Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

67: Clause 13, page 17, line 1, leave out subsection (7)
Member’s explanatory statement
Clause 13(1) requires an asylum claim to be made at a designated place. However, the UK territorial sea is excluded from being a place where a Home Office Immigration Officer is authorised to accept an asylum claim. This amendment would remove that provision.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Committee will be pleased to hear that I am not hangry any more. I would not like the Chief Whip to think that this speech is so short because of what he just said; it was going to be short anyway.

Amendment 67 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee seeks to take out an apparently innocuous part of the Bill that intends to put into primary legislation that the feet of the asylum seeker need to be on dry land in the UK before they can claim asylum. At present, this requirement, “UK terra firma” as I might call it, is contained in the Immigration Rules rather than in primary legislation. The concern of organisations such as the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association is that this strengthens the Government’s hand in any court case where Home Office actions are challenged as being contrary to the refugee convention, where the Government can now point to primary legislation as in some way overriding their international obligations.

Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 provides that nothing in the Immigration Rules may lay down any practice that would be contrary to the refugee convention. Moving the UK terra firma condition from the Immigration Rules to primary legislation may be seen as an attempt to get around this requirement. The change is seen as integral to other quite abhorrent and questionably legal measures that we will come to later, giving Border Force and others the authority to board, intercept and drive away vessels containing asylum seekers crossing the channel.

Presumably this change that we are challenging is to stop asylum seekers being pushed back towards France from trying to claim asylum in the channel. Clause 13(7) may seem innocuous, but it is part of a greater evil and should be removed from the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I have a couple of questions for the Minister on Amendment 67. I will be interested to hear the debate on this amendment because the change in Clause 13(7) appears to be fairly innocuous, although quite significant. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association has raised concerns about it so we will all listen carefully to what the practical impacts of this charge are.

Can the Minister explain what “territorial sea” of the United Kingdom means? I take the Chief Whip’s point—this may seem a very detailed point, but that is the point of Committee. What does “territorial sea” mean with respect to the beach? My understanding is that territorial water is low tide to 12 nautical miles out. The target then becomes the low beach mark. How is that measured? This is pedantic, but important: how is that measured around the coast?

I looked up the Explanatory Notes for Maritime and Coastal Access Act 2009 and I do not understand what they mean:

“For the most part the territorial sea of the UK does not adjoin that of any other state. Where it does do so in the English Channel, the Territorial Sea (Limits) Order 1989 … sets out the limits of the territorial sea in the Straits of Dover in accordance with an agreement between the UK and France.”


Is that still in existence? The notes continue:

“In relation to the delineation of the territorial sea between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, the situation is more complex, with no boundary having been agreed between the two states. Instead arrangements have been put in place under the Belfast Agreement for joint management of the Loughs that form the border (the Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission’s Loughs Agency).”


I do not expect the Minister to answer now—this is not a trick question—but will she write a letter to explain what the legislation means for someone who may or may not be claiming asylum? The Explanatory Notes continue:

“Within the territorial sea, the UK has jurisdiction for the sea itself, the seabed subjacent and the air above.”


I do not know what the “air above” means. Will the Minister clarify that point?

I am confused—and the Government are confused—on another point. A row is clearly going on in government between the Ministry of Defence and the Home Office on pushback and this House is confused by the Government’s response.

Yesterday at the Home Affairs Select Committee, the Home Secretary was asked whether James Heappey, a Ministry of Defence Minister, was right to rule out pushback by the Navy. To be fair, the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, ruled this out in this Chamber in answer to a question from me and other noble Lords. We were told by the Home Secretary, and this is really important, that the Minister

“gave a view … They are not facts. They cannot be facts, because the work—that operational work—is still under way. While I appreciate that he was responding to questions in Parliament, whether that was in Committee or in response to an urgent question, this is work in progress. It is wrong to say anything specific with regards to work operationally that is still being planned. That work has not completed yet.”

They cannot both be right, can they? If the Government have a pushback policy, they have a pushback policy and, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned, presumably including the seas helps with that. I do not know. What is the Government’s policy on pushback? We are debating the Nationality and Borders Bill and an aspect of it to do with territorial seas and I have no clue what the Government’s policy is.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I agree with the noble Lord and I will clarify the point on this issue. He knows that I will clarify that for him.

Amendment 67, if we can get on to that, seeks to weaken the message that this Bill strives to send. People should not risk their lives using unseaworthy vessels—I do not think anyone would think that they should—to reach our shores when they have already reached safety in a country such as France. It puts their lives at risk, and those of Border Force and rescue services. Events in recent months have all too starkly demonstrated the devastating human cost of undertaking these journeys. This provision is just one of a host of measures which aim to deter illegal entry to the UK. It is right that we prioritise protection for the most vulnerable people rather than for those who could have claimed asylum elsewhere.

Parliament has already had an opportunity to scrutinise these measures when they were placed in the Immigration Rules in December 2020. It has been a long-standing practice in place for many years to only accept claims for asylum in person at the individual’s first available opportunity on arrival in the UK. These provisions simply seek to place these long-standing requirements on a stronger statuary footing.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his intervention. From memory—and I have to say, no pun intended, that I am finding it difficult to keep my head above water with this Bill—we come on to pushback in a later group. Maybe the Minister might be able to say more when we get to the appropriate group on that issue.

But on this issue, there are lots of things in Immigration Rules that are not in primary legislation, and I do not understand why this particular issue is different. If it is simply to put something that has been for a long time been in Immigration Rules on a more secure statutory footing, why are we not seeing many more Immigration Rules being put on a firmer statutory footing by putting them into primary legislation? This leads me to believe ILPA—that there is some other motivation behind it related to pushbacks, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has said.

But there will be an opportunity to revisit this when we come to the groups debating pushbacks, so at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 67 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my name is to a number of amendments in this group—including Amendments 69A, 71A, 71B, 73A and 73B—and they all come from the UNHCR. I had written down not “guardian” but “steward”, but it comes to the same thing—that is, stewardship of the convention. I am not suggesting for a moment that I would be happy—or that it would be happy—to see these clauses remain in the Bill, and I hope I am not too much in “lipstick on pigs” territory, but given that the UNHCR of all bodies has proposed these, I think it right that I speak to them, and I will do so reasonably quickly.

The UNHCR has reiterated that the Bill is fundamentally at odds with the Government’s avowed commitment to uphold the UK’s international obligations under the convention, and its long-standing role as a global champion of supporting and protecting refugees. It has reminded us that three safeguards are essential to any inadmissibility rules. First, they must not operate in a way that denies the fundamental right to seek and enjoy asylum, which is another way of saying a good deal of what has already been said. Secondly, they must protect rights under international law during the refugee process and once a refugee has been recognised. Thirdly, the aim should be to increase access to asylum globally. Clause 15 does not meet those tests; in the interests of time, I will not go through why.

The amendments in my name are to prevent the UK breaching international standards. They would mean that a safe third state must be safe in law—I should put that first—but safe in practice, and that a claim must be considered under the Immigration Rules, not as an optional matter; they broaden the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must consider the application and reduce the risk of an asylum seeker being sent to a country which is not a signatory to the convention and does not respect the rights of refugees under international law. The “connection” would be what most people would regard as a connection in ordinary language, and they define a “relevant claim” as a claim for protective status consistent with the convention. On Tuesday there was a lot of discussion about the importance of the convention as a matter of morality and, very importantly, as law. These amendments relate to both.

On the issue of formal returns agreements, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred, Amendment 195 would require a returns agreement before regulations were brought into force. I agree with that but with the condition that the agreements were acceptable. The amendment perhaps begs the question: I would like to think that it would be possible—it would be proper—for Parliament to have a role, which it will in an international agreement, and that amendments that are thought by Parliament to be required are made, so that the agreement is not just imposed.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, there are lots of issues here, but I start by making an overarching comment. A decade or more ago, the Home Office was dealing with many more applications for asylum than now. I am talking about initial decisions, not appeals. It was dealing with them more quickly and more effectively; the backlog was lower; and the successful appeal rate was lower. I try to be a “glass half full” person and usually fail miserably—but enough of my problems. Let me put it this way: the Home Office has proved in the past that it can deal efficiently and effectively with many more asylum applications than it is facing today. The fix for the current problems lies in the staffing systems and processes of our Home Office, not in the legislation or the number of asylum applications.

I have said it before, and I will say it again: the Government are focusing on the wrong things in the Bill and doing nothing to address the things that need to be addressed. This group of amendments is about unfairly and unreasonably reducing the number of asylum applications rather than increasing the capacity of the Home Office to handle them effectively, as it has proved it is capable of doing in the past.

Clause 14 proposes that all claims for asylum from EU nationals must be ruled inadmissible and that, as it is not a decision to refuse a claim but a decision to refuse to consider a claim, there be no right of appeal. A claim can be considered in exceptional circumstances, but the examples given are where the EU state is at war and has suspended the European Convention on Human Rights, or is going off the rails to such an extent that the EU itself is taking action against it for not complying with the standards of human rights expected of a member state.

These exceptional circumstances do not go far enough, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said. We have seen EU states fail to act or take sufficient action to protect minorities. He mentioned Hungary. In 2020, six Polish cities announced LGBT-free zones. It may not necessarily be the case that an EU state, or even a municipality within an EU state, is overtly persecuting minorities, but failing to protect some minorities may make it unsafe for them to be in a particular state and as such may amount to grounds for asylum in the UK. Surely Home Office officials can determine whether any application for asylum has merit, whoever it is made by and whatever part of the world the applicant is from, without blanket bans of this kind in primary legislation. Amendment 68 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, would be useful if the clause survives, but Clause 14 should not stand part of the Bill.

Another category of claim the Government want to rule as inadmissible is where the claimant has a connection, however spurious, with a safe third state. It just smacks of: “Let’s invent lots of excuses for rejecting someone’s asylum claim, however far-fetched they may be.”

In relation to the other amendments, if the clause remains part of the Bill, of course a safe third state must be safe—and that means safe for everyone, including minorities. It means that their rights will be protected and that the asylum system is compliant with the refugee convention. Of course the Home Secretary should not be able to remove a genuine refugee to any safe third state—to dump them anywhere in the world, whether they have any connection with that state or not.

On what planet does the following make sense? You establish some kind of connection between an asylum seeker and a safe third state, but you cannot send them there because you do not have a return agreement with that state. However, you still refuse to consider their application for asylum. So what are they supposed to do now?

Another amendment seeks to prevent the following scenario: even if the refugee has family in the UK, they could still be deported to a safe third state—“Sorry, lad, I know your parents are here but you’ve got a connection with Turkey because your grandparents are old and frail and could only make it that far, so off you go”.

The conditions for establishing a connection with a safe third state—we have seen this sort of thing before—look like an awayday board blast, where there are no wrong answers and anything you can think of is uncritically written on a flipchart. Can “Well, we think you should have made a claim elsewhere” seriously be a reason an official can give to rule a claim inadmissible, with no right of appeal?

Clauses 14 and 15 should not be part of the Bill, and we will support the other amendments only if those clauses remain.

I was going to speak to Amendment 76, which seeks to override

“all prior national and international law”,

but there is no one here to speak to it, so I shall decline.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I am saying that there are a number of ways in which we can seek to secure this—formal, informal, diplomatic and otherwise. I am not saying there is a single solution to returns. Therefore, Clause 15 still needs to be in place.

It might not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants who have travelled via or have a connection to a safe country. The provisions that we have drafted already have flexibility that allows us to consider whether an individual has exceptional circumstances to warrant consideration of their asylum claim through the UK asylum system. As I said, this includes best interests. We also have the family reunion provisions that I mentioned earlier so, if individuals have family members in the UK, they should apply under those provisions. The inadmissibility provisions should not be used to circumnavigate those provisions and create a back door to enter the UK by dangerous means.

Furthermore, if an individual has not been recognised as a refugee, but has been provided with a different form of protection from refoulement, that country is safe for them to be removed to. To define a “safe third State” in the way suggested by the amendments ignores the other forms of protection available to individuals, which ensure that these countries are safe for them to be removed to.

Regarding Amendments 74, 73B, 74A and 75B, the UK should not be obliged to assess the substance of an asylum application where the applicant, due to a connection to a safe third country, can reasonably be expected to seek protection in that third country, or where they have already sought protection in a safe country and have moved on before the outcome of that claim, or where a claim has already been granted or considered and refused. This is a necessary part of achieving the policy aim of deterring those unnecessary and dangerous secondary movements. We are not alone in operating this practice. These amendments ignore the other forms of protection available to individuals that ensure that these countries are safe for them to be removed to. Amendments 75, 75A, and 76 would significantly undermine the aim of these provisions. The provisions as drafted send that clear message for those who could and should have claimed asylum in another safe country to do so.

I commend the spirit of Amendment 76, which would introduce a new clause to strengthen our inadmissibility provisions and deter irregular entry to the UK, particularly where that means of entry indicates that individuals have travelled to the UK via a safe country. I agree with the premise of this amendment—that access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need and not driven by criminal enterprise. The provisions in the Bill send that clear message. However, this proposed new clause probably goes too far, and would breach our international obligations. It could place individuals in indefinite limbo, which would be against the object and purpose of the refugee convention. The provisions as drafted ensure that individuals are not left in limbo, with their asylum claim neither considered in the UK nor another safe third country. If after a reasonable period it has not been possible to agree removal of the individual to a safe third country, as I said earlier, their asylum claim will be considered in the UK. The introduction of Clauses 14 and 15 as they stand aims to strengthen our position on inadmissibility, further disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys, and encourage them to claim asylum in the first safe country.

I will leave it at that. I hope that noble Lords will be happy not to press their amendments.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

The Minister said that two issues were widely recognised internationally. One was the definition of a safe third country and the other was on the first safe country principle—that refugees should claim asylum in the first safe country. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees asked for the definition, in the amendments, of a third safe country, so it does not agree that it is a widely recognised international definition. The UNHCR also says that it does not recognise the first safe country principle and that there is nothing in international law about it. Does the Minister accept that, even if she says that these things are widely recognised internationally, they are not recognised by the UNHCR?

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[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 82, 84, 86, 90, 91 and 96. I would like to start by taking up the point about the so-called principle specified in Clause 25(2) of the Bill

“that minimal weight should be given to the evidence.”

I am not aware of such a principle. Of course, there can be times when time limits are imposed in a court—and perhaps it can be done by statute—for evidence to be delivered, and if it is not delivered by that time it is excluded. But once evidence is before the court, as the Minister will appreciate, it has to be taken into account even if the relevant evidence—it may be documentary evidence—has been obtained improperly, when it should not have been disclosed or it has been disclosed inadvertently. Once the evidence is there, it is taken into account and given such weight as it is due. We do not have a principle in this country, so far as I am aware, of simply saying that if evidence is late we are not going to have regard to it. That seems to be a denial of justice. I certainly support all those who have spoken against that so-called principle.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his introduction to the difficulties faced by minority groups, particularly LGBTQI groups, in relation to the giving of evidence. In deciding whether there is good cause for late evidence, or for failure to comply in a timely manner with a priority removal notice and so on, all my amendments—apart from one—put forward that there be, on the face of the Bill, a provision so that the difficulties and particular situations of people who have a protected innate or immutable characteristic must be taken into account. I went into this, your Lordships will remember, on Tuesday in relation to Clause 11, and there is no need for me to repeat it. It has been put very well by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Cashman.

Apart from all the difficulties of having discreet, secret lives—particularly in the case of the LGBTQI community—and therefore perhaps not having any evidence as such, seeking information when it is required, and corroboration, from people back in the country from which asylum seekers come poses great difficulties. An asylum seeker will not want to implicate his or her family or friends, because they could suffer as a result. There are all sorts of adverse consequences as a result of conduct that is disapproved of in the many countries that proscribe sex between same-sex couples. There is a combination of a whole variety of things, in addition to all those other points made by people about the difficulty of coming to terms with one’s sexuality.

The same applies for single women. They have many similar problems: the shame of having left an abusive relationship, the shame on the family, the consequences for the family, the clandestine nature necessarily required for those women to come here—and then they may face a male authoritative figure. All these grave difficulties have to be taken into account.

I explained why this ought to be on the face of the Bill, despite the fact that the noble Baroness the Minister said it would all be dealt with in guidance, because, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, said, the record of the Home Office in relation to this is not good. I gave the statistics on Clause 11 earlier this week. In 2018, 29% of LGBTQI applicants were permitted asylum, but on appeal, taking the average from 2015 to 2018, nearly 40% of the appeals succeeded. That reality reflects the grave difficulties and the disbelief faced by these desperate people. That is why noble Lords will see in those amendments—apart from one; I will come to Amendment 91—that they are all to do with putting on the face of the Bill the need to take into account, wherever there is a reference to reasonable cause or what is practicable, the particular protected characteristic of the asylum seeker.

The one that is different is Amendment 91, which is one of the two amendments I have to Clause 22. Clause 22 provides for a new Section 82A to be inserted into the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and provides for “Expedited appeal to Upper Tribunal in certain cases”. For there to be an expedited appeal, the Secretary of State has to

“certify P’s right of appeal”—

that is, the person served with the priority removal notice—as being appropriate

“unless satisfied that there were good reasons for P making the claim on or after the PRN cut-off date (and P’s right of appeal may not be certified if the Secretary of State is satisfied that there were good reasons)”.

What is important is that, whatever the Secretary of State has to be satisfied about, they should be reasonably satisfied. My amendment is to impose a requirement that the Secretary of State can certify the right of appeal under this clause only if satisfied on reasonable grounds, so that there is some principle that can be examined in the light of the particular facts of the case.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained, Clause 17 has the potential for time limits to be placed on the submission of evidence in support of an asylum claim. I am immediately reminded of the criminal caution in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which says:

“You do not have to say anything. But, it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court.”


There is no time limit, you notice. I accept it is not a perfect analogy, because we have already established that asylum seekers are not illegal immigrants and, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, this should be an inquisitorial process not an adversarial one.

In this context, a notice served on a claimant saying something along the lines of “It may harm your claim if you do not provide evidence in support of your claim as soon as it is becomes available” seems reasonable. As in criminal cases, it should be left to the court, or in this case the tribunal, to place whatever weight it thinks appropriate on the evidence based on when it was submitted, and if it considers that the timing of submissions reflects on the credibility of the claimant or not. Placing a deadline for the submission of evidence seems completely arbitrary and unreasonable, hence Amendments 78 to 81. How long it takes to secure, collate, and submit evidence will be different in every case, and may be especially delayed in the case of vulnerable claimants for the reasons we discussed on Tuesday, and the reasons noble Lords have explained this afternoon, hence Amendments 78 and 82. Even if the Government want to instruct officials, why not do this through the Immigration Rules, as has always been done?

The rest of Clauses 17 and 18 seem superfluous. To instruct a judicial body by primary legislation what conclusions it must come to when it is presented with evidence appears unnecessary, unreasonable and unconstitutional. I say that not knowing anything about the constitution, but thinking in terms of separation of powers between Executive and judiciary.

Clauses 19, 20 and 21 relate to priority removal notices. These too set an arbitrary deadline that must be complied with—in this case, after which a person is liable to be removed and deported. I say that, but Clause 20(4) says:

“A priority removal notice remains in force … even if the PRN recipient ceases to be liable to … deportation”.


Amendment 87 asks why that is. I am guessing that it is to avoid having to serve a separate evidence notice.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, on that very important point, perhaps the Minister will take back to the Home Office that this Committee would very much like the guidance to be published in draft form in good time so that Members of the House and others can look at it.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am sorry for interrupting, but I am becoming a little confused again, I am afraid, probably because we have been at this for a very long time and it is very late and so forth. Is the Minister saying that the deadline that is set for the submission of evidence will be set on a case-by-case basis, for example, if the applicant is particularly vulnerable? If vulnerabilities come to notice that were not initially brought to the notice of the decision-maker, will the deadline then be adjusted and perhaps extended as a consequence of that? Although there might be general guidance about what the deadline might be in every case, is it movable and adjustable in every case and might it be adjusted further as the case progresses? In which case, why on earth is this part of the Bill?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Let me come to that point in a second. First, let me say that I almost took it as implicit in the request from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that the Committee would like to have the guidance, but I have heard the point made, and I will certainly pass it on. I do not want to go over points I have already made, and I think when the noble Lord looks in Hansard, he will see that I have set out quite clearly why, first, we need to have a system whereby, in particular cases, the date can be extended or adjusted, but also, secondly, why that does not undercut the principle of actually having a date and having this structure. However, I am very happy to look again at what the noble Lord has just said. If, having read it, it seems to me that I can add to what I have already said, I will; otherwise, I respectfully direct him to what I said earlier.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have put my name to the proposal that Clauses 22 and 23 should not stand part of the Bill. When I first saw the term “expedited appeals”, my antennae twitched. It sounds such a benign and helpful term but then so did “detained fast track”—the accelerated process for considering asylum claims introduced in 2002, involving detention immediately after the asylum screening interview, which was followed shortly by the substantive interview, with a decision the following day and two days to appeal. The High Court found that the DFT, as operated, carried

“an unacceptably high risk of unfairness”

to vulnerable or potentially vulnerable applicants, and to that extent it found it to be unlawful, and the Home Office eventually suspended it. Expedited appeals are not the same but some of the issues are really quite similar.

As we have been discussing, the Bill of course provides for priority removal notices to be served on anyone liable for removal or deportation; we have discussed the cut-off date for the provision of evidence. However, it does not set out the factors that may lead to a PRN being issued. That is left solely to Home Office guidance. I support what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, just said about needing to see guidance—but only so far because guidance, by definition, can be changed and although we may be reassured in February 2022, come February 2025 things might look quite different, with the same Government or another Government producing rather different guidance.

Listening to the previous debate, I was concerned that for an appropriate date to be set, the Home Office needs to know whether somebody is vulnerable, but it will know that only after the event of the notice. I understand the difficulty of trying to start without a starting point, which is the point that the Minister was making. Without a date, you cannot look further, but the extension of that is important. I found it quite difficult to follow all that. I am mentioning it now because it is part and parcel of the same issue and certainly Hansard will require careful reading.

The PRN will remain in force until 12 months after the cut-off date or exhaustion of appeal rights. We have talked about whether or not there is a principle. Clause 22 provides for an expedited appeal route for appellants who have been served a PRN and have made a claim on or after the cut-off date but while the PRN is still in force. In that circumstance, the Secretary of State may “certify”—an interesting term in itself—that any right of appeal against a Home Office refusal will be to the Upper Tribunal instead of the First-tier Tribunal. The Secretary of State can also certify that she or he is satisfied that there are good reasons for making the claim on or after the date. I cannot think of an alternative to what is probably an inappropriate term about being judge and jury in your own case, but I think noble Lords will understand what I mean.

The result of an appeal being certified is that one tier of appeal—the First-tier Tribunal—is lost. Under the Bill, the rules must provide for expedited appeals in the Upper Tribunal to be determined more quickly than an ordinary appeal in the First-tier Tribunal and allow for the Upper Tribunal to make an order that the expedited appeals process may—I stress “may”—not apply

“if it is satisfied that is the only way to secure that justice is done in the case of a particular expedited appeal”.

When someone is subject to the expedited process, Clause 23 provides that any other appeals they may have, for instance

“in respect of protection and human rights claims … deprivation of citizenship … EU citizens’ rights”

and so on, are dealt with as a related expedited appeal.

Ousting the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal, and so prohibiting an appeal from a first-instance decision, is clearly a significant matter. It would give no one the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal and, necessarily, not to the Supreme Court afterwards either. As we have discussed, the appeals concerned involve international protection rights, human rights, European Union and EEA citizens’ rights and the deprivation of citizenship, all areas where the UK has bound itself to abide by international agreements. For such a fundamental right as the right not to be sent back to a country where one is at risk of persecution to be excluded from an onward appeal to the Court of Appeal—even if the decision of the Upper Tribunal contains an error of law or a breach of natural justice—is extraordinary. This is not a criticism of the Upper Tribunal in any way; it is just not how things should be done. Removing Clauses 22 and 23 would leave the existing appeals structure in place.

How will one challenge Upper Tribunal decisions if these clauses stand? My noble friend made a caveat about the use of “constitutionality” but I think that it applies here, as well as on the impact on the rule of law. The Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House said in its report:

“The House may wish to consider the effect of clause 23 on the functioning of the appeals process and consequently on access to justice.”


That is quite strong stuff for a Lords committee.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise but, in the war of attrition that this Bill has become, we seem to have lost any contributions other than from the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Front Bench.

Bearing that in mind, I will add to what my noble friend said rather than repeat anything she said. This clause smacks of the Home Office trying to remove or deport people before they have had a reasonable chance to appeal against a removal or deportation decision. No doubt it is embarrassing when repeated stories emerge of government charter flights taking off almost empty because the courts ruled that the majority of those with a seat on the plane should not be deported, but the answer is not to deport them before they have a reasonable chance to put their case before the courts. The answer is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office to ensure that there is a cast-iron case for deportation that cannot be overturned in the courts at the last minute. Yet again, the Bill focuses on the wrong solution to the problem.

I am sure the Minister will agree that as the Home Office becomes better at making its decisions and more and more appeals are turned down, as opposed to the current situation where the majority are accepted by the tribunals, there will be fewer appeals as lawyers say to their clients “Look at what’s happening now. There’s absolutely no point in appealing.” That is the answer to this problem, not Clauses 22 and 23.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, the Bill’s system of penalisation includes curtailing appeal rights, as set out in Clauses 22 and 23. These clauses create an expedited appeal route for those who have been served with a priority removal notice and who have provided evidence or a claim after the PRN cut-off date. Most importantly, the right of appeal would be limited to the Upper Tribunal. However, where a person provides a good reason for lateness, they will not be subject to this clause.

Clause 23 wraps certain other appeals a person may have into the expedited appeals process, further restricting appeal rights. The Government say the reason this clause is needed is prevent delaying tactics, remove incentives for late claims and protect the system from abuse. It is probably fair to say that in this Bill, where so much of it is driven by the party-political considerations of the Government, they will be part of the so-called lefty-lawyers amendments—we have one or two others—who seem to have become the bête noire as far as this Government are concerned.

As has been said, I have added my name to the clause stand parts to Clauses 22 and 23, to start, at least, to probe concerns that have been raised about these provisions. The Law Society, the Public Law Project and Justice have recommended that these clauses be removed from the Bill. The UNHCR has raised legal concerns. I suggest that these are not concerns the Government should take lightly.

The UNHCR has said the expedited appeals process, as designed under Clause 22, risks “miscarriages of justice”. Its legal observations agree, as do we, that accelerated processes can be appropriate for

“manifestly unfounded or repeat claims, as long as they are sufficiently flexible and contain adequate safeguards to ensure that they can be determined fairly and justly.”

The UNHCR is, though, entirely clear that appeals

“should not be accelerated … for reasons that are unrelated to their merits.”

The widespread expediting of appeals under these sections is, in the words of the UNHCR, “arbitrary” and

“unrelated to considerations of justice or efficiency.”

It risks people having their human rights violated as a result of a truncated appeals process for asylum claims. The incorrect decision can cost an individual their safety, security and livelihood.

Clause 23 is particularly troubling on the “arbitrary” point as it joins certain pre-existing appeals to the expedited process, even where they pre-date the priority removal notice and were made entirely on time. I ask the Government: what in this clause actually targets the expedited process on vexatious and unmerited claims? That is the reason Ministers give for why the clause is needed but, as far as I can see, it is not what the clause as drafted achieves.

I will make a couple of further points. First, the Public Law Project has said that making a system quicker is patently not the same as making it efficient. In order to be efficient, a system must move both more quickly and more accurately.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 94A in this group. I am sorry that I could not respond to the Minister on the previous group, but I am sure we will come back to that. I was going to observe that the Chamber seemed largely to have cleared, possibly because other noble Lords could not bear this Bill any longer today, but some noble Lords have rejoined us.

It is clearly better that legal aid is available than not, but I am aware, as my noble friend is, of the shortage of provision and some of the problems here. I would say that it is not a matter for today, but actually it probably is. It is very significant, because the words in the Bill will not provide the advice. The Minister has referred two or three times very confidently to the legal aid offer; we are concerned to ensure that that offer has substance.

I have heard over the years of the difficulties of solicitors—if you can find one—advising and taking instructions in immigration removal centres, with the restrictions there on time, of 30 minutes eaten into by the client having to be fetched and then returned. I do not need to say again, but I will in one sentence, that the client often needs a lot of time over a period to tell his or her story.

My amendment seeks to understand how the Government have landed on seven hours. The Minister gently chided me for the use of the term “arbitrary” before. I will acknowledge that my proposal of 20 hours is arbitrary, but it is my way of probing why the Bill provides for seven hours. I asked ILPA whether that would be sufficient, and the reply was:

“I do not think seven hours of legal aid is sufficient to advise on the notice, the person’s immigration status, the lawfulness of removal, and immigration detention. The immigration system is complex, and the Bill makes it more complex through the expedited processes, priority notices, and new definitions/standards … It is also of concern”


that the Bill

“would allow a power to alter that 7 hour time limit.”

There must have been evidence for coming to the seven hours. If that is so, what evidence would the Minister apply to reduce that figure—or indeed extend it? ILPA says it does not

“have a sense as to the specific number of hours needed for this advice, as it would be so case-specific,”

which is entirely understandable,

“including the immigration and procedural history of the case, novelty of any legal arguments, number of bases on which to raise a claim, the legality of detention”

and so on. So I hope that the Minister can flesh out this provision in the Bill so we can understand what the Government think can be achieved with the seven hours of scarce legal aid.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for the reasons my noble friend Lady Ludford has explained. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, Amendment 94A is not to replace one arbitrary number with another but to probe how much legal aid should be provided in such cases. The Minister described, in a previous group, how cases are of different complexity and how people will be given more time to secure and collate evidence if they are from a vulnerable background. For example, if they come from an LGBTQIA background, they are less likely to be able to acquire evidence quickly, and therefore, the date on the notice they are given would change even during the process. Surely that points to the fact that each and every case is different and will require a different amount of legal aid, depending on how much aid is needed to advise in each particular circumstance. I understand that people who are in this situation do need legal aid, but surely the number of hours should be as case-specific and flexible as the deadline date of any notice for them to submit their evidence.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

We too support the amendments we are debating. I suppose, in a sense, this clause is a rare section of the Bill, in that we welcome it but desire it to go much further, as has already been said. Amendment 94A is a probing amendment, but it is a very valid one, because, clearly, the Government have come to the view that the seven hours of support that will be available will be sufficient.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I speak in support of the amendment in my name in relation to Clause 26, Amendment 98. It is that

“The Secretary of State may not give … certification if the appellant claims to have a protected characteristic … which is innate or immutable, and that the characteristic is relevant to the appeal.”


Cases in which the appellant is an asylum seeker who has an innate and immutable protected characteristic that is relevant to the appeal are not appropriate for the very short timescale set out in Clause 26(3). I think the noble Lord the Minister himself acknowledged, and the noble Baroness the Minister accepted earlier, that many of these cases raise difficult issues and that guidance that we wait to see will be issued to provide assistance. The paradigm case again is that of the LGBTQ+ asylum seeker. Establishing whether or not they are in fact LGBTQ, the adequacy of the evidence in support on that issue—whether or not there is a genuine fear of persecution because of that characteristic, whether what they have done in relation to pursuing their claim has been reasonable, even if it was not always in compliance with the required time limits—makes their appeal inappropriate for an accelerated appeal.

Once again I say, as others have said, that this conclusion is reinforced by the significant proportion of successful appeals that have been brought by LGB refugees. That is something we simply cannot ignore. Nearly 40% of appeals taken in the period from 2015 to 2018 succeeded.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, for the reasons I explained in a previous group, accelerating appeals processes is not the solution to the last-minute successful appeals against removal or deportation. Rather, it is improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office. Clause 26 is another clause with the wrong solution to the problem, and while Amendments 97 to 99 seek to limit the damage that accelerated appeals might cause, it is more lipstick on more pigs.

To my shame, I am struggling to keep my head above water on this Bill and asking that Clause 27 does not stand part of the Bill does not go far enough. Already the Home Secretary can certify that the decision to remove or deport can be appealed against only once the claimant has been removed or deported, which makes such an appeal more difficult. We should have tabled an amendment to remove that power, let alone Clause 27, which proposes to go one step further, allowing the Secretary of State to certify that a claim cannot be appealed against at all if she thinks it is clearly unfounded. That should be a decision for the tribunal and not the Executive.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

In this group, I have the Clause 26 stand part amendment, and Clause 26 requires the Tribunal Procedure Committee to create a fast-track route for certain appeals made from detention. The accelerated process would apply where the Secretary of State “considers” that an appeal brought in relation to the decision would

“likely be disposed of expeditiously.”

Of course, that raises the question of the basis on which the Secretary of State will decide that an appeal brought in relation to the decision is likely to be disposed of expeditiously. Will it be done on a whim? Will it be done on the basis that we need to speed things up and this may be the way to do it? Will they be getting legal advice on whether they should consider that it is likely to be disposed of expeditiously? What happens if they do decide that an appeal brought in relation to the decision is likely to be disposed of expeditiously, and they then find that it cannot be disposed of expeditiously? What is the redress in that situation?

The Explanatory Notes state:

“This clause aims to establish an accelerated route for those appeals made in detention which are considered suitable for a quick decision, to allow appellants to be released or removed more quickly.”


As far as the Explanatory Notes are concerned, it is being done for the highest of motives, and nothing to do with simply trying to speed up the process.

The Law Society, Justice, the UNHCR and the Public Law Project have recommended that the clause be removed from the Bill. They raise that the fast-track system largely replicates, as has been said, a system that was already found to be unlawful in 2015 in a Court of Appeal ruling.

We support the amendments and concerns raised in this group, but I intend to speak only to the amendment in my name, which is to oppose Clause 26 standing part of the Bill. The concerns are very clear. As I said, various organisations have recommended that the clause be removed from the Bill. Their basis for saying so is that it amounts to a new detained fast-track procedure that was found to be unlawful in 2015 due to being “structurally unfair”. The Court of Appeal described the timetable for such appeals as

“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.

It held that the policy did not sufficiently appreciate

“the problems faced by legal representatives of obtaining instructions from individuals who are in detention”,

nor did it

“adequately take account of the complexity and difficulty of many asylum appeals”

and

“the gravity of the issues that are raised by them”.

Since that ruling, the Tribunal Procedure Committee has repeatedly taken the position not to introduce specific rules in relation to cases where an appellant is detained. In its report of March 2019, the TPC concluded that

“a set of specific rules would not lead to the results sought by the Government. If a set of rules were devised so as to operate fairly, they would not lead to the increased speed and certainty desired.”

Following the clear and somewhat damning court ruling and the position of the TPC, the Government’s response has been, as we now see, to legislate to reintroduce a fast-track procedure by forcing the TPC’s hand and requiring it to create one.

The questions for the Government are fairly simple. What is it about this scheme that is significantly structurally different from the scheme that was found to be legally unsound? What about this scheme will prevent it having a timetable

“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity”?

Why, and on the basis of what evidence, do the Government disagree with the TPC when it says that such rules should not be brought in since they cannot both operate fairly and achieve the desired result of speed?

One wonders whether the Government are risking further judicial proceedings in replicating a scheme that has been found to be unlawful or, indeed, whether they would care too much anyway if there were such future judicial proceedings. I await the Government’s response.