Thursday 3rd February 2022
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberNationality and Borders Act 2022 View all Nationality and Borders Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 82-III(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Third Marshalled List) - (3 Feb 2022)
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
I thank noble Lords for speaking to these amendments. In terms of territorial waters, yes, I understand it to be 12 nautical miles at low tide. In terms of pushbacks, of course I agree with my right honourable friend the Home Secretary and we are developing a range of tools to tackle the illegal and very dangerous crossings in the channel.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I absolutely understand why the Minister has said what she has with respect to the Home Secretary. Nobody, including me, expects the Minister to get up and say that she disagrees with the Home Secretary—for obvious reasons. But that is not the point. The point is: what is the Government’s policy? The Ministry of Defence is saying one thing—including the Minister who speaks for defence matters from the Dispatch Box—and the Home Secretary is saying something completely different. It is not good enough.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
I agree with the noble Lord and I will clarify the point on this issue. He knows that I will clarify that for him.
Amendment 67, if we can get on to that, seeks to weaken the message that this Bill strives to send. People should not risk their lives using unseaworthy vessels—I do not think anyone would think that they should—to reach our shores when they have already reached safety in a country such as France. It puts their lives at risk, and those of Border Force and rescue services. Events in recent months have all too starkly demonstrated the devastating human cost of undertaking these journeys. This provision is just one of a host of measures which aim to deter illegal entry to the UK. It is right that we prioritise protection for the most vulnerable people rather than for those who could have claimed asylum elsewhere.
Parliament has already had an opportunity to scrutinise these measures when they were placed in the Immigration Rules in December 2020. It has been a long-standing practice in place for many years to only accept claims for asylum in person at the individual’s first available opportunity on arrival in the UK. These provisions simply seek to place these long-standing requirements on a stronger statuary footing.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his intervention. From memory—and I have to say, no pun intended, that I am finding it difficult to keep my head above water with this Bill—we come on to pushback in a later group. Maybe the Minister might be able to say more when we get to the appropriate group on that issue.
But on this issue, there are lots of things in Immigration Rules that are not in primary legislation, and I do not understand why this particular issue is different. If it is simply to put something that has been for a long time been in Immigration Rules on a more secure statutory footing, why are we not seeing many more Immigration Rules being put on a firmer statutory footing by putting them into primary legislation? This leads me to believe ILPA—that there is some other motivation behind it related to pushbacks, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has said.
But there will be an opportunity to revisit this when we come to the groups debating pushbacks, so at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Etherton (CB)
My Lords, I support the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to exclude Clause 15 from the Bill, for a wide variety of reasons.
First, if a claim is deemed to be inadmissible but to satisfy the convention, that seems effectively to be saying that the person is not a refugee within the convention. That does not make sense. If they satisfy the definition of refugee within the convention, they have a claim. It can be dismissed, and then there will be a right of appeal. What cannot be said—which is effectively what is being said here—is “We’re not going to hear you at all, even though you are a refugee within the strict terms of the convention”. So I take issue with the very idea of inadmissibility with no right of recourse at all by way of an appeal.
Secondly, the terms of Section 80C to be inserted into the 2002 Act in relation to four and five seem completely contrary to both the wording and principle of the convention. My understanding of Clause 4 is that it is, in some way or other, intended to be made analogous to the Dublin III regulation.
There are a number of points to be made about that. First, we are no longer part of the EU or of the Dublin regulation. Perhaps more importantly, EU member states themselves have recognised that the Dublin regulation has failed. On 23 September 2020, the European Commission adopted what they called the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, following consultations with the European Parliament, member states and various stakeholders. The PR notice from the European Commission, which is available on the internet, states:
“The new pact recognises that no member state should shoulder a disproportionate responsibility and that all member states should contribute to solidarity on a constant basis.”
It has failed because the effect of the Dublin regulation, when strictly applied, means that certain states are overwhelmed with refugees because they are inevitably the first state on the way through to somewhere else. What is happening at the moment is that the Commission is proposing to replace the Dublin III regulation with a new regulation on asylum and migration management. So, frankly, there is no point in referring to the Dublin III regulation. It has failed in practice, and we should not be emulating it.
Furthermore, proposed Section 80C(4) is inconsistent with the terms of the convention itself. There is nothing in the convention, in Article 31 or anywhere else that makes this “connection” mean that a refugee claim would fail.
I have another point about condition 4, and I would welcome clarification from the Minister on it. The description that would render a connection with the state, and therefore the claim, inadmissible is exactly the same as the definition of arriving “directly” for the purposes of Clause 11. Clause 36 effectively amplifies Clause 11 and paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the convention. It says:
“A refugee is not to be taken to have come to the United Kingdom directly from a country where their life or freedom was threatened if, in coming from that country, they stopped in another country outside the United Kingdom, unless they can show that they could not reasonably be expected to have sought protection under the Refugee Convention in that country.”
On this particular approach, you are never going to get anywhere near Clause 11 because you will be knocked out under Clause 15—so I do not understand that contradiction. Once you fall within condition 3, which is the same as condition 4—which is the same as not arriving directly under the definition in Clause 36 —you are knocked out. So which is it—are you knocked out or do you still have some right under Clause 11, admittedly, to show that you could with good cause fall within either group 1 or even group 2? I am left confused by that.
Condition 5, on which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and others have eloquently spoken, provides
“that, in the claimant’s particular circumstances, it would have been reasonable to expect them to have made a relevant claim to the safe third State (instead of making a claim in the United Kingdom).”
Nothing in the Dublin regulations says that, even if they were to apply—and there is certainly nothing in the convention that would make such a condition apply to exclude a claim.
So I support the suggestion that Clause 15 should be excluded because, with respect, it seems to be a muddle in a whole series of different respects—legally, practically and in principle.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords again for speaking to this group of amendments. I appreciate the thoughtful and well-meaning intent of Amendment 68, but we cannot accept it. The definition of “persecution” is well established and must be on the basis of a refugee convention reason—namely, race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. It is reiterated in Clause 30(1)(c) that persecution can be committed by
“any non-State actor”
where the state is
“unable or unwilling to provide reasonable protection”.
Given the level of protection afforded to EU nationals, through fundamental rights and freedoms, EU countries are inherently safe, and individuals are exceptionally unlikely to be at risk of persecution. If individuals experience discrimination, they can seek protection from within their country of nationality.
That said, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, might be comforted to have it confirmed that our processes already acknowledge that it may not be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to EU national claimants in exceptional circumstances. The list of exceptional circumstances included in the provisions is not exhaustive; it looks to protect individuals in the very rare circumstances that a member state is at risk of a serious breach or where there exists a serious and persistent breach of the values under the Treaty on European Union, including equality.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Briefly, on the Minister’s previous point in response to the right reverend Prelate about refugees being able to fly here instead of making perilous crossings, will she make a commitment that the Government will not slap transit visa restrictions on jurisdictions that produce a lot of genuine refugees because of what is happening over there, and that they will not use carriers’ liability as a deterrent for people trying to escape through that safer method?
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
Can I write to the noble Baroness on that? I suspect that I will misspeak if I try to answer because there are several things in that question that I am thinking about. I hope that she is okay for me to write to her.
The definition of a safe third state is already set out in the clause. It ensures that, even if a country is not a signatory to the refugee convention, the principles of the convention should be met if we are to remove an individual to that country. It defines safe third countries as states where an individual will not be sent to another state where they would be at risk of persecution or a breach of their Article 3 ECHR rights. This is consistent with our obligation under the refugee convention to ensure that individuals are not subject to refoulement; I keep pronouncing it as “refowlment”, which is completely wrong. This definition has been part of our previous legislation on safe countries and is a widely recognised definition of a safe third state; it is used in EU law under the procedures directive.
I want to come to point made by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, that the UNHCR says that we are breaking the refugee convention. There are three groups of amendments on this in Committee—not today, but shortly, so I will not go too much into the convention. We have already touched on it. We think that everything we are doing complies with our international obligations, including the convention. The first safe country principle is the fastest route to safety and widely recognised internationally. It is a fundamental feature of the Common European Asylum System. It is self-evident that those in need of protection should claim in the first safe country and that is the fastest route to safety.
There are different ways in which an individual may be protected and not all of them require entitlements that fall under the refugee convention. To define a safe third state in the way that is suggested by these amendments ignores the fact that other forms of protection are available to individuals which ensure that these countries are safe for them to be removed to. We will only ever remove inadmissible claimants to countries that are safe. Using this definition is not a new approach. It has been part of our previous legislation on safe countries. I do not think these amendments are necessary.
On Amendment 70, the ability to remove an individual declared inadmissible to any safe country has formed a part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to the Immigration Rules in December 2020. This amendment would remove a provision that Parliament has already had the opportunity to scrutinise. The aim of these provisions is to disincentivise people from seeking to enter the UK by dangerous means facilitated by criminals. They send a clear message that those arriving via an irregular route may be eligible to be transferred to another safe country, not of their choosing, to be processed.
I do not agree with the premise of Amendments 71 to 73A and 195. Agreements by a safe third country to accept an asylum seeker may not always be via a reciprocal or formal arrangement. It is right to seek removals on a case-by-case basis where appropriate. Doing so has formed a part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to the Immigration Rules in December 2020. I do not think that these provisions are unworkable without formal agreements in place. That said, I do not disagree with the need to get formal agreements in place. Without providing that running commentary, that is what we are working on doing.
Lord Dubs (Lab)
Will the Minister confirm that to date we do not have an agreement with any country for the return of the people she is talking about?
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
There are countries that we can return people to but, as I said, I will not provide a running commentary on ongoing discussions. Of course, there are countries that we return people to, or else we would never have returned anybody in the last two years, and we have.
The Lord Bishop of Durham
If I remember rightly, we returned only five last year. It is partly to do with Covid, I fully accept that, but it is also because there simply are not the agreements in place with the countries that we want to return those people to.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
I am not disagreeing with the need to have formal arrangements in place to return people. On that we are at one.
We also acknowledge that it might not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants who have travelled via or have a connection to a safe country. The provisions as drafted already have flexibility that allows us to consider if an individual has exceptional circumstances to warrant consideration of their asylum claim through the UK asylum system. That includes consideration of the best interests of any children affected.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
How does case-by-case work? If we are not going to have agreements and the Minister says it is much better to do it case by case, how does that work? The diplomatic post in the capital in question goes in and says, “We have Mr X in an accommodation centre in Kent. We’d like to send him to you because we think he has a connection to you and we don’t want to let him have asylum here.” What happens if the country in question says, “Well, if he’s with you, he’s your problem”? Do we just put him on a plane and tell him to take his chances at the other end, or are we negotiating his terms of entry into the third country?
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
I think it is both. We need to assess people on a case-by-case basis and we need to have return agreements in place. It is not an either/or. I fully acknowledge the need to have return agreements in place. We could not return someone to a country that said it would not accept them; that simply would not be on. That underlines the need to have formal return agreements in place.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
Does that mean that the Government accept that Clause 15 is pretty meaningless without such agreements in place? There is no argument about that, then.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
No, I do not accept that Clause 15 is meaningless. I am agreeing that we need to have return agreements in place. I do not think anyone would disagree with that point.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
If we do not have return agreements in place by the time this clause comes in, we will end up with a lot of people being here for six months while the Government try to find out if they can send them back to another country. If you have no agreements with any other countries, you know before you start that that is a further six months wasted before the Government seek to do anything meaningful. Clearly the clause is meaningless without those agreements in place.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
I was going to go on to say that if no agreement is possible within a reasonable period, the individual’s asylum claim will be considered in the UK, but I am not disagreeing with the point that return agreements need to be in place. I think I have made that quite clear. Similarly, this is a global challenge, so every nation in the world has to be mindful of the fact that they will be in similar positions as the months and years go on.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
No other country is in this position because other countries believe that the refugee convention means what it says. I am uneasy, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, must be right, but what makes this particularly peculiar is that we are considering inadmissibility here. Suppose there were an agreement in place. Suppose we were handling a case—the Minister says that it is best done case by case—but we have not done anything except say, “This is inadmissible.” We do not know anything about this chap. He has not had an appeal turned down and has not been categorised in group 1 or group 2; he has simply been declared inadmissible. What does the diplomatic post in the intended recipient country have to go on?
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
That is a very good point. I think we talked about this the other day, in terms of returns. We actually took far more than we returned under Dublin. At this juncture, I would say that we do not need formal agreements in place.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
The noble Baroness should be careful. I quite agree that it was an interesting point, but it is a point that works for the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, not for the Minister. While there was a Dublin agreement and only 10%—I do not vouch for the figure, but the noble Lord, Lord Green, may be right—what do we expect to happen when there is no agreement? Do the Government expect a higher acceptance rate from the French and Germans when there is no agreement, when they are declaring the guy inadmissible?
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
I do not know if the noble Lord heard my last point, but we do not necessarily need formal return agreements in place. We can do returns without formal agreements. The point about Dublin is that the formal arrangements that were in place did not necessarily work. It is important to try both—formal and informal, diplomatic and otherwise. It works both ways and, as I said, this is a global challenge. It is not that it is not an EU problem either.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
Can I just be clear? Will this then work on the basis of some ad hoc arrangements that will be determined through diplomatic channels, in which other countries take people whom we have declared inadmissible? As I understand it, the number of people we are likely to declare inadmissible will be high. Will all that be done by ad hoc arrangements? Will there not be any agreements and will these countries come forward and say, “Yes, that’s fair enough. You declared the claim inadmissible; of course we will take them back”. Is that how it is going to work?
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, I am saying that there are a number of ways in which we can seek to secure this—formal, informal, diplomatic and otherwise. I am not saying there is a single solution to returns. Therefore, Clause 15 still needs to be in place.
It might not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants who have travelled via or have a connection to a safe country. The provisions that we have drafted already have flexibility that allows us to consider whether an individual has exceptional circumstances to warrant consideration of their asylum claim through the UK asylum system. As I said, this includes best interests. We also have the family reunion provisions that I mentioned earlier so, if individuals have family members in the UK, they should apply under those provisions. The inadmissibility provisions should not be used to circumnavigate those provisions and create a back door to enter the UK by dangerous means.
Furthermore, if an individual has not been recognised as a refugee, but has been provided with a different form of protection from refoulement, that country is safe for them to be removed to. To define a “safe third State” in the way suggested by the amendments ignores the other forms of protection available to individuals, which ensure that these countries are safe for them to be removed to.
Regarding Amendments 74, 73B, 74A and 75B, the UK should not be obliged to assess the substance of an asylum application where the applicant, due to a connection to a safe third country, can reasonably be expected to seek protection in that third country, or where they have already sought protection in a safe country and have moved on before the outcome of that claim, or where a claim has already been granted or considered and refused. This is a necessary part of achieving the policy aim of deterring those unnecessary and dangerous secondary movements. We are not alone in operating this practice. These amendments ignore the other forms of protection available to individuals that ensure that these countries are safe for them to be removed to. Amendments 75, 75A, and 76 would significantly undermine the aim of these provisions. The provisions as drafted send that clear message for those who could and should have claimed asylum in another safe country to do so.
I commend the spirit of Amendment 76, which would introduce a new clause to strengthen our inadmissibility provisions and deter irregular entry to the UK, particularly where that means of entry indicates that individuals have travelled to the UK via a safe country. I agree with the premise of this amendment—that access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need and not driven by criminal enterprise. The provisions in the Bill send that clear message. However, this proposed new clause probably goes too far, and would breach our international obligations. It could place individuals in indefinite limbo, which would be against the object and purpose of the refugee convention. The provisions as drafted ensure that individuals are not left in limbo, with their asylum claim neither considered in the UK nor another safe third country. If after a reasonable period it has not been possible to agree removal of the individual to a safe third country, as I said earlier, their asylum claim will be considered in the UK. The introduction of Clauses 14 and 15 as they stand aims to strengthen our position on inadmissibility, further disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys, and encourage them to claim asylum in the first safe country.
I will leave it at that. I hope that noble Lords will be happy not to press their amendments.
Lord Paddick (LD)
The Minister said that two issues were widely recognised internationally. One was the definition of a safe third country and the other was on the first safe country principle—that refugees should claim asylum in the first safe country. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees asked for the definition, in the amendments, of a third safe country, so it does not agree that it is a widely recognised international definition. The UNHCR also says that it does not recognise the first safe country principle and that there is nothing in international law about it. Does the Minister accept that, even if she says that these things are widely recognised internationally, they are not recognised by the UNHCR?
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
We have had wide discussions about the UNHCR’s opinion on this and think that we are complying with international law. It is up to each state to interpret the refugee convention. I know that the noble Lord and most of this House do not agree but it will ultimately be for Parliament, through the passage of the Bill, to interpret what Parliament thinks of the refugee convention.
Lord Green of Deddington (CB)
My Lords, I will not move Amendment 76 and will consider the Minister’s comments on it.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, which has ranged fairly widely. I will try to cover everything in my response. I start with Amendments 77, 89, 90B and 95A, which were spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on behalf of Lord Rosser.
We acknowledge that there may be many good reasons why an individual is not able to comply with either the requirements of an evidence notice or the requirements of a priority removal notice. We also accept that those good reasons may often be linked to the trauma that they have suffered. Where such reasons exist, they will be fully considered by decision-makers on a case-by-case basis and thereafter by the judicial system, should a claimant appeal the refusal of a human rights or protection claim.
The key point here is that every claim is unique; that is trite to say but none the less true. I therefore suggest it is correct that case-by-case scrutiny is given to all individuals. The good reasons test therefore takes into account objective factors, such as difficulties in obtaining evidence, but it would also include subjective factors, such as an individual’s particular vulnerabilities—related perhaps to their sexual orientation, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, mentioned; gender identity; or, indeed, mental and physical health. I suggest that the good reasons test, which I think is appropriate, means that Amendment 77 is unnecessary.
To respond specifically to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, who invited me to parse or gloss what good reasons are and are not, I respectfully say that the test is deliberately open, not circumscribed, to ensure that all relevant factors in the individual case can be considered. Specifically, I can confirm that LGBTQ+ protections will be dealt with in guidance that specifically addresses good reasons and how they may relate to LGBTQ persons and issues, because of course you can have an LGBTQ issue even if you yourself are not LGBTQ.
Further, under Amendment 77, a vulnerable individual who did not fall within the specified groups listed in the amendment may nevertheless be served with an evidence notice. If they provided late evidence, a decision would be needed on whether or not they had good reasons for that lateness; whereas at the same time an individual who happened to fall within the categories set out in the amendment would be free to raise evidence at any time. For reasons that may be entirely unconnected with the reason for their exemption, they would none the less be automatically free from any disadvantage under the system or the consequences in the legislation, based on what is essentially something of a tick-box exercise. I suggest that that would be unfair.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked how the test would apply to children. This was taken up by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, speaking also on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins. Guidance will be published setting out how decision-makers should consider the age of the child in the exercise of their discretion. This should be obvious but let me state it from the Dispatch Box anyway: evidence provided by a child will be considered in the light of their age, degree of mental development, and maturity, currently and at all material times previously. As part of our obligations under the public sector equality duty, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, equality impact assessments have been completed in respect of these clauses. Those assessments incorporate a consideration of the impacts on children.
We are concerned that Amendment 77 could also lead to perverse outcomes, whereby individuals who do not fall into one of the categories identified by the amendment could abuse the process by falsely claiming that they did. That would perpetuate the issues that these clauses are designed to address, to the detriment of genuine claimants, undermining their usefulness.
For similar reasons, Amendments 90B and 95A are unnecessary and would confuse the test to determine the acceptable reasons for something being raised late in response to an evidence notice or a priority removal notice. Unlike the good reasons test, which is fair and is an established principle in the assessment of credibility of an asylum or human rights claim, an unclear and, at least in practice, a rather subjective test of “fairness” risks inconsistent decision-making, which could lead to an increase in uncertainty for both decision-makers and claimants. For those reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to not move her amendments.
Amendment 89 introduces a requirement to publish guidance on good reasons within 30 days of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. This is an arbitrary deadline which is not necessary to include in the Bill. I have already said that good reasons will be set out in published guidance for decision-makers. This will be made available when the measures come into force. The amendment does not assist those in genuine need of protection and would in fact limit the discretion of decision-makers and undermine the effectiveness of the priority removal notices. For those reasons, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to not move those various amendments.
I turn to Amendments 84, 90 and 96. In accordance with the public sector equality duty, protected characteristics must be considered by decision-makers when they are considering good reasons for lateness following service of an evidence notice or a priority removal notice. However, it is not intended that the good reasons are limited to the characteristics listed in Chapter 1 of the Equality Act 2010. For example, mental health issues or past trauma do not amount to a disability under the Act, but they will also be considered. These may be as important, perhaps even more important, than a protected characteristic in determining whether or not someone has a good reason for lateness. Therefore, the amendment is not only unnecessary but could have the unwanted effect of leading decision-makers to believe that they should be prioritising a narrower range of factors than those already intended within the Bill itself. I invite that amendment to be not moved.
I turn to Amendment 85, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington, and my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. Again, I associate myself with the remarks of other noble Lords: we wish her well. Clause 18 adds two new behaviours to the existing credibility provisions in Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. It introduces the principles that providing late evidence without good reason or not acting in good faith should be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. Where there are good reasons for providing late evidence, that will not impact on their credibility.
The concept that certain conduct should be damaging to credibility is not new. Decision-makers must consider egregious conduct by the claimant, and it is then open to the Home Office decision-maker or the court to decide the extent to which credibility should subsequently be damaged. The good-faith requirement is intended to address behaviours such as those mentioned in the amendment, as well as any other behaviours that a deciding authority thinks are not in good faith. Therefore, there is no need, I would suggest, to single out, as this amendment does, particular behaviours to highlight them specifically.
Lord Green of Deddington (CB)
My Lords, is the Minister saying that in practice—I hope he is—if someone has quite clearly destroyed their documents, that will be taken into account when considering their claim?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I really do not want —as I said earlier—to get into a position of glossing the wording of the Bill. It is very important that decision-makers and the courts are able to look at the Act—I hope that it will become an Act—and not my gloss on it. What they will have to do is to ask themselves whether there are good reasons or other circumstances, and whether the claimant acted in good faith. Those are the tests which they will have to apply. Although it is tempting to do so, I am going to resist the temptation to say that this would be included and that would not be included, because my underlying point is that this has to be assessed on a proper case-by-case basis and the statutory tests applied. I am going to leave it there, because I think I have said it clearly enough.
Let me now turn to Amendment 86A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. For the priority removal notice to achieve its objective and operate efficiently, it is essential that those who receive the notice should raise any relevant claims and provide information and evidence before the date specified in the notice. That is to ensure that all claims can be considered sufficiently in advance of the person’s removal, reducing the extent to which removal can be frustrated, and to allow those, on the other hand, in need of international protection to be identified and supported as early as possible. For individuals who have received a priority removal notice, there will be standard timescales for recipients to respond, which will be set out in guidance. Guidance for decision-makers will also set out the circumstances where it would be appropriate for these timescales to be adjusted or extended.
When considering whether to extend the standard timescale, decision-makers will be required to take into account a wide range of factors and will not just be limited to the recipient’s experience of, or alleged experience of, sexual or gender-based violence or torture, or modern slavery or trafficking. The approach is certainly not arbitrary, to use the noble Baroness’s word. The guidance will, therefore, actually go further than these amendments and will require decision-makers to consider a wider range of issues when determining what is a reasonable and fair timescale for an individual to be able properly to respond to a PRN. For those reasons, I invite the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.
It should also be noted, while I am on this point, that all recipients of a PRN will receive a legal aid advice offer to support them in responding to the notice. Having experience of sexual or gender-based violence or torture, or modern slavery or trafficking, does not necessarily mean—I underline the word “necessarily”; I do not want to be taken out of context here—that an individual will acquire additional time or a longer period to respond. There are many factors and reasons why an individual may require additional time to respond. Again, each case has to be looked at on its own circumstances. Therefore, we need to adopt a case-by-case approach, and not the approach set out in this amendment.
Turning now to Amendment 87, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, a person who has been issued with a priority removal notice can be subject to the conditions of the notice while it remains in force. That is a 12-month period after the cut-off date or, where a claim is received prior to the cut-off, the 12-month period after they have exhausted their appeal rights. We suggest that that is a reasonable period, which recognises that personal circumstances can change over time.
Lord Etherton (CB)
Is the Minister able to give an assurance that this guidance, which has been referred to a great deal, rather than putting what I would describe as cautionary provisions in the Act itself, will be ready before the Act comes into force and will be made sufficiently public so that there can be discussion and consideration of it by the general public?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I think I was asked a similar question, in a different context, on the police Bill. I will give the same answer, not least because I am conscious that a lot of these provisions are actually Home Office provisions. I can assure the noble and learned Lord that I will write to him with the answer to that question, so that when this matter comes back he will be in possession of the answer—rather than make an educated guess, which might turn out to be slightly inaccurate, from the Dispatch Box. I hope that is sufficient.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, on that very important point, perhaps the Minister will take back to the Home Office that this Committee would very much like the guidance to be published in draft form in good time so that Members of the House and others can look at it.
Lord Paddick (LD)
I am sorry for interrupting, but I am becoming a little confused again, I am afraid, probably because we have been at this for a very long time and it is very late and so forth. Is the Minister saying that the deadline that is set for the submission of evidence will be set on a case-by-case basis, for example, if the applicant is particularly vulnerable? If vulnerabilities come to notice that were not initially brought to the notice of the decision-maker, will the deadline then be adjusted and perhaps extended as a consequence of that? Although there might be general guidance about what the deadline might be in every case, is it movable and adjustable in every case and might it be adjusted further as the case progresses? In which case, why on earth is this part of the Bill?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
Let me come to that point in a second. First, let me say that I almost took it as implicit in the request from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that the Committee would like to have the guidance, but I have heard the point made, and I will certainly pass it on. I do not want to go over points I have already made, and I think when the noble Lord looks in Hansard, he will see that I have set out quite clearly why, first, we need to have a system whereby, in particular cases, the date can be extended or adjusted, but also, secondly, why that does not undercut the principle of actually having a date and having this structure. However, I am very happy to look again at what the noble Lord has just said. If, having read it, it seems to me that I can add to what I have already said, I will; otherwise, I respectfully direct him to what I said earlier.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
It may be that, because it has been a long day, I have missed something, or it may be that I have jumped the gun and the Minister was about to come to this point, but I have not yet heard the justification for having Clause 25 at all.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
There are a number of ways of skinning this particular cat because there are separate amendments but common themes. If when I am about to sit down, I have not dealt with it fully, I am sure the noble Baroness will intervene, but I will try to come to Clause 25 head on.
However, I was going to go next to Amendments 82A and 82B, both in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Different elements of Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 have different thresholds in how they are applied to the facts of a case and how credibility is consequently damaged. Clause 18 is drafted to take this into account, so that decision-makers will take into account the relevant thresholds on a case-by-case basis. Clause 18 will encourage claimants to engage with the process in good faith and, along with the measures relating to late evidence in Clauses 17 and 25, to provide evidence in support of their claim at the earliest opportunity. As I said earlier, we think that by encouraging people to bring all their evidence upfront in protection or human rights claims, we can protect those who need protection and identify any unmeritorious claims as early as possible.
Turning to Amendment 82B, the good faith requirement is intended, as I think is obvious, to address behaviours that a deciding authority thinks are not in good faith. Where an individual who makes a protection or human rights claim exhibits a pattern of non-compliant behaviour during their dealings with immigration authorities, their credibility should be damaged to reflect that behaviour. It is also designed to stop claimants deliberately obstructing the one-stop and expedited judicial process—for example, by not taking up our enhanced legal aid offer and then making a last-minute claim based on lack of access to legal advice. The good faith requirement therefore goes further than the behaviours currently described in Section 8 of the 2004 Act. It puts beyond doubt that past behaviour that is deliberately designed to frustrate or delay proceedings should be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. We think that is right, for the reasons I have outlined.
I turn to Amendments 83 and 88, which would remove the credibility provisions in Clauses 18 and 21. For the reasons that I set out earlier, we think that it is entirely reasonable to require evidence in support of a protection of human rights claim, or a claim of being a victim of modern slavery, to be provided in a timely manner, unless there are good reasons why that is not possible.
However, I underline that a person’s credibility is not necessarily determinative of their claim under the current rules and procedures, and the Bill does not change that. Decision-makers will still be required to consider credibility in the round, as they currently do, and, where a person has raised evidence late, which causes delay and wasted resource, it is right that decision-makers consider whether there is any merit in the reasons for that lateness.
I turn now to Amendment 90A, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. We recognise that, due to an person’s individual circumstances, it may be harder for them to provide material in a timely manner. Since this is essentially an amendment to Amendment 90 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I respectfully direct the noble Baroness to the response that I gave to the noble and learned Lord.
As I am on the noble and learned Lord’s amendments, I will now deal with Amendment 91 on reasonable grounds. It is right that, where an individual has been assessed as a priority for removal or deportation, they should avail themselves of the associated legal aid advice offer and provide any matters listed within Clause 19(3)(a) before the cut-off date and they should provide reasons for lateness where a late claim is raised, under subsection (7).
Decision-makers cannot reasonably be expected to speculate on or investigate why an individual who has received a removal notice and associated legal aid advice offer would raise a late protection or human rights claim. If no reasons for lateness are provided, or if the reasons provided are not considered to be good reasons, it would be clear to the decision-maker that any appeal must be subject to the expedited appeals process. In answer to the noble and learned Lord, I say that the good reasons test is adequate and sufficient.
The clause already provides significant safeguards for recipients of a PRN in the form of the legal aid advice provision and the good reasons test for individuals who raise late claims. I set out earlier what those good reasons can amount to. It is a very open-ended test. Therefore, I respectfully suggest to the noble and learned Lord that the amendment is unnecessary and, indeed, would risk complicating an otherwise straightforward and, I suggest, suitable test.
I turn now to Amendment 95 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, but spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. By introducing a statutory requirement to provide evidence before a specified date, the Bill redresses the current balance. It is right that decision-makers should have regard to the principle —I underline “principle”—that minimal weight is given to evidence that is late, following receipt of either an evidence notice or a priority removal notice, without good reason.
I will come to the thrust of Clause 25 in a second, but I will first say that this amendment would place an obligation on decision-makers, not only in the Home Office but also the judiciary, to accept that there were good reasons for late evidence in all asylum and human rights cases where either the claimant or the claim type fell into one of the listed categories. That would remove the requirement that decision-makers should have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence. That would be the case even if the reason for lateness was wholly unconnected to the category of claim or the personal factors. No causal link between the two is set out in the amendment. I respectfully suggest that that is overly prescriptive and would tie the hands of the decision-maker. Of course, in all cases, the decision-maker can take these matters into account—
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
It is not my amendment so maybe it could be worded better. The noble Lord gave great emphasis to the case-by-case basis earlier, which sounds very reasonable, and he talked about subjective factors. Has he read the recent research from the British Red Cross about women seeking asylum? It found that frequently their claims are met with disbelief and they are not treated very well at all. There is a lack of recognition of gender-based violence that they may be fleeing from, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, talked about earlier. I suggest that the noble Lord and those responsible for this clause look at this research, because I worry about putting so much emphasis on subjective factors and the case-by-case basis.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I think I have received the email from the Red Cross, as I think it emailed everyone. I have set up a folder for all these briefings, so I do not want to say that I have read it, but if I have been sent it I certainly have it and will read it. However, due to pressures of other business, I cannot say that I have read all the material yet.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
I absolutely understand—I do not think it was in its general briefing, but it produced a separate report last week or the week before, and it is worth looking at.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
In that case, I will certainly read it over the weekend. I know that those in the Home Office responsible for this area are obviously looking at the debate and will have picked up what the noble Baroness has said.
I was just dealing with Amendment 95, after which I will come to Clause 25 itself. I lost count of how many times the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “tawdry”. It really is not, if I may say so. We obviously disagree, and I will make no comparisons either to parking fines or international commercial litigation. At one point it seemed to me that the noble Baroness was saying that, on the one hand, this clause was terrible and, on the other, that this is what tribunals do in any event and we can trust them to do the right thing.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am saying that, if we trust—as I am sure the Government do—immigration officers, the Secretary of State, the First-tier Tribunal, et cetera, to be intelligent, effective operators in the system, they are by definition capable of looking at late evidence on a case-by-case, open-textured, well-reasoned basis and determining those occasions where there is a good reason and those where there is not. That goes without saying, so why do we have to have this diktat in the Bill, with “must” give it “minimal weight”? I suspect it is because, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggested, the Government are trying to dictate to the tribunals in particular what is and is not a good reason. That is the sinister aspect of this. It is also impractical, because you then have to have arguments about what is and is not a good reason. I promise the Minister that this will be litigated ad nauseam. It would be better, as he said to other noble Lords, to leave this to open-textured judgment and decision-makers who are capable of applying it.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
As regards the in terrorem threat that things will be litigated ad nauseam, I am tempted to say that that is not really a change from the current position. More substantively, and with respect, to say that the clause sets out that the tribunal “must give … minimal weight” to the evidence, as the noble Baroness just put it, is not what it does at all.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
It does not do that either.
It does not say that the tribunal “must give the evidence minimal weight”; it says that the tribunal
“must, in considering it, have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence”.
The tribunal is perfectly entitled to say, “Well, we’ve looked at that principle. Actually, we’re not going to apply it here”—for reasons A, B and C. There is no requirement and no fettering of the tribunal; there is no compulsion that the evidence be given minimal weight. What the decision-maker has to do is have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to any late evidence unless there are good reasons why it is provided late.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I promise that this is my final intervention on the Minister, but I do not understand why we have to have the provision at all. He is saying that it is perfectly open-textured enough, that good reasons do not have to be specified in the Bill because the Government are not going to put glosses on it or be overly prescriptive, that they can be objective good reasons or subjective good reasons, that it is only about having regard to the new principle that they are inventing et cetera. Why have this at all?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
It is because there is absolutely nothing wrong with Parliament saying to a tribunal, “We want you to have regard to this principle, but of course the final decision is yours”. We do that in other areas of the law as well. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, kindly said, I gave evidence yesterday to her committee in what I hope was an interesting session. One thing we talked about was Section 12 of the Human Rights Act. The layout there was not a million miles away from this. It too gives a very clear direction to the court, but ultimately it is the court’s decision. I find it slightly surprising that, on the one hand, the noble Baroness is saying that this is tawdry and dreadful but, on the other, is saying, “Actually, you don’t need it all because the same result is going to eventuate”. Both points cannot be right at the same time.
As we all know, the asylum and the legal systems in this regard are overwhelmed. We see repeated unmeritorious claims at the very last minute designed to delay removal. This clause is a proper part of an overall system to make sure that we give protection to those who need it—I always put that first; that is the most important thing—and at the same time to identify unmeritorious claims.
Finally, Amendment 137 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seeks to implement a recommendation made by the JCHR in its ninth report. Of course, we welcome the JCHR’s positive comments on Clause 45. Migrants who are subject to removal must be given sufficient opportunity to access justice. The clause improves and enhances the status quo. It gives a statutory guarantee that migrants will receive a minimum notice period of five working days. As a result, some migrants will get more time compared to the current policy. It introduces a separate statutory requirement for a notice of departure details to be provided to the migrant before removal.
On a practical level, Clause 45 will be supplemented by policy guidance that accords further respect to the common-law right to access to justice. I say respectfully that it is not clear to me what deficiency in Clause 45 Amendment 137 tries to address. I would genuinely welcome engagement from the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, to identify what offending aspects of Clause 45 there may be and how Amendment 137 would solve them.
Therefore, having taken probably too much of the Committee’s time already, I invite the various noble Lords to consider not pressing their amendments.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this very important debate. I also thank the Minister. Yes, it was a long reply, but it was an important one and it did not take up too much time. Sometimes long replies are needed, and the Minister was right to take the time that he took to respond. There are a large number of points on which I could reply to the Minister, but it is clear that we will have to come back to some of them on Report.
If the Minister does not mind me chiding him slightly, I will say that that was a bit of a “no worries, no problem” defence: “Everything is fine. It will all be sorted in guidance, although we will not see it until some future time. Do not worry about the children problem that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, raised, because we have all taken into account the sensitivity of children and how old they are. Do not worry about LGBTQI because they will all be very reasonable. Do not worry about the good reasons either—it will all be sorted. Good reasons mean good reasons. Nobody will do anything about it if the reasons are good.”
One example where the Minister was in trouble at the end essentially concerned Clause 25(2). When is a principle not a principle? Is it a principle when it is written down? I love the phrase “have regard to”; it is always put in. The Minister said that we do not have to take X or Y into account. In a sense, he agreed with the JCHR that a better word would be “may” instead of “must”. This is quite a significant change—something may be taken into account, or it may not be. At the moment, it says “must”. This is the problem with which he was trying to wrestle—first, whether there is a principle at all, and secondly, whether “may” or “must” should be used.
The Government are seeking to deal with the problem that the asylum system is in chaos. Half the decisions are overturned on appeal. Panic has broken out. The Government say, “We cannot have this. The public are going mad. Everybody is dissatisfied. We will get more and more of this. Everyone is making late appeals. They are not abiding by the rules. We have to do something.” A whole series of new measures is being taken to overcome a bureaucratic problem. In the end, it needs good—probably trained—decision-making, speedily done, to get a system that works. The Government will not address the very real problem in the Bill, particularly in respect of late priority notices, except on a piece of paper. In a year or two or three, there will be a Nationality and Borders Bill mark 2. If they are not careful, whoever is in government—I hope it will be a different Government—will be panicking in the face of it not working. They will bring in other measures.
Much of what has quite rightly been raised by noble Lords across the Chamber will have to be revisited on Report. I thank the Minister again for his courtesy and for the time and trouble he took to try to respond. Finally, the sooner we have a look at the guidance, the better. It is very frustrating when the Government say that they will publish the guidance and it is published after the Bill is passed. We deserve to see the guidance as soon as possible. I would be very grateful if the Minister could pass this on. I seek leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, in the last group I spoke at some length. This time I hope to be more brief. The principles have been discussed in some other groups and the points at issue are of relatively narrow ambit, although they are important.
Clause 22 creates a new expedited appeal that will be heard in the Upper Tribunal. Too often, those facing removal or deportation utilise delay tactics to thwart removal action, such as withholding relevant information in their initial claim, which can be used later if they are first refused, resulting in late and repeated claims and subsequent appeals. That is both costly and an unfair burden on the courts and tribunals system. With this clause, appeals in relation to late human rights or protection claims brought by recipients of a PRN are determined quickly, with decisions being final. That removes the incentive for bringing late claims.
Where a person provides good reasons for a late claim, their right of appeal will not be certified as an expedited appeal. Furthermore, the Committee will note in Clause 22(5) that the Upper Tribunal retains discretion and when it considers that the only way that justice can be done in an individual appeal is to remit to the First-tier Tribunal, that is what it will do. Therefore, while I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, that better decision-making is important and certainly part of the answer, I do not accept the implication of their contributions, that it is the only answer. This is also an important thing that we can do to improve the system.
Clause 23 works together with Clause 22 to ensure that individuals cannot utilise the appeal system as a tool for delay. Clause 22 provides expedited appeals to be determined quickly and finally by the Upper Tribunal. There may be additional rights generated by other claims that an individual may want to exercise in parallel with an expedited appeal. Those other appeals might usually be heard in the First-tier Tribunal. Therefore, without Clause 23, an expedited appeal might have concluded but there would be an outstanding appeal in the First-tier Tribunal, which would prevent removal. Clause 23 provides that the other related appeals will be heard by the Upper Tribunal at the same time, so provides a suitable one-stop shop. Again, there is a safeguard to ensure that in cases where the Upper Tribunal thinks that justice can be done only by continuing the appeal in the First-Tier Tribunal, it can do that. That is the burden of Clause 23(7).
For those reasons, which are brief but, I hope, persuasive, I beg to move that Clause 22 stand part of the Bill.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have contributed. These amendments obviously deal with matters of legal aid, and I remind the Committee that LASPO is the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, just to put everybody out of their misery—otherwise they will not be able to sleep when they get home. I will be quick, but I will just make one point: with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, this is not a matter of generosity. This is not about the Government being generous. I do not want to sound high-falutin’, but this is about the rule of law. Abiding by the rule of law is not a matter of generosity; it is simply non-negotiable, and this provision is in the Bill because it is a proper and necessary thing to do.
Amendment 93 and 94 seek to provide up to seven hours of free legal aid to individuals with a slavery or trafficking notice. They are unnecessary because existing legal aid rules will already ensure that individuals can receive more than seven hours of advice if they receive a slavery or trafficking notice. The key point to bear in mind—and I accept that this is complex—is that a slavery or trafficking notice can be issued only to individuals who have made a protection or human rights claim. That is relevant because it means that they are already within the immigration system and legal aid is already available in order to make that protection or human rights claim. So, in a case where an individual is in receipt of legal aid for their protection or human rights claim and they then receive a slavery or trafficking notice, they are already entitled to advice on that notice as part of their protection or human rights claim. Importantly, there is no limit on the number of hours that can be provided on someone’s protection or human rights claim. Legal advice is available until the matter is resolved, and it may well be for considerably more than the seven hours—or, indeed, 20 hours.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I am really sorry, I know we are looking at the clock, but if I have understood it, and I am sure the Minister is briefed to the hilt, the problem is that he who has, gets more, as it were. If you are already in the asylum system and then you get the notice, you will get even more legal aid—but what if you have not already made a protection claim? What about those people?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
The noble Baroness must have had access to my notes, because that was just the point I was going to make. I have written down here that I know the Committee will ask about individuals who are not receiving legal aid for their protection or human rights claim—and sure enough, the Committee did. My answer is that there could be multiple reasons for an individual not receiving legal aid in those circumstances. The individual might not have passed the means or merits test, and those two tests, as the Committee will know, are there to ensure that legal aid is targeted at those most in need who cannot afford advice themselves. That is one possibility, and I will come back to that in a moment. Another possibility—and this does happen—is that the individual has just made an application to the Home Office by themselves and has not sorted out a lawyer. If so, I would strongly encourage them to seek out a legal aid lawyer, who would be able to provide more than the seven hours of advice that could be provided.
Turning to Amendment 94A, the short answer to why we have specified up to seven hours in Clause 24 is that a balance must be struck between giving free legal advice and using taxpayers’ money responsibly. Seven hours is intended to reflect that this is an opportunity for initial legal advice to help individuals understand what the notice is and what it is requiring them to. It is available on a non-means-tested and non-merits-tested basis. That means that anyone with a PRN is guaranteed access to legal aid for up to seven hours, but it does not mean that, after seven hours, there is no further access to legal aid. Some individuals will need further advice; it is not intended that seven hours will resolve every immigration issue. At the end of the seven hours, any individual who has an issue within the scope of the legal aid scheme and who passes the means and merits test will be eligible for ongoing legal advice funded by legal aid until the matter is resolved.
I am conscious that that gets us into the territory of means and merits tests. I answered an Oral Question in this area on Tuesday, when I said that there was a review of the means test under way at the moment, on which I have personally spent a lot of time. I hope very much that we will soon be able to go out for consultation on that. We are conducting a really thorough review of the means test.
Finally, I will address the noble Baroness’s concerns that the exceptional case funding scheme might not be up to standard. Respectfully, I disagree. That scheme is specifically designed to act as a safety net and to provide legal-aid funding to individuals who can demonstrate that, without it, their human rights might be breached. In 2019-20, of the immigration cases that applied for exceptional case funding, 80% were granted legal aid, so that shows that the system works. We are continuing to work with legal aid practitioners and the Legal Aid Agency to improve the scheme if we can.
For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that the noble Baroness, speaking also for the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, will be content to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
Before my noble friend responds, could the Minister at least acknowledge that it is not just a matter of hours? It is a matter of the difficulties of finding a legal aid lawyer and the very clear existence of legal aid deserts and so on? Even when it is not a desert, there are difficulties which are, to a very considerable extent, related to the terms for the lawyers themselves. I do not know whether it ever occurred to the noble Lord that he might pursue a career in legal aid; he probably felt as guilty as I used to, when I was in practice as a solicitor, that my firm did not do legal aid, or at least it gave up doing it. That is partly because you need to specialise in legal aid, as well as the subject that you are dealing with, and that is very difficult for a lot of lawyers. It has led to two classes of lawyers, and that is a very bad thing.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
The noble Baroness’s question is quite broad. She knows that we have had a number of discussions about legal aid, which will continue. I did not do much legal aid in my practice. I do not want to advertise from the Dispatch Box, but my brother-in-law is one of the finest criminal legal aid solicitors in London—I am sure that no one here will ever need his services, but he is absolutely brilliant, none the less.
More seriously, I am very conscious of the need to make sure that people have access to a lawyer with the relevant skill set, because a general right to legal aid is not much use if you cannot find a legal aid lawyer—I absolutely appreciate that. On Tuesday, I explained some of the efforts that we are making in this area. To say any more now might trespass on the Committee’s patience, but I am obviously well aware of this point.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I appreciate the care with which the Minister has responded to these amendments. Although he started by saying that they were unnecessary, he conceded that there is a group of people who do not get legal aid. We might differ in our views on how meritorious they are in any claim for legal aid, but he said that they could find a solicitor and get legal aid that way—but that might not be the easiest thing in the world, for reasons that include what was just discussed. I am afraid that I am not really persuaded.
I will read the Minister’s remarks in Hansard, but I do not think that he denied that there are people who do not get legal aid. The fact that the anti-slavery commissioner was on the case with the JCHR shows that it is not just these Benches over here that think that this is an issue. For the time being, I have to accept that the Minister has given his response and I cannot get any further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
In this group, I have the Clause 26 stand part amendment, and Clause 26 requires the Tribunal Procedure Committee to create a fast-track route for certain appeals made from detention. The accelerated process would apply where the Secretary of State “considers” that an appeal brought in relation to the decision would
“likely be disposed of expeditiously.”
Of course, that raises the question of the basis on which the Secretary of State will decide that an appeal brought in relation to the decision is likely to be disposed of expeditiously. Will it be done on a whim? Will it be done on the basis that we need to speed things up and this may be the way to do it? Will they be getting legal advice on whether they should consider that it is likely to be disposed of expeditiously? What happens if they do decide that an appeal brought in relation to the decision is likely to be disposed of expeditiously, and they then find that it cannot be disposed of expeditiously? What is the redress in that situation?
The Explanatory Notes state:
“This clause aims to establish an accelerated route for those appeals made in detention which are considered suitable for a quick decision, to allow appellants to be released or removed more quickly.”
As far as the Explanatory Notes are concerned, it is being done for the highest of motives, and nothing to do with simply trying to speed up the process.
The Law Society, Justice, the UNHCR and the Public Law Project have recommended that the clause be removed from the Bill. They raise that the fast-track system largely replicates, as has been said, a system that was already found to be unlawful in 2015 in a Court of Appeal ruling.
We support the amendments and concerns raised in this group, but I intend to speak only to the amendment in my name, which is to oppose Clause 26 standing part of the Bill. The concerns are very clear. As I said, various organisations have recommended that the clause be removed from the Bill. Their basis for saying so is that it amounts to a new detained fast-track procedure that was found to be unlawful in 2015 due to being “structurally unfair”. The Court of Appeal described the timetable for such appeals as
“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.
It held that the policy did not sufficiently appreciate
“the problems faced by legal representatives of obtaining instructions from individuals who are in detention”,
nor did it
“adequately take account of the complexity and difficulty of many asylum appeals”
and
“the gravity of the issues that are raised by them”.
Since that ruling, the Tribunal Procedure Committee has repeatedly taken the position not to introduce specific rules in relation to cases where an appellant is detained. In its report of March 2019, the TPC concluded that
“a set of specific rules would not lead to the results sought by the Government. If a set of rules were devised so as to operate fairly, they would not lead to the increased speed and certainty desired.”
Following the clear and somewhat damning court ruling and the position of the TPC, the Government’s response has been, as we now see, to legislate to reintroduce a fast-track procedure by forcing the TPC’s hand and requiring it to create one.
The questions for the Government are fairly simple. What is it about this scheme that is significantly structurally different from the scheme that was found to be legally unsound? What about this scheme will prevent it having a timetable
“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity”?
Why, and on the basis of what evidence, do the Government disagree with the TPC when it says that such rules should not be brought in since they cannot both operate fairly and achieve the desired result of speed?
One wonders whether the Government are risking further judicial proceedings in replicating a scheme that has been found to be unlawful or, indeed, whether they would care too much anyway if there were such future judicial proceedings. I await the Government’s response.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I will come to the amendments in a moment but, since we have had a number of references to the old detained fast-track scheme, I will start by saying a word about that.
Obviously we considered carefully the legal challenges to the detained fast-track. We are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. It is right to say that the courts have been clear, in upholding the principle, that an accelerated process for appeals made in detention, operated within certain safeguards, is entirely legal. We believe that the new accelerated detained appeals route will contribute significantly to the timeliness with which appeals can be decided. We will be able to remove swiftly people found not to be eligible to remain while those people with valid claims can be released from detention more quickly, which is also important.
So far as the Tribunal Procedure Committee is concerned, the Bill sets out a clear policy intent but, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, says, changes to tribunal procedure rules are for the TPC to draft and are subject to its statutory consultation requirements and procedures. We have already begun to engage with the TPC on the elements of the Bill that will require tribunal rules to be made or amended and will continue to do so as the Bill progresses and passes into law.
I turn to the amendments before the Committee. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and, in his absence, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for Amendment 97. I understand the motivation behind it. It is right that appeals made from detention should be dealt with in a timely way so that, as I have said, people are not deprived of their liberty for longer than necessary, but we recognise that not all appeals made from detention will be suitable for the accelerated detained appeals route. So Clause 26 specifies that if a decision is certified as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal, in those circumstances the Secretary of State must consider that any appeal to the decision is likely to be disposed of expeditiously. Importantly, the tribunal may remove a case from the accelerated detained appeals route if that is the only way to ensure that justice can be done in a particular case.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
I may not have been listening as attentively as I should have been, but if the Minister has already said it I ask him to repeat the criteria under which the Secretary of State will make the decision that he or she considers that the appeal is likely to be disposed of quickly, which was a question I asked. Another point rises from something he said—that the clause now sets an extremely high bar for an appeal to be released from the scheme, and provides that it can be done only where
“it is the only way to secure that justice is done.”
Am I not right in saying that this has been amended by the Government during the Bill’s passage, and that the original language permitted the release of a case if the tribunal
“is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so”?
Why is it no longer the case that “the interests of justice” are a good enough reason to take action?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I shall reply to the second point first, if I may. The language in Clause 26(5) is essentially the same language as in Clause 23(7).
Lord Rosser (Lab)
Is it the same or essentially the same? My understanding, and I may be wrong, is that the Bill now says that
“it is the only way to secure that justice is done”,
where previously it said
“that it is in the interests of justice to do so”.
They may be similar but they are not the same words.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
My Lords, I think we are at cross-purposes. I was not saying that the language had not changed; I was saying that the test in Clause 26(5) is the same test as in Clause 23(7). On the question of whether the language has changed, I think the noble Lord is right. I will write to confirm the position—I do not want to get it wrong at the Dispatch Box—but I think there was a change in this clause. The test as set out is entirely proper. Is the only way that justice can be done to take the case out of this tribunal? If that is the only way justice can be done, it ought to be done. If this tribunal therefore, by obvious logic, can deal with the case justly, it should do so.
On the first question, I am not sure how much more I can say. The Secretary of State must consider, in order to certify a case as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal, that any appeal to that decision would be likely to be disposed of expeditiously and that the other conditions are met. In coming to that conclusion, the Secretary of State would obviously have to look at all relevant factors. I am not sure that I can take it much further than that, but let me look again at the noble Lord’s question in Hansard. If I can add anything more, I will do so, so he is in possession of everything I can say before we look at it again—no doubt on Report.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord again for his detailed responses. On the first point, on Amendment 97, I just hope that we do not find ourselves back in litigation. He asserts that the Bill avoids the pitfalls that the Court of Appeal found in 2015 and that the Tribunal Procedure Committee found later. Let us hope so, because obviously, resorts to litigation will also be something that gums up the system, which the Home Office already says is broken. Time will tell if this is going to stay as it is.
On Amendment 99, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is right. If my memory serves, the wording has changed since the Bill was in the other place. Certainly, the JCHR would suggest that wording that says that the tribunal “must”—not just “may”—if the interests of justice and fairness require it, take an appeal out of the accelerated detained system is stronger than the wording that is there at the moment. It says that the tribunal “must” if—and it is a broader test—it is in the interests of fairness and justice. It is a better test, and a fairer and more just test, so I am disappointed that the Minister does not like that amendment—although I guess I am not terribly surprised. On that note, I can only withdraw my amendment.