Arbitration Bill [HL]

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Second reading committee
Tuesday 19th December 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, for his fascinating historical overview from a personal perspective. For my part, I consider the Bill to be good and extremely useful, and I congratulate the Government on seeking to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations so quickly after the publication of its final report.

There is one matter I should like to raise for the Government to consider, but I want to emphasise that it is not my intention that there should be any amendment to the Bill. The issue concerns discrimination in arbitrator appointments. This matter was raised by the Law Commission in its consultations, in which it observed that women were up to three times less likely to be appointed than men. Consultees had different views about this but in the end the Law Commission decided that there should be no anti-discrimination provision in its draft Bill.

I ask the Government to consider, perhaps when there is next a review of the Equality Act 2010, whether there might be some provision in that Act concerning discrimination in arbitrator appointments. I recognise that it would be important for the Government to carry out a consultation prior to any decision on the matter to see whether such a provision would for technical or other reasons place the United Kingdom at a disadvantage in competing with other countries for the conduct of international arbitrations.

As I have said, this should not be the subject of an amendment to the Bill, not least because it is proceeding in accordance with the special expedited procedure for uncontentious Law Commission Bills. It is a matter for future consideration, possibly in relation to the Equality Act.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th April 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Etherton]

81: Clause 180, page 164, line 33, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) constitutes the offences of fraud, false accounting, money laundering or offences under any binding sanctions regime, whether at common law or in primary or secondary legislation,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for a shorter and more focused definition of “economic crime” than is presently to be found in Clause 180(1)(a) and Schedule 9.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I preface my remarks by emphasising that what I say about this amendment and the other amendments in this group is not intended in any way to qualify or undermine the broad objectives of the legislation. They are intended to make the legislation better.

I will focus for the moment on Amendment 81, which addresses the definition of economic crime to be found in Clause 180. The amendment has the support of the Law Society and the Bar Council. In the current wording of the Bill, the definition relates to only three matters. The first is the disclosure obligations under Clauses 175 to 178; the second is that by virtue of Clause 181(2C) it applies to the Law Society’s powers to impose a fine in cases relating to economic crime; the third circumstance is that it applies to the new legal services regulatory objective in Clause 183 of promoting the prevention and detection of economic crime.

Under the current definition in Clause 180, economic crime is defined by reference to a long list of offences, common law and statutory, extending over two and a half pages in Schedule 9. The definition of economic crime would be further extended under the Government’s proposal to add a new Schedule 10, which is directed to the failure to prevent fraud. As we heard in the last debate, although I think it is right to say that none of the amendments relating to SLAPPs is tied to any definition of economic crime in the existing Bill, SLAPPs would have to be in some way connected to some definition, and that may be wider than one would otherwise contemplate economic crime to comprise.

The definition of economic crime in Clause 180, by reference to Schedule 9, and its extended meaning by reference to the proposed Schedule 10, raises the fundamental question of what this Bill is actually about. Under Schedule 9, for example, it includes theft, and under the proposed Schedule 10 it includes false statements by company directors.

The Government’s intention, however, as I understood it, is that the Bill is directed to a specific type of criminal activity—fraud, false accounting, money laundering and the breaches of sanctions. Those are the activities which Amendment 81 sets out. Those elements were identified in a meeting which I had with Dame Margaret Hodge, who has played a significant role in the promotion of this type of legislation. Those activities—fraud, false accounting, money laundering and the breach of sanctions—chime with the Bill’s three key objectives, mentioned at the very beginning of the Explanatory Notes, which are focused on the abuse of corporate structures. That is what the Bill is about: the abuse of corporate structures to launder money, hide assets obtained unlawfully and prevent restitution of such assets by making them irrecoverable. To include theft under Schedule 9 goes far outside that type of activity, as it would embrace, for example, a straightforward theft of any object in any circumstances, which has no economic significance other than the loss of value to the owner of the object.

Further, Section 19 of the Theft Act 1968, mentioned in Schedule 10, as I have said, makes it an offence for any officer of a company or unincorporated association knowingly to make a false or deceptive written account with intent to deceive members or creditors. This is a very broad offence, and again not necessarily related to the objectives of the Bill, as they are explained in the Explanatory Notes, and as I understand them to be. I suggest, therefore, that the Government should focus on the real objective of the Bill and define economic crime accordingly and consistently, rather than by reference to a long list of common-law and statutory offences, which are diffuse and wide-ranging.

That brings me to my next point, which concerns good legislation and proper drafting. To define economic crime by reference to a wide range of offences over two and a half pages is not good drafting.

It complicates rather than simplifies the law. It also gives rise to potential difficulties if any legislation mentioned is repealed and re-enacted in the same or a different way. Of course, in these circumstances there is provision by way of regulation for the Secretary of State to add to or detract from Schedule 9, but there has to be an alteration. By defining the constituent elements of economic crime, as is done in Amendment 81, there is a clear steer as to the objectives of the Bill, and any change in legislative offences will not require an alteration to the Bill. Schedule 9 and proposed Schedule 10 would cease to be relevant. Amendments 82, 83 and 84 are all consequential on Amendment 81.

I now move to the next substantive amendment to Clause 183, which introduces a new regulatory objective into the Legal Services Act. Amendment 90 is signed by my noble friends Lord Verdirame and Lord Pannick and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. Unfortunately, none of them is able to be here today. I am very grateful to them for their support. This amendment also has the support of the Law Society and the Bar Council. Currently, the provisions in Clause 183 relating to the new regulatory objective are far too wide in the following respects. First, it is not confined to the conduct of the lawyer but is expressed as general enforcement of the law relating to economic crime. It turns the regulator of legal services into a general enforcer of the law. Secondly, Clause 183 is not confined to legal activity as defined by Section 10 of the Legal Services Act 2007. In broad terms, legal activity is defined in the 2007 Act to mean the conduct of litigation, advocacy and legal advice and assistance.

Thirdly, the clause does not focus on what is critical, namely the misconduct of the lawyer in this context, which is facilitation or collusion by that lawyer in economic crime. Facilitation or collusion by lawyers in economic crime are the principal areas of misconduct in relation to lawyers mentioned to me in my meeting with Dame Margaret Hodge. Fourthly, it does not make clear that the proposed legislation on economic crime does not trump legal professional privilege where that applies or to the “professional principles”, which will remain one of the regulatory objectives under Section 1 of the 2007 Act.

Just addressing this last point, in any legal proceedings legal professional privilege precludes the usual obligation to disclose and permit the inspection of all relevant documents. The privilege, which is the privilege of the client, not their lawyer, is a fundamental common-law constitutional right on which the proper administration of justice rests. There are two aspects to the right—first, legal advice privilege, which applies to communications made confidentially for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice, whether or not litigation is contemplated or pending and, secondly, litigation privilege, which applies to communications which come into existence for the purpose of litigation.

--- Later in debate ---

For those reasons, while completely understanding why the amendments have been proposed, I respectfully ask the noble and learned Lord not to press Amendment 90 or his other amendments, and to withdraw Amendment 81.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

Perhaps I should first take the opportunity to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I think the answer is that if somebody goes to a solicitor for advice on a potential course of action, it may be clear that it is unlawful, in which case legal professional principles would require the solicitor not to act for that client in relation to that. But there may be gradations of arguability about whether it is lawful or not; I gave the example of things going up and down, and he would be perfectly entitled to advise on those degrees of legality and prospects of success in litigation. My point was simply that that should not render the solicitor in any way concerned about committing any breach of a regulatory duty. That is the way it would work, and it would be the same for a barrister.

Turning to the Minister’s comments, I am afraid he has not really addressed the point that I made, which is that, in paragraph 2, the Explanatory Notes say that the Bill has three key objectives. That is the Government’s definition of what it is about:

“a. Prevent organised criminals, fraudsters, kleptocrats and terrorists from using companies and other corporate entities to abuse the UK’s open economy. This Bill will reform the powers of the Registrar of Companies and the legal framework for limited partnerships in order to safeguard businesses”.


Then it deals with strengthening

“the UK’s broader response to economic crime”

by seizure of crypto assets and so on. The extension of the definition of economic crime to matters such as I mentioned, for example representations of directors or theft, is way outside that. It is nothing to do with London as the place where people launder money, for example, and I do not accept that there may be some difficulty in distinguishing fraud and theft. A fraud may involve a theft, but fraud is quite clear as to what it is.

Amendment 81 is not an attempt to narrow the definition, except in relation to what I understand to be the essential elements: fraud, false accounting, money laundering and offences under any binding sanctions regime. If it is something more than that, then that ought to appear in the Explanatory Notes or be clearly stated by the Minister at the Dispatch Box. It should be made clear. You could combine a statement such as that—the broad objectives—together with various bits of legislation, but actually the advantage of expressing it in these generic ways is that it would make it far simpler and easier to understand, and would not require changes to the Act when there are legislative changes, with regard to the various offences currently listed in Schedule 9.

Having said that, I have made perfectly clear what the primary objections are to the new regulatory offence, which does not concentrate on the actual personal collusion or facilitation by the solicitor but could cover, for example, information that the solicitor receives in the course of advice from the client about some third party—because it is that wide, I say it would be an abuse of the legal regulation to leave it in that way rather than confine it to a personal involvement.

But I have made those points. I have listened to the Minister and certainly, so far as today is concerned, I beg leave to withdraw the amendments.

Amendment 81 withdrawn.

Human Rights Act 1998

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great privilege to participate in this debate, with so many moving and informative speeches. I want to mention in particular the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, which I thought graphically highlighted the way in which minorities, particularly the LGBTQ+ communities, have been assisted by having to go to Strasbourg—but, before the Human Rights Act came into force, at tremendous cost and with an inevitable delay.

Mention has been by a number of people of the now celebrated case of Smith and Grady, and a second case, Lustig-Prean and Beckett, against the United Kingdom, in which the brave claimants, all of whom had served in the military, had been dismissed from the military simply because they were of a homosexual orientation, not because they committed any sexual acts. In Strasbourg they successfully challenged the decision and policy of the Government, having failed, inevitably, before the divisional court and the Court of Appeal in this country. It was with great prescience that my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who gave the leading judgment—in fact, the only judgment—in the divisional court, said that the Ministry was fighting against the tide of opinion, and it was only a matter of time before the policy would be revoked at an international level—and that is indeed what happened. But it took six years for that to be achieved, and at great cost.

I want to reinforce and support everything that was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, about this remarkable Act—and the Human Rights Act is a remarkable Act. It melds together all sorts of apparently conflicting aspects of our constitution, and it works in a way which is not reflected anywhere else. She described it as a unique British invention. I would say it is a masterpiece, when you look at the way it is worked, of statutory provision.

I just want to reinforce that by looking at the three objectives that the Government set out for what they wanted to achieve through this Act and the way that they have been very effectively achieved. The first, on which almost everybody here has spoken, is bringing rights home. They have been brought home in the form of the obligation in Section 6 of the Act that:

“It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.”


We have to remember that before this Act, you could challenge the actions and policies of a public body by judicial review in our domestic courts only on the basis of so-called irrationality—the Wednesbury principle. There was no ability here to claim damages or an injunction for breach of a convention right.

However, “bringing rights home” here was to be achieved in a way that would ensure that the United Kingdom observed its international obligations as a member of the Council of Europe. There was to be a high degree of alignment between domestic law and the convention, and no major gaps. That is what has been achieved by Sections 3 and 4.

I am afraid that I do not agree with the analysis of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in his criticisms of either Ghaidan or indeed Section 2. That section says that the courts, when considering a convention issue, are to take Strasbourg into account. This has served to our advantage to enable what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, described as judicial dialogue, which has worked in our favour in cases where Strasbourg has failed to appreciate particular features of our own domestic courts and has then subsequently changed its jurisprudence.

As regards interpreting our provisions consistently so far as possible with the conventions concerned, it has always been open to the Government—and it is still open to the Government in any case, always—to put through Parliament legislation overturning decisions that they do not like.

Finally, and most importantly, parliamentary sovereignty was to be retained and reinforced. That is the effect of Section 4 of the 1998 Act, which provides for the courts a discretion to make a declaration of incompatibility but not to strike down or render invalid a piece of legislation.

At the end of the day, I would simply say that, as Sir Peter Gross said, having received 150 written submissions and held numerous meetings across the country, very little is wrong with this legislation. Anything that is found to be wrong can be corrected. The proposed new Bill of Rights is not moving forward; unfortunately, it will be moving, retrogradely, backwards.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Report stage
Thursday 31st March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, Amendments 1 to 3 in my name remove the power to make a quashing order prospective only or otherwise to limit its retrospective effect. These amendments replicate amendments tabled in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who unfortunately already had commitments abroad for today when I put down these amendments and so cannot be here.

This debate is not about the power to suspend a quashing order, which in some cases, we agree, may be a reasonable step. However, that is a far cry from a court on the one hand deciding that government action or regulation is unlawful, so that the court is going to make a quashing order, but then on the other hand being empowered to say that past unlawful action must stand, just as if it had been lawful. That is the effect of new subsection (4), which says that

“the impugned act is … upheld in any respect in which … subsection (1)(b) prevents it from being quashed”,

and of new subsection (5), which says that

“it is to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect.”

That is to validate unlawful action that the courts find expressly contravened the law—usually law made by Parliament.

I do not accept that the principle that unlawful action or regulation should be quashed ought to be abandoned simply because there may be hard cases for those who had relied on the law, as they wrongly believed it to be, and may be wrong-footed by the decision that the Government had acted unlawfully. In that category falls the songwriters’ case in 2015, mentioned in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, where those who had innocently copied CDs in the belief that they were entitled to do so were found to have acted on the basis of an unlawful regulation.

Such hard cases may be addressed either by administrative action, where unlawful activity before the law was clarified would go unpunished, or by a suspended quashing order, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and I argued in Committee, giving Parliament the chance to correct any possible injustice, if necessary retrospectively. After all, it is for Parliament to change the law, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, pointed out—not for judges to decide to overlook a failure by government to comply with the law’s requirements.

That completely solves the dilemma described in Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in respect of the case of Ahmed, a terrorist asset-freezing case. The noble and learned Lord specifically suggested in that case that a suspended order would give Parliament the time to introduce fresh, lawful regulations.

Even more important to be weighed in the balance than the risk of hard cases are the fundamental principles that underly judicial review: that government must act within the law, that there must be remedies to correct unlawful action and that judicial review is public law in action. Orders made on judicial review are for everyone, not just the applicant before the court but all affected citizens, past, present and future. Many potential applicants cannot afford to apply for JR or simply do not know they can or how to go about it, yet this proposal would expose them to the consequences of unlawful executive action, even if a later challenge by a better-funded and more savvy litigant succeeded. If enacted, this new subsection would fire the starting gun on an unseemly race for justice.

It cannot be right for judges to be able to find that, for example, a tax was unlawful and in excess of power, yet to hold—after thousands of citizens may have paid that tax—that they will quash the unlawful regulation but that, because the sums involved were low, it would be disproportionate to repay all those who have paid, and so quash it only prospectively, leaving those who have already paid the tax cheated and out of pocket.

That is not the end of it. What about those who have not paid up? The unlawful regulation and the unwarranted demands remain effective for them, treated, in the words of new subsection (5),

“for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect.”

The Minister’s only answer to this conundrum in Committee was that it was

“almost incomprehensible that a court would use”

the power

“where people have paid taxes that were necessarily unlawfully raised”.—[Official Report, 21/2/22; col. 68.]

That is no answer, especially in the light of the presumption that the courts should generally exercise the power. The only respectable answer is not to give them the power.

In the environmental field, this power would probably put us in breach of our international obligations. We are bound by Article 9 of the Aarhus convention of 1998 to accord to all members of the public with a sufficient interest the right

“to challenge acts and omissions by … public authorities which contravene … national law relating to the environment.”

We are further bound by paragraph 4 of the same article to provide them all with “adequate and effective remedies” for infringement. Environmental law is central to public law and frequently the subject of judicial review. We would not be complying with the convention by denying members of the public who do not get in first the right to enforce the law. That is what prospective-only quashing orders would do. I doubt that such orders can be an adequate remedy.

Furthermore, in a case involving judicial review of unlawful executive action breaching a citizen’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, this new subsection seems to run the risk of being a denial of the citizen’s Article 13 right to an effective remedy. That article guarantees that:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority”.


I suggest that an effective remedy is denied to a citizen whose right of action is stymied because some other litigant who was quicker off the mark in the race for a remedy has previously been granted a prospective-only quashing order.

This is not, as it has been described by the Government, a case of a harmless discretionary power in the judicial toolbox. It is a case of handing to judges the power to validate actions of the Executive that the court finds violated the laws passed by Parliament.

I will say very little about the presumption that is the subject of the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Pannick and Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I add only this to what I said in Committee: the presumption makes the denial of justice inherent in Clause 1(1) that much worse because, however many times the Minister may describe this as a “low-level” presumption and seek to persuade your Lordships that judges will always find ways not to implement it, the fact remains that it sets a default position to which conscientious judges are bound in law to adhere. In the absence of a finding of good reason not to do so, and provided that “adequate” redresses are offered

“in relation to the relevant defect”,

the court must both suspend a quashing order and remove, or limit, its retrospectivity. One is entitled to ask: “adequate redress” for whom? What does that expression mean, especially for the luckless loser in the race for justice which I mentioned? I do not believe that, to date, the Minister has given an adequate response. I beg to move.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

In the absences of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who has unfortunately caught Covid, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I shall speak to Amendment 4. This would remove subsections (9) and (10) of the proposed new Section 29A of the Senior Courts Act 1981. This amendment is supported by the Law Society, the Bar Council, the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law and the Public Law Project.

Subsections (9) and (10) are not based on any recommendation from the Independent Review of Administrative Law chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. Subsection (9) is either constitutionally dangerous or unnecessary. It reads like a straightforward presumption in favour of making one of the two new quashing orders—a suspended or prospective-only quashing order. If that is a correct reading, it will be for the courts to say what its proper interpretation is. Subsection (9) is constitutionally dangerous and inappropriate as providing a precedent for interference by the Executive with the exercise of judicial discretion. Furthermore, it is contrary to the rule of law in so far as it limits the remedies which are available to set right the unlawfulness of conduct by the state.

In Committee, the Minister said that subsection (9) is not a presumption in the sense of

“trying to fetter judicial discretion or to steer … the courts to a particular decision.”

He said that it will be

“up to the court to decide what remedy is appropriate in the individual circumstances of the particular case”,—[Official Report, 21/2/22; col. 93.]

and that the court’s choice of remedy will, in this case as in others, be guided by what is in “the interests of justice”.

One must ask what the purpose of subsection (9) is. Is it necessary at all? The Minister explained that its purpose is to encourage the development of jurisprudence applicable to the new quashing remedies by requiring the court to consider those remedies positively. If subsection (9) is not, as it appears to be, a straightforward presumption, there is absolutely nothing in the wording of the subsection to support the Minister’s explanation as to its purpose. It is completely unnecessary, following the Minister’s interpretation, because the court is bound to take into account all the circumstances and remedies available in the case of unlawful conduct by the state, and taking into account all the “relevant” matters is specifically required by subsection (8).

Moreover, whatever the reason for the presence of subsection (9), it will encourage further litigation by way of appeal, as it introduces the hard-edged test in subsection (9)(b) that one of the new quashing orders

“would, as a matter of substance, offer adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”.

That is a hard-edged test and not a discretion. It plainly raises the possibility of widespread disagreement. In short, no good purpose is served by subsections (9) and (10)—only bad purposes—and they should be removed.

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Moved by

[Lord Etherton]

4: Clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 24 to 32
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the presumption that where a suspended or prospective-only quashing order would offer adequate redress, such a quashing order should be made in preference to an ordinary quashing order.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Etherton]

5: Clause 2, leave out Clause 2 and insert the following new Clause—
“Limitation of review of Upper Tribunal’s permission-to-appeal decisions
(1) In the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, after section 11 insert—“11A Finality of decisions in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction(1) Subsection (2) applies in relation to a decision by the Upper Tribunal to refuse permission (or leave) to appeal further to an application under section 11(4)(b).(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), a decision made by the court of supervisory jurisdiction in relation to any such refusal by the Upper Tribunal, whether such decision of the court of supervisory jurisdiction is to refuse permission to proceed or is to dismiss the substantive claim in the supervisory court or is any other order, is final and cannot be questioned or set aside or reversed whether by way of renewal or appeal or otherwise.(3) An appeal lies to the Supreme Court from any such decision of the court of supervisory jurisdiction but only with the leave of the court of supervisory jurisdiction or of the Supreme Court; and such leave may not be granted unless it is certified by the court of supervisory jurisdiction that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision and it appears to that court or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be, that the point is one which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.(4) An application to the court of supervisory jurisdiction for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court must be made within the period of 7 days beginning with the date of the decision of the court of supervisory jurisdiction and an application to the Supreme Court for such leave must be made within the period of 7 days beginning with the date on which the application is refused by the court of supervisory jurisdiction.(5) In this section—“decision” includes any purported decision;“supervisory jurisdiction” means the supervisory jurisdiction of—(a) the High Court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, or(b) the Court of Session in Scotland,and “the court of supervisory jurisdiction” is to be read accordingly.”(2) The amendment made by subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a decision (including any purported decision) of the Upper Tribunal made before the day on which this section comes into force.”Member’s explanatory statement
These amendments retain the Cart supervisory jurisdiction but, subject only to a limited right to apply for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, bar any appeal from the court exercising the supervisory jurisdiction or any other challenge to decisions of that court whether by way of renewal or otherwise.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

This amendment is supported by the Law Society, the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law and the Public Law Project.

Amendment 5 is intended to strike a middle course between, on the one hand, the abolition of the Cart supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court in England and Wales, and the Court of Session in Scotland, subject only to the three exceptions specified in proposed Section 11A(4) of the 2011 Act, and, on the other hand, the full retention of the existing Cart supervisory jurisdiction. My amendment would maintain a Cart supervisory jurisdiction at the High Court level but, subject to one exception, without any right of renewal or appeal from a refusal of permission to appeal or a dismissal of the substantive judicial review application, or indeed any other decision of the High Court, such as interim relief. The one exception is that following a debate in Committee, and at the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the amendment now provides for an appeal direct to the Supreme Court if certified by the High Court as involving a point of law of general public importance, and the High Court or the Supreme Court grants permission to appeal. My amendment provides for a very short timetable of seven days for an application for leave to appeal.

My amendment would curtail the amount of judicial time currently spent on hopeless Cart cases. In one important respect, it would impose a more restrictive regime than that in Clause 2, as it does not make any exceptions as are to be found in subsection (4). Those exceptions give rise to concern, as it can be predicted, particularly in immigration and asylum claims where the objective is often to string out matters for as long as possible, that many applicants will claim to fall within one or more of the three exceptions, even if hopeless, and the High Court would have to adjudicate such claims, and with a right to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal.

Critically, retaining the restricted supervisory jurisdiction, as proposed in Amendment 5, would help to avoid injustice. The Ministry of Justice’s best estimate, based on the nine years from 2012 to 2020, is that the Cart jurisdiction has been successfully invoked in between 40 to 50 cases on average each year, and on being remitted to the Upper Tribunal for reconsideration of permission to appeal, the overwhelming majority are then given permission to appeal.

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[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I should like to make three essential points by way of reply to what has been said. I am extremely grateful to those Members of the House who have supported my amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, highlighted what is for him, and I think in government policy terms, critical: that it is said that the success rate is too low. This raises the question: at what price do we value justice? We are agreed that 40 to 50 cases each year have been wrongly refused permission to appeal by the Upper Tribunal. In the case of severely important asylum claims and human rights cases, those 50 cases represent all the trauma that is gone through by a complainant. If one has sat in court and listened to the stories of people who have made the most extraordinary efforts to get to this country, seeking asylum, going from place to place trying to get here, one will know that refusal of a Cart review as one of the 50 is a real denial of justice.

Yes, there are very many cases—too many cases; we are all agreed on this—of unmeritorious applications by way of Cart, but we have to find a balance which takes into account the injustice that will be suffered by even one person, let alone 50 people, in these most serious of cases which involve such a long time and, in many cases, severe trauma.

There are those who, like Micah, recall the admonition: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”. That is what I have spent my entire career attempting to do, particularly as a judge. I do not accept that the middle course is paying too high a price for the justice that would otherwise be denied to the categories of people for whom I have been speaking. My presentation—my middle course—is for those people who would otherwise suffer.

My last point is this. Attractively though the Minister has put it, that there are three bites of the cherry is not entirely correct. The modern method of appeal from tribunals is an appeal from a decision in an asylum case from the Lower Tribunal, then to the Upper Tribunal and then to the Court of Appeal. On his analysis, the Court of Appeal hearing would be a third bite of the cherry, but that is standard procedure. I do not accept that a third review of tribunal cases is in any way unusual. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am conscious that this is the last group, and I hope that we can end Report on a point of unanimity across the House. In Committee, I welcomed the proposal from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, to allow pro bono costs orders to be made in tribunals, in much the same way as they are already available in the civil and family courts. I am now very pleased to bring forward a government amendment that achieves this.

There are some differences in the way that this amendment is drafted. I have discussed these with the noble and learned Lord but, to point them out to the House, the reasons for these changes from the original draft are to ensure that we do not prescribe rules for tribunals outside of the Government’s control, nor trespass on the competence of the devolved Administrations. The amendment captures the majority of tribunals in which costs orders might be made and creates a power for the Lord Chancellor to bring additional tribunals within the scope of this power through secondary legislation.

In some respects, we are in fact going further than the original text from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, by ensuring that, where the tribunal is reserved and provision regulating the tribunal’s procedure could not be made by any of the devolved Assemblies—as, for example, when the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal or the employment tribunal sits in Scotland—the tribunal can, under this amendment, none the less make a pro bono costs order regardless of where the tribunal is sitting within the UK. I suggest to the House that this is a positive step for two reasons. First, it will provide additional funding to the Access to Justice Foundation, I hope in a material manner. Secondly, it will level the playing field between parties where one is represented pro bono.

There are also some consequential amendments in this group as to the extent and commencement clauses of the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the Minister for tabling this amendment. I strongly support it, and it is warmly welcomed by the Access to Justice Foundation, which is the prescribed charity in the new amendment. As the Minister has said, it replaces my own amendment along generally similar lines, which I tabled earlier. It would not have come without the active support of the Minister and his very helpful engagement with me both in meetings and in correspondence. I urge all Members of the House to support it.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Etherton]

51: After Clause 45, insert the following new Clause—
“Pro Bono Representation: TribunalsPayments in respect of pro bono representation: tribunals
(1) Section 194 of the Legal Services Act 2007 (payments in respect of pro bono representation) is amended as follows. (2) In subsection (1) after “civil court” insert “or tribunal”.(3) In subsection (3)—(a) after “the court” insert “or tribunal”; and(b) after “in respect of that part)” insert “, but so that no award made under this subsection may exceed the amount that the court or tribunal could order to be paid in respect of R’s representation of P, had such representation not been provided free of charge in whole or in part”.(4) In subsection (4) after “the court” insert “or tribunal”.(5) In subsection (5) after “the court” insert “or tribunal”.(6) In subsection (7)—(a) after “Rules of court” insert “and tribunal rules of procedure”;(b) omit the word “civil”; and(c) after “the court” insert “or tribunal”.(7) In subsection (10)—(a) in the definition of “legal representative” for “exercising a right of audience or conducting litigation on the party's behalf” substitute “, who has a right of audience or has the right to conduct litigation in relation to any class of proceedings in any part of the Senior Courts of England and Wales, or all proceedings in county courts or magistrates’ courts, whether or not the person is exercising such right in the particular proceedings”;(b) in the definition of “relevant civil appeal”, after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) from the Upper Tribunal in accordance with permission granted under section 14B(3) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (appeal to Supreme Court),”; and(c) after the definition of “relevant civil appeal” insert—““tribunal” means—(a) the First-tier Tribunal;(b) the Upper Tribunal;(c) an employment tribunal;(d) the Employment Appeal Tribunal;(e) the Competition Appeal Tribunal; and(f) any other body, established under or recognised by any enactment, which performs the function of determining matters, which are not criminal in nature, including but not limited to regulatory and disciplinary issues, and which has the power to make an order for the payment of costs.””Member’s explanatory statement
These new provisions will confer on tribunals the same power as civil courts and the Supreme Court currently have to order an unsuccessful legally represented party to pay pro bono costs to the prescribed charity the Access to Justice Foundation where the successful party has been represented pro bono.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

As I foreshadowed at Second Reading, I have tabled this amendment to enable tribunals to make pro bono cost orders, as is currently the position in the civil courts and the Supreme Court. I am very grateful to the Minister and his officials for their positive engagement on this issue. I know that the Minister himself, as he was at Second Reading, remains genuinely sympathetic to the principle embodied in the amendment.

We have not received so far any amendment proposed by the Government to match what I have tabled, but this morning those representing the Access to Justice Foundation, which is the prescribed charity and will be the recipient of any pro bono award, received notification that the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General support this change, with the Solicitor-General, who has general responsibility within the Government for pro bono, expressing strong support for it.

On that basis, I am cautiously optimistic that a government amendment will emerge in due course. The main issue of concern at the moment relates to the width of the tribunals that will be caught under the amendment. I know that work is going on regarding that. It would be useful for those who are interested in this issue to have the Minister’s current position recorded in Hansard. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we fully support the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord. There is nothing that I wish to add. It is plainly sensible. There is no distinction between the civil courts and tribunals, and it is an obvious case for orders in respect of costs.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, as this is the last group in Committee, it is nice to end on a point of general agreement rather than discord. Whoever put the groups together, I take my hat off to them.

I respectfully welcome the proposals in Amendment 51, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and am grateful to him for the time that he has given to me and my officials in discussing this. The amendment would allow pro bono cost orders to be made in tribunals, in much the same way as they are already available in the civil and family courts. This is a helpful proposal which will not only provide additional funding to the Access to Justice Foundation but—moving from pounds, shillings and pence to a statement of principle—importantly signals our support for the excellent work that is done pro bono by the legal profession up and down the country. Indeed, in the last group we heard an example of that from many years ago.

As I have already explained in meetings with the noble and learned Lord, we have two concerns about the amendment as drafted, though I underline that I am making not a point of principle but points of drafting. First, as drafted, it would apply to a very wide range of tribunals of different types, including tribunals for which the Government are not responsible; for example, professional disciplinary tribunals, such as those of the General Medical Council. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord and the Committee would agree that it would not be right for the Government to impose this measure on those tribunals that the Government are not responsible for, in circumstances where we have not been able to engage with them or seek their agreement. That is the first point: the ambit of the tribunals which we are talking about, although those for which the Government are responsible are, for these purposes, the vast majority, so that carve-out will not have too much of a practical effect, I hope.

There is a second point: issues of territorial extent. Again, as drafted, in Wales, it could impose measures on tribunals that are administered by the Welsh Government, while in Scotland, judges would not be able to make pro bono costs awards, even when they are dealing with reserved matters in reserved tribunals. That, again, is a drafting point I am confident we can discuss and agree on.

Therefore, I will formally invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment, but I assure him on the record that I and the Government remain entirely supportive of the principle behind his amendment. As he says, my learned friends the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General are also supportive of the measure. The noble and learned Lord and I have met on a couple of occasions now to discuss the amendment ahead of today’s debate. I will certainly continue to discuss this issue with him ahead of Report, and I am very hopeful that we will be able, between us, to do something that will resolve this issue and meet the point he seeks to address in his amendment.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I think there is nothing more to say. I am very grateful to the Minister for those indications, and on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 51 withdrawn.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, if I were to give my apprentice joiner grandson a tool for his toolbox, I would not say, “In all circumstances, other than quite limited circumstances, this is the tool you must use and ignore the ones you already have”. The Government’s toolbox analogy does not seem to work. I am glad to have the opportunity to raise a question before the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, contributes to the debate—as I hope he will—because perhaps he can throw further light on the clarity of the recommendations of the Independent Review of Administrative Law on the issue we are debating. Paragraph 3.69 considered what would happen if the committee’s recommendation for a non-presumed format for these circumstances were followed and stated that, if Section 31 were amended in this way,

“it would be left up to the courts to develop principles to guide them in determining in what circumstances a suspended quashing order would be awarded, as opposed to awarding either a quashing order with immediate effect or a declaration of nullity.”

It was a very clear recommendation, and the Government should have taken that advice, as they took much other advice from the excellent document produced by the Independent Review of Administrative Law.

I will enter one other point into the debate. It was referred to by the former Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton: the issue of adequate redress. The way the phrase appears in proposed new subsection (9)(b)—

“offer adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”—

worries me. It may not have been drafted with this intention, but there is a very great danger if “adequate redress” is seen as a matter which concerns only the person pursuing the action. It is perhaps too rash to say “most”, but many judicial review cases, by their very nature, have a far wider effect than simply on the individuals involved in the case. That is, indeed, recognised in the Government’s own formulation of proposed new subsection (8). It refers both to those

“who would benefit from the quashing of the impugned act”

and those who had expectations and

“relied on the impugned act”.

There will be large numbers of people in many judicial review cases who will be affected by the outcome, either because an action they have already taken will be deemed to have been unlawful at the time it was taken or, indeed, because the law on which they have relied to enforce a regulation has now been found not to have been good or effective law at the time. The breadth and implications of judicial review cases—which is why the subject arouses such widespread interest—is potentially threatened if the concentration becomes on “We’ve fixed it for the unfortunate person who appears before us in this case” without having proper regard to the very large number of people who will be affected. Now, courts do have regard to it and that is a feature of many of the cases referred to in the debate. I am suspicious that the Government wording appears to discourage them from doing so.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, indicated, I am happy to join myself with the amendment. Both the Law Society and the Bar Council oppose the inclusion of proposed new subsection (9), as do many others and for very good reasons. It is worth pointing out at the outset that the provision is not based on any recommendation of the Independent Review of Administrative Law headed by my noble friend Lord Faulks. To my mind, this part of new Section 29A is the critical provision because it colours the appropriateness or otherwise of what has gone before: in particular, the powers under the proposed new subsection (1)(a) and (b). It is objectionable, I suggest, for three reasons: it is unnecessary, it is wrong in principle, and it is potentially dangerous in practice.

It is unnecessary because proposed new subsection (8) sets out a comprehensive list of matters to be taken into account by the court, including, most importantly under (f)

“any other matter that appears to the court to be relevant.”

There is simply no need for any other guidance or mandatory direction to the court if the courts are to be left to choose the most appropriate remedy to right the wrong that has been committed. A problem would arise only if what is intended is that in certain circumstances the judge should not be left to choose the most appropriate remedy but one of the other quashing remedies to be found in the proposed new subsection (1).

As I understood the Minister’s answer to a point raised by my noble Lord, Lord Pannick, if the judge feels it would not be appropriate to impose a quashing order, notwithstanding the trigger in proposed new subsection (9) that would

“as a matter of substance, offer adequate redress”,

because the judge felt there would be injustice, that would be good cause. Well, if the judge feels that the appropriate remedy in all the circumstances to remedy the wrong committed by the public body is different from the quashing orders in proposed new subsection (1)(a) and (1)(b), that would be an injustice. So one asks oneself, “What on earth is the point of it all?” since the answer given by the Minister that I have just mentioned indicates that what one is left with is a free-ranging discretion to be applied in an appropriate judicial manner, having regard to all the circumstances to rectify the wrong that has been committed. So I am afraid I am left at a loss to understand exactly what it is that makes the proposed new subsection necessary or logical.

I have also said that proposed new subsection (9) is dangerous and wrong in principle. First, it provides a precedent for interference by the Executive with judicial discretion. In effect, it politicises the exercise of judicial discretion in carrying out the judicial function of selecting the most appropriate remedy to right, so far as possible, the wrong that has been committed.

Secondly—a point I raised at Second Reading—the trigger for the mandatory direction in proposed new subsection (9), that the court must exercise its powers under subsection (1), the new quashing powers, if that would

“as a matter of substance, offer adequate redress”

is bound to be the subject of dispute and appeals. It introduces a hard-edged objective test, quite different from the judge’s discretion, which will enable disappointed litigants an opportunity to litigate and appeal further, and that surely is something we must avoid if possible.

--- Later in debate ---

Unless the judicial review judge thinks there is something of merit in the complaint, it should be and will be thrown out very swiftly. Or to adopt the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Etherton, Amendment 23—which I hope he will speak to—would, as I understand it, make final a decision of the court of supervisory jurisdiction, thereby preventing any appeals. There are ways of dealing with the problem that does not involve preventing a litigant who does have a valid complaint, who can raise a substantial issue of law of a fundamental nature, and who is threatened with removal to another country where he or she is going to be persecuted or tortured from having the opportunity to make their complaint by way of judicial review. So, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. I too take the view that Clause 2, as presently drafted, is inappropriate.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, may I follow my noble friend Lord Pannick, who has referred to my Amendment 23, which would replace Clause 2 with what I have called a middle course? It is intended to be a middle course between, on the one hand, the provisions of Clause 2 which would abolish—subject to limited exceptions—the Cart supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court in England and Wales and the Court of Session in Scotland and, on the other hand, leaving the full Cart supervisory jurisdiction as it currently exists.

Amendment 23 is tabled on the basis that to abolish all Cart supervisory jurisdiction, subject only to the three limited categories of case specified in subsection (4), could give rise to injustice. On the other hand, it recognises, from my own experience as Master of the Rolls for over four years, that applications for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, from the High Court’s exercise of its Cart supervisory jurisdiction, are almost invariably utterly hopeless but nevertheless involve the Court of Appeal judge in question in a considerable amount of work ploughing through the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, the decision of the Upper Tribunal and the decision of the Administrative Court.

The middle course that I am proposing is to retain a supervisory jurisdiction at the level of the High Court, but to prohibit, first, an application to renew or appeal a refusal of permission to bring judicial review; secondly, to prohibit any appeal from a dismissal of the substantive judicial review application; and, thirdly, to prohibit any challenge to, or renewal of or appeal from, any other decision of the High Court such as, for example, in respect of interim relief.

In his reply at the Second Reading debate, the Minister said that he would consider this middle course but that the Ministry of Justice had calculated that abolishing the Cart supervisory jurisdiction would save 180 days of judicial resource in the Administrative Court. I have subsequently had a useful exchange of correspondence about that assertion, and I am extremely grateful to the Minister for answering a large number of questions that I have raised, probing that claim of 180-day savings. I hope the Minister will not take it amiss, but I regard it as perfectly clear that the Minister’s estimate of the saving of judicial time is greatly overstated.

The Ministry of Justice relies on a number of different sources, including a 2015 time and motion study from which it has extrapolated various assumptions. I am very doubtful about the accuracy of the statistics I have been provided with and the extrapolation provided by the ministry’s correspondence but, for what it is worth, the Minister’s response includes a breakdown of Cart cases from 2012 to 2020. It shows that over that nine-year period, 99% of Cart applications for permission to bring judicial review were dealt with on the papers and not at an oral hearing. The Minister’s letter allowed just over 1.3 hours for a judge to consider a paper application. In short, the figures supplied show that on average over the nine-year period, approximately 130 judicial days each year were spent on Cart applications in the Administrative Court.

At full complement and ignoring a substantial number of deputy judges, there are 71 full-time judges of the Queen’s Bench Division available to sit in the Administrative Court, which would mean just under two Cart applications each year per judge. Of course, there are plenty of people here, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, who has been Chief Justice, who will say that that is not how the world works because only a certain number of judges sit in the Administrative Court at any one time. On the other hand, it is not the way the world works having a single judge deal with all the Cart cases in a year. The truth is that they are spread among all the judges.

Furthermore, proposed new Section 11A(4) in Clause 2 provides three exemptions for the abolition of the Cart supervisory jurisdiction. I have been told by the Minister that there are no statistics to show how many of the Cart cases in the period 2012-20 fell within one or more of those three categories. In the absence of that information, it is not only utterly futile to suggest that Clause 2 would result in the saving of a specific amount of judicial time; it is clear that any saving would be less, perhaps far less, than even 130 days.

The middle course in the amendment I have tabled would help to avoid injustice while providing a useful curtailment of the Cart supervisory jurisdiction. I suggest that this is a sensible and just solution.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

May I add a couple of observations? It seems to me that experience has shown that it was difficult for the Supreme Court to find the right balance. On the other hand, this Bill goes too far and, if I may respectfully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, it is very easy for a judge to think in the particular circumstances of a case that a point of law is just nonsense. Therefore, having a check where points of law can be brought forward is essential.

I tend to feel that the suggestion made and the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, is probably the most pragmatic solution and I would support that. But one thing we cannot do is to leave out of the equation the ability to have a review where there has been a fundamental error of law. Experience has taught me that many people, when looking at the facts of a particular case, think that they are so against it that it is hopeless, but actually there is often something there, and we must preserve that. However, I commend, if I may, the solution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th February 2022 Lords Chamber

My name is down in respect of two stand part notices, in relation to Clause 28 and Schedule 3. This is an unworkable, highly expensive and politically driven policy which is not even backed up by the agreements with other countries that are needed to bring it into effect. The policy appears based on the Australian model, which was costly and did not seem to provide as much deterrent effect as intended as far as those arriving by boat were concerned.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I add my name to that of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in giving notice of my intention to exclude Clause 28 and Schedule 3 from the Bill. To move an asylum seeker to a detention or reception centre offshore while their claim is being assessed is wrong in principle, oppressive in practice, contrary to the 1951 convention and lacking sufficient safeguards under the Bill. Many speakers referred to Australia’s policy of offshore processing, as an example both of how awful it can be and, by one speaker, of a successful operation to deter unlawful immigration. It is worth putting a little flesh on the Australian experience.

In 2013, Amnesty International published a report, This Is Breaking People, highlighting a range of serious human rights concerns at the Manus Island, Papua New Guinea, immigration detention centre. In an update, Amnesty International reported that, in two days in February 2014,

“violence at the detention centre led to the death of … a 23-year-old Iranian man, and injuries to more than 62 asylum seekers (some reports suggest up to 147 were injured).”

It said in the report:

“There are credible claims that the asylum seekers … were attacked by private security guards, local police and possibly other contractors working at the centre. The response by security guards and local police to protests by asylum seekers was brutal and excessive.”


Amnesty’s report raised a number of concerns about living conditions, including overcrowding, cramped sleeping arrangements, exposure to the elements, as well as a lack of sufficient drinking water, sanitation, food and clothing. The update said:

“Since the violence on … February 2014, Papua New Guinean nationals no longer enter the compounds for catering or cleaning … Asylum seekers are delivered meals in take-away packs for self-distribution and also bear sole responsibility for cleaning the ablution blocks.”


At the time of Amnesty’s site visit in March 2014,

“ablution blocks in all compounds were dilapidated, dirty, mouldy, and”

some latrines were

“broken and without running water.”

Amnesty International expressed concern about the issue, saying:

“Australian and Papua New Guinean authorities are deliberately denying asylum seekers’ right to access lawyers and human rights organizations.”


In an article published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs in February 2017, it was said:

“LGBT asylum seekers are particularly vulnerable … and face significant disadvantages and dangers. In detention they experience discrimination, harassment and violence from other detainees and from members of staff. The detention environment has serious long-term effects on their mental and physical well-being.”


From time to time, Ghana and Rwanda have been floated in the media as places to which asylum seekers in the UK might be transferred, although Ghana has officially denied any such possibility. The appropriateness or inappropriateness of such locations for LGBTIQ asylum seekers is manifest. In Ghana, same-sex sexual acts carry a potential sentence of up to 25 years. There is a current proposal to raise the minimum sentence to 10 years and to require conversion therapy. LGBTIQ people face homophobia, physical violence and psychological abuse.

In Rwanda, same-sex sexual relations are not unlawful, but there are no anti-discrimination laws relating to sexual orientation or gender identity, including in relation to housing, employment and access to government services, such as healthcare. A 2021 report on Rwanda by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada cites sources disclosing discrimination and stigma facing LGBTIQ people in religious and civil society, the media and business, harassment by the police and the use of indecency and vagrancy offences against transgender and gender-diverse people. The experience in the offshore detention centres I referred to in Australia and the position in Ghana and Rwanda show the inappropriateness of holding asylum seekers in offshore detention or reception centres.

In particular, the following are not answered in the Bill, the Explanatory Notes or any other guidance from the Government. First, how will asylum seekers have access to legal advisers with knowledge of the law and practice relating to UK asylum claims, assuming that they are being processed under UK law, which is complex and difficult? Secondly, legal aid and advice is available to refugees in the UK, but there is nothing to suggest that it will be available to refugees in offshore holding centres. Thirdly, and as has previously been pointed out, if conditions in the proposed offshore centre are so bad as to cause physical or mental harm to refugees, whether through physical conditions in the centre or—in the case of single women or LGBTIQ members, for example—because of discrimination, harassment, bullying and violence from staff or other asylum seekers, will they be able to have recourse or bring proceedings in the UK, or will they be restricted to such remedies as might be available in the foreign country?

Until these fundamental questions are answered and set out expressly in the legislation, there should be no question whatever of exporting refugees to offshore holding centres. To do so would be inconsistent with the spirit and the letter of the refugee convention and the UK’s own history of welcome to genuine asylum seekers over the centuries.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to this group of amendments, and I thank my noble friend Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate for tabling his Amendments 100, 101 and 102.

On the back of my noble friend’s point, it might be helpful to clarify the definitions of “asylum seeker”, “refugee” and “economic migrant.” An asylum seeker is a person, either in transit or awaiting a decision, seeking the protection of a state under the terms of the refugee convention. A refugee is a person who meets the definition of “refugee” in Article 1 of the refugee convention—they do not have to be recognised by a state to be a refugee—and so it follows that a “person with refugee status” is a person who meets the requirements under the UK Immigration Rules to be granted refugee status.

The term “economic migrant” is inexact. It may, of course, refer to a person who is using or looking to use economic routes, such as FBIS, to enter a state. However, there will be people who meet the definition of Article 1 of the refugee convention but are looking to enter the UK and choosing it over other countries purely for economic reasons. One of the objectives of the New Plan for Immigration is to ensure that the most vulnerable can be protected, which in turn means that those attempting to enter the UK for economic reasons should use the appropriate routes.

Changes within Clause 28 via Schedule 3 are one in a suite of critical measures designed to break the business model of people smugglers and are the first step in disincentivising unwanted behaviours—for example, by dissuading those who are considering risking their lives by making dangerous and unnecessary journeys to the UK in order to claim asylum. By working to establish overseas asylum processing, we are sending a clear message to those who are risking their lives and funding criminal gangs both here and abroad or abusing the asylum system elsewhere that this behaviour is not worth it. We must make it easier to ensure that such people are simply not allowed to remain in the UK.

It also might assist noble Lords—and indeed my noble friend Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate—to know that for nearly 20 years, it has been possible under UK law to remove individuals from the UK while their asylum claim is pending if a certificate is issued under Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, so this is not a new concept. What this measure does is amend our existing legal framework to make it easier to remove such individuals. I do not know which noble Lord asked this, but Schedule 3 also defines the term “safe third country”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 106 in the name of, and at the invitation of, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, I will speak also to Amendments 109 and 110.

If Clause 36 is not amended or deleted, it will contradict Article 31 of the refugee convention. It seeks to punish or penalise a refugee for arriving in the UK to make an asylum claim by a route that took them through other countries. The requirement in the refugee convention to come directly was intended only to prevent a person who had acquired refugee status and protection in one country deciding to switch to another. Excluding a person from asylum in the UK simply because they stopped in France, Germany or Belgium, perhaps for a night’s rest, is completely unreasonable. The UK courts have confirmed that any merely short-term stopover en route to an intended sanctuary cannot forfeit the protection of Article 31 of the convention.

Any other interpretation, as the Government seek to impose in Clause 36, means, as in so much of this Bill, a shirking of the sharing of international responsibilities, such that looking after refugees falls overwhelmingly on countries neighbouring the countries of conflict from which the person is seeking to escape. Therefore, Amendment 106 would at least amend the clause, which, however, we might find later, needs to be deleted. I beg to move.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 107 in my name, which relates to Clause 36 and provides that a refugee will have come directly to the United Kingdom for the purposes of Clause 11, notwithstanding that

“they have passed through the intermediate country on the refugee’s way to the United Kingdom by way of short-term stopover”.

Those words in the amendment reflect the reasoning and decision of the Administrative Court in Adimi, where my noble and learned friend Lord Brown presided. They also reflect the approval of Adimi by the Appellate Committee of this House in a case called Asfaw.

In this respect, Clause 36 is an important part of the Government’s policy. The reason for that is that it provides a definition of “directly” for the purposes of Clause 11 that makes a distinction between group 1 and group 2 refugees. Under the provisions of Clause 11, if the refugee does not come directly from the place of persecution, they inevitably cannot be in group 1.

Secondly, it is important because, as I pointed out in a previous debate on this Bill, the provisions for describing coming to the United Kingdom directly, as defined in Clause 36, also reflect the provision in the admissibility provision in Clause 15. Your Lordships will recall that, in Clause 15, if there is a connection with another state, the refugee’s claim is inadmissible; in fact, it is not recognised as a claim at all and there is no right of appeal. Clause 15 provides that, if you fall within one of the five conditions inserted in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 by the clause, you have a connection. One of those conditions, condition 4, is that

“the claimant was previously present in, and eligible to make a relevant claim to, the safe third State … it would have been reasonable to expect them to make such a claim, and … they failed to do so.”

So there are two essential elements of the policy behind the Government’s provisions for asylum, where the question of the meaning of coming “directly” is extremely important. I pointed out to the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that there was a muddle here. If condition 4 in Clause 15, as I have described it, is satisfied, you never get to a distinction between group 1 and group 2 because your claim is inadmissible. The noble Baroness was going to look at that and let me know the position from the Government’s perspective, but I have not yet heard from her.

Before I address what coming “directly” means—as I said, my amendment reflects the reasoning and conclusion in Adimi, and the adoption of the decision in Adimi by the Appellate Committee of this House in Asfaw—I want to say a couple of things about what appears to be the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, to interpretation. I do not think you need to be a lawyer to appreciate that if, under the aegis of the United Nations, you agree with other states in the world that you will conduct yourself in a particular way and that an agency of the United Nations has a responsibility for overseeing both the implementation of that agreement and that disputes between member states in relation to the meaning and the application of the agreement—here, the refugee convention—will be referred to an international court, there must be a point in time when one has to identify core values. If there are no core values, there is nothing to adjudicate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to Article 35, which requires member states to co-operate with the United Nations body responsible for oversight in relation to the implementation of the refugee convention. So what one has to do here is decide whether what the Government are doing in putting forward these proposals goes beyond the core principles in the refugee convention, which must be applicable generally to member states—otherwise, all the clauses I have referred to, Article 35, co-operation and adjudication by a court are totally meaningless and impracticable.

So I take issue with the broad statement of principle, as I understand it, put forward by the Minister. He said that it was perfectly acceptable for every member state signed up to the refugee convention to decide, from its perspective, what the convention meant. If that were correct and he was saying that it was for Parliament to decide what it meant for the United Kingdom, it would mean that changes could be made by each successive new Government as to what they felt would be appropriate to support their policy. Well, that is obviously nonsense, if I may respectfully say so.

What the courts have done—and this would be the approach of the all the courts of the countries signed up to the convention—is try to understand what the refugee convention was intended, by those who made it, to mean. The starting point is always the travaux préparatoires leading up to the convention—what was said and what was done—and then trying to understand whether there has been a deviation and, if so, why. That has been exactly the approach put forward and implemented in both Adimi and Asfaw.

The starting point, inevitably, for the interpretation of this particular convention is, as I think the Minister said, the Vienna convention on the interpretation of treaties. I do not think it has yet been said that we are entitled to change, and that we have changed, that treaty according to what we think it ought to say. It provides in Article 31.1:

“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”


That phrase, as has been noted by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I think, was applied by the UK’s highest court, the Supreme Court, in a case called ST (Eritrea) in 2012 as meaning that there is a duty to give the refugee convention

“a generous and purposive interpretation, bearing in mind its humanitarian objects and the broad aims reflected in its preamble”.

I have to say as a starting point that I have seen nothing so far in this part of the Bill which is a “generous and purposive interpretation”, having regard to humanitarian objects and the broad aims reflected in the preamble of the 1951 convention. Every provision that people have addressed appears to be, as it has been put, a mean-spirited approach to refugee applications.

It is against that background that I now turn to the meaning of “directly”. I have already referred to the clear decision in Adimi on this point about stopping at intermediate countries by way of short-term stopover. Just to give this a bit of flesh, what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, said then was:

“I am persuaded by the applicants’ contrary submission, drawing as it does on the travaux préparatoires, various Conclusions adopted by UNHCR’s executive committee … and the writings of well respected academics and commentators … that some element of choice is indeed open to refugees as to where they may properly claim asylum. I conclude that any merely short term stopover en route to such intended sanctuary cannot forfeit the protection of the Article, and that the main touchstones by which exclusion from protection should be judged are the length of stay in the intermediate country, the reasons for delaying there (even a substantial delay in an unsafe third country would be reasonable were the time spent trying to acquire the means of travelling on), and whether or not the refugee sought or found there protection de jure or de facto from the persecution they were fleeing.”

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, can I remind the noble Lord of the Chief Whip’s reminder of brevity please? We are running extremely late at the moment.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

In Anwar, as I have said, the Supreme Court approved of that and in doing so again referred to the travaux préparatoires and the way in which those words came into the convention. They were put in at the last minute to appease the French representative because they were concerned about refugees claiming asylum in France who could have applied elsewhere. In 2001, an expert round-table conference was held in Geneva by different countries and disciplines which again upheld the interpretation of a short-term stopover not affecting coming directly from territories where there was persecution.

In a previous debate on this subject on Clause 11, the Minister relied on a provision in Section 31(3) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 which had very similar wording to what we find in Section 36. What she did not say, and which comes out of the very detailed speeches of Lord Bingham and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is that when those provisions in Section 31 of the 1999 Act were being debated, the Attorney-General specifically said, in light of the view of the UNHCR, that there was flexibility in the concept of arriving directly. So, far from that Act being a precedent for a strict interpretation of those words, his elaboration meant that there was, in fact, a correspondence with the meaning arrived at in the courts of this country in Adimi. For those reasons, I say that the definition of arriving directly in Clause 36 is incorrect. It does not meet the international standards of the UNHCR and is contrary to the convention.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I shall be very brief. I am trying to work out exactly what I am being asked to agree to here. Perhaps I may ask the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—maybe not the noble Lord, Lord Dubs—and certainly my noble friend on the Front Bench: am I being asked to end or at least change the first safe country principle by accepting these amendments? If that is the case, I have grave concern about an increase in what is known as forum shopping. Perhaps I can say to the Hansard writers that forum is spelled “forum” and not “foreign”, which is how it was reported last time. Foreign shopping is what you go to Paris to do; forum shopping is a rather more serious matter.

It is important because this country is an exceptionally attractive place for people seeking to find the best future for themselves. I explained last time that the very fact that debates are going on your Lordships’ House shows how much concern we have to make sure that the rights of people are looked after. It is also an extremely flexible job market once you are here. Getting and maintaining a job is much easier than in some of the areas such as France, where there is a much more rigid job market. There is a non-contributory health and social security system. There is a diaspora from nearly every country in the world. Your mates are here, so you want to come here to join them. We would all want to join our mates. As a last point, you have learned the English language, which is the lingua franca of the world and, in particular, the lingua franca of technology.

I hope that, when my noble friend comes to answer the debate, he will bear in mind that, if we were to accept this, it will open up the borders for people who are seeking—I do not say that they should not seek—the best future for themselves and, as such, are not abiding by the first safe country principle. We are not in a position to provide the answer to a lot of these people.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great privilege for me as a relatively new Member of this House to follow such a long-standing and distinguished person as the noble Lord, Lord Hacking. I am very pleased to do so.

In my five minutes I would like to deal with four matters. The first is quashing orders. It is advantageous for the court to have the remedies open to it increased. The problems here arise under the mandatory provisions of Clause 1(9). There are two problems, in my view: first, that there is no need, and it is unhelpful, to circumscribe the discretion of the court; and, secondly, that it will be unclear in many cases how the court should apply the phrase

“would as a matter of substance offer adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”.

I predict that there will be a plethora of satellite litigation and appeals in relation to the court’s approach to those words in many cases.

The second matter is the abolition of the Cart jurisdiction. This area of consideration is bedevilled by the lack of published statistics. Based on my own experience as Master of the Rolls and Head of Civil Justice for over four years until January last year, I agree with the IRAL report of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that the Cart judicial review jurisdiction has been abused in many cases.

The filter on abusive cases should—and, I assume in the absence of any specific published statistics, would—be dealt with at the stage of permission to apply for judicial review. That is dealt with, or can be dealt with, on paper, and if permission is refused, there is no right for the applicant to renew the application at a substantive hearing of the judicial review.

What concerns me particularly, from my own experience, is that if the Cart jurisdiction is unsuccessfully invoked, at that stage or subsequently—the leave stage or the substantive hearing—the matter rarely terminates with the administrative court of the Queen’s Bench Division. Inevitably, the applicant will then seek permission to appeal to the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal, either from the refusal of permission to bring judicial review proceedings or from the dismissal of any substantive application. I rely on my own experience and knowledge to say that the success rate of applications to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal is minuscule and diverts the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal from addressing other appeals, which causes delay and so injustice and imperils the international standing of the court. So, there are, in fact, false potential stages to consider when considering whether permission to appeal should be given back at the tribunal stage.

What is to be done about this? The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, points out that there are cases where injustice would result from a refusal of a Cart review. A middle course, which I ask the Government to consider carefully, would be to retain the judicial review jurisdiction of the Queen’s Bench Division but provide that there shall be no appeal to the Court of Appeal from either the refusal of permission to bring judicial review proceedings or an unsuccessful substantive application.

Thirdly, on the Online Procedure Rule Committee, it will be many years before full digitisation of court processes. Even then, it is likely that many cases will be excluded from online procedures, whether because of litigants in person, the inability of one of the parties to master digital processes, the nature of the case, or other reasons. Co-ordination between standard rule-based proceedings and online processes is currently achieved by both of them falling within the remit of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, the Family Procedure Rule Committee, the Tribunal Procedure Committee, or the stand-alone digital steering committee, which I set up, between all of which there is an overlap in membership. The provisions of the Bill dealing with online rules and the establishment of the Online Procedure Rule Committee contain no express provisions to ensure co-ordination of any kind with the standard civil, family and tribunal rule-making committees. I suggest that consideration be given to amending the Bill to facilitate such co-ordination.

My final point is on pro bono costs. I am grateful to the Minister for sympathetic consideration of my proposal to include in the Bill a provision to amend Section 194 of the Legal Services Act 2007 to enable tribunals, as is currently the case in the civil court, to order an unsuccessful, legally represented party to pay pro bono costs to the Access to Justice Foundation, where the successful party has been represented pro bono. I will bring forward an appropriate amendment in Committee.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Etherton]

68: Clause 14, page 17, line 41, at end insert—
“(c) fails to protect its nationals, including in particular those who have a protected characteristic within the meaning of Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Equality Act 2010 which is innate or immutable, from persecution by third parties who are not agents of the member State.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that there are exceptional circumstances where, even though there is no overt persecution by the State or state agents, the conduct of others towards a person which the State has failed to prevent can amount to persecution within the Refugee Convention.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

In moving the amendment in my name, I should say that I have also put my name to the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to exclude Clause 15 from the Bill—but I will wait to hear him and support him when he proceeds with that.

I will make a relatively short point in relation to Amendment 68. The provision relates to Clause 14 and the section of the Bill that deals with inadmissibility. Clause 14 is concerned with amending the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the exclusion in that Act, by way of amendment, of asylum claims by EU nationals. I am not certain why they have been selected for exclusion, but I assume it is because EU member states are bound by the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, the provisions of which, for the most part, mirror the European Convention on Human Rights and, in some respects, go beyond it. In Article 1A(2) of the refugee convention, persecution is obviously tied to the question of human rights.

The point I wish to make is simply that, under the new clause proposed by Clause 14—headed “Asylum claims by EU nationals”—to amend the 2002 Act, the Secretary of State

“must declare an asylum claim made by a person who is a national of a member State inadmissible.”

Proposed new Clause 80A(4) states:

“Subsection (1) does not apply if there are exceptional circumstances as a result of which the Secretary of State considers that the claim ought to be considered.”


Proposed new subsection (5) states:

“For the purposes of subsection (4) exceptional circumstances include”—


and then it lists a series of matters under proposed new paragraphs (a) and (b), with three proposed sub-paragraphs under (b).

Basically, short the point is that there can be persecution for the purposes of entitlement to refugee status under the convention even where the state itself is not the protagonist of the persecutory conduct but allows citizens, residents or others present within its territory to persecute particular groups or persons who otherwise fulfil the requirements of the convention’s definition of “refugee”. My amendment proposes adding to the exceptional circumstances in proposed new Clause 80A(5) the circumstance when the EU member state

“fails to protect its nationals, including in particular those who have a protected characteristic within the … Equality Act 2010 which is innate or immutable, from persecution by third parties who are not agents of the member State.”

This is not a fanciful matter. If we take the case of Hungary, which has been moving more and more to the right in political terms, we see a campaign that is based on undisguised anti-Semitism against George Soros’s support for universities there, and a constant encouragement by the Government there of homophobia and attacks on LGBTQI+ people. So it is not a fanciful point, and I suggest that it should plainly be added as one of the exceptional circumstances. That is the point. On that basis, I beg to move.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, notwithstanding the fact that we have touched on some of these issues before, we have to face them head-on in this group of amendments. The issue is whether an asylum seeker has to claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach, and we might as well deal with that head-on because it is fundamental to many of our criticisms of the Bill. Bearing in mind the Chief Whip’s request that we keep our speeches short, I shall endeavour to do that, but this issue is so important.

First, there is a practical issue in all this. If we had demanded that asylum seekers should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach, the result would have been that every Syrian who reached Europe would have had to have stayed in Greece, Italy or Malta. That is clearly not a practical way for the world to function. If we make demands on where asylum seekers should claim asylum, so of course can other countries. It is quite wrong in practice.

The principle is perhaps more important; that principle being the Geneva convention of 1951. I would have thought it would be widely acceptable to say that the UNHCR was the guardian of the 1951 convention, and if the UNHCR has a view on that convention then that should surely have some influence on the Government—after all, the convention has been fundamental to human rights for asylum seekers over the last 70 years or so. The UNHCR has made it very clear that it disagrees with the argument that refugees should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach, saying that:

“Requiring refugees to seek protection in the first safe country to which they flee would undermine the global humanitarian and cooperative principles on which the refugee system is founded”.


No country close to the main countries of origin of refugees would ever have considered signing a convention if it meant that they would assume total and entire responsibility for all refugees. These are responsibilities that the international community has to share, and that is implicit in the 1951 convention. Therefore, some of the amendments, although they are in my name, probably seem to be compromising a fundamental objection in principle to what the Government are seeking to do. For example, my explanatory statement on Amendment 70 says that

“asylum seekers should not be removed to a safe third State other than the one with which they are considered to have a connection.”

One can argue about that. The Bill says clearly what it means to have a connection, and some of its definitions are okay but some are not.

Amendment 71 says that there must be a return arrangement in place. Clearly, unless we have a return arrangement in place with other countries, we cannot even begin to consider returning people. I say to the Minister: do we have a return arrangement with any country? If people come from France, across the channel—we all deplore the people traffickers and how they endanger lives, and the tragic loss of life that we have seen in the channel—unless there is an agreement with France, what do we do? If they have come from France, can we send them back to France or not? The French will not accept that. Incidentally, judging from this morning’s papers, our relationship with France is getting worse and worse; that is something that should be put right anyway, regardless of other considerations. Surely there must be a return arrangement in place, otherwise we cannot even consider this.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, providing sanctuary to those fleeing war and persecution and to those trying to get their loved ones to safety, is an international effort. We are proud of that effort, but we by no means do more than our share. I simply ask the Government: what would happen if every state were to pass a clause absolving them of responsibility for months at a time in the hope that someone else might be able to deal with it?

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I support the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to exclude Clause 15 from the Bill, for a wide variety of reasons.

First, if a claim is deemed to be inadmissible but to satisfy the convention, that seems effectively to be saying that the person is not a refugee within the convention. That does not make sense. If they satisfy the definition of refugee within the convention, they have a claim. It can be dismissed, and then there will be a right of appeal. What cannot be said—which is effectively what is being said here—is “We’re not going to hear you at all, even though you are a refugee within the strict terms of the convention”. So I take issue with the very idea of inadmissibility with no right of recourse at all by way of an appeal.

Secondly, the terms of Section 80C to be inserted into the 2002 Act in relation to four and five seem completely contrary to both the wording and principle of the convention. My understanding of Clause 4 is that it is, in some way or other, intended to be made analogous to the Dublin III regulation.

There are a number of points to be made about that. First, we are no longer part of the EU or of the Dublin regulation. Perhaps more importantly, EU member states themselves have recognised that the Dublin regulation has failed. On 23 September 2020, the European Commission adopted what they called the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, following consultations with the European Parliament, member states and various stakeholders. The PR notice from the European Commission, which is available on the internet, states:

“The new pact recognises that no member state should shoulder a disproportionate responsibility and that all member states should contribute to solidarity on a constant basis.”


It has failed because the effect of the Dublin regulation, when strictly applied, means that certain states are overwhelmed with refugees because they are inevitably the first state on the way through to somewhere else. What is happening at the moment is that the Commission is proposing to replace the Dublin III regulation with a new regulation on asylum and migration management. So, frankly, there is no point in referring to the Dublin III regulation. It has failed in practice, and we should not be emulating it.

Furthermore, proposed Section 80C(4) is inconsistent with the terms of the convention itself. There is nothing in the convention, in Article 31 or anywhere else that makes this “connection” mean that a refugee claim would fail.

I have another point about condition 4, and I would welcome clarification from the Minister on it. The description that would render a connection with the state, and therefore the claim, inadmissible is exactly the same as the definition of arriving “directly” for the purposes of Clause 11. Clause 36 effectively amplifies Clause 11 and paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the convention. It says:

“A refugee is not to be taken to have come to the United Kingdom directly from a country where their life or freedom was threatened if, in coming from that country, they stopped in another country outside the United Kingdom, unless they can show that they could not reasonably be expected to have sought protection under the Refugee Convention in that country.”


On this particular approach, you are never going to get anywhere near Clause 11 because you will be knocked out under Clause 15—so I do not understand that contradiction. Once you fall within condition 3, which is the same as condition 4—which is the same as not arriving directly under the definition in Clause 36 —you are knocked out. So which is it—are you knocked out or do you still have some right under Clause 11, admittedly, to show that you could with good cause fall within either group 1 or even group 2? I am left confused by that.

Condition 5, on which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and others have eloquently spoken, provides

“that, in the claimant’s particular circumstances, it would have been reasonable to expect them to have made a relevant claim to the safe third State (instead of making a claim in the United Kingdom).”

Nothing in the Dublin regulations says that, even if they were to apply—and there is certainly nothing in the convention that would make such a condition apply to exclude a claim.

So I support the suggestion that Clause 15 should be excluded because, with respect, it seems to be a muddle in a whole series of different respects—legally, practically and in principle.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords again for speaking to this group of amendments. I appreciate the thoughtful and well-meaning intent of Amendment 68, but we cannot accept it. The definition of “persecution” is well established and must be on the basis of a refugee convention reason—namely, race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. It is reiterated in Clause 30(1)(c) that persecution can be committed by

“any non-State actor”

where the state is

“unable or unwilling to provide reasonable protection”.

Given the level of protection afforded to EU nationals, through fundamental rights and freedoms, EU countries are inherently safe, and individuals are exceptionally unlikely to be at risk of persecution. If individuals experience discrimination, they can seek protection from within their country of nationality.

That said, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, might be comforted to have it confirmed that our processes already acknowledge that it may not be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to EU national claimants in exceptional circumstances. The list of exceptional circumstances included in the provisions is not exhaustive; it looks to protect individuals in the very rare circumstances that a member state is at risk of a serious breach or where there exists a serious and persistent breach of the values under the Treaty on European Union, including equality.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, I will not move Amendment 76 and will consider the Minister’s comments on it.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the Minister for battling so valiantly in relation to all the points that have been raised, and am extremely grateful for all the amendments that have been spoken to. What has become clear from this discussion is that there are, on any footing, immense practical difficulties in relation to Clauses 14 and 15. In effect, I think the Minister accepted that it is not going to be straightforward to repatriate people with inadmissible claims to other EU countries without any agreement. The expression “window dressing” has been used. It is going to be very difficult.

I hope I correctly interpreted the Minister in getting my crumb of comfort from Clause 14. I think she reassured me that the exceptional circumstances specified were not closed. As a statement from the Dispatch Box in Parliament, recorded in Hansard, that is quite an important point. If Clause 14 remains, it will give at least some people some succour at any event, particularly in the circumstances I mentioned: an EU country which does not prevent those who are citizens, resident or present within the country, from persecuting others belonging to a social group, or for some other reason.

I am afraid that the overwhelming sentiment—and certainly my view—was that whatever may be said by the Government about adopting existing expressions which are generally used or have been previously used, in vital respects Clause 15 is inconsistent with the convention. This is not in a complex way, but in an obvious way. I am sorry to say this, but to my mind as a lawyer it is an egregious contravention of the convention. I ask the Minister about, for example, condition 5 in new Section 80C. Not only is that not in the convention, but I do not know where it comes from. I can see it is there as a matter of policy but it is not in the Dublin regulations, so far as I can recall. As I pointed out, in any event the Dublin regulations are being revised, so there is no point in going back to them.

There are a number of difficulties. There is one point I was hoping the Minister might be able to reply to that she has not. I would be grateful if she could explain perhaps in communication with me. How does one reconcile condition 4, which is failing to make a claim in the first country—thereby rendering you having a connection and the possibility of inadmissibility—with one of the requirements under Clause 11 to satisfy Article 31, which is arriving directly, because you never get there if you are rendered inadmissible? At the moment I do not see how the two fit together. I am not suggesting it is a straightforward and easy point; it is a lawyer’s point, but an important one. It shows a muddle somewhere along the line. But, on the basis of everything that has been said, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 68 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 83 and 88, which I have co-signed, and Amendment 96, but there are some other superb amendments. I am not a lawyer—I am not going to apologise for that because I have had an interesting life— but I did get a lawyer to look at this for me; not yet a QC, but obviously it is a possibility. Their thoughts were that these evidence notices treat asylum seekers like criminals—in fact, worse than criminals; they treat asylum seekers as if they were dreadful criminals.

In a criminal case, late evidence might be treated as less compelling than if it had been raised earlier on, but evidence is evidence, and if evidence demonstrates a fact, then that is a fact. Facts do not care about your timescales. Rather than allowing a tribunal to determine how much weight to give the evidence, Clause 25 forces them to give minimal weight if the evidence is supposedly late. Even if it were the most compelling evidence, a tribunal would be forced to give it minimal weight. That really cannot be right; it is not justice. I cannot believe the Minister will stand up—in a few moments, we hope—and say that this is justice. This is an artificial exercise. It is not founded in justice. It is a purely political venture to make it harder and harder for people to claim asylum, and to make it easier for them to be deported. It must be stopped.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 82, 84, 86, 90, 91 and 96. I would like to start by taking up the point about the so-called principle specified in Clause 25(2) of the Bill

“that minimal weight should be given to the evidence.”

I am not aware of such a principle. Of course, there can be times when time limits are imposed in a court—and perhaps it can be done by statute—for evidence to be delivered, and if it is not delivered by that time it is excluded. But once evidence is before the court, as the Minister will appreciate, it has to be taken into account even if the relevant evidence—it may be documentary evidence—has been obtained improperly, when it should not have been disclosed or it has been disclosed inadvertently. Once the evidence is there, it is taken into account and given such weight as it is due. We do not have a principle in this country, so far as I am aware, of simply saying that if evidence is late we are not going to have regard to it. That seems to be a denial of justice. I certainly support all those who have spoken against that so-called principle.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his introduction to the difficulties faced by minority groups, particularly LGBTQI groups, in relation to the giving of evidence. In deciding whether there is good cause for late evidence, or for failure to comply in a timely manner with a priority removal notice and so on, all my amendments—apart from one—put forward that there be, on the face of the Bill, a provision so that the difficulties and particular situations of people who have a protected innate or immutable characteristic must be taken into account. I went into this, your Lordships will remember, on Tuesday in relation to Clause 11, and there is no need for me to repeat it. It has been put very well by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Cashman.

Apart from all the difficulties of having discreet, secret lives—particularly in the case of the LGBTQI community—and therefore perhaps not having any evidence as such, seeking information when it is required, and corroboration, from people back in the country from which asylum seekers come poses great difficulties. An asylum seeker will not want to implicate his or her family or friends, because they could suffer as a result. There are all sorts of adverse consequences as a result of conduct that is disapproved of in the many countries that proscribe sex between same-sex couples. There is a combination of a whole variety of things, in addition to all those other points made by people about the difficulty of coming to terms with one’s sexuality.

The same applies for single women. They have many similar problems: the shame of having left an abusive relationship, the shame on the family, the consequences for the family, the clandestine nature necessarily required for those women to come here—and then they may face a male authoritative figure. All these grave difficulties have to be taken into account.

I explained why this ought to be on the face of the Bill, despite the fact that the noble Baroness the Minister said it would all be dealt with in guidance, because, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, said, the record of the Home Office in relation to this is not good. I gave the statistics on Clause 11 earlier this week. In 2018, 29% of LGBTQI applicants were permitted asylum, but on appeal, taking the average from 2015 to 2018, nearly 40% of the appeals succeeded. That reality reflects the grave difficulties and the disbelief faced by these desperate people. That is why noble Lords will see in those amendments—apart from one; I will come to Amendment 91—that they are all to do with putting on the face of the Bill the need to take into account, wherever there is a reference to reasonable cause or what is practicable, the particular protected characteristic of the asylum seeker.

The one that is different is Amendment 91, which is one of the two amendments I have to Clause 22. Clause 22 provides for a new Section 82A to be inserted into the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and provides for “Expedited appeal to Upper Tribunal in certain cases”. For there to be an expedited appeal, the Secretary of State has to

“certify P’s right of appeal”—

that is, the person served with the priority removal notice—as being appropriate

“unless satisfied that there were good reasons for P making the claim on or after the PRN cut-off date (and P’s right of appeal may not be certified if the Secretary of State is satisfied that there were good reasons)”.

What is important is that, whatever the Secretary of State has to be satisfied about, they should be reasonably satisfied. My amendment is to impose a requirement that the Secretary of State can certify the right of appeal under this clause only if satisfied on reasonable grounds, so that there is some principle that can be examined in the light of the particular facts of the case.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained, Clause 17 has the potential for time limits to be placed on the submission of evidence in support of an asylum claim. I am immediately reminded of the criminal caution in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which says:

“You do not have to say anything. But, it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court.”


There is no time limit, you notice. I accept it is not a perfect analogy, because we have already established that asylum seekers are not illegal immigrants and, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, this should be an inquisitorial process not an adversarial one.

In this context, a notice served on a claimant saying something along the lines of “It may harm your claim if you do not provide evidence in support of your claim as soon as it is becomes available” seems reasonable. As in criminal cases, it should be left to the court, or in this case the tribunal, to place whatever weight it thinks appropriate on the evidence based on when it was submitted, and if it considers that the timing of submissions reflects on the credibility of the claimant or not. Placing a deadline for the submission of evidence seems completely arbitrary and unreasonable, hence Amendments 78 to 81. How long it takes to secure, collate, and submit evidence will be different in every case, and may be especially delayed in the case of vulnerable claimants for the reasons we discussed on Tuesday, and the reasons noble Lords have explained this afternoon, hence Amendments 78 and 82. Even if the Government want to instruct officials, why not do this through the Immigration Rules, as has always been done?

The rest of Clauses 17 and 18 seem superfluous. To instruct a judicial body by primary legislation what conclusions it must come to when it is presented with evidence appears unnecessary, unreasonable and unconstitutional. I say that not knowing anything about the constitution, but thinking in terms of separation of powers between Executive and judiciary.

Clauses 19, 20 and 21 relate to priority removal notices. These too set an arbitrary deadline that must be complied with—in this case, after which a person is liable to be removed and deported. I say that, but Clause 20(4) says:

“A priority removal notice remains in force … even if the PRN recipient ceases to be liable to … deportation”.


Amendment 87 asks why that is. I am guessing that it is to avoid having to serve a separate evidence notice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

Is the Minister able to give an assurance that this guidance, which has been referred to a great deal, rather than putting what I would describe as cautionary provisions in the Act itself, will be ready before the Act comes into force and will be made sufficiently public so that there can be discussion and consideration of it by the general public?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I think I was asked a similar question, in a different context, on the police Bill. I will give the same answer, not least because I am conscious that a lot of these provisions are actually Home Office provisions. I can assure the noble and learned Lord that I will write to him with the answer to that question, so that when this matter comes back he will be in possession of the answer—rather than make an educated guess, which might turn out to be slightly inaccurate, from the Dispatch Box. I hope that is sufficient.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is right to say this is the detained fast track brought back again, in effect. I simply say that this is a very good idea. Leaving aside the detail, if experienced officials can see that a case is really very unlikely to be a genuine one, there should be a fast track and the person should be detained. The details can be sorted, but it is the right way to go. It is what we need to do, given the enormous wave of applications we are now receiving.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I speak in support of the amendment in my name in relation to Clause 26, Amendment 98. It is that

“The Secretary of State may not give … certification if the appellant claims to have a protected characteristic … which is innate or immutable, and that the characteristic is relevant to the appeal.”


Cases in which the appellant is an asylum seeker who has an innate and immutable protected characteristic that is relevant to the appeal are not appropriate for the very short timescale set out in Clause 26(3). I think the noble Lord the Minister himself acknowledged, and the noble Baroness the Minister accepted earlier, that many of these cases raise difficult issues and that guidance that we wait to see will be issued to provide assistance. The paradigm case again is that of the LGBTQ+ asylum seeker. Establishing whether or not they are in fact LGBTQ, the adequacy of the evidence in support on that issue—whether or not there is a genuine fear of persecution because of that characteristic, whether what they have done in relation to pursuing their claim has been reasonable, even if it was not always in compliance with the required time limits—makes their appeal inappropriate for an accelerated appeal.

Once again I say, as others have said, that this conclusion is reinforced by the significant proportion of successful appeals that have been brought by LGB refugees. That is something we simply cannot ignore. Nearly 40% of appeals taken in the period from 2015 to 2018 succeeded.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, for the reasons I explained in a previous group, accelerating appeals processes is not the solution to the last-minute successful appeals against removal or deportation. Rather, it is improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office. Clause 26 is another clause with the wrong solution to the problem, and while Amendments 97 to 99 seek to limit the damage that accelerated appeals might cause, it is more lipstick on more pigs.

To my shame, I am struggling to keep my head above water on this Bill and asking that Clause 27 does not stand part of the Bill does not go far enough. Already the Home Secretary can certify that the decision to remove or deport can be appealed against only once the claimant has been removed or deported, which makes such an appeal more difficult. We should have tabled an amendment to remove that power, let alone Clause 27, which proposes to go one step further, allowing the Secretary of State to certify that a claim cannot be appealed against at all if she thinks it is clearly unfounded. That should be a decision for the tribunal and not the Executive.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Lord Etherton Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 22nd October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I presided in the Court of Appeal on the case of Noel Conway. We followed the Nicklinson decision, to which my noble and learned friend Lord Mance referred, and we decided that, although he had set out a framework very similar to that to be found in the present Bill, it was a matter for Parliament to decide the principles and the policy behind assisted dying. I now find myself in Parliament itself and feel I cannot, as it were, deviate any further and must nail my colours to the mast.

I support the Bill for a number of reasons, but I wish to concentrate and focus on the legal analysis. First, inevitably, as many have said very eloquently, the starting point is that a right to request assisted dying in the circumstances set out in the Bill is an exercise of personal autonomy. Personal autonomy is an inseparable aspect of human dignity, which has been at the heart of the western concept of human rights since the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.

Secondly, a person of full mental capacity, who has not been unduly influenced by others, has an absolute right in common law to insist on the withdrawal of treatment. This prevails over the desire of medical and nursing professions to keep the patient alive. It makes no difference that, in the eyes of others, the decision to insist on withdrawal of treatment is unwise. In those circumstances, as my noble and learned friend Lord Mance said, as suicide is no longer a crime, I suggest that it defies logic to preclude a patient, with appropriate safeguards, from seeking assistance to terminate his or her life.

Furthermore, thirdly, difficult decisions already have to be made in relation to termination of the life of incapacitated individuals. There are many decided cases on this, and often the court, usually the Court of Protection, has to intervene in the event of disagreement between the treating medical professionals and the patient’s family. The overriding principle is that a decision should be made in the best interests of the incapacitated patient, but that is a many-faceted concept and includes, in this context, what the patient himself or herself would have wanted, had they had capacity. This situation presents at least as much risk as is feared in the present Bill, with family and friends being able to influence the decision. Just as much as an improper motive could be ascribed—so it is said—in the case of the present Bill, so, in theory, at any event, such an improper motive could apply in such a case. But we have seen no evidence of such motives and no law reports to suggest that that is a common cause for concern at all, or indeed any cause for concern.

Many withdrawal of treatment cases raise difficult issues, such as that of Anthony Bland, and the conjoined twins case. Those were not strictly assisted dying cases, but the moral and ethical difficulties are no less significant than in cases to which the Bill would apply. I suggest that there is an obvious flaw in logic and consistency in making such early termination of life possible for incapacitous people but not permitting a person of full capacity, free from undue influence and properly informed, to request assistance in dying. Inconsistency in the application of the law heralds injustice, and I therefore support the Bill.