Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It gave the decision that the ongoing domestic judicial review process should be concluded.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Of course it is right that NSK’s application for an interim injunction was heard by the High Court—by the lead judge of the Administrative Court—and the interim relief application was refused. That was appealed to the Court of Appeal, which agreed with the single judge that there should be no interim relief. Application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed. It was only the European court that decided to grant the interim relief. It appears that our own domestic courts at all levels and at great levels of distinction were satisfied with the Government’s statement that they would return NSK to the UK in the event that his judicial review challenge succeeded. Why does the noble Lord say it is right for the European court to form a view by way of press release when our own courts, in detailed judgments, had considered all the arguments and decided the other way?

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, in view of the hour and the information which I have to hand, and given the stark terms in which the noble Lord expresses himself, that might perhaps be the better course.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Is it not the case that the answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is that it depends? We know from the Policy Exchange paper and many other sources that there have been many cases where Rule 39 indications have not been complied with by states parties, including France, Italy, Albania and Slovakia. It all depends on the circumstances, does it not?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend but the answer “it depends” renders the matter, to a certain extent, even more complicated and emphasises the number of considerations that I will have to take into account in writing to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. While I am grateful to my noble friend for his contribution, my undertaking to write to the noble Lord remains in place.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Well, that is the deterrent effect. Assuming that of those who are coming, 50% on a regular basis are deterred, then over the long term there would still be 50% coming by boats. That is not my estimate, it is the Government’s estimate.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Before I give way, presumably what the noble Lord wants to get to is a deterrent effect of 100%, so that the boats are stopped, which is what we all want. But so far I have not found anything in any government documentation of policy that says that anything they are going to do will bring about 100% deterrence. Has the noble Lord found it?

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Permanent Secretary at the Home Office was unable to do so. That is why he sought ministerial direction. Home Office civil servants sought ministerial direction because the Permanent Secretary said that the Government’s policy was not proven value for money.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Will the noble Lord give way?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I will address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and then happily give way to the noble Lord.

The valid question is, “If this Bill will not work, what would work?” We know that this Bill will not work, so the better deterrent effects are those policies such as relocation and resettlement agreements, which comply with international law and have policing mechanisms attached to them. That is called the Albania deal. I am sure that the noble Lord will agree that this has been a success.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

From a sedentary position. I agree with the noble Lord. I think Hansard picked it up: a successful 90% deterrent. The noble Lord heard me at Second Reading saying that we welcomed the Albania deal. An internationally legal, efficient, effective resettlement and relocation agreement is what works. This is not any of those. I happily give way to the noble Lord, Lord Murray.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is very interesting that the noble Lord should refer to the effectiveness of the Albania arrangement. The document that the noble Lord likes to refer to in relation to the ministerial direction on deterrence came before the Albania deal, the 90% drop and the tangible evidence that deterrence works that we saw as a result of the Albania deal. We can extrapolate from the experience of the Albania deal to say that deterrence will work more generally if we can be sure that a significant proportion of those crossing the channel in small boats are sent to Rwanda for third-country processing.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Even for the noble Lord, it is a bit of a leap to say that a negotiated relocation agreement with Albania has been a deterrent because they may have thought we were going to send them to Rwanda. Even factually, I am afraid that he was incorrect. The noble Lord knows that the ministerial direction sought on the migration and economic development agreement with Rwanda was specifically for this Rwanda agreement. He also knows that when the Permanent Secretary was giving evidence in December, after the Albania agreement was agreed, he said that no circumstances had changed with regard to his view for value for money for this agreement. The Permanent Secretary still believes that the Rwanda agreement will not propose to be value for money. I agree with the Permanent Secretary at the Home Office.

The monitoring committee will have eight members, as the Minister said, and its terms of reference are online. The Minister said earlier that it would be independent of government, and that is true to an extent—if you think that four members being appointed by one party and four by another constitutes independence, because when it is being established, each party will appoint them. The key thing from our point of view is the ability of the monitoring committee to, as the Minister wrote in a letter to me,

“ensure all obligations under the treaty are adhered to”.

It will not, because it cannot—the monitoring committee has no powers of enforcement. It will be able to refer aspects it considers important to the joint committee, but it is under no duty to publish any of those recommendations or any of its findings, which can be significant. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, said, the safeguards that must be in place as far the Government are concerned will be considered to be in place only if the monitoring committee has said that they are in place. We in Parliament will not know; but we are supposedly the decision-makers when it comes to whether Rwanda will be safe.

The joint committee, under Article 16, can make only non-binding recommendations to the parties. So, there is a monitoring committee that does not have a duty to publish its findings and cannot ensure adherence to the treaty. It can make only recommendations to a joint committee, which can make only non-binding recommendations, and which itself is not duty bound to report to the body that is apparently to be making the decisions: Parliament.

I asked how we would then change this if the circumstances changed. Even if we in Parliament found that out from a monitoring committee and joint committee that do not report to us, how would we change it? The noble and learned Lord rightly said that no Parliament can bind its successors. That seemed to imply that a future Parliament could change this arrangement. Well, it cannot, because, of course, no Parliament can bind its successors, but no Parliament can bind a Government on making or ending treaties—that is a prerogative function. How can we in Parliament change the treaty if we decide that Rwanda is no longer a safe country? I hope the Minister can explain that to me when he winds up.