British Indian Ocean Territory

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Luke Evans]

rose—

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

rose—

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

rose—

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[Seema Malhotra]

I will continue my remarks, but I will give way shortly.

It is, therefore, the UK’s long-standing legal view that if Mauritius challenged us again in the courts, we would struggle to defend our position. Our Indo-Pacific foothold and the operation of the base could be put at risk within weeks. That is why the Government remain fully committed to the deal to secure the joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia, which is vital for our national security.

[James Cartlidge]

This is a fundamental point. The most sensitive part of our military is the nuclear deterrent; it is critical to the defence of ourselves and our allies. The United States is also nuclear armed. We are a naval nuclear nation, and the base at Diego Garcia is a critical naval base in strategic terms. Yesterday, it was reported that the Deputy Prime Minister of Mauritius, Mr Bérenger, had declared that nuclear weapons could not be stored on Mauritius if sovereignty is restored to Mauritius. Does the Minister understand that to be the case?

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the shadow Defence Secretary for his intervention. It is a long-standing policy, as he will know this from having been in government, that we do not comment on operational matters or the location of nuclear weapons.

The Opposition know—[Interruption.] Perhaps I may make some comments on the Pelindaba treaty—

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[Calum Miller]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but I was in the Chamber on Monday when he remarked that it was a fine aspect of joint working between Reform and the Conservatives to bring in that view from Donald Trump. I do not think it is appropriate for the leader of Reform to be whispering in the ear of the US President to upset negotiations. The right hon. Member makes a brave point when he appears to suggest that the fact that the US President has moved in one direction recently means that it will be sustained in the future. That notwithstanding, it is the case that the US President has recently made those remarks about the Chagos islands, and we will have to take those into consideration during the progress of the Bill.

We need to reflect on the other outstanding problems with the Government’s proposed legislation. Since the start of debates over the treaty, Liberal Democrats have been the only party consistently championing the rights of Chagossians. That stands in contrast with the Government’s lack of substantive engagement with the Chagossian community. Chagossians have been denied a meaningful say in their future and the provisions of the treaty shamefully fail to affirm their rights. But that is not only a failing of the Government; indeed, despite the remarks of the shadow Foreign Secretary, the motion we are debating today in her name includes not a single reference to the Chagossian community. That is addressed in the amendment in my name on behalf of my party.

[James Cartlidge]

Did you hear her speech?

[Calum Miller]

I did indeed. My point is that when the Conservatives had the opportunity to provide the bases for their objection to the Bill, they did not once mention the rights of the Chagossian community.

It is clear that those rights are just as low a priority for the Conservatives as they are for the Government. When the Liberal Democrats proposed, in Committee of the whole House, an amendment to the Bill that would have provided for a referendum of the Chagossian people, the Conservatives failed to back it and the Government opposed it. Even at this late stage, however, I want to encourage the Government to reconsider their position. There remains a window of opportunity for the Government to support the rights of Chagossians and buck the historical trend of this community being left out of decisions about their future. Will the Government therefore support a second Liberal Democrat amendment in the other place that would require binding guarantees from the Government of Mauritius on the rights of Chagossians?

Another outstanding issue is the question of money. The Government are proposing to send billions of pounds to Mauritius, despite having what appears to be zero monitoring, evaluation or recall mechanisms built into the treaty. It is inconceivable that the Government would oppose the introduction of such measures or fail to support the principle that the UK should be able to cease future payments to Mauritius if the treaty were deemed no longer to support the UK’s security, so will the Government back a third Liberal Democrat amendment in the other place introducing meaningful and effective safeguards around the proposed vast sums of public funds due to be sent to Mauritius?

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[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

May I begin by offering the Opposition’s condolences to the family of Captain Philip Muldowney of the Royal Artillery, who tragically lost his life training with the British Army this week?

It is a pleasure to close today’s debate on the Chagos islands, and to hold the Government to account for the total meltdown of their attempt to surrender sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory without opposition. Well, today they are getting that opposition, and they are getting it from the Conservatives, because it is we who have exposed the total fallacy of the legal argument used to justify this crazy deal. And let us be clear: it is a truly crazy deal—one of the worst ever proposed to this Parliament. As every single one of my colleagues said in their excellent speeches, this deal involves our hard-pressed taxpayers, struggling as they are with an ever-growing tax burden since Labour came to power, handing over another £35 billion to lease back land that we already own freehold. It is our land, over which we have sovereignty, the ultimate guarantor of legal security in a dangerous world. Given that we need that money for our own armed forces; that billions of pounds is to be given to Mauritius, and will be used to cut taxes for its people; that Labour knows that the threats that we face are growing, and that we need Diego Garcia more than ever; and that the policy treats the Chagossian people with contempt, the public will be scratching their heads, and will ask a simple question: why are the Government doing this?

To be fair to the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, last September, he tried to spell out the reasons, and I will quote exactly what he said to justify this crazy deal:

“Had we not signed the treaty, we could have faced further legal rulings against us within weeks...Further legal rulings might have included arbitrary proceedings against the UK under annex 7 of the UN convention on the law of the sea, known as UNCLOS.”

He went on to say that such a judgment would ultimately threaten operations on the base, because it would

“impact on our ability to protect the electromagnetic spectrum from interference”—[Official Report, 9 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 741.]

It is bad enough that the Government’s case rests entirely on rulings that “could” and “might” be made; worse still, the Government are failing to take into account our clearcut ability to reject any such hypothetical ruling.

We understand that the Government are afraid of legal action relating to the United Nations convention on the law of the sea, but article 298 of UNCLOS states very clearly:

“When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a State may, without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes”,

including, under (b),

“disputes concerning military activities”.

On operational threats to the base, the Government’s argument is that hypothetical action by UNCLOS might lead to further hypothetical action by the International Telecommunications Union, leading, hypothetically, to a threat to the electromagnetic spectrum on the base at Diego Garcia. Well, article 48 of the “Constitution of the International Telecommunications Union”, which is entitled “Installations for National Defence Services”, states, under section 1:

“Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations.”

To clarify further, the telecoms Minister, the hon. Member for Rhondda and Ogmore (Chris Bryant), who is always a helpful soul, confirmed, in a written answer from last February to my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), that

“Individual countries have the sovereign right to manage and use the radio spectrum, within their borders, the way they wish, subject to not causing interference with other countries…The ITU cannot challenge the UK’s use of civilian or military spectrum.”

A slam dunk! Now we have it: we can challenge UNCLOS, where military bases are concerned, and the ITU cannot challenge our use of electromagnetic spectrum.

Is it not therefore the truth that there is no threat to this country if we maintain our sovereignty over Diego Garcia, but there is a massive threat if we surrender it? There are, for ourselves and the United States, clear and unambiguous threats to the most sensitive and critical things relating to our military operations—those that relate to our ability to use nuclear weapons and deter the most serious threats to our nation.

Yesterday, it was confirmed that the Deputy Prime Minister of Mauritius, Paul Bérenger, has stated that nuclear weapons could not be stored on Diego Garcia if Labour’s deal went through. That is crystal clear. That is because Mauritius is a signatory to the Pelindaba treaty, prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons across Africa, including all the territory of Mauritius. We repeatedly warned Ministers of the threat arising from the Pelindaba treaty, but they dismissed our concerns, and today they could not answer the questions at all.

Can the Minister tell us if anyone in Government has discussed the storage of nuclear weapons on Diego Garcia with the US Administration? In particular, has the Prime Minister at any point discussed this matter with President Trump? Is it not another example of the total madness of Labour’s crazy Chagos deal that we, who rely on a naval nuclear deterrent to keep us safe in a dangerous world, are surrendering sovereignty of one of the most vital naval bases in the world to a nation that has signed up to a treaty outlawing the stationing of nuclear weapons on that territory?

We have had some absolutely fantastic speeches today. I have to pay tribute to the hon. Members for Macclesfield (Tim Roca), and for Rugby (John Slinger), for answering the distress flare from their Whips Office. Labour had two more contributions today than it did in the urgent question the other day, when not a single Labour MP stood up in support of the Government. We Conservative Members, however, showed real passion, because none of us supports this deal; we have consistently opposed it. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan) said, what does it say about our strategic priorities? As my right hon. Friend the Member for Wetherby and Easingwold (Sir Alec Shelbrooke) said, this is a Government without a strategic policy on China, so what message does the deal send, especially when we have agreed the Chinese super-embassy?

I have to give special mention to my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans), who gave an absolutely brilliant speech that totally demolished the Government’s case around the financial position—not a flesh wound in sight after that. He referred to the sketch with the Black Knight, but increasingly we think of another Monty Python sketch. The Government think that this treaty has been paused—that it is merely resting—but we increasingly suspect that this treaty is pushing up the daisies, and I can assure you, Madam Deputy Speaker, that we will campaign with every bit of fight we have to ensure that it is an ex-treaty.

[Tom Hayes]

On the question of cost, can the hon. Member tell the House how much the Conservative Government were offering for such a deal? Was it higher or lower than Labour’s offer? If he does not know, will he table a written parliamentary question or make a freedom of information request to the Foreign Office to find out?

[James Cartlidge]

I do not think the hon. Gentleman quite understands. We did not sign a deal; we would not sign a deal, because the terms were totally unacceptable, and they have got an awful lot worse since then—35 billion times worse. The cost is £35 billion—that comes from a freedom of information release from the Government themselves. That is an absolute disgrace, and it is why we will vote against the deal.

[Andrew Rosindell]

I have one simple question for the hon. Member. Is it now Conservative party policy to give self-determination and the right of resettlement to the Chagossian people?

[James Cartlidge]

The hon. Member knows that we have opposed this deal, but on self-determination, I would like him to ask his party leader, the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage), if he believes in the self-determination of the people of Ukraine, who have been invaded and brutally bombed by Russia. His leader still says that that was provoked by NATO. The hon. Member should be ashamed of that, if he believes in self-determination.

To conclude, I asked why the Government were surrendering land that we own freehold, only to lease it back for £35 billion. Is it not the same reason why they are surrendering our brave veterans to a new era of lawfare? Is it not the same reason why Labour gave up our fishing grounds, the most critical possession of an island nation, to access an EU defence fund from which it has not had a penny? We have a weak Prime Minister who always fails to put Britain’s national interests first. If Labour was strong enough to put our national interests first, surely it would stand up to Mauritius and reject this deal. After all, if the Government did that, they could spend the money that they saved on our armed forces, at a time when rearmament at home is on hold, precisely because Labour has failed to fund defence properly.

If there is one silver lining to having such a weak Prime Minister, it is his habit of constant U-turns. We have had 13 U-turns to date from this Government. Would the best thing for our national security not be for Labour to recognise that the game is up, to turn the pause on the Chagos Bill into a permanent full stop, and to scrap this terrible deal?

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[Luke Pollard]

Madam Deputy Speaker, I have been asked to finish early so that the shadow Cabinet can sit. I do want to ensure that I can get through as many questions as I can before those on the shadow Front Bench need to go and busy themselves in a meeting.

I will try to answer a few of the questions. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller), asked a sensible question about the amendment that his party tabled in the other place. He will appreciate that it is a wrecking amendment, so we could not support it; he will also be clear, though, that we take the issues behind it very seriously. I am glad that he continues to raise the issues of the Chagossians, which are important.

The hon. Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell), who now sits on a different Opposition Bench, raised the issue of resettlement on the outer islands. He made the case that resettlement on the outer islands will help to restore some dignity to the Chagossians, who have been treated appallingly for many decades. He will know that the deal we have signed with Mauritius includes the right to resettle on the outer islands and for visits to take place to Diego Garcia. It might not satisfy all his concerns on the matter, but I hope he can understand that that is a step forward.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Tim Roca) for his speech, in which he talked about uncertainty. As a Defence Minister, I am most concerned about uncertainty around the operation of the base and continuation of disruption. That is what this deal seeks to close off. He was right to raise the matter.

The right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), a former Defence Minister, said that he learns something new every day. Every day can indeed be a school day, and what I have learned today is that when the right hon. Gentleman swapped from the Government Benches to the Opposition Benches, his opinion on the deal miraculously changed, too. He backed it when he was a Minister, and now, on the Opposition Back Benches, he opposes it. That does say something.

My hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (John Slinger) asked the very same question that I started with: why did the Conservatives start these negotiations? It is a question they still cannot answer.

I note that the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan) has found his voice, but only after completing his chicken run from the seat he thought he was going to lose to his new one. Let me be absolutely clear on this point: it is shameful that the Conservatives are trying to drag other overseas territories into the mess they are arguing over here. In their speeches, Conservatives have tried to create the impression that the sovereignty of the Falklands is not secure. The Falkland Islands Government have noted that the agreement has

“no impact on the self-determination of the Falkland Islands people, and the existing and future relationship between the Falkland Islands and United Kingdom”.

Let us not hear any more Conservative MPs raising questions over the future of the Falkland Islands.

[James Cartlidge]

Will the Minister give way?

[Luke Pollard]

No, I will not. The hon. Gentleman has a meeting to get to and I am trying to help him get there. [Interruption.] I think he should sit down and prepare for his next meeting.

The right hon. Member for Wetherby and Easingwold (Sir Alec Shelbrooke) was a good voice in this debate. In an important and sound contribution, he talked about the change in the geostrategic picture. His work on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly gives him an added insight into the importance not only of the base and the UK-US relationship, but of making sure that we have a strong defence. We will continue to invest in our national security. I am proud of my country and proud of our armed forces. I am proud that we are increasing defence spending under this Government to the highest level since the end of the cold war, but there is more that needs to be done.

The hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans) spoke for a good 20 minutes, but I am afraid that he seems to have read everything but the treaty itself. He was asking questions about what can be stored on the base. Annex 1 of the treaty says that there will be

“unrestricted access, basing and overflight for United Kingdom and United States of America aircraft and vessels to enter into the sea and airspace of Diego Garcia.”

It says that unrestricted ability means

“to control the conduct and deployment of our armed operations and lethal capabilities; and to control the storage of all goods, including but not limited to fuels, weapons and hazardous materials”

The shadow Defence Secretary forgets that we do not talk about the location of nuclear weapons, but the protections were designed and tested at the highest level of the US security establishment, who supported the UK proceeding with the deal. We continue to work closely with the US to ensure that the necessary arrangements are put in place.

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[Luke Pollard]

To help the Front-Bench team get to their shadow Cabinet meeting, I will not read out the same points again. [Interruption.] The shadow Minister invites me to do that, so I will. We are talking about the unrestricted ability to

“control the storage of all goods, including but not limited to fuels, weapons and other hazardous materials”;

I am very clear on this, but there are a few other questions that I want to get to.

The hon. Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) spoke about value in his good, characteristic style. I liked his approach. When he spoke about comparison of value, it is worth noting that securing the continued operation of the base is roughly about £100 million a year. That compares favourably with the base that the French rent in Djibouti, which is next to a Chinese naval base. Our base secures a 24-hour nautical exclusion zone around it. Full control of the electromagnetic spectrum is something the shadow Defence Secretary does not seem to understand, but it is actually quite important.

[James Cartlidge]

On that point—

[Luke Pollard]

Oh, go on then. The shadow Defence Secretary can be late for his meeting.

[James Cartlidge]

The Minister is very kind. I have a very specific question. That annex does not mention nuclear weapons. We have asked about this repeatedly throughout the debate today. It is a matter of critical national security. The Deputy Prime Minister of Mauritius has clearly stated that nuclear weapons cannot be stored on the base. Is that correct—yes or no?

[Luke Pollard]

I feel like I have to read out the point for a third time. It is no wonder the Conservatives could not conclude the deal. Annex 1 says that it is unrestricted ability to

“control the storage of all goods, including but not limited to fuels, weapons and other hazardous materials.”

We do not comment on the location of nuclear weapons. The shadow Defence Secretary might remember that from when he was a Defence Minister.

Despite the boisterous amnesia we heard from the Conservatives in this debate, I hope that the voices of the Chagossians have truly been heard. There were some very good remarks about the Chagossians, including from the hon. Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller) and the recently Reform-ed hon. Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell).

It is important that the Chagossians have greater involvement. That is why we have set up a Chagossian trust fund. The hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury (Aphra Brandreth) asked earlier whether the Chagossians will have a say in the trust fund. Mauritius has confirmed, on 12 December, that it is putting in place legislation to enact the Chagossian trust fund. It will be run by Chagossians for Chagossians, and it will include UK-based Chagossians. I hope that goes some way to providing the clarity that the hon. Member was seeking.

I said that I would finish at five minutes to 4 so that the Opposition Front Bench can get to their shadow Cabinet meeting, so I will finish at five minutes to 4, because I am a man of my word.

Question put.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

My hon. Friend has perhaps not been in for some of the previous debates on this, but I have set out why on a number of occasions. [Interruption.] Again, there is a lot of noise from the Conservatives, but they knew the problem here. They knew the risk to the operations of the base, which is why they engaged in 11 rounds of negotiations. I say again that the operations of this base were under threat, and we are not willing to play roulette with our national security. We therefore put in place the necessary steps to protect—and this is the crucial thing—the operations of that base, and our ability to carry them out fully in the way they are today, from the threats to it that existed. They put our national security—

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

What threats?

[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Member asks what the threats are. I have set those out on many occasions in this House. What is more, we have secured better protections in this deal than the Conservatives attempted to negotiate, including the buffer zone and the protections in relation to foreign forces on the outer islands. The priority for us has been securing our national security and the operation of this base for us and our allies.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Monday 20th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

Thank you, Madam Chairman. The Opposition ask questions and then make so much noise—they do not even want to hear the answers.

I have mentioned the obligations placed on the BIOT Administration by UN bodies to cease specific activities. I have mentioned the series of procedural complications and blockages at international organisations, including the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. There are many examples of clear risks. I have explained before the potential under annex VII of UNCLOS—

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

Potential.

[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Gentleman chunters “potential”, but is he willing to gamble with our national security? Is he willing to gamble on the operational effect? [Interruption.] Oh, he is willing to gamble! I find it absolutely extraordinary that he is willing to gamble with our national security and that of our allies. That is exactly why the United States and our Five Eyes partners back this deal: it settles that debate.

I will turn to the amendments. The right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel) tabled amendments 1, 2 and 7 and new clause 2 on the publication of legal advice. She will know from her time in government that it is highly unusual for the Government to publish legal advice that they have obtained. That advice is privileged, and it is important that the Government are able to take frank and confidential advice, as she well knows. In some circumstances, the Government may publish a statement of their legal position, as we did in the case of the Diego Garcia treaty, on the day it was signed. As I have repeatedly explained—Members keep chuntering about it—if a long-term deal is not reached between the UK and Mauritius, it is highly likely that further wide-ranging litigation would be brought quickly by Mauritius against the UK. It might include, for example, further arbitral proceedings against the UK under annex VII of the UN convention on the law of the sea. A judgment would be binding on the UK.

Let me turn to amendments 11 and 14. The hon. Member for Clacton, who has finally turned up but is not even listening, tabled several amendments that appear to serve no function other than wasting Government and parliamentary time. The public consultation proposed in amendment 11, and the impact assessment, would be needlessly costly and time-consuming. They would only confirm the conclusion—on which he had no answers—already reached by our closest ally, the United States, by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee, and by our Five Eyes partners. The public already know that the treaty secures the future of the critical base on Diego Garcia. The strategic value has been debated at length and is well understood. We are not willing to gamble with our national security, even if the Member for Clacton is willing to. Quite frankly, he has some gall to turn up after his comments on NATO and Russia—I find it quite extraordinary.

In amendment 13, the hon. Member for Clacton offers an ill-conceived proposal that would keep Diego Garcia listed as an overseas territory while accepting that His Majesty the King would no longer be sovereign. Not only is that constitutionally inaccurate, but in the context of the British Nationality Act 1981 it would have serious consequences for the nationality rights of Chagossians born on different islands in the archipelago. Surely his intention cannot be for individuals born on Diego Garcia to be treated differently from those born on Peros Banhos or the Salomon Islands.

Amendments 3, 4, 5 and 6, tabled by the right hon. Member for Witham and amendment 8 tabled by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), seek to change or remove the statutory powers to make an Order in Council. It is, of course, absolutely right that Parliament should be able to scrutinise the use of power, which is why the Bill provides for the negative procedure to be used. The vast majority of changes that the Government will make using that power will be technical and operational amendments on matters to ensure that our domestic law is consistent with the new status of Diego Garcia—those are matters as varied as police pensions, copyright law, and changes to student finance. The proposed amendments would mean that the House would be obliged to spend valuable parliamentary time on each change to legislation for 99 years. Members surely cannot wish us to spend that amount of time on all those things, and that approach is consistent with powers taken to amend existing legislation in previously comparable situations.

New clauses 1, 11, and 10 regard the prior approval of payments. I have set out clearly the costs, and the absolutely nonsensical figures that have been put forward by the Opposition and the hon. Member for Clacton, and we wholly reject the new clauses. It is entirely usual and proper for payments under international treaties to be made under the royal prerogative, and requiring a separate distinct vote before payments can be made would create unacceptable risk for the long-term sustainability of the treaty. Without the certainty that the Bill and the treaty provide, the UK and US military would not be able to invest in vital capabilities. That would have major operational implications for the base. On new clause 11 tabled by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, the House of Commons will scrutinise our annual estimates in the usual way, and spending under the treaty will be included in that process. New clause 10 is not necessary either.

New clauses 3, 4 and 9 are on the marine protected area. There is no requirement for the UK to consent to Mauritius establishing such an area or to its management, and that would be inconsistent with the treaty. Although the UK will be playing a different role in respect of the future MPA, both the UK and Mauritius remain committed to protecting that vital marine environment. That is why, under the terms of the treaty, we will provide technical support and assistance to Mauritius, in accordance with a separate written instrument. We will not make any additional direct payments to Mauritius as part of that activity.

On Chagossians and the right of self-determination, amendments 9 and 10, and new clauses 7, 8, 12, 13, and 14 concern the Chagossian community, and I understand and share the strength of feeling on the wider subject, and the historical treatment of the Chagossian communities. That is why the Government have put the preservation of nationality rights at the heart of the Bill. I am sympathetic to the concerns put forward about resettlement. I understand the intention of amendment 9, but it is not necessary. Under the agreement we have already agreed that Mauritius will be able to develop a programme of resettlement on islands other than Diego Garcia—I refer the hon. Member for Surrey Heath to comments from Olivier Bancoult and the Chagos Refugees Group. They have been clear that that is why they support this measure, and are urging us all to support the treaty. I also understand the questions on consultation, but as I have said, those negotiations were between the UK and Mauritius. The islands that make up BIOT do not have, and never have had, a settled population and have never been self-governing. No question of self-determination for a population therefore arises now.

New clauses 5, 6, 15 and 17 relate to national security issues, but they are simply not needed because the treaty protects our national security and secures the base. We have maintained full operational control of Diego Garcia with all the necessary rights and authorities, as well as a series of additional protections. In closing, the Bill and the treaty have been thoroughly scrutinised—

British Indian Ocean Territory: Sovereignty

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

I will not comment on ongoing judicial matters, but as I have set out a number of times the negotiations were necessarily between the UK and Mauritius. However, we recognise the importance of the islands to Chagossians, which is why the measures that I just set out have been put in place.

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. In answer to the hon. Member for St Ives (Andrew George), the Minister seemed to imply—to Opposition Members’ ears anyway—that the United States would be paying, I think he said, a larger quantum of the funding for the deal. I think he was referring to the operational cost of the base. May I ask for confirmation that the United States is not contributing at all to the £30 billion lease under the settlement?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

Order. That is not a point of order for the Chair, as the hon. Gentleman will appreciate, but if the Minister wishes to respond I will allow him to do so.

Chagos Islands

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Wednesday 13th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Gentleman knows that I have a great deal of respect for him on these matters, and for his care for people and human rights around the world. I am very clear that the treaty and the deal respect the rights and interests of the Chagossians, and we have sought to put them at the heart of the arrangements. I have engaged with many Chagossians, who have a range of views, as we have heard today. It is absolutely clear to me that we need to put their interests at the heart of the deal, and we have done that. I am confident that when they look at the detail, they will see very positive outcomes for them and their communities, and we will provide that detail to the House in due course.

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Points of order come after urgent questions and statements, unless they are directly relevant to the UQ or statement. Is the point of order directly relevant to the urgent question?

[James Cartlidge]

Yes, very much so.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Go ahead.

[James Cartlidge]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Obviously, the issue of cost is of huge importance, because it is public money, and the Opposition think that the public should know about the cost involved in this agreement. The Minister said to my hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley (Paul Holmes) that the Government do not give out the figure because they do not state the cost of overseas bases. My hon. Friend pointed out that the Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), has clearly stated the cost of the base in Kenya. The Foreign Office Minister said that that is only a training base, but I can confirm to the House that back in November 2022, James Heappey, the then Minister for the Armed Forces, stated the cost of running the base in Akrotiri to the then Member for East Lothian, and that is not a training base at all. Mr Heappey gave three years’ worth of figures. Such a request is therefore clearly not unprecedented and it is an extremely important point of public interest, because this is public money. How can we hold the Government to account if they will not tell us what they will pay to rent back the base that we already own?

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

That is not a matter for the Chair, but the hon. Member has put his robust point of order on the record.

International Immunities and Privileges

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Wednesday 24th July 2024 Commons Chamber

[Catherine West]

If the shadow Secretary of State wants to say something, I would be happy to allow him, following your advice, Mr Speaker.

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

I am very grateful to the Minister. Can she confirm that there will be no delay to the Ministry of Defence’s currently planned spending on GCAP this year?

[Catherine West]

To be clear to Members new and old, this instrument is the legal framework within which the programme will sit. It does not have specific funding recommendations attached to it because it is the scaffolding, or the nest, within which all the work will happen.

This order was laid before Parliament in draft on 23 May 2024. It is subject to the affirmative procedure and will be made by the Privy Council once it is approved by both Houses. Subject to approval and ratification, the treaty will enter into force on the deposit of the last instrument of ratification or acceptance of the parties. That is anticipated to be in autumn 2024 to meet the 2035 in-service date.

This order confers a bespoke set of privileges and immunities to enable the GIGO to operate effectively in the UK. The Government consider those privileges and immunities both necessary and appropriate to deliver on the interests and commitments that the UK has towards the organisation.

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[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

May I associate the shadow Defence team with the remarks from the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition about the terrible attack on a British solider in Kent? Our thoughts are with his family.

I can confirm that we support the measures before us and recognise that they are necessary to deliver into law the administrative governance of the global combat air programme. Although this is a Foreign Office measure, the statutory instrument was prepared with strong input from the Ministry of Defence—it certainly crossed my desk when I was Minister for Defence Procurement. May I put on the record that it was a great honour to serve in that role—with significant responsibility in relation to GCAP—alongside the two previous Secretaries of State, Ben Wallace and Grant Shapps.

It was a privilege to engage with our international GCAP partners from Italy and Japan, whom I had the pleasure of hosting last September in Lancaster House for trilateral discussions. This is not just about delivering UK military capability in the crucial area of combat air, but about doing so to the benefit of two great partners, and, in the case of Japan, one that faces the threat of China and Russia right on its doorstep. Since that trilateral, the project has achieved significant goals, not least the signing of the international treaty last December that we are legislating for today. The treaty establishes the legal basis for the formation of a new GCAP international organisation, the GIGO. I am delighted that we are able to agree that the international HQ of the GIGO will be in the UK, but that, in keeping with the spirit of equal partnership that underpins GCAP, the first chief executives of the GCAP agency and joint venture are from Italy and Japan. As such, the SI before us effectively enables this international treaty to enter into effect, with further important measures on immunity and privileges that are necessary for the effective operation of the GIGO.

All that said, although the SI is necessary to deliver GCAP’s governance arrangements, it will not directly deliver a single aircraft. Alongside this SI, we need the Government to back the GCAP programme wholeheartedly by ensuring that it has the funding necessary to deliver our sixth-generation fighter capability. Indeed, it would be quite extraordinary for the Government to ask us as a House to approve the regulations if they were at the same time seriously contemplating scrapping UK involvement in GCAP. Yet that prospect has figured prominently in the press in recent days. While the best of British defence aviation has been gathered at the Royal International Air Tattoo and Farnborough, incredibly the Government have not been able to repeat the wholehearted backing of GCAP that they gave prior to the general election.

In responding to the statement from his predecessor Grant Shapps on 18 December last year, when he confirmed the trilateral agreement for the GCAP treaty, the now Defence Secretary said:

“Developing a sixth-generation fighter will ensure that we can continue to safeguard our UK skies and those of our NATO allies for decades to come. It will inspire innovation, strengthen UK industry and keep Britain at the cutting edge of defence technology.”

I totally agree with his remarks. Yet fast-forward to the present, and, as we have just heard at Prime Minister’s questions, the Prime Minister is only able to say that the programme is “important.” Meanwhile, the Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), who is on the Front Bench and for whom I have great personal respect, said:

“It's not right for me to prejudge what might happen in the defence review”.

He thus implied that the defence review might not continue the UK’s commitment to GCAP. We now need clarity from the Government for Parliament, industry and our international partners. We are being asked to approve this SI to deliver a key stepping-stone to the GCAP project, so are the Government still committed to it?

This is my guess about what is currently happening. I would be truly staggered if the Government were to withdraw from a programme that they have previously given such full support—not because theirs is a party that does not know a good U-turn, but because it would bring international ramifications that do not bear thinking about either for the Foreign Office or the Ministry of Defence. Rather, in my view, we need to have in mind another Department—one that I have also had the pleasure of serving in—the Treasury. I suspect that the overall question of whether the Government are committed to GCAP is a red herring. What really matters is whether they are committed to funding it this year, with important spending decisions to be made right now. They will be in the inbox of the Secretary of State, under “Funding decisions on GCAP.” We want the Government to continue that funding in the years beyond, and we want to know whether they are using the review as a chance to shift spending decisions to the right.

It is not unprecedented in the history of the Treasury for it to work in that way under successive Governments, probably. It might offer illusory short-term savings, but it would cause immediate and lasting pain to the most important conventional defence programme of our time. To be clear—and I mean this—I have the greatest respect for the way the Treasury has to balance the books and be responsible for the nation’s finances. I was delighted that the previous Government proposed moving to 2.5% once it was affordable—we were prepared to make difficult decisions to fund that 2.5% by reducing the size of the civil service to pre-pandemic levels—and once it was sustainable. Far from this Government inheriting what the Chief Secretary to the Treasury has described as the “worst economic inheritance” since world war two, we did what we promised and moved to 2.5% only once the economic conditions allowed—namely, when inflation was back to target, with healthy economic growth and a deficit heading towards a little over 1% over the forecast period. That is our clear pathway to 2.5% versus Labour’s uncertainty and delay, which makes the real difference.

To understand the direct short-term importance of 2.5% and its relevance to GCAP and this statutory instrument, we need only go back to what the Secretary of State said the response to the statement from his predecessor Grant Shapps in December. He said:

“This month, the National Audit Office reported on the MOD’s equipment plan. It exposed a £17 billion black hole in Britain’s defence plans and showed that Ministers have lost control of the defence budget.”—[Official Report, 18 December 2023; Vol. 742, c. 1137.]

It is not so much that we lost control of the defence budget; rather, Putin invaded Ukraine and sent inflation soaring all around the world. In a world that was then in a rush to rearm, that context caused an inevitable hit to the costs of major defence projects and matériel. I have never pretended otherwise.

Bearing in mind that the equipment plan—the MOD’s forward inventory—accounts for over 10 years, the NAO’s assessment of a black hole did not take account of one thing: moving to 2.5% by 2030. As I said in my wind up to the Thursday’s debate on the Gracious Speech, by setting out a fully costed and clearly timetabled pathway to 2.5%, we were able to deal with those funding pressures head on, and ensure that our largest two programmes—the nuclear deterrent and GCAP—would be stabilised, and, as a result, properly funded into the future. I asked the Foreign Office Minister who responded to my to confirm that the Government’s timetable would not put funding of either programme at risk. There was no answer, and we have had no answer today, either. That is the problem. The Government can afford to bring forward this SI and to continue building the administrative apparatus for GCAP, but we fear that they cannot afford to approve the funding requirements for the next stage of building the actual aircraft, because of their vacillation on reaching 2.5%.

We Conservatives are clear that we support the SI on the basis that we are also supporting GCAP as a whole, including by putting in place the funding necessary to deliver its requirements over the urgent timescale that all three member nations require. That is a key point: for all three nations, GCAP is all about pace and timetable. For the UK and Italy, that means replacing the Typhoon before it is withdrawn from service towards 2040; for Japan, with equal urgency, it means replacing the Mitsubishi F-2. That is why any delay or deferment, whether caused by the lack of a clear timetable to 2.5% or otherwise, is so important and critical.

Overall, it is my view that withdrawing from GCAP now would be the equivalent of scrapping the Spitfire programme in the 1930s. It is that serious. However, if such an outcome is seriously under consideration—and we know that there are those in government who are hugely sceptical—I will explain why we are ultimately supporting this SI. It is because we on the Conservative Benches believe that GCAP is a military necessity that will bring enormous economic and strategic benefits to the United Kingdom.

To start with the military capability argument, if there is one key lesson from Ukraine, it is that in the absence of air superiority we face the prospect of terrible attritional warfare with huge casualties, reminiscent of the worst battles of world war two.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I know it is thinking very far into the future, but does my hon. Friend accept that one of the lessons from the Ukraine conflict, where we have had to give indirect support, is the importance of maintaining aircraft that we have withdrawn from service—in mothballs, if necessary—so that they can be made available to allies, should they ever face a crisis such as this one? When the happy day comes that we have these great sixth-generation aircraft, can we be certain that we have not unduly disposed of their predecessors, in case someone else needs them in future?

[James Cartlidge]

My right hon. Friend’s question is an interesting one. Whenever I was in front of the Select Committee—it was always a great joy and privilege to be cross-examined, particularly by my colleagues on the Conservative Benches—there was always a debate about when we withdraw platforms and when we bring in their replacements. That will never go away, and I wish the Armed Forces Minister well when he has the unique privilege and experience of going in front of the Committee. What I would say to my right hon. Friend is that we have to accept that, as a matter of avionic reality, the Typhoon will reach the end of its service life, and we as a country have to replace it. GCAP is key to that, with the construction of the new core platform.

While investing in the best combat air capability does not guarantee air superiority in the future, it offers us the chance to deny adversaries such potentially deadly freedom of operation by maintaining technological competitiveness. However, there are those who ask, “Why don’t we simply go off-the-shelf and buy more F-35s?” I noticed similar views being expressed in The Daily Telegraph this very day, and there is even a rumour that some Government Departments, such as those I mentioned earlier, may take a view along those lines. We must be clear that the F-35, while a brilliant and highly capable aircraft, is a fifth-generation platform, not a sixth-generation one. It is not optimised for the battle space that is likely to pertain by the late 2030s, and the United States—which, after all, possesses and manufactures the F-35—is itself investing in a sixth-generation programme, as are our adversaries.

[Jim Shannon]

I commend the shadow Minister for what he is saying: his great focus on the issues of modern technology, our companies and what they are involved with. I know that he has a tremendous interest in Northern Ireland—he visited there regularly in his former role in government. Can he give us some suggestions about the role that aerospace in Northern Ireland could, and will, play in finding a way forward?

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[James Cartlidge]

I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who is an absolute champion of the defence industry in Northern Ireland. He is right: one of my last visits was to the Thales factory in Belfast, which of course is home to the next-generation light anti-tank weapon, the lightweight multirole missile, and other key munitions. In terms of aerospace, the first small and medium-sized enterprise forum that I held as Defence Procurement Minister was in Larne in Northern Ireland, on Armed Forces Day last year. Spirit was one of the attendees, and I am confident that it has a strong place in the future of British aviation in the defence sector, as long as we put the funding in place and keep with the programmes.

Having said all that, there must obviously be debate when we are spending this amount of money on a capability, and I understand why there are those who question the sums of money involved, the timeframes and so on. To be clear, as a former Defence Procurement Minister, I would not support a programme that was purely about spending such a vast amount of money just on a new core platform to replace Typhoon. That brings us to what GCAP is really about, which the Minister mentioned in her opening remarks, to her credit. On one of my last visits to a land company—a company manufacturing armoured vehicles for this country—the chief executive I spoke to referred to the GCAP of land. The point is that, although the “A” stands for air, when we talk about GCAP in military capability terms, it is equally about how we work with autonomous and uncrewed systems. That is the key to the sixth-generation concept.

I am very passionate about this issue—I was proud to bring forward the first defence drone strategy at the Ministry of Defence—and although there are those who are concerned about the timeframe, I would just make the following points. First, the timescale for delivering GCAP is very ambitious compared with that of Typhoon; secondly, we can gain capability benefits from GCAP on a much shorter timescale. We have heard the Chief of the General Staff talking about the need for the Army to be able to fight a war within three years, and when I was Defence Procurement Minister, I was keen to ensure that all the services were looking at what they could do to boost lethality and survivability in the near term. Surely, the key to that is how we make use of uncrewed systems.

The United Kingdom is incredibly well placed in that regard: we jointly lead the maritime coalition in respect of Ukraine alongside Norway. Of course, Ukraine’s greatest military success has been naval, having pushed back the Russian fleet using what we might describe as innovative weapons rather than traditional naval deployments. Likewise on land, the incredible importance of drones cannot be overstated, including the psychological impact on those who are fighting out there.

[Sir Mark Hendrick (Preston) (Lab/Co-op)]

I totally agree with what the former Minister is saying about the requirement for and necessity of sixth-generation aircraft, as well as about maintaining sovereign capability. However, does he agree that it seems peculiar that the Americans are developing their own sixth-generation aircraft with Lockheed Martin, the French and the Germans are developing their own sixth-generation aircraft as well, and we have forged this strange partnership with the Italians and the Japanese to develop GCAP? Does the Minister think that makes sense, in terms of pooling effort and making sure that our allies have at least one good sixth-generation fighter aircraft?

[James Cartlidge]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his question, but I do not regard it as a strange partnership. All my experience of dealing with GCAP and meeting my Italian and Japanese counterparts, particularly industry representatives from all three countries, and working so closely together—there is already so much work going on—tells me that this is about developing a brilliant platform that is needed by all three nations. There will always be a multiplicity of platforms from different countries, which I think is perfectly healthy. What is good about the hon. Gentleman’s question is that he has opened up the debate about sovereign capability, which I will come to shortly. I just wanted to finish my point about the uncrewed domain, and what it means to be sixth-generation.

[Mr Francois]

Before my hon. Friend does so, would he give way very briefly?

[James Cartlidge]

Of course—it is a pleasure.

[Mr Francois]

My hon. Friend was a very good Defence Procurement Minister, and we on the Committee liked him because, crikey, he actually answered the questions. He will know from that experience that even the Americans, who have a new thing called the next generation air dominance fighter, are struggling to afford it; there have been media reports in the US that they may even cancel that programme, because even the Americans cannot afford to do everything unilaterally anymore. In the light of that, does my hon. Friend believe that a three-way programme represents good value for money?

[James Cartlidge]

My right hon. Friend, who not only served on the Committee but was an Armed Forces Minister, makes an excellent point. There are those who argue that we should go beyond 2.5%; I would argue that 2.5% is still a significant jump for this country. We had a funded plan, and that 2.5%—crucially and critically, with the pathway we set out, which became an accumulation of significant additional billions of pounds for the MOD—enabled us to afford GCAP and stabilise that programme.

I want to make one crucial point about the uncrewed domain. To be frank, for the uncrewed side of the Navy, Army and Air Force, those programmes are not funded: hitherto, the funding has come primarily from support for Ukraine. That is entirely logical because, under the defence drone strategy, we were very clear that there is no point in the Army, for example, ordering large-scale drones now; it might order them to train with, but the technology is changing so fast. What we as a country need to build, as I set out in the drone strategy, is the ecosystem to develop those drones, and we are doing that.

I have always said—I said it during my statement on the integrated procurement model—that my most inspiring moment as Defence Procurement Minister was visiting a UK SME that was building a drone for use in Ukraine. It was a highly capable platform, but brilliantly, it was getting feedback and spiralling it—as we call it—the very next day. On GCAP, it should be a technology for the whole of defence—it should be a pan-defence technology of how we team with uncrewed systems, how the Navy fights with an uncrewed fleet above and below the surface, for the Army and of course for the Air Force.

I have two final points on military capability, as a couple of points have been floating around in the press. The first is that the Army is putting out its opposition to GCAP. I find that idea impossible to believe. Of course, if the Army wants to succeed, it needs the support of the Air Force and so on. That is why an integrated approach to procurement is so important, not single service competition. There has also been the point that we should choose between GCAP and AUKUS, as if, when the next war comes, the Russians will step into our dressing room and ask if we would like to bowl or bat: would we like to fight on land or sea—what is our preference? The fact is that we do not know where the threat will come from, but we know that it is growing, so we should support both GCAP and AUKUS, not least for the enormous economic benefit they bring.

You will be pleased to know, Mr Speaker, that that brings me to the last part of my speech, on the economic benefits of GCAP. There are those who say we should buy off the shelf. We would stress how, in a state of ever greater war readiness, it pays to have operational independence and sovereignty. In particular, investing in the great tradition of UK combat air offers huge economic gains for every part of the country.

In 2020, PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated that the Tempest programme alone would support an average of 20,000 jobs every year from 2026 until 2050. Those are well-paid jobs in every constituency up and down the country—including many in Lancashire, as you will know, Mr Speaker. Scrapping GCAP would hit our economy hard. Even delaying or deferring GCAP expenditure would undermine our brilliant aerospace industry, which was on display this past week at the Royal International Air Tattoo in Farnborough, and cast doubt over the vast sums of private investment that are waiting, from which hundreds of UK SMEs stand to benefit.

An interesting point was raised by the Leader of the Opposition when asking the Prime Minister about exports and discussions with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is an incredibly important point. I was clear that, in reforming procurement, we have to have exportability at the heart of it because otherwise industrial supply chains wither. It is as simple as that. The demand from this country is not big enough. This has been the French lesson for many years, which is why they have put so much effort into export, and we need to do the same—whether it is GCAP, or any other platforms or capability manufactured by the United Kingdom.

To undermine GCAP is to undermine our economy, our future war-fighting capability and relations with our closest international partners. The Government should instead embrace GCAP wholeheartedly and confirm that they stand by their previous position of steadfast support. Then they should commit to a clear timetable on 2.5%, so that we can turbocharge the programme by investing not only in the core platform, but in the associated technology of autonomous collaboration and a digital system of systems approach, enabling the mass and rapid absorption of battlespace data.

To conclude, the best way to win the next war is to deter it from happening in the first place. Part of our overall deterrence posture is to signal to our adversaries our preparedness to always be ready to out-compete their technology. How can we send that deterrent signal if we have such mixed messages on our largest conventional military programme? We support this statutory instrument, we support GCAP and we support the powerful gains it will give to the United Kingdom’s economic and military strength.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Can I gently say that I welcome the very thorough response from the Opposition, but the shadow Minister did take twice as long as the Minister? I do have other speakers on his own side who also want to get in, so please just work to make sure we can get everybody in.

We now come to a maiden speech—I call Calvin Bailey.