Equitable Life

George Kerevan Excerpts

Thursday 11th February 2016 Commons Chamber

[Peter Heaton-Jones]

I entirely agree. The Government have done a great deal to support savers and to support and encourage those who invest for the future, and have done a great deal for pensioners as well. That is undeniable. I hope that, as part of the package, there will be some movement on the issue, and that it will be kept under careful consideration.

The letter that the Treasury Minister wrote to me in response to the letter that I wrote on behalf of the EMAG representatives in my constituency contains the welcome information that she is open to submissions in relation to the Budget. She also points out that the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s report was published in 2008, and that—as we heard from the hon. Member for Angus (Mike Weir)—it is only since the Conservative-led coalition Government came to office in 2010 that any compensation has been paid. It is important to remember that this Government started the ball rolling.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

I appreciate everything that the hon. Gentleman is saying, but there is clearly a difference between banks that have been mis-selling having to pay up for their misdeeds, and the Treasury, regardless of party—and the state, regardless of who are the Government of the day—paying for a regulatory failure. It is not a question of charity from a Government to the individuals who have suffered under Equitable Life. People suffer as a result of a regulatory failure, and therefore it is the Treasury’s duty to pay full compensation, just as it is the banks’ duty to pay full compensation to those who have suffered as a result of mis-selling.

[Peter Heaton-Jones]

I take the hon. Gentleman’s point, but let me return to a point that I made earlier. He refers to the Treasury paying compensation. The Treasury has no money; it is all taxpayers’ money. We need to strike a careful balance. There must be fairness, not only to Equitable Life policyholders but to taxpayers in general, because it is they who will ultimately have to foot the bill for any compensation.

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[Huw Merriman (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) for initiating the debate, and I have been asked by my constituents to thank him for everything that he has done on their behalf over the years.

In 2010, when standing for election in North East Derbyshire, I engaged with many Equitable Life policyholders. They were your constituents, Madam Deputy Speaker, and they were full of praise for the work that you had done on their behalf. I added that to a lengthy list of reasons why you were returned and I was not. Having served my apprenticeship, I put some of those best practices to good effect when I was selected for the constituency of Bexhill and Battle, and was subsequently elected.

All the constituents with whom I have interacted have put their positions with clarity and with understanding of the economic challenges that the Government face in balancing the books. Given that those people had planned to save so sensibly for their own retirement, it is clear that prudence and budget-planning were second nature to them. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who has responded to my numerous items of correspondence on this subject both in person and in writing. Her explanations, and the time that she has given to explaining, have helped me to communicate with my impacted constituents, and for that I am very grateful.

As I interpret a recent letter from the Treasury, prompted by one of my constituents, I understand that the Government have closed the scheme to new compensation claims, and will reallocate unclaimed moneys remaining in the pool to policyholders who are receiving pension credit. I had understood the words

“I am sorry to say that no changes to the funds allocated to the Scheme are planned”

to mean that no new moneys would be added to the pool, and that the £1.5 billion paid out would be the final payment, in the light of the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s direction that the Government should have regard to the impact on public finances. However, one of my more eagle-eyed constituent policyholders has read those words to mean that, while the manner in which the funds within the pool are to be allocated is fixed, that does not expressly rule out the possibility that new funds could be added to the pool, and go towards the £2.6 billion shortfall, during the current term.

I should be grateful if the Minister made it clear whether any further funds for the pool are expressly ruled out for this term, so that I can pass on that clarification to my constituents. It may sound perverse, but many of them would accept that position, because they have reached a stage at which they would like to have absolute finality, and to know whether it makes sense for them to continue funding the fight.

I also want to say something about the stated position for with-profits policyholders. The letter that I received from the Treasury states that they were compensated in full. I understand that the proxy value of the pensions of pre-1995 with-profits policyholders was calculated by virtue of a benchmark from the Prudential, which was considered to be a similar proxy for their own policies. However, I understand that in the case of post-1995 with-profits policyholders, the proxy value was calculated by the benchmarking of not only Prudential, but Scottish Widows. The appropriateness of the latter as a benchmark was disputed by some of my constituents on the grounds that it was a poorly performing policy. Those policyholders dispute the claim that they have received full value, and have drawn distinctions between their own policy and that of the Prudential, and the policy of Scottish Widows. I should like the Minister to tell me whether my understanding is correct. Perhaps he will also comment on why the Scottish Widows policy was seen as a fair benchmark for this exercise, if my contention is indeed along the right lines.

I should add that I empathise hugely with all the policyholders who have been impacted by the losses to their policies. However, I am also conscious that this matter was determined before my election, and that I was elected on a manifesto which promised to deliver a budget surplus. Adding a further £2.6 billion would mean that other constituents of mine would have to provide for it. I have explained that difficult concept in person to my impacted constituents, because I believe in being direct when a resolution is unlikely to be arrived at, and I am indebted to them for the manner in which they have responded to my direct approach.

[George Kerevan]

Is the hon. Gentleman saying that he prefers delivering a budget surplus to delivering justice?

[Huw Merriman]

I was elected on the basis that there would indeed be a budget surplus. I think that it would be wrong of me to stand up and try to proclaim—this was mentioned earlier—that £2.6 billion could be found down the back of the sofa. If only it were that easy. I also believe in being direct and straight with my constituents, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman thinks that I am doing so now.

I support the Government in their approach to this difficult issue. Let me end by asking the Minister, on behalf of my constituents, whether the funding of the scheme is indeed final for this term, and whether the use of the Scottish Widows policy benchmark was justifiable.

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

George Kerevan Excerpts

Tuesday 9th February 2016 Public Bill Committees

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

I speak as a member of the Treasury Committee, although obviously I do not speak for the Committee. I remind the Minister of the Committee’s view that one of our principal roles is to protect value for money on behalf of the taxpayer. Regulatory bodies are often, for very good reasons, concerned with regulating and may be remiss when it comes to consideration of value for money. This is particularly important because regulatory functions have to be carried out effectively, and there is a cost in terms of resources: sometimes regulators do not have these resources, and sometimes resources are put in in the wrong way. The Select Committee is keen to ensure that the auditor plays a distinct and effective role. I underline to the Minister that, regardless of formal decisions here, the Treasury Committee has an ongoing brief to ensure that the relationship between the Bank and the auditor runs smoothly and the auditor is allowed to do his business.

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

George Kerevan Excerpts

Tuesday 9th February 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Richard Burgon]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Wilson, and to serve opposite the Minister.

On part 1 of the Bill, which is on the Bank of England, it is our intention to make the case for increased transparency and increased accountability at the Bank. At a time when the financial services sector, as the political system does, faces a lack of public support and public trust—or rather, not as much as we would like—it is in the interests of the sector as a whole and the Bank of England itself for it to present itself and its decisions in the most open way possible.

Clause 1 relates to membership of the court of directors. Amendment 9 regards representation on that court. We accept the proposals in the clause regarding membership of the court, but I note that concern was expressed in Committee in the House of Lords about a potential reduction in the number of non-executive directors in the court. Will the Minister clarify the number of non-executive directors that the Government foresee sitting in the court? In the light of amendment 9, which is in my name, and new clause 2, tabled by Scottish National party Members, the Government should make use of the option of nine non-executive directors in the legislation to ensure the widest possible representation and fullest possible input into and scrutiny of the Bank’s work through the court.

Through amendment 9, we seek to amend the Bank of England Act 1998 to insert a requirement that, of the nine non-executive directors, four be designated as representatives of specific practitioner sectors, including a consumer representative. We recognise that the court, as it stands, includes representatives of a variety of backgrounds, including, historically, the trade union movement. We welcome that and believe that that tradition and representation should continue.

To improve that representation, we propose drawing on the practice at the Financial Conduct Authority and the categorisation of its statutory panels to ensure that a practitioner representative for larger firms, a smaller business practitioner representative for smaller firms, a markets practitioner representative and a consumer representative are included. That is all I have to say directly in relation to amendment 9.

We believe that providing transcripts of the court’s proceedings, such as Hansard provides of our own discussions in Parliament, allows for rich scrutiny of lines of argument and is a clear way to increase transparency and public awareness. In the United States of America, it is the practice to broadcast meetings of the chairs of the various Federal Reserve banks. In the new clause, Members have not asked the Bank to go that far, but we believe that that is a positive example. The aim is to enable the public to understand what is going on and to allow greater scrutiny of the Bank of England’s valuable work.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

I want to speak to new clause 2, which is a probing amendment. My response will be determined by the Minister’s response. We are asking that, when making nominations to the Bank’s court of directors, the Chancellor should have due regard to the importance of ensuring balanced representation from the UK’s regions.

Overall, the Bill is useful in tightening regulation and in refocusing the organisation and direction of the Bank of England. In particular, there is much merit in tidying up the operation of the Bank’s three main committees overseeing micro and macroprudential activity and the operation of the Monetary Policy Committee and, if that is accepted, in ensuring that the Bank’s court becomes essentially the organiser of the organisation, with responsibility, as the main oversight, for how the Bank’s operation works and for ensuring that there is managerial competence and value for money and that resources are well deployed between the Bank’s various functions.

It has been generally recognised over the years that the court has sometimes had an ambiguous position halfway between being a proper corporate board and a policy-making institution. The Bill, correctly, separates the policy functions that go to the committees, leaving the board with the essential corporate governance. That is a step forward. My point is that, if we do that —if we redefine and concentrate the board’s activity—we must look at the composition of the board and ensure that it is fit for purpose—a new board for a new competence.

The composition of the current board is a little too narrow. I accept that it has moved beyond the days when the court consisted simply of City grandees. In recent years, appointment to the board has widened; the international influence has widened. It includes a South African and an American. There is some industrial representation, but by and large there is still a feeling in the wider financial community outside London and in the wider industrial and commercial communities outside London that it is too City focused. For a board that is about not simply managing the City, but managing the central bank, it would be in the interests of the central bank and of commanding the respect of the central bank if there were a wider remit in relation to appointments to the board.

In the new clause, I am trying not to be too specific. A board should not be federalised; it should not consist of delegates. A board has overall responsibility. I presume that most people around this table have been on the boards of companies, large and small. I have been on at least two dozen boards in my rather geekish lifetime. When boards have discussions about who should be on them, they say, “Well, what experience do we have? Who is not represented? What area of competence do we need that will help the board to function?” That is perfectly proper.

I am just saying that, given the key role that the Bank of England plays in the UK, there should be more representation of the regions and nations of the UK. That is particularly the case because the banking community is no longer concentrated simply in the City of London. There are operations in Manchester, Bristol, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Cardiff and beyond, and the industries and sectors there want to feel some confidence that the Bank of England listens to them.

I know of course that the Bank of England has long had a system of agents. I suppose that many of us around the table will have met the agents in our region over the years. However, the agents have a different function. We are talking about a new board for a single bank.

Let me say—I hope that the Government will respect this—that the principle has already been conceded in one respect, which has been referred to. It has been traditional since the post-war period for the Bank to have a representative of the labour movement, the trade union movement, on the grounds that labour and capital were the two great elements of the economy. Given that that principle has already been conceded, all we are talking about is extending it.

My final point is that the distinguished Governor of the Bank of England, Mr Carney, of course comes from Canada, where the principle is already accepted. There is a rule that, in composing the board of the Bank of Canada, due consideration should be given to the provinces being represented. There is not a rule that every province has to be represented on the board of the Bank of Canada; it is not as specific as that and nor should it be. However, if we look at the board of the Bank of Canada, we see that, strangely enough, all the provinces are represented. Mr Carney is perfectly comfortable with that, so we are not trying to impose a burden that he has not had to face in the past.

[Richard Burgon]

I will comment on new clause 2, in the name of the hon. Member for East Lothian. As I said, we see merit in the proposal for wider geographical representation on the board and we believe that it complements our proposals to ensure that different stakeholders are represented. We would be interested to hear a little more detail if possible. He spoke about different centres of employment—Birmingham is one example—but I would be interested to hear specific comments on whether this proposal relates to personal residency or employment and, crucially, does the SNP believe that devolved bodies should make recommendations to the Chancellor?

To clarify, our new clause 5, on the publication of transcripts of meetings of the court, is a small tidying amendment, but we hope that it would have a significant impact by opening up the discussions of the court to wider scrutiny and that it would ensure increased transparency and accountability. That is why I will seek a Division on new clause 5 and why I invite all hon. Members to consider voting for it.

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[Harriett Baldwin]

With great respect to the hon. Gentleman, I do understand that. Perhaps he would like some further examples. The court plays an important role in relation to emergency liquidity assistance at the time of a financial crisis. We have to agree as a Committee that there will be times when the court is discussing something that we do not want to have transcribed and put into the public domain. Personally, I thought that Governor Warsh was very convincing in comparing what happens on day one of the Monetary Policy Committee and what can happen at other times—not necessarily all the time—and how a record will be published. The hon. Gentleman will vote one way and I will vote another. I do not agree with the amendment.

Amendment 9 would require representation on the court of particular sectors, and require the Chancellor to have regard for balanced regional and national representation on the court. Obviously, the Bank of England plays a central role in the UK economy, and its policy decisions are vital to everyone in the United Kingdom. I therefore entirely agree with hon. Members about the importance of the Bank of England giving careful consideration to how its policy decisions affect people throughout the country. This is at the heart of the Bank’s mission of promoting the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability—indeed, that is precisely what the Bank does.

I will give a few examples. The Bank has representatives around the country; those agents work from 12 agencies, in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the regions of England, to gather information from businesses operating across many different sectors, including financial and non-financial firms. The regional agents, often joined by the Bank’s governors and members of the policy committees, regularly meet and hold panel discussions with companies of a range of sizes across the UK to gauge economic conditions and inform the Bank’s monetary policy and financial stability work. I trust that all members of the Committee have had an opportunity to observe that activity in their constituencies. If they have not, I strongly recommend that they do so, because those Bank activities are extensive. To give hon. Members an idea of how extensive they are: in 2014-15 the agents visited some 5,200 companies drawn from firms in all sectors and in all corners of the country; also, panel discussions were held with 3,700 businesses. Undoubtedly, the Bank goes to great lengths to ensure that it develops a detailed understanding of the conditions for businesses in all sectors across the whole United Kingdom.

In addition, the Prudential Regulation Authority’s practitioner panel ensures that the interests of those who must put the PRA’s rules into practice are communicated to the regulator. The panel includes representatives of banks, insurers, building societies and credit unions. The Financial Conduct Authority’s consumer panel has a statutory right to make representations to the PRA, and the FCA chief executive sits on the Financial Policy Committee and the PRA board, and will sit on the new Prudential Regulation Committee.

Through this Bill we are going further in ensuring that the regulators take into account the diversity of business models operating in the financial sector. Specifically, we are making it clear that both the PRA and the FCA must take account of the differences between different types of firm, including mutuals, whenever they are discharging their general objectives. We argue that these amendments are unnecessary and, indeed, unhelpful. They would cloud the appointments process.

[George Kerevan]

Does the Minister not accept that there is a difference between being consulted and having a right to be consulted and having a right to feel that one is represented on a deliberative body?

[Harriett Baldwin]

There is, but the purpose of the deliberative body, as we have heard, is effectively to act as the board of the Bank of England, supervising the different committees. Prior to the financial crisis, members of the court were often selected specifically to represent a range of sectoral interests, including many of those proposed in the amendments. The first problem with the amendments is that requiring representatives of different sectors and regard to regional representation will entail a much larger and therefore oversized and dysfunctional court. Before the financial crisis, when the court had non-executives specifically to represent different interests—why stop at the four listed in the amendment?—the court had an incredible 16 non-executives, rendering it far too large to operate effectively and unable to hold the executive properly to account.

[Harriett Baldwin]

The hon. Gentleman is right to highlight that difference. Of course, what the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have regard to is the quality and ability of those individuals to perform the function they are asked to perform. The Banking Act 2009 sensibly limited the court to nine non-executives, and in practice we have now reduced the number of non-executives to seven while keeping that non-executive majority, which means that the court is now sufficiently small to form an effective body that can challenge the executive. The amendments before the Committee would inevitably mean a return to a large, inefficient and ineffective court.

A second problem with amendment 9, which would require sectoral representation on the court, is that it would give rise to conflicts of interest. The amendment calls for several practitioner representatives on the court. We have tried that in the past, too. During the crisis, the conflicts of interest meant that some of those on the court who could have been of most assistance to the Bank had to leave the room for the most important decisions, such as on liquidity provision to the markets and on individual firms. That hampered the court’s ability to respond effectively.

[George Kerevan]

Does the Minister agree that her statement about the ineffectiveness of the board, because of its narrow composition during the crisis, makes our point that we need wider representation across the country, across areas and across industrial sectors?

[Harriett Baldwin]

I do not think anyone disagrees with the idea that we would want to have a range of different abilities and skills on the court of directors. What we are fighting against in opposing the amendments is the propensity of such amendments to lead to a larger and larger group of individuals on the court. Importantly, in relation to highlighting the potential for conflicts of interest, the conflicts policy now makes it clear that, among other restrictions, members of the court should not accept or retain any interest that is in conflict with membership and should not normally be associated with a PRA or Bank-regulated firm, whether as a director, employee or adviser. That ensures that the wide-ranging expertise—we all agree that that is necessary—appointed to the court can be deployed without obstacles, and leaves the court better equipped to respond to a crisis. The amendment would unravel those arrangements, and I argue that we should oppose it; we should not allow it to take us backwards.

The third and most important concern about the amendments is that they would impose unnecessary and undesirable constraints on appointments to the court. In the past three years, the court has been transformed. The Chancellor has appointed the highest-quality team, with significant experience of running large organisations and deep expertise in matters relevant to the Bank. The Government look far and wide for the best candidates, with roles advertised in the international press. Let me be clear: obviously, there are highly competent and highly qualified individuals who work in the sectors proposed and from all the regions across the UK. The amendments would constrain the appointments process utterly unnecessarily, potentially preventing us from forming the highest-quality, most experienced board for one of the most important institutions in the country.

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[George Kerevan]

The Minister is being very sporting in giving way this morning. Can I take it from the tenor of everything she has said that the place for the trade union representative on the court, which we have had since world war two, is now in jeopardy?

[Harriett Baldwin]

I do not know where the hon. Gentleman would get that impression from. It is important that we have a chief executive of a major telecoms provider, a chief executive of a major power utility, a private equity specialist, a leader of a global information services group and a leader of a major public sector trade union. The chair, Mr Anthony Habgood, is one of the most experienced and respected company chairmen in the country.

[George Kerevan]

There has always been, since world war two, a place reserved on the court for a leading trade union figure. That is not written down anywhere, but it has always been accepted. Will it continue?

[Harriett Baldwin]

Nothing in my remarks this morning has suggested any change whatsoever in that policy, but it is important that the best people are selected for the roles and we do not accept the Opposition amendments, which would further constrain the selection process. I hope we can all agree that every member of the court, wherever they are from, should consider in their decision making the Bank’s impact on everyone in the UK, across the UK, not just in one region or one individual sector.

The amendments call for a different kind of court, made up of representatives from UK regions and representatives of narrow interests, and that would result in a court riven by conflicts of interest. We have tried that kind of court before and we know how the story ends. I hope that members of the Committee agree that we should not allow the amendment to take us back there.

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[Richard Burgon]

The abolition in clause 3 of the oversight committee was clearly a very controversial part of the original Bill, as evidenced at each stage of the debate in the House of Lords. My colleague in the other place, Lord Tunnicliffe, supported Lord Sharkey in seeking to challenge it. Labour Members believe that the abolition of the oversight committee is an attack on accountability within the Bank, and yet another example of the Government rolling back recent legislation. I am sure that we will come to that topic on another day.

Not only is the reverse burden of proof or the presumption of responsibility being removed before it is even implemented, but the oversight committee was established only in the Financial Services Act 2012, as hon. Members will remember. The Government clearly felt unable to sustain their line of argument, and in amending the clause to allow a majority of non-executive directors the power to initiate reviews, they have made a welcome concession. It remains our view that the abolition of the committee is a retrograde step. We are yet to be convinced that affording the non-executive directors this power without the existence of the previous forum for discussion will mean that power can be exercised effectively. Perhaps the Government can say how they believe the non-executive members will discuss their concerns outside of the meetings of the court. Will they have to organise something akin to a stand-alone non-executive directors meeting? Perhaps such a forum exists, and the Minister can inform and enlighten me about it.

Following the negotiations in the other place, we have decided to allow this change in the Bill to be made. We will keep a watching brief on how it works over the coming months and we will seek to take advice from the non-executive directors on how they feel it has affected their ability to carry out their oversight functions.

We have proposed a number of amendments to improve the clause, particularly amendment 12, which seeks to increase the authority of the non-executive directors. On Report in the Lords, the Government stated that the initiators of a review among the non-executive directors would determine that they have the power to decide who should carry it out. It could be someone external or someone internal, from the independent evaluation office.

During a Treasury Committee hearing, the Governor was questioned at length, and told the Chair of the Committee that the IEO’s work is set by the court. Therefore, our amendment seeks to give the non-executive directors a duty to bring in external expertise and analysis to conduct such a review into the work of the Bank. Amendments 10 and 11 would further clarify and strengthen the Bill in that regard.

[George Kerevan]

I, too, had reservations about the abolition of the oversight committee. I warm to it to the extent that we have clarified, or are in the process of clarifying, the role of the court in a narrower sense as a proper functioning board of a wider organisation, although the Minister’s responses in the previous debate have given me some cause for concern.

It is important to grasp that the existing oversight committee is nothing more than the non-executive directors meeting as a body, so the existing oversight body gives some official grounds for the non-executives to meet. I have been on many boards where it was quite the norm for non-executives to meet informally, and one trusts that the non-executives on the court are of sufficient experience to be able to do that. Nevertheless, there must be a worry if the current ability to meet separately and to be resourced as the oversight committee is taken away. Therefore, the amendments being proposed to the clause are a useful way of just stressing on the part of Parliament that what I have described is what we expect the non-executives to do.

It might be important to consider circumstances where the non-executives might want to discuss the overall direction of the Bank. We have had one such experience in the last couple of years. The major activity of the Prudential Regulation Authority, which is soon to be the Prudential Regulation Committee, has been to conduct the stress tests on the banks. It does so under separate legal obligations from Europe. The stress testing is a highly extensive and highly resource-driven activity, and there were issues in the first round of stress testing because resources were clearly being directed from other parts of the Bank to help the PRA to do its job. There were issues about who was making decisions, and about whether enough resources and staff time were being made available from the other parts of the Bank to the PRA. A number of the non-executive directors became slightly alarmed about how the stress tests would be conducted and about the availability of the necessary resources.

There can be quite significant points when the non-executive directors would have to say, “We are worried about the deployment of resources by the executive directors. We want to stand back and look at how this is being done.” The non-execs must have the power as a body to lean against the significant influence of the executive. The Bank of England is one of the major institutions of the UK and of global banking, and the Governor of the Bank, Mr Carney, for whom I have a great deal of respect, is one of the most senior central bankers in the entire world. Leaning against him when he says, “Do this or do that,” is difficult. The amendments would give the non-executives some backbone, so when they are worried about the direction of resources they can say, “Whoa.”

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[John Mann]

The debate on the clause is very important, because the little-discussed danger is that we are creating an all-powerful Governor who determines, in his or her ultimate wisdom, a financial stability strategy for the country—as if everything will then be fine.

The current Governor obviously has a bit more time on his hands because interest rates have not risen since 2009. The MPC, with its monthly meetings having gone down to eight a year, has not had a great deal to do other than maintain the status quo. In some ways, that is precisely the problem that was there previously. Before the 2008 crisis the Governor was responsive—looking at things, making speeches about what had happened in the past month or two and trying to tweak the system—and examination of the underlying problems in the system, in the sector and on occasion in the economy as well simply did not happen. The danger is that we again become complacent about such things. That is precisely why the Treasury Committee was keen to see an enhanced and powerful court of directors taking responsibility. It would be useful to have a clear statement from the Minister, endorsed by Parliament, that the model being created is not that of the all-powerful Governor, and nor is it one that we expect to see in future.

The Treasury Committee is a wonderful body, with great membership over the years and reasonable membership even to this day, but a clear message about what is expected of it by Parliament would be valuable: the Committee, on behalf of Parliament, is expected to hold the court to account properly and effectively. That has not been the case over the past decade. The chair of court has appeared, but the non-execs have been invisible. With the court having a more important role, it is critical that the Treasury Committee be given a clear indication by Parliament that it is expected to give a reasonable amount of its time to holding the court to account publicly for the new powers, whether the Committee likes it or not, or does it joyously or reluctantly.

It will be useful to hear from the Minister about those two points, so that we get her views on the record.

[George Kerevan]

In itself, the clause is innocuous. It is a tidying-up operation, but lurking beneath it is a danger. Standing back from the restructuring of the policy committees of the Bank, we appear to be ending up with an exercise in bureaucratic symmetry—a committee to do this and a committee to do that, micro, macro, prudential or supervision, and the Monetary Policy Committee. The different committees are not supposed to talk to each other, doing discrete policy. That looks all right—someone is doing it—but what we are in fact ending up with is what I want to underline to the Minister and, through her, to the Treasury team.

The danger is that in creating bureaucratic symmetry, we have not got very far in creating a workable regulatory regime that is robust enough to meet the next crisis. One of the problems is that we are creating a silo for fiscal stability—basically, checking when a bubble arises and stopping it—and a silo for monetary policy, but the two are not talking to each other, so we are in danger of creating conflicts between the two main policy committees.

It is perfectly possible for the Monetary Policy Committee to go in a separate direction. At the moment it is refusing to raise interest rates, but that is leading to the committee in charge of fiscal policy and financial stability starting to discuss whether it should use its financial buffers to slow down a bubble in the housing market. It is possible, but a bit crazy, for the two different committees to take two different stances when the whole point of putting financial stability and monetary policy under the same roof—the Bank—was meant to be a co-ordinated policy.

Assigning responsibility for financial stability to the Financial Policy Committee does not get us off the hook of someone somewhere laying down broad policy objectives. The MPC has broad monetary policy objectives—I think that in the present climate of deflation, they are probably the wrong ones—but the FPC has very vague guidelines as to what it should be doing, and so suddenly we discover, in default, that the only person in the land who is actually overseeing all the different policy options is the Governor himself, and he is not even getting clear enough direction from the Treasury. By all means support clause 5 as a tidying-up operation, but it still leaves big holes in terms of who is actually laying down the major policy directions for the committee.

[Harriett Baldwin]

Opposition Members have suggested that the Bill, in and of itself, makes a change to the power and importance of the role of the Governor of the Bank of England. I would submit that the Governor of the Bank of England is an incredibly powerful and important appointment, but I would not say that the statutory powers of the Governor are increased from their already elevated level by the Bill. Obviously, he is the one who has a role across all the different committees, but he has always had a very important role.

The hon. Member for Leeds East is absolutely right to highlight the fact that in the other place there was extensive debate on the precise wording of the clause. Convincing arguments were made to change it and the Government tabled amendments to provide the court with an express power to delegate determination of the strategy. That is a change from the original intention after the consultation undertaken in the summer. To be clear, it will be for the court, as the governing body of the Bank, to decide who is best placed to set and review the strategy.

The hon. Member for Bassetlaw asked specifically about the role of the Treasury Committee in continuing to scrutinise the role played by the Bank of England, the Governor and the court. I see nothing before us today that would change the current arrangements whereby the Committee has an important role in taking evidence.

Hon. Members asked about the co-ordination between the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee. They are independent committees with separate objectives. It is important that the Governor sits on both committees and is able to see what is going on in both committees, but we think it right to strike a balance to ensure that each of the committees remains focused on its individual remit while fostering interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy.

There has been a good debate in both Houses, illustrating the value of line-by-line scrutiny. I think that we have landed in the right place and I commend clause 5 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Monetary Policy Committee: membership

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriett Baldwin]

I would certainly be very concerned if the hon. Member for Leeds East were developing a reputation as a moderate, not least because that might cause him not to be put forward as a Labour candidate at any future election. That would be a very worrying development. My analysis of his political point of view is that no one in this country could describe him as a moderate. This may be the first occasion on which he has been described as such. “Trot” might have been a more appropriate description of some of his political views, but I digress in an entirely inappropriate way.

I want to respond to some of the points raised and indeed to the important speech made by the hon. Member for Bassetlaw about the fact that the UK is an open economy. Therefore, by its very nature, it is open to economic developments in the rest of the world. He highlighted three topics with which the Financial Policy Committee should rightly be concerned. The first was the importance to financial stability in this country of the UK Government being able to receive tax revenues in order to pay for public services. He will know that it is incredibly important in this regard that we work with other countries and, notably, the OECD on the base erosion and profit shifting work, which is an important matter, perhaps not so much for this Committee but for other Committees in this House. That is an incredibly important issue on which we work internationally.

I reassure the Committee that, in terms of the overall resilience of the UK banking sector today, compared with the resilience at the time of the last shock, it does appear to be increasingly resilient. We would like to put that on record. The aggregate capital ratio, the common equity tier 1 ratio, is currently 12% for the banking system as a whole, which is a full 3.7% higher just since the end of 2013. The major UK banks all came through their stress test with the FPC at the end of last year without being asked to raise more capital. The FPC concluded that the UK banking system would have the capacity to support lending to the real economy even in the context of a severe global economic slowdown triggered by a downturn in the emerging economies.

The hon. Member for Bassetlaw also mentioned the housing market. Again, I think that it would be really valuable for the Committee to put on the record that the Government have granted the FPC powers of direction regarding residential mortgages and are also consulting—I hope that Opposition Members will support this—on extending its remit to cover powers regarding buy-to-let mortgages as well. Those are important points.

The hon. Gentleman also mentioned the rise of private sector borrowing. On that point, we argue that progress has been made to improve the personal financial position of households in the UK. Household debt relative to income has fallen from 168% in 2008 to 142% at the last reading. That includes both mortgage and unsecured debt. The FPC does study these numbers very closely. It stated, the last time that it looked through them, that given the actions that it has taken household indebtedness currently does not pose an imminent threat to financial stability, not least because underwriting standards are currently more prudent than in the past. Of course, however, the FPC must and will continue to monitor the household sector and will take further action if necessary.

[George Kerevan]

I appreciate the Minister’s overview of the financial markets and how stable they are. Obviously, she has not read the financial press this morning. The whole basis of the international bank resolution regime that we have brought in since 2008 is based on convertible bonds. The convertible bond market has gone berserk in the past two days. Constant default rates on commercial paper covering bonds have spiked by a whole number of points. Let me assure the Minister that the markets are not anywhere near as quiescent as she tells us.

[Harriett Baldwin]

Again, the hon. Gentleman puts words into my mouth that I did not utter. However, I did want to point out that the FPC looks at the financial sector’s resilience. No one would deny that the markets are going through rough and troubled times, but the FPC’s role is important and I hope he will agree that its powers to look at different aspects of the economy have improved the architecture of financial regulation since the last crisis. I highlight the way in which the Bank of England, as part of its monetary policy remit, has kept inflation as low as it has.

The hon. Member for Leeds East pointed to the “spaghetti” of the Bank’s organisation. I agree that we need clarity to be able to tell our constituents about how the architecture works. I share that objective. The Bill improves the pasta-related shapes of financial architecture. I would argue that the current situation, with a subsidiary and so on, is more like spaghetti. When I was trying to think of an appropriate pasta-related analogy for what the Bill does in establishing new architecture that we can explain to our constituents in simple terms, I came up with the idea of three ravioli—independent, but, importantly, in the same bowl.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Monetary Policy Committee: membership

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Financial Conduct Authority

George Kerevan Excerpts

Monday 1st February 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. I am sorry to say that we are now going down to five minutes, because of interventions. I call George Kerevan.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

indicated dissent.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

In that case, we can still have six minutes. I call Michelle Thomson.

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [Lords]

George Kerevan Excerpts

Monday 1st February 2016 Commons Chamber

[Harriett Baldwin]

My hon. Friend, who was a distinguished member of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, is right to say that the commission highlighted the fact that the approved persons regime made it very difficult to pin down responsibility. The new regime, with its duty of responsibility clearly articulated —every organisation will have that set out when managers are first appointed and on an annual basis thereafter—is a much stronger regime. It also delivers more flexibility in the regulators’ enforcement powers, enabling them to impose high standards of conduct through rules applying to individuals, including those whom they have not approved. The expansion of the new regime to all authorised financial services firms will enhance personal responsibility for senior managers, as well as providing a more effective and proportionate means of raising the standards of conduct of key staff more broadly.

Given the improvements that the senior managers and certification regime with the statutory duty of responsibility delivers in terms of senior accountability, the reverse burden of proof is simply not necessary. In extending the new regime to all authorised financial services firms, it is important to consider whether, under these new circumstances, the application of the reverse burden of proof to any or all firms is appropriate. Most of the firms to which the regime will now apply are small, and it simply would not be proportionate to apply it to those firms. By retaining it for the banking sector alone, we would raise serious questions of fairness and competition.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

Can the Minister explain what has happened in the two and a half years since the 2013 Act was passed—essentially, by a Conservative Government—to change the reverse burden of proof?

[Harriett Baldwin]

As the hon. Gentleman knows, the measures in the 2013 Act are due to come into force on 7 March this year. The position in relation to the reverse burden of proof is becoming increasingly clear. Andrew Bailey said in his evidence to the Treasury Committee, of which the hon. Gentleman is a member:

“I support the change, because what the change does is it turns the process round and puts the judgment back on to us”

—that is, the regulator.

“I would rather it does that than have us heading down this tick-box regime with legal questions around it over human rights.

I do not want to come back or have one of my successors come back to you in the future and have to say, ‘I am sorry; we could not use this regime in the way that was intended, because it was always a bit doubtful that we could make it stick’. It is far better we come at this point to you and say, ‘I do not think this has a sufficient probability of being effective’.”

I could supply further quotations, from members of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards in the other place, but I must make fairly rapid progress now.

--- Later in debate ---

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

I will try to do so, Madam Deputy Speaker.

It is always a great pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), who chairs the Treasury Committee. Ninety-nine times out of 100, I would bow to his wise words. Indeed, his repository of knowledge often leads me to think that he should be one of the regulators, rather than sitting on the Back Benches in Parliament. However, in this instance, it pains me that I cannot follow him or the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier).

I will try to get the right hon. Member for Chichester to understand why those of us on the Opposition Benches cannot accept the Bill as it stands. Fundamentally, it is about the shift away from the reverse burden of proof. Given the backlog of distrust on the banking system and given that the reverse burden of proof was put into legislation and is just about to come into operation in March, to shift away from it now will only make the public less likely to accept what is going on and to make them fear that the banks are being let off the hook yet again. I would say to him and the Minister that it would have been much better to let the legislation run for a few years to see how it worked in practice.

The right hon. Member for Chichester gave us a very good reason for saying that, after so much legislation, it was perhaps time to pause while we made sure that it works in practice. However, his argument can be turned against him, because we are changing legislation at the last moment, after we passed it two years ago, but not implemented it. We should do that: we should see how the reverse burden of proof works. That is why I support the hon. Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon) in opposing the Bill as it stands.

[Sammy Wilson]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that one piece of evidence about why the reverse burden of proof would have been an effective brake on the excesses of the banks is the fact that bankers themselves are not keen on it? They knew that it would be an effective tool and were fearful of it.

[George Kerevan]

I am trying to avoid pointing the finger and drawing inferences. What I will do, in agreeing with the hon. Gentleman, is to quote the right hon. Member for Chichester. I hope he will forgive me for doing so. When the LIBOR scandal emerged in 2014, after the Banking Commission, he said:

“As time passes, the pressure for reform will weaken”—

it is, is it not?—

“The old system failed disastrously…Maintaining or resuscitating parts of the failed system, whether at the behest of bank lobbying or for the convenience of regulators, must not be permitted to happen.”

I think we are getting both: we are getting bank lobbying, but we are also getting the regulators wanting a quiet time.

The hon. Member for Wyre Forest made a reasonable point. He said that by extending the senior managers and certification regime, the Bill will place in law a very detailed duty of responsibility on senior bankers to take all reasonable steps to prevent wrongdoing. However, at the same time, it will place the onus on the regulators to prove that that responsibility was discharged. Suddenly, it gives the regulators a job—

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

And no resource.

[George Kerevan]

Absolutely.

As the right hon. Member for Chichester pointed out, time after time when there have been regulatory failures, the regulators have been implicated. I therefore do not want to return to a situation in which it is up to the regulators to prove that something has gone wrong in the new regulatory regime, when they are partly responsible for it. I want the onus to fall on the bankers themselves.

It is worth looking more forensically at the reasons against the presumption of the reverse burden of proof. Andrew Bailey has argued that there is a worry that when the next crisis comes along, senior bankers will rush off to the European Court and claim that their rights under the European convention on human rights are being taken away because of the reverse burden of proof. That is rubbish.

The Parliamentary Commission was perhaps a little unwise to use the phrase “the reverse burden of proof”, even though we all use it and I use it. We are not talking about criminal law and making people guilty until proven innocent. We are talking about infractions in banking if, say, a banking crisis takes place. The legislation that the Government are trying to change would make it an infraction to be responsible for an activity in which wrongdoing took place, rather than for committing the wrongdoing itself. To give a flippant example, if it is a criminal offence to be in charge of a bawdy house, the prosecution needs to prove only that somebody was in charge of that house of ill repute, not that they were selling their own body. It would be no defence that they thought the bawdy house was a nunnery.

The reverse burden of proof regime makes managers responsible for the activity in their banks. When a disaster takes place, it is up to them to prove that they failed to stop it happening, rather than, as has always been the case, it being up to the regulators to find the solution and explain what happened, which means that everyone hides behind collective responsibility.

[Mark Garnier]

The hon. Gentleman is making an extraordinarily intelligent speech, but he has just hit on the key point. It is possible for bankers to provide a tick-box operation, which their lawyers have advised them on, to prove that they have undertaken every possible measure to prevent such action. It is therefore very easy for them to get around the reverse burden of proof legislation. The point behind reversing that legislation, which was given by Andrew Bailey and by the Governor of the Bank of England and some of the Bank’s lawyers, is that there cannot be a tick-box operation to show that they have complied with the rules because they involve a much more esoteric way of running the bank. It is therefore much more difficult for bankers to escape the rules if something does go wrong.

[George Kerevan]

I respect the logic of the hon. Gentleman’s argument. Sadly, we will never get a chance to see the legislation that he voted for in the last Parliament put into practice and to watch it fail. I look forward to his contribution—he will have time to make it if I hurry up—and to finding out why he has changed his mind.

I am interested in Mr Bailey’s tick-box argument, which is that if we reverse the burden of proof, senior bank officials will hold endless seminars with those on the trading floor, explaining to them why doing the sort of things that happened in the LIBOR scandal is wrong. When the inevitable crisis happens, they will come with list of who they spoke to—they told the traders that this should not happen, but it did.

It is not enough to have lots of meetings; we must change the culture of the banks. It is also important to remember—I hope the Minister remembers this—the title of the Parliamentary Commission’s report on banking standards: “Changing banking for good”. There are a lot of good things in the Bill, but it does not change banking for good. It is half a loaf, and I am afraid that another half loaf will lead us more quickly to yet another banking crisis for which nobody is responsible. Ultimately, we need responsibility.

In conclusion, we are being offered a duty of responsibility versus a presumption of responsibility. Once upon a time, there was a convention: when a ship sank, the captain went down with the ship, whether it was his fault or not. It was presumed that it was his fault no matter what happened, because he was in charge of the ship. What happens these days is that the ship goes down, the captain gets into the first lifeboat, and he turns up at the inquiry to say—to use a Scottish term—“It wisnae me; I did my best”. Once upon a time Ministers also resigned when something went wrong. We should return to a situation where if there is a banking crisis the captain goes down with the ship, and we assume that he will do that, whether it was his fault or not, because he or she was in charge and leading the bank. If we do not change that culture, we will go on having banking crises ad nauseam.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I will be neither as discursive nor as time-consuming as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), but he made some important points. Even before 2008, banking was one of the most highly regulated industries. Although I agree that ideally we need to move towards a much more competitive world in the banking sphere, it is also worth reflecting that one reason why we have not had a great upsurge of challenger banks is because—at least in the retail banking sector—the banking world is insufficiently profitable to make it worth while for such competitors to come through. One reason for that is because there is ever more regulation and compliance in the retail world. It is therefore perhaps predictable that the furore surrounding this Bill has been concentrated on the role in the institutional architecture of the Financial Conduct Authority, and the changes that have already been referred to regarding the Government’s original proposals on the senior managers’ regime.

As the MP for the City of London, I have had my ear to the ground over 15 years as Governments—Labour, the coalition, and now Conservative—have grappled with devising a framework of regulation and compliance, in particular one that was fit for purpose in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. We should all accept that that is not easy work and, in making such changes, it is important not to undermine our global competitive advantage in financial services—again, that was alluded to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chichester, who pointed out that the most effective regulatory framework will probably have an international nature, rather than one specific to the UK.

We should all be much poorer if regulation is designed simply to punish banks and bankers. By the same token, sensible voices from the City of London—there are more than might be appreciated by certain elements on the Opposition Benches—fully recognise that the British public need to see the risk of future bail-outs kept to a minimum. For all the talk of maintaining free markets and global capital flows, the sheer importance of the financial system to the economy as a whole means that there will continue to be some form of implicit guarantee from taxpayers in the event of a future financial crash. The price to be exacted by the public for that guarantee is rigorous regulation and watchful compliance, as well as the ongoing banking levy that has been introduced and is, I think, here to stay.

As the Minister will recall, I must confess that I have consistently argued against the reversal of the burden of proof, which had been proposed as a key element of the senior managers regime. I am pleased that we have not implemented what was going to come into place on 7 March. I should therefore rightly pay fulsome tribute to the Treasury for rowing back from this draconian and potentially unenforceable measure. Likewise, I am pleased that the Government have fiercely resisted attempts in the other place to resist that.

There was already plentiful evidence that senior executives of global banks were thinking twice about relocating, or indeed continuing to be based, here in the United Kingdom. The notion of a criminal liability being levied on management for actions committed by junior bank staff who were perhaps working even in another jurisdiction, and such liability being regarded by the courts essentially as strict, risked leading to an exodus of senior management from London. Indeed, it has been my understanding that the senior managers regime, as originally proposed, was the single biggest consideration in the ongoing deliberations by HSBC and Barclays that they might headquarter outside the UK—more important than concerns over the bank levy, bonus caps, remuneration caps and the whole ring-fencing agenda.

[George Kerevan]

Is the right hon. Gentleman essentially saying that, from his knowledge, the Treasury was blackmailed into changing the proposed legislation?

[Mark Field]

I am not suggesting that for one minute, but we need to make legislation that is effective and enforceable. I think there were human rights implications about having a reverse burden of proof. If we are going to try to encourage a banking and professional services industry that is worth its salt here in the UK, we need to ensure we do not put it under burdensome regulations that apply here in the UK but not across the globe.

I agree very much with the Chancellor’s decision not to renew the contract of the first chief executive officer of the Financial Conduct Authority, Martin Wheatley. The concern went beyond the well-publicised leak over pensions policy, which saw £3 billion wiped off insurance company shares. In truth, Mr Wheatley had lost the confidence and, more importantly, the respect of many leading figures in the City. I suspect some Opposition Members would regard that as a badge of honour, but frankly for an industry regulator to let it be known that he regarded those working in the financial services industry as inherently dishonest is not the way to win hearts and minds. To be quoted as saying he would

“shoot first and ask questions later”

in championing customers against the banking fraternity may have played to the gallery, but it was not sensible regulation.

I am unconvinced that that superficially robust approach ever truly benefited customers. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb) for securing a Backbench Business debate later today on the failure, thus far, of the FCA to secure fair redress for victims of financial mis-selling of interest rate hedging products. I have constituents—I am sure all Members do—who are still waiting for redress from the mis-selling of such products in 2007. They now find themselves out of time, under the six-year rule, to initiate legal proceedings because the Financial Services Authority advised them to rely instead on its own processes and the FCA subsequently failed to devise a satisfactory structure for compensation.

I was pleased to see last week that the respected head of the Prudential Regulation Authority, Andrew Bailey, was appointed as Mr Wheatley’s successor. I know from my own dealings with him that he is no soft touch. I trust that his experience and his reputation for fairness, not only at the PRA but at the Bank of England, will restore credibility to this vital part of the regulatory infrastructure. The breadth of his experience should hopefully ensure that he is able to take a comprehensive view of the financial system that avoids some of the mistakes of the discredited tripartite system of oversight. Going forward, I believe City regulators—and central bank governors, for that matter—would perhaps do well to give careful consideration to the famous advice one is given on joining the Whips Office: why say one word when none will do? I fully endorse the clauses of the Bill that recalibrate the duties of the FCA. I hope the Government are now able to convince an admittedly sceptical public and a very wary financial services community that in its new iteration the FCA will achieve more—much more—of what was intended when it was set up.

It was fair of the hon. Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon) to point out that the other place had made changes to regulation, but I am not sure it went far enough. I still think there is the risk of a virtually untrammelled power being given to the Governor to appoint or remove deputy governors. Granted, such appointments and dismissals would necessitate a statutory instrument procedure in the House, but such a process would not pass muster as good corporate governance of a FTSE 250 company, so why, in view of the Bank’s extensive powers, should it be tolerated here? This is not simply an academic concern. We are potentially enabling a Governor to pack his board with worthies happy to do his bidding and thereby outweigh the influence of the Bank’s independent directors.

As Mark Carney begins the second half of his term, we have seen in the past week the swooning of the financial press over Mario Draghi’s decisive actions as President of the European Central Bank. This cult of the central banker is nothing new—it goes back to the 1920s and the greater control central banks had in the aftermath of world war one—but I have long been sceptical about the practicality, or even the desirability, of fully fledged Bank of England independence. In the final analysis, strategic economic decision making must lie with elected politicians operating within financially responsible Ministries. The composition of the Bank should neither be nor, more importantly, appear to be the plaything of the Governor.

In wholeheartedly supporting the Bill, I trust that the Minister will give some thought to those genuine governance concerns as it makes its way through the House.

Small Businesses: Tax Reporting

George Kerevan Excerpts

Monday 25th January 2016 Westminster Hall

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

I commend the hon. Member for Hertsmere (Oliver Dowden) for bringing the matter to our attention. As is usually the case with Petitions Committee debates, we come here to speak on behalf of not ourselves or our parties, but the 100,000-plus individuals and small businesses who have expressed their concern.

I heard the Minister’s words in the Chamber about the Google issue and I take his point that small businesses are not being asked to commit to quarterly full tax returns. That is understood, but the very fact that so many people have signed the petition—every Member will be able to cite examples of constituents and local businesses who have expressed their worries—shows how worried people are, and that indicates clearly that the Government need to consult further.

This is not about whether we should implement a fully electronic, real-time tax system on the internet, as all that would provide benefits. The issue is not the technology, but bringing that technology into play and taking small businesses and the electorate with us. The charge against the Minister and the Government, which is not new or made in a cavalier way, is that there is a rush to judgment.

The Minister simply has to tell us that there could be a delay in implementing the quarterly information updates and that, rather than setting a band at £10,000, there could be a variation as to when small businesses of various sizes are brought into the system. He could tell us about checks and balances with regard to the delivery and effectiveness of HMRC’s system that must be addressed before activities such as updating quarterly are triggered. He could provide all sorts of safeguards so that we could reassure our constituents and give all-party support to the introduction of the new technology.

[Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)]

Like the hon. Gentleman, I and, more importantly, my constituents would be fascinated to learn how increasing the rate of reporting to quarterly—whether that involves a full report or an update—reduces the amount of administration faced by businesses. That is a crucial point. Did he hear the estimates at the time of the Chancellor’s announcement that HMRC would collect an additional £600 million as a result of the policy? Is the purpose of the change really to increase tax returns from small businesses? Deals such as that with Google, which was the subject of today’s urgent question, have caused great unease and real anger not just in my constituency, but right across the country.

[Philip Davies (in the Chair)]

Order. Before Mr Kerevan resumes his speech, may I say that interventions should be somewhat shorter than they have been?

[George Kerevan]

I am happy to reinforce the hon. Gentleman’s point. Indeed, various Treasury papers suggest that the shift towards a paperless tax system will increase receipts by about £600 million. That is not a bad thing, and no one would oppose it if it happened, but the issue is that the Minister and HMRC are rushing to judgment in introducing the proposed system. They think that moves to put it in place will be so advanced by 2020 that they will be able to start instructing small businesses to update quarterly.

Buried in the small print of last November’s Treasury press notice is a suggestion as to one of the advantages that will come from the proposal:

“HMRC expects the number of calls”

to its various call centres

“to reduce from 38 million in 2015-16”

to a mere 15 million by 2020. Magically, as a result of the electronic vision being presented to us, about 23 million phone calls will no longer be made to HMRC. Does anyone here, the Minister included, actually believe those numbers?

In the run-up to introducing a new system, the likelihood is that things will go wrong. If we are lucky, we might make something like the proposed saving in calls 10 years from now, but I doubt that that will happen between now and 2020. I have great respect for the Minister, but I would like to hear him swear on his heart that he actually thinks we will deliver 23 million fewer calls.

[David Morris (Morecambe and Lunesdale) (Con)]

From what I can gather, the whole point of having a trial period from 2018 is to iron out that anomaly in the system. Would the hon. Gentleman not agree that it is welcome that we are using small and medium-sized enterprises and self-employed people as a test bed, rather than putting through some sort of virtual reality programme?

[George Kerevan]

I could not agree more. At the risk of repeating myself, I stress that the Scottish National party—I think this goes for all parties—agrees that this is the road to take and that we need to consult, but there is a question over the speed at which this is being done. I understand why the Treasury and HMRC have to sell things and to make promises about what they can deliver but, as the hon. Member for Hertsmere said, experience proves that the introduction of major IT systems rarely works out, particularly when they are on this scale. We are talking about getting 50 million taxpayers and small businesses on this system between now and 2020, but that will not happen.

The Government need to slow down and consult more. The Minister has to stop putting in place arbitrary timetables for when the consultation will work itself out. In particular, he has to stop telling us that he can implement the system in 2020 and impose quarterly returns, which is the thing that is worrying small businesses. Instead, he should concentrate on bringing the consultation to a point where everyone is on board, and then the system will come into play.

I want to reinforce an important point that other Members have made in interventions: we do not have full digital coverage in this country. When Culture, Media and Sport Ministers get up in the main Chamber and talk about getting to nearly 100% coverage, what is the target date? It is 2020, but that may slip. If the new system needs 100% broadband coverage, it makes much more sense to wait until that coverage is in place before switching over the entire British tax system, including the system on which small businesses depend, to a new one. That is another argument for delaying full implementation until 2025 or 2030.

I worry that there is a hidden agenda. Clearly, the Government are attempting to make cost savings. The very Treasury press statement that introduced the idea of moving quickly to a new electronic tax system by 2020 told us that HMRC seeks to make

“£717 million of sustainable resource savings”

by 2020. The system is being put in place at the same time that HMRC is being expected to make major cuts. Again, that does not all stack up.

My real point to the Minister is that no one opposes the introduction of this system, but clearly there has been a catastrophic failure in how the Government have presented it to small businesses. We hear constantly from Ministers that they are pro-small business, so now is the time for them to honour those words. If they simply consult more, delay the introduction of the new system until they are sure that they have everyone on board and set aside the requirement for quarterly reporting until they are sure that the system is actually working, they will achieve success.

Spending Review and Autumn Statement

George Kerevan Excerpts

Wednesday 25th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

I certainly give my hon. Friend a commitment that we will continue investing in his constituency, which he champions so effectively. We have spoken previously about the enterprise zone at Blackpool airport, and although shale gas development is controversial in his area, it is now supported by a shale wealth fund that will mean money for local communities. He is right to say that north-west England is an area with real expertise in nuclear power, and we have made a big commitment not just on the development of this generation of nuclear power stations, but on the small modular reactors in which there is real expertise not just in south Yorkshire but in the north-west.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

The OBR report—at paragraph 1.43, in case the Chancellor has not read it—states that

“there is a roughly 55 per cent chance”

of him meeting his budget targets. Given that 50:50 proposition, will the Chancellor reassure the House that this Budget will not be torn up the way that three previous ones have been in the past 12 months?

[Mr Osborne]

The OBR assesses the Government against our fiscal targets, and that is the point of having an independent fiscal council. May I make a suggestion to the Scottish Government and the Scottish nationalists? Why not get on and create an independent fiscal council in Scotland? It is something they are refusing to do.

The Economy

George Kerevan Excerpts

Wednesday 18th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Harriett Baldwin)]

I start by associating myself with the sentiments expressed by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) about the French atrocities and the importance of our security forces. I and other Treasury Ministers yesterday signed the book of condolence at the French embassy.

The economic policy of Her Majesty’s Opposition is now represented by a man who wants to overthrow capitalism, nationalise businesses without compensation, and who answers to Len McCluskey. He is a man who thinks that printing money, and triggering the inflation that hurts the poor and the elderly the most, is a good thing. He thinks that a budget surplus is “barmy”, and that we can balance the books by avoiding “any cuts whatsoever”. He is a high-tax, high-inflation, high-unemployment socialist who draws his economic inspiration from the Venezuelan economy and Syriza in Greece. The Government will not take economic lectures from him on how to run our policies, and we will do everything in our power to keep him in opposition.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

Will the Minister remind the House how many pound notes the Bank of England has printed through quantitative easing?

[Harriett Baldwin]

Monetary policy has been run by the Bank of England independently, and I am sure that the Scottish National party will continue to support the Bank’s independence against the inflationary tendencies of the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington. I am pleased to have the opportunity to remind the House once again of how this Government’s long-term economic plan is delivering for the working people of the United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

Where does growth come from? Government Members have made much of their claim to fame of having delivered growth, but if we want growth to be sustainable, where does it come from? Does it come from investment? There has been only a slight uptake in investment in the UK in the past 18 months. It will certainly not be the driver of growth, looking to the future. Does growth come from trade? Many speakers have said that trade has not added to growth since 2010, if not since 2008, when the recession began. In fact, trade in goods and services has been a negative—a drawback on growth—because imports have increased faster than exports. The Office for Budget Responsibility predicts that that will continue through the spending period to 2020. We have not rebalanced the economy—the Chancellor’s claim in his emergency Budget in 2010 and at the beginning of this year—towards manufacturing exports. That has not happened and will not happen until, if we are lucky, the mid-2020s. That is the Government’s palpable failure.

So where has growth come from? It has come from shifting public debt on to private debt, and from a growth in consumer spending, which is unsustainable because, the moment interest rates go up, it will turn into a huge negative as consumer debt piles up and consumers stop spending. The Government have created growth, but it is short term and unsustainable. The moment America starts to put up interest rates, we are in trouble.

Let us contrast that with the response to the previous recession in 1992. We had a devaluation in 1992, which boosted trade. We do not have that now. We need a real, not a paper focus—not rhetoric—on economic development, industrial investment and boosting our trade pattern. We should not cut science spending, which has happened, or subsidy and support for industrial investment. We need a real industrial plan and we do not have that. I predict that we will come back in a few years when interest rates start to go up and the drive from consumers that underpins growth goes, and the Government will be smiling on the other side of their face.

Guaranteed Income for Retirees

George Kerevan Excerpts

Tuesday 17th November 2015 Westminster Hall

[Ian Blackford]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. I agree that all of us in this House have a responsibility to ensure that an adequate level of protection is in place for consumers. We must learn from the large number of mis-selling scandals that have happened over many years. I am concerned that, as things stand, there are not yet adequate safeguards in place to protect consumers from the changes.

The Work and Pensions Committee described the scarcity of information about Pension Wise as being

“not conducive to effective scrutiny”

and asked the Government to publish statistics on a quarterly basis, including on the take-up of the different channels of guidance and advice, and on the reasons for not taking them up. The FCA claims that eight out of 10 savers would have got a better deal if they had shopped around when choosing the best product for retirement. That illustrates another reason for clear, understandable, accessible guidance for consumers. The untested nature of the reform demands close monitoring and data collection.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. To add to what he has said, when I questioned the FCA in the Select Committee on the Treasury, they said they were worried that not enough time had been given for new products to emerge for savers drawing down their pension pot. The Chancellor announced the change rather precipitously, and a longer timescale might have allowed those new products to emerge.

[Ian Blackford]

I agree with my hon. Friend, although I come back to the fundamental point that what we need is reform of the annuity market. I am not sure that the products that may come to the market over the coming period will do what we need them to do, in allowing the level of consumer protection and choice that we are talking about.

Witnesses to the inquiry by the Work and Pensions Committee, such as the Financial Services Consumer Panel and the Pensions Policy Institute, said that it was essential to enable the policy to develop in the light of experience. The Committee recommended that the Government publish regularly data encompassing

“customer characteristics including pension pot size and other sources of retirement income…take-up of each channel of guidance and advice…reasons given for not taking up guidance and advice…subsequent decisions taken; and…reasons given for those decisions.”

Royal Bank of Scotland

George Kerevan Excerpts

Thursday 5th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Quin]

I have a lot of faith in the regulatory system that Ministers have put in place over the past five or six years under the coalition Government and this Government. What we need to focus on, as a House, is ensuring that we have the regulatory system that will deliver the results for our constituents and for the broader UK economy. I am nervous that the motion proposed by the hon. Member for Edmonton, although well intentioned, would delay support going into the economy.

I was serving in the Treasury when the stake in RBS was originally taken. I know that no hon. Member would be under any illusion that that stake was ever taken in a leisurely manner with a view to getting a tidy investment. The decision was taken by Labour with the very best of intentions, and it was the right decision to support the UK economy and the UK banking system at an absolutely critical moment.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

Given the hon. Gentleman’s experience at the time, does he agree that there is still nevertheless an onus on the Treasury to ensure that the money paid out in acquiring RBS is paid back in full to the taxpayer?

[Jeremy Quin]

I understand the attraction of that argument. The hon. Gentleman is an economist of fine standing, and his point, which was also made by the hon. Member for Edmonton, is one to which we would all like the answer yes, but it is not as simple as that. The reality is that the value of a share is what people are prepared to pay for it. We know what the value of RBS is at present. A lot of actions were taken within RBS that might have been right for the UK economy but not have added to the value of the share price. If we are expecting RBS to act in the interests of the UK, that may not always be right for their share price.

[Jeremy Quin]

I will, but let me make one final point in rebutting the point made by hon. Member for East Lothian (George Kerevan), and then I am sure the hon. Gentleman will have another go. The Rothschild report is thorough—it is bigger than the two pages produced by the Governor of the Bank of England—and sets out why the taxpayer can expect to at the very least break even and probably make an overall profit on their investment in the banking system. That is a remarkable achievement, given that back in 2009, when the Labour party was in government, the Treasury was talking about a £20 billion to £50 billion loss.

[George Kerevan]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for letting me back in. I simply asked him whether he felt, given his experience, that the goal should be to try to maximise the return to the taxpayer, given what they put in. I accept they might not get it all back, but should not the goal be to maximise the return to the shareholder, who is the taxpayer?

[Jeremy Quin]

Of course, we must maximise the returns, but we must do so in the context of the broader picture for the UK. I acknowledge that the banking system is incredibly important to our economy, including what it can provide to the real economy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bailey]

I broadly agree with the hon. Gentleman’s thesis, but I do not think that he would agree with mine: that if we had the sort of financial services industry that was focused in the right direction, it would not really matter anyway what progress they were making.

[George Kerevan]

Is it not ironic that the Government are privatising the UK Green Investment Bank, which is a de facto regional investment bank with its headquarters in Edinburgh, and are instead about to invest £2 billion in the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to provide local area funding for infrastructure and companies in Asia?

[Mr Bailey]

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention reinforces the sheer incoherence, inconsistency and irony of the Government’s policies towards the financial sector.

I want to speak for a few moments about small and medium-sized enterprises. The Government talk about rebalancing the economy, first from service industries to manufacturing and then from London and the south-east to other regions. If we look at the economy, we see that that must be done through SMEs. They constitute 90% of our businesses, 60% of employment and 50% of output. Although those in manufacturing may represent only 12% of our total GDP, they are hugely significant and crucial to driving up productivity and in our export performance, which are key pillars in driving forward our economy.

It would be reasonable to look at our financial services sector to see what it delivers to help to drive forward the economy. Finance and investment are the fuel for this engine of growth, but the problem is that the fuel is flowing in exactly the wrong direction. Despite Government schemes to boost investment loans to small businesses, the number of such loans has declined. The level of lending is highest in London, which has the smallest manufacturing sector and the largest service sector, and lowest in the regions, where there is a higher proportion of manufacturing. Take my own region of the west midlands, the region with the highest manufacturing output: it receives 9% of investment while London receives 20%.

As was articulated by my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton, one of the reasons behind the situation is the decline of branch banking. We have an over-centralised system. The demise of local banking and the growth of digitalisation have led to a consequential reduction in the local knowledge and insight required to understand the needs of both local communities and local business.

--- Later in debate ---

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

I associate myself with the comments from hon. Members congratulating the hon. Member for Edmonton (Kate Osamor) on securing the debate. The advantage of having this debate is that we have moved the agenda forward, rather than looking back. Yes, we have castigated and held RBS to account, but the Minister should also note that Members on both sides of the House want to move the banking agenda forward.

We have spent seven or eight years, in the Treasury Committee and in the House, trying to refashion the regulatory machinery. In fact, the new regulatory machinery is yet to come into force, because it will be another two years before most of Vickers and the ring-fencing is in force, and another four years before it is fully operational. That means that we will have spent more than a decade trying to sort out the problems of 2007, and when we get there, we will discover that economic and banking problems have moved forward. Therefore, the advantage of today’s debate is that we have tried to start moving the agenda beyond 2007. I think that the Government should bear that in mind. That is why the motion, despite being drafted in very general terms, expresses the will of the House, which is that we need to look forward at how we can make the banking system more responsive, rather than simply protecting it from replicating the previous bubble.

I associate myself with the words of the hon. Member for Horsham (Jeremy Quin) and my hon. Friend the Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Dr Monaghan). In criticising the strategy pursued by various managements of RBS, which hopefully was largely in the past, we should never extend the criticism to the work done by the ordinary workers in the branches and call centres. They have struggled to cope with the crisis of 2007-08, and with the various restructurings that have taken place. I remind Members that employment in RBS was around 200,000 when it was taken into public ownership, and now it is about 92,000, so there has been a massive shedding of labour.

[Ian Blackford]

It is interesting that my hon. Friend is referring to the challenges that some of the staff at Royal Bank of Scotland have faced. They are fully deserving of our support. Does he agree that we should reflect on the employees of RBS and other banks who were encouraged by their managements to own shares pre-the crisis, and who, among others, have suffered parlously from the mistakes by those managements?

[George Kerevan]

My hon. Friend, and old friend, makes a very good point. There is not a wall between the customer and the rank and file staff of RBS; they too are customers and shareholders, and they too suffered.

That brings me to where we go next. I do not think that Members of this House would stand in the way of returning RBS to private ownership. When the Minister replies, she must not define our difference of opinion as being that the Government support a return to private ownership while the rest of us are demanding that RBS stay in the public sector. That is not the issue. The issue is the emphasis placed by the Treasury and the various Treasury agents in their approach to the various generations of management in RBS. In public ownership, the key goal given to RBS management was to pay down the level of debt—to reduce the balance sheet. During that period, RBS reduced its balance sheet by some £1.3 trillion. To put that in numbers that people can understand, it is equivalent to the entire balance sheet of Lloyds plus the entire balance sheet of Standard Chartered.

Achieving that has required the management of RBS to focus only on internal issues. Of all the weaknesses that have been identified by Members—I agree with all of them—the central weakness is that the management has concentrated on RBS’s problems and not on the customer. I will explain how I would crystallise this debate for the Minister. In choosing when and how to send RBS back to private ownership, the test must not be, “Did we get all our money back? Is the Treasury satisfied? Has the balance sheet been paid down to a certain amount?”; it must be the impact on the customer and whether RBS has returned to a customer-led focus. I think that the current chief executive, Ross McEwan, and his staff are struggling to do that. Since the senior management was changed two years ago, there has been some refocusing. I remind the Minister that the proximate reason for the change in chief executive was that the then chief executive had disagreed with the pressure that he was being put under to get the bank ready for full privatisation when he was saying, “No, we need to restructure in favour of getting the bank ready to meet the needs of the customer.” The test is not about ideological machismo—are we in favour of private ownership or public ownership?—but the fact that the bank can be privatised and move forward only when it is capable of winning back its customers and its customers’ confidence.

The fundamental break with RBS’s customers has been the loss of faith of its small business customers. That has not changed; we have heard a number of examples today. Whether or not RBS was ultimately culpable, through the global restructuring group, in driving viable businesses to the wall, that is what RBS’s customers feel happened. Until that is resolved, the bank will never become the bank that we all want that can drive the economy forward.

The Government have to be very careful about how they approach privatisation in case they further break the confidence of small businesses. In August, when there was the first wave of privatisation in which the Government started to sell off their shares, that produced bad headlines yet again. I personally think there was evidence of short selling. The Treasury certainly lost more money than it needed to in trying to sell off 5% of shares. That brought further bad headlines, which cannot be allowed to happen again.

At this stage in the game, after seven to eight years of constant restructuring at RBS, it will not be easy to start again and ask RBS management and staff to have a whole new business model. We might come to that point, but I give a word of caution. If we look at the long and sorry history of the attempt to hive off Williams & Glyn, which is a disaster still waiting to happen, we will see that it is not possible simply to wave a magic wand and break up RBS into a dozen or so regional banks. I believe we need to create regional and stakeholder banks, but breaking up RBS may be more difficult than some Members imagine.

Williams & Glyn was not a standalone bank—it was a brand that was totally integrated into RBS. Hiving it off again has taken so long that the original investor, Santander, walked away. The RBS management has been forced to enter into a bizarre arrangement with Corsair Capital, which is an interesting name for the partner RBS has joined in order to bring in capital to Williams & Glyn and then float it off. I do not think that RBS will make any money when it is floated off, so the taxpayer and the Treasury will not get any more money back. Corsair Capital is an American group with a long history of consolidation in the banking world, so I do not think it will be very long before Williams & Glyn is bought by somebody else, precisely so that the Corsair group makes a return on its money and effort. In the end, therefore, we will be no further forward when it comes to small businesses.

I am being chided by you, Madam Deputy Speaker, so I will be brief in offering some practical suggestions.

[Ian Blackford]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[George Kerevan]

I will not take another intervention, because I am mindful of the time.

The Government have to rethink the idea of extending the new bank surcharge, which they have applied to the larger banks, to the smaller banks and mutuals. If we want to strengthen the mutual stakeholder section, we need to reduce the bank surcharge on it.

There is a growing issue—we have not mentioned this today, but it is beginning to emerge in the banking community—of access to the interlink payment system that binds together all the banks. The electronic system, which relates to cashline machines, standing order payments and contactless payments in a shop, is commonly owned by the big banks, but it is very difficult for smaller banks, new challenger banks and, ultimately, stakeholder banks to access it. We need to open it up. Finally, we need to open up the pricing structure so that SMEs can see how much it costs them to run accounts with a bank

Members on both sides of the House have collectively offered suggestions to the Government. There should be no rush to judgment. Let us think about what we are doing. RBS must have a customer-led focus and we should not just look at what the Treasury wants to do in order to get its money back.