International Immunities and Privileges

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 24th July 2024 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

May I associate the shadow Defence team with the remarks from the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition about the terrible attack on a British solider in Kent? Our thoughts are with his family.

I can confirm that we support the measures before us and recognise that they are necessary to deliver into law the administrative governance of the global combat air programme. Although this is a Foreign Office measure, the statutory instrument was prepared with strong input from the Ministry of Defence—it certainly crossed my desk when I was Minister for Defence Procurement. May I put on the record that it was a great honour to serve in that role—with significant responsibility in relation to GCAP—alongside the two previous Secretaries of State, Ben Wallace and Grant Shapps.

It was a privilege to engage with our international GCAP partners from Italy and Japan, whom I had the pleasure of hosting last September in Lancaster House for trilateral discussions. This is not just about delivering UK military capability in the crucial area of combat air, but about doing so to the benefit of two great partners, and, in the case of Japan, one that faces the threat of China and Russia right on its doorstep. Since that trilateral, the project has achieved significant goals, not least the signing of the international treaty last December that we are legislating for today. The treaty establishes the legal basis for the formation of a new GCAP international organisation, the GIGO. I am delighted that we are able to agree that the international HQ of the GIGO will be in the UK, but that, in keeping with the spirit of equal partnership that underpins GCAP, the first chief executives of the GCAP agency and joint venture are from Italy and Japan. As such, the SI before us effectively enables this international treaty to enter into effect, with further important measures on immunity and privileges that are necessary for the effective operation of the GIGO.

All that said, although the SI is necessary to deliver GCAP’s governance arrangements, it will not directly deliver a single aircraft. Alongside this SI, we need the Government to back the GCAP programme wholeheartedly by ensuring that it has the funding necessary to deliver our sixth-generation fighter capability. Indeed, it would be quite extraordinary for the Government to ask us as a House to approve the regulations if they were at the same time seriously contemplating scrapping UK involvement in GCAP. Yet that prospect has figured prominently in the press in recent days. While the best of British defence aviation has been gathered at the Royal International Air Tattoo and Farnborough, incredibly the Government have not been able to repeat the wholehearted backing of GCAP that they gave prior to the general election.

In responding to the statement from his predecessor Grant Shapps on 18 December last year, when he confirmed the trilateral agreement for the GCAP treaty, the now Defence Secretary said:

“Developing a sixth-generation fighter will ensure that we can continue to safeguard our UK skies and those of our NATO allies for decades to come. It will inspire innovation, strengthen UK industry and keep Britain at the cutting edge of defence technology.”

I totally agree with his remarks. Yet fast-forward to the present, and, as we have just heard at Prime Minister’s questions, the Prime Minister is only able to say that the programme is “important.” Meanwhile, the Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), who is on the Front Bench and for whom I have great personal respect, said:

“It's not right for me to prejudge what might happen in the defence review”.

He thus implied that the defence review might not continue the UK’s commitment to GCAP. We now need clarity from the Government for Parliament, industry and our international partners. We are being asked to approve this SI to deliver a key stepping-stone to the GCAP project, so are the Government still committed to it?

This is my guess about what is currently happening. I would be truly staggered if the Government were to withdraw from a programme that they have previously given such full support—not because theirs is a party that does not know a good U-turn, but because it would bring international ramifications that do not bear thinking about either for the Foreign Office or the Ministry of Defence. Rather, in my view, we need to have in mind another Department—one that I have also had the pleasure of serving in—the Treasury. I suspect that the overall question of whether the Government are committed to GCAP is a red herring. What really matters is whether they are committed to funding it this year, with important spending decisions to be made right now. They will be in the inbox of the Secretary of State, under “Funding decisions on GCAP.” We want the Government to continue that funding in the years beyond, and we want to know whether they are using the review as a chance to shift spending decisions to the right.

It is not unprecedented in the history of the Treasury for it to work in that way under successive Governments, probably. It might offer illusory short-term savings, but it would cause immediate and lasting pain to the most important conventional defence programme of our time. To be clear—and I mean this—I have the greatest respect for the way the Treasury has to balance the books and be responsible for the nation’s finances. I was delighted that the previous Government proposed moving to 2.5% once it was affordable—we were prepared to make difficult decisions to fund that 2.5% by reducing the size of the civil service to pre-pandemic levels—and once it was sustainable. Far from this Government inheriting what the Chief Secretary to the Treasury has described as the “worst economic inheritance” since world war two, we did what we promised and moved to 2.5% only once the economic conditions allowed—namely, when inflation was back to target, with healthy economic growth and a deficit heading towards a little over 1% over the forecast period. That is our clear pathway to 2.5% versus Labour’s uncertainty and delay, which makes the real difference.

To understand the direct short-term importance of 2.5% and its relevance to GCAP and this statutory instrument, we need only go back to what the Secretary of State said the response to the statement from his predecessor Grant Shapps in December. He said:

“This month, the National Audit Office reported on the MOD’s equipment plan. It exposed a £17 billion black hole in Britain’s defence plans and showed that Ministers have lost control of the defence budget.”—[Official Report, 18 December 2023; Vol. 742, c. 1137.]

It is not so much that we lost control of the defence budget; rather, Putin invaded Ukraine and sent inflation soaring all around the world. In a world that was then in a rush to rearm, that context caused an inevitable hit to the costs of major defence projects and matériel. I have never pretended otherwise.

Bearing in mind that the equipment plan—the MOD’s forward inventory—accounts for over 10 years, the NAO’s assessment of a black hole did not take account of one thing: moving to 2.5% by 2030. As I said in my wind up to the Thursday’s debate on the Gracious Speech, by setting out a fully costed and clearly timetabled pathway to 2.5%, we were able to deal with those funding pressures head on, and ensure that our largest two programmes—the nuclear deterrent and GCAP—would be stabilised, and, as a result, properly funded into the future. I asked the Foreign Office Minister who responded to my to confirm that the Government’s timetable would not put funding of either programme at risk. There was no answer, and we have had no answer today, either. That is the problem. The Government can afford to bring forward this SI and to continue building the administrative apparatus for GCAP, but we fear that they cannot afford to approve the funding requirements for the next stage of building the actual aircraft, because of their vacillation on reaching 2.5%.

We Conservatives are clear that we support the SI on the basis that we are also supporting GCAP as a whole, including by putting in place the funding necessary to deliver its requirements over the urgent timescale that all three member nations require. That is a key point: for all three nations, GCAP is all about pace and timetable. For the UK and Italy, that means replacing the Typhoon before it is withdrawn from service towards 2040; for Japan, with equal urgency, it means replacing the Mitsubishi F-2. That is why any delay or deferment, whether caused by the lack of a clear timetable to 2.5% or otherwise, is so important and critical.

Overall, it is my view that withdrawing from GCAP now would be the equivalent of scrapping the Spitfire programme in the 1930s. It is that serious. However, if such an outcome is seriously under consideration—and we know that there are those in government who are hugely sceptical—I will explain why we are ultimately supporting this SI. It is because we on the Conservative Benches believe that GCAP is a military necessity that will bring enormous economic and strategic benefits to the United Kingdom.

To start with the military capability argument, if there is one key lesson from Ukraine, it is that in the absence of air superiority we face the prospect of terrible attritional warfare with huge casualties, reminiscent of the worst battles of world war two.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I know it is thinking very far into the future, but does my hon. Friend accept that one of the lessons from the Ukraine conflict, where we have had to give indirect support, is the importance of maintaining aircraft that we have withdrawn from service—in mothballs, if necessary—so that they can be made available to allies, should they ever face a crisis such as this one? When the happy day comes that we have these great sixth-generation aircraft, can we be certain that we have not unduly disposed of their predecessors, in case someone else needs them in future?

[James Cartlidge]

My right hon. Friend’s question is an interesting one. Whenever I was in front of the Select Committee—it was always a great joy and privilege to be cross-examined, particularly by my colleagues on the Conservative Benches—there was always a debate about when we withdraw platforms and when we bring in their replacements. That will never go away, and I wish the Armed Forces Minister well when he has the unique privilege and experience of going in front of the Committee. What I would say to my right hon. Friend is that we have to accept that, as a matter of avionic reality, the Typhoon will reach the end of its service life, and we as a country have to replace it. GCAP is key to that, with the construction of the new core platform.

While investing in the best combat air capability does not guarantee air superiority in the future, it offers us the chance to deny adversaries such potentially deadly freedom of operation by maintaining technological competitiveness. However, there are those who ask, “Why don’t we simply go off-the-shelf and buy more F-35s?” I noticed similar views being expressed in The Daily Telegraph this very day, and there is even a rumour that some Government Departments, such as those I mentioned earlier, may take a view along those lines. We must be clear that the F-35, while a brilliant and highly capable aircraft, is a fifth-generation platform, not a sixth-generation one. It is not optimised for the battle space that is likely to pertain by the late 2030s, and the United States—which, after all, possesses and manufactures the F-35—is itself investing in a sixth-generation programme, as are our adversaries.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

It is an absolute honour to follow the hon. and gallant Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey). He has delivered an excellent maiden speech, and it is an example to every new, and old, Member of this House that he should set out his love and affection for the place where he lives and where he has clearly spent many happy years. It is obviously a custom in this House to use the term “honourable and gallant” for somebody who has served, but in the case of the hon. Member it has particular resonance, because he received an MBE a decade ago in recognition of meritorious, gallant, and distinguished services. He made a tremendous speech, and the whole House will have heard him talk about the importance of a new hospital to his constituency, and about the scourge of knife crime, and his own personal reflections on why young people carry knives. We will all reflect on his thoughts and comments as he makes them in the months and years to come.

I welcome the Minister of State to her place, and congratulate her on her new role at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. Given that she shadowed that role for some time, I feel hopeful that she has a good understanding of our partnerships not just in Europe but in east and south-east Asia, and that they are safe with her.

On behalf of the Liberal Democrats I welcome the Government’s announcement that they remain committed to the global combat air programme. I also welcome the presence in the King’s Speech of the strategic defence review. Reflecting on the speech that we have just heard, it is essential that we go through a strategic defence review every time we have a serious change of Government, as we have had after 14 years. It was encouraging to hear that the review will be published soon, within the first half of next year.

Professor Michael Clarke points out that this is the 12th defence review to have taken place since the end of the cold war, and that most have “not been very strategic”. He says that most reviews have been cost-cutting exercises, and that only a couple of them could be described as genuinely strategic. He goes on:

“I think this one has an ambition to be more genuinely strategic.”

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman’s analysis of past strategic defence reviews, and I particularly remember the 1998 SDR, which was after a Labour landslide. It was strategic and outlined concepts that stood the test of time. One reason for that was that it gave other people the opportunity to contribute to the review. I am hoping that Labour Ministers might pay a little attention to the idea that if they want their strategic defence and security review to do well, they should open up the process so that people on a non-partisan basis can have serious input to it—[Interruption.] I am delighted to see my friend the Minister for the Armed Forces nodding his agreement.

[Richard Foord]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for that intervention, and so far I gather that the Government are prepared to listen to external expertise. I was encouraged to hear that Fiona Hill will be very much at the pinnacle of this review, and I know as an example that she has a great deal of insight into matters Europe, and in particular in relation to Russia. The defence review will need to look not only at means, which is what we are discussing today, but at ends and ways, so that it comes to thinking about means only after thinking about ends and ways. The problem with pre-empting a review and leaping straight into talking about particular procurement programmes is that it only serves, at this stage at least, to start to raise questions about what programmes have not been confirmed so far.

In this, the week of the Farnborough airshow, lots of questions have been raised about GCAP, or “Tempest” as the fighter aircraft will be known in the UK. On Saturday, one headline warned:

“RAF jet may never get off the ground”

and on Monday a subheading read

“questions are being asked about whether it should be scrapped to save money.”

On Tuesday an opinion column warned:

“The Government’s silence over the future of the Tempest fighter is deeply concerning.”

Sometimes the question is not as simple as whether to spend, but whether to spend in the near term or the long term, or on procuring equipment today or in the future. There is a trade-off in combat power between the near term and the long term.

I appreciate that the Government will be seeking to confirm to our allies that GCAP will proceed, and they will want to reassure Italy and Japan, as well as offer reassurance to commercial partners. Those of us from the west country need look no further than Yeovil to see what a success Leonardo has been for industry in our region. Defence exports from Yeovil amounted to £1.6 billion in 18 months. This issue clearly does matter a great deal to UK industry, but we must think about what else is happening in the commercial space.

We have heard about the European future combat air system—SCAF—consortium made up of France, Germany and Spain, which is developing a fighter jet in parallel. I urge the Government to consider whether the two systems can be as interoperable as possible. The pyramid open systems architecture that we anticipate will be part of GCAP would do well to be able to speak with whatever the SCAF comes up with.

Aside from GCAP, the strategic defence review should consider the UK’s existing capabilities, and existing combat air in particular. Twenty-six tranche 1 Typhoon fighter aircraft are due to be retired from service at the end of next March. The option remains for those tranche 1 aircraft to be brought up to the standard of tranche 2 or tranche 3. BAE systems provided the previous Government with the structural and avionic modifications that would be required, but they chose not to take that up. Instead, they intended to put the 26 tranche 1 aircraft on to a so-called reduce to produce programme to strip them of usable parts for the Typhoon fleet’s inventory of spares. I wonder whether consideration also could be given to whether they could become tranche 2 or tranche 3 aircraft instead.

An initial order of 150 F-35 Lightning aircraft has already been scaled back to 138, in part to release funding to GCAP. We can see that there is always a trade-off between thinking about future combat air in 2035 versus what we might need today. Upgrading the 26 tranche 1 fighter aircraft would grow the UK’s Typhoon fleet from 107 to 133. Of course, they will not have the latest air-to-ground capabilities of the F-35, and they certainly will not have the range, payload or stealth capabilities that we will expect of GCAP and Tempest, but they would be available soon. In recent months we have seen Typhoon intercept Russian long-range maritime patrol bombers north of the Shetland islands within NATO’s northern air policing area. Now does not seem to be the time to cannibalise Typhoon tranche 1 for spare parts.

I recall from my own service the phrase used in the armed forces that we should “deal with the crocodile nearest the boat.” In announcing that GCAP will go ahead, I trust that the defence review will also appraise those near-term risks in our near abroad rather than simply carrying on with existing programmes because they are already in train.

In closing, I will pose three questions to the ministerial team. First, is GCAP still too linked to the assumptions about geopolitics from the 2021 integrated review? Is it taking into full account the integrated review refresh of 2023, and particularly the Russian invasion of Ukraine? Secondly, if there is to be a parallel development of GCAP and SCAF by other European allies, will the Government reassure us that consideration is being given to interoperability such as in relation to open systems architecture? Thirdly, if there is not enough money in the pot to upgrade Typhoon tranche 1, buy more F-35s and develop GCAP, which of those three initiatives is the UK unlikely to do?

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[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

Madam Deputy Speaker, may I begin by congratulating you on your election and welcoming you to the Chair? I am sure that you will chair our proceedings excellently. We wish you all good luck.

May I also thank the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) for a fine, fluent and—if I may say so—at times poignant maiden speech? He spoke well on behalf of his constituents. I have it on good authority that when my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) was the procurement Minister, the hon. Member took him on a tour of Brize Norton and helped to brief him on the A400M. My hon. Friend has asked me to pass on his thanks. As a former Army officer, may I say to a former RAF officer what a great pleasure it is to see the RAF turn up on time? There is indeed a first time for everything. [Laughter.]

The purpose of the order is laid out clearly in paragraph 4.1 of the explanatory memorandum, which states that it

“gives effect to the Convention between the Government of the Italian Republic, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom…establishing the Global Combat Air Programme International Government Organisation signed on 14 December 2023”.

It points out that

“The Convention was negotiated by the Ministry of Defence.”

My third welcome is to the Minister; it is good to see her in her place. However, as the convention was nominated by the Ministry of Defence, could she explain for clarity why the FCDO and not the MOD is handling this statutory instrument?

The Minister kindly nominated me for a place on the House of Commons Defence Committee. As today appears to be a day for people taking up nominations, I will gladly accept that and announce that I am going to run—for that Committee.

I also point out that in the explanatory memorandum the policy context for the order—this is important—is described as follows:

“In December 2022, the Prime Ministers of UK, Japan and Italy launched GCAP to deliver a next generation aircraft by 2035. The signing of the GCAP Convention between the partners took place in December 2023 and was conducted by the respective Defence Secretaries of the three nations. The GIGO will function as the executive body with the legal capacity to place contracts with industrial partners engaged in the GCAP.”

So far, so good. The debate takes on some additional resonance, however, because we now have a defence review, which some people have interpreted as a sword of Damocles hanging over this important programme. My fourth welcome is to the new Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), who represents a military constituency; it is good to see him in his place, too.

A few minutes ago at Prime Minister’s questions, the Prime Minister described GCAP as a “really important programme”. It is. It is good that he was able to go to Farnborough, see the mock-up of the aircraft for himself and receive a briefing.

When I served on the Defence Committee in the last Parliament, in March 2024 we travelled to Japan to examine the programme as best we could from the Japanese perspective. We spoke to politicians, civil servants, industrialists and the Japanese air self-defence force—its military. We were going to write what I believe would have been a very positive report, and then someone went and called a general election. We cannot blame the Minister for that, but she and some of her colleagues did somehow appear to benefit from it.

I would like to stress three themes from that trip, which came out strongly. The first was the absolute unanimity of purpose among the Japanese to deliver the programme. As one politician put it to us,

“We live in a tough neighbourhood, including three autocracies with nuclear weapons. We need to strengthen our defences, and this programme is fundamental to that.”

I think that is a very good summary of the Japanese perspective.

Secondly, we were struck by the willingness of the Japanese to consider third party exports of GCAP to make the aircraft affordable by increasing its production run. My hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk was always hot on that when he was the procurement Minister. For various historical reasons, I do not think that the Japanese would necessarily have taken that view even a few years ago; that is important.

Thirdly, the Japanese have an absolute determination to achieve the in-service date of 2035, which is referred to directly in the memorandum. The Japanese air self-defence force uses a mixture of F-15J Eagle aircraft and the F-2, which is sort of a souped-up version of the American F-16. They are both good and capable aircraft, but they are getting rather long in the tooth. The Japanese have to plan forward against a threat from the Chinese J-20 or the Russian Su-57. The risk is that by the mid-2030s those aircraft will be outmatched by those two powerful new combat aircraft.

Reference has been made to the F-35. It is a fine aircraft, but it is expensive to buy and very expensive to run. The Americans have found that to their cost—the F-35 was nicknamed by the American media

“the plane that ate the Pentagon”.

It might not necessarily be the answer to the Treasury’s dream. Moreover, for the record, deliveries of the F-35 to the United States forces were suspended for nearly a year—they have only just been resumed—because of problems in upgrading the computers and the software. If we are to talk about the realities, the F-35 has been quite a troubled programme and, to some extent, continues to be so.

What would be the implications of cancellation of GCAP? This is an international agreement and, as it says in paragraph 7 of the explanatory memorandum:

“No external consultation was undertaken as the instrument implements provisions of an international agreement to which the United Kingdom will be obliged to give effect as a matter of international law once it enters into force.”

The first implication were we to cancel it is that it would put back Anglo-Japanese relations and Anglo-Italian relations, arguably for decades. I would not want to be the CEO of a British company trying to sell something to the Japanese Government in the aftermath of the cancellation of GCAP. Secondly, given the scale and the prominence of the programme, there would be a serious risk that we in the United Kingdom would achieve a reputation as an unreliable partner in major military collaborative programmes—everything from AUKUS through to collaboration in space. In an era when things such as a sixth-generation combat aircraft are so expensive that, as I intimated earlier, even the Americans are struggling to afford one on their own, the reality for us as a medium power is that we need to collaborate. We would find it very difficult to find future partners if we suddenly cancelled such an important and sizeable programme for financial reasons.

Thirdly, it would make a nonsense of the UK’s so-called tilt to the Pacific, which was inherent to the so-called integrated review and was reinforced when the review was refreshed before the general election. How can we tilt to the Pacific if we then cancel a major collaborative programme with a critical Pacific partner, which faces challenges from Russia and China even more immediately than we do? Bluntly, our name would be mud in that theatre of operations if we were to do that.

Fourthly, there is what one might call the prosperity agenda. As they said in the King’s Speech, the Government are very committed to growth—let us not debate building and the green belt now, but focus on this issue. In the last few years, about 80% of the UK’s defence exports have come from combat air—mainly sales of Typhoon or our 15% workshare on the F-35. That has averaged roughly £6 billion a year. Again, what would be the threat to our exports and our reputation as a reliable supplier if we were to cancel the programme?

What should we do? The GIGO, which this memorandum establishes, will incorporate prominent representatives from all three countries—the UK, Japan and Italy—and it will be headquartered here. If the programme is to survive, which I strongly believe it should, the GIGO has a vital role to play as the management organisation. It will have to be leaner and less bureaucratic than its predecessor organisations, which oversaw the Tornado and Typhoon programmes—two wonderful aircraft with a proud heritage in the Royal Air Force. I think everyone in the industry would admit that those organisations were a bit too bureaucratic.

The GIGO will have to be a lot leaner and meaner to get the job done. The principal industrial partners—BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Leonardo, among others—will have a real challenge. Historically, the answer to such a dilemma might have been, “Look, it’s a very complicated programme. It will take years to achieve, and it all depends on how many countries join, how many aircraft they buy and what configuration they go for. Will the Saudis participate? Will they want it built in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia if they do participate? There are lots of imponderables, so we will come back to you in about five years’ time with a unit price.” That will not wash. I would submit that one of the first tasks of the GIGO, working with those industrial partners and the three Governments, is to come up with at least a realistic pricing envelope for the programme, which the Treasury can look at and, hopefully, take a positive view on. If they do not do that, there can be no blank cheque, even for this.

To conclude, there is no such thing as an uncancellable defence programme—although I still hope for Ajax—but this comes close. To cancel this programme for short-term financial reasons would be a disaster militarily, politically, diplomatically and industrially. If it comes down to GCAP, AUKUS or Ajax, for me, Ajax has to go, and I say that as a former soldier. We need to understand how extremely serious the implications are of cancelling this programme.

I was a soldier, but the Royal Air Force has a proud tradition in the defence of this country and its interests, going back to the Battle of Britain and the first world war—when it grew out of the Army, I hasten to say.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

And the Navy.

[Mr Francois]

And the Navy, in which my father served, for completeness. The Royal Air Force needs this aircraft. We need it. The Japanese, the Italians and the west need it. By all means, let us control the costs, but let us keep it. We are not going to scrap the Spitfire of the future.