” is well established and must be on the basis of a refugee convention reason—namely, race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. It is reiterated in Clause 30(1)(c) that persecution can be committed by

“any non-State actor”

where the state is

“unable or unwilling to provide reasonable protection”.

Given the level of protection afforded to EU nationals, through fundamental rights and freedoms, EU countries are inherently safe, and individuals are exceptionally unlikely to be at risk of persecution. If individuals experience discrimination, they can seek protection from within their country of nationality.

That said, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, might be comforted to have it confirmed that our processes already acknowledge that it may not be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to EU national claimants in exceptional circumstances. The list of exceptional circumstances included in the provisions is not exhaustive; it looks to protect individuals in the very rare circumstances that a member state is at risk of a serious breach or where there exists a serious and persistent breach of the values under the Treaty on European Union, including equality.

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[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, I will not move Amendment 76 and will consider the Minister’s comments on it.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the Minister for battling so valiantly in relation to all the points that have been raised, and am extremely grateful for all the amendments that have been spoken to. What has become clear from this discussion is that there are, on any footing, immense practical difficulties in relation to Clauses 14 and 15. In effect, I think the Minister accepted that it is not going to be straightforward to repatriate people with inadmissible claims to other EU countries without any agreement. The expression “window dressing” has been used. It is going to be very difficult.

I hope I correctly interpreted the Minister in getting my crumb of comfort from Clause 14. I think she reassured me that the exceptional circumstances specified were not closed. As a statement from the Dispatch Box in Parliament, recorded in Hansard, that is quite an important point. If Clause 14 remains, it will give at least some people some succour at any event, particularly in the circumstances I mentioned: an EU country which does not prevent those who are citizens, resident or present within the country, from persecuting others belonging to a social group, or for some other reason.

I am afraid that the overwhelming sentiment—and certainly my view—was that whatever may be said by the Government about adopting existing expressions which are generally used or have been previously used, in vital respects Clause 15 is inconsistent with the convention. This is not in a complex way, but in an obvious way. I am sorry to say this, but to my mind as a lawyer it is an egregious contravention of the convention. I ask the Minister about, for example, condition 5 in new Section 80C. Not only is that not in the convention, but I do not know where it comes from. I can see it is there as a matter of policy but it is not in the Dublin regulations, so far as I can recall. As I pointed out, in any event the Dublin regulations are being revised, so there is no point in going back to them.

There are a number of difficulties. There is one point I was hoping the Minister might be able to reply to that she has not. I would be grateful if she could explain perhaps in communication with me. How does one reconcile condition 4, which is failing to make a claim in the first country—thereby rendering you having a connection and the possibility of inadmissibility—with one of the requirements under Clause 11 to satisfy Article 31, which is arriving directly, because you never get there if you are rendered inadmissible? At the moment I do not see how the two fit together. I am not suggesting it is a straightforward and easy point; it is a lawyer’s point, but an important one. It shows a muddle somewhere along the line. But, on the basis of everything that has been said, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 68 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 83 and 88, which I have co-signed, and Amendment 96, but there are some other superb amendments. I am not a lawyer—I am not going to apologise for that because I have had an interesting life— but I did get a lawyer to look at this for me; not yet a QC, but obviously it is a possibility. Their thoughts were that these evidence notices treat asylum seekers like criminals—in fact, worse than criminals; they treat asylum seekers as if they were dreadful criminals.

In a criminal case, late evidence might be treated as less compelling than if it had been raised earlier on, but evidence is evidence, and if evidence demonstrates a fact, then that is a fact. Facts do not care about your timescales. Rather than allowing a tribunal to determine how much weight to give the evidence, Clause 25 forces them to give minimal weight if the evidence is supposedly late. Even if it were the most compelling evidence, a tribunal would be forced to give it minimal weight. That really cannot be right; it is not justice. I cannot believe the Minister will stand up—in a few moments, we hope—and say that this is justice. This is an artificial exercise. It is not founded in justice. It is a purely political venture to make it harder and harder for people to claim asylum, and to make it easier for them to be deported. It must be stopped.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 82, 84, 86, 90, 91 and 96. I would like to start by taking up the point about the so-called principle specified in Clause 25(2) of the Bill

“that minimal weight should be given to the evidence.”

I am not aware of such a principle. Of course, there can be times when time limits are imposed in a court—and perhaps it can be done by statute—for evidence to be delivered, and if it is not delivered by that time it is excluded. But once evidence is before the court, as the Minister will appreciate, it has to be taken into account even if the relevant evidence—it may be documentary evidence—has been obtained improperly, when it should not have been disclosed or it has been disclosed inadvertently. Once the evidence is there, it is taken into account and given such weight as it is due. We do not have a principle in this country, so far as I am aware, of simply saying that if evidence is late we are not going to have regard to it. That seems to be a denial of justice. I certainly support all those who have spoken against that so-called principle.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his introduction to the difficulties faced by minority groups, particularly LGBTQI groups, in relation to the giving of evidence. In deciding whether there is good cause for late evidence, or for failure to comply in a timely manner with a priority removal notice and so on, all my amendments—apart from one—put forward that there be, on the face of the Bill, a provision so that the difficulties and particular situations of people who have a protected innate or immutable characteristic must be taken into account. I went into this, your Lordships will remember, on Tuesday in relation to Clause 11, and there is no need for me to repeat it. It has been put very well by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Cashman.

Apart from all the difficulties of having discreet, secret lives—particularly in the case of the LGBTQI community—and therefore perhaps not having any evidence as such, seeking information when it is required, and corroboration, from people back in the country from which asylum seekers come poses great difficulties. An asylum seeker will not want to implicate his or her family or friends, because they could suffer as a result. There are all sorts of adverse consequences as a result of conduct that is disapproved of in the many countries that proscribe sex between same-sex couples. There is a combination of a whole variety of things, in addition to all those other points made by people about the difficulty of coming to terms with one’s sexuality.

The same applies for single women. They have many similar problems: the shame of having left an abusive relationship, the shame on the family, the consequences for the family, the clandestine nature necessarily required for those women to come here—and then they may face a male authoritative figure. All these grave difficulties have to be taken into account.

I explained why this ought to be on the face of the Bill, despite the fact that the noble Baroness the Minister said it would all be dealt with in guidance, because, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, said, the record of the Home Office in relation to this is not good. I gave the statistics on Clause 11 earlier this week. In 2018, 29% of LGBTQI applicants were permitted asylum, but on appeal, taking the average from 2015 to 2018, nearly 40% of the appeals succeeded. That reality reflects the grave difficulties and the disbelief faced by these desperate people. That is why noble Lords will see in those amendments—apart from one; I will come to Amendment 91—that they are all to do with putting on the face of the Bill the need to take into account, wherever there is a reference to reasonable cause or what is practicable, the particular protected characteristic of the asylum seeker.

The one that is different is Amendment 91, which is one of the two amendments I have to Clause 22. Clause 22 provides for a new Section 82A to be inserted into the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and provides for “Expedited appeal to Upper Tribunal in certain cases”. For there to be an expedited appeal, the Secretary of State has to

“certify P’s right of appeal”—

that is, the person served with the priority removal notice—as being appropriate

“unless satisfied that there were good reasons for P making the claim on or after the PRN cut-off date (and P’s right of appeal may not be certified if the Secretary of State is satisfied that there were good reasons)”.

What is important is that, whatever the Secretary of State has to be satisfied about, they should be reasonably satisfied. My amendment is to impose a requirement that the Secretary of State can certify the right of appeal under this clause only if satisfied on reasonable grounds, so that there is some principle that can be examined in the light of the particular facts of the case.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained, Clause 17 has the potential for time limits to be placed on the submission of evidence in support of an asylum claim. I am immediately reminded of the criminal caution in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which says:

“You do not have to say anything. But, it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court.”


There is no time limit, you notice. I accept it is not a perfect analogy, because we have already established that asylum seekers are not illegal immigrants and, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, this should be an inquisitorial process not an adversarial one.

In this context, a notice served on a claimant saying something along the lines of “It may harm your claim if you do not provide evidence in support of your claim as soon as it is becomes available” seems reasonable. As in criminal cases, it should be left to the court, or in this case the tribunal, to place whatever weight it thinks appropriate on the evidence based on when it was submitted, and if it considers that the timing of submissions reflects on the credibility of the claimant or not. Placing a deadline for the submission of evidence seems completely arbitrary and unreasonable, hence Amendments 78 to 81. How long it takes to secure, collate, and submit evidence will be different in every case, and may be especially delayed in the case of vulnerable claimants for the reasons we discussed on Tuesday, and the reasons noble Lords have explained this afternoon, hence Amendments 78 and 82. Even if the Government want to instruct officials, why not do this through the Immigration Rules, as has always been done?

The rest of Clauses 17 and 18 seem superfluous. To instruct a judicial body by primary legislation what conclusions it must come to when it is presented with evidence appears unnecessary, unreasonable and unconstitutional. I say that not knowing anything about the constitution, but thinking in terms of separation of powers between Executive and judiciary.

Clauses 19, 20 and 21 relate to priority removal notices. These too set an arbitrary deadline that must be complied with—in this case, after which a person is liable to be removed and deported. I say that, but Clause 20(4) says:

“A priority removal notice remains in force … even if the PRN recipient ceases to be liable to … deportation”.


Amendment 87 asks why that is. I am guessing that it is to avoid having to serve a separate evidence notice.

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[Lord Etherton (CB)]

Is the Minister able to give an assurance that this guidance, which has been referred to a great deal, rather than putting what I would describe as cautionary provisions in the Act itself, will be ready before the Act comes into force and will be made sufficiently public so that there can be discussion and consideration of it by the general public?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I think I was asked a similar question, in a different context, on the police Bill. I will give the same answer, not least because I am conscious that a lot of these provisions are actually Home Office provisions. I can assure the noble and learned Lord that I will write to him with the answer to that question, so that when this matter comes back he will be in possession of the answer—rather than make an educated guess, which might turn out to be slightly inaccurate, from the Dispatch Box. I hope that is sufficient.

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[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is right to say this is the detained fast track brought back again, in effect. I simply say that this is a very good idea. Leaving aside the detail, if experienced officials can see that a case is really very unlikely to be a genuine one, there should be a fast track and the person should be detained. The details can be sorted, but it is the right way to go. It is what we need to do, given the enormous wave of applications we are now receiving.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I speak in support of the amendment in my name in relation to Clause 26, Amendment 98. It is that

“The Secretary of State may not give … certification if the appellant claims to have a protected characteristic … which is innate or immutable, and that the characteristic is relevant to the appeal.”


Cases in which the appellant is an asylum seeker who has an innate and immutable protected characteristic that is relevant to the appeal are not appropriate for the very short timescale set out in Clause 26(3). I think the noble Lord the Minister himself acknowledged, and the noble Baroness the Minister accepted earlier, that many of these cases raise difficult issues and that guidance that we wait to see will be issued to provide assistance. The paradigm case again is that of the LGBTQ+ asylum seeker. Establishing whether or not they are in fact LGBTQ, the adequacy of the evidence in support on that issue—whether or not there is a genuine fear of persecution because of that characteristic, whether what they have done in relation to pursuing their claim has been reasonable, even if it was not always in compliance with the required time limits—makes their appeal inappropriate for an accelerated appeal.

Once again I say, as others have said, that this conclusion is reinforced by the significant proportion of successful appeals that have been brought by LGB refugees. That is something we simply cannot ignore. Nearly 40% of appeals taken in the period from 2015 to 2018 succeeded.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, for the reasons I explained in a previous group, accelerating appeals processes is not the solution to the last-minute successful appeals against removal or deportation. Rather, it is improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office. Clause 26 is another clause with the wrong solution to the problem, and while Amendments 97 to 99 seek to limit the damage that accelerated appeals might cause, it is more lipstick on more pigs.

To my shame, I am struggling to keep my head above water on this Bill and asking that Clause 27 does not stand part of the Bill does not go far enough. Already the Home Secretary can certify that the decision to remove or deport can be appealed against only once the claimant has been removed or deported, which makes such an appeal more difficult. We should have tabled an amendment to remove that power, let alone Clause 27, which proposes to go one step further, allowing the Secretary of State to certify that a claim cannot be appealed against at all if she thinks it is clearly unfounded. That should be a decision for the tribunal and not the Executive.