Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

33: Leave out Clause 4 and insert the following new Clause—
“Decisions in individual claims(1) Section 2 does not prevent—(a) the Secretary of State or an immigration officer from deciding (under any applicable provision of, or made under, the Immigration Acts) whether the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country for the person in question or for a group of persons to which that person belongs; or(b) a court or tribunal considering a review of, or an appeal against, a relevant decision to the extent that the review or appeal is brought on the grounds that the Republic of Rwanda is not a safe country for the person in question or for a group of persons to which that person belongs; or(c) a decision-maker considering whether there is a real risk that the Republic of Rwanda will remove or send the person in question to another State in contravention of any of its international obligations.(2) The court or tribunal may grant an interim remedy that prevents or delays, or that has the effect of preventing or delaying, the removal of the person to the Republic of Rwanda. (3) Section 54 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 is disapplied for the purposes of this Act.(4) In this section—“interim remedy” means any interim remedy or relief however described (including, in particular, an interim injunction or interdict);“relevant decision” means a decision taken by the Secretary of State or an immigration officer (under any applicable provision of, or made under, the Immigration Acts) that the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country for the person in question.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment restores the ability of the Secretary of State, immigration officers, courts, and tribunals, to consider whether the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country and jurisdiction of domestic courts and tribunals to grant interim relief.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, on Monday overwhelming majorities of your Lordships voted to amend this Bill by adding compliance with the law to the purpose of deterrence in Clause 1, by requiring a statement from the treaty monitoring committee, before and for as long as Rwanda may be presumed safe, and by allowing such presumption to be displaced by credible evidence to the contrary. It is the last of these that provided the most legal, as opposed to political, protection. Yet even that would become illusory if the dangerous interference with His Majesty’s judges’ jurisdiction in the current Clause 4 passes unamended, so Amendment 33 would restore to decision-makers, and crucially our courts, the ability to consider the safety of Rwanda for people and groups to which they belong.

I draw your Lordships’ attention to today’s thunderer, expressing the personal reflections of the chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on her recent visit to Kigali. Decision-makers and courts would once more be able to consider any real risk of refoulement contrary to international law. Vitally, this amendment also restores our age-old common-law tradition of His Majesty’s courts having discretion to grant interim relief while a case is considered—to protect a claimant, in this case, from removal in the meantime. We have had rule-of-law appetisers; this is now the main course, but it must be fast food to prevent filibuster and to allow more votes. That was two minutes; I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps within two minutes I will complete my observations to support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. To anticipate what my noble friend the Minister is going to say, I acknowledge that there is force in his prospective argument, which I suspect will be that if we allow these amendments we facilitate a number of unmeritorious applications to the courts, and that will stand in the way of the Bill being effective. There is force in that argument, but I put before your Lordships three considerations that point the other way.

First, the judiciary can be more robust in the way it deals with unmeritorious applications. Furthermore, although I am not an expert in this field at all—I have not practised in immigration law for a long time—a more effective filter could be put in place to weed out the unmeritorious. That is the first point. The second is really the point of principle: I regard it as very dangerous indeed to exclude individuals who happen to be within the jurisdiction from having recourse to the courts for protection. I regard that as a very dangerous proposition, and we should accede to it with the greatest caution. That takes me to my last point, which is essentially a pragmatic one. Those of your Lordships who share my doubts, especially on the matter of principle, should ask themselves whether the Bill is likely to achieve its policy objective. If it is not, we will be doing things that are very bad in principle in support of a policy that will achieve nothing.

My own judgment—I concede that it is a matter of judgment—is that individuals will not be deterred from crossing the channel in small boats by the slight prospect of being relocated to Rwanda. If that is right, we will be doing something that is in principle profoundly wrong in support of a policy that is going nowhere. It is for that combination of reasons that I shall support the noble Baroness. I have spoken for three minutes.

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I think, with respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that that point has been canvassed extensively on previous occasions.

As we set out on Monday, the legislation required for Rwanda to ratify the treaty passed that country’s lower house on 28 February, and it will now go to that country’s upper house. Once ratified, the treaty will become law in Rwanda. It follows that the Government of Rwanda would then be required to give effect to the terms of the treaty in accordance with its domestic law, as well as international law. As my noble friend Lord Lilley set out on Monday, it is inconceivable that Rwanda will not implement carefully and considerately, and we continue to work at pace with the Government of Rwanda on implementation.

We therefore do not consider it necessary to make the proposed changes to Clause 4 to permit decision-makers or courts and tribunals to consider claims on the basis of Rwanda’s safety generally, or that Rwanda will or may remove persons to another state in contravention of its international obligations or permit the courts and tribunals to grant interim relief, other than where there is a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm. There are ample safeguards in the Bill, and these amendments would be contrary to the Bill’s whole purpose.

To conclude, we have made it clear that we cannot continue to allow relocations to Rwanda to be frustrated and delayed as a result of systemic challenges on its general safety. In this context, the safety of a particular country is a matter for Parliament and one in which Parliament’s view should be sovereign. The evidence that we have provided and the commitments made by the United Kingdom and the Government of Rwanda through this internationally binding treaty enable Rwanda to be deemed a safe country. The Bill will allow Parliament to confirm that it considers that it has sufficient material before it to judge that Rwanda is in general safe and makes it clear that the finding cannot be disturbed by the courts.

Before I sit down, I return in a bit more detail to the matter which the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, started with his comment and which was answered by others. As we have set out previously, the constitution of Rwanda includes a broad prohibition of discrimination and does not criminalise or discriminate against sexual orientation in law or policy. As part of the published evidence pack, the updated country information note gave careful consideration to evidence relating to the treatment of LGBT individuals in Rwanda. Rwandan legal protection for LGBT rights is, as we have heard, generally considered more progressive than that of neighbouring countries.

I will conclude my submissions with reference to the point raised earlier by my noble friend Lord Lilley when he spoke about the precedent set by the 2004 legislation and referred to the views of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, in relation to parliamentary supremacy. As my noble friend correctly quoted, it is a matter of this country enjoying parliamentary supremacy. Parliamentary supremacy is at the heart of accountability to Parliament and, through Parliament, accountability to the people about whom my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne has spoken so eloquently during the debate on this Bill.

In conclusion, I submit that the noble Baroness should not press her amendment for the reasons I have given. Were she to do so, I have no hesitation in inviting the House to reject it.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

As always, I am grateful to all noble Lords, particularly those who spoke briefly. I am grateful to my supporters, not least the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Defending our constitution and the rule of law runs very deep in his family, and he has brought such honour to his family, your Lordships’ House and our country with his contributions on this Bill. To the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, I say simply that, in this case, the Supreme Court did not attack the policy; it made a finding of fact, as it is entitled to do.

I am grateful to all Members of your Lordships’ House who participated in such good faith on the trip to Rwanda, as part of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As we have heard, even in good faith there can be a dispute of fact between parliamentarians, let alone people on different sides of your Lordships’ House. Forgive me, but the man of the match in answering that predicament was the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who said that this is what courts are for. I am grateful, as always, for the support of my noble friend Lord Coaker.

The Minister kindly apologised for the lack of concision, but a psychiatrist would always find the magic words hidden in the many. On a previous occasion, he told us that Rwanda was to become safe by decree. Today, he told us that this is about special circumstances. The road to hell is not just paved with good intentions; it is paved with special circumstances as well. He speaks rightly of parliamentary sovereignty. We are part of Parliament, and parliamentary sovereignty is not executive domination.

I am particularly sad that parts of today’s debate contrasted with what we heard yesterday in the debate on foreign affairs, when so many noble Lords, including those from the Government Front Bench, spoke about the importance of the international rule of law. Today, the Home Office is on parade and we hear exactly the opposite. It is time to trust the courts, and it is time to test the opinion of the House.

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Our courts and tribunals should be able to exercise that role. There may be defects in the procedures adopted by the European Court of Human Rights; among other things, there is no right for the party against whom proceedings are brought to appear and express a view, whereas in our courts that certainly is a position, and our procedures are much more consistent with what we regard as in accordance with proper procedures. What my amendment seeks to do, very simply, is to enable our courts and tribunals to exercise that role in this important matter. I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly in support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the amendments in this group. I do so for three reasons.

First, whatever one’s views about international law, parties to any dispute must have some access to interim relief—whether neighbourhood disputes or business disputes, and particularly in relation to human rights concerns. The Government are resisting interim relief in our domestic courts, but they really cannot do that in relation to the European Court of Human Rights as well, or there will be no interim relief for mistakes that can lead to very dire consequences—as has happened in the past, even in immigration cases in this country.

The second reason I support the amendments in the group is this. When the Government originally raised concerns about Rule 39 last year, it was because of natural justice concerns about the procedure of the courts not always allowing Governments to be heard, or not allowing them to be heard after interim relief had been granted. Those procedural concerns have now been addressed, not least thanks to the efforts of Foreign Office Ministers, including the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, for which he is to be commended.

Finally, I think back to yesterday’s debate, which did your Lordships’ House such credit. I remind noble Lords that there are currently Rule 39 interim measures in place to prevent the Russian Federation executing Ukrainian prisoners of war. It will do our arguments and moral authority no good at all if we start saying that we can pick and choose which Rule 39 measures we accept.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley—in relation to his question to the noble and learned Lord—that he might like to look at today’s Politico, where Dunja Mijatović, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, has criticised not just the present Bill but the French state for the very case that he referred to. The French were wrong to do what they did and we must do better.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose Amendments 36, 37, and 38 in respect of Rule 39 interim measures. I am afraid that I will not observe or respect the admonition that we should brief necessarily. We are discussing the substantial and significant issue of parliamentary sovereignty, and the right of the British people to have their views respected and not blocked by an unelected House, especially when the elected House, the other place, has been able to make a decision in significant numbers.

In deference to the sensitivities of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, I will, for the avoidance of doubt, be referring to “an international” rather than “a foreign” court. I am sure he will be pleased about that. These are fundamentally blocking or wrecking amendments, designed to make the Bill inoperable. They are designed to thwart the will of the people, expressed through an electoral mandate and the will of the other place, to reduce immigration and to fulfil the primary duty of government, which is to protect its borders and its people and, more importantly—I look to the Lords spiritual in this respect—the moral imperative to save lives in the channel and destroy the business model of evil people traffickers.

More specifically, these amendments subvert and traduce the long-held principle that our laws are made in Parliament and implemented by the courts—simply, the concept of parliamentary sovereignty—in favour of a nebulous, opaque concept of “the rule of law” and the ECHR as a living document. The former is essentially uncodified and lacks precise consensual meaning, but it is used to advance judicial activism by unelected, unaccountable jurists in an international court, undermining faith and trust in the court system, parliamentary democracy and government in this country and destroying the delicate equilibrium between the Executive, the legislature and the judiciary. There is but one rule of law, and that is made in Parliament by elected representatives. That confers legitimacy on our proceedings. These amendments will assist in furthering the trend towards the politicisation of the judiciary.

Even the concept of the separation of powers, much lauded in this House, is itself alien to the constitutional settlement of the UK, and is certainly an evolving issue. It is unclear and prey to subjective interpretation, as we established earlier this week on Report when we discussed the deeming presumption of a safe list for asylum seekers, including Greece, in the case of Nasseri v Secretary of State in 2009. This was ultimately found by the Appeal Court and the House of Lords, under Section III of the ECHR and the Human Rights Act in respect of inhuman treatment, not to have violated those pieces of legislation. That was the Blair Government, who created an unrebuttable presumption that a list of countries was safe, so there is a precedent already set many years ago.

I wish to ponder briefly the idea of the rule of law, Rule 39 interim measures and the implications for parliamentary sovereignty and the myth of the ECHR, which is eulogised with rapture by so many noble Lords in the context of our own Parliament and judicial system. Advancing the rule of law as superior to parliamentary sovereignty—“the rule of lawyers”, as my noble friend Lord Lilley said in his excellent opinion editorial in the Daily Telegraph two days ago—is what we are looking at. It is about the subjective fiat of another court, over which we have no control. It is a modern phenomenon, as opposed to parliamentary sovereignty, and an example of judicial mission creep. That said, even Lord Bingham stated, after the case of Jackson v Attorney-General on the Hunting Act 2004:

“The bedrock of the British constitution is … the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament”.


He echoed the thoughts of such eminent jurists as Lord Denning and AV Dicey, to whom I referred in Committee.

As we know, and as my noble friend Lord Lilley alluded to earlier, the French have taken an altogether more robust view of the authority and sanctity of their own domestic legislation vis-à-vis the perverse and sometimes dangerous and damaging rulings of the ECHR. In November 2023, Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin removed an Uzbek national, MA, who was allegedly a radicalised Islamist extremist, despite a Rule 39 interim measure against this being done, the first time that the French Government have openly defied such an interim measure. Indeed, they also defied the Conseil d’État, the equivalent of the Supreme Court.

The French elite is more likely to question and challenge the état de droit, the French equivalent of the rule of law. In an article in Le Figaro—

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Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

45: Clause 9, page 6, line 38, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) This Act comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by regulations appoint.(1A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless— (a) the Secretary of State has laid a statement before each House of Parliament pursuant to section 1(1C), and(b) a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(1B) The Secretary of State may by regulations made in accordance with subsection (1A), provide for the Act to be in force for an initial period not exceeding 2 years (the initial implementation period).(1C) At the expiration of the initial implementation period, the Secretary of State may by regulations made in accordance with subsection (1A), provide for a further period during which the Act will be in force, provided that such an extension is for a period not exceeding 2 years.(1D) At the expiration of the first extension and in respect of any subsequent extension, the Secretary of State, may by regulation, made in accordance with subsection (1A) provide for the Act to be in force for a further period, any such extension must not be for a period exceeding two years.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment replaces commencement of the Bill, currently triggered by the entry into force of the Rwanda Treaty (an executive act), and the Act’s continuation for periods of no more than two years, with a parliamentary trigger requiring both a statement from the Secretary of State and resolution of each House of Parliament.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, there is always an alpha and an omega, and here we are. Earlier, the Minister said that he does not apologise for insisting on accountability—parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability for the crucial decisions that are being discussed here. He said, “We will not ratify until we are satisfied that various provisions of the Rwanda treaty have been fully implemented”. Who is “I” and who is “we”? I think the Government’s argument throughout the Bill’s deliberations has been about parliamentary sovereignty, which is a fair point, but if it is parliamentary sovereignty and not executive domination, my Amendment 45, supported by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich, really challenges the Government to say whether they believe in parliamentary sovereignty, as opposed to executive domination. This amendment is about commencement. It would give Parliament, rather than just the Executive, a role. As I see the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, in his place, I ask him to explain.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I will make just a one-minute contribution to this debate on Amendment 45. This is the rolling sunset to which I have previously referred. It is a natural phenomenon not previously identified by meteorologists, but the purpose is, as the noble Baroness has said, to ensure that the Secretary of State is accountable. He or she has to come to Parliament to trigger the commencement, and the rolling sunset provides for assessment every two years, in effect. That seems to me highly desirable, and in that spirit of desirability I support this amendment.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I did not entirely overlook them; I thought they were redundant, on the basis that there is no chief inspector—he has been sacked—so, no, we have not asked the chief inspector to look at the matter. As and when an interim is appointed, I am sure that will be part of his remit.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, as always, I am grateful to all noble Lords, not only those who have spoken in this group, which is supposed to be about commencement of the Act, but also to those who participated in this important Report stage where 10 very important amendments—all of which improve rather than wreck the Bill—have been passed.

However, there is an alpha and an omega, and I remind noble Lords and Ministers opposite that, right at the beginning of the Bill, we are told in Clause 1(2)(b) that

“this Act gives effect to the judgement of Parliament”—

not the judgment of the Government or the Prime Minister, or the Home Secretary of the day, but the judgment of Parliament—

“that the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country”.

Amendment 45 is about giving Parliament a role in commencement of the Bill, because ratification of the Rwanda treaty is obviously an Executive act, not a parliamentary one, in the current terms. That is all; that is not wrecking—it is improvement. Many noble Lords have made that point.

In earlier debates, noble Lords, including noble and learned Lords, and Ministers have spoken about decrees. But this is Britain in the first quarter of the 21st century and we do not rule by decree; we govern by consent, democracy and accountability built on the rule of law. Commencement of this very controversial legislation should be by parliamentary judgment, as the Bill provides in Clause 1, and not by Executive decree, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, mentioned earlier, and certainly not by just simple treaty ratification, which is an Executive act.

I am not going to press this amendment, but before this Bill returns, much amended, to the other place, I ask the noble Lords and Ministers to consider—because their whole argument is based on accountability and parliamentary sovereignty—whether Parliament, rather than Ministers or the Executive alone, should have a role in determining whether Rwanda is actually safe and continually safe, and whether this Bill, which may become an Act, should be brought into force. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 45 withdrawn.