Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, we have Amendments 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 82A, 82B, 86A, 86B, 90 and 90A in this group. I have also put my name to Amendment 95A along with that of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I do not know whether she is planning to speak to it—it is the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins—but its thrust certainly falls within this group. Noble Lords will be pleased to know I am not going to speak precisely to each amendment.

I am slightly hesitant to raise this point, given the expertise of the noble Lord on the Front Bench and the noble and learned Lord sitting opposite, although it feels as if I have been sitting next to him through most of the passage of this Bill. Listening to the last exchange, is it something to do with the whole of our legal system that we place asylum seeker on one side opposite the state as the other party? The whole way this is designed is to have parties to proceedings fighting one another. I am glad to see the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, nodding at that. It has only just occurred to me.

This clutch of amendments addresses the period within which the claimant is to provide evidence. I hoped that the noble and learned Lord might be speaking ahead of me because I am sure I would be saying I agree with him. Why is the specific date a matter for the Secretary of State or the immigration officer? Different people will need different periods of time. That might be an argument for variability, but it should not mean that it can be an arbitrary date without there being a reasoned basis. The lawyers in the Chamber will tell me if I get this wrong, but I think one would usually expect to see time periods within tribunal rules with a possibility of applying for an extension, but the procedure rules are the subject of the next clause. I am concerned about whether this is a proper way to go about giving notice. It should be neutral and objectively appropriate, and Clause 17 gives the Secretary of State considerable power.

Under the new subsections introduced by Clause 18, the tribunal is required to make a statement as to whether the claimant has behaved in a way designed or “likely” to go to his credibility. When we tabled Amendments 82A and 82B, I was thinking about points noble Lords made and will make again and again about the impact of trauma on a claimant, and the difficulties someone may have—even someone who is not affected—in dealing with authority figures, accessing documents and so on. This point was very clearly made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, a couple of days ago. That is why I stress the word “likely”.

This gives me the opportunity to ask the Government why Clause 18 is included. It would be good to have that on the record. Others may have a different take on the reasons for some claims having taken the course they have.

In my Amendment 86A, I am not really seeking to amend the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 86, just to add to it by requiring adequate time before a cut-off date in a priority removal notice. Amendment 86A would add more of the people about whom we have been concerned to the list; the same point is made on Amendments 90 and 90A.

I also have Amendment 86B in this group. I got into quite a circular argument with myself last weekend about this. I am not sure I resolved it, but I will not trouble the Committee with it this evening, given the time.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 95 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, who apologises for having had to leave early. This speech will be in two halves—although one will be rather bigger than the other. The first half is roughly what the noble Baroness would have said.

At Second Reading she spoke about the ways in which she believes this Bill places additional unacceptable barriers in the way of women refugees seeking asylum who are fleeing sexual violence and exploitation. The amendment seeks to remove one of those obstacles and to extend the benefit to other groups of asylum seekers who may be similarly disadvantaged, so that it is accepted that they have a good reason for a late claim.

As we understand it, the issue is that in the proposed legislation the authorities deciding an asylum claim or appeal are instructed to attach, as we have heard, only minimal weight to any evidence provided late by the applicant, unless there is a good reason for it being late. However, there is robust evidence to show that the trauma suffered by the victims of sexual violence or trafficking can impact on memory and the ability to recall information. The Home Office guidance itself makes this clear. The other categories she included in Amendment 95, such as victims of torture, modern slavery and trafficking, are just as likely to suffer the same effects on memory and should be protected in the same way. I strongly support what she would have said.

However, as the arguments from this perspective are very similar to those I made in support of Amendment 40 on Tuesday, I will focus on children, a group we have not talked much about so far, although I was very pleased that my noble friend Lord Coaker did so in introducing this group. It is the strong view of children’s organisations such as the Children’s Society—I am grateful for its help—that the Bill completely fails to protect children, a group in particular need of it. Despite recognition of this added need for protection, this Bill’s harsh reforms apply to children just as they do to adults, unless the Minister can tell me that I am wrong—I hope he can. This is not right; it is a serious failure of the Government’s duty to protect children.

We need only look at Clauses 25 and 17 to see the disproportionate impact many of these provisions will have on children and young people. Amendment 95 seeks to ensure that children are recognised as having a good reason for not providing evidence by the deadline and that any evidence they provide late is given due weight. We know from organisations on the ground that asylum-seeking children who have been forced to flee, who may have witnessed violence and the destruction of their homes or schools, or even death, and who may have endured traumatic journeys, might not be able to share all the details of their ordeal in the first instance to provide evidence to support their case. The particular difficulties children might face in providing prompt evidence are recognised by the JCHR.

The Government know this. Their only quality impact assessment, to which my noble friend referred, sets out how these clauses will have a disproportionate impact on vulnerable persons, including children. The Home Office’s Children’s Asylum Claims Casework Guidance makes it clear:

“Decision makers must take account of what it is reasonable to expect a child to know”—


or relay—

“in their given set of circumstances”.

It is inappropriate for authorities to question the credibility of a child’s claim if they omit information, bearing in mind the child’s age, maturity and other reasons that may have led to those omissions. Requiring time-limited evidence and penalising children when they are unable to meet the deadlines goes against the Government’s own assessments and guidance and does nothing to protect children or, as we have heard, their best interests.

As one young person supported by the Children’s Society, which has long supported asylum-seeking children and young people, reminds us:

“This is not a joyful moment in our lives. We have to talk through the worst parts of our past. It is very traumatic.”


Children and young people need time and a sense of safety before they can begin to disclose their experience. They also need good, child-appropriate legal representation, which we know they often do not get, unfortunately. All too often, asylum-seeking children receive poor initial legal advice, which can lead to ill-prepared claims and to them not feeling comfortable about setting out their information. Due to legal aid funding cuts, quality legal advice is not readily available.

Another young asylum seeker supported by the Children’s Society described his experience:

“My solicitor did nothing, it was horrible. They didn’t even prepare a witness statement for my interview. I had to do everything myself. I had my social worker but she didn’t know how to help me with my asylum case. The interviewer told me she had no information and I had to tell her everything.”


The Children’s Society sees many asylum-seeking children who have to provide evidence at later stages of their claim, not because of any weakness in the claim but because of the trauma they have endured or the consequences of non-existent or poor legal representation. No doubt the Minister will assure us that these concerns will be addressed in guidance and on a case-by-case basis, yet, as was highlighted in the recent report, An Inspection of Asylum Casework, guidance is often neither followed nor implemented by Home Office caseworkers. Home Office staff themselves stressed that they

“did not have time to consider each case on its own merits, contrary to the guidance they receive.”

So the aim of Amendment 95 is not to tie the hands of decision-makers or legislate for every situation in which a person might provide late evidence. Rather, it is to ensure that the most vulnerable are protected in the Bill, because we cannot leave their safety and well-being to chance. That is consistent with this highlighted observation from the JCHR:

“It is crucial that decision-makers recognise the many legitimate reasons why asylum seekers may struggle to provide evidence in support of their claims within tight deadlines.”


If Clause 25 stands part—I have to say that I will support the proposal that will be put by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that it should not—this amendment represents the minimum necessary to protect children, women, women fleeing gender-based violence and others in the most vulnerable circumstances.

I want to return briefly to what the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, said. Given the Home Office guidance, we cannot see any logical or humane reason why the Government would not accept this amendment and establish on the face of the Bill that, in these circumstances, for these victims, any late evidence should always be accepted as being late for a good reason, and their application or appeal should not in any way be disadvantaged because of it.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 85 on the destruction of documents. I am a sponsor of this amendment, together with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, who is unfortunately unwell and in isolation.

The purpose of these subsections is to indicate matters that might damage a claimant’s credibility in respect of an asylum or human rights claim. The destruction of documents is clearly one of these. Why else would this be done, except to make it much more difficult to identify the claimant and therefore much more difficult to assess their claims? Noble Lords will remember that claimants arriving by air used to cut up their passports and dispose of them in the aircraft’s toilet. That was dealt with by photocopying their documents before they boarded the aircraft. This time round, it is rather more difficult to counter, but it should certainly be regarded as relevant to an assessment of the validity of their claim.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I think I was asked a similar question, in a different context, on the police Bill. I will give the same answer, not least because I am conscious that a lot of these provisions are actually Home Office provisions. I can assure the noble and learned Lord that I will write to him with the answer to that question, so that when this matter comes back he will be in possession of the answer—rather than make an educated guess, which might turn out to be slightly inaccurate, from the Dispatch Box. I hope that is sufficient.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, on that very important point, perhaps the Minister will take back to the Home Office that this Committee would very much like the guidance to be published in draft form in good time so that Members of the House and others can look at it.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am sorry for interrupting, but I am becoming a little confused again, I am afraid, probably because we have been at this for a very long time and it is very late and so forth. Is the Minister saying that the deadline that is set for the submission of evidence will be set on a case-by-case basis, for example, if the applicant is particularly vulnerable? If vulnerabilities come to notice that were not initially brought to the notice of the decision-maker, will the deadline then be adjusted and perhaps extended as a consequence of that? Although there might be general guidance about what the deadline might be in every case, is it movable and adjustable in every case and might it be adjusted further as the case progresses? In which case, why on earth is this part of the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

There are a number of ways of skinning this particular cat because there are separate amendments but common themes. If when I am about to sit down, I have not dealt with it fully, I am sure the noble Baroness will intervene, but I will try to come to Clause 25 head on.

However, I was going to go next to Amendments 82A and 82B, both in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Different elements of Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 have different thresholds in how they are applied to the facts of a case and how credibility is consequently damaged. Clause 18 is drafted to take this into account, so that decision-makers will take into account the relevant thresholds on a case-by-case basis. Clause 18 will encourage claimants to engage with the process in good faith and, along with the measures relating to late evidence in Clauses 17 and 25, to provide evidence in support of their claim at the earliest opportunity. As I said earlier, we think that by encouraging people to bring all their evidence upfront in protection or human rights claims, we can protect those who need protection and identify any unmeritorious claims as early as possible.

Turning to Amendment 82B, the good faith requirement is intended, as I think is obvious, to address behaviours that a deciding authority thinks are not in good faith. Where an individual who makes a protection or human rights claim exhibits a pattern of non-compliant behaviour during their dealings with immigration authorities, their credibility should be damaged to reflect that behaviour. It is also designed to stop claimants deliberately obstructing the one-stop and expedited judicial process—for example, by not taking up our enhanced legal aid offer and then making a last-minute claim based on lack of access to legal advice. The good faith requirement therefore goes further than the behaviours currently described in Section 8 of the 2004 Act. It puts beyond doubt that past behaviour that is deliberately designed to frustrate or delay proceedings should be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. We think that is right, for the reasons I have outlined.

I turn to Amendments 83 and 88, which would remove the credibility provisions in Clauses 18 and 21. For the reasons that I set out earlier, we think that it is entirely reasonable to require evidence in support of a protection of human rights claim, or a claim of being a victim of modern slavery, to be provided in a timely manner, unless there are good reasons why that is not possible.

However, I underline that a person’s credibility is not necessarily determinative of their claim under the current rules and procedures, and the Bill does not change that. Decision-makers will still be required to consider credibility in the round, as they currently do, and, where a person has raised evidence late, which causes delay and wasted resource, it is right that decision-makers consider whether there is any merit in the reasons for that lateness.

I turn now to Amendment 90A, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. We recognise that, due to an person’s individual circumstances, it may be harder for them to provide material in a timely manner. Since this is essentially an amendment to Amendment 90 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I respectfully direct the noble Baroness to the response that I gave to the noble and learned Lord.

As I am on the noble and learned Lord’s amendments, I will now deal with Amendment 91 on reasonable grounds. It is right that, where an individual has been assessed as a priority for removal or deportation, they should avail themselves of the associated legal aid advice offer and provide any matters listed within Clause 19(3)(a) before the cut-off date and they should provide reasons for lateness where a late claim is raised, under subsection (7).

Decision-makers cannot reasonably be expected to speculate on or investigate why an individual who has received a removal notice and associated legal aid advice offer would raise a late protection or human rights claim. If no reasons for lateness are provided, or if the reasons provided are not considered to be good reasons, it would be clear to the decision-maker that any appeal must be subject to the expedited appeals process. In answer to the noble and learned Lord, I say that the good reasons test is adequate and sufficient.

The clause already provides significant safeguards for recipients of a PRN in the form of the legal aid advice provision and the good reasons test for individuals who raise late claims. I set out earlier what those good reasons can amount to. It is a very open-ended test. Therefore, I respectfully suggest to the noble and learned Lord that the amendment is unnecessary and, indeed, would risk complicating an otherwise straightforward and, I suggest, suitable test.

I turn now to Amendment 95 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, but spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. By introducing a statutory requirement to provide evidence before a specified date, the Bill redresses the current balance. It is right that decision-makers should have regard to the principle —I underline “principle”—that minimal weight is given to evidence that is late, following receipt of either an evidence notice or a priority removal notice, without good reason.

I will come to the thrust of Clause 25 in a second, but I will first say that this amendment would place an obligation on decision-makers, not only in the Home Office but also the judiciary, to accept that there were good reasons for late evidence in all asylum and human rights cases where either the claimant or the claim type fell into one of the listed categories. That would remove the requirement that decision-makers should have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence. That would be the case even if the reason for lateness was wholly unconnected to the category of claim or the personal factors. No causal link between the two is set out in the amendment. I respectfully suggest that that is overly prescriptive and would tie the hands of the decision-maker. Of course, in all cases, the decision-maker can take these matters into account—

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

It is not my amendment so maybe it could be worded better. The noble Lord gave great emphasis to the case-by-case basis earlier, which sounds very reasonable, and he talked about subjective factors. Has he read the recent research from the British Red Cross about women seeking asylum? It found that frequently their claims are met with disbelief and they are not treated very well at all. There is a lack of recognition of gender-based violence that they may be fleeing from, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, talked about earlier. I suggest that the noble Lord and those responsible for this clause look at this research, because I worry about putting so much emphasis on subjective factors and the case-by-case basis.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I think I have received the email from the Red Cross, as I think it emailed everyone. I have set up a folder for all these briefings, so I do not want to say that I have read it, but if I have been sent it I certainly have it and will read it. However, due to pressures of other business, I cannot say that I have read all the material yet.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I absolutely understand—I do not think it was in its general briefing, but it produced a separate report last week or the week before, and it is worth looking at.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

In that case, I will certainly read it over the weekend. I know that those in the Home Office responsible for this area are obviously looking at the debate and will have picked up what the noble Baroness has said.

I was just dealing with Amendment 95, after which I will come to Clause 25 itself. I lost count of how many times the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “tawdry”. It really is not, if I may say so. We obviously disagree, and I will make no comparisons either to parking fines or international commercial litigation. At one point it seemed to me that the noble Baroness was saying that, on the one hand, this clause was terrible and, on the other, that this is what tribunals do in any event and we can trust them to do the right thing.