Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Stewart of Dirleton Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I hesitate to stand up, looking around. We very much support Amendment 33 from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. If she wishes to test the opinion of the House, we will certainly support her.

I just say to the noble Lord, Lord Murray, in defence of the Select Committee system, that sometimes there are differences of opinion on Select Committees. However, it is a really important point of principle about Parliament that reports from Select Committees, both in this and the other place, are hugely respected, even when there is a division of opinion. We need to be careful about suggesting that a chair of a Select Committee has come to an opinion because of their party-political allegiance. That is a difficult point to make. In my experience, chairs of Select Committees of all political parties have sometimes made very difficult decisions and come to very different conclusions from those of the party of which they are a member. That important point of principle underpins our democracy, and we need to be careful about suggesting that the chair of a Select Committee has been openly influenced by party-political allegiance to come to a particular conclusion. Going down that route is dangerous.

The point about this, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti outlined, is to try to give immigration decision-makers the opportunity to see whether a particular decision is able to be challenged in the courts and whether an individual’s rights need to be protected. My view is that this is of course about the rule of law, but the courts are there to ensure that justice is done. Justice in this case requires the ability for the law, as it impacts an individual, to be tested in the courts. That strikes me as fundamental to how the rule of law operates.

As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said, sometimes that is really inconvenient to Governments. Sometimes it is really convenient to all of us. Justice is an important part of our democracy and goes alongside the rule of law. I just say to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that I think that is what her Amendment 33, supported by others, seeks to do and why we would support it.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)]

My Lords, this was a brisk debate that touched on a number of very important points. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in opening, developed her point with admirable concision, which I fear I will be unable to match in responding. None the less, in answer to her points relating to the protection of claimants—the same point raised by my noble friend Lord Hailsham from our Benches—we say that those protections are to be found in the Bill and the treaty and the mechanisms which they set up.

My noble friend challenged us on three specific points. He first said that, in his belief, the judiciary can be more robust in the way that it treats unmeritorious claims. Respectfully, I agree and I do not suppose that anyone in the Chamber would disagree. My noble friend went on to say that it is dangerous to exclude persons who are within the jurisdiction of our courts from their jurisdiction. In the special circumstances with which this Bill is concerned, I consider that the protections of such persons as are involved through the scheme of the Bill are guaranteed adequately by our arrangements with the Republic of Rwanda and the oversight that we have in place.

My noble friend went on to ask whether the policy was likely to achieve the aim of deterrence that we have sought with the Bill. He quite properly rehearsed his view to the House that he thought that it was unlikely to be the case. All I can say in response is that, for the reasons set out by my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, I beg leave to disagree.

My noble friend Lord Inglewood posed the question of whether it is government policy to look at each individual case. In relation to that, I refer him to Clause 4 of the Bill, which permits decisions based on the individual circumstances of particular applicants.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, accused the Government of extremism and authoritarianism. I detect gratitude on the part of noble Lords on the Opposition Front Bench that, unlike on Monday, her fire was directed at the Government principally, instead of at their party. But she returned to the attack that she mounted on Monday. I disavow any suggestion that the Government are motivated by either extremism or authoritarianism.

There was another brisk debate involving the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy and Lady Lawrence, and my noble friends Lady Meyer and Lord Murray of Blidworth on these Benches. The conclusion, or the final submission in relation to that debate, was given from the Cross Benches by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I accept that noble Lords, having informed themselves by travelling to Rwanda and considering the position on the ground, have reached contrary views. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, invited us to consider that the appropriate forum for discussion and consideration of these points is the courts. His Majesty’s Government begs to disagree: we find appropriate protections for claimants in the arrangements made for supervision by officials in real time via the structures set up in the Act to examine Rwanda’s compliance with its obligations. As we have heard in previous debates, one of the core principles that the Bill is seeking to address is to limit challenges that can be brought against the general safety of Rwanda.

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[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Have the procedures required under Article 10.3 of the treaty to ensure that refoulement does not take place, as it did in the Israeli case, yet been devised?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, the Israeli case to which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, referred was—I make this point first—a completely different circumstance from the provisions set out in our Bill and the accompanying treaty. I will have to revert to the noble Lord on the specific point he raised, which is whether those procedures are in place as yet, or whether they come under the context of those to which I made reference—whether they are being worked up and implemented. If the noble Lord is content with that answer, I will correspond with him. I am grateful to him for indicating assent.

As I was saying, we will ratify the treaty only once we are satisfied that all necessary implementation is in place, and the treaty will be expedited. As I was saying in relation to the noble Lord’s point a moment ago, we continue to work with the Rwandans on this. As we set out to the House on Monday—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

If the treaty has to be agreed and the Government have to be satisfied, how can they expect us to recognise that Rwanda is at present safe?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I think, with respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that that point has been canvassed extensively on previous occasions.

As we set out on Monday, the legislation required for Rwanda to ratify the treaty passed that country’s lower house on 28 February, and it will now go to that country’s upper house. Once ratified, the treaty will become law in Rwanda. It follows that the Government of Rwanda would then be required to give effect to the terms of the treaty in accordance with its domestic law, as well as international law. As my noble friend Lord Lilley set out on Monday, it is inconceivable that Rwanda will not implement carefully and considerately, and we continue to work at pace with the Government of Rwanda on implementation.

We therefore do not consider it necessary to make the proposed changes to Clause 4 to permit decision-makers or courts and tribunals to consider claims on the basis of Rwanda’s safety generally, or that Rwanda will or may remove persons to another state in contravention of its international obligations or permit the courts and tribunals to grant interim relief, other than where there is a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm. There are ample safeguards in the Bill, and these amendments would be contrary to the Bill’s whole purpose.

To conclude, we have made it clear that we cannot continue to allow relocations to Rwanda to be frustrated and delayed as a result of systemic challenges on its general safety. In this context, the safety of a particular country is a matter for Parliament and one in which Parliament’s view should be sovereign. The evidence that we have provided and the commitments made by the United Kingdom and the Government of Rwanda through this internationally binding treaty enable Rwanda to be deemed a safe country. The Bill will allow Parliament to confirm that it considers that it has sufficient material before it to judge that Rwanda is in general safe and makes it clear that the finding cannot be disturbed by the courts.

Before I sit down, I return in a bit more detail to the matter which the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, started with his comment and which was answered by others. As we have set out previously, the constitution of Rwanda includes a broad prohibition of discrimination and does not criminalise or discriminate against sexual orientation in law or policy. As part of the published evidence pack, the updated country information note gave careful consideration to evidence relating to the treatment of LGBT individuals in Rwanda. Rwandan legal protection for LGBT rights is, as we have heard, generally considered more progressive than that of neighbouring countries.

I will conclude my submissions with reference to the point raised earlier by my noble friend Lord Lilley when he spoke about the precedent set by the 2004 legislation and referred to the views of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, in relation to parliamentary supremacy. As my noble friend correctly quoted, it is a matter of this country enjoying parliamentary supremacy. Parliamentary supremacy is at the heart of accountability to Parliament and, through Parliament, accountability to the people about whom my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne has spoken so eloquently during the debate on this Bill.

In conclusion, I submit that the noble Baroness should not press her amendment for the reasons I have given. Were she to do so, I have no hesitation in inviting the House to reject it.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

As always, I am grateful to all noble Lords, particularly those who spoke briefly. I am grateful to my supporters, not least the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Defending our constitution and the rule of law runs very deep in his family, and he has brought such honour to his family, your Lordships’ House and our country with his contributions on this Bill. To the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, I say simply that, in this case, the Supreme Court did not attack the policy; it made a finding of fact, as it is entitled to do.

I am grateful to all Members of your Lordships’ House who participated in such good faith on the trip to Rwanda, as part of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As we have heard, even in good faith there can be a dispute of fact between parliamentarians, let alone people on different sides of your Lordships’ House. Forgive me, but the man of the match in answering that predicament was the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who said that this is what courts are for. I am grateful, as always, for the support of my noble friend Lord Coaker.

The Minister kindly apologised for the lack of concision, but a psychiatrist would always find the magic words hidden in the many. On a previous occasion, he told us that Rwanda was to become safe by decree. Today, he told us that this is about special circumstances. The road to hell is not just paved with good intentions; it is paved with special circumstances as well. He speaks rightly of parliamentary sovereignty. We are part of Parliament, and parliamentary sovereignty is not executive domination.

I am particularly sad that parts of today’s debate contrasted with what we heard yesterday in the debate on foreign affairs, when so many noble Lords, including those from the Government Front Bench, spoke about the importance of the international rule of law. Today, the Home Office is on parade and we hear exactly the opposite. It is time to trust the courts, and it is time to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, as I said, Amendment 37 puts the ball in the court of the Attorney-General; it is for her to make the decision and recommendation to the Government about the propriety of the interim measures. This is the most modest of the amendments in this group—and I do not know whether other noble Lords will be pressing their amendments.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I am again grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this debate, opened by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. He acknowledged that we had enjoyed a full debate on the topic in Committee, in which conflicting views on certain essential matters emerged.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, repeated the view he expressed earlier that the practice in relation to the Rule 39 interim indications of the European Court of Human Rights is suboptimal. But he also indicated that there are hopes that the procedure might shortly be improved.

Amendment 36 tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, would allow a court or tribunal to have regard to a Rule 39 interim measure when considering whether to issue interim relief. But there is an equivalent domestic remedy in Clause 4, which means that there should be no need for the Strasbourg court to intervene. The decisions of the United Kingdom’s domestic courts to issue interim relief should be made only when they have reached their own conclusion about whether a person is at risk of “serious and irreversible harm”, and not when the European Court of Human Rights has indicated an interim measure.

“Serious and irreversible harm” is broadly the same test that the Strasbourg court applies; there is no reason why our domestic courts cannot be relied on to reach their own decision, rather than having regard to another court that may not be in possession of the most up to date information in the case. We have been clear that one of the primary purposes of the Bill is to reduce the number of legal challenges that seek to frustrate or delay relocations to Rwanda. We also need to create a deterrent and make it clear that those arriving via small boats will not be able to stay.

My noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough made a number of important points on judicial activism and the contrast between the rule of law and the rule of lawyers. Ultimately, if I may summarise his position, it comes down to an assertation of the accountability, of which we have spoken, introduced into our counsels by my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne at an early stage. That is an important consideration for the House to bear in mind.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, referenced Churchill. Again, if I may put words into my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough’s mouth, I suppose that my noble friend’s point is that these times are not Churchill’s times. He spoke of the geopolitical challenge and the nature of the difficulties that illegal migration is causing to this country.

I note that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, is not in her place. None the less—

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

Oh, she is. Well, while she did not press the point again, there was none the less a Green-wedge approach, which included my noble friend Lord Deben, attacking the stance of the Opposition Front Bench. Noble Lords opposite are old enough and ugly enough to defend themselves, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, did so. On the aspects of my noble friend’s submission that attacked the Government, I say to him that his point is misguided. Of course, the French Government are not the European Union; they are acting in this context as a sovereign country and not as a member of the EU.

As I said, “serious and irreversible harm” is broadly the same test that the Supreme Court applies. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, went on to raise a matter in relation to the Constitutional Reform Act. This Bill takes the same approach adopted in Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act; the Constitutional Reform Act is not referenced in the Illegal Migration Act. Under both provisions, it is for a Minister of the Crown alone, and not a court, to decide whether to comply with an interim measure. That reflects the orthodox position that international obligations act on the Government, rather than having effect on the domestic plane. It does not constitute an attack on judicial independence. There is no implied reform of Section 3 of the 2005 Act, which makes provision for the upholding of judicial independence. This provision remains intact and it is not necessary for legislation that does not bind judicial decision-making to spell that out. The judiciary’s independence is a fundamental principle of our constitution, as I think all noble Lords across the House will agree. The Government are committed to enabling judicial decisions to be made independently and impartially, whether domestically or in relevant international courts and tribunals.

I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and gratefully acknowledge his courtesy in approaching me to chase up the correspondence to which he referred the House. I apologise that the Home Office carrier pigeon failed to reach Ipswich before today. I have a copy of the letter that he sought and, with his leave, and that of the House, I will read the relevant provision.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, before the Minister leaves that point about carrier pigeons, can he say when the response from the Government to the Joint Committee’s report on this Bill will be forthcoming, given that on Monday we were told that it would be here for the proceedings today?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, the answer to the noble Lord’s question is “imminently”.

Returning to the correspondence with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I quote from that letter that bears my signature and which I trust that he will see in due course. He asked whether the Government agree that if, in compliance with Clause 5, a Minister decides not to comply with an interim measure, that would place the United Kingdom in breach of its international obligations. Clause 5 provides that it is for a Minister only to decide whether the United Kingdom will comply with an interim measure indicated by the European Court of Human Rights in proceedings relating to the intended removal of a person to the Republic of Rwanda under, or purportedly under, a provision of or made under the Immigration Acts. The Bill is in line with international law. The Government take their international obligations, including under the ECHR, very seriously, and there is nothing in the clause that requires the United Kingdom to breach its international obligations. In any event, it is not correct that a failure to comply with interim measures automatically involves a breach of international law. There are circumstances where non-compliance with an interim measure is not in breach of international law. There follows a list of further addressees whom I hope will receive the letter presently.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister. I recall that, of the Grand Chamber in Mamatkulov, 13 of the 14 judges in the majority thought that there were no circumstances in which a failure to comply with interim measures could be in accordance with international law. The 14th expressed the view that the Minister has just expressed. Can the Minister indicate in what cases it is lawful under international law not to comply with interim measures issued by the court?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

It would be in circumstances where compliance is not possible.

Turning to Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the text that the Minister read out placed a great deal of importance on the phrase “does not require” a Minister to do something. However, it does empower a Minister to do it. Would what it empowers the Minister to do not be in breach of our international obligations?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I now turn to Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I do not wish to prolong things, but so we can be completely clear, is the Minister accepting that in circumstances where the Strasbourg court has made an order and it is possible for the United Kingdom to comply with that order, then the United Kingdom will be in breach of its obligations if the Minister decides not to comply with it? That is what I take from what he has just said.

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, as I said, the Bill is in line with international law. It is not correct that a failure to comply with interim measures automatically involves a breach of international law.

Turning to Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in making a decision about whether to comply with a Rule 39 interim measure, the Government expect that the Minister will carefully consider what is required to comply with the United Kingdom’s international obligations. That decision ultimately will be dependent on the individual facts of each case. As I set out in Committee, nothing within Clause 5 prevents Ministers from consulting Cabinet colleagues or seeking advice where appropriate. Given the importance of this decision, we would expect a Minister to do so. However, this is a decision for Ministers. Amendment 37, which introduces a requirement to consult the Attorney-General, is therefore not necessary.

Furthermore, specifying in a Bill that the Attorney-General must be consulted before a decision is made undermines the convention that relates to the law officers. This is a long-standing convention whereby advice received from the law officers is not disclosed outside government. It is also the convention not to disclose whether the opinion of the law officers has been sought.

It is essential that we take bold steps to stop illegal migration and to prevent removal being frustrated by a cycle of legal challenges and rulings by the court. Clause 5 puts beyond doubt that the decision on whether to comply with a Rule 39 interim measure is for a Minister of the Crown. Given the importance of this decision, we are clear in the Bill that this decision must be taken personally by a Minister of the Crown. The Minister will be accountable—that word again, which I make no apology for stressing—to Parliament for the exercise of that personal discretion. We have made clear on several occasions, including in my rehearsal of the text to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, that the Government take their international obligations very seriously. There is nothing in this clause that requires the Government to act in breach of international law.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Can we then take it from what the Minister has said that, if the Government, after taking appropriate legal advice that they choose to take, take the view that not to comply with a Rule 39 order would in the circumstances then prevailing put the Government in breach of international law, the Government would then comply with that order?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

The point is that Rule 39 interim measures are not final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, which do bind the United Kingdom. They are not binding on the United Kingdom domestic courts. When deciding whether to comply with an interim measure indicated by the Strasbourg court, due consideration will be given to the facts in the individual case and careful consideration of the United Kingdom’s international obligations.

As we heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in opening, Amendment 38, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would remove Clause 5 and disapply Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act. This would lead to a conflict between the duty to remove, established by the Illegal Migration Act, and the effect of an interim measure issued by the Strasbourg court, which in turn would create uncertainty as to which would prevail. Clause 4 includes a specific provision enabling the United Kingdom courts to grant an interim remedy preventing removal to Rwanda where they are satisfied that a person would face real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm. We have designed these measures to ensure that our courts are not out of step with the Strasbourg court.

As I have said already, there is no reason why the United Kingdom courts, which we would expect to be in possession of all the evidence and facts in the case when making such a decision, cannot be relied upon to reach their own decision rather than having regard to another court which may not have the most up-to-date information. I acknowledge that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is not pressing his amendment, and I ask the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, not to move his amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords from all sides of the House, whatever their views may have been, for contributing to this debate. The result has been a much more interesting discussion than I anticipated in my rather brief and somewhat lame introduction to my amendment.

I shall make only one point. My amendment is concerned with the position of our own courts. As Clause 5(3) stands, it prohibits our courts from having any regard to an interim measure when considering an application which relates to a decision to remove someone to Rwanda. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is quite right when he says that the current procedures under Rule 39 are suboptimal. There are various defects which we would not accept in our courts, but that does not apply to our procedures. They are perfectly open, proper and thorough. Our judges would be able to take on board all the points that have been made in the course of the discussion and weigh up one way or another whether this measure from the European Court of Human Rights should be given effect to. I am not asking that they should be bound to give effect to it but that they should be permitted to do so. It seems to be a perfectly reasonable thing to ask our courts to do.

I have considered whether I should press this to a vote, but we have to ration ourselves at this stage of our proceedings and have regard to what happens next. If this goes down to the House of Commons, no doubt it will bounce back again and so on. We have to be careful how far we press things to a Division; I would have liked to do so, but at some points one has to exercise self-restraint, which I am doing.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, has once again asked the Government to explain the apparent contradiction between provisions in this Bill and Article 2 of the Windsor Framework. We believe that this is an important issue, and I can understand why the noble Lord believes that the Government did not fully respond to him or to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, in Committee, especially given the concerns raised by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland and others on potential contradictions.

On Monday, this House strongly expressed its opinion that this Bill must be compliant with existing law. It is not unreasonable for the Minister now to fully respond to the questions of compliance. So we support the noble Lord in asking these questions, although we would not support the amendment if he were to press it to a vote.

I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, made some important points about some of the amendments that have already been passed at this Report stage, which may reduce some of the anomalies that seem to be apparent in Northern Ireland. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s response to that point.

My noble friend Lord Dubs raised the issue of Guernsey. There is another amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, about Jersey. I think that it was the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who said that the point really applies to all Crown dependencies. I would be interested to hear the noble and learned Lord’s response as to why the Crown dependencies were not consulted on provisions in this Bill.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I will respond first to Amendment 44ZA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn, which seeks to provide for the Bill’s effect in Northern Ireland, notwithstanding Section 7A of European Union (Withdrawal) Act.

The noble Lord makes his point exceptionally well, as he always does, in relation to the anxious question of the applicability of United Kingdom law to the United Kingdom. We have sought to be clear at the Dispatch Box that it is the unequivocal intention of the United Kingdom Government to apply the Bill in the same way across the United Kingdom. That is explicit in the Bill, which provides that immigration is a United Kingdom-wide matter.

I recognise that the tabling of this amendment once again reflects recent developments in the courts, of which we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, as well the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn. As I stated to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, on Monday, when she raised these issues, the Government have always been consistent about their position on Article 2 of the Windsor Framework. I can advise that, following consideration of all aspects of the judgment of the court in the case of Dillon, His Majesty’s Government are applying for an appeal to the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in relation to that matter. In any event, we remain quite clear that nothing in this Bill that provides for administrative arrangements concerning asylum and immigration policy engages Article 2.

For Article 2 to be engaged by this Bill, it would be necessary to demonstrate, first, that the alleged diminution relates to a right set out in the relevant chapter of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement on rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity; secondly, that the right was given effect in domestic law in Northern Ireland on or before 31 December 2020; and, thirdly, that it occurred as a result of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. These conditions are not all made out here and, indeed, fail at that first hurdle: they are not Belfast/Good Friday agreement rights. Accepting this amendment would undermine the Government’s position by implying that Article 2 and the rights in the Belfast agreement are far broader than is the case—that, I think, could not have been the intention of the noble Lord.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn, for informal engagement with me and my colleague earlier this evening. As the noble Lord proposed, I would be delighted to meet him and any of his colleagues prior to Third Reading of the Bill. I have given, as I say, the assurance that an appeal has been sought in the appellate court in Belfast.

Briefly, in answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, the Government are not throwing any constitutional convention to the wind here. The Government’s position is an assertion throughout of constitutional orthodoxy.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Can the noble and learned Lord indicate what the Government’s position is if the judgment stands—that is, where the leave to appeal is not given or the appeal fails?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

In that event, as with any adverse decision, I think, the Government would have to reserve their right to consider the matter, but the position is as I have stated, and we are confident of success.

I turn to the points raised by the noble and learned Lord—

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

Before that, I know that I am not learned, but I did say some things and I have been ignored. What has happened to the response to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights? We are getting very close to finishing Report and, when I last checked, it still had not been published. I point out that the Government may have been consistent in their position on Northern Ireland, but is it possible that they have just been consistently wrong?

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Before the noble and learned Lord replies, can he also respond in relation to the Constitution Committee’s report as well? Will we get the Government’s response before the end of Report?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I first beg the noble Baroness’s pardon; I had not intended to overlook her. In relation to the answers to which she and the noble and learned Lord refer, as we have said on previous occasions at the Dispatch Box, these responses will be issued imminently.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am sorry, but that really is not good enough. We are practically at the end of Report. This was promised to us by Wednesday. It is now 7.55 pm, on Wednesday evening, and we are about to finish Report, and still we are just promised it “imminently”.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I beg the noble Baroness’s pardon. I think that we had indicated that we were trying to get it by this point. That has not been possible, and I apologise to the noble Baroness.

I turn now to the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. Home Office officials meet the Justice and Home Affairs department officials of Jersey and officials from the Isle of Man and Guernsey on a regular basis. This engagement includes detailed updates on the Illegal Migration Act and this Bill. I note the points that noble Lords have raised with regard to consultation and confirm that the Government remain committed to consulting the Crown dependencies on legislation that might impact them. Unfortunately, due to the tight timeframes leading up to the introduction of the Bill, the Home Office was unable to engage in advance. However, as I have set out, I know that engagements have taken place since introduction.

Although it may seem unlikely, if, down the line, the United Kingdom-Rwanda treaty were to be extended to the Crown dependencies without the permissive extent clauses in this legislation—to which the noble Lord, Lord German, referred in his contribution—relocations from Jersey to Rwanda would not be able to take place, and it would be considerably harder to unpick this if the PEC is removed.

It is important to note that inclusion of a PEC in a Bill does not constitute legislating for the Crown dependencies, nor does it require any Crown dependency or the United Kingdom to do anything. Rather, it is a legislative tool that enables the United Kingdom’s provisions to be extended to the Crown dependencies when either a Crown dependency or, in extremis, the United Kingdom thinks necessary. There is no obligation to activate a PEC, but the enabling power remains in reserve.

[Lord German (LD)]

I thank the Minister for the reply—which was that “We were in such a hurry that we didn’t have time to follow our own rules”—but the question I asked him was what advice officials gave him, given that the requirement not to put a permissive extent clause in this Bill is in fact within the guidance issued to the Home Office, and this is the Government’s own internal rule for it. Somebody must have said something at this point. Can the Minister tell me why the officials’ decision was to override their internal rules?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I regret to say that I am not privy to that information directly. I hear the point that the noble Lord raises, and, if he will permit, I will write to him to set out in appropriate detail an answer to the point that he makes.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

I am afraid that we are still left with a very unclear position as regards Jersey, and possibly also the other Crown dependencies. Where does this leave us? Jersey has made it clear that it does not consent to the permissive extent clause. Where does that leave us? It is a bit of a mess. Should not the Government bring forward something to tidy this up at Third Reading?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I shall make sure that the noble Lord’s point is given consideration before Third Reading.

For the reasons that I have sought to set out, I would encourage the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, to withdraw his amendment at this stage.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response to the debate and to everyone who has taken part. My purpose in bringing this amendment is, again, to shed light on the reality of where Northern Ireland in particular stands. I hear what he said about the appeal and what he said about meeting us before Third Reading; I would like to explore these matters in greater detail. We have heard the reassertion of the original assertion, which might have been understandable before the first case, or maybe even after the first case, but after three court cases it is beginning to wear a little thin. However, I look forward to meeting him and discussing it further. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment standing in my name.