Lord Coaker
Main Page: Lord Coaker (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Coaker's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberNo. My Lords, this is Report. First, we are allowed to speak only once during a debate. Secondly, even if noble Lords were not here for Second Reading or Committee, they should not be making Second Reading or Committee speeches on Report.
We cannot support this amendment because there is no differentiation between documents that are genuinely lost or stolen. We know that people smugglers control the people they are smuggling, including stealing and taking their documents away from them deliberately, so it may not be the fault of the asylum seeker that they do not have a document. This amendment and the other provisions in the Bill seem to ignore the fact that officials and tribunals are quite capable of deciding, on the basis of the evidence, what weight they place on the evidence that is provided to them and what should be considered in terms of the credibility of the claimant, without what is contained in the Bill or in this amendment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said, on the basis of a freedom of information request, that only 2% of asylum seekers were in possession of a passport. Only four in 10 Americans have a passport. Is it any wonder that those fleeing war in less developed countries, often when normal government services have completely collapsed, do not have passports? If you are fleeing war, if you are being bombed, if you are being persecuted because of your sexuality or your political views, the first thing on your mind is to get out of that country, not to go to the Government and ask for a passport.
This amendment and the related clauses in the Bill that seem to be telling officials and tribunals what interpretation they should put on evidence should not be supported by this House.
My Lords, under Clause 18, where an asylum seeker provides late evidence, this should damage their credibility. Amendment 33 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington, would provide that a person’s credibility should also be damaged where that person fails to produce ID documents when they enter the UK or are intercepted at sea. We do not support the clause or believe it should be part of the Bill, so we do not support the addition to it. A person’s credibility should be based, as it always has been, on the full picture and the worth of the evidence that is submitted.
As we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, where people are fleeing the horrors of war and risk to life, they may not bring the right documentation, or it may have been lost or stolen along the route. As we can see from recent horrors around the world, I am not sure that it would be anybody’s first priority to go back to wherever they were to find any documentation they might have—it would be to get out of danger. However, under the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Green, they would be penalised: it would be a failure by the claimant to provide identifying documents. Such a carte blanche failure to produce identifying documents would mean that such people seeking asylum would automatically be excluded from doing so. I do not think that that would be something that the country or, indeed, this Chamber would want.
There are other issues I wish to raise that are more relevant to the next amendment; however, if this amendment is put to a vote, we will vote against it.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for raising the issue and of course I understand the concerns that lie behind it.
Clause 18 adds two new behaviours to the existing credibility provisions in Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. It introduces the principles that providing late evidence without good reason or not acting in good faith should be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. Where, conversely, there are good reasons for providing evidence late, that would not affect the claimant’s credibility.
The concept that certain conduct should be damaging to credibility is not new. Decision-makers must already consider the claimant’s conduct. It is then open to the Home Office or the courts to decide the extent to which credibility should subsequently be damaged. The focus of Clause 18 is, therefore, the Home Office and then the judicial decision-making process. It is intended to address the issue of late evidence raised in unfounded protection and human rights claims and put beyond doubt that behaviour designed to abuse the system will be taken into account. Clause 18, therefore, is intended to apply to those individuals who have made a protection or human rights claim and have been issued with an evidence notice as per Clause 17. It is not intended to apply, for example, to individuals immediately when intercepted in the territorial waters of the United Kingdom.
Against that background, I suggest that Amendment 33 is unnecessary. The destruction, alteration or disposal of a passport without reasonable explanation, or the failure to produce a passport on request to an immigration officer or to the Secretary of State—again, without reasonable explanation—are behaviours to which Section 8 already applies. The good faith requirement in the Bill is intended to address behaviours such as those mentioned in the amendment, as well as any other behaviours that a deciding authority thinks are not in good faith. Specific instances of a lack of good faith are necessarily caught by the broader provision that refers to good faith: the greater includes the lesser. Therefore, there is no need to single out the behaviours prescribed in this amendment.
As to the detail of the amendment, I say that verification of someone’s identity normally takes place on land. However, should a claimant be in possession of their passport or identity document and fail to provide this when requested by an immigration officer, Section 8 will apply, as I said. Moreover, where evidence is provided late following receipt of an evidence notice in a protection or human rights claim—again, without good reason—this should be taken into account as damaging the claimant’s credibility.
As this amendment refers to specific examples of behaviour designed to abuse the system, and that type of behaviour as a whole is already caught by the provisions of the Bill, I respectfully suggest that the amendment is necessarily unnecessary. For those reasons, I respectfully invite my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe to withdraw it.
My Lords, we support the amendment as far as it goes, particularly the emphasis on those subjected to sex and gender-based violence, abuse or exploitation. However, there are many others, such as those from sexually and gender-diverse communities, who will hesitate to bring forward all the evidence that they rely on in support of their claim. As I said in the last group, and as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, said, officials and tribunals already weigh evidence and credibility but if, in the Bill, the Government insist on leaning on decision-makers in relation to the weight that they should place on late evidence, then this or an expanded amendment should be included; that should also include children.
My Lords, I do not want to add much to what the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and my noble friend Lady Lister said in support of this important amendment. They outlined some of the problems well.
The amendment relates to Clause 25(2), which says:
“Unless there are good reasons why the evidence was provided late”.
It bedevils any Government that as soon as you state, “Unless there are good reasons”, the argument then becomes, “What do you mean by good reasons?” Then you produce a list and people complain that the list does not include everything. So you state that there will be guidance and then the Government do not produce guidance for people to look at to see whether it is worth it or needs to be improved. I appreciate what the noble Baroness and my noble friend said about engagement with the Minister, but these are real issues because people will be excluded from asylum claims on the basis of late provision of the evidence—and we do not know what the good reasons are that will prevent those claimants being excluded as a result of being classified as having given late evidence. It is not satisfactory.
At this stage, on Report, there is this question for the Minister. The list has been produced. The Minister will say, exactly as the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, said, that by having a list, you will miss people out. That is why the amendment is trying to insert “but not limited to”. This is quite an unsatisfactory situation. Can the Minister not say a little more about what the guidance will say? Can he not give us a little more, in consultation with the Home Office, about whether there could be a draft of some sort, even at this late stage, to give some indication of what the guidance will be on what “good reasons” actually means? I appreciate that this is an ask for the future but the amendment tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Coussins and Lady Lister, is extremely important and goes to the heart of the problem with Clause 25 —notwithstanding the fact that many of us do not agree with the clause anyway. In seeking to improve the parts of the legislation that we do not agree with, what “good reasons” means is absolutely fundamental to our understanding.
As I say, I support the amendment; I appreciate that it seems to be a probing amendment. However, these are important issues and the Minister will need to go further to deal with them, I think.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, for her engagement with me, as the House will have heard, on the amendment, which she has redrafted since Committee, for the reasons she set out in her speech. I am also grateful to the amendment’s co-sponsor, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett.
We have a proud history of providing international protection to those most in need. This is a responsibility that we take seriously, but we need a system that is efficient as well as effective. By introducing a statutory requirement to provide evidence before a specified date, the Bill redresses the current balance. It is right that decision-makers have regard to the principle that minimal weight is given to evidence that is late following the receipt of either an evidence notice or a priority removal notice without good reason. The House will appreciate that Clause 25 is therefore essential to the architecture of this part of the Bill. However, at the same time, it is important not to tip the balance too far. Decision-makers in the Home Office and the judiciary will maintain their discretion as to whether, having considered the principle and in the absence of good reasons for lateness, it is appropriate in all the circumstances of the particular case to apply minimal weight to late evidence, taking into account the claimant’s particular claim and any specific vulnerabilities.
I have been asked to define “good reasons”. This has not been defined in the Bill for, if I may say so, a good reason. We cannot legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for providing late information or evidence in relation to their protection claim. To do so would be impractical and would detract from the important principle that decision-makers are best placed to consider an individual’s particular vulnerabilities on a case-by-case basis. I say this because “good reasons” can include both objective factors, such as practical difficulties in obtaining evidence—for example, where the evidence was not previously available—and subjective factors, such as a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities relating to their age, sexual orientation, gender identity or mental and physical health. Decision-makers must be able to respond on a case-by-case basis.
I contrast that with Amendment 34, which would place an obligation on decision-makers not only in the Home Office but in the judiciary to accept that there were good reasons for late evidence in all asylum and human rights cases where either the claimant or the claim type fell into one of the listed categories. I suggest that this would undermine the principle that we want decision-makers and the judiciary to apply their discretion on a case-by-case basis. By setting out a non-exhaustive list—I appreciate that it includes the words “not limited to”—of potential experiences or categories of claimant, it is true that this amendment does not exclude those not listed in the amendment from having good reasons. However, in any non-exhaustive list, there is a risk of focusing attention on the factors in the list, thus putting other applicants with different issues at a relative disadvantage.
My Lords, as we have heard, in addition to the family reunion amendments so ably explained by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and my noble friend Lady Ludford, this group includes amendments on setting an annual target for the acceptance of asylum seekers into the UK and the acceptance of refugees in specific circumstances—such as those faced by female judges in Afghanistan, the victims of genocide and those fleeing the appalling situation in Ukraine. If the noble Baroness does not take up the challenge set by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, to combine the best parts of the two family reunion amendments, we will vote for Amendment 48, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, explained, the Government need to build capacity in this country to enable us to take in at least 10,000 refugees a year—a number that is seen almost universally as the UK’s annual fair share of global refugees. Without a target to aim for, the necessary arrangements—the infrastructure and capacity in local services—will not be in place to cope with situations, such as Ukraine, that can arise, as we have seen, with relatively little notice. It is no excuse for the Government to say, “We are unprepared”. We must be prepared, and Amendment 49 seeks to ensure that we are.
I reiterate what I said late on Monday: the British people want to help genuine refugees, like those fleeing the conflict in Ukraine. What they worry about, rightly or wrongly, is being overwhelmed by immigrants. I repeat: in recent years only six in every hundred people coming to the UK to live have been asylum seekers. The British people have nothing to fear from this amendment. On the contrary, if it was explained to them, I am sure that they would support it overwhelmingly.
We support Amendment 50—so powerfully spoken to, and in the name of, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws—which makes special emergency provision for people at particular risk, such as human rights defenders, including journalists, and minorities. We also support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, to make special provision for victims of genocide.
To put beyond doubt the mixed messages from the Government about what they will do to support refugees from Ukraine, Amendment 54A in my name, and signed by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, puts into primary legislation the requirement to support, by whatever means necessary, Ukrainian refugees who need to come to the UK. We passionately support all the amendments in this group.
My Lords, what a powerful debate we have just had on what is one of the most important parts of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, spoke about wishing that we could inform the public. I sometimes wish—I do not know how you would do it, unless you put it on live television—that the public could hear more of the speeches made in places like this. That would inform the debate and take it forward in a way that allowed people to make their own mind up. It is disappointing that it does not happen.
It is important, in this context, to remind ourselves that we are all wrestling with how we deal with refugees, family reunion and resettlement schemes. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, needs to be repeated time and again: this is not about immigration, it is about refugees fleeing persecution and about asylum. That is extremely important.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton, was also right, with his Amendment 51, to remind us of some of the people who need support.
In speaking to her Amendment 50, my noble friend Lady Kennedy referred movingly to her work to support the judges in Afghanistan. She has dedicated her life to trying to do something for people in such situations.