(7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I will address Amendment 1 alongside government Amendment 2 in one moment. I need not repeat in detail why this Bill is important, as we debated it so recently, just two weeks ago at Second Reading, but I want to address some of the points raised. I wrote to noble Lords—and to noble and learned Lords—but thought it important to put those matters on record here as well.
Clause 1 makes it clear that the Bill will have retrospective effect. The Government have carefully considered the point and decided that the Bill should have retrospective effect, meaning it will apply to litigation funding agreements in place before the PACCAR judgment and to any that may have been made between the judgment and the Bill becoming law. I thank noble Lords for their contributions, particularly my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, King’s Counsel, who is not in his place today.
There were concerns about the possibility of claimants who negotiated new funding agreements following the PACCAR decision, having believed their first agreement to be unenforceable, facing the prospect of two funding agreements that could be enforced once the Bill comes into effect. In addition, reference was made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, King’s Counsel, to a suggestion that the Bill’s retrospective effect may interfere with the Government’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. That was raised in the context of the opinion of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, King’s Counsel, which was shared among noble Lords ahead of Second Reading. On behalf of the Lord Chancellor, I thank noble Lords for raising this issue and assure them that the Government are looking into the questions raised and hope to provide a further update on Report.
I regret that I cannot say much more than that at this stage, to allow the Government to review the matter, but I welcome the continued engagement from across the House, of which this Committee is a part.
I should also like briefly to mention the forthcoming Civil Justice Council review of third-party litigation funding, which was discussed by a number of noble Lords, and to address particularly the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, KC, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, who raised a series of important questions on potential regulation of the market and limits on funders’ returns. As the Committee may be aware, since Second Reading, the Civil Justice Council published its terms of reference for the review on 23 April, which provide further detail on scope and timing. I thank noble Lords for their interest. If any noble Lords have further material they wish to share, I encourage them to contact the Civil Justice Council directly, which will doubtless welcome their contributions and expertise.
With those points addressed, I turn to the amendments. The Bill contains two clauses. Clause 1 amends Section 58AA of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. Its subsection (2) amends the definition of a damages-based agreement to provide that an agreement
“to the extent that it is a litigation funding agreement … is not a damages-based agreement”
—a DBA. Subsection (3) defines an LFA for the purposes of Section 58AA. Subsection (4) provides that the amendments are to be
“treated as always having had effect”.
The amendment addresses only the Supreme Court’s finding that certain LFAs are DBAs and does not seek to reverse the finding that litigation funders provide claims management services.
The Government have tabled two amendments to this clause. Amendment 1 remedies a perceived gap in the current draft definition of a litigation funding agreement, or LFA. As drafted, the definition of an LFA does not include reference to an agreement to pay the expenses of unrepresented litigants, which may occur where, for example, an unrepresented litigant receives funding for an expert report—a report from a skilled witness. Since the expert would not be providing “advocacy or litigation services” within the meaning of the legislation, an agreement to provide funding in this instance would not qualify as an LFA within the current draft definition.
The Government therefore believe that this should be addressed by bringing a small technical amendment to the Bill. This amendment will ensure that an LFA of the type rendered unenforceable by PACCAR, which is used to fund items of expenditure where the litigant is unrepresented, will be enforceable between the funder and the litigant. This reflects the policy objective of the Bill, which is to restore the position to that which existed before the Supreme Court ruling in July 2023, so that those LFAs of the type affected by the judgment are enforceable.
The second amendment tabled by the Government also addresses an ambiguity in the draft definition of a litigation funding agreement. As currently drafted, the definition of an LFA includes an agreement for
“the payment of costs that the litigant may be required to pay to another person by virtue of a costs order”.
However, there is a legitimate concern whether the expression
“by virtue of a costs order”,
may be interpreted too narrowly, and therefore be a source of litigation around its meaning regarding LFAs which neither specifically fund court or tribunal proceedings or envisage the issue of costs being determined by the court.
This amendment, which is, again, a small technical change, is designed to make it clear that the payment of adverse costs the litigant may be required to pay to another party, which would be funded under an LFA, includes the payment of costs following court, tribunal or arbitration proceedings, or as part of a settlement.
Clause 2 explains the extent, commencement and short title of the Bill, as I specified at Second Reading. I hope that noble Lords, and noble and learned Lords, will support these technical amendments, and I beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak now because I have tabled the only non-government amendment before the Committee. It is a probing amendment.
The Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, mentioned briefly the discussion about this Bill since the Second Reading debate—mostly in the context of the letter that he and the Secretary of State helpfully circulated—and the publication of the terms of reference for the review. That has been part of a wider discussion, and questions have been asked by a number of briefings. The briefing process for this Bill in relation to members of the public and interested or affected parties has been late; that has been a feature of the discussion, which has centred largely around questions on the need for regulation of the litigation funding market generally and on the issue of retrospectivity for the principal provision of the Bill, which the Minister mentioned.
I hope I will be forgiven for running through some of the arguments that were canvassed at Second Reading, largely in the light of the lateness of the briefings that we have had and the expressions of concern that there have been. A powerful argument has been advanced by some clients of litigation funders. They make the point—I foreshadowed it at Second Reading—that, in an unregulated market, litigation funders can effectively impose their terms on clients. This can mean that successful clients end up with only a very small part of the damages awarded to them, with the litigation funders taking the lion’s share; indeed, in one case that was brought to my attention and that of other noble Lords, funders have been in a position, following a case that they have funded, under their contracts of not only retaining all the damages awarded to the claimants but actively pursuing those claimants—their clients, in effect—for substantial costs that they incurred over and above the damages that were recovered. The clients say that that is most unfair; one can see their point.
The same people point to the DBA regulations—the Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013—and say, again with considerable force, that lawyers who enter into DBAs with their clients may not retain for themselves more than a prescribed proportion of the damages awarded, and that such lawyers are bound by other prescriptive regulations as to what they can set for their clients or in the contracts between them and their clients, the litigation funders having the upper hand in any negotiations of such agreements. They ask: why should similar restrictions as are imposed on lawyers in damages-based agreements not be imposed on litigation funders? They also say that, in any event, lawyers are already limited in the terms of what they can agree and are subject to comprehensive professional regulation, whereas litigation funders are not.
Noble Lords may remember that, at Second Reading, I said that, in the absence of regulation, there was
“a bit of a jungle out there”,—[Official Report, 15/4/24; col. 818.]
and that that should not be permitted to persist. Those expressing these concerns call for regulation of the litigation funders’ market generally, the primary purpose being to ensure more of a level playing field between funders and clients and the argument being that, if regulation of DBAs is appropriate for lawyers, why is it not for litigation funders?
As is well known to this Committee, the PACCAR decision gave legal effect to the essentially political argument that litigation funders should be subject to the DBA regulations. As we all know, this was because the Supreme Court decided that, if LFAs did not comply with the DBA regulations, which they generally would not, they would be unenforceable because LFAs involve the provision of case management services.
I will make the briefest of comments. I welcome the amendments put forward by the Minister. I very much take to heart the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the Bill would be pretty pointless unless there was an element of retrospectivity to it. I read the information that we were sent by the Bingham Centre, which was informative and interesting, and by the Bar Council. I absolutely understand the primary purpose behind this legislation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, commented on the legal balance in this Committee. I join her, as a non-lawyer; I cannot match her for gender, I am afraid. However, I can talk about the clients who are paying for this. I might have made the point at Second Reading that, by my understanding, the bulk of the people who take advantage of this type of funding would be at the sort of middle to large-sized company where I was chief executive. It is a way of cash management, in essence, because you do not know what litigation is on the horizon and you do not want to spend too much time on the litigation because that takes time away from running the business. So having these ongoing litigation funding arrangements is a way of managing risk. For me, that was the main purpose of occasionally entering into those agreements, rather than the litigation itself.
The other primary point worth repeating is that a lot competitors out there would like this business—Singapore, Australia, Dubai and elsewhere. I was very aware of that when I was running a business. I was regularly approached by people wanting to reach alternative ways of resolving any disputes that may arise.
Nevertheless, given those thoughts from a client’s perspective, I welcome this legislation. The English and Welsh model should be as up to date and competitive as possible. In that sense, I welcome the Bill and the Government’s amendments.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords and noble and learned Lords for all their contributions today. I will try to respond to the substance of the points that noble Lords have raised.
The Supreme Court judgment in PACCAR rendered many litigation funding agreements unenforceable. Uncertainty around litigation funding risks having a detrimental impact on the attractiveness of the England and Wales jurisdiction as a global hub for commercial litigation and arbitration, as well as on access to justice more broadly.
Through this Bill, we will restore the position that existed before the Supreme Court’s ruling in July 2023 so that litigation funding agreements affected by the judgment are enforceable. This will also ensure that claimants can get access to litigation funding in order to bring big and complex cases against bigger, better-resourced corporations, which they could not otherwise afford. In saying that, I reflect the principled concern raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, in her brief comments and echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede. It is a leitmotif that ran through much of our discussions at Second Reading; we are all seized of the difficulties to which inequality of arms can give rise.
The remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on Thames, which went over much of the history of litigation funding as we now have it—or as we had it up to the point of PACCAR—gave us a useful reminder of some of the issues at stake. It is also of use for us to consider the background to the rise of litigation funding and to bear in mind the objections that law has traditionally had against third-party litigation of this sort—the traditional objections to the pacta de quota litis, which would allow someone else a controlling hand in the manner in which litigation was carried out, perhaps to the detriment of the person in whose interest that litigation was nominally being pursued.
(7 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government how many (1) women, and (2) persons who were under 18 years of age when their index offence was committed, are serving an indeterminate sentence for public protection and have never been released on licence.
My Lords, as of December 2023, there were nine women serving an IPP sentence and 33 prisoners serving a detention for public protection sentence, who are in custody having never been released on licence. The IPP action plan aims to promote sentence progression for all those serving the IPP sentence. Provisions in the Victims and Prisoners Bill will give more offenders the opportunity to have their sentences terminated, so that they can move on with their lives.
My Lords, I congratulate the Government on having achieved some reduction in these numbers over the last two years, although noble Lords will, in some cases, still be surprised that there are women serving IPP sentences who have never been released and that there are people who committed their crime aged under 18 who have never been released; the majority of the latter are now 10 years or more over their tariff. In that light, does my noble and learned friend agree that while it is perfectly reasonable to have a Parole Board public protection test for prisoners serving a definitive sentence, since they will be released into the community at the end of their sentence, it is less appropriate for IPP prisoners, as the alternative for them is remaining in custody indefinitely, potentially for decades more? Should not this test, advanced in the current Bill, be modified for IPP prisoners?
My Lords, the IPP action plan, which the Government have promulgated, remains the best vehicle to deliver support to all IPP and DPP prisoners, so that they can progress towards a safe release—safe for them and for the community into which they will be released. The IPP action plan provides continued focus on supporting those serving IPP and DPP sentences in custody and in the community, ensuring that each has an effective sentence plan tailored to their individual needs by supporting those in the community on licence to comply with their conditions.
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, in his crusade for justice for these prisoners. The Government rejected resentencing of DPPs and IPPs, as the Minister knows, arguing that the Parole Board has consistently not backed these prisoners so therefore they should just lie in prison and rot there. However, the former head of the Parole Board, Martin Jones, now the Chief Inspector of Probation, is one of many experts calling for resentencing to end the nightmare injustice of imprisonment without end. What is the Government’s real reason for rejecting resentencing? Is it because they do not want to be seen as soft on crime ahead of a general election?
My Lords, it is not the case that the Government are acting out of that reason—the position on resentencing has been rejected twice by the Government at different times. Instead, we take the view that as there is a public protection aspect to these sentences, it is apt that they continue to be treated in the current way. I reject the noble Lord’s proposition that people are being left to “rot” in prison. The action plan has achieved the extension of the scope of the psychology services so that they can continue to support some of the more complex IPP cases. The safety team in HMPPS has developed and issued a safety toolkit concentrating on the needs of IPP prisoners and HMPPS has also commissioned new IPP delivery plans to roll out in May 2024. The Government are not inactive in this area.
My Lords, these 33 DPPs referred to by the Minister are 33 people who have never had a shot at adult life in the community. They are all well past their original tariff, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said, and passing one’s tariff date is a time when mental health often drops off a cliff edge. Does the Minister agree that we should give them the same kind of holistic and multidisciplinary wraparound care that Section 117 prisoners get to help them get through the gate and out into supported life in the community?
My Lords, provision of just such multidisciplinary approaches is precisely what the Government are accomplishing in their approach to these people. I fully accept the noble Baroness’s considered point that persons who have not experienced freedom will suffer extreme and acute mental health difficulties from time to time. With that in mind, I can advise the House that the Government remain committed to improving outcomes for individuals with mental health needs, including such IPP prisoners. The IPP safety team has devised a dedicated safety briefing. A special IPP toolkit has been issued so that persons dealing with such prisoners across the level of the prison system can concentrate on their needs. There is also a national partnership agreement on health and social care in England, published in 2023, which sets out a shared priority work plan to deliver safe, decent and effective care, improving health outcomes for people in prison and on probation. To conclude, I congratulate the noble Baroness, my noble friend and all noble Lords on their concern for this often-overlooked group of prisoners.
My Lords, recently in Lincoln prison I met a man who has been continuously in the prison system for the last 48 years—since I sat my A-levels. He is not mentally ill in any obvious way. He told me that he keeps sane by keeping God between himself and the other prisoners—that was the gist of what he said anyway—but that he is so socialised by being in prison for so long that he has almost forgotten what he was in there for. He asked that if he were to be released could there be specialist units in nursing homes where there would be the proper care for someone who has not known freedom in his entire adult life?
My Lords, the right reverend Prelate’s example will strike a chord with noble Lords across the House and engage their sympathy. The work the Government are carrying out to establish psychology services is, as I said, multidisciplinary in nature and involves not only expert psychologists but dedicated probation officers, specialists in their field and those who have looked at the problems of suicide in prison. We are working in particular with a group called UNGRIPP and a Mrs Donna Mooney, who has done great work in this field. We are engaged with the Howard League for Penal Reform. There is also a commitment to working with the Samaritans to provide further assistance for persons coming out of the prison estate.
My Lords, do the Government not feel ashamed of the obvious injustice of the continuing 16,000 former IPP residents in prison who are still on IPP sentences? This is a gross injustice that lingers in people’s lives, who are in a place of permanent panic and unable to get on with their day-to-day existence because they are looking over their shoulder, wondering whether they be tapped for a recall. In the past 10 years I have visited 73 prisons up and down the UK and met hundreds of IPP people inside prison, and I have not encountered a single one who was not worthy of release tomorrow. The system is so badly broken. It needs a kind of approach that we had for the Post Office that clears out the residue of this long, unjust sentence, which was described as a great evil by two former Home Secretaries.
My Lords, the number of IPP prisoners are down to 1,312 as of 30 June 2023, from a maximum of 6,000. I hear the noble Lord’s views on the worthiness for release of those whom he has met, but it is not something which can be consigned to an individual; it is a matter for consideration by persons holding a wide range of specialisms and experience. I do not share the view that the Government should be ashamed of their response. The latest review by the inspectorate found that His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service is taking “proportionate” and “necessary” decisions to recall offenders on an IPP licence for public protection.
My Lords, to be clear, the Labour Party does not support the resentencing of IPP prisoners. Our view is that it would put the resentencing judges in an impossible situation when there have been multiple recent reviews of those IPP prisoners. Nevertheless, the Government constantly tell us that there is a review of the sentencing plans for those IPP prisoners. Can the Minister tell us how many of the IPP prisoners have had their sentencing plans reviewed?
My Lords, I cannot provide the noble Lord with that information directly, but I will be able to do so in a very short space of time. I gratefully acknowledge the statement he gave on behalf of his party relating to the approach that has been proposed of resentencing such offenders. His views are at one with those of His Majesty’s Government.
(7 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill will fulfil the Government’s commitment to address the impacts of the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of the King on the application of PACCAR Incorporated and others v Competition Appeal Tribunal and others. The reference for the case is 2023 UKSC 28. It was handed down in July 2023. This case is colloquially known as PACCAR, taking the name of the lead applicants in the case.
First, I will address the judgment in question. It arose out of a claim against truck manufacturers regarding anti-competitive behaviour. The Supreme Court ruling rendered many third-party litigation funding agreements—LFAs—unenforceable by bringing them into scope of the regulatory regime for damages-based agreements, or DBAs. For the sake of brevity, I will refer from time to time to these vehicles by their initials.
The Supreme Court ruling has had a detrimental impact on access to justice and the attractiveness of this jurisdiction as a global hub for commercial litigation and arbitration. This is an important sector for the United Kingdom and so we must act now. Put simply, the Bill will restore the position that existed before the Supreme Court ruling in July 2023, which was that LFAs are not DBAs and hence are enforceable.
It will accomplish this by amending the definition of a DBA in Section 58AA(3)(a) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. It will also ensure that claimants can continue to access litigation funding to bring big, complex cases against larger, better-resourced corporations which they could not otherwise afford.
The restoration of the previous funding position is needed urgently to reduce uncertainty for both the future of litigation funding and for LFAs that had been entered into previously. By rendering many existing LFAs unenforceable, the position post judgment risks undesirable satellite litigation, an increased burden on the courts, and creating an unfavourable market for litigation funding, which, in turn, threatens access to justice. I will go on to explain in more detail how the Bill operates, but first will address why it matters.
Third-party litigation funding plays a key role in enabling ordinary people and small and medium-sized enterprises to bring large, costly claims against better-resourced companies and institutions. Litigation funding agreements involve a third-party funder, typically an independent financial institution. The funder finances all or part of the legal costs of a claim, in return for a share of any damages awarded. Third-party litigation funding is a niche market, which operates typically in high-value commercial, arbitration or group litigation claims, including the types of claims brought in the Competition Appeal Tribunal.
A recent example of where an LFA was used is the Post Office Horizon case—Bates v the Post Office—which had the backing of a litigation funder. Some other examples of cases where LFAs have been used include equal pay cases; motorists bringing claims against car manufacturers over false diesel emissions; and consumers bringing claims against multinational companies regarding data breaches and data misuse.
In the United Kingdom Supreme Court judgment in PACCAR, the court held that LFAs between claimants and litigation funders which entitle the litigation funder to payment based on a percentage of the damages recovered from the losing party are DBAs—damages-based agreements—as defined in Section 58AA of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. The principal problem is that LFAs which fall within the definition of DBAs are subject to, but generally will not comply with, the DBA Regulations 2013, as was noted in the PACCAR judgment. As such, those LFAs are rendered unenforceable against the claimant.
For many claimants, LFAs are not just an important pathway to justice; they could be their only route to redress against well-resourced corporations with deep pockets. I have no doubt that all noble Lords will have been moved by the plight of the sub-postmasters affected by the Horizon scandal, and their impressive campaign for justice. It is just one example of the importance of third-party litigation funding. Alan Bates himself has noted that, as things stand today, since the Supreme Court judgment, the sub-postmasters would not be able to bring their claim had it arisen. That is why we must remove the risk and return to the position preceding the July 2023 judgment: promoting access to justice for ordinary people by making sure that it is not the preserve only of big business, powerful institutions and the moneyed few.
The new legislation, which will apply to all proceedings, will allow the Government to deliver a return to a funding regime which promotes access to justice, as well as enhance the competitiveness of the jurisdiction and the attractiveness of a thriving United Kingdom legal sector which contributes over £34 billion per annum to the UK economy.
I return to how the Bill achieves this. The Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill provides that LFAs are not damages-based agreements. It should be noted that the legislation applies and extends to England and Wales only. This restores the position in place before the July 2023 judgment, making affected LFAs enforceable once again and enabling ongoing and future claims to continue to be funded by LFAs.
The Bill contains two clauses. Clause 1 amends Section 58AA of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. Subsection (2) amends the definition of a DBA to provide that an agreement, to the extent that it is an LFA, is not a DBA. Subsection (3) defines an LFA for the purposes of section 58AA of the 1990 Act. Subsection (4) provides that the amendments are to be treated as always having had effect. The amendment only addresses the Supreme Court’s finding that LFAs are DBAs and does not seek to reverse the finding that litigation funders provide claims management services.
Clause 2 explains the extent, commencement and short title of the Bill. Subsection (1) provides the territorial extent of the Bill, expressing that the Bill extends to England and Wales only. Subsection (2) provides the commencement provision for the Bill. The Bill will be commenced upon the day of its passing. Subsection (3) gives the shortened title by which the Bill can be referred as upon passing. This is described as the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Act 2024.
The Bill will have retrospective effect. The legality and propriety of the proposed retrospection, including its compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights, has been considered carefully. The Bill will achieve the important policy objective of preserving the rights of individuals to challenge alleged breaches of the law. Access to justice is an essential component of the rule of law. If the Bill were prospective only, there would be uncertainty as to the enforceability of agreements entered into before the PACCAR judgment but where the claim is concluded after the Act comes into force. This could lead to undesirable satellite litigation, which would benefit no one.
Retrospective effect will also ensure that the contractual rights and obligations agreed under LFAs entered into before the Supreme Court’s judgment continue to have effect as intended. Early commencement will minimise the period of retrospection. These provisions will remove any uncertainty about the enforceability of LFAs in cases that have settled and enable litigation funders to continue to fund cases, including existing cases.
On retrospective effect, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven KC, has raised a number of points for the Government to consider. I also acknowledge the engagement which I have had with my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts in relation to wider risks which may arise in some circumstances out of third-party litigation funding. I first thank the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, for sharing his expert views, and assure him that the Government will consider them in due course. In relation to the useful engagement which I have had with my noble friend Lord Hodgson, I will come on to discuss the ambit of a review of the matter which the Government have ordered.
There are a wide variety of views about litigation funding arrangements and how they should work. That is why, alongside legislative change, the Lord Chancellor has asked the Civil Justice Council—which is the body for overseeing and co-ordinating the modernisation of the civil justice system in England and Wales, under the chairmanship of the Master of the Rolls—to undertake a review of the third-party litigation funding market in England and Wales.
The review will consider questions raised during the discussions on the PACCAR judgment, including in your Lordships’ House, such as the need for greater safeguards for claimants, regulation of the sector and the possibility of caps on the returns made to funders. The CJC will publish its terms of reference and other related documents shortly. An interim report is due by this summer—2024—and a final report by the summer of 2025. The Government will consider the way forward following that final report.
By acting swiftly to restore the previous funding position via legislation, and investigating whether that position can be enhanced through a longer-term, forward-looking review, the Government will restore and improve a vital avenue to justice for all deserving claimants, not just those with the most resources. I submit that this is a much-needed Bill to address an important issue affecting access to justice. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to all those noble Lords who participated in this debate. I am grateful in particular to the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, from their Benches, for the broad support they are giving. But if a financial metaphor is not inappropriate in the circumstances, I do not take either of them to have issued the Government with a blank cheque as far as this legislation goes. If your Lordships are minded that a Committee of the whole House should be established to consider this Bill, as I will move, I look forward to your contributions, and those of the whole House, in giving the Bill the scrutiny it deserves.
The noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, opened the responses and in many ways set the parameters for the interesting debate that followed, setting up the question of access to justice and stressing from a historical perspective the medical legal cases arising out of the condition known as vibration white finger. That prompted me to recollect the importance of associations such as trade unions and others in providing legal assistance for their members when entering into costly litigation relating to the safety of the workplace.
It is quite correct that funding litigation is frightening for individuals and smaller companies who are contemplating it in defence of their right. It is for that reason that the Government have put forward this Bill to address the consequences of the PACCAR ruling. Legal Members of your Lordships’ House touched on that question, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred to the surprising character of the judgment. Certainly, it took lots of people in the profession by surprise. It is to deal with the consequences of that decision that the Government tabled the Bill. I respectfully endorse the characterisation of the dissenting judgment by Lady Rose, which was put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, as a powerful one.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, in a characteristically thoughtful analysis of the position, set forth what is accepted across the House with one exception—that there is no real alternative to funding of this sort in the litigation landscape as we currently find it. I do not wish to depress the House by saying that legal aid is dead. On civil cases in England and Wales, legal aid can be provided as an exceptional case funding measure, for matters out of scope where the failure to provide legal services would breach or likely breach a person’s ECHR rights. Where a matter is within legal scope or could be caught by exceptional case funding, the applicant must also pass a means and merits test.
The Ministry of Justice published the Government’s response to the means test review consultation exercise on 25 May 2023. That set out the detailed policy decisions underpinning the means test arrangement. The Government assess that their changes will increase the number of people eligible for civil legal aid in England and Wales by 2.5 million. Therefore, although there are concerns from Members across the House—particularly the noble Lords, Lord Mendelsohn, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, Lord Meston and Lord Carlile of Berriew, and my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, and while legal aid will remain an important feature of how access to justice is delivered, it is the view of the Government and I think of the debate overall that we must take steps to address the necessity of third-party funding to permit access to justice for the sorts of persons, organisations and corporations which I have described.
The very interesting contribution by the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, anticipated me in referring to the decision of the American judge who said that the alternative to class actions funded by funders of this sort was not 17 million individual actions but no actions at all because, as the noble Lord quoted, and as I am happy to repeat, only a lunatic or a fanatic would litigate over $30. The noble Lord also, along with my noble friend Lord Arbuthnot, put before the House a quote from “The Italian Job”. I wonder whether that is the first occasion when that particular work has been referred to in your Lordships’ counsels.
Both noble Lords—and my noble friend Lord Arbuthnot spoke with the immense moral authority that he carries with him as a result of his selfless and tireless work on behalf of the sub-postmasters—made important points about access to funding for litigation. As I quoted in opening the debate, the eponymous Mr Bates has referred to the importance of third-party litigation funding in enabling the process by which justice is arrived at to commence.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to the manner in which, as all of us common lawyers know, definitions or concepts of enormous importance across the whole mighty edifice of the common law world can emerge from the least important-sounding or most apparently trivial causes, whether it be snails emerging from bottles of ginger beer in cafés in Paisley or other areas in which matters of huge import for the civil common law have arisen from small-scale disputes between parties.
All the noble Lords were united in their concern about the sums ultimately received by litigants and the potential sums realised by litigation funders. The best vehicle for discussion of this point will be the review by the Civil Justice Council to which reference has been made, but it is a problem of which the Government are acutely conscious.
I am grateful too for the contribution to the debate made by my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and for his informed engagement with me at an earlier stage, to which he was good enough to refer your Lordships—an earlier stage before I rose to address the House this afternoon. I am grateful to him for his analysis of the concept of retrospection in legislation, as I am for his endorsement of the constitutional position in relation to Parliament being responsible for making law.
My noble friend Lord Sandhurst referred to the importance of maintaining a situation where defenders are not unduly harassed by litigations funded by third-party funders, and he was quite correct to make that point. I am sure that this is something that the review being carried out under the chairmanship of the Master of the Rolls will consider.
A number of specialist points were made during the debate. In relation to a series of questions posed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, I look forward to engaging with the points that he made. In the first instance, I will write to him in relation to those specific points with which he concluded his submission, and I would like to do so against the basis of an understanding of the terms of reference of the forthcoming review. In relation to him and to the point echoed from the Opposition Front Bench by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, as your Lordships heard from me in opening, an interim report is expected in the summer; the terms of reference under which that report will be carried out will be published in due course.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, expressed herself as suspicious of everything that comes out of the Government. I have to echo that by saying I am suspicious of everything that comes out of the Green Party. After all, I have to live in Scotland where we see the effects of government by the Green Party, and they are absurd where not actively malign.
I am sorry for intervening. It is a separate Green Party. It actually disaffiliated itself because of me, and I feel strongly about it.
As always, the noble Baroness has fulfilled a valuable public service.
On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Meston, on the scope of the Bill, the view of the Public Bill Office confirms that this is a one-purpose Bill. Its scope is closely connected to the enforceability of litigation funding agreements and the Public Bill Office does not think that amendments relating to the wider category of damages-based agreements would be in scope, nor would more general issues relating to litigation funding. Again, I would be happy to revert to the noble Lord with further details on those points, as I learn them.
The noble Lord, Lord Meston, along with my noble friend Lord Sandhurst and the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, also posed a question on the revision of the current DBA regulations. The Government will consider the timetable to make improvements to the DBA regulations without encouraging unnecessary litigation. Any revisions to the current regulations will be subject to a statutory consultation, which is set out in Section 58AA of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, and to an affirmative resolution, which is set out in Section 120 of the 1990 Act.
I apologise to any noble Lords whose valuable contributions to this interesting debate I may have overlooked. To sum up, I gauge the mood of your Lordships’ House as one of concern that access to the courts, the reputation of which the House is jealous of and grateful for, should not be artificially constrained. I also recognise noble Lords’ concerns that access to justice on behalf of a less well-funded party or individual should not come at the expense of excessive profits for those responsible for funding. In my own jurisdiction of Scotland, it is a matter of daily encouragement and inspiration to enter Parliament Hall in Edinburgh and pass the portrait of a notable lawyer, of whom it was said after his death that, while he lived, no poor man in Scotland wanted for a good lawyer. It is the aspiration of the whole House that that should apply today as much as it did in previous centuries. I hope that, ultimately, the Bill passes and that the House, as a whole, accepts that it is done with the intention of furthering that aspiration.
(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this 11-page Statement contains a series of self-congratulatory assertions from the MoJ on everything from falling crime, longer sentences, new offences and deporting foreign national offenders to the response to the pandemic. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has pointed out the weaknesses in some of those assertions. But there is one thing in this Statement that is new. Buried on page 9 is the obscure passage:
“We will also extend the existing end-of-custody supervised licence measure to around 35 to 60 days. We will enable that to happen for a time-limited period and work with the police, prisons and probation leaders to make further adjustments as required”.
What a masterpiece of obfuscation.
On 16 October last, the Government announced their plan to allow up to 18 days’ early release, for a limited period, to meet what they called “acute and exceptional demand”. That period has now been extended indefinitely and, subject to further adjustment in future, to allow for early release between 35 and 60 days before scheduled release dates. This announcement betrays the panic in government that it has simply run out of prison spaces—and the crisis is going to get worse.
We now have a prison population of 88,220 on last Friday’s figures, against a maximum operational capacity of around 85,000 men and 3,300 women. The Daily Telegraph reports that there are just 238 male and 118 women’s places unfilled. Those figures exceed a far lower design capacity of 79,507, less than the MoJ’s certified normal accommodation of 80,000. Furthermore, the few unfilled places are dotted around the prison estate, so prisoners are shuffled from prison to prison, impacting on education and training, community contacts, family visits and relationships with staff and other prisoners. Can the Minister provide figures for the extra prison transfers caused by place shortages since last October’s Statement?
Then we have other harmful measures, such as the use of police cells for holding prisoners in custody. Will the Minister write to us with the statistics for the use of police cells for prisoners since the October Statement? Then there are the temporary prefab extra cells. Will he say what extra facilities for exercise, training, education and even eating have been provided for the increased numbers in the affected prisons? Then there are inevitably unexpected disasters, such as the discovery of radioactive gas at Dartmoor and the enforced closure of 184 cells between November and February.
The 10,000 new places by next year and 20,000 new places long term have been on the table for ages but, even if they all work out, they hardly scratch the surface. Increased sentences and increasing time served, loudly trumpeted in this Statement, serve only to increase the prison population, which is predicted to rise by March 2028 to a central estimate of 105,800, an increase of roughly 17,000. Will the Minister explain the maths?
Five Wells and Fosse Way, with a total capacity of 3,600, are already open and so are included in present capacity. Are they double-counted as part of the 10,000 due this year, mentioned in the Statement? Millsike in Yorkshire will open later this year and will have a capacity of 1,500. As to the remaining 10,000 places, not a brick has been laid and none is likely to be available until some time between 2027 and 2030. Gartree in Leicestershire, with a capacity of 1,700-odd, has outline planning permission but the detail has yet to be approved. Grendon in Buckinghamshire, with a capacity of 1,500-odd, has only just been approved by the Levelling Up Secretary. In Lancashire, the new prison in Chorley for 1,700 is the subject of a planning appeal which has not even commenced.
There was a consultation in 2021 about two possible new prisons at Wethersfield, near Braintree in Essex, but the MoJ says that no decision has yet been taken. Please will the Minister tell us more about the planning progress for these prisons? When is building predicted to commence? When might they open, and with how many places? Where is the budget? Have I left anything out? Again, will he please explain the maths and the figure of 20,000 for the promised new places?
My Lords, in order to respond to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, it is as well that the House reminds itself of the background against which the Government are acting: the unprecedented circumstances of the Covid pandemic. During that time, extraordinary pressure was placed on our justice system and the Government took certain difficult—but, as it turned out, wise—decisions in relation thereto.
Recognising the importance to our judicial system, to our system of justice, of jury trials, we did not suspend them. Recognising the importance of custody as one of the tools in our penal system, we did not introduce wholesale release of prisoners, as happened in other states, such as France, where 12,000 people were released from prison, I believe. Factor into that the action taken by members of the Bar in relation to their salaries, and we are in a situation where we have unprecedented strain on the system, which the Government are now seeking to work through.
That is the background to the steps that the Government are taking, bearing in mind at all times their principal desire to protect the public and to cut crime by taking dangerous criminals off the streets. That is the Government’s intention, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, in reference to the Statement, quoted the figure of 20,000 additional prison places. The figures are indeed stark, as both noble Lords pointed out to the House. As a result of the factors that I have mentioned, both the remand population and the recall population in prisons in England and Wales have risen.
The Government’s response to this has been to push ahead with a programme amounting to the largest expansion of the prison estate since Victorian times, with 10,000 of the additional places to be delivered by the end of 2025—of which 5,900 have already been delivered. In addition—again, I recognise the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about facilities for prisoners—short-term measures have been put in place across the prison estate to expand capacity by the equivalent of around 2,000 places since September 2022. That has involved measures that would otherwise be considered undesirable, such as the doubling up of cells and the delay of non-urgent maintenance work, but the point is that these have been taken as temporary measures in relation to these unprecedented circumstances.
Noble Lords from both Front Benches referred to foreign national offenders. As the House has heard, last October, and again with a subsequent announcement this month, a series of measures has been announced to ease the pressure, including deporting more foreign national offenders and moving some lower-level offenders on to supervised licence up to 18 days before their automatic release date. In addition, our Sentencing Bill will help cut reoffending rates by creating a presumption that custodial sentences of less than 12 months will be suspended.
The work the Government will carry out includes tabling an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill to extend conditional cautions to foreign national offenders with limited leave to remain; amending deportation policy so that foreign national offenders given suspended sentences of six months or more, up from the current 12 months, can be deported; expediting prisoner transfers with priority countries such as Albania, the country with the largest individual component within the 10,000-plus foreign national offenders currently in our prisons; concluding new transfer agreements with partner countries such as Italy; radically changing the way in which foreign national offenders’ cases are processed, creating a new task force and allocating 400 more caseworkers to prioritise these cases and streamline the process of removal.
I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Marks, once again, who referred to the end-of-custody supervised licence provisions. I have a number of observations to make on that. It is clear, in my submission, that further action is needed in the short term, and in order to do that, as the House has heard, there has been a programme to increase the number of days some lower-level offenders could be moved from prison and on to licensed conditions in the community before their automatic release date. As the House has heard, this will be increased to around 35 to 60 days. This will take place for a limited period, again recognising the current extraordinarily acute pressures on the system. We will work with the police, the prisons and probation leaders to made adjustments as they are needed.
I emphasise that this remains a temporary, targeted measure aimed at anyone convicted of serious crimes, such as crimes of a sexual nature. By “serious”, I do not necessarily confine myself to seriousness in terms of sentence; there is seriousness in terms of impact. I am looking also at people convicted of stalking offences and at domestic abuse cases, not just their seriousness to individual victims but to the community at large. These will not be affected, and those who break the rules imposed will face a return to jail.
We are conscious also of the impact our changes may have on probation, so on top of the extra £155 million a year being put into the Probation Service, from April we will reset probation so that practitioners prioritise early engagement, at the point at which offenders are most likely to breach their licence conditions, allowing front-line staff to maximise supervision of the most serious offenders. In many ways, this will simply instrumentalise a process that already happens quite naturally: if a person appears to be making good progress and satisfies those responsible for his management that that is the case, it is right and proper, I submit, that their attention should be focused on persons more in need of support, rather than having support spread out across the full period of somebody’s licence. That, I submit, will permit the maximisation of supervision and the most effective use of resources and time.
Reference was made to the use of police accommodation under a system known as Operation Safeguard, which is a matter of permitting police cells and other accommodation of that nature to be used in order to address acute capacity pressures caused by the barristers’ strike, building upon the pandemic. Across the country, 163 cells were available under Operation Safeguard, and His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service has the authority to activate a further 200. The background to that is in relation to custody of persons being moved from location to location in order to attend court.
Other developments in hand include the rolling out of a national scheme to consider bail applications and to consider the balance as to whether bail or remand is the appropriate disposal in relation to somebody awaiting trial.
A question was posed as to the change in the point of release from 18 days up to between 35 and 60. As the House has heard, a similar scheme was operated in 2007. That scheme was different, and the early ECSL—end-of-custody supervised licence—scheme that is being introduced has a range of safeguards. The scheme operating between 2007 and 2010 released some people straight into the community without any supervision and led to the early release of some prisoners convicted of terror offences. Naturally, it is appropriate that fresh provisions look to such lessons as might be learned from previous schemes, and seek to build upon and correct them. I submit that the ECSL scheme that has been announced is different. Everyone is being moved on to supervised licence with strict conditions, including tags and curfews where necessary. The 2007 to 2010 scheme led to more than 80,000 prisoners being released; by contrast, the ECSL scheme is talking about a small proportion of people who are being moved on to supervised licence. Reflecting the concerns that I know are shared across the House about the impact on victims, complainers in crime who are perhaps affected or concerned by the possibility of release, if they have signed up to the victim contact scheme, they will be notified about an offender’s release where that takes place under the ECSL scheme.
In addition, I will say something about the resources being invested. As I think the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, some 400 probation officers have applied—that exceeds the recruitment target the Government had in place over the years 2020-21 and 2022-23. I submit that that is a significant number. In addition, a sum of £53 million will fund more than 200 new bail information officers who will support the courts in reaching decisions as to bail and remand.
I think mention was made of the bail accommodation scheme, which provides temporary accommodation for individuals released from prison on home detention curfew, and provides a secure community-based alternative to remanding an individual in custody. I can speak from professional experience of the dreadful consequences that can follow from a person being released unexpectedly from custody into liberty where inadequate provisions are made for that person’s readmission into society by way of accommodation and support, or where no steps have been taken to prepare that individual, or to provide for him or her the physical needs of accommodation, food and money.
In those circumstances, each of the buildings in the bail estate houses up to four people, and residents are supported by visits to provide support and to address any wider issues. There is female-only accommodation, supported by CCTV, and funding is available that will be expanded across the remainder of the estate over the next six months.
The overall intention of the Government is to address this backlog that has grown up—this increasing strain on the resources of our criminal justice system—by additional cash, an increase in resources and, by that, an increase in the number of prison places to be made available over the next few years. As I say, the ambition is 10,000 new places—of which 5,900 are already in place—by 2025.
I was asked a number of very specific questions by both noble Lords who have opened for the Front Benches. I am very conscious of the fact that I have not provided detailed, specific, numerical answers to certain of the questions put to me, but officials are in the Box. If noble Lords are content, I will either correspond myself or, more likely, my noble and learned colleague Lord Bellamy, who is the Minister in the Ministry of Justice, will correspond with noble Lords, in an endeavour to give them answers which they will consider satisfactory to the questions they posed.
My Lords, I have two specific questions. The first point is that the early release scheme will put an additional burden on the Probation Service. The noble and learned Lord quoted the £155 million which was first raised in 2021. Can he confirm that there is no specific additional money for this additional work by the Probation Service as a result of yesterday’s Statement?
The second question is more wide-ranging. I wrapped up my contribution by pointing to the £0.5 billion cut in next year’s justice budget. As I said, the Government are keen to trumpet the extra spending. How are those two numbers reconciled, between the cut in the budget and the extra spending that the Government have just announced?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for clarifying certain of the remarks that he made initially and putting them down into two specific questions. I regret to say that they fall within the category of information which I have sought but do not readily have available. So, with the noble Lord’s leave, I will correspond with him on that matter.
My Lords, may I clarify one point? First, I am very grateful for the indication that we will have in writing the specific answers to the specific questions we asked, but I make it clear that we regard it as of great importance to clarify the numbers of prison places against the projected increase in the prison population, on the Government’s own figures and in light of the measures that have been introduced, increasing time served and sentences. The significance of that is to test whether the places on tap will be enough to match the increase in the projected prison population. If those answers could be given specifically, I would be very grateful.
I hear what the noble Lord has said. He makes a series of good points and we will write to him on those. I will ensure that those specific matters feature in the letter.
(8 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI hesitate to stand up, looking around. We very much support Amendment 33 from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. If she wishes to test the opinion of the House, we will certainly support her.
I just say to the noble Lord, Lord Murray, in defence of the Select Committee system, that sometimes there are differences of opinion on Select Committees. However, it is a really important point of principle about Parliament that reports from Select Committees, both in this and the other place, are hugely respected, even when there is a division of opinion. We need to be careful about suggesting that a chair of a Select Committee has come to an opinion because of their party-political allegiance. That is a difficult point to make. In my experience, chairs of Select Committees of all political parties have sometimes made very difficult decisions and come to very different conclusions from those of the party of which they are a member. That important point of principle underpins our democracy, and we need to be careful about suggesting that the chair of a Select Committee has been openly influenced by party-political allegiance to come to a particular conclusion. Going down that route is dangerous.
The point about this, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti outlined, is to try to give immigration decision-makers the opportunity to see whether a particular decision is able to be challenged in the courts and whether an individual’s rights need to be protected. My view is that this is of course about the rule of law, but the courts are there to ensure that justice is done. Justice in this case requires the ability for the law, as it impacts an individual, to be tested in the courts. That strikes me as fundamental to how the rule of law operates.
As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said, sometimes that is really inconvenient to Governments. Sometimes it is really convenient to all of us. Justice is an important part of our democracy and goes alongside the rule of law. I just say to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that I think that is what her Amendment 33, supported by others, seeks to do and why we would support it.
My Lords, this was a brisk debate that touched on a number of very important points. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in opening, developed her point with admirable concision, which I fear I will be unable to match in responding. None the less, in answer to her points relating to the protection of claimants—the same point raised by my noble friend Lord Hailsham from our Benches—we say that those protections are to be found in the Bill and the treaty and the mechanisms which they set up.
My noble friend challenged us on three specific points. He first said that, in his belief, the judiciary can be more robust in the way that it treats unmeritorious claims. Respectfully, I agree and I do not suppose that anyone in the Chamber would disagree. My noble friend went on to say that it is dangerous to exclude persons who are within the jurisdiction of our courts from their jurisdiction. In the special circumstances with which this Bill is concerned, I consider that the protections of such persons as are involved through the scheme of the Bill are guaranteed adequately by our arrangements with the Republic of Rwanda and the oversight that we have in place.
My noble friend went on to ask whether the policy was likely to achieve the aim of deterrence that we have sought with the Bill. He quite properly rehearsed his view to the House that he thought that it was unlikely to be the case. All I can say in response is that, for the reasons set out by my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, I beg leave to disagree.
My noble friend Lord Inglewood posed the question of whether it is government policy to look at each individual case. In relation to that, I refer him to Clause 4 of the Bill, which permits decisions based on the individual circumstances of particular applicants.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, accused the Government of extremism and authoritarianism. I detect gratitude on the part of noble Lords on the Opposition Front Bench that, unlike on Monday, her fire was directed at the Government principally, instead of at their party. But she returned to the attack that she mounted on Monday. I disavow any suggestion that the Government are motivated by either extremism or authoritarianism.
There was another brisk debate involving the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy and Lady Lawrence, and my noble friends Lady Meyer and Lord Murray of Blidworth on these Benches. The conclusion, or the final submission in relation to that debate, was given from the Cross Benches by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I accept that noble Lords, having informed themselves by travelling to Rwanda and considering the position on the ground, have reached contrary views. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, invited us to consider that the appropriate forum for discussion and consideration of these points is the courts. His Majesty’s Government begs to disagree: we find appropriate protections for claimants in the arrangements made for supervision by officials in real time via the structures set up in the Act to examine Rwanda’s compliance with its obligations. As we have heard in previous debates, one of the core principles that the Bill is seeking to address is to limit challenges that can be brought against the general safety of Rwanda.
Have the procedures required under Article 10.3 of the treaty to ensure that refoulement does not take place, as it did in the Israeli case, yet been devised?
My Lords, the Israeli case to which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, referred was—I make this point first—a completely different circumstance from the provisions set out in our Bill and the accompanying treaty. I will have to revert to the noble Lord on the specific point he raised, which is whether those procedures are in place as yet, or whether they come under the context of those to which I made reference—whether they are being worked up and implemented. If the noble Lord is content with that answer, I will correspond with him. I am grateful to him for indicating assent.
As I was saying, we will ratify the treaty only once we are satisfied that all necessary implementation is in place, and the treaty will be expedited. As I was saying in relation to the noble Lord’s point a moment ago, we continue to work with the Rwandans on this. As we set out to the House on Monday—
If the treaty has to be agreed and the Government have to be satisfied, how can they expect us to recognise that Rwanda is at present safe?
My Lords, I think, with respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that that point has been canvassed extensively on previous occasions.
As we set out on Monday, the legislation required for Rwanda to ratify the treaty passed that country’s lower house on 28 February, and it will now go to that country’s upper house. Once ratified, the treaty will become law in Rwanda. It follows that the Government of Rwanda would then be required to give effect to the terms of the treaty in accordance with its domestic law, as well as international law. As my noble friend Lord Lilley set out on Monday, it is inconceivable that Rwanda will not implement carefully and considerately, and we continue to work at pace with the Government of Rwanda on implementation.
We therefore do not consider it necessary to make the proposed changes to Clause 4 to permit decision-makers or courts and tribunals to consider claims on the basis of Rwanda’s safety generally, or that Rwanda will or may remove persons to another state in contravention of its international obligations or permit the courts and tribunals to grant interim relief, other than where there is a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm. There are ample safeguards in the Bill, and these amendments would be contrary to the Bill’s whole purpose.
To conclude, we have made it clear that we cannot continue to allow relocations to Rwanda to be frustrated and delayed as a result of systemic challenges on its general safety. In this context, the safety of a particular country is a matter for Parliament and one in which Parliament’s view should be sovereign. The evidence that we have provided and the commitments made by the United Kingdom and the Government of Rwanda through this internationally binding treaty enable Rwanda to be deemed a safe country. The Bill will allow Parliament to confirm that it considers that it has sufficient material before it to judge that Rwanda is in general safe and makes it clear that the finding cannot be disturbed by the courts.
Before I sit down, I return in a bit more detail to the matter which the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, started with his comment and which was answered by others. As we have set out previously, the constitution of Rwanda includes a broad prohibition of discrimination and does not criminalise or discriminate against sexual orientation in law or policy. As part of the published evidence pack, the updated country information note gave careful consideration to evidence relating to the treatment of LGBT individuals in Rwanda. Rwandan legal protection for LGBT rights is, as we have heard, generally considered more progressive than that of neighbouring countries.
I will conclude my submissions with reference to the point raised earlier by my noble friend Lord Lilley when he spoke about the precedent set by the 2004 legislation and referred to the views of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, in relation to parliamentary supremacy. As my noble friend correctly quoted, it is a matter of this country enjoying parliamentary supremacy. Parliamentary supremacy is at the heart of accountability to Parliament and, through Parliament, accountability to the people about whom my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne has spoken so eloquently during the debate on this Bill.
In conclusion, I submit that the noble Baroness should not press her amendment for the reasons I have given. Were she to do so, I have no hesitation in inviting the House to reject it.
As always, I am grateful to all noble Lords, particularly those who spoke briefly. I am grateful to my supporters, not least the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Defending our constitution and the rule of law runs very deep in his family, and he has brought such honour to his family, your Lordships’ House and our country with his contributions on this Bill. To the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, I say simply that, in this case, the Supreme Court did not attack the policy; it made a finding of fact, as it is entitled to do.
I am grateful to all Members of your Lordships’ House who participated in such good faith on the trip to Rwanda, as part of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As we have heard, even in good faith there can be a dispute of fact between parliamentarians, let alone people on different sides of your Lordships’ House. Forgive me, but the man of the match in answering that predicament was the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who said that this is what courts are for. I am grateful, as always, for the support of my noble friend Lord Coaker.
The Minister kindly apologised for the lack of concision, but a psychiatrist would always find the magic words hidden in the many. On a previous occasion, he told us that Rwanda was to become safe by decree. Today, he told us that this is about special circumstances. The road to hell is not just paved with good intentions; it is paved with special circumstances as well. He speaks rightly of parliamentary sovereignty. We are part of Parliament, and parliamentary sovereignty is not executive domination.
I am particularly sad that parts of today’s debate contrasted with what we heard yesterday in the debate on foreign affairs, when so many noble Lords, including those from the Government Front Bench, spoke about the importance of the international rule of law. Today, the Home Office is on parade and we hear exactly the opposite. It is time to trust the courts, and it is time to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, as I said, Amendment 37 puts the ball in the court of the Attorney-General; it is for her to make the decision and recommendation to the Government about the propriety of the interim measures. This is the most modest of the amendments in this group—and I do not know whether other noble Lords will be pressing their amendments.
My Lords, I am again grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this debate, opened by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. He acknowledged that we had enjoyed a full debate on the topic in Committee, in which conflicting views on certain essential matters emerged.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, repeated the view he expressed earlier that the practice in relation to the Rule 39 interim indications of the European Court of Human Rights is suboptimal. But he also indicated that there are hopes that the procedure might shortly be improved.
Amendment 36 tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, would allow a court or tribunal to have regard to a Rule 39 interim measure when considering whether to issue interim relief. But there is an equivalent domestic remedy in Clause 4, which means that there should be no need for the Strasbourg court to intervene. The decisions of the United Kingdom’s domestic courts to issue interim relief should be made only when they have reached their own conclusion about whether a person is at risk of “serious and irreversible harm”, and not when the European Court of Human Rights has indicated an interim measure.
“Serious and irreversible harm” is broadly the same test that the Strasbourg court applies; there is no reason why our domestic courts cannot be relied on to reach their own decision, rather than having regard to another court that may not be in possession of the most up to date information in the case. We have been clear that one of the primary purposes of the Bill is to reduce the number of legal challenges that seek to frustrate or delay relocations to Rwanda. We also need to create a deterrent and make it clear that those arriving via small boats will not be able to stay.
My noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough made a number of important points on judicial activism and the contrast between the rule of law and the rule of lawyers. Ultimately, if I may summarise his position, it comes down to an assertation of the accountability, of which we have spoken, introduced into our counsels by my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne at an early stage. That is an important consideration for the House to bear in mind.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, referenced Churchill. Again, if I may put words into my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough’s mouth, I suppose that my noble friend’s point is that these times are not Churchill’s times. He spoke of the geopolitical challenge and the nature of the difficulties that illegal migration is causing to this country.
I note that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, is not in her place. None the less—
Oh, she is. Well, while she did not press the point again, there was none the less a Green-wedge approach, which included my noble friend Lord Deben, attacking the stance of the Opposition Front Bench. Noble Lords opposite are old enough and ugly enough to defend themselves, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, did so. On the aspects of my noble friend’s submission that attacked the Government, I say to him that his point is misguided. Of course, the French Government are not the European Union; they are acting in this context as a sovereign country and not as a member of the EU.
As I said, “serious and irreversible harm” is broadly the same test that the Supreme Court applies. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, went on to raise a matter in relation to the Constitutional Reform Act. This Bill takes the same approach adopted in Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act; the Constitutional Reform Act is not referenced in the Illegal Migration Act. Under both provisions, it is for a Minister of the Crown alone, and not a court, to decide whether to comply with an interim measure. That reflects the orthodox position that international obligations act on the Government, rather than having effect on the domestic plane. It does not constitute an attack on judicial independence. There is no implied reform of Section 3 of the 2005 Act, which makes provision for the upholding of judicial independence. This provision remains intact and it is not necessary for legislation that does not bind judicial decision-making to spell that out. The judiciary’s independence is a fundamental principle of our constitution, as I think all noble Lords across the House will agree. The Government are committed to enabling judicial decisions to be made independently and impartially, whether domestically or in relevant international courts and tribunals.
I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and gratefully acknowledge his courtesy in approaching me to chase up the correspondence to which he referred the House. I apologise that the Home Office carrier pigeon failed to reach Ipswich before today. I have a copy of the letter that he sought and, with his leave, and that of the House, I will read the relevant provision.
My Lords, before the Minister leaves that point about carrier pigeons, can he say when the response from the Government to the Joint Committee’s report on this Bill will be forthcoming, given that on Monday we were told that it would be here for the proceedings today?
My Lords, the answer to the noble Lord’s question is “imminently”.
Returning to the correspondence with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I quote from that letter that bears my signature and which I trust that he will see in due course. He asked whether the Government agree that if, in compliance with Clause 5, a Minister decides not to comply with an interim measure, that would place the United Kingdom in breach of its international obligations. Clause 5 provides that it is for a Minister only to decide whether the United Kingdom will comply with an interim measure indicated by the European Court of Human Rights in proceedings relating to the intended removal of a person to the Republic of Rwanda under, or purportedly under, a provision of or made under the Immigration Acts. The Bill is in line with international law. The Government take their international obligations, including under the ECHR, very seriously, and there is nothing in the clause that requires the United Kingdom to breach its international obligations. In any event, it is not correct that a failure to comply with interim measures automatically involves a breach of international law. There are circumstances where non-compliance with an interim measure is not in breach of international law. There follows a list of further addressees whom I hope will receive the letter presently.
I am very grateful to the Minister. I recall that, of the Grand Chamber in Mamatkulov, 13 of the 14 judges in the majority thought that there were no circumstances in which a failure to comply with interim measures could be in accordance with international law. The 14th expressed the view that the Minister has just expressed. Can the Minister indicate in what cases it is lawful under international law not to comply with interim measures issued by the court?
It would be in circumstances where compliance is not possible.
Turning to Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker—
My Lords, the text that the Minister read out placed a great deal of importance on the phrase “does not require” a Minister to do something. However, it does empower a Minister to do it. Would what it empowers the Minister to do not be in breach of our international obligations?
My Lords, I now turn to Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.
My Lords, I do not wish to prolong things, but so we can be completely clear, is the Minister accepting that in circumstances where the Strasbourg court has made an order and it is possible for the United Kingdom to comply with that order, then the United Kingdom will be in breach of its obligations if the Minister decides not to comply with it? That is what I take from what he has just said.
My Lords, as I said, the Bill is in line with international law. It is not correct that a failure to comply with interim measures automatically involves a breach of international law.
Turning to Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in making a decision about whether to comply with a Rule 39 interim measure, the Government expect that the Minister will carefully consider what is required to comply with the United Kingdom’s international obligations. That decision ultimately will be dependent on the individual facts of each case. As I set out in Committee, nothing within Clause 5 prevents Ministers from consulting Cabinet colleagues or seeking advice where appropriate. Given the importance of this decision, we would expect a Minister to do so. However, this is a decision for Ministers. Amendment 37, which introduces a requirement to consult the Attorney-General, is therefore not necessary.
Furthermore, specifying in a Bill that the Attorney-General must be consulted before a decision is made undermines the convention that relates to the law officers. This is a long-standing convention whereby advice received from the law officers is not disclosed outside government. It is also the convention not to disclose whether the opinion of the law officers has been sought.
It is essential that we take bold steps to stop illegal migration and to prevent removal being frustrated by a cycle of legal challenges and rulings by the court. Clause 5 puts beyond doubt that the decision on whether to comply with a Rule 39 interim measure is for a Minister of the Crown. Given the importance of this decision, we are clear in the Bill that this decision must be taken personally by a Minister of the Crown. The Minister will be accountable—that word again, which I make no apology for stressing—to Parliament for the exercise of that personal discretion. We have made clear on several occasions, including in my rehearsal of the text to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, that the Government take their international obligations very seriously. There is nothing in this clause that requires the Government to act in breach of international law.
Can we then take it from what the Minister has said that, if the Government, after taking appropriate legal advice that they choose to take, take the view that not to comply with a Rule 39 order would in the circumstances then prevailing put the Government in breach of international law, the Government would then comply with that order?
The point is that Rule 39 interim measures are not final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, which do bind the United Kingdom. They are not binding on the United Kingdom domestic courts. When deciding whether to comply with an interim measure indicated by the Strasbourg court, due consideration will be given to the facts in the individual case and careful consideration of the United Kingdom’s international obligations.
As we heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in opening, Amendment 38, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would remove Clause 5 and disapply Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act. This would lead to a conflict between the duty to remove, established by the Illegal Migration Act, and the effect of an interim measure issued by the Strasbourg court, which in turn would create uncertainty as to which would prevail. Clause 4 includes a specific provision enabling the United Kingdom courts to grant an interim remedy preventing removal to Rwanda where they are satisfied that a person would face real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm. We have designed these measures to ensure that our courts are not out of step with the Strasbourg court.
As I have said already, there is no reason why the United Kingdom courts, which we would expect to be in possession of all the evidence and facts in the case when making such a decision, cannot be relied upon to reach their own decision rather than having regard to another court which may not have the most up-to-date information. I acknowledge that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is not pressing his amendment, and I ask the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, not to move his amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords from all sides of the House, whatever their views may have been, for contributing to this debate. The result has been a much more interesting discussion than I anticipated in my rather brief and somewhat lame introduction to my amendment.
I shall make only one point. My amendment is concerned with the position of our own courts. As Clause 5(3) stands, it prohibits our courts from having any regard to an interim measure when considering an application which relates to a decision to remove someone to Rwanda. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is quite right when he says that the current procedures under Rule 39 are suboptimal. There are various defects which we would not accept in our courts, but that does not apply to our procedures. They are perfectly open, proper and thorough. Our judges would be able to take on board all the points that have been made in the course of the discussion and weigh up one way or another whether this measure from the European Court of Human Rights should be given effect to. I am not asking that they should be bound to give effect to it but that they should be permitted to do so. It seems to be a perfectly reasonable thing to ask our courts to do.
I have considered whether I should press this to a vote, but we have to ration ourselves at this stage of our proceedings and have regard to what happens next. If this goes down to the House of Commons, no doubt it will bounce back again and so on. We have to be careful how far we press things to a Division; I would have liked to do so, but at some points one has to exercise self-restraint, which I am doing.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, has once again asked the Government to explain the apparent contradiction between provisions in this Bill and Article 2 of the Windsor Framework. We believe that this is an important issue, and I can understand why the noble Lord believes that the Government did not fully respond to him or to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, in Committee, especially given the concerns raised by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland and others on potential contradictions.
On Monday, this House strongly expressed its opinion that this Bill must be compliant with existing law. It is not unreasonable for the Minister now to fully respond to the questions of compliance. So we support the noble Lord in asking these questions, although we would not support the amendment if he were to press it to a vote.
I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, made some important points about some of the amendments that have already been passed at this Report stage, which may reduce some of the anomalies that seem to be apparent in Northern Ireland. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s response to that point.
My noble friend Lord Dubs raised the issue of Guernsey. There is another amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, about Jersey. I think that it was the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who said that the point really applies to all Crown dependencies. I would be interested to hear the noble and learned Lord’s response as to why the Crown dependencies were not consulted on provisions in this Bill.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I will respond first to Amendment 44ZA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn, which seeks to provide for the Bill’s effect in Northern Ireland, notwithstanding Section 7A of European Union (Withdrawal) Act.
The noble Lord makes his point exceptionally well, as he always does, in relation to the anxious question of the applicability of United Kingdom law to the United Kingdom. We have sought to be clear at the Dispatch Box that it is the unequivocal intention of the United Kingdom Government to apply the Bill in the same way across the United Kingdom. That is explicit in the Bill, which provides that immigration is a United Kingdom-wide matter.
I recognise that the tabling of this amendment once again reflects recent developments in the courts, of which we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, as well the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn. As I stated to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, on Monday, when she raised these issues, the Government have always been consistent about their position on Article 2 of the Windsor Framework. I can advise that, following consideration of all aspects of the judgment of the court in the case of Dillon, His Majesty’s Government are applying for an appeal to the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in relation to that matter. In any event, we remain quite clear that nothing in this Bill that provides for administrative arrangements concerning asylum and immigration policy engages Article 2.
For Article 2 to be engaged by this Bill, it would be necessary to demonstrate, first, that the alleged diminution relates to a right set out in the relevant chapter of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement on rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity; secondly, that the right was given effect in domestic law in Northern Ireland on or before 31 December 2020; and, thirdly, that it occurred as a result of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. These conditions are not all made out here and, indeed, fail at that first hurdle: they are not Belfast/Good Friday agreement rights. Accepting this amendment would undermine the Government’s position by implying that Article 2 and the rights in the Belfast agreement are far broader than is the case—that, I think, could not have been the intention of the noble Lord.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn, for informal engagement with me and my colleague earlier this evening. As the noble Lord proposed, I would be delighted to meet him and any of his colleagues prior to Third Reading of the Bill. I have given, as I say, the assurance that an appeal has been sought in the appellate court in Belfast.
Briefly, in answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, the Government are not throwing any constitutional convention to the wind here. The Government’s position is an assertion throughout of constitutional orthodoxy.
Can the noble and learned Lord indicate what the Government’s position is if the judgment stands—that is, where the leave to appeal is not given or the appeal fails?
In that event, as with any adverse decision, I think, the Government would have to reserve their right to consider the matter, but the position is as I have stated, and we are confident of success.
I turn to the points raised by the noble and learned Lord—
Before that, I know that I am not learned, but I did say some things and I have been ignored. What has happened to the response to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights? We are getting very close to finishing Report and, when I last checked, it still had not been published. I point out that the Government may have been consistent in their position on Northern Ireland, but is it possible that they have just been consistently wrong?
Before the noble and learned Lord replies, can he also respond in relation to the Constitution Committee’s report as well? Will we get the Government’s response before the end of Report?
I first beg the noble Baroness’s pardon; I had not intended to overlook her. In relation to the answers to which she and the noble and learned Lord refer, as we have said on previous occasions at the Dispatch Box, these responses will be issued imminently.
I am sorry, but that really is not good enough. We are practically at the end of Report. This was promised to us by Wednesday. It is now 7.55 pm, on Wednesday evening, and we are about to finish Report, and still we are just promised it “imminently”.
I beg the noble Baroness’s pardon. I think that we had indicated that we were trying to get it by this point. That has not been possible, and I apologise to the noble Baroness.
I turn now to the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. Home Office officials meet the Justice and Home Affairs department officials of Jersey and officials from the Isle of Man and Guernsey on a regular basis. This engagement includes detailed updates on the Illegal Migration Act and this Bill. I note the points that noble Lords have raised with regard to consultation and confirm that the Government remain committed to consulting the Crown dependencies on legislation that might impact them. Unfortunately, due to the tight timeframes leading up to the introduction of the Bill, the Home Office was unable to engage in advance. However, as I have set out, I know that engagements have taken place since introduction.
Although it may seem unlikely, if, down the line, the United Kingdom-Rwanda treaty were to be extended to the Crown dependencies without the permissive extent clauses in this legislation—to which the noble Lord, Lord German, referred in his contribution—relocations from Jersey to Rwanda would not be able to take place, and it would be considerably harder to unpick this if the PEC is removed.
It is important to note that inclusion of a PEC in a Bill does not constitute legislating for the Crown dependencies, nor does it require any Crown dependency or the United Kingdom to do anything. Rather, it is a legislative tool that enables the United Kingdom’s provisions to be extended to the Crown dependencies when either a Crown dependency or, in extremis, the United Kingdom thinks necessary. There is no obligation to activate a PEC, but the enabling power remains in reserve.
I thank the Minister for the reply—which was that “We were in such a hurry that we didn’t have time to follow our own rules”—but the question I asked him was what advice officials gave him, given that the requirement not to put a permissive extent clause in this Bill is in fact within the guidance issued to the Home Office, and this is the Government’s own internal rule for it. Somebody must have said something at this point. Can the Minister tell me why the officials’ decision was to override their internal rules?
I regret to say that I am not privy to that information directly. I hear the point that the noble Lord raises, and, if he will permit, I will write to him to set out in appropriate detail an answer to the point that he makes.
I am afraid that we are still left with a very unclear position as regards Jersey, and possibly also the other Crown dependencies. Where does this leave us? Jersey has made it clear that it does not consent to the permissive extent clause. Where does that leave us? It is a bit of a mess. Should not the Government bring forward something to tidy this up at Third Reading?
I shall make sure that the noble Lord’s point is given consideration before Third Reading.
For the reasons that I have sought to set out, I would encourage the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, to withdraw his amendment at this stage.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response to the debate and to everyone who has taken part. My purpose in bringing this amendment is, again, to shed light on the reality of where Northern Ireland in particular stands. I hear what he said about the appeal and what he said about meeting us before Third Reading; I would like to explore these matters in greater detail. We have heard the reassertion of the original assertion, which might have been understandable before the first case, or maybe even after the first case, but after three court cases it is beginning to wear a little thin. However, I look forward to meeting him and discussing it further. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment standing in my name.
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 62 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker would ensure that a Minister of the Crown making a decision on an interim injunction consults the Attorney-General. This would ensure that, before making a decision on compliance with any interim measures issued by the ECHR for the purpose of blocking a person’s removal to Rwanda, the relevant Minister consults the Attorney-General, creating an additional safeguard. The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, introduced his speech by saying he was not going to be arrogant or impudent, so I will adopt the same approach in my speech, which will be brief. I am not going to go into the legal arguments—many eminent lawyers have done that—but I am going to go into the politics and address what seems to me to be the question that has been left hanging in the air.
Yesterday morning, I watched the television and Mr Michael Tomlinson, the Illegal Migration Minister, was on our screens and he was absolutely explicit: he said that the flights will take off as soon as the Bill becomes an Act and the treaty comes into force. He said they will be going pretty much immediately. There was no question of the niceties of Rule 39 and all the other things we have been talking about; the subject simply did not come up. That is the politics of it: when the Bill becomes an Act, the treaty comes into force and those flights will be taking off.
My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer went into how the decision on Rule 39 might be made. The question he, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, asked, was, would it be subject to judicial review? To me, that is the question hanging in the air, and I look forward to the Minister’s answer, because as far as I can see it will be for the Attorney-General to make that decision, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and she will be doing that as a law officer. Today’s Daily Telegraph said—I do not know how it knows this—that when Mr Tomlinson was Solicitor-General, he had written legal advice saying that it would be illegal to go against Rule 39. I know it is private advice; nevertheless, that was in today’s Daily Telegraph.
So, there are two issues. First, the Illegal Migration Minister was explicit about the flights taking off on the conclusion of proceedings on the Bill. Secondly, what is the status of judicial review of any Rule 39 decision?
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the Committee for an exceptionally lively, informed and learned debate on this matter. The consideration of obligations to obtemper interim measures—interim indications from the European Court of Human Rights—seemed to gravitate around two poles. On one hand we had the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lords, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard and Lord Hannay of Chiswick, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and others. On the other hand, my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne spoke powerfully, my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough added his weight, and we heard supportive contributions from my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, who spoke from the Cross Benches offering, if I may say so, a qualified view as to the obligation to obtemper any such interim measures.
The scheme of the Bill is to enact Clause 5 to put beyond doubt that the decision about whether to comply with an interim measure, in proceedings relating to the intended removal of a person to the Republic of Rwanda under, or purportedly under, a provision of or made under the Immigration Act, is in the hands of a Minister of the Crown. The requirement for a Minister of the Crown is to exercise the decision personally, which reflects the seriousness of the decision to be taken.
Why, then, does the Victims and Prisoners Bill, as presented by the Government, require the Secretary of State to consult the Attorney-General before amending the victims’ code, if there is this long-standing convention that the Government are indivisible and the Attorney-General will always be consulted on important matters? Also, why is this significant decision potentially to ignore interim relief from the Strasbourg court for Ministers and not Parliament, given that the Government’s central argument in this Bill is about parliamentary sovereignty?
I think the answer to the first point is that the Victims and Prisoners Bill relates to victims, a matter on which the Attorney-General, exercising her supervision over aspects of the criminal legal system, would be in a good position to answer. That distinguishes it from this measure. However, that is only my instinctive answer. So as not to mislead the Committee, if the noble Baroness is content then I will write to her on the topic. I am grateful for her nod of agreement. As to whether this should be for Parliament as opposed to the Executive, in the form of the Minister, I can only repeat that the scheme of the Bill and the Government’s intention is that this decision should lie with the Minister responsible.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, made two points, the second of which echoed the question anent judicial review posed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. Our position is that the decision on the part of a Minister to comply with an interim measure is not amenable to judicial review. His other question related to the views expressed by my honourable friend in the other place the Minister for Immigration about flights taking off as soon as the Bill passes. While this Committee is engaged in detailed legal scrutiny, my honourable friend is speaking in public about the Bill’s policy: to see to it that these flights take off as quickly as possible and the deterrent effect of which my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom and I have spoken should take effect.
Why is it not susceptible to judicial review? Ouster of the courts normally involves at least a provision in a Bill. There is no such provision here. Ousting the courts by a statement from the Dispatch Box in the House of Lords is very unusual.
My Lords, I am not in a position to go into detailed discussion on this point, but I have given the Government’s position on the amenability of judicial review in relation to these decisions.
Could the Minister indicate when he might be in a position to debate it?
I undertake to correspond with the noble and learned Lord on that.
Amendments 58, 60 and 61 would bind the United Kingdom Government, preventing a Minister of the Crown or discouraging domestic courts from considering the individual facts of the case or the determination of the domestic courts as to whether a person would face a risk of serious and irreversible harm if returned to Rwanda.
The amendments would also require the United Kingdom courts to take account of an interim measure issued by the Strasbourg court, potentially supplementing the ECHR’s decision, rather than making their own independent finding about whether a person would face a real risk of serious and irreversible harm.
Finally, the disapplication of Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act would lead to a conflict between the duty to remove established by the Act and the effect of an interim measure issued by the Strasbourg court. That would create uncertainty as to which will prevail.
Clause 4 includes a specific provision enabling the United Kingdom courts to grant an interim remedy preventing removal to Rwanda where it is satisfied that a person would face a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm. Those measures have been designed to ensure that our courts are not out of step with the Strasbourg court; the serious and irreversible harm test is broadly the same that the Strasbourg court applies. Clause 4 would have our courts apply the same test as the Strasbourg court when considering the position of a person who might be sent to Rwanda. There is no reason why the United Kingdom courts, which we would expect to be in possession of all the evidence and facts in the case when making such a decision, cannot be relied upon to reach their own decision rather than being required to have regard to another court which may not have complete information on the case.
The Government submit that these amendments risk hampering or thwarting our efforts to stop the boats and to remove people with no right to remain in the United Kingdom.
There have been references from various quarters about the absence of my noble friend Lord Hailsham today. I indicate to the Committee that he was courteous enough to contact me directly and let me know what the position was. He has tabled Amendment 63, which relates to rules governing Rule 39 procedures. In support of that, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was the first to make inquiries of the Government as to what the position is in relation to the changes in the procedures. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who also discussed this. On 13 November 2023, the Strasbourg Court announced proposed amendments to its rules and practice concerning interim measures, including the naming of judges who make the decisions on interim measure requests, interim measures communicated as formal decisions, considering state representations before interim measures are indicated, and parties being able to request reconsideration of an interim measure.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, referred to his observations at Second Reading, expressed again today, concerning the differences between procedures when interim remedies are sought in our domestic courts and the case that is hitherto applied in the European court. I do not intend to repeat in any detail the points the noble Lord made. The point was that in relation to that case, as the noble Lord described, there was what amounted to a breach of natural justice, as it would be identified in a domestic court, as the United Kingdom was unable to put its case. As the noble Lord pointed out, in the domestic sphere, a person is able to seek and be granted an interim remedy.
I am grateful that the Minister was kind enough to inform the Committee about the November reforms from the Strasbourg court, so surely all these natural justice concerns have now been met.
I gave the noble Baroness a list of the recommendations, or the proposed amendments to the rules, but I do not see them as answering all of the concerns which the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, expressed, and with which I agree. The question of the ability to go to court directly after an indication has been made, or an interim interdict or injunction in our jurisdictions has been granted, and to argue the point with the court, does not form part of the reforms to the direct ability to challenge which the Strasbourg court has announced.
My Lords, ultimately the matter for the Committee to take into account—I appreciate that I am not giving the noble Lord an answer—is where this leaves our domestic obligations, not our international ones.
Surely it is relevant to this Committee, if we are being invited to pass Clause 5 into law, to know whether or not, in the Government’s view, it will enable or facilitate a breach of international law by a Minister acting in reliance on it. The Minister does not seem to be able to tell us whether he takes that view or not. I read the human rights memorandum as taking the orthodox view that there is a breach of our international obligations when interim measures are disregarded by a Minister. Is the Minister telling us that the position has changed since that memorandum was drafted?
My Lords, in addressing the Committee, I outlined that the position in relation to international measures is that they must be incorporated into domestic law before they take on binding character for our domestic courts.
I do not believe there is any dispute in this Committee about the proposition that the Minister has just delivered himself of. However, we are not talking about domestic law; we are talking about international law. If the Minister cannot answer the question now, will he add it to what is, I am afraid, the lengthy list of questions on which he has kindly offered to write to the Committee in due course?
My Lords, in view of the hour and the information which I have to hand, and given the stark terms in which the noble Lord expresses himself, that might perhaps be the better course.
Is it not the case that the answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is that it depends? We know from the Policy Exchange paper and many other sources that there have been many cases where Rule 39 indications have not been complied with by states parties, including France, Italy, Albania and Slovakia. It all depends on the circumstances, does it not?
I am grateful to my noble friend but the answer “it depends” renders the matter, to a certain extent, even more complicated and emphasises the number of considerations that I will have to take into account in writing to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. While I am grateful to my noble friend for his contribution, my undertaking to write to the noble Lord remains in place.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this predominantly technical debate on the view of the UK’s legal position if it were to ignore an interim measure from the European Court of Human Rights. The final intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the Minister’s answer leave me just as confused as when we started the debate. It reminds me why, after I graduated 40 years ago, when I was offered the chance of becoming an NHS manager or going to law school, I chose to become an NHS manager. That was hard enough.
Clearly, noble and noble and learned Lords have raised several issues, but because of the lateness of the hour, I will not repeat them all. There is the issue of judicial review, which is quite bizarre. If a Minister’s sole decision on such an important issue cannot be judicially reviewed, particularly if the position is completely irrational, I think most noble Lords would agree that it would be easy for international law to be broken and for the individual to have no recourse even to our own domestic courts. As many noble Lords have said, the perverseness of Clause 5 as it stands is that it is preposterous that even our own domestic courts are ruled out from making any interim judgments. The Minister has not been able to give any convincing answer as to why that is.
A number of noble and noble and learned Lords asked this question in different ways, which the Minister, in answering, still ignored: if an interim decision is of such a serious nature, why would a Minister of the Crown wish to ignore it? It is hard to conceive why a Minister would wish to do that, particularly if there is no judicial review. It makes the individual completely reliant on a rational Minister making a decision devoid of the policy of the Government, which is absolutely central to stop the boats. It gets the Minister in a political and legal position that is highly suspect both for the individual on the receiving end of the decision and for the Minister having to make it. I am absolutely convinced of that, based on the views that have been raised.
Of all those views raised, the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about the judgment and Articles 32 and 34 is one that I felt was definitive, as, I think, did many other noble Lords. However, the Government refused to accept that and continue to insist that Clause 5 is not in breach of international law and is not in any way a dilution of the separation of powers. I believe that this issue will come back on Report, and quite rightly so. Depending on what the Government say, I am sure that it will be a bone of contention for the House. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, this is a very small amendment. I tabled this amendment because I read that, according to what the Home Secretary said, it will be possible for people who have sought or been given asylum in Rwanda to be returned to this country if they are guilty of a serious offence.
Can the Minister say whether the Government have any idea of the numbers that they expect to be returned, or is it just a small number, as the Home Secretary said? What is the definition of a serious crime that would require somebody to be returned to the UK from Rwanda? Can we refuse somebody who is in Rwanda and the Rwanda Government are seeking to return on the basis that they have been guilty of a serious crime? Can the UK Government refuse to accept them back from Rwanda, if that is the case? If they are successfully returned to the UK from Rwanda because of the serious crime that they have committed, or the national security threat that they pose, what is their status when they are back in the UK? If we chose to do so, would we be able to deport them to another country?
This is a probing amendment; I was just curious, when I heard the Home Secretary talking about the possibility of criminals who had been deported to Rwanda being returned to the UK. It would be helpful to have a few answers to those questions. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for Amendment 68, but I cannot support its addition to the Bill. We do not consider such a change necessary, as individuals would be returned from Rwanda only in extremely limited circumstances, which we have agreed to in this legally binding treaty.
The first question that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, posed was to ask the Government again for numbers, as he had in the previous amendment. I do not think that any attempt to estimate likely numbers of people committing serious crimes is something that the Government could be expected to provide. If somebody who has been relocated to Rwanda commits a very serious crime, there is a chance that they could have their status revoked. In these limited circumstances, they may be removed to the United Kingdom, but only after they have served any prison sentence in Rwanda. This will ensure the non-refoulement element of the treaty will not be breached.
Could the Minister define the prison sentence? Is it any prison sentence, or is it a sentence of two, four or five years?
The provision in the treaty is reserved for the most serious crimes—one punishable by five years or more imprisonment.
The amendment would necessitate, in the rare event of such returns to the United Kingdom, parliamentary consideration as to whether the Rwanda treaty should be suspended. However, it does not follow that, because an individual is returned from Rwanda to the United Kingdom because of serious criminality, the whole treaty is called into question. The return of individuals to the United Kingdom, including in these circumstances, is envisaged expressly by the treaty. It would be an example of the treaty functioning as it should, not a reason for its suspension.
The Minister quite rightly says that it is in the treaty—under Article 11, I assume. But that article says that the person will come back to the United Kingdom only with the relocated individual’s consent. If that consent is not given, what happens in this instance?
I will have to revert to the noble Lord with an answer to that question, which is a hypothetical situation I had not considered.
The Government have set out the expense caused to the British taxpayer of billions of pounds in relation to illegal migration. As my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom has pointed out on more than one occasion, our primary concern is the dreadful cost in life that it is inflicting. That is why we need bold and novel solutions towards ending it. Deterrence is a key element of the Rwanda partnership. Ultimately, we need to stop people making dangerous and illegal journeys across the channel. It is vital that we can show those who enter the United Kingdom illegally that they will not be permitted to remain here, thus breaking the model of the people smugglers and helping us to put an end to their vile trade. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Whitaker, who reminded us of the importance of the law in protecting the rights of individuals against states. It is also a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and yet another speech in which he said that the debates and discussions on these groups of amendments bring us to fundamental principles of democracy, including the rights of law, freedom of speech and the separation of powers. Debating and discussing these in the context of the Bill is an important reminder of the power and responsibilities of this Chamber.
I am pleased to support the amendments of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, on reasserting the role of the domestic courts. To the noble and learned Baroness and my noble friend I say that it shows what a strange world we live in that, when the current Minister for Illegal Migration was Solicitor-General, he is reported to have told the Government that ignoring interim relief would put us in breach of the ECHR and that they should act with great trepidation. Now he is no longer Solicitor-General but is responsible for illegal migration, and he seems to have forgotten the advice he gave the Government. He could do with reading his own advice. All this, of course, is “so we are told”.
We are also told that the Attorney-General has had serious worries about this, but of course nobody can know about that because legal advice is always kept secret. Although he is the Advocate-General for Scotland, the Minister is not acting in a legal capacity but as a Justice Minister of some sort, and no doubt he will have read the comments made in the other place by various Members about how the Bill works with respect to the interaction with the Scottish judicial system. This is a parallel universe in which we exist, but, none the less, these are all extremely important amendments.
In speaking to my Amendment 48, I wish to highlight a particular aspect that goes alongside Amendment 39 and the others in my noble friend’s name. As a barrack-room lawyer, I take on board the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, with respect to my inadequate amendment and the fact that it does not include interim relief. I apologise profusely for that oversight. In due course, it may return on Report with interim relief.
On a serious point, the Supreme Court said that the main reason it found Rwanda not to be a safe country in general was the risk of refoulement. The Government have gone to great length, in the treaty and in other things they have published, to say that they have dealt with all the concerns the Supreme Court had—although we note that, in its report published a few days ago, the JCHR continues to assert that there are problems that need to be considered.
I draw attention to Clause 4, which allows individuals who have compelling reasons to argue against their deportation under this Bill and the Illegal Migration Act. I remind noble Lords that even this minor concession of allowing individuals to do so, rather than debating the general safety of Rwanda, was regarded as a step too far by many in the Conservative Party and the Government.
My amendment seeks to delete Clause 4(2). I am grateful for the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, although he is not in his place, and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. The particular aspect I draw noble Lords’ attention to is that, although an individual can present compelling circumstances, and try to persuade the Government that this Bill should not apply to them and that they should not be deported to Rwanda, it does not allow them to do so if they say that they should not be sent there as there are reasons why they might be refouled—in other words, sent to a third country.
Under Clause 4(2), they are prohibited from arguing that in the courts. Subsection (2) says this is so
“to the extent that it relates to the issue of whether the Republic of Rwanda will or may remove or send the person in question to another State in contravention of … its international obligations”.
It includes the word “will”. An individual cannot even argue that they “will” be sent to another country, never mind that they “may” be—the Government included the word “will”. I find that extraordinary; it is almost that an individual cannot argue in a court, as a matter of fact, that they will be refouled. They cannot say, “I have compelling evidence that I will be sent to a third country”. It is extraordinary that legislation would say that you cannot as an induvial—let alone the point about general safety made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—argue in a court that you will be refouled. The court could dismiss such an argument, of course, but it would be up to the court—that is the whole point of the courts.
I take the point about interim relief, but I want justification from the Government as to why an individual cannot take that argument to a court, an immigration officer or the Secretary of State. The Home Secretary, or an immigration officer, cannot consider an individual saying to them, “I will be refouled if I am sent to Rwanda”. How on earth is that consistent with the principles of democracy of this country, of which we are all so proud? That is why I tabled the amendment, and I would like to hear the Government’s justification.
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to an interesting debate on this important point.
Clause 4 provides that a Home Office decision-maker, or a court or tribunal, can consider a claim that Rwanda is unsafe only
“based on compelling evidence relating specifically to the person’s individual circumstances”.
Subsection (2) prevents a decision-maker or the courts considering any claim where it relates to whether Rwanda
“will or may remove or send the person in question to another State in contravention of any of its international obligations”.
Where the duty to remove under the Illegal Migration Act does not apply, subsections (3) and (4) prevent the courts granting interim relief unless that person can show that they would face
“a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm”
if they were removed to Rwanda. This is the same threshold that can give rise to a suspensive claim based on serious and irreversible harm under the Illegal Migration Act. Subsection (5) provides that the consideration of “serious and irreversible harm” will be in line with the definition set out in the Illegal Migration Act, with any necessary modifications. Any allegation relating to onward removal from Rwanda is not an example of something capable of constituting serious and irreversible harm, as the treaty ensures that asylum seekers relocated to Rwanda under the partnership are not at risk of being returned to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened.
Regarding the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond, spoke to in opening, I remind noble Lords that the evidence pack published alongside the Bill details the evidence the United Kingdom Government have used to assess the safety of Rwanda. It concludes that, alongside the treaty, Rwanda is safe for the purposes of asylum processing, and the policy statement outlines the key findings. As experts on the bilateral relationship between the United Kingdom and Rwanda and its development over the past 30 years, FCDO officials based in the relevant geographic and thematic departments, working closely with colleagues in the British high commission in Kigali, have liaised with the Home Office throughout the production of the policy statement.
As my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom and I set out in earlier debates, the United Kingdom Government and the Government of Rwanda have agreed and begun to implement assurances and commitments to strengthen Rwanda’s asylum system. These assurances and commitments provide clear evidence of the Government of Rwanda’s ability to fulfil their obligations generally and specifically to ensure that relocated individuals face no risk of refoulement. In answer to the points raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond, which were adopted by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester, and by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, from the Opposition Front Bench, among others, the position is that a person cannot argue this fundamentally academic point over a long period of time, occupying court resources. It is a point rendered academic because of the provision of the treaty governing the Bill.
I am grateful to the Minister for stating clearly that the Government of Rwanda have begun putting the safeguards in place. That is consistent with what he said earlier in Committee—that the Government of Rwanda are moving towards putting safeguards in place—but he accepted that Rwanda will be a safe country only when those are place, which may be after Royal Assent. Will an applicant be able to argue, even after Royal Assent, that Rwanda is not safe until the measures that are being moved towards are put in place?
My Lords, on the passing of the Bill, the Act will decree that Rwanda is safe. Just because work is being done to render a place safer it does not make it unsafe.
The Minister just said that Rwanda is becoming safer, but in his earlier comments he said that it has begun to put measures in place, and he has previously confirmed to me that until they are in place, it cannot be determined that Rwanda is safe. The Bill will decree that it is safe before the measures are in place so that it is safe. Surely someone would be able to argue in a court that it is not safe until those measures are in place. That is what the Minister just said.
My Lords, what I said was that on the passing of the Bill, Rwanda is safe. What I say is that it is—
I did not. I said that just because safeguards have not yet been fully put in place, it does not mean, as a result, that Rwanda cannot be deemed safe.
If Rwanda is not safe now, but it will be safe, then the period between now and the point at which it will be safe must be one in which somebody could argue that it is not safe, otherwise it does not mean anything. My noble and learned friend has himself said that it is not safe now but will become safe. I am not one who thinks that we cannot have an extraterritorial arrangement, but I do not understand the logic that says that it is not safe now, it will be safe, but you cannot appeal to the courts in between those times otherwise it is just academic. This is a use of “academic” that I do not really understand.
I reiterate my previous answer: the fact that further work is being done does not mean that the safety or otherwise of a place is conditional on the completion of that further work.
The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, cited the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord McDonald of Salford, concerning a journalist. She is quite correct: I did not address that specifically when I spoke earlier. The question was not pressed on me subsequently, but given that the noble Baroness has returned to it, I will look into the matter with officials and correspond.
I have one final point for the Minister. If this legislation decrees on Royal Assent that Rwanda is a safe country, what is the point of having the safeguards he has mentioned?
My Lords, any work being done to improve a place is desirable of itself.
Does the Minister still stand by the assurance from the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, that nobody will be deported to Rwanda until the monitoring committee is up and running? He is talking as though people will start to be deported the moment this Bill passes, which is not what the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, led us to believe.
My noble friend Lord Sharpe confirmed to me a moment ago that the monitoring committee is already operational; it is up and running.
My Lords, the monitoring committee consists of four people, two of whom are apparently in the pay of the Rwandan Government. Can the Minister reassure us that he thinks it will be completely unbiased?
My Lords, in the first instance, the monitoring committee consists of not four but eight people. If I might express the words of my noble friend sitting next to me on the Front Bench, I can give that assurance.
My noble friend Lord Deben quoted John Donne’s line that
“No man is an island, entire of itself”.
I think in that piece of prose, which is one of his sermons, Donne also says the familiar passage about asking not for whom the bell tolls; “it tolls for thee”. None the less, while accepting everything of a universalist nature that my noble friend says about our obligations one to another as humans, I have to say that the Government’s scope for operation is restricted. We can operate within our powers and jurisdiction, must legislate to protect our borders, and cannot seek to exceed our powers.
Both the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, raised the point that the progress and content of this legislation are under scrutiny. His Majesty’s Government fully accept that scrutiny and appreciate that it is timely and important because of the scale of the problem that we face. It is a problem faced across all sorts of different countries, and the Government are undertaking to address it by this legislation.
The Minister may be about to speak on this but I did ask a specific question as to the Government’s response to the absolutely damning statement from the UN commissioner for human rights, which was published today and which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, also quoted. It talked about
“drastically stripping back the courts’ ability to scrutinise removal decisions”
and
“a serious blow to human rights”.
This is serious stuff. I would like to know the Government’s response.
The noble Baroness indeed anticipated me as I was turning to that point. As she says, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, had touched on that. I have the statement by the United Nations human rights chief. The Government repudiate the charges that he places when he says:
“The combined effects of this Bill, attempting to shield Government action from standard legal scrutiny, directly undercut basic human rights principles”.
We disagree with that.
Will the Minister answer a very simple question? Did the United Kingdom vote for the High Commissioner for Human Rights to take his post? If so, by what right does it now repudiate his views?
Whether or not we as a country voted for him to take his place does not exclude the possibility of disagreement with anything that any official, be he ever so high, may have to say.
I am encouraged by the noble and learned Lord’s statement that the monitoring committee is up and running. He will know that the international treaties committee of this House said that
“the implementation of the Treaty requires not just the adoption of new laws, systems and procedures, but also the recruitment and training of personnel. For example, the Monitoring Committee has to recruit a support team”.
Are we to take it that the Minister is saying the committee has indeed already recruited a support team? If not, it is very difficult to see how it could be described as “up and running”.
That is the information given to me, but I am happy to look into the matter to reassure the noble and learned Lord.
Is it that it has recruited a support team, or that it is up and running?
The point I am making is that I have been told the body is up and running. That does not touch on the matter of the recruitment of a support team, which is the basis of the noble and learned Lord’s supplementary question.
From the Opposition Front Bench, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, touched on advice said to have been given by the former Solicitor-General and by the Attorney-General. I think he is aware—I have touched on it from the Dispatch Box at earlier stages—of the existence of the law officers’ convention. I will return to it again in a later group, but the essence of that convention is not only that the content of advice given is confidential but also that it is confidential that advice has even been sought. The reason for that, accepted by Governments of every stripe over the years, is to assist with the passage of decision-making and the consideration of legal matters that touch on legislation to be passed. As I said, if I may, I will revert to that in consideration of a later amendment.
The assurances and commitments that the Government have received, together with the treaty and conclusions from the FCDO experts reflected throughout the policy statement, allow his Majesty’s Government to state with confidence that the Supreme Court’s concerns have been addressed and that Rwanda is safe. As the point has been taken in this debate, albeit in passing, I stress once again that this is a matter not of overturning the findings of the United Kingdom Supreme Court but rather of acting on them.
The Minister is being generous in giving way, but what he just said contradicts what he said previously in Committee. At col. 70 of 12 February’s Official Report, I asked about the mechanisms for safeguards. It had been the Government’s position—until today, it seems—that the requirements of the Supreme Court would be met by the implementation of the treaty, which includes the safeguards within it. These include the appeals mechanism and the training and capacity-building. They have to be in place. If they are not in place, the treaty is not operative. Progress is being made towards them, as the Minister said, but he has just said that the Government’s view is that the requirements of the Supreme Court have been met. These comments are contradictory. This is important because, when I asked,
“can the Minister at the Dispatch Box reconfirm that position: that no individual will be relocated before the safeguards—including the appeals mechanism, the training and the capacity-building—are in place?”,
the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, responded:
“I can answer the first part of the noble Lord’s question in the affirmative”.—[Official Report, 12/2/24; col. 70.]
Is that still the case, or did he mislead the House?
The point I was making was in answer to the point raised earlier in the debate by noble Lords, who were characterising the Government’s actions as going back on, or overturning, the Supreme Court’s decision. As I said, the point is that the terms of the Bill and the treaty are a response to the Supreme Court’s decision.
But it is absolutely clear from the policy statement, and from answers that the Home Secretary gave to the international treaties committee of our House, that the position is not complete in Rwanda until it implements new Rwandan asylum legislation, which has not yet been passed. The Home Secretary was specifically asked when that legislation would be passed by Rwanda, and he was unable to give a timeframe. For the noble and learned Lord to say that Rwanda is now safe, when even the Home Secretary accepts that this law has yet to be introduced in Rwanda, seems to completely contradict the Government’s position. I ask him to reconsider the answer to the question: are the Government saying that Rwanda is now safe, without that legislation in Rwanda?
I think the terms of Article 9 of the treaty are clear. The Act comes into force the day that the treaty comes into force. As to the specific Rwandan legislation to which the noble and learned Lord refers, I am not able to give a categorical answer from the Dispatch Box.
Will the Minister answer a couple of rather simple questions? Has he read the Rwandan legislation? Does he believe it is in conformity with the treaty?
The answer to the former is that it does not fall to me to read the Rwandan legislation; but, given that decisions are taken collectively by the Government, I can answer the noble Lord’s second question in the affirmative.
The Advocate-General for Scotland may not be the right person to express a view in relation to Rwandan legislation, but I assume that somebody in the Government has seen a draft of this legislation. Could he indicate who that is and what that person’s opinion is?
My Lords, I will look into that. Presumably, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office will take this matter under its wing. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, refers to the Home Office. We will look into that and provide the noble and learned Lord with an answer.
Could the Minister confirm, for the benefit of all of us, that the Home Office team in charge of the Bill has not seen the Rwandan legislation and has no idea who has?
My Lords, what I have said was that I have not seen the Home Office legislation. I have not been called upon to review it.
My Lords, I would be keen to know what is the basis for the noble and learned Lord’s assertion that Rwanda is safe, which he is putting forward on behalf of the Government.
My Lords, it has been a matter that has been canvassed exhaustively already, but it flows from the treaty which the Rwandan Government and His Majesty’s Government have entered into.
Could the Minister tell us whether the draft Rwandan law exists?
My Lords, again, if the noble Lord is asserting that the relevant Rwandan legislation is a figment of the imagination of the Rwandan Government or His Majesty’s Government, I am not quite sure I can answer that. However, the point is that the treaty and the work going on—which has already been substantially completed—between the British Government and that of Rwanda must indicate that there is such a piece of legislation.
The assurance and commitments to which I have referred, given to and drawing upon the conclusions made by FCDO experts, reflected throughout the policy statement, allow us to state with confidence that the concerns of the Supreme Court have been addressed and that, I repeat, Rwanda is safe. We do not, therefore, consider it necessary to make the proposed changes to Clause 4 to permit decision-makers or courts and tribunals to consider claims or grant interim relief on the basis of Rwanda’s safety generally or that Rwanda will or may remove persons to another state in contravention of its international obligations. That is contrary to the whole purpose of the Bill. The assurances we have negotiated in a legally binding treaty with Rwanda address the concerns of the Supreme Court and make detailed provision for the treatment of relocated individuals in Rwanda, ensuring they will be offered safety and protection with—it must be emphasised—no risk of refoulement.
I turn to Amendment 48, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. If I may build on a point I have been making, the treaty makes clear that Rwanda will not remove any individual relocated there to another country, except the United Kingdom in very limited circumstances. Article 10(3) of the UK-Rwanda treaty sets out explicitly that no relocated individual shall be removed from Rwanda except to United Kingdom in accordance with Article 11(1). Annexe B of the treaty also sets out the claims process for relocated individuals and how they will be treated. Part 3.3.2 of Annexe B sets out clearly that members of the first-instance body, who will make decisions on asylum and humanitarian protection claims,
“shall make decisions impartially, solely on the basis of evidence before them and by reference to the provisions and principles of the Refugee Convention and humanitarian protection law”.
If there is no risk of refoulement because of all those processes, all the legislation and all the things the Minister has just read out, in view of his earlier answers will he confirm that all of that is in place now? Or is it due to be in place? And if it is due to be in place, when will that be? How long into the future will all of the various points that the Minister has read out be in place? At the moment, as it stands under the Bill, I cannot go to the Home Secretary or to any immigration official and say I might be refouled, because I will not be allowed to under the Bill. And yet the Minister cannot tell us that all of the processes to protect me from refoulement are in place. So, what am I supposed to do if I am at risk of refoulement?
If the noble Lord were to be threatened with refoulement, it could only happen to him once the Bill and the treaty were in place. A person could not be relocated to Rwanda until the Bill and the treaty are in place, and once the Bill and treaty are in place, there is no risk of refoulement.
I am very concerned with what the Minister has literally just told us. The Minister has just said that, once this Bill has passed, there is no risk of refoulement. Article 10 of the treaty says:
“The Parties shall cooperate to agree an effective system for ensuring that removal contrary to this obligation does not occur”.
Those are not consistent. The effective system has to be in place, because that is what the treaty says; the effective system is not the passage of this Bill. So can the Minister now correct the record?
My Lords, the Government are working with the Government of Rwanda to implement new protections to the Rwandan asylum system, including the introduction of new legislation. I am reverting to a point that was taken earlier, but I give the same answer that I gave to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. Protections offered by the treaty will prevent refoulement from Rwanda to elsewhere.
I am grateful to the Minister, who has been very patient with so many concerned Members of the Committee, but everything that he says very honestly in relation to each question suggests that the safeguards are not yet in place. Therefore, Rwanda is not yet safe, because that was the whole point of the treaty: to offer additional protections and to attempt to assuage the concerns of the Supreme Court. How can all of this be academic? This is not a bathroom that has been plumbed in and we are now just painting the tiles; we do not have the plumbing yet.
My Lords, the treaty guarantees that anyone relocated to Rwanda will be given safety and support and will not be returned to a country where their life or freedom will be threatened. That directly addresses the Supreme Court’s concerns about refoulement. As to the matter of the use I made of the word “academic”, I was using that in answer to points raised by noble Lords in relation to why the Bill bars the taking of general points of academic interest, which was referring to a point once the Bill and the treaty are in place. Once they are in place, there is no possibility of refoulement from Rwanda without contravention of an international instrument. The point is that, at that stage, argument before the domestic courts would be academic. I give way to the noble Lord.
I do not think that the Minister has taken on board what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked him. Article 10(3), which is the provision in the treaty that allows relocation only back to the UK, contains the following phrase:
“The Parties—”
that is, Rwanda and the UK,
“shall cooperate to agree an effective system for ensuring that removal contrary to this obligation—"
the obligation being to remove only to the UK—
“does not occur”.
The parties have not yet agreed that. The parties, the UK and Rwanda, therefore accept that, currently, there is not in place an effective system for ensuring that removal contrary to the obligation only to remove to the UK exists. Could the Minister please explain to the Committee how he can possibly say that, at the moment, under the agreement—that is the overarching agreement, not the agreement to agree an effective system for ensuring non-refoulement—such safeguards currently exist? We need an explanation for that.
My Lords, the point is that the treaty, while it has not been ratified, is a matter of agreement. I spoke about the work—
Further to the Minister’s answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, does the system—the effective system for ensuring that removal contrary to the obligation does not occur—exist?
My Lords, I am not fully clear that I follow the import of the question that the noble Lord poses. If he will bear with me, I am going to defer answering that point and will do so with him in writing.
Forgive me: I am just trying to understand the Minister’s position on the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and pursued by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. The treaty requires the parties to set up a system—it says they shall agree a system. The Minister is saying that Rwanda is safe and implying that that system has been set up, or at least has been agreed, and will come into force the moment the treaty is ratified. Is that the case?
The system has been agreed and will come into place along with the treaty.
Could the Minister then tell us what that system is? When will the House see that system? It would help us to judge how real the remaining risk of removal to a third country is if we could see the system that has apparently been created to ensure that that risk does not come to fruition.
My Lords, I will expand on the matter in the correspondence to which I referred the noble Lord.
I will go into more detail about the work that has been and is being conducted between Rwandan and British officials. Officials from the UK and Rwanda have worked closely together to strengthen Rwanda’s asylum system. We have already developed and commenced operational training for Rwandan asylum decision-makers and strengthened procedural oversight of the MEDP and asylum processes.
In November 2023, technical experts from the Home Office, working with the Institute of Legal Practice and Development, delivered a training course aimed at asylum decision-makers in Rwanda. It focused on applying refugee law in asylum interviews and decision-making, and on best practice in assessing credibility and utilising country-of-origin information.
Furthermore, as set out in paragraph 14.1.15 of the published country information note on Rwanda’s asylum system, once the treaty is ratified there are provisions for Rwanda to move to a case-worker model when deciding asylum claims. Under that model, for the first six months Rwanda’s decision-making body will consider advice from a seconded independent expert prior to making any decision in relation to a claim.
Under CRaG, the scrutiny period for the treaty has now been concluded, so, for clarification, when will the UK ratify the treaty?
That is a decision not for me to take. It will be taken by the Government collectively. I am not in a position to give a date to the noble Lord, if he was asking me to give one. In the circumstances, I cannot supply him with any further information.
The Minister just referred to the independent experts who are going to help the Rwandans in relation to their processing of claimants. Our International Agreements Committee said those independent experts have yet to be appointed. Could he give the House an indication of how the appointment process is going? How many have been appointed, and when?
My Lords, that is a matter of detail upon which I will have to correspond with the noble and learned Lord.
The Government of Rwanda are committed to this partnership. Like the UK, they are a signatory to the refugee convention and have an international obligation to provide protection to those who are entitled to it. The Bill is predicated on the compliance by both Rwanda and the UK with international law in the form of the treaty, which itself reflects the international legal obligations of the UK and Rwanda.
Taking together the strengthened Rwandan asylum system and the commitment set out in the legally binding treaty—which, once ratified, will become part of Rwandan domestic law—it is unnecessary for a decision-maker, whether that be an immigration officer or a court, to consider any claim made on the ground that Rwanda may remove a person to another state. Furthermore, as I said earlier, that would delay unnecessarily the relocation of individuals to Rwanda, thereby undermining the core of the Bill.
For the reasons outlined, I respectfully ask that noble Lords do not move their amendments.
My Lords—before the Minister sits down—it becomes crucial to know when this Act will come into force. This is not a personal observation, but the Minister has given the most unsatisfactory series of answers about what the position is in Rwanda. Clause 9 of the Bill says:
“This Act comes into force on the day on which the Rwanda Treaty enters into force”.
On Wednesday, I took the Minister through what the statement and the agreement suggest, which is that the Bill comes into force when the steps required for ratification are completed by both countries. The only step required for ratification that is referred to in the policy statement made by the Government, as far as the UK Government are concerned, is the passage of this Bill. So it appears that the Government are envisaging that, almost automatically on the passage of the Bill, they will treat the agreement as ratified. The consequence is that the Bill will immediately come into force. If that is right, it is pretty obvious that the Bill will become law and the Government can deport people to Rwanda when the safeguards are not in place. Could the Minister confirm that my understanding of when the Bill is going to come into force, which I set out in detail last week, is correct?
I cannot go beyond the terms of the clause to which the noble and learned Lord refers. Clause 9(1) states:
“This Act comes into force on the day on which the Rwanda Treaty enters into force”.
As always, I am grateful to the Committee for its deliberations, but on this occasion I am particularly happy to welcome the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond, to those deliberations, and indeed to what I hope will be a long and happy role as a legislator in your Lordships’ House. I think the Committee will agree that she dealt with this important group of amendments with the expertise and clarity that we would have expected. She pointed out the dangers of the “for ever” conclusion that Rwanda is safe and therefore the inability of our domestic courts to ever look at that issue—something that I think every speaker other than the Minister found unsatisfactory and said so more than once.
The noble and learned Baroness pointed out the oddity of a situation where there would be at least the possibility of jurisdiction in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in circumstances where our domestic courts had been stripped of jurisdiction. For those concerned about sovereignty, that seems to be a very odd state of affairs. The one thing that the Bill does not purport to oust is the final jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg—although it attempts to allow Ministers to ignore interim relief from Strasbourg—but it completely ousts all serious jurisdiction of our domestic courts, particularly in relation to the issue of the general safety of Rwanda. That is a very odd and unsatisfactory state of affairs and, again, no one in the Committee other than the Minister appeared to say otherwise.
I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester and my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett for reminding the Committee what the UNHCR said just today about the Government of the UK attempting to shield themselves from judicial oversight. My goodness me—what would we be saying about any other country or jurisdiction in the world that that was said about by the main refugee monitor at the UN? Furthermore, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, for pointing out the significance of this in places such as the UN Human Rights Council, and how shameful it is that an examination of the UK should now be threatening to eclipse the situations in the Middle East and Ukraine. There are almost no words.
When there are almost no words, thank goodness for the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I refer the Committee to Hansard last Wednesday, when he spoke about the “nature of truth” and how we should always be seeking after it and never trying to end that exploration. I say to the Minister that rather more important than any references to John Donne today was the allusion to Al Gore; it is the inconvenient truth that the Government are constantly seeking to avoid with this Bill. It is the inconvenient truth that Rwanda is not yet safe, hence the need for the treaty in the first place and all the mechanisms that need to be brought in and operated under it. This was put so well, repeatedly, by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. There is also the inconvenient truth that we still believe in the rule of law in this country. We still believe in anxious scrutiny of individual cases before people’s rights are put in jeopardy. There is the inconvenient truth that, even if Rwanda became generally safe tomorrow, things could change quickly, as they do in countries all over the world, as was pointed out once more by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Whitaker for pointing out very real concerns about journalists currently detained in Rwanda. We wait for responses “in due course” from the Government about reports of torture of the journalists currently incarcerated there. I was grateful for the support of my noble friend Lord Coaker on the Opposition Front Bench. I thought, if I may say so, that the courtesy and deference he gave to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the mutuality of respect between them, boded well for the attitude of a future Labour Government. I will hold him to that in due course, I hope.
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is customary on these occasions to thank all noble Lords directly for their contributions to the Bill; but, in light of the remarks the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, made from the Opposition Front Bench, the Committee will pardon me if I address those first.
I first acknowledge that, with characteristic courtesy, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, approached me informally and indicated that he would be making these points. He was also, if I may say so, animated by a characteristic concern for the standing of this House. I can give the assurance—which, if assurance were necessary, my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom gave me a moment ago as the noble Lord was winding up—that we as Ministers reflect very carefully on matters raised at every stage in the House, as we do with Questions, and we are concerned to pass back to directing departments and colleagues the views of the House, with an end to finding community between all sides of the House, or at least majorities of the House where possible. We do not allow these matters to go unsaid. Regarding one matter the noble Lord raised, the Government Front Bench can take no responsibility for the editorial policy of a national newspaper. Nonetheless, we can observe where that newspaper errs in anything it says.
Is the Minister saying that the quote of the Prime Minister’s words is not accurate?
I certainly was not. I was saying that, when the noble Lord quoted, or referred to the content of, that newspaper article describing every amendment as being a wrecking one, that is the matter to which I referred. I am happy to put the record straight. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his nod of acceptance.
I thank all noble Lords who participated in this debate. The Bill builds upon the treaty between the United Kingdom and the Government of Rwanda, signed on 5 December 2023. The treaty, along with evidence of changes in Rwanda since summer 2022, will enable Parliament to conclude that Rwanda is safe, and the new Bill provides Parliament with the opportunity so to do.
That last proposition came under attack from a number of areas in the House. If I do not mention or cite them all by name, noble Lords will forgive me. I mention in particular the contributions from my noble friend Lord Clarke of Nottingham, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, speaking from the Cross Benches and, indeed, the noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench.
I emphasise points made in Committee on Monday. The treaty does not override the judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court; rather, it responds to its key findings to ensure that the policy can go ahead. The court recognised in its decision that changes may be delivered in the future which would address the issues it raised. These are those changes. We believe that they address the Supreme Court’s concerns, and we will now aim to move forward with the policy and help put an end to illegal migration.
My Lords, the Minister has raised a really important point concerning the treaty. Clause 2(4) states that
“a court or tribunal must not consider … any claim or complaint that the Republic of Rwanda will not act in accordance with the Rwanda Treaty.”
That is quite significant. The Minister is saying is that the treaty deals with the Supreme Court’s concerns, but the Court will not be able under this Bill to determine whether the concerns that have been raised, which the treaty is meant to deal with, have been dealt with to the satisfaction of the UK Supreme Court. Is that correct?
My Lords, the policy of the Bill is to respond to the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s decision in the form of this treaty and the Bill which accompanies it. This does not, Canute-like, revise or reverse the truth. As I say, it is a response to the findings of the Supreme Court—findings made, as they were, in relation to a period of time which dates from the High Court’s consideration of the matter.
These were findings that related to a period of time. The Government are saying that that period of time has moved on and therefore they make other findings. But they are also saying that no one may make any other findings, even if that moves on. In other words, the Government are saying that there is only one moment in which we can make this judgment. We have not got there yet—the Government have said we have not got there—but there is one moment, and once the judgment is made, although I do not know what the opposite of “retrospectively” is, it cannot then be changed, even if the facts change and even if the courts want to change it on the evidence. Will he please tell me whenever or wherever, in what Bill, that has ever been put before this or any other House?
My Lords, the point of the principle of the Bill is to remove the matter from the consideration of the civil courts and to place it before the court of Parliament; to take the matter from the civil courts and place it in the international and diplomatic sphere.
What are the mechanisms —since, as my noble friend Lord Scriven said, the courts are no longer able to look at this—by which we can judge whether Rwanda will adhere to its treaty obligations? The Minister said that this is now going to be a duty of the court of Parliament: what is our mechanism in Parliament for doing that?
First, I remind the noble Lord of some of the constitutional truths that were adverted to in the debate on Monday. No Parliament can bind its successor. Parliament can always come back and revisit matters in future. On the specific point of how Parliament will come to learn of any matters that are of concern, I will refer to this in greater detail in the course of my submission, but I can refer the noble Lord to the independent monitoring committee which the treaty and the Bill establish, and to the work that that will do, feeding back to the joint committee of the two Governments.
I am fascinated by this new “court of Parliament” concept. Anyone who thinks that the Age of Reason ended in 1800 will need to read Hansard tomorrow because, if I may say so, the Conservative Privy Council Benches have perhaps delivered some of the finest contributions to this Committee today. I, for one, will be rereading the noble Lord, Lord Deben, because enlightenment is clearly not a single moment but something that has to be fought for again and again so as not to end up where the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, warned us. If there is now to be a court of Parliament that is examining the safety of Rwanda on an ongoing basis, I do think the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, should have an answer on what procedures there are, under the Bill as currently drafted, for these monitoring committees to report not just to the Government but to the court of Parliament that is being so elegantly expounded by the noble and learned Lord.
My Lords, before the Minister answers the question, this is a rather unusual court, because it is a court that does not afford the most basic rights of justice to the people who will be affected by the decisions we make. In any other court, if you are about to be exported to a place you say will torture you, you can normally at least have your voice heard; but not in this new court that the noble and learned Lord has just set up.
First, as the noble and learned Lord is perfectly well aware, the Bill blocks the possibility of refoulement and of return to any country other than the United Kingdom. In relation to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that Parliament is a court is a familiar and well-known concept; it is a name by which Parliament is well known.
Not on the theory point but on the practical point of what the Bill states, can the Minister just expand a bit more? He said that there will be a monitoring committee that will report to the joint committee of the Governments. How will they report to Parliament if we are to make a judgment, subsequently, that we wish to repeal this?
As I said to the noble Lord when first responding to him, I will address those matters in more detail in the course of my submission.
Clause 2 creates a conclusive presumption that Rwanda is generally safe and will not send someone to another country in breach of the refugee convention. I respectfully disagree with my noble friend Lord Clarke of Nottingham, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol and others that this amounts to an abuse, far less to a constitutional innovation. In relation to a point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, made on the matter of how the courts might respond, the noble and learned Lord put it to the Committee that there would be one case that would decide. I congratulate him on his optimism, but he must surely recognise—reflecting on the practice of immigration across the decades—that what happens is that, where a position is advanced and set forth before the court, it will remain open subsequently for people to argue that there has been a change in fact or a change in circumstances. Therefore, the proposal that the noble and learned Lord advances to the Committee that there would simply be one case that would determine all things is, I regret, a proposition to which I cannot accede.
The conclusive presumption as to the safety of Rwanda enables Parliament to confirm that Rwanda is safe for the purposes of the Migration and Economic Development Partnership. It reflects the strength of commitment from the Government of Rwanda on the safety and support that they will provide to individuals relocated there. Clause 2(2) notes that a decision-maker means the Secretary of State, immigration officers and the courts, including tribunals, when considering a decision relating to the relocation of an individual to Rwanda under provision of the Immigration Act. Clause 2 also excludes several general grounds of challenge and, as set out in subsection (3), prohibits generalised appeals or reviews.
As I have said already, the Government have signed an internationally legally binding treaty responding to the Supreme Court’s conclusions, in particular on the issue of refoulement. We have been clear that Rwanda will not remove any individual relocated there to another country, except to the United Kingdom in very limited circumstances. The implementation of these provisions in practice will be kept under review by the independent monitoring committee, whose role is enhanced by the treaty, and which will ensure compliance with the obligations. Therefore, as set out in subsection (4), there is no reason for a court or tribunal to consider any claim that Rwanda may remove a person to another state, that an individual may not receive fair and proper consideration of an immigration claim in Rwanda or that Rwanda will not abide by the treaty terms. Finally, subsection (5) is a “notwithstanding” provision, requiring courts to honour—I give way to the noble Lord, Lord Scriven. I am so sorry, I thought the noble Lord was poised to intervene.
Finally, subsection (5) is a “notwithstanding” provision, requiring courts to honour the previous clauses, notwithstanding all relevant domestic law, the Human Rights Act 1998 to the extent that it is disapplied by this Bill, and any alternative interpretation of international law reached by the court or tribunal.
The effect of Amendments 19, 21, 25 and 28, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, would be to remove the requirement for decision-makers and courts or tribunals to treat conclusively Rwanda as a safe country. That is similar to the terms of Amendment 22, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German. These amendments would allow individuals to present evidence to challenge removal decisions on the grounds that Rwanda is not generally a safe country.
I just remind the noble and learned Lord that he said he would return to the temporal issue of how Parliament would be able to reassess the safety of Rwanda, if facts changed—if there were a sudden change of government or a coup, or if the monitoring committee found that people had been refouled, which was the fear of the Supreme Court, of course. What processes, under the Bill as currently crafted, are there for the court of Parliament to take an application to reconsider its safety, so that it is not determined as safe for all time?
My Lords, the noble Baroness’s point echoes the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed. I had a brief communication on it with my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom as the noble Baroness was speaking. I think the temporal point that the noble Baroness referred to and the noble Lord raised is to be dealt with in a subsequent group. Perhaps noble Lords will be content if we treat that matter in detail in that subsequent group. I have no doubt that the noble Baroness and the noble Lord will bear in mind the burden of their questions and will come back to us if we have not answered them to their satisfaction. I am obliged to them.
I move on to consider Clause 4, which preserves the ability of individuals to challenge removal due to their particular circumstances where there is compelling evidence that Rwanda is not a safe country for them, other than where that allegation relates to onward refoulement, in relation to which the treaty is very clear. That is the appropriate mechanism to ensure that an individual’s circumstances have been considered.
In response, therefore, to Amendments 37 and 42, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, we maintain that it is right that the scope for individualised claims remains limited to prevent persistent legal challenges covering the same ground and to enable us to remove individuals who have entered the United Kingdom illegally.
The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, raised, quite appropriately, the constitutional implications of our response to the Supreme Court’s decision. I underscore my submission to the Committee: no constitutional violence has been done in referring this matter to Parliament, and in taking it into the international, diplomatic and political sphere, as opposed to the civil courts. Ultimately, returning to a remark made by my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne, who is in his place, this Committee must be concerned with the question of accountability for decisions.
The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, also made the point that evidence must be of an holistic nature. The rules of evidence are based on the principle of exclusion of that which has nothing to do with matters of fact and law with which a particular case is concerned. I wholly accept the point that the noble Lord was trying to make, which was that all individual circumstances must be borne and considered in the round. Although referring to individual reasons is appropriate for considering individual cases, I dispute his submission that it is appropriate for the systemic general claim. I do not accept that.
If the arrangements in the treaty are not in place, that would be specific to the individual, yet the Bill excludes that being looked at by the court. Would that kind of issue—whether the provisions within the treaty are in place—not be relevant to an individual case?
The only thing relevant to an individual case would be matters specific to the individual.
In line with our obligations, I assure noble Lords—in particular the noble Lords, Lord Scriven and Lord German —that individuals will still be able to challenge removal decisions on the basis of compelling evidence that Rwanda is unsafe for them due to their particular individual circumstances. The threshold for such claims is a high one, rightly. People must not be allowed to frustrate and delay removal with the kind of legal challenges we have been seeing for some time, which the Bill is intended to prevent. I have spoken at length—
Surely we come back to the point about temporality, which a number of noble Lords have raised. Surely the circumstances of an individual, and the nature of the Rwanda they are being transported to on the day their flight lands, are relevant to the individual case.
My Lords, that would depend entirely on the case presented by the individual.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, for tabling Amendment 30 with regard to victims of torture. With reference to the points of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in winding up, while we will reflect on the matters she raises, at this stage I cannot support their inclusion in the Bill.
Is the Minister going on to another point? I did ask some specific questions.
I am of course ready to take specific questions that the noble Baroness develops, but it was not my intention to pass by her contribution at this stage.
Is the Minister going to answer my questions?
My Lords, as I have said several times during this debate, at this and other stages, it is the Government’s assessment that Rwanda, which is a signatory to the United Nations convention against torture, is generally a safe country with respect to the rule of law. The treaty, at Article 15(9), provides that the monitoring committee is to develop a complaints system that can be used by relocated individuals. The committee will be expected to report any significant issues to the joint committee straightaway, and may provide advice and recommendations to the joint committee on actions that should be taken to address issues that have been identified. Any issues escalated will involve reporting directly to the joint committee co-chairs in relation to emergency and urgent situations. We will continue to assess complaints and observations by Redress and the other organisations to which the noble Baroness, and others—the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, made mention of this as well—have referred when they are referred to us.
There is no obligation on the monitoring committee to publish its report, so how will we know what they are?
My Lords, as I said to the noble Lord, this matter is to be dealt with in further groupings. In the interests of saving the Committee’s time, I will revert to consideration of the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett.
The treaty which the United Kingdom has agreed with Rwanda makes express provision for the treatment of relocated individuals, demonstrating the commitment of both parties to upholding fundamental human rights and freedoms without discrimination and in line with both our domestic and international obligations. Rwanda’s obligations under these international agreements are embedded too in its domestic legal provisions.
The High Court found that it was generally safe for individuals relocated under the MEDP to be in Rwanda. In view of its finding on the issue of refoulement, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide the question of whether individuals were generally at risk of ill treatment in Rwanda. The Court of Appeal likewise did not reach a conclusion on this point. This means that the ruling of the High Court on the point of general safety remains undisturbed.
The amendment has two parts. One was the about treatment of asylum seekers in Rwanda and that there should not be evidence of torture for two years. The other was about asylum seekers who have already suffered torture. I asked a couple of specific questions in relation to them. One was about what investigations the Government have done about the support they can expect in Rwanda. Supporting people who have gone through torture is more than just everyday support. These people have been traumatised. They need help with their mental and physical health. Even in this country, that help is often inadequate, and they have to turn to civil society groups. The point was made the other day that civil society is still quite weak in Rwanda, so I do not know whether there are any organisations that could specifically help torture survivors. I also asked why the Home Office does not routinely collect data about the number of people in detention who have suffered torture, given that the Home Office’s rules say that torture is an example of a vulnerable group that needs special support in detention.
My Lords, I cannot answer the noble Baroness’s question about why those statistics are not kept. My noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom tells me that they are not. That may be a matter to be taken back to the Home Office to be given consideration. It would be pointless for me to speculate on the reasons why that should not be.
I have not taken part in this debate—I came in only earlier this afternoon—but on this I have some information. It is that the mental health situation in Rwanda is very poor. The country suffered a genocide, as we all know, some 30 years ago. There is a very high level of mental illness within its population. Apparently 25% of the population have mental health problems or suffer depression or recurring episodes of post-traumatic stress disorder. It is intergenerational, so the next generation also suffers the consequences. There are only 15 psychiatrists in the whole country and very few trained psychologists. We are talking about a very underresourced country when it comes to mental health problems.
My Lords, I am reminded that Article 13 of the treaty makes the specific provision:
“Rwanda shall have regard to information provided”
by the United Kingdom
“about a Relocated Individual relating to any special needs that may arise as a result of their being a victim of modern slavery or human trafficking, and shall take all necessary steps to ensure that these needs are accommodated”.
I could well have missed it when I read the treaty, but the quotation the Minister has given talked about human trafficking and slavery but not torture. My noble friend has reinforced my fears about what will happen to torture survivors, who will probably have very serious mental health needs, if they are removed to Rwanda, however “safe” it might be.
My Lords, all relocated individuals will receive protection appropriate to them and assistance according to their needs, including, where necessary, referral to specialist services to protect their welfare. Furthermore, it remains possible for an individual to raise a claim that their individual circumstances mean that Rwanda is not a safe country for them. Should such a claim succeed in demonstrating that serious, irreversible harm will result from removal to Rwanda, that removal will not take place. We expect such successful claims to be rare, bearing in mind the safety of Rwanda, which I have already set out in my response.
The United Kingdom and Rwanda will continue to work closely to make this partnership a success. I do not accept that individuals relocated to Rwanda would be at risk of torture or any other form of inhumane or degrading treatment. I assure the Committee that, under this Bill, decision-makers will already be able to consider compelling evidence relating specifically to a person’s individual circumstances. Should someone with particular vulnerability concerns be relocated to Rwanda, safeguarding processes will be in place.
That Rwanda cares deeply about refugees is amply demonstrated by its work with the UNHCR to accommodate some of the most vulnerable populations who have faced trauma, detention and violence. We are confident that those relocated under our partnership would be safe, as per the assurances negotiated in our legally binding treaty. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, it was once the practice of our courts to prevent the jury from dining until they had reached their verdict. Rising to my feet on the wrong side of 3.30 pm, it seems that this practice may live on, unreformed, in what we must get used to calling “the court of Parliament”. Your Lordships may feel that they have had enough food for thought in this debate and that it is time for sustenance of a different kind, so I shall be as brief as I can in response.
What a debate it has been—fully up to the standards of its predecessor earlier today. I will pick out a few of the highlights from the Back Benches. We had lessons from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, on precedent. It seems one has to go back to 1531 to find a precedent for this Bill. The moral I took from his tale was that it ended badly for both the cook and the Act.
We were reminded by the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady D’Souza, of the astonishing fact that the courts must not consider even a complaint of risk of torture in Rwanda or a country to which Rwanda might send somebody. As the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, reminded us, that is no theoretical possibility. What an illustration it is of the lengths to which this extraordinary provision goes. We also heard a political analysis from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer—I suspect it was very astute, but it is well above my pay grade so I will say nothing more about it. The right reverend Prelates the Bishops of Bristol and Leeds wove together the legal, moral and even philosophical aspects of the issue, as did the noble Lord, Lord Scriven. We are grateful to them for that.
I will single out two speeches, both from the Conservative Benches. The first was from the noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham. I followed with great care everything the noble Lord said, not just in this debate but in the debates on the Illegal Migration Bill. It seems that he is one of the very few people, either in this House or outside it, who can vocalise the quite understandable unease engendered in fair-minded people in this country by the prospect of immigration generally, and particularly by the prospect of people—as they see it—coming in without respecting the rules. He combines that with an absolute conviction that we need to address that problem without sacrificing our core values. I am so grateful to him, once again, for that extraordinary speech. How on earth did he never become Prime Minister of this country? There will be political historians who know the answer to that.
The speech of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, is the other speech I will single out, because he made the link so persuasively between this Bill and the most insidious of the threats to our democracy: disregard for the truth and subjugation of the truth to political expedience.
As to the Minister’s speech, he made the argument that considering even a claim that someone would be exposed to torture would place, as he put it, excessive demands on the resources of the courts and stand in the way of relocating individuals. With great respect to the Minister, I found that extraordinary coming from the mouth of a lawyer. I have rarely heard such a formulation of the argument for administrative expedience.
He raised Clause 4(1), and I acknowledge that it makes provision for decisions based on “particular individual circumstances”. If you have compelling evidence relating specifically to your individual circumstances, you might receive some consideration, either by the decision-maker or the court. However, as the clause also says, if your ground is that the Republic of Rwanda is not a safe country in general, it does not work. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffman, reminded me sotto voce during the debate, it is apparently therefore a defence to a claim under Clause 4 that you are about to be exposed to torture, “Oh, don’t worry, plenty of other people will be exposed to torture as well, it’s nothing to do with your own particular individual circumstances—case dismissed”. It is extraordinary.
We should be grateful, I suppose, to hear the Minister say that our amendments and speeches are listened to and that his party does not dictate the reporting of the Sun. I am grateful for both of those things, and we look forward to seeing those welcome words reflected in actions. On that theme, it was good to see the Opposition Front Benches listening intently throughout. I have no doubt that we will be coming back to these issues on Report. It may be that, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, the Bill will not be blocked, but we have to get it right and we cannot legislate for nonsense.
I say to the Minister that we do not want to boil him alive—although it may sometimes feel a bit like that—but this Bill poisons the springs of our democracy and I very much hope that this Chamber at least of the court of Parliament will continue to say so. However, because it is the convention at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, this group of amendments focuses on Clause 3 and demonstrates the threat to the domestic rule of law posed by the Bill. The Bill proposes ripping up not only our international obligations but our existing domestic legal structure, and it sets a dangerous precedent. It is clear that, when taken in combination with the serious limitations put on our own courts to decide what is and is not true, the Bill shows no respect for our domestic structures. I ask again: what are we getting in return? Do the Government really believe that delivering this scheme as it is currently proposed is worth it?
The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, moved the first amendment in this group, and he said, quite rightly, that the Bill usurps the role of the domestic courts and disapplies the Human Rights Act. He emphasised that the domestic courts are usurped within the Bill.
There has been a lot of discussion about Amendment 33 from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, and there was some legal discussion just now between noble Lords about the best way that that amendment can prevent delay in considering making a remedial order. I will not comment further on that because it is above my pay grade as a magistrate rather than a lawyer who deals in this type of law.
More widely, there were very wide-ranging comments on the law, the theological principles underlying the Human Rights Act itself, and the principle of treating everybody equally, and an almost theological debate about whether this is a properly Conservative Bill. I am reluctant to trespass on theological or Conservative Party debates but, from the Opposition’s point of view, this group and the disapplication of a number of elements within the Human Rights Act go to the core of the objections to the Bill. I am sure we will come back to this in some form at a later stage. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, as always, I am grateful to noble Lords who contributed to the debate on this group and added their wisdom to the Committee’s deliberations in relation thereto.
Clause 3 disapplies in particular circumstances certain provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998, specifically Sections 2, 3 and 6 to 9. I state and emphasise at the outset that we do not strip human rights from anybody by this means. It is
“a fundamental tenet of modern human rights that they are universal and indivisible”—
I happily associate myself with the views of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford in that regard—
“this is reflected in, amongst many other things, Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Articles 1 and 14 of the ECHR.
But it is legitimate to treat people differently in different circumstances: to take just two examples, a citizen may legitimately be treated differently, and have different legal rights, from a non-national; and a person in detention may have certain rights restricted when compared to a person at liberty. The ECHR, as interpreted by the case law of the ECtHR, fully recognises this principle. Rights are therefore universal, but what rights may mean for different people may legitimately differ depending on the circumstances, so long as any difference in treatment is justifiable within the framework of the relevant right. Therefore, everybody holds their rights without distinction on any ground; but the extent to which those rights may be limited, restricted, interfered with, or indeed vindicated, depends on each individual’s circumstances, and the legitimacy of the limitation, restriction, interference, etc.
To be clear, there is nothing in the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill that deprives any person of any of their human rights: in accordance with Article 1 of the ECHR, we shall continue to secure to everyone within our jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. What we can legitimately do, and what we are doing, is to draw legal distinctions between those with a legitimate right to be in this country, and those who have come to this country illegally”.
I have just quoted ad longum—extensively—the submission of the Lord Chancellor to the Joint Committee on Human Rights last year.
The noble and learned Lord’s noble friend is just trying to speed up parliamentary consideration after a declaration of incompatibility. As the nature of the noble and learned Lord’s argument throughout the Committee has been about parliamentary sovereignty, not executive diktat—“we do not need the courts”—what would be wrong with the idea that Parliament should be seized of these issues a little quicker than usual?
Given how well the declaration of compatibility procedure is working and has worked in the past, there is no reason to innovate on that basis.
As the Minister of State for Illegal Migration set out in the other place, the United Kingdom has a long-standing tradition of ensuring that rights and liberties are protected domestically and that we are fulfilling our international human rights obligations. We remain committed to that position and will ensure that our laws continue to be fit for purpose and work for the people of the United Kingdom.
The noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, raised the matter of refoulement, the sending back of people to dangerous places from whence they came. I refer again to the debate of Monday night about the extent of the treaty. Although some of the provisions in the Bill are novel, the Government are satisfied that it can be implemented in line with convention rights. We know that people will seek to frustrate their removal from this country, and the Bill prevents the misuse of the courts to that effect. As such, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am sorry to prolong matters, but I asked an explicit question about Northern Ireland. I pointed out that the Bill applies to the whole of the United Kingdom. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, by majority, asked for an explanation before Report of why the Government do not accept the advice of Northern Ireland’s watchdogs —its Human Rights Commission in particular—on incompatibility with the Good Friday agreement and Windsor Framework. If he cannot provide an explanation, can I please get confirmation that we will get that explanation before Report?
I beg the noble Baroness’s pardon for seeming to ignore her contribution. I was at fault. I touched on the Northern Ireland situation in answering Amendment 80 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn, on Monday night. That is to be found in the relevant Hansard at col. 120. As I said to the noble Lord, and to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, I am reluctant to step outwith the responsibilities of my department in relation to Northern Ireland matters, which may have certain aspects with which I am not readily familiar. To that extent, if the noble Baroness is content, I will write to her, making sure that the answers reflect the specific questions that she has posed in debates to your Lordships’ Committee.
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who contributed to this debate, and in particular to the noble Lord, Lord German, for opening. I acknowledge the spirit across the Committee of approaching this matter by looking to see what can be amended and not setting out to wreck the Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said on the first group.
I would like to wreck the Bill—just so the Minister knows.
I accept that and I did hear the noble Baroness make that point from the Benches opposite.
Since summer 2022, when judicial review proceedings in relation to the migration and economic development partnership began, the United Kingdom and the Government of Rwanda have worked to refine and improve that partnership. This has strengthened not only the operational readiness of Rwanda to receive and support migrants relocated under the partnership but the legal footing of the agreement and the commitments both sides undertake to ensure that national and international obligations and standards are met, having scrutinised closely and carefully all the circumstances of the country and information from appropriate sources.
Rwanda has a long history of supporting and integrating asylum seekers and refugees in the region. It has also been recognised internationally for its general safety and stability, strong government, low corruption and gender equality. I quote from what the Kigali-based comprehensive refugee response officer, Nayana Bose, of the UNHCR said in December 2021—mark the date:
“Rwanda has done an excellent job integrating refugees in the national education system, including urban refugees in the national community-based health insurance plan, providing them with national ID cards and offering them livelihood opportunities”.
As the Committee is aware, the Bill is underpinned by the treaty, Article 10 of which in particular sets out the assurances for the treatment of relocated individuals in Rwanda, including abiding by the refugee convention in relation to those seeking asylum. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 3 of the treaty, the parties agree that the obligations therein
“shall be met in respect of all Relocated Individuals, regardless of their nationality, and without discrimination”.
Under this commitment, Rwanda will treat all groups of people fairly. We have assurances from the Government of Rwanda that the implementation of measures within the treaty will be expedited. The treaty will follow the usual process with regard to scrutiny and ratification. I note that amendments tabled by noble Lords on this topic will be debated in the group to follow.
Amendment 17 would also oblige the Secretary of State to consider Rwanda safe only if it was deemed so for every descriptor of person as set out in Section 7(3) of the Illegal Migration Act. In relocating individuals to Rwanda, decision-makers will make a case-by-case decision about whether there is compelling evidence that the particular circumstances of each case would mean an individual would be at risk of serious and irreversible harm were they to be relocated to Rwanda. This means that each person’s circumstances are considered before relocation. We therefore consider the amendment unnecessary.
Amendments 24 and 27 relate to the roles of courts and tribunals. It is important that we recognise that these are considered decision-makers in relation to relocating individuals to Rwanda, and they may have a say in it.
Amendment 27 in particular would place an obligation on courts and tribunals to consider any claim that Rwanda may breach its international obligations by removing an individual to a country that was unsafe for them; that an individual may not receive fair and proper consideration of their asylum claim; and that Rwanda will not act in accordance with the terms of the treaty. This obligation is unnecessary. Rwanda is as committed to this partnership as we are. We have worked closely together to build this partnership and have trust that the commitments in the treaty will be upheld. That is why we have introduced the Bill, which reflects the strength of the Government of Rwanda’s protections and commitments given in the treaty, allowing Parliament to confirm the status of the Republic of Rwanda as a safe third country.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton—I speak to his later contribution, rather than when he was assisting the noble Lord, Lord German, with legal analysis—posed the question of whether judicial review might be applicable. My noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne took up that point as well. On that aspect, I refer noble Lords to the terms of Article 22 of the treaty, which provides:
“In the event of a dispute arising out of or relating to this Agreement, including any question regarding its existence, validity, termination, interpretation or implementation, the Parties shall refer the dispute to the Joint Committee which shall meet within 14 … Working Days to discuss and seek resolution to the dispute by consultation”.
Therefore, the process by which matters will be addressed, if there is some shock to the operation of the system once it is operational, is set out in the terms of the treaty and operates on the level between the two countries.
I thank the noble and learned Lord for answering the question, but I am not sure that answers the point. Suppose the position were that the UK said, “You haven’t implemented it properly”; the effect of this Act would be nevertheless that a Minister and every single deciding body would have to decide that Rwanda was a safe country. I am not quite sure how Article 22 responds to the suggestion that I think the noble Lord, Lord German, makes in his amendment that judicial review should be available—albeit, as the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, said, it would be the decision of the Secretary of State as to whether it was a safe country. Could the noble and learned Lord address that suggestion?
My Lords, in relation to the operation of the treaty during its currency, we should bear in mind that a monitoring committee is in place, which examines these things on a going-forward basis, keeps them under supervision and reports back.
Annexe B of the treaty also sets out the claims process for relocated individuals and how they will be treated. It sets out clearly that members of the first instance body, who will make decisions on asylum and humanitarian protection claims, shall make such decisions
“impartially, solely on the basis of evidence before them and by reference to the provisions and principles of the Refugee Convention and humanitarian protection law”.
In preparation for the potential relocation of individuals, officials in the United Kingdom have worked together with Rwandan officials to develop and commence operational training for Rwandan asylum decision-makers. Most recently, Home Office technical experts, in collaboration with the Institute of Legal Practice and Development, delivered a training course aimed at asylum decision-makers in Rwanda.
My Lords, I wonder if the Minister might tell us how long the course was, how many people were training and where they were from.
I do not think the noble Lord will be especially surprised to hear that I do not have those facts to hand, but I will undertake on behalf of the relevant department to communicate with him in writing on that topic.
The course focused on applying refugee law in asylum interviews and decision making—
The UN has reported on the treaty and the deficiencies that the Supreme Court referred to. In January, it noted in paragraph 20 of its report that training, based on its historical review of what is required in such circumstances, is normally of limited use. Over and above the training, what else has been put in place for those decision-makers to ensure that they fully abide by and understand their obligations, not just within Rwandan law but international agreements?
My Lords, as I said when I was responding to a point from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, the presence of British officials and foreign judges in Rwanda, looking at these matters and collaborating to resolve them, will clearly inculcate an atmosphere and a spirit of proper observance.
My Lords, the Minister speaks in the future tense—that the presence of British judges and the training “will” have that effect. I guess he is right; it may very well have that effect. But the point is that we are asked to declare Rwanda safe now. I hope the Minister is going to answer the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, about timing: when do we expect Rwanda to produce the new asylum law? When do we expect the judges to be appointed? When do we expect the system that is to be devised to ensure that there is no refoulement? When will that system be created? When are the Government going to see it? When will the House see it? If we are asked to say that Rwanda is safe, then we have already voted that we cannot ratify the treaty until the measures set out in Amendment 84, which were in the International Agreements Committee report, have come into effect. It is all very well the Minister speaking in the future tense; he has to tell us now when things are going to happen.
My Lords, can I add to the Minister’s list the number of judges who have agreed to go to Rwanda and work there, and indeed the number of officials, and for how long?
My Lords, it is a matter of working towards having the safeguards in place. We have received assurances from the Government of Rwanda that the implementation of all measures in the treaty will be expedited. The point is that we are working with them to accomplish that end. We have already developed and commenced operational training—
I am grateful to the Minister. That is the closest we have got to an answer: “working towards”. Can we pursue that a wee bit more? If the Rwandan Government are “working towards” putting safeguards in place, that means they are not currently in place. Is that correct?
Just before the noble Lord stands up or resumes his position, I have specific information on the point he raised earlier on information available electronically. I am told that the page on the GOV.UK site to which he was referring was in fact withdrawn on 11 September 2023 and has been superseded by one dated 11 January 2024.
I am grateful. I clicked on it half an hour ago. Maybe they can do some clicking in the Box, because the information the Minister has just provided is false. He needs to correct the record, but he can do it in writing to me if he so wishes.
I think a discussion on this point would be taking up too much of the Committee’s time.
As the Minister confirmed to me, by definition, the safeguards that would make Rwanda safe are not in place, because the Rwandan Government are “working towards” having them in place. Why then are we asked to determine that Rwanda is currently safe when the Minister has said it is not?
My Lords, taking the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, together with that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, I think that brings us to considering where we are with the decision of the Supreme Court, and how that sits with what we, as a Government, are inviting the House to do at this stage.
The point is—and it is one which has been anticipated by noble Lords contributing on this and the previous group—that the factual basis on which the Supreme Court reached its decision has changed. The factual basis on which the Supreme Court reached its decision was frozen in time, as it were, by the court of first instance. Since then, considerable development has taken place. The facts have changed; we are entitled to move forward. I also do not consider that that there is anything—
I thank the Minister for giving way. In January, the UN gave an assessment of where the Rwandan immigration system is. Paragraph 18 of that report states:
“As of January 2024, UNHCR has not observed changes in the practice of asylum adjudication that would overcome the concerns set out in its 2022 analysis and in the detailed evidence presented to the Supreme Court”.
What the UNHCR is saying is that, as of January this year, it has seen no evidence that the issues that the Supreme Court had in its evidence have been addressed to make Rwanda a safe country.
My Lords, we disagree with the views of the UNHCR on that point. As noble Lords were reminded at an earlier stage, the UNHCR is not the sovereign Parliament of this country.
Will the Minister give way? Just a moment ago, he said that Rwanda was “working towards”—that is not the same as “is”. I hate to say it, but it would appear that he is contradicting himself.
I do not think that that is the case. I think that by saying that Rwanda is continuing to work on a process is to say that it is working on making things safer—not that they are not safe already.
More than a few weeks ago, I think, but what we have is an internationally binding treaty between two sovereign states. That—if the noble and learned Lord will bear with me—is of the utmost significance in considering such matters.
Am I right in saying that the legally binding commitment commits Rwanda to do the things, particularly in relation to refoulement, which it had already promised—although not in an agreement—to do? Am I right in saying that the very judgment which the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, said an hour ago the Government respect, would take considerable time to take effect because of cultural understanding and the need for very substantial change? I am looking for something other than simply signing an agreement to do with that which it had already promised to do, which the Supreme Court said it was not in a practical position to deliver. Will the Minister tell the Committee what has happened that gives one confidence that that which the Supreme Court says will take time will in fact be ready in an instant?
It is not a matter of being ready in an instant. The work is being undertaken. The point is that we have a specific treaty commitment not to refoul. As the noble and learned Lord knows, but just to remind the Committee, that is not to send people from Rwanda anywhere other than back to the United Kingdom; and, specifically, not to send them to places where they might be subject to torture or mistreatment; and, further, not to send them back to the countries from which they emerged if those countries are deemed dangerous.
Have we bought through financial consideration special treatment for the people we send for asylum, as distinct from anyone else being considered for asylum; or is the asylum system as a whole being reformed? If we are buying them business class, as distinct from sitting at the back of the bus, does that really conform to our high standards of the rule of law and the protection of human rights? Or are we just buying something a bit special for the folk we are intending to put on a plane?
My Lords, the Government enter into diplomatic arrangements such as treaties with other countries on behalf of the Government, the people and the country of the United Kingdom. Decisions on how to approach handling immigration or asylum claims elsewhere are surely matters for other countries. We would not trespass upon their independence and privileges in order to negotiate on behalf of them with a separate sovereign country.
Is their whole system to be reformed in order that we can be confident of the quality of decision-making?
I think the noble Baroness has my answer, but the point is this: we do not impose or seek to impose upon anyone; nor, when the noble Baroness talks about buying privileged status, would I go along with that. What I am talking about and what the Government are seeking to enact in this measure is a commitment with a forward-looking, democratic country which is signatory to the same treaties and international obligations as we are.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, is about to stand up to intervene. I am aware she has not been here for the whole of this debate.
I am sorry to intervene again, but I have been here for the whole debate. May I take the Committee back to the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, quoting from the UNHCR? The Minister said that we do not agree with the UNHCR, but it points out that its conclusions are based on
“UNHCR’s own extensive experience in capacity development of national asylum systems”.
Is the Minister saying that this Government have more experience than the UNHCR of the capacity of countries to change? It makes it very clear that training is not enough and that there needs to be systemic change and a change of culture.
As I say, this is now a matter of a treaty commitment by that country. We surely accept the possibility that countries have changed. We know the trauma Rwanda has gone through in the comparatively recent past, and we support and acknowledge the work it is attempting to do as a forward-looking African country, looking to provide solutions as opposed to exporting problems.
These questions have ranged far and wide, but was not the one issue, as I understand it, on which the Supreme Court came to its decision the risk of refoulement? That is covered in the treaty, and anybody would be able to see and know whether anyone was refouled in breach of international law and the concern expressed by the Supreme Court.
I am grateful to my noble friend. The matter is entirely patent on the Supreme Court’s decision. It is about refoulement. We now have a treaty commitment preventing that happening.
I have a straightforward and simpler question for the Minister. Paragraph 20 of the policy statement states:
“in order to implement the treaty, the GoR will pass a Rwandan asylum law in the coming months”.
When will that law be produced? Has it already been passed? If not, when will it be passed? If it is going to be passed after we pass this Bill, obviously, the treaty cannot be enabled.
I do not have information specific to the questions the noble Lord raises.
I have listened very carefully to this debate. I was particularly interested in the comments from my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer about training people in Rwanda. I think he said there were two weeks of training. For any treaty to work, it must be between countries that are equal. My impression is that we are telling the Rwandan Government and people what to do, putting pens in their hands and making them sign without properly training them and giving them the experience to act equally to what we are looking to do ourselves. I may be wrong—perhaps the Minister can put me right.
I think the noble Lord overstates the matter. Advice and assistance are being provided to assist a country to shape its laws and culture in a way which is consistent with ours. The work Rwanda has undertaken is substantial. Work has been done in response to the decision of the Supreme Court, albeit, as my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne pointed out, that that decision ultimately related to refoulement, which is expressly covered in the treaty.
The noble Lord, Lord Howard, is correct when he says that the fundamental reason why the Supreme Court said no to this was the risk of refoulment. But it said that the risk of refoulement was caused by Rwanda’s asylum system, which was totally defective across the board. Rwanda could not prevent refoulement because its system was so bad. The judgment refers to
“its practical ability to fulfil its assurances, at least in the short term, in the light of the present deficiencies of the Rwandan asylum system, the past and continuing practice of refoulement … and the scale of the changes in procedure, understanding and culture which are required”.
That is what the Supreme Court identified as being required. So it is both accurate but rather misleading to say it was only refoulement. There was the risk of refoulement because of the failures. Would that be the Government’s understanding of the position?
People cannot be refouled to a different country under this treaty. They can be sent back to the United Kingdom; that is as far as it goes.
The Minister rests a great deal on a signature on a treaty with a country that—with the current Government—has in the last decade refouled over 4,000 refugees sent by Israel to Rwanda. That was the current Government of Rwanda behaving badly with refoulement. Why is the Minister so confident that the same Government are so fundamentally different and reformed?
Well, my Lords, the treaty is governed by our laws, by the Government of Rwanda and by international law. For a former diplomat, the noble Lord seems to have very little confidence in the ability of treaties to regulate the conduct of Governments between one another.
For the Minister to be persuasive in response to that question, he would not have said that they are working towards putting safeguards in place—safeguards which have to be in place, in respect of the point about refoulement made by the noble Lord, Lord Howard. The Minister said that they were working towards putting safeguards in place. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, said no relocation would take place before these safeguards were in place. So can the Minister at the Dispatch Box reconfirm that position: that no individual will be relocated before the safeguards—including the appeals mechanism, the training and the capacity-building—are in place? And when will the date be for when relocations of individuals can happen? I ask because we will be informed in Parliament that all of those safeguards are in place; not that they will be in place or are being worked towards, but that they are in place.
I can answer the first part of the noble Lord’s question in the affirmative. On the second part, I cannot give a date.
As I understand it, my noble and learned friend is effectively saying that, because the treaty is going to be in place, Rwanda can be presumed to comply with its obligations. However, Clause 1(4) of this Bill says:
“It is recognised that … the Parliament of the United Kingdom is sovereign, and … the validity of an Act is unaffected by international law”.
“International law” is very widely defined in subsection (6). If that is true of this country, is it not also true of Rwanda, and why should we necessarily believe in its commitments to the treaty?
Another noble Lord is perhaps too ready to disparage the activities and views of the Rwandan Government. As to the first point, paragraph 54 of the Constitution Committee’s report, which was published recently and quoted by the noble Lord, Lord German, towards the beginning of this debate, says:
“It is the case that United Kingdom Parliament is sovereign, and therefore may enact legislation which breaches international law. It is also true that the validity of an Act of Parliament, in domestic law, is not affected by international law. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom is still subject to the provisions of international law”.
I do not disagree with anything that the Constitution Committee says in that document. The United Kingdom and this Government take their international commitments extremely seriously, but this measure, this treaty and this Bill are drawn up in response to a considerable problem. People are dying, and a huge amount of money is being spent by the United Kingdom in accommodating people, many of whom have no business being here in the first place. This Bill is an attempt to drive the matter forward.
As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said when winding up for the Opposition Front Bench at Second Reading, a number of things are being done already. He endorsed them on behalf of his party. He spoke about the directions against criminal groups to try to break their business model. He spoke about the enhanced levels of co-operation with our partners on the continent of Europe. Patently, however, while this is a complex and multilayered problem, these things are not working of themselves and the Government have taken a view that we must take further measures to try to stop the boats.
The noble Lord, Lord Howard, is quite right that the crux of the Supreme Court judgment is the question of refoulement. Ex-diplomats tend to take treaties very seriously. They read Article 10.3 of the treaty with Rwanda, which says:
“The Parties shall cooperate to agree an effective system for ensuring”
that refoulement does not occur. I repeat:
“The parties shall cooperate to agree an effective system”.
That is the crux of it. Where is that system? Can we see it? If we could see that system, it might help us to determine whether Rwanda is safe.
The noble Lord is aware that, as I explained a moment ago, the provisions of the treaty will send people to the United Kingdom only. They will not and cannot be refouled under the treaty and the arrangements we have with Rwanda.
Why then does the second sentence of Article 10.3 exist? Why is there? Why does it say:
“The Parties shall cooperate to agree an effective system for ensuring that removal contrary to this obligation”
which the Minister refers to “does not occur”?
Why do we need a system? If the Minister is completely confident, why have this Government signed a treaty that has a fallback to say what should happen if refoulement does occur? When will we see that system to ensure the fallback—the safety net? When are we going to see that? It is not good enough for the Minister to say that refoulement cannot happen because we have signed a treaty. The Government have also signed a treaty containing a provision for what happens if refoulement nevertheless occurs.
My Lords, it is entirely prudent and appropriate to anticipate contingencies in the terms of a document such as a treaty.
The noble and learned Lord is taking a much tighter and more defensive position than the Government themselves are taking. They accept the proposition of the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. They do not say that Article 10 is enough on its own. They say the following:
“The Supreme Court concluded that changes needed to be made to Rwanda’s asylum procedures in order to ensure compliance with the principle of non-refoulement”.
They accept the proposition. That is paragraph 76 of the Government’s own statement. So tell us what changes and where we have got to. It is not enough—and the Government accept that it is not enough—just to rely on Article 10.
My Lords, I have adverted at some length already to the Monitoring Committee that is in place and to the work currently under way by judicial and bureaucratic civil servant staff assisting the Rwandans in working through these matters.
My Lords, I am feeling slightly confused at this point. Am I correct in saying that the Government accept that, at present, Rwanda has not fully adhered to the commitments that it has given and that it follows that, by reference to those tests, it would be unsafe? As I understand it, even if the Government did nothing, if this Bill goes on the statute book as currently drafted, no changes will take place in the wider world and, suddenly, Rwanda becomes a safe country. Is that the reality of what we are looking at?
My Lords, the intention of the Bill is to provide that Rwanda is a safe country. As I have explained to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in discussing Article 22 of the treaty, in the event of some disturbance to that situation the matter will be approached on a Government-to-Government basis by the convening of the relevant committee within 14 days.
Returning to a text which was prepared earlier for me, I ask the Committee to bear in mind that Article 10 of the treaty sets out particular assurances for the treatment of relocated individuals in Rwanda, including abiding by the refugee convention in relation to those seeking asylum. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 3 of the treaty, the parties agree that the obligations therein shall be met in respect of all relocated individuals, regardless of their nationality and without discrimination. Under this commitment, Rwanda will treat all groups of people fairly. Furthermore, Article 10(3) in the treaty sets out clearly that the only place to which Rwanda can remove individuals—we have covered this ad longam—is the United Kingdom, which ensures that there is no risk of refoulement.
For noble Lords who remain concerned as to whether the Rwandan Government will abide by the treaty, the independent monitoring committee will be in place to ensure that obligations in the treaty are adhered to. For an initial period of at least three months, there will be enhanced monitoring; that shall take place daily to ensure rapid identification of, and response to, any shortcomings. I refer the Committee in that regard to Article 15(7) of the treaty. This enhanced phase will ensure that monitoring and reporting take place in real time. Individuals who are relocated to Rwanda will be able to raise any issues of concern, should they arise, with the committee. It should also be remembered, as I have said on a number of occasions, that this is a legally binding treaty that will become part of Rwandan domestic law.
Taking all of this into consideration, I submit that these amendments are unnecessary. Further, they undermine the objective of the Bill, unnecessarily delaying, potentially, the relocation of individuals to Rwanda. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, if the Committee will forgive me, slid into an earlier part of the Minister’s response was a reference to some glowing statements about the progress within Rwanda on gender equality. Those statements should not be allowed to be left standing, because although we have been very much focused in this debate on refoulement, we are assuming that if refugees—in particular, women refugees—are given status in Rwanda they will remain and have to live in Rwanda. On those glowing statements made about gender equality there, yes, it is well known that Rwanda has made considerable progress in terms of parliamentary representation and ministerial representation—indeed, more progress than our own Parliament has.
None the less, is the Minister aware that in Rwanda, 83% of women work in the informal sector or are in low-wage occupations, earning on average 60% of men’s incomes? Its National Gender Statistics Report 2021 revealed that physical violence affected 36.7% of women and girls aged 15-49 in Rwanda. Will the Minister acknowledge, with regard to his earlier remarks, that making claims about gender equality progress in Rwanda needs to be done with caution?
I respectfully agree with the noble Baroness that it is important to look at such matters with caution. In relation to the figures which she cites, the statistics concerning domestic violence would be primarily, one presumes, a matter for Rwandan society itself.
I am sorry: those were not domestic figures but general violence against women and girls figures.
I am very aware of the noble Baroness’s campaigning work on the topic, and she will be aware that the bulk of violence visited upon women criminally is within the domestic setting.
Given that, what is the basis for the Minister’s assertion about gender equality, which was also made in the letter of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, to Peers? Can he give us some references, since the noble Baroness has?
With respect to the important point which the noble Baroness tables, I have a feeling that this matter is dealt with in a later group. I do not have the figures to hand at the moment. If we do not touch upon that in a later group, with which I may not be concerned—I have not had a look at that, as a result of the division of labour on these Benches—then on the point which the noble Baroness makes, which reflects the original question, I will make sure that those figures are either brought out in the scope of the debate or are the subject of correspondence.
To be helpful, as the Minister finds his place, what is clearly becoming a bone of contention between the Government Front Bench and the Committee is the progress that has been made. To help us before we get to Report, can the Minister write to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate to show the significant progress—that is the phrase he used—that Rwanda has made to deal with the concerns of the Supreme Court? We would then have some evidence before we get to Report to see the exact content of those significant reforms.
I am happy to take up the noble Lord’s suggestion. We will correspond with him and other noble Lords who have participated in this debate.
I touched on the role of the independent monitoring committee. We have heard about the presence of persons from outwith Rwanda offering their expertise and skills, bolstering the system that will rule in these situations.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, made a point in relation to the situation in Rwanda. Of course, the Committee ought to be reminded that it is not the intention of the Government that this be a means of sending people to Rwanda; our intention is that people who want to come to Britain will be deterred from following illegal routes travelling to Britain. We intend to use Rwanda as a deterrent for those people. Rwanda itself is safe. The point is that the people who want to travel to Britain will be deterred from travelling if they know that they will be taken instead to Rwanda. This is expressed in a legally binding treaty, which will become part of Rwandan domestic law.
Taking all of what has been said, including the extensive extemporary interventions from Members on all sides, I submit to the Committee that these amendments are unnecessary. They undermine the Bill’s objective. They unnecessarily delay matters in relation to the relocation of individuals and the deterrent effect of which I spoke. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I congratulate the Minister on keeping his cool during this debate, because he has had a lot of information requests thrust at him.
If you were to separate this group of amendments into two halves, the first is about the process by which Parliament deals with the results of the Bill and how it should do it, looking at normal parliamentary practice. That is what was at the heart of this group; we should do it in a proper and appropriate manner. When the Government have determined that it is safe, according to the conditions laid down for them by this House, they would put an order before this House and the Commons, which would be voted on and could have a judicial end if necessary. That was the purpose of this group of amendments.
The second half of the group is much more about what we know in order to make that decision about whether Rwanda is safe. We have heard, “Rwanda is safe, but we’re going to make it safer”. We have heard “It will be expedited”, “We are working towards the treaty” and “We are”—as written down—“seeking assurances and commitments”. All those are in the future tense. The House is being asked to change our mind about what it has already determined, and we need to have the evidence to make that determination. On the most fundamental, simple question—whether, to implement the treaty, the Government of Rwanda will pass a new Rwandan asylum law—we do not know the answer, let alone having answers to all the other questions raised. We do not know where we will be by the time we get to Report.
On the issue of process, bearing in mind the idea of rolling sunset clauses—we need to look a judicial review and everything else—all those matters are important, but they do not deal with what happens before the Rwanda treaty is enacted; they deal with afterwards. I am interested in what happens both before and after, to find solutions which meet the needs of this Committee.
In a sense, I am in a quandary. If you were to ask me after listening to this debate to make a decision on whether Rwanda is safe, the answer would be, “I don’t know and I’ll come back later—but please tell me when I should come back”. As far as I can see, the Committee does not know when that will be. We have had no evidence, dates or timings, or rollout of information to help us make that decision. I hope that we will see it. If we do not, we certainly will be back. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
We have. The noble Baroness may disagree with us, but we have put forward a number of proposals involving tougher action to tackle criminal gangs, including more co-operation with our European partners—particularly France—and tackling the problem at source. That would be done through the re-establishment of the aid budget, which the noble Baroness’s party cut; however, I do not want to get party political about this. Those are the sorts of things we have suggested. The noble Lord shakes his head, but that does not mean that we do not have a plan—simply that he and the noble Baroness disagree with it. That is the nature of political debate. In supporting the amendments from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, we are saying that undermining international law is not the way to tackle a problem that we all agree needs to be sorted.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this debate, which has been a far-ranging one given the nature of the amendments. Clause 1(4)(a) and (b) states that it is recognised
“that the Parliament of the United Kingdom is sovereign”
and that
“the validity of an Act is unaffected by international law”.
That is a statement in conventional terms of constitutional reality. My noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth expressed it with his characteristic clarity and concision. We have heard nothing in this debate—not from my noble friend Lord Hailsham, not from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, not from the noble Lord, Lord German, on the Liberal Democrat Benches—to disturb that reality.
I will take matters out of the order in which they were presented, to deal with them conveniently. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, replying a moment ago from the Opposition Front Bench, asked for a word about the status of the instruments enumerated in Clause 1(6). Following on from what I said, it is not the case that the Bill jettisons those commitments. It says—as my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth said—that this provision exemplifies what is meant by international law. When it lists these provisions, it does so for the purpose of stating what is, again, the constitutional reality—that the validity of an Act is unaffected by international law. That includes those provisions. That is and always has been the case. I appreciate that not all Members of the Committee think that it should be the case. We have heard cogent submissions from Members of the Committee to that effect. However, the point is that it is the case until such time as Parliament decides otherwise.
I shall be brief. Why did the Minister put that on the face of the Bill, when all the lawyers in the Committee agree that, as a matter of domestic law, unless a treaty is incorporated directly, it is not justiciable in the UK courts? None the less, as a matter of international law, our word is binding. My noble friend Lord Coaker made it very clear why it is so important in this dangerous world that our word should be binding. If this is just a statement of domestic law, why was there the need to put it in the Bill? Is it because the Minister wants to show a bit of ankle to his friends who are pushing even further to the right with their amendment? What on earth are the Government trying to signal with this kind of statement in primary legislation?
There are a number of points that I could address there. As for the matter of me as a Minister showing ankle—the noble Baroness of course speaks metaphorically—I found it as difficult to comprehend as I found the references to a “Braverman wing” of the Conservative Party.
I go back to the submission of the noble Baroness earlier on. International law, as she is well aware, operates on the international plane, not on the domestic plane. There could be no greater restraint on state action than a treaty, and that is what the Government propose to deliver. She gave a submission earlier about the implications for Ministers and indeed for civil servants. To reassure her, I say that this does not bear on the actions of civil servants fulfilling their duties to assist the Government.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, referred to Section 19(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act. He was, I think, disparaging about the use of that provision, as opposed to Section 19(1)(a), which more familiarly is a statement given by the promoter of a Bill that, in his or her view, it is lawful. Of course, there is nothing unusual about the use of Section 19(1)(b) in these circumstances; it is entirely appropriate, which is why it appears in the Bill. It was used, for example, by the last Labour Government in, I think, the Communications Act 2003—I might be corrected on that, but it has been used by Labour when in government in those circumstances.
Can the Minister say how many times it has been used in total?
The noble and learned Lord will not be surprised to hear that I do not have the figure to hand, but I imagine it is readily available from Westlaw.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said, “Answer yes or no, does our word continue to be our bond?”, or words to that effect. It continues to be our bond within the circumstances of the incontrovertible constitutional position set out in Clause 1(4)(b). The United Kingdom and this Government take their obligations—
I wonder whether I can encourage the Minister to try that out on some foreigner with whose country we are signing a binding agreement, by telling him, “We will shake hands on that but, by the way, we can do what we like afterwards”. He ought to try it; he would find it quite an interesting experience.
That would be a treaty commitment of the sort that is the strongest bond that two countries can enter into, as we have been reminding the Committee. The conventional statement of constitutional reality—as I described it and as my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough described it in his submission, citing AV Dicey—was little more than a reassertion of the position that applies in law and that always has.
The Bill, as currently worded, enables Parliament to come to the same conclusion and provides a statutory finding that decision-makers, including courts or tribunals, will conclusively treat Rwanda as a safe country. Amendments 9 and 13, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham, seek to remove the provision that recognises the sovereignty of Parliament and the provision that confirms that the validity of an Act is unaffected by a domestic court’s or a tribunal’s view that there is a conflict with international law. That is at the core of the Bill, and many of its other provisions are designed to ensure that Parliament’s conclusion on the safety of Rwanda is accepted by the domestic court. The treaty, alongside the evidence of changes in Rwanda since summer 2022, to which we referred, will enable Parliament to conclude that Rwanda is safe, and the new Bill provides Parliament with the opportunity so to do.
I note that Amendment 10 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German, is a probing amendment that makes it clear that the primary responsibility of the courts is to uphold the constitution of the United Kingdom, including the constitution’s fundamental commitment to the rule of law. That amendment again sets out the status quo. But the rule of law, as a concept, is difficult to tie down in a series of short statements, and I fear that the noble Lord’s amendment would be productive of debate in the abstract, producing perhaps more heat than light.
I again assure the Committee that the United Kingdom continues to be bound by and respects its legal and international obligations. The Bill is predicated on both Rwanda’s and the United Kingdom’s compliance with international law in the form of the treaty, which itself reflects the international legal obligations of the United Kingdom and Rwanda. It does not legislate away our international obligations. The purpose of the Bill is to say that, on the basis of the treaty and the evidence before it, Parliament believes those obligations to have been met—not that we do not care whether they have been. I repeat that the Government take their international obligations, including those under the ECHR, very seriously. There is nothing in the Bill that requires the United Kingdom to breach its international obligations.
As noble Lords will know, states take different approaches to their different international law obligations. Some states treat international law as automatically forming part of their domestic law, but the United Kingdom and other countries with a similar background, including many Commonwealth countries, with which we share so much, have a dualist system in which a treaty ratified by the Government does not alter the laws of the state unless and until it is incorporated into national law by domestic legislation.
On Amendment 32, tabled by my noble friend Lady Lawlor, this legislation provides that a court may grant interim relief, which prevents removal to Rwanda, only where it is satisfied that there is a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm. As my noble friend put it in her submission, the Bill needs tightening. We do not accept the amendment proposed by her and my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough. None the less, I invite the Committee to consider that in the course of the discussion and the interventions which were made on my noble friends, matters of interest and importance emerged.
We do hold that law has to command public support and that it should emerge from public consideration, whether through our common law, which does no more than evolve to meet certain essential propositions that bargains should be sustained and that harm should be punished and compensated for, or whether it emerges from a representative Parliament. None the less, the law dare not risk moving too far from the confidence of the public. The risk to the maintenance of institutions and public peace of judicial activism and overreach moving too far away from what the public is prepared to appreciate is, I think, the point that my noble friends took.
My noble friend Lady Meyer added to the discussion by stating that while the Bill was, in her words, not perfect—that has been something of a leitmotif running through the submissions which we have heard today, and indeed at Second Reading—it is none the less not holding itself out as a silver bullet. It is not perfect because—to quote my noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere—in a dull and sublunary world, very few things are capable of perfection. However, as my noble friend Lady Meyer pointed out, it is rather a pragmatic response to an urgent crisis. I commend my noble friends for their thoughtful analysis of the problems facing other countries grappling with the impact of mass migration, and the risks to their own domestic systems which have been identified as flowing therefrom.
I have said to the Committee and will say again that, as I think we heard earlier from my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, other countries are watching keenly the experience of this country in moving legislation of this sort. It is clear that this is a huge problem. I readily accept everything that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said from the Opposition Front Bench as the last submission to this group about the need to work with our partners abroad to devote resources to smashing the pernicious grip of criminal gangs on people’s lives. However, as I said at Second Reading, we are doing all of that now and there is no simple answer to the problem, and that is why the Bill is being advanced.
I will revert to Amendment 32. As I said, the legislation provides that a court may grant interim relief preventing removal to Rwanda only where it is satisfied that there is a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm. That is the same threshold which can lead to a temporary suspension of the duty to remove under the Illegal Migration Act. These measures are necessary to ensure compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights and to ensure that the grounds by which people can challenge removal are appropriately narrow. This amendment also undermines the safeguards that we see as necessary to ensure that the Bill and the Illegal Migration Act are compatible with the United Kingdom’s international obligations. The Illegal Migration Act and the Bill include provision for a person subject to removal to a safe third country to make a limited class of suspensive claim on the grounds that they would face a real risk of serious and irreversible harm were they to be removed.
The threshold for serious and irreversible harm is a high one. The harm in question must be both imminent and permanent. This reflects the test applied by the European Court of Human Rights when considering whether to indicate an interim measure under Rule 39, meaning that the United Kingdom courts will have to consider these questions before they are progressed to Strasbourg, further undermining the case for Strasbourg to intervene.
I turn to Amendment 80 tabled by noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn. The Northern Ireland position was also adverted to in the debate on group 1 by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. She is not in her place, but I apply my remarks across the House. The Bill will apply in full in Northern Ireland, as it will across the whole United Kingdom. Nothing in the Windsor Framework or the Belfast/Good Friday agreement changes that. I seek to provide reassurance to the Committee in relation to the constitutionally vital point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn.
The Government’s position is clear that the Bill’s provisions relate to administrative matters of asylum procedure and as such do not engage Article 2. This is because the Bill does not relate to the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, rights given effect in domestic law in Northern Ireland and underpinned by EU law before the end of the transition period, or the specific rights contained in the Belfast/Good Friday agreement which concern Northern Ireland’s particular circumstances. Any suggestion that the relevant chapter of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement should impinge on the Bill implies that the rights in the agreement are far more expansive than is the case. The Government will continue to defend the application of the Bill on a United Kingdom-wide basis.
I offer further reassurance to the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, and his colleagues on those Benches, with the letter written by my learned colleague in the other place the Minister for Immigration, Michael Tomlinson KC, to Sir Jeffrey Donaldson of the DUP dated 19 January 2024. He said that as he set out in debate and at Second Reading on 12 December, the Bill applies across the entire United Kingdom, and
“neither the Withdrawal Agreement nor the Windsor Framework do anything to cut across that position. I do recognise, however, the concerns raised by your colleagues in Parliament as to whether the Bill may have specific interactions in that regard”.
Nothing in the Bill affects the required incorporation into domestic law of the ECHR, as required in the agreement, or the ability of domestic courts to consider issues of compatibility. Nor does the Bill alter the capacity of the domestic courts to overrule incompatible legislation of the Northern Ireland Assembly with convention rights. The noble Lord referred the Committee’s attention to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Government have underlined consistently that the Charter of Fundamental Rights does not form part of domestic law anywhere in the UK, including Northern Ireland.
I want to be clear. I referred to the provision of the procedures directive which requires a case-by-case decision on whether a third country is safe. I contrasted that with Clause 2(1) of the Bill, which says that:
“Every decision-maker must conclusively treat the Republic of Rwanda as a safe country”.
Is the Minister saying that there is no difference between those provisions, or is he accepting there has been a diminution of rights under the procedures directive and saying that it does not matter? If that is case, can he explain why it does not matter?
My Lords, I do not wish to enter into a matter that lies outwith my department and sphere of responsibility at this hour. With the noble Lord’s permission, we shall write.
Having offered those reassurances to the unionist Benches, I offer this conclusion. We have devised a solution that is innovative and within the framework of international law. It is a long-term solution that addresses the concerns set out in the Supreme Court judgment and ensures that this policy can go ahead, paving the way, as I said earlier, for other countries to look at similar solutions. I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to review the criteria for the granting by Home Office officials of asylum status for individuals with previous convictions for offences committed in the United Kingdom.
My Lords, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 strengthened existing legislation and reduced the criminality threshold. From 28 June 2022, anyone convicted of a particularly serious crime resulting in a custodial sentence of 12 months or more, who is considered a danger to the United Kingdom, will be denied asylum and will be considered for removal from the United Kingdom. We believe this approach is the right one.
My Lords, the public are rightly concerned at recent cases which seem to indicate that our asylum system is broken and that we are unable to deport foreign criminals and failed asylum seekers due to bureaucratic inertia, judicial intervention and incompetence. Will my noble friend therefore commit to an urgent review of the criteria used in assessing asylum claims, including alleged religious conversions to Christianity, facilitated by the Church of England? Does he agree with me that, fundamentally, this and future Governments must decide between the safety and security of their own citizens and the perverse and damaging rulings of a foreign court?
My Lords, there are several reasons why a decision may be overturned at appeal, including new evidence that was not available to asylum caseworkers. Where a crime has been committed, it will be considered whether the person committing the crime poses a danger to the community and should be denied protection. As for the matter of Christian conversions that my noble friend raised, it is important to bear in mind that the Christian church—the Church of England—is not an arm of the Home Office, and that conversion is not a bureaucratic exercise but rather a matter of the operation of grace, such as we heard from the right reverend Prelate earlier.
My Lords, will the Minister confirm that this is absolutely nothing to do with foreign courts? If the system, as outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is broken, there have been 14 years for this Government to put it right. Is it not correct that, from 2004 onwards, the restriction was already in place in relation to the removal of those who had committed crimes—including sexual crimes—enhanced, yes, by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022? Is it not the process, rather than anything to do with the law, that requires examination?
My Lords, any foreign national convicted of a crime and given a prison sentence is considered for deportation at the earliest opportunity. Under the legislation to which the noble Lord referred, the UK Borders Act 2007, a deportation order must be made where a foreign national has been convicted of an offence and received a custodial sentence of at least 12 months. As to the other matters raised in the question, it is important to remember that restrictions on returning persons to the countries from whence they came are also matters of our international obligations, including treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights.
My Lords, both the Church of England and my most reverend friend the Archbishop of Canterbury have repeatedly said that we want the boats to stop, criminal gangs to be prosecuted and people to be held accountable if they commit offences. We note that a prominent Member in the other place recently said that the Church is
“facilitating industrial-scale bogus asylum claims”,
which has been widely reported in the press. Administering the sacrament of baptism is one of the core duties of the clergy. Given that, what is the evidence to substantiate claims that baptism is being used systematically and extensively to support asylum claims? If the Minister cannot give me that information now—I understand that it is a big ask—can he please write to me? We would like to see the evidence.
My Lords, I have already spoken on the nature of baptism, and I hope that what I said corresponds with the views of the right reverend Prelate on the matter. All asylum claims are considered carefully on their individual merits, including issues relating to the freedom of religion and belief and the credibility of a conversion. Indeed, on that last point, additional training is being rolled out to officials who assess matters of credibility in this context. I invite the House to reflect on the fact that the Home Office has for many years worked closely with the All-Party Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief and the asylum advocacy group, and engaged with a wide range of faith groups to assist in training caseworkers.
My Lords, I am sure that I am being charitable in assuming that the Question from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, was motivated by his deep concern about violence against women in this country. With that in mind, can the Minister say any more about the Government’s strategy for dealing with the terrible acid and alkali attacks perpetrated by all sorts of people of different nationalities, including our own citizens?
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her comment. It is important for us all to reflect on the fact that, wicked and despicable though this action was, it is not unprecedented. Indeed, I note that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who is in his place today, chaired the Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh in the case of Modiak in 1992, where a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment was upheld. He approved the wording of the trial judge, who described that act, of extremely similar circumstances to the one with which the House is concerned, as being of “unprecedented gravity”.
My Lords, further to that point, can the Minister say what monitoring of and protection from the public can expect in relation to somebody on the sex offender register? What progress has been made with the independent review that the Government undertook last year, and produced by the former chief constable of Derbyshire, on the very serious aspects of violence against women in this matter? He made recommendations that the Government certainly need to pursue, particularly on the identification of location.
My Lords, I undertake to write on the review to which the noble Lord adverted, not having the details of its scope and progress to hand as yet. I should have said that I will also write to the right reverend Prelate on the matter he raised. What I can I say is that all who claim asylum undergo a series of security checks against immigration and police databases. They are screened to identify individuals who have been involved in criminality, both inside and outside the United Kingdom, or are persons who engage the national security interest.
My Lords, if an asylum seeker is assessed as presenting no risk to the people of this country, even if they have committed crimes in the past, which may have been related to the persecution they faced in their own country, will they be granted asylum in this country?
My Lords, all applications will be treated on a case-by-case basis. The situation the noble Baroness described is one in which the individual circumstances will rule.
My Lords, following my noble friend Lord Blunkett’s excellent question, can the Minister comment on the following figures? There are 8,786 convicted foreign criminals with varied status living in communities. Half have been here for at least 12 months, with almost 4,000 for over five years. The inspectorate said that the Government had lost control and that this was
“no way to run a government department”.
As my noble friend asked, what will the Government do to look at implementing the existing process and get on with it?
My Lords, progress is being made. In the year ending September 2023, there were 5,506 enforced returns, an increase of 54% on the previous year. In that cohort, foreign national offenders make up the majority of enforced returns, at 62%.
My Lords, can my noble and learned friend comment on press reports that suggest that the Home Office has been following a policy of not returning people to Afghanistan? If that is the case, the arguments about this particular case and the criteria that were applied therefore seem to be irrelevant. Can he say what proportion of the cases that have come before the Home Office have resulted in people being returned to Afghanistan?
I am obliged to my noble friend for his question. First, I emphasise that it is not Home Office policy that dictates the return of persons to Afghanistan; rather, it is our adherence to international treaties, as I said earlier. On the specific figure my noble friend sought, in 2023 99% of Afghan applications were granted. That figure is up from 49% of applications from that country in 2020. It reflects our international obligations and the situation in that unhappy country.