Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 5th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the long overdue ending of the injustice done to those deprived of the right to citizenship because their British Overseas Territory father was not married to their mother. I pay tribute to Trent Miller and David Varney for their years of battling to make this happen. Sadly, this positive citizenship step is overshadowed by making it harder for stateless children to acquire British nationality, the last-minute introduction of the power to remove citizenship without notice and the very disappointing response in the Commons to attempts to remedy the gross injustice done to the Chagossians, evicted permanently from their homeland by the British Government, with their descendants denied citizenship rights. I hope we can rectify that and rectify the long- standing overcharging of children’s citizenship fees.

I turn to the asylum sections of what has been justifiably dubbed the “anti-refugee Bill”. Contrary to government claims, the Bill, as we have heard, is, in the words of the UNHCR,

“fundamentally at odds with … the United Kingdom’s international obligations under the Refugee Convention”.

First, through criminalisation; secondly, through the application of inadmissibility rules which, according to the UNHCR, rely on a

“fundamental misapplication of … the Refugee Convention”,

in particular a non-existent “first safe country” principle; and thirdly, by the creation of two refugee classes, the Bill effectively denies most asylum seekers the rights afforded by the convention. Moreover, through the prospect of offshoring, discredited by Australian experience, it strips them of their dignity and humanity.

The temporary protection status that awaits “group 2” refugees is likely to mean the kind of barracks-style accommodation found to be dehumanising and injurious to mental health by an APPG on Immigration Detention inquiry, of which I was a member, together with a significant increase in the numbers with no recourse to public funds, spelling serious hardship, including for children. In short, to quote the UNHCR, group 2 status is

“a recipe for mental and physical ill health, social and economic marginalisation, and exploitation.”

This is all in the name of the all-important but, at present, very limited safe and legal routes. Yet, as the UNHCR observed, resettlement programmes, crucial as they are, cannot on their own compensate for the abdication of global responsibility that this Bill represents. Moreover, far from expanding such routes—for instance, through humanitarian visas—the Bill’s weakening of family reunion rights will reduce them.

One consequence, the UNHCR warns, will be that more women and children are likely to attempt dangerous journeys. The ministerial mantra that women and children are being elbowed aside by young men is used to suggest that the former will benefit from this legislation. How is it, then, that Women for Refugee Women and more than 50 other organisations have written to the Home Secretary to warn that more women will be wrongly refused asylum, retraumatised and placed at risk of violence and abuse? Among their concerns are the consequences for women fleeing gender-based violence, more restrictive rules governing asylum interviews and the definition of “particular social group” which women often use to make their case. We have here the institutionalisation of the culture of disbelief that has long marred the asylum process. Children’s organisations share many of these worries, as well as expressing alongside professional organisations strong opposition to the proposed changes to age assessments.

I have two questions for the Minister. First, the Bill, as we have heard, is premised on the assumption that those entering the UK unlawfully, particularly in small boats, are not genuine asylum seekers. How can the Government make such an a priori assumption, particularly given the Refugee Council’s analysis that shows that most of those crossing the channel are likely to be recognised as being in need of refugee protection? Secondly, why should we accept the Government’s interpretation of the refugee convention over that of the body with supervisory responsibility for it?

In conclusion, I cite a refugee who contributed to a Refugee Action consultation following the Government’s failure to take adequate account of refugees’ lived experience in their own consultation. She asked that we look through the eyes of those affected so that we do not create rules that will in future fill us “with shame and regret”. If we let this pernicious Bill pass unamended I, for one, will feel both deep shame and intense regret.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard - Part 1
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 1 is grouped with Amendments 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17 and 21. Amendment 9 is in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and my noble friend Lady Ludford; the others are all in our names.

This Bill is not all bad, so I am glad to be able to start with Part 1, most of which we support, although the exceptions to that support are very significant. This rather gentle introduction is to probe into the clause that remedies historical inequalities. What is not to like? One thing that I do not like—which is not directly related to the Bill, but I am going to take this opportunity to say it—is that I am not comfortable with receiving so many briefings from organisations to which we cannot do justice. That is my discomfort. It is not that we do not want the briefings, but often they come too late for us to reflect concerns in amendments. I know that I am not alone in this House in finding it hard to keep on top of the material and feeling particularly bad about not being able to use all that is sent to us. I hope that organisations—which I know are very often overstretched and understaffed, and have their day job to get on with—will understand that we are not ignoring them, but please could they send us material earlier than sometimes they do? I am sure I am not the only one who has received briefings this morning.

I turn to the substance of the matter. Clause 1 provides for parents where there is discrimination in British nationality law that prevents mothers passing on British Overseas Territories citizenship to their children. It provides for the parents in such cases to be treated equally in terms of passing on that citizenship. The Joint Committee on Human Rights pointed out that this could mean equally well or equally badly; naively, I had not thought about it being equally badly. The way the clause is drafted is not the same as Section 4C of the British Nationality Act, which addresses the same discrimination in respect of British citizenship. That uses the phrase “in the same terms”, and that is what is proposed in several of these various amendments. I understand that concerns have also been raised that the reference to the parents having “been treated equally” is, on its face, unclear. The JCHR said it would be prudent to deal with the drafting so that it is “in the same terms”. I add that when you have different wording relating to very similar situations, that in itself suggests that the two should be dealt with differently.

Amendment 8 takes us to the issue of good character and would repeal Section 41A of the British Nationality Act. That section requires adults and young persons to be “of good character” if they are to be able to register as British citizens. If someone has the right to become a British citizen—or, more accurately in some cases, to have their right to citizenship registered, because the right is to citizenship and registration is simply the procedure—then what is done by the right hand should not, by giving discretion to the Secretary of State, let the left hand take it away. I hope the Secretary of State will allow me, for this purpose, to describe her as the left hand.

This point applies to Amendments 10 and 19 and to Amendment 9 from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and my noble friend Lady Ludford. Their explanatory statement is much more elegantly expressed than mine, but it is the same point. This point is particularly acute in the case of a child. Is the test really in the child’s best interests? I saw a bit of resonance with the police Bill, which I was going to say we have so recently finished but of course we have not, when we debated an amendment about candidates’ disqualification for standing for office as police and crime commissioners because of a misdemeanour—I think I can almost use that term in its technical sense—in their youth. This term is not the same as that; it is more amorphous. It is a discretionary matter and is of particular concern. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendments 8 and 9 about good character. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I am particularly concerned about its application to children and those whose conduct when a child—and we are talking about children as young as 10—is used to deny the right to register as a citizen, which would otherwise be theirs.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has voiced its concern, not just with regard to this Bill but in a 2019 report, where it pointed out that

“half of the children denied their … right … to British nationality on good character grounds have not even received a criminal conviction (having merely received a police caution)—let alone been prosecuted for ‘heinous crimes’.”

The Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement, of which I was a member, expressed considerable concern about the good character requirement. The committee called for a review of its use and description and of the age from which it applies—which is, as I said, 10. The Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens, of which I am a patron, and Amnesty International, which have been campaigning on this point for some years, say:

“That some British people are required to satisfy the Home Secretary that they are ‘good’ for their citizenship rights to be recognised is divisive and alienating.”


I am not sure how many politicians would come out well as having “good character”, but I shall leave that as it may be. The good character condition is relatively recent in nationality law. It certainly should not be extended; ideally, it should now be scrapped.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, as we have heard, the Joint Committee on Human Rights spent quite a lot of time considering this and related issues. I should perhaps say at the outset that when I was in the Commons, I served on the Public Bill Committee dealing with the Bill that became the British Nationality Act. I am trying for the life of me to remember some of the details of the discussions. I have not had time to look them all up, but we certainly spent many weeks and many sittings on that Bill, but I do not recall this issue arising. I do not think the good character requirement existed then; I think it was brought in later.

The issue is that in the process of trying to get British nationality, there has been some discrimination, or there would be discrimination if the good character requirement were to apply. I am thinking of somebody who should normally have been able to get British citizenship but was unable to do so and, when applying now, if this is passed, will have to meet the good character requirement. That seems a little odd. I hope I have understood that correctly; that was certainly how we looked at it on the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Perhaps the best thing I can do is to quote from the committee’s report, because it states it very clearly. This is from paragraph 41:

“We reiterate concerns made by this Committee in previous Parliaments that requiring good character when considering applications resolving prior discrimination risks perpetuating the effects of discrimination for those previously discriminated against. Moreover, we also share the concerns raised by the JCHR in 2019 about the appropriateness of the good character requirements being applied to children, particularly children whose main or only real connection may be with the UK. It is difficult to align this requirement with the obligation to have the best interests of the child as a primary consideration.”


That is the case for this amendment.

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, this is the first time I have spoken on the Bill, as I was unable to speak at Second Reading. I want to speak to the amendments in my name in this group. I look forward to hearing the thrust of Amendment 13 from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. At the outset, I declare that my mother was a naturalised Brit through marriage, under an earlier incarnation of this Act. I am also a non-practising member of the Faculty of Advocates.

I shall move Amendment 3 and speak to Amendments 4, 5, 6, 7, 18 and 22. I am enormously grateful to Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland for his expertise and briefing in preparing these amendments, which concern the fees to be charged under Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7 of the Bill. The amendments are the work of the Law Society of Scotland, and in particular I pay tribute to its immigration and asylum sub-committee, which has considered this part of the Bill in some detail.

The Law Society of Scotland states that it agrees with Clause 1, subject to the registration process being free. There is no clarity around that in Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7. This is a cause of concern and which is why I have tabled these amendments. In this connection, the Law Society acknowledges and agrees with the 2020 report by British Future, Barriers to Britishness. At pages 10 and 11, it recommends:

“Citizenship by registration should be free for those who become British by this route. This group mostly comprises children and those with subsidiary categories of British nationality, such as British Overseas Territories Citizens and British National (Overseas) passport holders from Hong Kong who now have a route to citizenship through the bespoke British National (Overseas) visa.


Nationality law should be amended to allow children born in the UK to be British citizens automatically, restoring a policy that applied before 1983.


Vulnerable groups of people should be encouraged to take legal advice, which should be affordable and widely available in all parts of the UK.”


The Law Society looked particularly at the case of PRCBC and O v Secretary of State for the Home Department—reported in “[2021] EWCA Civ 193”—where the Court of Appeal held that the fee of £1,012 for certain applications by children to register was unlawfully high. An appeal to the United Kingdom Supreme Court has recently been heard. We await the decision in due course.

I also want to refer to the extremely helpful report from the Constitution Committee of this House about the Bill. Paragraph 16 concludes:

“The Government should clarify its intentions on the amount of fees to be charged under Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7.”


The committee sought clarity as to what fees will be charged for registration applications under this clause and under similar provisions in Clauses 2, 3 and 7, referred to earlier. The committee also referred to the forthcoming appeal decision of the Supreme Court.

I urge my noble friend, when summing up on this little group of amendments, to come forward and say whether fees are going to be applied and at what level they will be set. It is inappropriate to discuss the Bill at this stage and not to have any idea as to what fees will be charged during the process. With those few remarks, I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 13 in my name. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham—who cannot be here today—for their support. I support the other amendments in this group. I am grateful, too, to the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens, of which I am a patron, and to Amnesty International UK, for their help. Once again, I pay tribute to them for their continued work to promote children’s citizenship rights.

Essentially, the new clause would ensure that children are not excluded from their right to citizenship by registration by unaffordable fee levels, well above the cost of administering that right. It will also require action to raise awareness of this right.

It feels a bit like Groundhog Day. I have lost count of the number of times we have raised this issue in your Lordships’ House. Indeed, we are now known as “Terriers United”, although I do not think that all the terriers are able to be present today. On our last outing, during debate on the then Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill of 2020, I warned the Minister that we would be snapping at the Home Office’s heels until we achieved justice for this vulnerable group of children.

I will recap the arguments briefly. We are talking about a group of children who were either born here to parents—neither of whom was, at that time, British or settled—or who have grown up here from an early age and have rights to register as British citizens. A combination of factors, notably the exorbitant fee of more than £1,000—£640 more than the most recent stated cost of administration—lack of awareness of the need to register, and the difficulties faced by local authorities with regard to looked-after children, have resulted in thousands of children being denied that right to British citizenship, even though it is theirs. A High Court judgment, to which I shall return, noted the mass of evidence. As a consequence, many children born in the UK feel alienated, excluded, isolated, second best, insecure and not fully assimilated in the culture and social fabric of the UK.

When we last debated this issue, as part of an amendment calling for a review of the barriers to registration of the right to citizenship, the Minister said:

“I completely acknowledge the points that the noble Baroness makes about citizenship costs; I will not tell her that you do not need citizenship to live here, because your Lordships will not accept that sort of answer.”


Quite right. I trust that there will be no attempt to revive such arguments today. Instead of trying to combat our arguments, the Minister proposed a “task-and-finish activity”. This would involve discussion of the issues in the wider context of societal cohesion and integration, which, sadly, will suffer as a result of this Bill. She then said that she would

“think about how we can then bring that back to the House”.—[Official Report, 5/10/20; cols. 429-30.]

Well, we had one initial meeting. It was very constructive, but it did not really address the substance of the withdrawn amendment, and nothing came back to the House.

In the meantime, there has been a significant development: the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s judgment which had found the fee unlawful because of the Home Office’s failure to take account of the best interests of children under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act. It is worth noting a few points from the Court of Appeal’s judgment. First, it spelled out:

“There is no issue but that the recent and current levels of fees have had a serious adverse impact on the ability of a significant number of children to apply successfully for registration.”


It noted that payment of the fee would involve “unreasonable sacrifices” for those on low or middle incomes and, in the case of the children of lone parents on benefits,

“it is difficult to see how the fee could be afforded at all.”

Secondly, it underlined the importance of citizenship. Both these points, it said, were

“not disputed by the Secretary of State.”

Thirdly, and crucially, it said that, because

“no other consideration is inherently more significant than the best interests of the child”,

the Home Secretary

“must identify and consider the best interests of the child … and must weigh those interests against countervailing considerations.”

The judgment gave short shrift to the frankly pathetic Home Office argument that the debate on the fees initiated by Members of both Houses constituted consideration of children’s best interests. The chutzpah of trying to put that argument takes my breath away; anyway, the court would have nothing to do with it.

The case was heard by the Court of Appeal in October 2020 and the judgment was given in February 2021. The Home Office chose not to appeal against the best interests judgment yet, nearly a year later, it still has not published the outcome of the best interests review required by that judgment. However, because of a separate appeal on a different point of law to the Supreme Court in the name of PRCBC, of which I am a patron, and O, whose case it was, judgment on which is still awaited, Ministers now argue that publication of the best interests review must await that judgment. Why, given that the judgment has nothing to do with the best interests review?

As it happens, I understand that the judgment will be given next week. Can the Minister therefore commit to publishing the outcome of the best interests review swiftly following that judgment, and certainly before Report? If not, why not? The longer the continued wait, the more children will be denied their right to citizenship because of the level of the fee. This cannot be right. Please do not use the Supreme Court’s irrelevant judgment as an excuse for rejecting this amendment. These children cannot afford to wait any longer. Every month of delay is another month of exclusion and alienation from British society. The terriers are growing very impatient.

[The Lord Bishop of Gloucester]

My Lords, I will speak on Amendment 13 on behalf of my noble friend the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, who sadly cannot be in the House until later today. He wishes to declare his interests in relation to both RAMP and Reset, as set out in the register. The following words are his, but I will say that I wholeheartedly agree with every one of them.

My interest comes from my ongoing engagement in this House with issues concerning children and ensuring that their best interests are central to legislation. The Government should be doing everything they can to ensure that all children in the UK have the opportunity to thrive. We should be working to remove barriers that they may face in seeking to reach their full potential. The current British citizenship registration fees create a barrier for many children to being and feeling fully part of society.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for his support of the principle, but is he suggesting that the Home Office would manipulate the cost in this way? The figure that we have is a Home Office figure. The Home Office tells us how much it costs to administer it, and therefore it seems reasonable that the fee should be linked to that. Ideally, I would like there to be no fee for this either, but that might be pushing things too far. Certainly, we are arguing for no fees for those who are in local authority care, but it is a Home Office figure, not a figure per person who is registering.

[Lord Horam (Con)]

I appreciate that perhaps “manipulate” was the wrong word. I simply meant that events and costs can change over time. If you have it in an Act of Parliament, you cannot change it; you introduce inflexibility, which may in some instances work against you. Often the case is put forward that this is the right way to do it; I have seen a number of these instances, but it never works.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Absolutely, and I understand that that might be the case, but that is not the essence of either of the noble Baroness’s amendments. If I have not explained it by the end of what I have said, I am sure that the noble Lord will come back to me.

We support all these amendments, and I am grateful to Amnesty and many others for their briefings. As we have heard, and as the Explanatory Notes explain, Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7 are aimed at ending anomalies in British nationality law, such as allowing women as well as men to pass on citizenship at the time of birth, including where the parents are not married. They also aim to allow the Secretary of State to grant citizenship where a person failed to become a British citizen and/or a British Overseas Territories citizen because of an historical legislative unfairness, such as an act or omission by a public authority or other exceptional circumstances—the Windrush injustices come to mind. But all these measures come to nothing if those entitled to citizenship cannot afford to pay the required fees to correct the injustice; hence Amendments 3 to 7, 18 and 19, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Mcintosh of Pickering. The Government accept that applicants have been unfairly treated, but they then continue to treat them unfairly by charging, in many cases, prohibitively high fees.

I pay tribute to the sustained and tireless work of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, on this issue, and thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, who summarised previous debates in the House so well. Amendment 13, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, takes a slightly less generous approach than the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, but one perhaps more likely to be accepted, ensuring that the Home Office could charge only cost price for citizenship—still a considerable amount of money—or less in the case of children if the family cannot afford it.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I take this opportunity to clarify what is says: it says that no person may be charged a fee that is “higher than”. It is not saying that it should be the cost price. Given that, every year, the Home Office must look at the fees, I do not see that there is a problem. I am sorry to interrupt.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am very grateful for that important clarification. The cost price is the maximum that should be charged, not the actual cost that should be charged.

There may be some difficulty around whether there is to be a means test, as implied by subsection (3), but the important addition to the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Mcintosh—subsection (4) —is the requirement for the Secretary of State to raise awareness of the right to be registered as a British citizen or British Overseas Territories citizen. As Amnesty rightly points out, thousands of children grow up in the UK excluded from their citizenship rights because they are unaware that they are without British citizenship and need to exercise their right to be registered.

Citizenship should not be an optional extra. It is the right to have rights. It is not, as the Minister said on the previous group, a privilege. It is a right that these people have. It is also likely to make those who acquire it feel more included, and more likely to be loyal to this country, its laws, values and traditions. It is not just of value to those who acquire it but to everyone in the UK, and, as such, the cost of acquiring it should not fall solely on the applicant but on society as a whole.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

Does the Minister accept that there is a difference between leave to remain and citizenship? We are talking about citizenship, and the courts were very clear about the importance of citizenship. Please do not rerun the argument that leave to remain is as good as citizenship, because it is not.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Of course I accept the distinction. There is no arguing about that at all.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, raised the point that the provisions in this Bill are about righting historical wrongs, and I assure the Committee that it remains our intention to continue to adopt the approach of not charging fees in instances where unfairness or injustice has occurred. But as I tried to outline above, this is not a matter for the Bill. As my noble friend Lord Horam noted, it should be remedied through secondary legislation in line with other changes to immigration and nationality fees, as far as applications for British citizenship are concerned. Administration of British Overseas Territories citizenship applications is a matter for the overseas territories. We have consulted with them about the new nationality provisions; that applies to all the amendments except Amendment 13.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, that it is a lot of money is not in dispute. I am coming to the part that deals with the various reviews and the High Court judgment, so I hope the noble Lord will bear with me for a second. I think this will address his other questions.

Amendment 13 was put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. I note that this new clause is identical to one considered in the other place. That the noble Baroness has put it to this Committee to consider leaves us in no doubt about the strength of feeling on this matter, and this debate has reinforced that.

Proposed new subsection (2) would prevent the Secretary of State charging a fee to register as a British citizen or British Overseas Territories citizen if the child is being looked after by a local authority. I just mentioned that as well. The Government already have waivers in place, which I referred to, that will allow any child looked after by their local authority, irrespective of nationality, to apply for both limited and indefinite leave to remain, which I accept is not the same citizenship, without being required to pay application fees. This ensures that children in local authority care can access leave to remain, and the benefits of living, working and studying in the UK, without having to pay a fee.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

The noble Lord acknowledges that leave to remain is not the same as citizenship. When we last discussed this, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, accepted that this is not an argument that this House will accept. Please do not keep putting that argument, because it does not wash here.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I assure the noble Baroness that I am not going to try it again today.

Proposed new subsection (4) would require the Secretary of State to take steps to raise awareness of rights under the British Nationality Act 1981 to be registered as a British citizen or British Overseas Territories citizen among people possessing those rights. The Government publish information about becoming a British citizen on GOV.UK and we are committed to ensuring that such information is fully accessible by all.

Going on to the Supreme Court, pretty much every speaker has alluded to the fact that child citizenship fees have been the subject of a legal challenge brought forward by the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens, and that this litigation has not yet concluded. We await the final judgment of the Supreme Court hearing, which took place on 23 and 24 June 2021, so that we can take proper account of the Supreme Court’s views. I believe that judgment is due next week, to confirm what I think has also been said here. In the meantime, the Home Office will continue to charge the fees set out in the Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Regulations 2018.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am very sorry to interrupt yet again, but I pointed out that the appeal that has gone to the Supreme Court is a completely separate legal point from the one that requires the Home Office to carry out a best interests review. Why do the Government keep putting this argument when it has been over a year since the judgment? Why can they not produce the best interests review now? It has nothing to do with the appeal to the Supreme Court.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I was just coming to that.

The Government are currently carrying out a Section 55 assessment, in tandem with the best interests review, in relation to the child registration fees. I cannot predict the outcome of that assessment, but that does not necessarily mean that the fees will change. I cannot give the noble Baroness the assurance she seeks on when it will be published, but the reviews are ongoing.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

Who is carrying out this review?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot answer that, I am sorry. I will write on that.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, with respect to the noble Lord, we are awaiting the further judgment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am sorry, but the lawyers behind this are very clear that these are completely separate legal points. The people who appealed the Court of Appeal’s judgment were not appealing in relation to the best interests of the child. The Government accepted the best interests of the child judgment a year ago. Why do we still not have the best interests review? As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, surely the Government should have acted immediately once they accepted that it was unlawful to charge this fee without taking account of the best interests of the child.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I said, I do not have the answer to why it has taken a year, but I will write to the noble Baroness and all noble Lords who have expressed an interest in this subject to try to explain.

Having said all that, I hope you understand that I cannot comment on the Supreme Court’s judgment. We remain of the view that it is the right course of action to wait until the judgment—I am sorry to labour the point. Accordingly, for the reasons I have given, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, first, we do not address each other as “you”. I know that the Minister is new to the House, but we do not use that term.

Secondly, there is a difference between an on/off decision about whether to charge a fee, as suggested by the Baroness in her amendments, and interfering with the current system, where the fee level is set by regulations. They are two different issues.

Thirdly, the noble Lord kept talking about interfering with the existing legislative framework. That is our job. We interfere with the existing legislative process by passing legislation. That is a nonsense argument.

Finally, the noble Lord talked about fees being waived in exceptional circumstances. People do not apply to register their right to British citizenship and then, when they take a look at what the fees are, say, “There’s absolutely no way that we can go ahead with this. We’re not even going to apply.” The fee being waived in exceptional circumstances does not even arise. Does the noble Lord not accept that?

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

The noble Lord said something about how the system relies on these fees. Could he clarify what he means? I hope he does not mean the immigration system, which is often referred to, because we are not talking about immigration here. Many of these children were born in this country.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I apologise for my inadvertent use of the word “you”. I feel suitably admonished. My apologies. To answer that question, it is the migration and borders system.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am sorry, but that is irrelevant, because this is not about immigration. It is about the right to register for citizenship for children who have been born here or who otherwise have lived most of their lives here.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I thank everybody who contributed to this debate. I thank my noble friend for his courteousness in giving as full a reply as he is able to at this time.

I acknowledge the indefatigable campaigning skills of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, and the work they have done. I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester for sharing the concerns of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and his work in this regard.

I will focus on one particular aspect of my noble friend’s reply. I will not get involved in the best interests review because that is a separate argument. We need a very clear undertaking that, if the Supreme Court is to rule on the appeal as soon as next week, the Government will come forward and let us know what the scale of fees will be. I accept that the amendments I have put forward are the more radical. They say that the fees should be waived for all the reasons given during the debate: they are proving a barrier to children who, as the Government Benches and the Minister have agreed—I welcome that—should be welcomed, and citizenship should be awarded to them provided they meet the conditions. I do not think that a fee of £400 more than the cost of the work being done is satisfactory. It is unacceptable.

In the words of the Law Society of Scotland and of the Constitution Committee, I urge the Government to clarify their intention on the amount of fees to be charged under the relevant clauses—Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7—after the Supreme Court judgment is announced, and to come forward with an amendment in this regard before Report, otherwise I will feel obliged to retable the amendments. At this moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

11: After Clause 4, insert the following new Clause—
“Provision for Chagos Islanders to acquire British nationality
(1) Part 2 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (British overseas territories citizenship) is amended as follows.(2) After section 17H (as inserted by section 7), insert— “17I Acquisition by registration: descendants of those born in British Indian Ocean Territory(1) A person is entitled to be registered as a British overseas territories citizen on an application made under this section if they are a direct descendant of a person (“P”) who was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies by virtue of P’s birth in the British Indian Ocean Territory or, prior to 8 November 1965, in those islands designated as the British Indian Ocean Territory on that date.(2) An application under this section must be made before the date specified in subsection (3).(3) The specified date means—(a) in the case of a person aged 18 years or over on the date of coming into force of this section, five years after the date of coming into force of this section, or(b) in the case of a person under the age of 18 years on the date of coming into force of this section, before they reach the age of 23 years.(4) A person who is being registered as a British overseas territories citizen under this section is also entitled to be registered as a British citizen.(5) No charge or fee may be imposed for registration under this section.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would allow anyone who is descended from a person born before 1983 on the British Indian Ocean Territory to register as a British overseas territories citizen. They may also register as a British citizen at the same time. Both applications would be free of charge. The application must be submitted within 5 years, or in the case of a minor born before the date of coming into force, before they reach 23 years old.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the noble Lord, Lord Woolley of Woodford, for their support for the amendment. The amendment would extend the right to register as citizens to the descendants of Chagossians exiled from their homeland, subject to a time limit. I am grateful to Rosy Leveque of BIOT Citizens for her help with it, and to Chagossian Voices for its briefing.

To understand the case for this amendment, a bit of history is necessary. Back in the 1960s and early 1970s, the inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago—a British Overseas Territory which became part of the British Indian Ocean Territory—were evicted by the then British Government to make way for a US airbase on Diego Garcia, the largest of the islands. They have never been allowed to return. Not only did they lose their homeland, but their grandchildren and other descendants have no right to British Overseas Territory citizenship and, therefore, to British citizenship. Only those born on the islands and the first generation born in exile have such a right. I should perhaps make it clear that the right to citizenship should not be confused with the quite separate right of return, which is not affected by this amendment, important as it is.

The Chagossians were deported to Mauritius and the Seychelles and now around 4,000 live in the UK, but because of the unjust citizenship rules many are undocumented and children have been and continue to be deported. Families have been broken up and communities are divided, as some members have access to citizenship rights while others do not. This has caused hardship for many and has aggravated the trauma associated with exile. The lack of citizenship rights has created insecurity and made it harder to integrate into local communities.

In the Commons, in Committee, the Minister, Tom Pursglove, expressed some sympathy for the case made for the extension of citizenship rights and acknowledged that

“the Chagossians present a unique case.”—[Official Report, Commons, Nationality and Borders Bill Committee, 4/11/21; col. 644.]

He said he would “reflect further”. It all looked rather hopeful but when the Conservative MP, Henry Smith, raised the issue on Report, what looked like a half-open door was slammed shut by the Immigration Minister, Kevin Foster, which was very disappointing. Mr Smith emphasised the anomalies created, the injustices caused and that we are talking about no more than a few hundred to the low thousands of people who would benefit. So far, BIOT Citizens has identified 500 descendants. What is at stake is a small concession but one that would make a huge difference to the lives of those affected. It would also have symbolic importance for a people who have lost their homeland through no fault of their own.

Mr Smith’s amendment was rejected in a single paragraph. There appear to be two strings to the Government’s case. The first is that the amendment

“would undermine a long-standing principle of British nationality law … under which nationality or entitlement to nationality is not passed on to the second and subsequent generations born and settled outside the UK and its territories, creating quite a major precedent.”—[Official Report, Commons, 7/12/21; col. 258.]

I am sure noble Lords can spot what a specious argument this is in this context. The only reason the Chagossians in question do not meet this condition is because they are descended from people who were evicted against their will from a British Oversees Territory. Forced and continued exile prevents them from meeting these long-standing conditions. It is not clear that the Government really understand this, but as the Junior Minister acknowledged in Committee, it is “a unique case” so no precedent would be set, unless the Government have plans to evict others from their British Overseas Territory homelands. I hope and trust that, if the noble Baroness—I think it is the noble Baroness—the Minister has been briefed to use this argument, she will scrap it now.

The second government concern is more credible. They do not want to create an open-ended right in the way that the Commons amendment did, and I think that is reasonable. This amendment therefore creates a five-year time limit for applications, following the Windrush precedent in the British Nationality Act 1981. Those aged under 18 at the time of enactment will have up until the age of 23. I am offering the Minister an opportunity to add something positive, that would be widely welcomed, to a Bill that—with very few exceptions to be found in this part of it—has been widely condemned. If this particular way of capping entitlement is not to the Government’s liking I am, of course, open to discussions about alternative means, such as a generational cap. I very much hope that the Minister will accept the amendment or a revised version of it for Report. Is she willing to meet virtually with me and other signatories to the amendment and those advising me to discuss how we might proceed? I plan to return to the issue on Report to try to put right what Henry Smith MP correctly described as an “appalling injustice”. I beg to move.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thoroughly endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has said, and I am very pleased to co-sign this amendment. In the first two groups that we discussed this morning, we talked a lot about righting injustices. This is an opportunity to right a gross historic wrong—a forced eviction and exile that was, indeed, ruled illegal by the International Court of Justice in 2019.

I was one of those who raised this issue very briefly at Second Reading. I do not think the Minister referred to it in her response, although I know she had a lot of issues to cover. It should be noted, though, that the amendment in the other place from Henry Smith MP at Report stage, which the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to, had the sizeable support of 245 Members, displaying the strength of feeling about the trauma and hardship of the Chagossian community that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to.

The all-party group on Chagos is a strong and active group that has long campaigned to right, in so far as is possible, the wrongs of the 1960s when, having resisted independence from Mauritius, of which Chagos was part, Britain secretly acceded to an American request to make one of the islands, Diego Garcia, available on a long lease as a “communications hub”. Of course, it later became notorious as a site for rendition flights. Anyway, the then British Government of, I am afraid, Harold Wilson, detached Chagos from Mauritius and then emptied Chagos, chucking out its inhabitants. This appeared, apparently, to be compensation for the Americans for the UK declining to get involved in the Vietnam War.

The saga is littered with lies and about-face. The UK told the UN that the Chagos Islands had no permanent population and the Chagossians were merely contract labourers. The British Indian Ocean Territory—BIOT—comprising all the Chagos Islands was detached from Mauritius and, between 1968 and 1973, the entire population of Chagos was removed. Some 2,000 people were deported to Mauritius, some went to the Seychelles and some arrived in the UK, particularly in Crawley, perhaps because it is near Gatwick, in Sussex.

As was discussed this morning, the purpose of Part 1 of this Bill is to address long-standing discrimination in British nationality law. I put to the Committee that Amendment 11 fits perfectly in this context. The original appalling injustice of the late 1960s and early 1970s perpetrated against the Chagossians has been compounded ever since, not only by their continuing enforced exile from their homeland but by the deprivation of their descendants of their citizenship rights. Had they not been evicted but had stayed in BIOT, they would have passed British Overseas Territory citizenship from generation to generation and some would have had the entitlement to be registered as British citizens or at least benefited from the Home Secretary’s discretion to so register them.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said, Ministers in the other place have provided no justification for resisting the rectification of this injustice suffered by the Chagossians. The Government simply rely, in a sense, on the injustice of eviction to perpetuate the injustice. Because we had chucked them out, they were not BIOT citizens and so they cannot benefit from any subsequent citizenship rights. The Government now have an opportunity with this new clause to make substantial amends—hardly complete amends—for the wrongs done half a century ago. I suggest that it is wrong to seek to assert that correcting the nationality law consequences of this wrong would create any wider precedent, as the noble Baroness said.

By the way, if anyone wants to read the history of the UK’s perfidious treatment of the Chagossians, I recommend this booklet of a lecture by Professor Philippe Sands QC entitled Chagos: The Last British Colony in Africa – A Short History of Colonialism, a Modern Crime Against Humanity? and I will give this to Hansard so it can correctly identify it. I urge the Minister to give a positive response.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I do not think that anybody in this Committee would say that what happened to the Chagossians was, by any means, acceptable to them personally. I do not think I was trying to make that case.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has contributed to this debate. It is fair to say that there is unequivocal support across the Committee—perhaps not for the exact wording of the amendment, but for what it is trying to achieve. Noble Lords spoke very strongly. It is unusual for nothing to be said in opposition to what is trying to be achieved.

The Minister expressed her sympathy and empathy. I am afraid that butters no parsnips when it comes to what the Chagossians rightly want. As other noble Lords have said, this is a question of justice and human rights. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti asked a pertinent question about the distinction between those who choose to leave a British territory and those who are forced out. The Minister has accepted that a wrong was done. Whichever Government were in power—I know it was my party—we share the shame. Here is an opportunity, not to put it right but at least to do something tangible that will go some way towards putting one aspect of it right.

I am desperately disappointed that the Government are still using the argument that, because the Chagossians are in the wrong place, they are subject to a long-standing principle of British law. What other group of people has been forcibly evicted in this way? As I said, we are not setting a precedent because I assume we are not planning to evict anybody else.

I thank the Minister for the offer of a meeting. Perhaps we could take a cross-party delegation to reflect the strength of feeling across the House. I hope she will think again. If not, I shall want to bring this back on Report.

My noble friend Lady Whitaker has been supporting the Chagossians for many years; I am relatively new to this issue and the legal position is extremely complicated. I may not have it completely right but there is a principle of justice and human rights, which has been recognised across the Committee. We must use this legislation to put it right. As a number of noble Lords have said, there is no better place than this part of this Bill, which is about putting right historical discrimination in nationality and citizenship law. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment for now.

Amendment 11 withdrawn.

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Could some of the sharpest corners in this legislation be smoothed off? I do not know, but it is because of those millions of silent majority who would see many of the objections to Clause 9 to be perverse, unfair, unreasonable or possibly all three, that I think the Government have so far got the balance right in what they are seeking to achieve in Clause 9 and why I support it.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not a lawyer either, but like my noble friend Lady Blower I have read the Bingham Centre’s report on this. I want to draw your Lordships’ attention to one aspect of it, which I do not think has been mentioned—I apologise if it has. There have been so many good speeches, particularly from the other side of the House, and across the House.

According to the report, the clause includes a retroactive power which would allow what was not lawful at the time to be made lawful now. The report suggests that this is retroactive lawmaking of the worst kind and particularly offends the rule of law. I think we should do away with the clause altogether. I have also read an article by Dominic Grieve, the much-respected former Conservative Attorney-General, on the “ConservativeHome” blog, which I must admit is not normally at the top of my daily reading list. It is an instructive piece. I will not read at length, because time is getting on, but he calls it,

“using legislation as a form of propaganda”

That is from a former Attorney-General and worth taking note.

I also draw attention to the fears that this is creating in the wider public. I have just had an email saying that over 100 organisations have written an open letter to the Prime Minister asking that this clause be removed. I hope that, when we come to Report, the House will remove this clause, which offends the rule of law.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am also not a lawyer, but we have Amendment 29 in this group and we join the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in opposing the Question that Clause 9 stand part of the Bill. I accept that Clause 9 is about giving notice, but the amendments in the group go beyond that. The main concerns that this group addresses are the significant increase in the use of the power to deprive British citizens of their citizenship and the new provision of dispensing with the requirement that the Secretary of State requires notice to be given to a person deprived of citizenship.

There have been many detailed and compelling speeches and I do not intend to repeat them, but I will refer to the powerful and personal speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, about how this provision is affecting some British citizens. This is not going to affect some British citizens, like me, at all, but when you hear her personal recollections of the fear that this clause is generating and about the importance of the family attaché case—reinforced by the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik—you understand that, although it may not be targeting particular communities within the cohort of British citizens, it is certainly causing distress among certain parts of that cohort.

To answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, on what we do with those people who wish to do us harm, I say that we prosecute them in the courts. We do not dump them on other countries.

Depriving someone of their citizenship is a very serious step to take and it is being taken with increasing regularity. To then do away with the requirement even to notify the subject is totally unacceptable. How can anyone take any steps to correct or challenge a decision that they know nothing about? The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, talked about how we notify the unnotifiable. Even in the case that he and other noble Lords referred to, which has been in the courts, the individuals were not uncontactable; they were not unnotifiable within the law. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, explained, notice could have been served on that individual, but the Home Office chose not to. In the figures he gave about how many times that has stopped the Home Office from serving notice on somebody of deprivation of nationality, the answer was zero. Clause 9 is not only unreasonable but, based on the facts, unnecessary as well.

With the increased use by the Secretary of State of the power to deprive a British citizen of their citizenship, we support Amendment 28 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which says that reviews of the use of the power should be annual and not every three years. We also agree with Amendment 27 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, to restrict the circumstances in which someone can be deprived of their British citizenship. My noble friend Lady Hamwee will address our Amendment 29, which removes the power of the Secretary of State to directly deprive a British citizen of their citizenship, requiring an application to be made to a court.

We agree with the principle behind Amendments 32 and 33 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, that the powers the Secretary of State has to deprive British citizens of their citizenship need to be curtailed and the process made more transparent, but we believe that our Amendment 29 achieves those objectives.

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[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, I again refer to my membership of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We have produced detailed reports on many aspects of the Bill, including on this matter.

It is surely a basic right that nobody should be stateless. This is fundamental. Stateless people have fewer rights—they have virtually none—and they are vulnerable. I have tabled this amendment to avoid statelessness.

As things stand, stateless children born in the UK are covered by this provision in the Bill. Prior to the British Nationality Act 1981, all children born in the UK were British under jus soli. As I said earlier, I served in the Commons at the time—indeed, I was on the Public Bill Committee which dealt with this Bill for many long weeks—and we had a long discussion about jus soli, and I only hope that the position I took then is the same as the one I am taking now—in other words, in opposition to the provision. I think I can claim that I have been consistent over 40 years; I hope so, but if anyone wants to look it up in order to disprove it, I will listen to them.

Clause 10 has a new requirement that will make it more difficult for stateless children to acquire British citizenship. It puts another hurdle in the way of acquiring that citizenship. The onus will now be on children—or, if they are very young, the people responsible for them —to produce the evidence, unless the Home Secretary is satisfied that the child is unable to acquire another nationality. The provision will effectively mean that a child born in the UK, or their parents or carers on their behalf, will have to prove that they could not reasonably have acquired another nationality—so the onus is on the child, or the parents or carers, to prove that. That may be quite a difficult point to prove, and the onus is switched in allocating the burden of responsibility. That could be especially hard for children who do not have significant support or access to the relevant documents. For example, the children of refugees might find it very difficult to have the necessary documentation or to be able to produce the evidence, so it would put a significant additional burden on them.

It is an anomaly that when children become adults they can apply. It remains an oddity that a child can remain stateless for some years until they become an adult, when they can then apply. What is the advantage to anyone of having a child stateless for that period? It certainly cannot be in the best interests of the child, and that surely must be the bottom line. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child always talks about what is in the best interests of the child; Article 7 says that a child should be registered as having a nationality immediately after birth. That is fairly clear. Furthermore, it says that a contracting state shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless. With this clause, the Government are going against these provisions in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

It is difficult to see how Clause 10 complies with the United Kingdom’s obligations under both the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is an unnecessary measure that makes things even more difficult. I can see no argument, not even the security arguments that the Minister advanced in the previous debate, for putting this hurdle in the way of children who might otherwise be stateless. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Dubs and the proposal that Clause 10 should not stand part of the Bill. I put on record my thanks to the Joint Committee on Human Rights for the very helpful work that it has done on the Bill, with a whole raft of very useful reports. According to ILPA and the Bar Council, this clause contravenes the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, and that should give us pause for thought. Research by the European Network on Statelessness shows how some children in very vulnerable circumstances will be affected, as my noble friend said, and found that there can be good reasons for delays in registering a child’s nationality.

To my mind, the justification that the clause is needed because there has been a significant increase in the number of registrations of stateless children smacks of the culture of disbelief and suspicion criticised by Wendy Williams in the Windrush report. Surely it is to be celebrated that more children are exercising their rights—no thanks to the Home Office, which has been dilatory in making children and their parents aware of these rights and in removing the barriers to registering them. It is thanks to the hard work of organisations such as the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens that more children and parents have become aware of the right to registration. As I say, this is to be commended, not cracked down on as if it were some kind of crime.

As the JCHR observes, and Amendment 31 addresses —a point made also by my noble friend Lord Dubs—it is difficult to see how this clause is compatible with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. While the Home Hoffice human rights memorandum states that it has considered the best interests of the children affected, it is not clear from it how such a clause is in their best interests, so can the Minister spell out exactly how this clause meets the best interests of children affected?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I agree with the noble Baroness that we have done good work on the Bill. On a more serious note, perhaps I may say how much we appreciate the chairmanship of the right honourable Harriet Harman MP, whose recent bereavement has saddened us so much.

I will speak to both Amendments 30 and 31. As has been said by other noble Lords, Clause 10 amends the British Nationality Act to introduce new requirements for the registration of a stateless child—a child born in the UK—and could make it even more difficult for them to acquire British nationality, to which there are already significant hurdles. I could not agree more with the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. Why should it be a problem that children are becoming stateless and ceasing to have the security of nationality?

Under Clause 10, the Home Secretary has to be satisfied that the child is unable to acquire another nationality. That puts that child in the position of having to prove that they could not reasonably have acquired another nationality. The policy rationale seems to be a suspicion that parents are wilfully causing their child’s statelessness—the culture of disbelief that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to. As colleagues and the JCHR say, it is difficult to see how the best interests of the child, as required by the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, are served by the new test in this provision. How is it in that child’s interests to be left stateless?

Indeed, asserts the JCHR, Clause 10

“risks punishing the child for a perceived failure”

on the part of their parent or carer, which is obviously through no fault of their own. However, the UN convention does not impose a requirement on the parent to exhaust all avenues to seek the citizenship of another state. So Clause 10 could move the UK away from the convention. I was interested that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, quoted ILFA and the Bar Council as saying that they do indeed think that this is a contravention of the convention, and I can see why. Amendment 30 is an attempt to move the UK back towards the intention of the convention by saying that British citizenship could only be withheld

“where the nationality of a parent is available to the child immediately, without any legal or administrative hurdles.”

Amendment 31 aims to make the best interests of the child central to the decision-making.

Finally, in addition to the risk of alienation from our society of individual children, it cannot be in the interests of British society as a whole for young people born here to be excluded from sharing citizenship and thus rootedness in their community.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

But that is why we need family reunion routes.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

Can I just point out that the Refugee Council, for example, has made the point that cutting back and restricting family reunion rights, which the Bill will do—this is one of the key safe and legal routes—will particularly affect women and children? Plenty has been written about what safe and legal routes might look like—it is family reunion; it is humanitarian visas. Is the noble Lord really suggesting that we have no responsibility to the kind of people that my noble friend talked about? No one is suggesting that everyone comes over here, but much poorer countries than this country are taking responsibility for asylum seekers, and we will not take any responsibility.

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I listened carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and she quite rightly reminded the House that we are talking about asylum seekers. I have to say that, after that, our paths diverged quite considerably.

In listening to a debate covering 16 amendments and a clause stand part, I discerned three angles. The first, what I might call the ultras, led by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, want to remove the clause completely. The second angle is to take the clause to pieces, as in the amendments from my noble friend Lady McIntosh, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port. Thirdly, there are the other amendments, described by, I think, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, as picking at the scab. If you leave aside the point that the clause should not exist and take the other two, the inevitable result is that what we are doing, maybe imperceptibly, is widening the opportunity for asylum seekers to come to this country. How many and whether it is a good or a bad thing can be debated, but that is going to happen if we accept the amendments put forward in this group.

That, in turn, raises a couple of issues for me about fairness. First, there is fairness to those who have so far followed the scheme for tier 1 and are therefore going to find their position disadvantaged by the arrival of more people who would otherwise have been in tier 2. Once that thread is broken and the rules become more judgmental, then there are obviously issues of fairness for those who have the clearest position.

The second question of fairness is about the contract with the British public. In the debate on Clause 9 at the last meeting of the Committee, I discussed the nature of what I call “informed consent”. I described it as a concept that Peter Bauer had expressed to me half a century ago in a debate at my business school. Here, I touch very much on the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Clarke, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. There is a question of informed consent. The informed consent is not absolute; it is conditional. One of the reasons I think we have had reasonably satisfactory race relations so far is the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Clarke that the public have felt, though stretched, often badly stretched, their consent is still there. But, as I say, it is not absolute and we need to make sure that the British public is able to see rules that are clear, unequivocal and comprehensible in their impact on them, their families, their communities and the society in which they live. The more complex the rules become, the greater the chances of cases emerging that will endanger and maybe break that informed consent.

My second point of concern about this is what I call “foreign shopping”. For a number of years I was a trustee of a charity called Fair Trials International—the name is self-explanatory—which does excellent work in many areas but in particular as regards extradition. We came across the extremely unattractive practice of people seeking extradition going round looking for the best jurisdiction, the best legal system or the best court to enable them to be successful. I think we have to be very careful to ensure that similar practices, which may already exist now, do not grow further as regards asylum seekers.

Again, my noble and learned friend Lord Clarke referred to it. He said, “If I was in Nigeria with my noble friend Lord Horam and we were deciding we were a couple of likely lads and we thought the future looked better outside Nigeria, we would look around at all the jurisdictions that might offer us the best prospects.” Now, I think the United Kingdom is an extremely attractive place to go to. We have had a long debate tonight and I am not going to go through the reasons why I think it is. They include a series of things, not least that people can see that the Parliament of the United Kingdom spends time talking and thinking about it and is concerned about it. What better way to try and find your way into a country that has the interest and the focus to make sure that even the lowest person is looked after and their rights are protected?

When my noble friend the Minister comes to wind up, I hope she will be able to say that the Government are going to look very carefully at the impact of more asylum seekers of variable abilities, perhaps—more people who may risk breaking the informed consent of the British people. For all these reasons, we need to be very careful before we widen the aperture and widen the opportunities any further than proposed in the Bill as presently drafted.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I oppose Clause 11 and simply want to pose four questions, the answers to which I hope might help clarify the mind of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham—my home city.

First, how is it possible to decide a priori whether someone is an economic migrant or a refugee on the basis of how they arrive in the country? It appears to be a key assumption on which Clause 11 and much of the Bill is based. The evidence—in particular the Refugee Council’s analysis of channel crossings—shows that most of those crossing the channel irregularly, and therefore deemed illegal, are likely to be recognised as in need of refugee protection. That does not support the assumption.

I recently met virtually with members of the Baobab Centre for Young Survivors in Exile and was told that, in their 32 years of work, they had never met an unaccompanied young person who had arrived by a safe and legal route, yet all had been fleeing danger, with many having seen family members killed and many traumatised. A constant refrain among the young survivors themselves was that they wished Ministers would put themselves in their shoes—a refrain we have heard before this evening—and that they felt the proposed policy was based on a lack of compassion and trust.

Secondly, what assessment has been made of the likely impact on integration—an issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, which Ministers claim is still a goal—of creating a second-class group of refugees with no security and only very limited rights?

Thirdly, what assessment has been made of the case made by a number of organisations, including the UNHCR, that placing restrictions on the right to family reunion for this group will, in the words of the Refugee Council, “all but destroy” the

“main safe route out of conflict for women and children at risk”.

Fourthly, and finally, why should we accept the Government’s interpretation of the refugee convention over that of the body with global supervisory responsibility for it? The UNHCR has provided detailed legal observations in support of its claims that the Bill is

“fundamentally at odds with … the United Kingdom’s international obligations under the Refugee Convention”.

Likewise, Freedom from Torture has published a joint legal opinion from three chambers which states that

“this Bill represents the biggest legal assault on international refugee law ever seen in the UK”

and

“is wrong as a matter of international refugee law.”

To my knowledge, the Government have not published the legal advice on which their claims that Clause 11 is compatible with international law are based. Will they now do so, particularly in light of the very important speech from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown?

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, I shall be extremely brief; this has been a long debate. I just want to commend the noble Lords, Lord Horam and Lord Hodgson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. They all pointed out the need to take full account and understanding of public opinion. I agree with that; I do not need to repeat it. As for Clause 11, it is clearly a legal problem. I suspect that it will also be a policy problem, but we will come to that later.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I hope that, through the course of my response here, I will lay out the rationale for why we are doing what we are doing. We disagree with the UNHCR and we feel that, as a sovereign nation, it is up to us to interpret the 1951 convention.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

If the Government’s argument is to be that they have a different interpretation, it is not clear why we should accept their interpretation over the UNHCR’s interpretation. I asked if the Government would publish the legal advice on which their interpretation rested. Then we can judge against other interpretations.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I think the noble Baroness knows that we do not do that. I am not going to commit to publishing the legal advice. I am, however, going to come to her questions later if the Committee will be patient.

Can I get on now to pull factors? They are complex, but it is reductive to claim that asylum seekers do not ever make decisions about their destination based on policy calculations. They are like the rest of us; they do not simply respond to one or two factors such as family or language in making a choice. Many more factors come into play in this respect, as my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts mentioned, and one of those will very naturally concern how to rebuild the life they lost after being forced to flee their country of origin. But to defend the first safe country principle for the reasons I have set out, we must do everything we can to deter dangerous secondary movements from countries that are already safe and provide perfectly good means for a flourishing life.

Noble Lords have mentioned Denmark, Australia and Japan. We have seen large reductions in spontaneous intake in both Denmark and Australia, following similar approaches to that which we intend to take. In fact, Australia resettles the single largest number of refugees in the world.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness responds, I add that I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is confused: I fear that the Minister is being mildly disingenuous with us. Can she confirm that there is a difference in the intended treatment of group 1 and group 2 refugees as concerns family reunion? Otherwise, what is the point of Clause 11(6):

“The Secretary of State or an immigration officer may … treat the family members of Group 1 and Group 2 refugees differently, for example in respect of … whether to give the person leave to enter or remain”


et cetera? What is the point of this being in the Bill if there is no intention to treat group 2 refugees differently? The Minister told us about how this will not breach the refugee convention and so on. I asked specifically about the comments on Article 8, and I look forward to her replying specifically on that. But can she confirm whether their intention is to treat group 1 and group 2 refugees differently in terms of rights to family reunion?

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

May I just add to that? Clause 11(5) says:

“The Secretary of State or an immigration officer may treat Group 1 and Group 2 refugees differently, for example in respect of … whether leave to enter or remain is given to members of the refugee’s family.”

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

40: Clause 11, page 13, line 44, at end insert—
“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b), the following will be regarded as having presented themselves “without delay”— (a) people who have experienced sexual violence;(b) people who have made a protection or human rights claim on the basis of gender-based violence;(c) people who have made a protection or human rights claim on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;(d) people who are a victim of modern slavery or trafficking;(e) people who are a victim of torture;(f) people who are suffering from a mental impairment;(g) people who are suffering from a serious physical disability;(h) people who are suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses;(i) people who were under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom.”Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to ascertain whether and to what extent certain vulnerable groups would be covered by the “without delay” condition.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, and my noble friend Lord Cashman for their support and for hanging on in there, as well as to Women for Refugee Women for its help with the amendment. The amendment sets out a number of groups in vulnerable circumstances who should be deemed to meet the condition that they have presented themselves to the authorities to claim asylum without delay. This is a probing amendment, which does not imply acceptance of Clause 11, which, as I made clear earlier, I totally oppose; rather, it addresses one specific aspect of it that was not interrogated in the Commons.

As the UNHCR advises:

“There is nothing in the Refugee Convention that defines a refugee or their entitlements under it according to … the timing of their asylum claim.”


At present, the Bill does not provide any exceptions to the “without delay” condition relating to their potential vulnerability, although, if I understood her correctly, I think the Minister said on Amendment 39 that there is some flexibility, so I look forward to hearing more about that.

The amendment covers a range of groups who could be adversely affected by the clause. It reflects a warning made by Freedom from Torture that:

“Penalising refugees who do not present their claim ‘without delay’ following arrival risks further punishing the most vulnerable. It is clinically recognised that an experience of torture or trauma will lead to avoidance behaviours and interfere with the person’s ability to disclose.”


I shall focus mainly on women fleeing gender-based violence. The “without delay” condition is one of a number of provisions that will, contrary to ministerial claims, disproportionately adversely affect women, as more than 50 organisations warned the Home Secretary in a letter in which they argued that more women will be wrongly refused asylum, re-traumatised and placed at risk of violence and abuse. LGBTQ+ asylum seekers will also be at particular risk as a result of the “without delay” condition. I think my noble friend is going to say more about that.

Women for Refugee Women’s research has documented how many women seeking asylum in the UK have fled gender-based violence in their countries of origin, including rape, female genital mutilation and forced prostitution. Many were abused again on their journeys to safety. In the organisation’s experience, many of these women are heavily traumatised when they arrive and need time to feel safe before they feel able to share their experiences with a government official. This is endorsed in a legal opinion from Garden Court Chambers, which states:

“there may well be very good reasons to explain why … their claim was delayed … which relates to the particular forms of persecution to which women are subject, and their experience of gender-based violence and inferior social status.”

British Red Cross research published just last week reinforces the point and demonstrates how insensitive the asylum system already is to gender-related trauma and women’s needs. The Bill will only make this worse. In Women for Refugee Women’s experience, survivors, many of whom have experienced serious trauma, move at their own pace with regard to disclosure. No amount of legal or mental health support can guarantee a willingness to disclose without delay.

Preliminary findings from research into LGBT+ women carried out by Rainbow Sisters, a group supported by Women for Refugee Women, found that 20 out of 25 women did not claim asylum within the first month of entering the UK. The great majority of those who gave reasons said they were too traumatised by past experiences of persecution or scared to come forward, and many had not even realised that they could claim asylum on the basis of their sexual orientation.

The Home Office is well aware of such barriers to disclosure, because it acknowledges them in its own current guidance, which gives a number of reasons for reluctance to disclose information at the outset, including

“feelings of guilt, shame, and concerns about family ‘honour’, or fear of family members or traffickers, or having been conditioned or threatened by them.”

It notes the impact sexual assault can have on the ability to present one’s case. The same policy guidance says that late disclosure should not automatically prejudice a woman’s credibility.

The same considerations apply to failure to present oneself without delay. So, why does the Bill not reflect this clearly? On Second Reading, the Minister acknowledged these arguments in relation to the provision of late evidence, saying:

“We will set out in guidance what can constitute good reasons”—[Official Report, 5/1/22; col. 668.]


for late evidence. But no provision seems to have been made for good reasons for failing the “without delay” condition. Why is that? I know the “without delay” phrase is carefully taken from the convention—an example of what the UNHCR calls “selective echoes” from it—but that does not obviate the point. So, do the Government intend to protect the groups covered by the amendment in the guidance?

Can the Minister also provide some information about statistics, if necessary, in a subsequent letter? First, do the Government collect statistics on the number of women who claim asylum based on sexual or gender-based violence in their country of origin? If yes, what proportion of overall claims did these represent? Secondly, do they collect statistics on when survivors of gender-based violence make an asylum application? If yes, what do those statistics show? Thirdly, do they collect statistics on the number of women subject to sexual abuse on their journeys to the UK? Again, if so, what do they show?

I hope the Minister will be able to provide some clarity and, better still, an assurance that the “without delay” condition will be applied in a way that does not impact adversely on those in vulnerable circumstances—if Clause 11 survives. I beg to move.

[Baroness Neuberger (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. I would have said almost everything the noble Baroness has said, so I will just add a few other points.

One is that we have to recognise the nature of asylum seekers arriving in the country and the evidence presented by Doctors of the World and others. Asylum seekers often arrive suffering from considerable ill health. It is important we realise that, because that makes them the sort of people who ought to be included in the list provided in the amendment. According to Doctors of the World’s experience of running a clinic, 70% of patients with an outstanding asylum claim have at least one chronic medical condition, 30% have a psychological condition, almost a quarter present with an acute condition, and over 40% report their health as being “bad” or “very bad”. These are therefore people whom one might class as vulnerable, and this is the issue we are probing. Like my noble friend Lord Kerr, I am a bit worried about lipstick on pigs. Nevertheless, I think we will need to tease this out a little more, and we know the health conditions of asylum seekers are considerably worse than those of the general population.

I also want to pick up on what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said about the piece in the Times, which I also saw, and I want to reflect on some personal experience. We run a very small charity in memory of my parents. My mother was an asylum seeker, a refugee from Nazi Germany, and in my parents’ name we run this small charity to provide opportunities for education for asylum seekers who are not entitled to get student finance. I have therefore interviewed, over the last 20 years, quite a large number of asylum seekers, the majority of whom have been young men.

Without exception, they report being traumatised. They do not come as dangerous would-be criminals; they have seen their parents be killed before their eyes, have been forced into armies of appalling dictatorships, have been involved in civil wars and have been persecuted because they are bisexual—whatever it may be. None of them come and apply for a scholarship in the first period after they arrive in this country. We probably do not see them until a year, 18 months or two years in, and only then are they beginning to be able to talk about their experiences. Therefore, because they are clearly vulnerable, would they be classed as people who could be regarded as making an application “without delay”?

The Home Office’s guidance on gender-based violence and women who have suffered that kind of issue being treated favourably, if you like, and being allowed to wait until they are able to speak out is moderately generous—perhaps I would not go that far but would just say “possibly” generous, but whatever. I want to know whether we can extend that principle to those who have been traumatised in all sorts of other ways and have major mental health issues, often brought on by the trauma of what they have experienced.

Would the Minister be willing to entertain the prospect of those who are vulnerable for a whole variety of reasons being treated in the same way, if you like, as the Home Office guidance? We cannot see it within the Bill, but it would be wonderful if that were the case.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate for what have been very thoughtful contributions. I will directly address the question that the noble Lord asked me in the previous group about locking single males up. I have not seen the Times article. If he will allow me, I will look at it and respond in due course.

Although the policy is intended to deter dangerous journeys and encourage people to claim asylum in the first safe country, I assure noble Lords that we have been very careful to strike the right balance between how the policy achieves its aim and protecting the most vulnerable, which is what noble Lords have spoken about this evening. Before I explain why I think statutory exemptions are probably not needed, I will offer a few thoughts in relation to how the “without delay” element of Clause 11 is anticipated to operate.

There are two broad categories under which I envisage the exercise of discretion is most likely to be appropriate. The first is where a person finds themselves unable or unwilling to present themselves to the authorities for any reason that pertains to their proposed asylum claim. In such instances, there will need to be very careful consideration of whether it was reasonably practicable for that person to have claimed without delay. For example, if they had been tortured—noble Lords have given this sort of example—suffered sexual violence at the hands of state authorities or, indeed, feared admitting their sexual orientation due to state persecution on those grounds, this sort of situation would trigger very careful consideration.

The second category is where a person was simply not in control of their actions. In such circumstances, we would also be very careful to consider the facts of that case when determining whether it was reasonably practicable for that person to have claimed without delay. I think primarily of victims of human trafficking, unaccompanied children, and those suffering serious physical or mental disabilities.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked about statistics. I do not have them to hand, but I will try to get them.

On the guidance and training, one of the things that I looked into in great detail way back, when we talked about LGBT people in the detention estate, was how practitioners went about establishing claims made on the basis of a person’s sexual orientation. It is fair to say that, back in the day, “clunking” would probably have been a charitable word to use—some of the ways people were questioned were on the verge of being inhumane. We really went to extraordinary lengths to try to change that and make it a much more humane process. It is now about establishing the reasons why someone is making a claim, not proving it, so our policies and training are now designed to support claimants in being able to explain their claim in a very sensitive and safe environment. Our approach, I can confirm, is trauma informed.

Our guidance on sexual orientation and gender identity, as I said previously, was developed to take these issues into account—UNHCR, Stonewall and Rainbow Migration contributed to its development—and we will review and update our training and guidance where necessary to support people who are LGBT+. I confirm again that this will take people’s experiences into account, including the trauma that they have suffered. I thank those organisations, particularly Stonewall, Rainbow Migration and UNHCR, that have helped to make the process far more humane so that people’s very difficult journeys and experiences are eased somewhat by our attitude and approach.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords very much for their support for this amendment—their willingness to apply some lipstick to the pig that I think we would all like to be rid of. Some very powerful speeches made the case very strongly for why the groups which are listed may well have good reasons for delay. I take the point that any asylum seeker is, by definition, likely to be vulnerable, but we are talking here about those who have particular vulnerabilities.

I thank the Minister for giving more of a sense of what will happen. It is late and I need to read what she said, but I think that the powerful speeches from noble Lords and the Minister’s response justified our taking this as a separate amendment. As I have said, it was not interrogated in the Commons; this has given us a chance to do that.

I thank the Minister for saying that she will look into the statistics—it was I, in fact, who raised it; I think Women for Refugee Women would value having whatever statistics are available. However, just last week, the British Red Cross produced research suggesting that, for all the better training and guidance, women asylum seekers are still treated very badly, with a lack of gender sensitivity and trauma sensitivity. I would encourage the Minister to read this research, think about it and see what more needs to be done.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I apologise—I was not quick enough to my feet. I wanted to get in before the noble Baroness withdrew her amendment to ask the Minister if she might be able, after today if not tonight, to answer my question about how Clauses 11 and 36 work together. That could inform our debate when we get to that later clause. Again, I apologise to the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

There is no need—I am glad that the noble Baroness said that. I had made a note to mention it and then, of course, completely forgot or could not read my handwriting, or both. Anyway, it is late, and I realise that people want to get on. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 40 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

46: Clause 11, page 14, line 13, leave out paragraph (c)
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment, along with another amendment to Clause 11, would amend the list of examples of ways in which refugees, or their family members, can be treated differently depending on whether they are in Group 1 or Group 2 by removing reference to the attachment of no recourse to public funds requirements so as to probe when this requirement would be attached.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, it is me again, I am afraid. I rise to move Amendment 46, and I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Stroud, my noble friend Lord Blunkett—who had to leave—and the British Red Cross and Praxis for their support.

Again, this is a probing amendment. Together with Amendment 54, it would delete reference to the “no recourse to public funds” condition from the listed ways in which group 1 and group 2 refugees and their families could be treated differently under Clause 11. In other words, it would remove one source of potential discrimination from the list of examples of the discriminatory treatment of group 2 refugees. It is a probing amendment because while I am totally opposed to Clause 11 standing part of the Bill, it is important that we have more information about how the “no recourse to public funds” condition will be applied.

In fact, questioning the application of the no recourse condition reinforces the case against Clause 11. UNHCR makes it clear that denying refugees recourse to public funds is a clear violation of Article 23 of the refugee convention, which states in unambiguous terms:

“The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is accorded to their nationals.”


Given that Ministers constantly claim that the Bill is compatible with our international obligations, does the Minister believe that UNHCR is wrong, and if so, on what grounds?

Similarly, the JCHR points to a violation of Article 24 of the convention, which specifically cites the right to social security. It argues that the differentiation policy, including specifically restrictions on recourse to public funds

“raises serious questions of compatibility with Article 14 ECHR—the prohibition on discrimination in the enjoyment of other Convention rights.”

It concludes that the policy is

“arguably disproportionate to achieving the stated aims.”

In fact, as the committee notes, the aim of dissuading asylum seekers from travelling to the UK other than by safe and legal routes ignores all the research, including that of the Home Office, which indicates that it is rare for asylum seekers to know what support is available.

To repeat something that my noble friend Lord Rosser said, UNHCR warns:

“The adverse consequences of a ‘No Recourse to Public Funds’ condition will fall not only the refugees themselves, but also on their families, including on any children who travel with them, are able to join them later, or are born in the UK. These consequences have been documented in numerous studies as well as in the context of litigation. They include difficulty accessing shelters for victims of domestic violence, denial of free school meals where these are linked to the parents’ benefit entitlement”—


—although this is currently suspended, and a very long review is taking place; this policy has been under review for 15 months now—

“and de facto exclusion from the job market for single parents (largely women) who have limited access to government-subsidised childcare, as well as significant risks of food poverty, severe debt, sub-standard accommodation, and homelessness.”

It also notes that public funds include payments specifically for children, such as child benefit, and for those in particularly vulnerable circumstances, such as carers and disabled people. It warns of the adverse consequences for integration and for local authorities which may have to pick up some of the tab for children and those with care needs.

Its conclusions chime with evidence from a range of organisations, including a recent Citizens Advice survey that documents the severe poverty and destitution caused by the rule, with children, women and people of colour disproportionately affected and with what it describes as a “devastating impact” on mental health. Likewise, the BMA has raised concerns that the rule’s effects can compound physical or mental health conditions among those with particular vulnerabilities fleeing violence or trauma.

There are real fears now that the Bill will increase significantly the numbers affected by the “no recourse” rule. There is also a lack of clarity as to whom among group 2 refugees it will be applied, both in the short term and each time their status comes up for renewal. I hope that the Minister will provide some clarity and not fob us off with the response that details will be set out in the guidance and rules that follow, as was said in the Commons.

What was made clear in the Commons was that those already in receipt of Section 95 asylum support will not face restrictions on access to public funds. However, this is not made clear in the Bill itself. Can we be confident that most asylum seekers will have been in receipt of Section 95 asylum support? What about those refugees who face destitution but were not receiving Home Office support, such as those who choose not to enter the asylum support system and rely instead on informal networks of support because of accommodation being allocated on a no-choice basis? What about those who fall into destitution after being granted refugee status, which will be a greater risk as a result of this clause?

It is currently difficult to get the “no recourse” rule lifted on the grounds of destitution because the concession applies only to a minority of those affected and involves a difficult, complicated process. Citizens Advice warns that

“in our experience these limited exemptions for destitution give too little help too late”,

with a decision typically taking more than four weeks, according to the Minister in the Commons. Can the Minister tell us who exactly among group 2 refugees will in practice not be subject to the “no recourse to public funds” rule? What is the Government’s estimate of the proportion of group 2 refugees who will be subject to it? What will happen when their status is up for renewal? Will the destitution exception be open to any group 2 refugee or only to certain groups, as is the case now? Will access to the concession be made easier than it is currently?

In recent oral evidence on the “no recourse” rule to the Work and Pensions Committee, the Minister, Tom Pursglove, refused to answer questions about the Bill’s implications, stating that policy work is ongoing. This elicited the response from the committee chair that, given that the Bill had already completed its passage through the Commons, surely we ought to know what its implications are—indeed. Surely by now the Home Office should be able to answer what are some pretty basic questions about how Clause 11(5)(c) and (6)(d) will work. It is crucial that we have this information should Clause 11 continue to stand part of the Bill, although I fervently hope that it will not, not only because it contravenes the refugee convention but also because it will spell hardship and insecurity for many group 2 refugees—who will be very much class 2 refugees. I beg to move.

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, I want to take the opportunity afforded by Amendments 46 and 54 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, to which I was pleased to add my name, to probe the Government’s exact intention regarding the outworking of Clause 10 and the application of NRPF.

I have long been concerned about the NRPF policy, but I have profound concerns about its application to group 2 refugees. According to the Home Office’s own guidance, the NRPF condition must not be applied in circumstances where a person is destitute or at risk of becoming so. Can the Minister confirm that this understanding is correct, or would group 2 refugees not be able to receive asylum support and be subject to NRPF? Can the Minister also clarify what would happen should such a person qualify for the destitution test?

There are a number of areas where I would encourage the Minister to consider the impact of applying NRPF to group 2 refugees. I know that Members of this House would be happy to work with her if that is helpful. First, on the impact on local authorities, if the NRPF condition is extended to refugees subject to the new temporary protection status, the increase in the number of individuals subject to NRPF would increase the pressure on already overstretched local authorities. Such increased pressure could lead to more families with NRPF being wrongly refused assistance by local authorities. This would have a devastating impact on the health and development of children in these families and would counter any efforts to develop integration. In addition, it would affect already vulnerable families who have the same characteristics as those who are permitted to access public funds. This is an area of concern to me: they have just arrived here via different routes, but there is no difference in their vulnerability.

Imposing an NRPF condition will cause refugees to live without access to welfare benefits and housing support. When we are considering NRPF, we often think of out-of-work benefits, but this also affects in-work benefits. You could have the extraordinary circumstance of two auxiliaries working in a hospital, one being able to claim in-work support, and the other not. He or she would not be able to survive in those circumstances, even if they were doing everything right. There is also evidence from those already subject to the NRPF condition that this restriction can cause destitution and lead children to experience homelessness, hunger and mental health conditions.

If, as seems to be the case, group 2 refugees would be subject to NRPF, this policy may not achieve its intent. I would value the Minister setting out the exact policy intent of NRPF, as I have found it hard to find what the intent of no recourse to public funds is.

My work as chair of the Social Metrics Commission, a cross-party commission which measures poverty in the UK, finds that no recourse to public funds is a significant cause in driving poverty, homelessness and destitution. NRPF has been shown to have significant mental health consequences, including for children. It makes finding stable work more difficult, accessing education harder, and securing stable housing a challenge. These are all things we want to see for this community of people.

It is important for us to really understand who we are talking about. We are not talking here about asylum seekers or economic migrants. We are talking about people the Government recognise as bona fide refugees—that has already been decided—who have fled conflict, war or famine and arrived in Britain hoping to find a place of refuge. By tabling this probing amendment, I want to ensure that, purely by virtue of the route by which refugees arrive here, they will not be subject to profound insecurity, at a time when we are committed to ending rough sleeping, levelling up the UK and defining the character of the nation we want to be.

As this is a probing amendment, I ask the Minister to clarify whether group 2 refugees would or would not be able to receive asylum support. Would they be subject to NRPF, even when qualifying for a destitution test? If so, what is the exact policy intent of NRPF for this group of people? How would group 2 refugees have been provided for during Covid, when they would not have had access to furlough or universal credit? Finally, in what way is the Government’s commitment to ending rough sleeping, and NRPF for group 2, compatible?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

As with all questions affecting our colleagues in France, it is very difficult to answer that.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, what evidence are the French basing this view on? The academic evidence that I am aware of, and certainly the evidence that the JCHR draws attention to, does not support the view that public funds, or welfare more widely, somehow acts as a pull factor. The pull factors were set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud —family commitments, language and so on—and the evidence shows that the push factors are much more important. I would be very interested to know what evidence the French base this on because it may well be just reading our newspapers, which is probably not very good evidence.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

Would the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, please ask the French?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It might be helpful to the noble Lord if I outlined situations in which it might be applied, as opposed to putting them in the Bill. I am very happy to go away and look at that and write to him with some examples of where it might be applied—I get his point on that.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. There have been some very powerful arguments for the amendment. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud: she put it better than anyone else could, drawing on her knowledge of these issues. I thank the Minister but I must say that I am disappointed. The whole point of the amendment was to try to get a bit of clarity—my noble friend Lord Rosser has been trying, without success—but, to be honest, I am none the wiser now than I was at the beginning as to who will and will not be subject to the “no recourse to public funds” rule.

The noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, made the point that discretion involves subjective judgment. I have been involved in social security for a long time. There was a reason why we reduced the element of discretion in it: because subjective judgment may be used in ways that we do not feel very happy with. It can be negative as well as positive. All that we know about the culture of disbelief in the Home Office, the refugee system and so on does not fill me with great hope.

I am glad that the Minister said that she will write to my noble friend; I hope that she will copy it to everyone who has taken part in this debate. I hope that she will look at Hansard and the questions I asked to see whether she can answer some of them. If she cannot, it suggests that, as my noble friend said, this has been put in the Bill without a clue as to what it will actually be used for—and that is not good.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am sorry to intervene, but will the Minister include in the letter to noble Lords how this measure, which will be broad and flexible—I think that is what she said—and at the discretion of the Home Office, will amount to a deterrent?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

That is a very good question, but it has taken away my train of thought. What I wanted to say was that this really is not good lawmaking. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, quoted the Migration Advisory Committee, which I was planning to quote as well in relation to the right to work, and pointed out that it is not good policy-making not to provide evidence. The Minister said she disagreed, but I hope she did not disagree with the fact that one should provide evidence for policy, which is what I challenged the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about. I would be very interested to see this evidence the French are using. I do not think it exists.

Anyway, it is late. I am disappointed, because I am none the wiser as to how this potentially very dangerous power, which could cause immense hardship if we are not careful, is going to be used. But I hope that the Minister’s letter will show some clarity about how the Government are thinking about how they plan to use this power. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 46 withdrawn.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

56: Clause 12, page 15, line 39, at end insert—
“(4A) In section 16 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Establishment of centres), after subsection 2 insert—“(2A) Accommodation provided under this section must—(a) have a capacity of no more than 100 residents, and(b) provide any non-related residents at the centre with an individual room in which to sleep, such that residents are not required to share sleeping quarters with people to whom they are not related.”” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would amend the 2002 Act to ensure that accommodation centres are not too large and that residents are not required to share sleeping quarters with anyone they are not related to.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 57, 59 and 60 in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Neuberger and Lady Hamwee, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. I also express broad support for the other amendments in this group. The amendments reflect the concerns of the British Red Cross together with many other organisations, and I am grateful to them for their help. Together, the amendments would place restrictions on who could be accommodated in the accommodation centres proposed under Clause 12 and for how long, the numbers to be accommodated in a centre and the sleeping arrangements, and would ensure that if children were ever accommodated in those centres, they would not be prevented from attending local maintained schools.

Under Clause 12, as signalled in the new plan for immigration, accommodation for asylum seekers will move from what has been the dominant dispersal model, in which asylum seekers are housed in local communities, to accommodation in reception centres, using a power provided by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. No detail has been provided, so one purpose of the amendments is to try to elicit more detail than was provided in the Commons. In particular, how many accommodation centres are planned, and where? Will they be purpose-built or will they use existing sites such as Napier barracks? What criteria will be used to decide whether such existing sites are designated as accommodation centres or contingency accommodation?

What the Government have made clear is that they will use Napier as asylum accommodation for a further five years, and that this will allow testing and piloting to inform the final design of how accommodation centres will operate. In view of the High Court judgment about the inadequacy of the accommodation provided, and having sat on an inquiry held by the APPG on immigration detention into quasi-detention centres, I find the idea that Napier could provide the model for future accommodation centres profoundly worrying.

The evidence we received—both from stakeholder organisations and from those with experience of living in Napier or in another centre, now closed—was overwhelmingly negative. Typically, such centres are in remote areas. This spells isolation and a lack of easy access to support services. It is not conducive to integration. On the contrary, it creates what HOPE not hate describes as “targets of hate”. It warns that the use of such centres is likely to lead to increased harassment of asylum seekers.

As noted in the joint evidence from Doctors of the World, the Helen Bamber Foundation, Forrest Medico-Legal Services and Freedom from Torture, the use of dormitory-style accommodation means a total lack of privacy. This can be particularly problematic for LGBTQ+ residents. It also results in serious sleep deprivation for many. The impact of this deprivation on mental health and well-being was described very powerfully in evidence to the inquiry by those with experience of Napier barracks.

The use of former military barracks can be retraumatising for those who have suffered abuse and torture. As a dozen organisations, including Doctors of the World, the Helen Bamber Foundation, the BMA and various royal colleges warned the Home Secretary in a joint letter, this makes them inappropriate for people seeking asylum. They also warned that the kind of accommodation centres envisaged represent a real public health risk and impede adequate medical care.

It was clear from our inquiry and from the experience of a range of health and refugee organisations that such accommodation is bad for mental and physical health. It undermines any sense of agency and hope. According to the Helen Bamber Foundation,

“the use of institutional accommodation of this type is extremely harmful to survivors of torture”

and its features

“have the same impact as open prisons with groups of people with little to motivate or occupy themselves becoming increasingly desperate.”

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Refugee Council has warned:

“Proposals to extend these forms of accommodation are ill-thought out and dangerous, and undermine the UK’s duties to support and protect those making asylum claims.”


It advised that international examples of the use of congregated settings, including in the Republic of Ireland, have shown that this kind of accommodation is completely inappropriate for housing those seeking asylum.

The amendments will not prevent the use of such accommodation centres—the power for which stems from earlier legislation, as I said—but they would go so way towards addressing their most inhumane features. Amendment 57 would, with some additions, give legislative force to what is supposed to be current policy—of not housing groups with particular vulnerabilities in such accommodation. Our inquiry, British Red Cross research and the experiences of stakeholders all indicate that, all too often, people with vulnerabilities are housed in such accommodation. It is therefore essential the safeguards are spelled out in the legislation. In the absence of such legal safeguards, what assurances can the Minister give that the use of accommodation centres will be accompanied by more robust screening and protection than exist at present?

With regard to children, in the Commons Committee, the Minister assured Members that the Government had “no intention” and “no plans” to accommodate children. Welcome as such assurances are, they are far from a cast-iron guarantee. We need to spell it out in the legislation. I do not see why the Government would resist this—if this is their intention. I invite the Minister to give an absolute assurance on the record.

Without a firm—preferably legal—guarantee, Amendment 60, which assures children’s access to local maintained education facilities, is still needed. At present, Section 36 of the 2002 Act prevents a child who is resident in an accommodation centre being admitted to a maintained school or nursery. Section 29 allows for education to take place within the centres. The prior information notice for accommodation centres, published by the Government last August, includes provision for education services. It surely cannot be in the children’s best interests to segregate them from children in the local community in this way.

Amendment 56 would limit the number of residents in any one centre to 100. The larger such centres are, the less the residents feel that their humanity is recognised and the more likely the centres are to attract hostile attention and to work against social cohesion and integration. In the Commons Committee, the Minister said that such a limit would undermine a key objective of resolving asylum cases more quickly on site. It is not clear how it would do so. Could the Minister please explain?

The other part of the amendment would ensure that residents were not required to share sleeping accommodation with anyone to whom they were not related. This reflects a recommendation made five years ago by the Home Affairs Select Committee—that room-sharing should be phased out across the asylum estate. It would help address lack of privacy and public health concerns.

The Minister was rather dismissive of this in the Commons Committee, but he did not seem to appreciate what it is like for people seeking asylum to be housed in dormitory-style accommodation, as opposed to sharing a bedroom in accommodation in the community. It is all very well saying, as he did, that torture survivors receiving treatment should not share sleeping quarters, but in practice, all too often, inadequate screening means that torture survivors and others who are vulnerable do so.

Amendment 59 would remove the power given to the Home Secretary in Clause 11 to increase the maximum period for which someone can be accommodated. At present, there is a limit of six months in most cases. The Explanatory Note gives no indication as to how the new power might be used, other than to argue that it provides flexibility. The UNHCR has expressed concern that, unless there are necessary safeguards and support services, prolonged accommodation in such centres is likely to harm well-being, increase the need for future support and delay refugee integration. The 90-day limit in the amendment reflects current practice at Napier. We know the damaging impact on mental health caused by the absence of any clear time limit. It should not be replicated in accommodation centres.

In conclusion, I will quote from residents of Napier and of Penally, which is now closed. One told the APPG inquiry:

“When I arrived, the fear completely overwhelmed me. The design of the camp was oppressive, the high fences, the sheer numbers of people, the security who … looked like they were from the military. It was terrifying and I could feel it through my whole body. It reminded me of the military camps in [my home country]. I was in complete shock for the first few days. I did not sleep at all … It reminded me of [my home country] and I could not function.”


Another suggested:

“It would be difficult to design a system that more perfectly delivers despair and deteriorating human health and mental capacity than these asylum camps.”


A third said:

“I did not feel like a person when I was there.”


These quotes show quite clearly the experience of dehumanisation. The JCHR suggested, in one of its reports on the Bill, that such dehumanisation and distress are not inevitable in accommodation centres. It also made it clear that it was imperative that the Government learn from the poor treatment of asylum seekers housed in former military barracks. The amendments in this group give the Government the opportunity to demonstrate that they have learned from the overwhelming evidence of the damaging impact of such accommodation. I beg to move.

[Lord Horam (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly welcome my noble friend’s initiative in building and setting up reception centres of this kind. I appreciate that the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and others, are, in effect, probing amendments to find out more about the Government’s exact intentions. I fully understand that. It is perfectly reasonable.

I do not think that the noble Baroness objected to the principle of reception centres of this kind. At the moment, first of all, people are visited on local authorities, which are asked to accommodate them. Inevitably, these are not local authorities in London and the south-east, where accommodation costs are very high, but in areas such as the Midlands, the north-west and the north-east. I come from the north-west, so I know it particularly well. Here there is the largest concentration of people of this kind in council flats and so forth. They are, in effect, in competition with local people on the council waiting list, who may be rather resentful if they find they are asked to wait rather longer because of the need to accommodate people who have just come across the channel on a boat. This is not conducive to good community relations, as well as being quite unfair on people who have long been resident in this country.

Secondly, if they cannot be accommodated by local authorities—indeed, it is increasingly difficult to find appropriate council accommodation because of the shortage of housing, even in areas such as the north-east and north-west—they are sent to local hotels. I know this particularly well because I happened to spend part of my youth in Southport. Southport has a splendid main street called Lord Street. The Committee may not know it, but it was visited by Louis Napoleon, the Emperor of France, when he was in exile in this country before he became the emperor. On the basis of Lord Street, he created the Champs-Élysées in Paris. In Southport we always think of the Champs-Élysées as being the French Lord Street.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord but, according to the Refugee Council, which did a very careful analysis of those coming over on boats—and this was an analysis, not just throwing out statistics in the way the Home Secretary did, perhaps—the great majority would be expected to receive refugee status. So, yes, of course, there are always going to be some people who are not “genuine” asylum seekers, but surely the assumption should be that they are until proved otherwise, rather than that they are not until it is proved that they are. The noble Lord seems to be assuming that they are not genuine asylum seekers and there is no evidence to support that.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

I think we need to be careful not to make an assumption in either direction. I was quoting the Home Secretary in the expectation that she has information to back that up. Even without that, and the noble Baroness did not address this point, the historical record is that 50% over the last 10 years have had their cases refused. I leave it at that. My point is clear on that matter.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I think I said right at the outset that I do not have a figure at this point in time. In terms of speeding up claims and decision-making, we are dealing with a sustained high level of new asylum claims, including from those who arrive in small boats who noble Lords have been talking about. That is creating an additional pressure on the asylum system, but we are committed to ensuring that asylum claims are considered without unnecessary delay and that those who need protection are granted it as soon as possible. We have in place a transformation programme. We are developing existing and new technology. We are digitising casework. We are building a high-performing team, and we are investing in training and supporting staff in professional development to aid staff retention, which we so desperately need.

A key objective of setting up accommodation centres is to resolve asylum cases faster by putting casework and other services on-site. As my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots said, there is no rationale per se for restricting the number of people in each site to 100, as Amendment 56 seeks to do. It is only likely to make it much more difficult and expensive to set up the centres, meaning that fewer asylum seekers will benefit from the efficiencies that we are trying to achieve. There is also no reason that unrelated residents of accommodation centres cannot share sleeping quarters provided they are the same sex, as this is already allowed in the asylum accommodation system. I take the point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham about the noise and probable brightness within the facilities, and I will most certainly take that comment back.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt, but I was so struck when we took evidence about sleep deprivation from people who had been in Napier. It really got me, as someone who hates being deprived of sleep, because it clearly is such a fundamental issue for their mental health. It is not just noisy. They cannot sleep because of the noise.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Baroness and I share more in common than I thought, because sleep deprivation, which I have been a bit subject to recently, is not something I find very easy at all. I am going to take those comments back and provide more commentary, on the back of the right reverend Prelate’s questions, on what we were doing and what we are doing now, if the noble Baroness will bear with me.

As I said, there is no reason that unrelated residents of accommodation centres cannot share sleeping quarters. In fact, the right reverend Prelate conceded that some people like sharing sleeping quarters with others. It is the peripheral issues that he has brought to my attention that I will take back.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

Okay, I thank the right reverend Prelate for being so specific. However, I do not think that, fundamentally, there is a reason that unrelated residents cannot share. This amendment clearly provides effective action to alleviate this burden and seeks to restrict the introduction of efficiencies, already mentioned, to the system.

Amendment 57 is unnecessary because there are no current plans to place those with children in accommodation centres, and all other individuals will be placed in an accommodation centre only following an individual assessment that it will be suitable for them and they will be safe.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

Will the Minister at this point make a firm, absolute assurance not only that there are no current plans—I get very suspicious when I hear that, because a plan can be thought up in a few weeks’ time—but that no children will be placed in such centres?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I do not think I can go further than saying that there are no current plans because if a child was destitute and there was a place for the night, I could not say we would not put the child in an accommodation centre.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

Could the Minister at least give an assurance that, except in the most exceptional circumstances, no child will be put in such a centre? I hope she can understand why saying that there are no current plans is not sufficient to satisfy us.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I understand the noble Baroness’s point. I cannot go beyond saying there are no current plans, but I can think further about the point she is making and perhaps give her more detail on it, if she will allow me to do so, but that is as far as I can go. She might be further comforted by some of the things I am going to say about vulnerability, et cetera.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I repeat that these are not detention centres. There may be specific conditions—for example, if an asylum seeker needs to attend an interview about their claim, they will be required to be there—but they are not detention centres.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt—I know that there is a lot to cover—but I want to follow on from that important point. Again, we were given an example of a specific reason. The person may just want to go for a walk. They may want to go into the local town, if they can get there. Will they be free simply to go out when they want to?

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

I can assist the Minister here.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

There is a limit to both the resources and the geography of this country. That is why the system needs to run in a way that accommodates the most vulnerable people. People whose claims are not upheld need to leave.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank Committee Members for their kind words and, more importantly, those who made strong contributions in support of these amendments. It is not appropriate to cover them all in detail, but what is important is that the case was made for decent accommodation for asylum seekers that promotes their welfare and is based on a recognition of their common humanity.

While to an extent it is true that, as the noble Lord, Lord Horam, said, I am not opposed to accommodation centres in principle, I am opposed to what I think is envisaged. I am sorry if I did not make that clear. It is one thing to have small, homely centres; it is another to have things based on military barracks or their equivalent.

I will refer to what two noble Lords said before turning to the Minister. First, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, asked me a specific question about why 100 residents. To be honest, I do not know the answer. The British Red Cross suggested 100 and I have great respect for its work in this area, but the specific number is not important. What is important is that people at such a centre can feel that it is their home for a while. That point was made powerfully by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. There is a real danger that big centres—this is what HOPE not hate is afraid of—will attract the kind of hostility that residents of Napier have faced. The noble Lord made the point that it would be easier to accommodate families, but the Minister herself said that this is not the intention; these are not appropriate for families. I have not come up with an actual answer, but the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, also had the grace to acknowledge that his argument was based on anecdote that people might prefer to be in larger groups. But I have been using the evidence from both research and organisations working on the ground.

I also want to pick out what the right reverend Prelate said, partly because he made an important point at the outset about how, not in all but in many cases, we are talking about future citizens. He made a wonderful remark: he said that we should treat them as

“a gift to us rather than a problem”.

Too much of this debate has been based on the assumption that these people are problems. Please bear in mind what the right reverend Prelate said.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

Does the noble Baroness agree that there should be a distinction between those who have had their cases examined and are refugees and those whose cases have not yet been examined? That is all I am asking for.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

No, I am sorry; I do not, because they are all people. We should start by accepting their common humanity, and then we can see how people fare in the system. That is my working assumption and I think it is the right reverend Prelate’s too.

It was helpful that this debate was postponed, because it was originally supposed to have been while the right reverend Prelate was at Napier. In fact, I am supposed to be at Napier today with the APPG. I was struck by what he said and that there have been improvements. That is welcome and we should acknowledge it. However, he said that—I am paraphrasing—despite the improvements, he could not help getting the impression of a prison camp rather than a place of safety. We should be creating places of safety, not prison camps. That is my other working assumption.

I am very grateful to the Minister. She was on her feet responding for nearly an hour and I appreciate how she has really tried to address many of the points made. All noble Lords appreciate that. It is very difficult with so many amendments and so many questions. I am still very worried about children because, despite being pressed, the Minister said that there could be circumstances when children would be accommodated. My fear is that this would open the door, but she said that she would take this away and look at it. We will have to come back to lots of these aspects on Report, that one in particular. If the amendment about children’s education is unnecessary and there is no intention for these centres to provide education, I do not understand why the prior information notice included how they should be able to provide education facilities. I am not asking the Minister to respond now, but perhaps she could look at that.

Despite the Minister’s valiant attempts to answer them, a number of questions went unanswered. I will not push them now, but perhaps she could write one of her famous letters—and make sure that it actually gets sent. I have been asking the Library about one of them and it knew nothing about it, but I am glad it has been sent now. I am also worried about the emphasis on individual assessment, because that is supposed to happen now yet we find that many people in vulnerable circumstances end up in places like Napier. She might want to look at that and we might want to come back to it.

I am conscious that we have spent a lot of time on this and rightly so, because it is such an important issue. I am very grateful to every noble Lord who contributed and to the Minister for her engagement on the issues, even if I am left dissatisfied, because I am not sure we have moved on much further than the Commons in answering the questions asked—even though she tried very hard to do so. I suspect we will come back to at least some aspects of the accommodation centres on Report. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 56 withdrawn.

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[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I was trying to intervene on the noble Lord’s speech, and I apologise to him for doing that. As I am also going to be involved in the other business going on in Grand Committee a little later on, I might not be able to be here to hear the Minister’s reply, so I am going to have to forego the opportunity of speaking on this group of amendments. However, I wanted to register my strong support for them, not least because, in 2016, I moved an amendment on the six-month issue and this House passed it by 218 in favour to 195 against. One point that the noble Lord might also like to register is that Article 23 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights specifically sets out the right to work. That is something that this House has an obligation to consider, but I thoroughly endorse everything that the noble Lord has said. I should mention that I am patron of Asylum Link Merseyside, which has made representations on this subject.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 65, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud. She is very sorry that she is unable to be here today, not least because she feels so strongly about this issue. I hope that the three of us who are supporting signatories will act as effective understudies.

The general case has already been made very persuasively by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The main difference, as he explained, between his amendment and this one is that our amendment proposes the right to work after six months, which is the usual time period proposed and is probably more realistic. It also ensures that that right allows an asylum seeker to take up employment on grounds no less favourable than those of a person with recognised refugee status. This means they would not be confined to the highly restrictive shortage occupation list, as they now are when they are finally allowed to work.

It has already been said that there is great support for asylum seekers’ right to work, including from business and the general public. Even the Deputy Prime Minister has said that he is open-minded on the subject. Home Office Ministers repeatedly claim to be committed to refugee integration, a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. As the Migration Advisory Committee made clear, the right to work after a reasonable period—and I think six months is one—in a job not limited to the shortage occupation list, represents one of the key foundation stones of integration. The committee also challenged the pull-factor argument put forward by Ministers, an issue that we debated at some length on Tuesday, and noted that the recent

“parliamentary statement regarding analysis of the employment ban … contained no evidence on the ‘pull-factor’.

It suggested that,

“To the extent that the Home Office has robust evidence to support a link between the employment ban and a pull factor, they should of course make this evidence publicly available for scrutiny and review. That is how good policy is made.”

In the interests of good policy-making, then, will the Minister now undertake to publish that evidence, because all the evidence that I have seen, including academic studies, does not support the pull-factor argument?

As well as its implications for integration, the denial of the right to work can take a toll on mental health and feelings of self-worth. I recently attended a Zoom meeting at which members of MIN Voices, part of the Maryhill Integration Network, talked about what it meant for them. One talked about his life being frozen; another about being made to feel helpless and useless. The Government should recognise such sentiment, given the weight that they attach to paid work, especially in their social security policy.

I would like to finish by reading a statement from MIN Voices that makes the case much more powerfully than I am able to. It says:

“Remember, we are Human Beings first, and we have dignity. Asylum Seekers who came here had to leave everything behind. Security for asylum seekers is not only shelter and health but also work, the ability to contribute to their own life and other people’s. Who will give back the five years of my life I lost in the asylum claims process? Who will give me back my skills and my health? Not being able to work makes us feel less human. We are living in constant worry, feeling worthless, frustrated, in pain and fearful. Not knowing the future. Not being able to plan for the future. If we can work, it will help with integration and allow us to live in a dignified and a healthy life. If we can work, we will feel less stressed, have a sense of control over our life, have better mental and physical health, and feel at home … Being able to work is important for self-respect and dignity. If we can work, we belong to something and do not live in complete limbo. If we are not allowed to work, if we cannot even study, then what are we allowed to do? When we can work, we could pay tax, look after our families and children. Many of the problems will disappear. See us as human beings not a number.”


That is very relevant to the last debate we had, when we were constantly talking about numbers and forgetting we are talking about fellow human beings.

“See us as human beings not a number. Let us build our life and future and not waste our time and skills.”


So I hope that, like the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister will be open-minded to the growing calls for this very basic right: the right to work.

[Baroness Prashar (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady Ludford, and myself. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, in her usual manner introduced it fully and spoke movingly, as did the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

As we heard, asylum seekers wait months or even years for a decision on asylum claims, and sometimes decades. This condemns them to poverty, uncertainty and fear. It leaves them in a limbo, experiencing poverty and destitution. If they are allowed to work, this would improve family life, give them better prospects for their lives in the UK, and they would be able to rebuild their lives in the UK and eventually integrate better. It also, of course, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, makes economic sense. As we have already heard, the Migration Advisory Committee, which advises the Government on migration policy, in December 2021 recommended that the Government should look again at this policy. It also recommended giving asylum seekers the right to work after six months and not restricting them to the jobs on the shortage occupation list. Perhaps the Minister can explain why they are not paying heed to the advice of their own advisory committee?

The committee also states that the argument that this right would be a pull factor, as we have heard already, is not supported by evidence. The benefits of allowing asylum seekers to work outweigh the unfounded fears expressed by the Government. Therefore, I urge the Minister to accept this amendment, which has very wide support.

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[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, we have heard eight speakers on one side of this debate, and I think a word is in order from the other side. We are back to the same point: should we or should we not assume that all those who come here to seek asylum are genuine? It is, to me, no answer to reply that we are all human. Of course we are, but so are the population of this country and the constituents of those who were MPs.

In the medium and longer term, any asylum system has to have the support of the public. That could be brought into doubt if they saw increasing numbers of mainly young men arriving in this country, as others have mentioned, in a very visible fashion. As for public opinion, that will depend very much on the outcome of the next months and years. If that is a bad outcome from the point of view of numbers—numbers who are not perhaps genuine—that will decide itself.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, and it may be that he was going on to acknowledge this, but the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and I think the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, quoted actual public opinion surveys which showed big majorities in favour of the right to work for asylum seekers.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

Yes, I heard that opinion poll mentioned a couple of times. I would actually like to see the question and the context in what it was put. Any opinion poll needs to be looked at very carefully, but it may well be the case—I do not know, I have not looked at this particular one—if you ask the public that question today, they will say “Okay, sounds sensible”. What I am saying is that, if we set the asylum system in such a manner that the numbers will increase significantly month after month and year after year, that will change. So we need to be careful about what we do with this amendment at this point.

We know that the system is already under considerable pressure; we have talked about that. We know that the present conditions on work are very tight, as other noble Lords have mentioned. They are deliberately tight. The case must have been undecided for 12 months —there are far too many of those now—and the job must be on the official shortage occupation list, which is barely relevant to the qualifications of most asylum seekers.

My argument is that it would be a serious mistake to abolish both these requirements as the amendment proposes. It would make for a very clear incentive to spin out the claims process—not that they need to at the moment, but in the longer term—to get permission to work in any capacity. With the current delays in the system, additional numbers would get permission, thus adding to the pull factors at the channel.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, it is based on a calculation. I shall not try to bluster my way through what that calculation is, but I shall get the details to the noble Lord. As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, people who are destitute will have things like council tax and utility bills paid for them by the Home Office.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I hate to say it, but I have just checked my phone and there is no evidence there of that letter having arrived.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, we often say that we will not provide a running commentary, but I will provide a running commentary on said letter. When we break for the Statement at 3.30 pm, I shall look to the Box as to the whereabouts of the letter —which I did clear some time ago.

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Moved by

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

66: After Clause 12, insert the following new Clause—
“Prescribed period under section 94(3) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999
(1) The Asylum Support Regulations 2000 (S.I. 2000/704) are amended as follows.(2) In regulation 2(2) (interpretation) for “28” substitute “56”.(3) Subject to subsection (4), this section does not prevent the Secretary of State from exercising the powers conferred by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to prescribe by regulations a different period for the purposes of section 94(3) (day on which a claim for asylum is determined) of that Act.(4) The Secretary of State may not prescribe a period less than 56 days where regulation 2(2A) of the Asylum Support Regulations 2000 (S.I. 2000/704) applies.”Member’s explanatory statement
When an individual is granted refugee status, their eligibility for Home Office financial support and accommodation currently ends after a further 28 days. This amendment would extend that period to 56 days or allow the Secretary of State to set a longer period.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 66 is also in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, whom I thank. I speak at the risk of being called a Stakhanovite by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti.

The aim of the amendment is to extend from 28 to 56 days what is called the moving-on period, which sets a deadline by which those recognised as refugees are required to move on from asylum support to mainstream social security support and housing. As I said the other day, it feels like Groundhog Day, because I think it was six years ago that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and I first raised the difficulties created by the moving-on period during the passage of what became the Immigration Act 2016. I have lost count of how many times I have raised it since but have certainly had at least one meeting with the Minister about it. I pay tribute to the British Red Cross for continuing to press the issue with us.

The case for the change rests on the fact that it is extremely difficult for newly recognised refugees to make the transition to mainstream support in 28 days. Not only do they have to sort out all sorts of complex administrative issues that would try any of us at the best of times, and not only does research by the BRC and others show that it is virtually impossible to achieve within 28 days, but there is also a basic incompatibility between a moving-on period of 28 days and the 56 days that local authorities usually have to support those at risk of homelessness and the 35 days it takes from application to receipt of a first universal credit payment. In case the Minister has been briefed to respond to this issue, I point out that an advance payment that has to be repaid out of basic benefit is not an inviting prospect for someone already on the breadline.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

That is not in dispute; I was just echoing the point made by my noble friend Lady Stowell about respect, because I think it is always a good thing to be promoting.

I too listened to “More or Less” yesterday—the programme that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, referred to—and I think the conclusion was that it depended on how you looked at it. So everyone was right and everyone was wrong, all at the same time; I think that was the conclusion. But I very much enjoyed listening to that calculation.

Anyway, before I cause any more controversy, I will start by saying that it is very clear that individuals leaving asylum support following a positive immigration decision receive the assistance that they need to obtain other housing and apply for other benefits, such as universal credit, that they are entitled to. We do not think it is sensible to increase the length of time they remain eligible for asylum support from 28 to 56 days, and I will explain why.

The asylum accommodation estate is under huge strain and demand for normal asylum dispersal accommodation —that is to say, flats and houses obtained from the private rental market—is exceeding supply. The only way to meet this demand has been to use hotels, and there are currently around 26,000 people accommodated in them. A programme of work is under way to drive down the use of hotels by obtaining more dispersal accommodation and introducing accommodation centres. This clause would impede this work—I hope that answers the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about “Why not 56 days?” In simple terms, the longer that successful asylum seekers remain in asylum accommodation, the fewer beds will be available for those entering the asylum system, including those temporarily accommodated in hotels at great expense to the taxpayer.

We are aware of reports that some refugees do not access UC, as it is called, or other benefits or adequate housing within 28 days. The reasons for this are complex, but the problem is not solved by increasing the 28-day move-on period, for reasons I have explained, and that is why our focus has been on implementing practical changes with the aim of securing better outcomes for refugees within the 28-day move-on period. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, talked about some of the things that have been done during the pandemic that have actually improved the situation. These include ensuring that the 28-day period does not start until refugees have been issued with a biometric residence permit, the document that they need to prove that they can take employment and apply for universal credit, and that the national insurance number is printed on the permit, which speeds up the process of deciding a UC application.

We also fund Migrant Help which, as noble Lords will know, is a voluntary sector organisation that contacts refugees at the start of the 28-day period and offers that practical, move-on assistance, including advice on how to claim UC. I think this is a big change from the last time the noble Baroness and I spoke on the subject. We offer advice on the importance of an early claim; on other types of support that might be available; on booking an early appointment at their nearest DWP jobcentre, if needed; and on how to contact their local authority for assistance in funding alternative housing. We did evaluate the success of the pilot scheme that booked an early appointment with the local jobcentre for those who wanted one. The evaluation showed that all applicants for UC in the survey received their first payment on time—that is, 35 days from the date of their application—and that those who asked for an earlier advance payment received one, although I take her point about the advance payment. This assistance is now offered to all refugees leaving asylum support and is provided by Migrant Help, which again, as the noble Baroness knows, is a voluntary organisation funded by the Home Office.

Asylum accommodation providers are under a contractual duty to notify the local authority of the potential need to provide housing where a person in their accommodation is granted refugee status. Refugees can also apply for integration loans which can be used, for example, to pay a rent deposit or for an essential domestic item or work equipment, or for training.

We have a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, and I can reassure the Committee that this Government are committed to ensuring that all refugees are able to take positive steps towards integrating and realising their potential. We keep the move-on period under review, but we must consider the strong countervailing factors that make increasing it very difficult at this stage. For the reasons that I have outlined, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who spoke in support of the amendment, and I thank the Minister. I did ask some questions that she did not answer. I will not push them now, but I would be grateful if she could write to me, particularly about the potential implications of the Bill for the numbers affected—but I am conscious that we all want our lunch so I will not press her to reply now.

I said that hope springs eternal, but hope constantly gets dashed, does it not? It is the same old arguments. I was aware that there had been improvements since I last raised this with the Minister, so I asked the British Red Cross to brief me on what those improvements were and what the effects had been—and, yes, they have had some effect. But there are still problems, otherwise the British Red Cross would not be asking us to put this amendment. So why does the Home Office think that everything is hunky-dory? I take the point about accommodation, although, as I pointed out, if you leave newly recognised refugees without accommodation there are knock-on costs for other statutory services. But that point is not valid for UC. So even if one accepted the point about accommodation —which I do not—why cannot newly recognised asylum seekers receive asylum support for longer before they get UC?

It is not complex; it is quite simple. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, just do the maths. It is simple arithmetic: there is not enough time. I actually think it is a territorial issue about who is paying. I ask the noble Baroness—I am sorry, I need my lunch and I am sure the Minister does too—the Minister to take this back to her department and the DWP and look again at the basic incompatibility with universal credit. If nothing else, I think there is a strong case for continuing financial support for longer than 28 days to ensure that people can claim UC. I will leave it at that, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 66 withdrawn.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, we have Amendments 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 82A, 82B, 86A, 86B, 90 and 90A in this group. I have also put my name to Amendment 95A along with that of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I do not know whether she is planning to speak to it—it is the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins—but its thrust certainly falls within this group. Noble Lords will be pleased to know I am not going to speak precisely to each amendment.

I am slightly hesitant to raise this point, given the expertise of the noble Lord on the Front Bench and the noble and learned Lord sitting opposite, although it feels as if I have been sitting next to him through most of the passage of this Bill. Listening to the last exchange, is it something to do with the whole of our legal system that we place asylum seeker on one side opposite the state as the other party? The whole way this is designed is to have parties to proceedings fighting one another. I am glad to see the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, nodding at that. It has only just occurred to me.

This clutch of amendments addresses the period within which the claimant is to provide evidence. I hoped that the noble and learned Lord might be speaking ahead of me because I am sure I would be saying I agree with him. Why is the specific date a matter for the Secretary of State or the immigration officer? Different people will need different periods of time. That might be an argument for variability, but it should not mean that it can be an arbitrary date without there being a reasoned basis. The lawyers in the Chamber will tell me if I get this wrong, but I think one would usually expect to see time periods within tribunal rules with a possibility of applying for an extension, but the procedure rules are the subject of the next clause. I am concerned about whether this is a proper way to go about giving notice. It should be neutral and objectively appropriate, and Clause 17 gives the Secretary of State considerable power.

Under the new subsections introduced by Clause 18, the tribunal is required to make a statement as to whether the claimant has behaved in a way designed or “likely” to go to his credibility. When we tabled Amendments 82A and 82B, I was thinking about points noble Lords made and will make again and again about the impact of trauma on a claimant, and the difficulties someone may have—even someone who is not affected—in dealing with authority figures, accessing documents and so on. This point was very clearly made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, a couple of days ago. That is why I stress the word “likely”.

This gives me the opportunity to ask the Government why Clause 18 is included. It would be good to have that on the record. Others may have a different take on the reasons for some claims having taken the course they have.

In my Amendment 86A, I am not really seeking to amend the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 86, just to add to it by requiring adequate time before a cut-off date in a priority removal notice. Amendment 86A would add more of the people about whom we have been concerned to the list; the same point is made on Amendments 90 and 90A.

I also have Amendment 86B in this group. I got into quite a circular argument with myself last weekend about this. I am not sure I resolved it, but I will not trouble the Committee with it this evening, given the time.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 95 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, who apologises for having had to leave early. This speech will be in two halves—although one will be rather bigger than the other. The first half is roughly what the noble Baroness would have said.

At Second Reading she spoke about the ways in which she believes this Bill places additional unacceptable barriers in the way of women refugees seeking asylum who are fleeing sexual violence and exploitation. The amendment seeks to remove one of those obstacles and to extend the benefit to other groups of asylum seekers who may be similarly disadvantaged, so that it is accepted that they have a good reason for a late claim.

As we understand it, the issue is that in the proposed legislation the authorities deciding an asylum claim or appeal are instructed to attach, as we have heard, only minimal weight to any evidence provided late by the applicant, unless there is a good reason for it being late. However, there is robust evidence to show that the trauma suffered by the victims of sexual violence or trafficking can impact on memory and the ability to recall information. The Home Office guidance itself makes this clear. The other categories she included in Amendment 95, such as victims of torture, modern slavery and trafficking, are just as likely to suffer the same effects on memory and should be protected in the same way. I strongly support what she would have said.

However, as the arguments from this perspective are very similar to those I made in support of Amendment 40 on Tuesday, I will focus on children, a group we have not talked much about so far, although I was very pleased that my noble friend Lord Coaker did so in introducing this group. It is the strong view of children’s organisations such as the Children’s Society—I am grateful for its help—that the Bill completely fails to protect children, a group in particular need of it. Despite recognition of this added need for protection, this Bill’s harsh reforms apply to children just as they do to adults, unless the Minister can tell me that I am wrong—I hope he can. This is not right; it is a serious failure of the Government’s duty to protect children.

We need only look at Clauses 25 and 17 to see the disproportionate impact many of these provisions will have on children and young people. Amendment 95 seeks to ensure that children are recognised as having a good reason for not providing evidence by the deadline and that any evidence they provide late is given due weight. We know from organisations on the ground that asylum-seeking children who have been forced to flee, who may have witnessed violence and the destruction of their homes or schools, or even death, and who may have endured traumatic journeys, might not be able to share all the details of their ordeal in the first instance to provide evidence to support their case. The particular difficulties children might face in providing prompt evidence are recognised by the JCHR.

The Government know this. Their only quality impact assessment, to which my noble friend referred, sets out how these clauses will have a disproportionate impact on vulnerable persons, including children. The Home Office’s Children’s Asylum Claims Casework Guidance makes it clear:

“Decision makers must take account of what it is reasonable to expect a child to know”—


or relay—

“in their given set of circumstances”.

It is inappropriate for authorities to question the credibility of a child’s claim if they omit information, bearing in mind the child’s age, maturity and other reasons that may have led to those omissions. Requiring time-limited evidence and penalising children when they are unable to meet the deadlines goes against the Government’s own assessments and guidance and does nothing to protect children or, as we have heard, their best interests.

As one young person supported by the Children’s Society, which has long supported asylum-seeking children and young people, reminds us:

“This is not a joyful moment in our lives. We have to talk through the worst parts of our past. It is very traumatic.”


Children and young people need time and a sense of safety before they can begin to disclose their experience. They also need good, child-appropriate legal representation, which we know they often do not get, unfortunately. All too often, asylum-seeking children receive poor initial legal advice, which can lead to ill-prepared claims and to them not feeling comfortable about setting out their information. Due to legal aid funding cuts, quality legal advice is not readily available.

Another young asylum seeker supported by the Children’s Society described his experience:

“My solicitor did nothing, it was horrible. They didn’t even prepare a witness statement for my interview. I had to do everything myself. I had my social worker but she didn’t know how to help me with my asylum case. The interviewer told me she had no information and I had to tell her everything.”


The Children’s Society sees many asylum-seeking children who have to provide evidence at later stages of their claim, not because of any weakness in the claim but because of the trauma they have endured or the consequences of non-existent or poor legal representation. No doubt the Minister will assure us that these concerns will be addressed in guidance and on a case-by-case basis, yet, as was highlighted in the recent report, An Inspection of Asylum Casework, guidance is often neither followed nor implemented by Home Office caseworkers. Home Office staff themselves stressed that they

“did not have time to consider each case on its own merits, contrary to the guidance they receive.”

So the aim of Amendment 95 is not to tie the hands of decision-makers or legislate for every situation in which a person might provide late evidence. Rather, it is to ensure that the most vulnerable are protected in the Bill, because we cannot leave their safety and well-being to chance. That is consistent with this highlighted observation from the JCHR:

“It is crucial that decision-makers recognise the many legitimate reasons why asylum seekers may struggle to provide evidence in support of their claims within tight deadlines.”


If Clause 25 stands part—I have to say that I will support the proposal that will be put by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that it should not—this amendment represents the minimum necessary to protect children, women, women fleeing gender-based violence and others in the most vulnerable circumstances.

I want to return briefly to what the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, said. Given the Home Office guidance, we cannot see any logical or humane reason why the Government would not accept this amendment and establish on the face of the Bill that, in these circumstances, for these victims, any late evidence should always be accepted as being late for a good reason, and their application or appeal should not in any way be disadvantaged because of it.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 85 on the destruction of documents. I am a sponsor of this amendment, together with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, who is unfortunately unwell and in isolation.

The purpose of these subsections is to indicate matters that might damage a claimant’s credibility in respect of an asylum or human rights claim. The destruction of documents is clearly one of these. Why else would this be done, except to make it much more difficult to identify the claimant and therefore much more difficult to assess their claims? Noble Lords will remember that claimants arriving by air used to cut up their passports and dispose of them in the aircraft’s toilet. That was dealt with by photocopying their documents before they boarded the aircraft. This time round, it is rather more difficult to counter, but it should certainly be regarded as relevant to an assessment of the validity of their claim.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I think I was asked a similar question, in a different context, on the police Bill. I will give the same answer, not least because I am conscious that a lot of these provisions are actually Home Office provisions. I can assure the noble and learned Lord that I will write to him with the answer to that question, so that when this matter comes back he will be in possession of the answer—rather than make an educated guess, which might turn out to be slightly inaccurate, from the Dispatch Box. I hope that is sufficient.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, on that very important point, perhaps the Minister will take back to the Home Office that this Committee would very much like the guidance to be published in draft form in good time so that Members of the House and others can look at it.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am sorry for interrupting, but I am becoming a little confused again, I am afraid, probably because we have been at this for a very long time and it is very late and so forth. Is the Minister saying that the deadline that is set for the submission of evidence will be set on a case-by-case basis, for example, if the applicant is particularly vulnerable? If vulnerabilities come to notice that were not initially brought to the notice of the decision-maker, will the deadline then be adjusted and perhaps extended as a consequence of that? Although there might be general guidance about what the deadline might be in every case, is it movable and adjustable in every case and might it be adjusted further as the case progresses? In which case, why on earth is this part of the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

There are a number of ways of skinning this particular cat because there are separate amendments but common themes. If when I am about to sit down, I have not dealt with it fully, I am sure the noble Baroness will intervene, but I will try to come to Clause 25 head on.

However, I was going to go next to Amendments 82A and 82B, both in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Different elements of Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 have different thresholds in how they are applied to the facts of a case and how credibility is consequently damaged. Clause 18 is drafted to take this into account, so that decision-makers will take into account the relevant thresholds on a case-by-case basis. Clause 18 will encourage claimants to engage with the process in good faith and, along with the measures relating to late evidence in Clauses 17 and 25, to provide evidence in support of their claim at the earliest opportunity. As I said earlier, we think that by encouraging people to bring all their evidence upfront in protection or human rights claims, we can protect those who need protection and identify any unmeritorious claims as early as possible.

Turning to Amendment 82B, the good faith requirement is intended, as I think is obvious, to address behaviours that a deciding authority thinks are not in good faith. Where an individual who makes a protection or human rights claim exhibits a pattern of non-compliant behaviour during their dealings with immigration authorities, their credibility should be damaged to reflect that behaviour. It is also designed to stop claimants deliberately obstructing the one-stop and expedited judicial process—for example, by not taking up our enhanced legal aid offer and then making a last-minute claim based on lack of access to legal advice. The good faith requirement therefore goes further than the behaviours currently described in Section 8 of the 2004 Act. It puts beyond doubt that past behaviour that is deliberately designed to frustrate or delay proceedings should be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. We think that is right, for the reasons I have outlined.

I turn to Amendments 83 and 88, which would remove the credibility provisions in Clauses 18 and 21. For the reasons that I set out earlier, we think that it is entirely reasonable to require evidence in support of a protection of human rights claim, or a claim of being a victim of modern slavery, to be provided in a timely manner, unless there are good reasons why that is not possible.

However, I underline that a person’s credibility is not necessarily determinative of their claim under the current rules and procedures, and the Bill does not change that. Decision-makers will still be required to consider credibility in the round, as they currently do, and, where a person has raised evidence late, which causes delay and wasted resource, it is right that decision-makers consider whether there is any merit in the reasons for that lateness.

I turn now to Amendment 90A, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. We recognise that, due to an person’s individual circumstances, it may be harder for them to provide material in a timely manner. Since this is essentially an amendment to Amendment 90 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I respectfully direct the noble Baroness to the response that I gave to the noble and learned Lord.

As I am on the noble and learned Lord’s amendments, I will now deal with Amendment 91 on reasonable grounds. It is right that, where an individual has been assessed as a priority for removal or deportation, they should avail themselves of the associated legal aid advice offer and provide any matters listed within Clause 19(3)(a) before the cut-off date and they should provide reasons for lateness where a late claim is raised, under subsection (7).

Decision-makers cannot reasonably be expected to speculate on or investigate why an individual who has received a removal notice and associated legal aid advice offer would raise a late protection or human rights claim. If no reasons for lateness are provided, or if the reasons provided are not considered to be good reasons, it would be clear to the decision-maker that any appeal must be subject to the expedited appeals process. In answer to the noble and learned Lord, I say that the good reasons test is adequate and sufficient.

The clause already provides significant safeguards for recipients of a PRN in the form of the legal aid advice provision and the good reasons test for individuals who raise late claims. I set out earlier what those good reasons can amount to. It is a very open-ended test. Therefore, I respectfully suggest to the noble and learned Lord that the amendment is unnecessary and, indeed, would risk complicating an otherwise straightforward and, I suggest, suitable test.

I turn now to Amendment 95 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, but spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. By introducing a statutory requirement to provide evidence before a specified date, the Bill redresses the current balance. It is right that decision-makers should have regard to the principle —I underline “principle”—that minimal weight is given to evidence that is late, following receipt of either an evidence notice or a priority removal notice, without good reason.

I will come to the thrust of Clause 25 in a second, but I will first say that this amendment would place an obligation on decision-makers, not only in the Home Office but also the judiciary, to accept that there were good reasons for late evidence in all asylum and human rights cases where either the claimant or the claim type fell into one of the listed categories. That would remove the requirement that decision-makers should have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence. That would be the case even if the reason for lateness was wholly unconnected to the category of claim or the personal factors. No causal link between the two is set out in the amendment. I respectfully suggest that that is overly prescriptive and would tie the hands of the decision-maker. Of course, in all cases, the decision-maker can take these matters into account—

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

It is not my amendment so maybe it could be worded better. The noble Lord gave great emphasis to the case-by-case basis earlier, which sounds very reasonable, and he talked about subjective factors. Has he read the recent research from the British Red Cross about women seeking asylum? It found that frequently their claims are met with disbelief and they are not treated very well at all. There is a lack of recognition of gender-based violence that they may be fleeing from, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, talked about earlier. I suggest that the noble Lord and those responsible for this clause look at this research, because I worry about putting so much emphasis on subjective factors and the case-by-case basis.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I think I have received the email from the Red Cross, as I think it emailed everyone. I have set up a folder for all these briefings, so I do not want to say that I have read it, but if I have been sent it I certainly have it and will read it. However, due to pressures of other business, I cannot say that I have read all the material yet.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I absolutely understand—I do not think it was in its general briefing, but it produced a separate report last week or the week before, and it is worth looking at.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

In that case, I will certainly read it over the weekend. I know that those in the Home Office responsible for this area are obviously looking at the debate and will have picked up what the noble Baroness has said.

I was just dealing with Amendment 95, after which I will come to Clause 25 itself. I lost count of how many times the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “tawdry”. It really is not, if I may say so. We obviously disagree, and I will make no comparisons either to parking fines or international commercial litigation. At one point it seemed to me that the noble Baroness was saying that, on the one hand, this clause was terrible and, on the other, that this is what tribunals do in any event and we can trust them to do the right thing.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Horam (Con)]

Yes, I do acknowledge the differences, which is why I said that there is no guarantee at all that, even if this is tried, it will work in British circumstances. All I am saying is that it worked in Australian circumstances, the Government are clearly interested in this and, as I say, it would be a dereliction of duty if they did not put this among their options and pass the legislation that enabled us to try this out. That is where we are now.

I point out that, after the success of this policy in Australia, the Australian Government were enabled to expand the legal routes for asylum seekers to go to that country because it ceased to be controversial: immigration was less controversial as a consequence of the anti-boat policy being successful. The fact is that, as I have said before in these debates, if the public do not buy into the policy, you will have problems in persuading them to have more immigration. If they buy into it because they can see that you are controlling your borders, they have a more relaxed attitude to immigration and accept higher levels of it because they can see that they are in control of both the amount and the type of immigration coming in.

Therefore, there is a prize at the end of this for those who genuinely want to have more immigration, frankly, than we have at the moment, and if you can seem to be in control. What worries people is if you are not in control—if they can see clearly that people are behaving illegally getting here, jumping the queue and all the rest of it. In view of what the Whips on both sides have said, I do not want to go on any longer, but we ought to consider this in a rational and sensible way, as a clear option that any responsible Government of whatever kind should pursue; and I point out that, in Australia, for example, it does have all-party support.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, we have obviously been reading different things because everything that I have read and heard about the policy in Australia suggests that it is far from successful, and certainly not for asylum seekers themselves.

[Lord Horam (Con)]

If the noble Baroness reads the evidence given by the Australian high commissioner to the House of Commons—evidence-taking on a section of this Bill—she will find that much of what I have said is corroborated there.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I tend to give more credence to people on the ground, but there it is.

I share concerns that have already been raised about potential health and human rights implications and the general dehumanising nature of a power that allows the British Government, in the words of the UNHCR,

“to externalise its obligations towards refugees and asylum seekers to other countries with only minimal human rights safeguards”.

No doubt, we are talking about poorer countries on the other side of the world to which asylum seekers will be moved like cattle, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said.

I want to raise a few questions; some have been covered so I will not repeat them but build on them. First, with regard to children, who a number of noble Lords have mentioned, in the Commons the Minister assured Caroline Nokes, a former Immigration Minister, that unaccompanied children would not be transferred for offshore processing. When she asked about accompanied children, and about what would happen to a child who turned 18 during the process of applying for asylum, answer came there none. I hope that there will be an answer to those questions today.

Can the Minister also say what would happen to a child whose age is disputed? When we reach that group of amendments—probably around midnight, so it will be great scrutiny—we will hear of the widespread fears among medical and social work professionals and children’s organisations that Part 4 of the Bill will lead to many more children being wrongly assessed as adults. If so, I fear that many unaccompanied children could be transferred because it is not believed that they are, in fact, children. I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on that. Can she assure us that no young person will be transferred while the age-assessment process is going on?

Secondly, building on what the right reverend Prelate and the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, said, the UNHCR observes that the Bill

“is silent on what, if any, legal obligations the United Kingdom would consider itself to have”

towards asylum seekers once their asylum claims have been dealt with. It expresses concern that there is nothing in the Bill that confines the application of the changes to extraterritorial processing, which is the stated purpose in the Explanatory Notes.

Detention Action warns that, even if a third country’s authorities recognised the asylum seeker as a refugee, the Bill provides no power for the UK to re-admit them or grant them any form of leave. Can the Minister say whether this interpretation is correct? If it is not, can she assure us on the record that those who are deemed to qualify for refugee status will be readmitted to the UK—that is, the country from which they sought refugee protection—and explain under what legal power in the Bill they would be so readmitted? If Detention Action’s interpretation is correct, this is not simply about offshore processing, which is a euphemism, but, even more shockingly, it is about the Government wiping their hands of all responsibility for those who qualify for refugee protection via a claim for asylum—not short-term offshore processing but long-term deportation. If so, the case for Clause 28 and Schedule 3 not standing part of the Bill is that much stronger.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Government’s position in justifying this and other measures in the Bill rests on the UK’s so-called excellent track record on refugees, and the Minister has repeatedly pointed to the UK’s track record on resettlement schemes. The UNHCR thinks differently:

“Resettlement programmes, while welcome, are, by themselves, an inadequate means for fairly distributing global responsibilities towards refugees and sharing the burden currently shouldered by major host countries.”


It goes on to give the facts about the numbers who are making their own way from areas where people are being persecuted. It concludes:

“For all of these reasons, the Bill undermines, rather than promotes, the Government’s stated goal of improving the United Kingdom’s ‘ability to provide protection to those who would be at risk of persecution on return to their country of nationality.’”


As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has just said, one of the reasons for offshoring is to temporarily house asylum seekers while their claims are being considered. Would the Minister like to comment on an article in the Times on Saturday that claimed that Priti Patel, the Home Secretary,

“wants to … reject Channel migrants’ claims for asylum within a fortnight of them reaching Britain”?

The story claims that

“government lawyers raised concerns over the plans”

but the Secretary of State

“believes a fortnight is a ‘reasonable’ window for immigration officials”

to make such a decision. According to the article, a Home Office spokesperson told the newspaper:

“We do not comment on leaks”,


so I ask the Minister a different question. Does she believe that two weeks is a reasonable timeframe to consider asylum seekers’ claims? If so, there would not appear to be any need for offshoring.

The Bill goes from bad to worse. As Amnesty and Migrant Voice put it,

“the prevailing attitude emanating from the Home Office … appears determined by any means and at almost any cost to seek nothing more than avoiding its responsibilities while demanding other countries should take theirs. This is a hopeless prescription from which no good can possibly come”.

The Home Office is seeking the power not only to remove an asylum seeker to any country while it considers their claim, but to do so and then tell that country, “If you think they are a refugee, you take them. It’s not our problem any more”. I do not know how the Government think they can persuade another country to take the UK’s unwanted asylum seekers on either a temporary or a permanent basis. According to Amnesty and Migrant Voice, offshoring by Australia effectively excluded legal, judicial, medical, humanitarian and media scrutiny; has cost a fortune—over £500 million a year, according to the British Red Cross—and, contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Horam, seems to have seen or heard, has failed to stop those seeking asylum, including those arriving in Australia by boat.

I understand that academic evidence on the whole offshoring scheme was given by a university in Australia to the Public Bill Committee in the other place that appears to contradict the evidence that the Australian High Commission gave to the same Committee, so there is clearly a serious difference of opinion as to whether the scheme is successful. Apparently, the independent academic assessment of the scheme thinks it is a failure. The UNHCR says:

“As UNHCR has seen in several contexts, offshoring of asylum processing often results in the forced transfer of refugees to other countries with inadequate State asylum systems, treatment standards and resources”,


which amendments in this group seek to address.

“It can lead to situations in which asylum seekers are indefinitely held in isolated places where they are ‘out of sight and out of mind’, exposing them to serious harm … UNHCR has voiced its profound concerns about such practices, which have ‘caused extensive, unavoidable suffering for far too long’, left people ‘languishing in unacceptable circumstances’ and denied ‘common decency.’”


I am hoping that this apparently unworkable and morally repugnant provision is yet another paper tiger, designed to appeal to the Daily Mail in deterring genuine asylum seekers, but that it is no more than propaganda. Clause 28 and Schedule 3 should not be part of the Bill. All the other amendments in this group are well- meaning, but they are window dressing.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

The problem is that the Minister only said, “unaccompanied children”, and did not refer to children in families. I am sorry, but we do not have the confirmation that this addresses the whole range of scenarios—such as families being split up—which we have raised but have not been answered.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

Before the Minister replies, I also asked some questions about children and, more specifically, about when they turn 18 and whether their age will be challenged.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I have said I will write, but to be more explicit than my honourable friend was in the Commons might risk exploitation on routes taken by children. Therefore, this is as far as I will go today. I will lay out the various safe and legal routes through which children can come to this country and reiterate what my honourable friend said in the House of Commons.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am very sorry but the noble Baroness is not answering the right reverend Prelate’s question. It is not about safe and legal routes but about who will and will not be offshored, which is an awful term. She seems to be saying that children who are accompanied, who are in families, could well be offshored. Is that correct? The Minister in the Commons refused to answer the question and avoided it; I am afraid that is what the Minister is doing here.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I am not trying to avoid it; I am saying that that is about as far as I can go. However, I will try to outline any further detail that I can in writing to noble Lords. Noble Lords will know—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am sorry, but a whole range of noble Lords asked a question, in different ways, about what happens to the asylum seekers if they are granted refugee status in the country to which they have been offshored. Are they allowed back into this country or are they just left there? If they are left there, they have, in effect, been deported.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I do not have the answers before me, so I will write on the questions that I have not answered, if that is okay with the noble Baroness.

--- Later in debate ---

In setting out the arguments this evening, this gives my noble friend the Minister the chance to set out precisely why the Government are seeking to change tack, as set out in Clause 31, setting aside the case law that has curried favour in the law courts on both sides of the border—in England and Scotland—for a considerable number of years.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 105 in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, who cannot be here tonight, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to whom I am grateful. I also thank Women for Refugee Women and ILPA for all their work on this amendment.

The amendment would remove the narrow restrictive and requirement in Clause 32 that, in order to qualify under the “particular social group” grounds of persecution for recognition as a refugee under the convention, two conditions must be met. The amendment would replace this with an either/or condition. As I will explain, this would be in line with international standards and UK case law.

This is a small amendment, but it is significant, as the UNHCR has made clear. The UNHCR explains that Clause 32 is one of a

“series of changes that would make it more difficult for refugees who are admitted to the UK to be recognised as such.”

The case for the amendment is, in effect, set out in its detailed legal observations, which have been invaluable to our scrutiny of the Bill. The UNHCR warns that narrowing the definition of “particular social group” in the way that the clause does

“could exclude some refugees from the protection to which they are entitled … In the UK and other jurisdictions, the particular social group ground has proved critical in the protection of those with claims based on gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, status as former victims of trafficking, disability or mental-ill health, family and age.”

This view is endorsed by the Bingham Centre, which warns:

“The result will inevitably be to refuse protection to people who, as a matter of international law, are refugees.”


It picks out this clause as one of a number that are particularly troubling to it from a rule of law perspective.

The UNHCR explains the origins of the two conditions and why it has recommended that they should be treated as alternative, rather than cumulative, tests. The argument was endorsed by the late Lord Bingham, acting in his judicial capacity, when he ruled that the cumulative approach taken in Clause 32 was wrong because

“it propounds a test more stringent than is warranted by international authority.”

Thus this approach, the UNHCR points out, has been affirmed in the UK courts over an EU interpretation. I cannot resist observing that it is rather odd that a Government committed to taking back control from the EU is so keen to apply an EU interpretation that has been rejected by the British courts. Indeed, on the previous group, the Minister said that our starting point should be that we had left the EU, so could he perhaps explain why that does not apply to this clause?

In their briefing, Women for Refugee Women—WRW —and ILPA include an example, taken from Garden Court Chambers barristers, of what this might mean:

“a trafficked woman would need to show not only that her status as a trafficked woman is an innate characteristic”—

one shared with other members of a group—

“but also that trafficked women as a group are perceived as having a distinct identity in her country of origin. The latter is of course much more difficult to establish than the former because this is judged by the perceptions of the society in her country, and it can be very challenging to find objective evidence on women as a distinct group.”

WFW and ILPA also point out that there was “no pre-legislative consultation” on this clause because it was not included in the New Plan for Immigration. Can the Minister explain why this is the case? Moreover, the equality impact assessment on the Bill, which has been described as “superficial and inadequate” by barristers at Garden Court Chambers, fails adequately to assess the impact of the change on groups in vulnerable circumstances.

As I have already noted, the UNHCR has warned of the likely implications for a wide range of such groups. I particularly draw attention to how this clause is likely to have an adverse impact on women fleeing gender-based persecution—a group that the Government claim to care about. As I made clear on an earlier amendment, it is one of a number of such clauses that have to be viewed in the context of the failings that already exist. According to WRW and ILPA,

“Over the years, there has been substantial research on the failures of the Home Office in delivering a fair asylum process, and on the reasons why many women who flee gender-based persecution may be wrongly denied protection.”


Most recently, as I noted last week and gave the Minister some weekend reading on, the British Red Cross has published research that details experiences that

“highlight the distrust and disbelief women can face when discussing traumatic experiences of violence”,

especially, but not only, when interviewed by men. One survivor’s words are recounted:

“you feel so low and you feel so degraded and you’ve been violated and you were [telling] your story, you were expecting to be heard and to have someone who shows you some form of sympathy.”

In the Commons Public Bill Committee, the Government justified their position by asserting that the new clause was necessary to bring certainty to an area bedevilled by conflicting authority. But ILPA and WFW give that argument short shrift, pointing out:

“There is no conflicting authority: the UNHCR and the senior UK courts have a clear and constant interpretation. It is the Government that seeks to depart from this shared interpretation of the Refugee Convention, and it does so without warrant or proper justification.”


So can the Minister provide a more convincing justification today of a clause that, in the words of Women for Refugee Women and ILPA

“reverses case law of senior UK courts, contravenes UNHCR standards, and reinstates an erroneous EU law standard”?

If not, will he agree to this amendment?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, all of these clauses seek to restrict access to the protection of the refugee convention. I will speak to Amendments 103 and 104 to Clause 31 and Amendment 111 to Clause 37, which are all in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and which I have co-signed. However, I share the view of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that all of these clauses should in fact be removed.

The problem with Clause 31 is that it changes the standard of proof for the test of whether a person is a refugee. It creates two limbs of the test and changes the bar from “reasonable likelihood” to

“on the balance of probabilities”.

Although the refugee convention does not prescribe the standard of proof, UNHCR’s handbook says:

“The requirement of evidence should … not be too strictly applied in view of the difficulty of proof inherent in the special situation in which an applicant for refugee status finds himself.”


So, for 20 years, the UK courts, including the Supreme Court, have applied a “reasonable likelihood” standard of proof in a composite and holistic manner.

Clause 31 overturns this established interpretation of the law by dividing the overall test into a series of sub-questions and applying different standards of proof to different limbs of questioning, to require the person to prove on a balance of probabilities that they fear persecution and the decision-maker to revert to a test of reasonable likelihood in assessing whether the person would face persecution and lack state protection. It is quite a mishmash, and a complex and confusing one—not least for already burdened caseworkers. As we have heard so frequently in this Committee, if the Government really want to fix a broken asylum system, why are they making everything more complex and building in delay?

As the Bingham Centre points out, Clause 31

“allows for rejection of a person as a refugee because they failed one of the steps”

imposing that higher hurdle,

“whereas if the test was taken in its totality, the person may have been accepted as a refugee.”

The process may well lead to exclusion from sheer error because of all these complex, different bits of the test. Either the JCHR Amendments 103 and 104 should be accepted, or Clause 31 should be deleted.

On Amendment 111 to Clause 37, as the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has said, we object to the lowering of the threshold for regarding a crime as particularly serious such that a person can be expelled. It is designed to—and will—exclude many more people from the protection of the refugee convention. Not only is the threshold sentence reduced from two years to 12 months but it changes the rebuttable presumption of “particularly serious” into an unchallengeable assertion.

This is disproportionate; a blanket exclusion is incompatible with the refugee convention, which envisages a crime that is a major threat and expulsion as a last resort. Bear in mind that the Bill seeks to impose a four-year sentence for the mere act of arriving in the UK without permission, which most refugees have to do. That gives you a measure of the lack of proportion in what is supposed to be a serious crime under the remit of the Bill; I am not validating or endorsing any crime, but under the refugee convention it has to be “particularly serious”, and the Government are departing from that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am not a lawyer, so I rise with some trepidation, but it seems to me that it suits the Government’s purpose to interpret it in this way, because it means that fewer vulnerable groups—particularly women—fleeing violence will receive refugee protection as a result. It is no clearer than the interpretation that it is overruling, and it seems odd. It is quite rare for the Government to pray in aid an EU interpretation over that of their own courts. Maybe one of the lawyers opposite will be able to give a better response than I can, but I am afraid I am not convinced, because it seems as though that is why this is being done—it is nothing to do with clarity. If this legislation had clearly put in law Lord Bingham’s interpretation, that would be clear. So why the EU interpretation, which is, as numbers of authorities have said, likely to mean fewer vulnerable people—particularly women—receiving the refugee protection to which they are entitled under the convention?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I set out why we think this interpretation is correct. I am certainly not saying that we are using this interpretation because it is the EU one; I was referring to the EU to make the point that, with respect, it is very difficult to challenge this as somehow an unfair, unworkable or inapt interpretation when it is actually reflected in the EU jurisprudence. I absolutely take, with respect, the noble Baroness’s comments about the importance of the equality impact assessment for the policies being taken forward through the Bill. The public sector equality duty is not a one-off duty; it is ongoing, and I want to provide reassurance now that we will be monitoring equality impacts as we put the Bill into operation and as we evaluate its measures and, indeed, those in the wider new plan for immigration.

I assure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester that we are well aware of the particular issues facing women and survivors of gender-based persecution and, indeed, the asylum system is sensitive to them. The interview guidance contains clear instructions to interviewers in this area. We seek to offer a safe and supportive environment for individuals to establish their claims. Despite references to the decision of this House in its judicial capacity, in Fornah, those comments were obiter. I underline that there is no authoritative definition in case law of what is a “particular social group”, and that is why it is absolutely right for this Parliament to define it in this clause.

Clause 37 amends the definition of a “particularly serious crime” from one which is punished by imprisonment of two years or more to one which is punished by imprisonment of 12 months or more. To be clear, imprisonment means an immediate custodial sentence—I am not sure that any noble Lord made that point, but it is important. Indeed, it is why I brought the handbook: if you receive a suspended sentence, you are not caught by its provisions—going back to the underlying legislation. Furthermore, not only does it have to be an immediate custodial sentence of 12 months or more but the second limb has to apply—namely, whether the individual is a danger to the community—and that is rebuttable.

We cannot accept Amendment 111 because it would potentially allow dangerous foreign national offenders to remain here, putting the public at risk. If somebody has been sentenced to a year or more in prison, we should not enable them to second guess the verdict of the jury or the decision of the court by allowing them to bring into play again whether they were such an offender. We seek to allow only the second bit of it to be rebuttable; namely, whether they pose the relevant danger.

I think I have answered all the questions that have been asked. On the last point put by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, at the heart of this lies not some dinner party conversation but a lack of clarity in the current case law and standards, which make it harder for decision-makers to make accurate and efficient decisions; that is it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am surprised that anyone in a democracy is troubled by a Government listening to the people and putting forward legislation which, first, delivers on a manifesto commitment, and, secondly—as I have said and I repeat —is entirely consistent with our international law obligations. There is nothing wrong and everything right with each signatory to the refugee convention interpreting its obligations under it; we have now been around that point on several occasions.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am sorry to keep bobbing up, and I appreciate what the Minister said about monitoring the equality impact of this legislation, but does he accept that Clause 32 means that a woman fleeing gender-based violence with good grounds for being accepted as a refugee is less likely to be so accepted? I do not believe that that is what the British people voted for.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am not trying to be difficult here. What it means is that a woman, like anybody else, who has a proper claim under the refugee convention will find refuge in the UK. That is what we are seeking to do. By having a clearer set of definitions, we are trying to make sure that it will not depend on the happenstance of who the decision-maker is and the way the test is applied.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my name is on this amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, knows whereof she speaks, so I shall not attempt to do more than support her. To me, this is a matter of professional judgment, which she has brought, but also of common sense. What I hope is my common sense has been informed by what I have heard over quite some years, including, very significantly, in the debate that we had last week. It is clear that in the UK—it may in this context be England and Wales—the systems, if they can be called systems, for assessing the health needs of asylum seekers are patchy and often inadequate.

It is also common sense that assessment should start from a solid, informed base, incorporating the best, up-to-date understanding and experience, so a review is important. So is consultation with those who are expert in the field. I support the amendments.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support these amendments, to which I was pleased to add my name. I thank the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Helen Bamber Foundation for their help.

Many of us have already highlighted how provisions in this Bill will seriously harm the mental and physical health of people seeking asylum, through, for example, leaving group 2 refugees living in limbo with uncertain status or by placing people in vulnerable circumstances in accommodation centres that function as quasi-detention and have been shown to have a terrible impact on health.

The amendments are a positive step that aims to ensure that the physical and mental health needs of people seeking asylum are prioritised and that there is a comprehensive, co-ordinated approach to addressing those needs in line with our obligations under Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 to

“recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”.

Numerous reports and work by organisations such as the Helen Bamber Foundation, Freedom from Torture, the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Equality and Human Rights Commission show that people seeking asylum face barriers in accessing services, including health services, throughout the asylum process, from their arrival in the UK to the conclusion of the process and beyond. They are also more likely to have specific healthcare needs caused by distressing experiences in their country of origin and traumatic experience during their journey seeking refuge.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, explained, there are numerous points in the asylum system where the physical and mental health of people seeking protection affects their ability to engage in the process or is worsened by the system we have in place. One particularly troubling example is the detention system, which the noble Baroness has talked about and is the subject of a later group of amendments—I shall scrub what I was going to say about that, given the lateness of the hour.

I am aware that the Home Office is currently engaging with the NHS, NGOs and other stakeholders through groups like its asylum seeker health steering group and associated subgroups. This is welcome, but much more is needed. The current guidance is inadequate and its implementation patchy. Codes of practice focused on the health and care of people seeking asylum and the responsibilities of all those engaging with them in the asylum system would not only increase the fairness and efficiency of the system but provide better protection and support to those in need of asylum.

I hope that the Minister will look kindly on these amendments, which I think are part of the solution.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise with great pleasure in following the three noble Baronesses who have proposed this amendment.

Outside Yarl’s Wood detention centre, at the “Set Her Free” protest, I listened to some incredibly powerful and moving speeches from women who had been detained in that centre and had then come back to protest. They spoke about what the experience was like and what they had been through. They showed huge bravery. We talk a lot about trauma in your Lordships’ House; you could hear the trauma in those women’s voices.

I see that the noble Baroness the Minister will not be answering this question, and I do not necessarily expect her to remember this, but in June 2020 when I was still a new Member of your Lordships’ House, she was kind enough to have a one-on-one call with me after I went with the South Yorkshire Migration and Asylum Action Group to Urban House in Wakefield, where the conditions were absolutely dreadful. We saw SYMAAG trying to pick up the pieces after the failure of government services to meet the most basic provisions.

That is why I want to make this particular point: much of the provision covered by the noble Baroness’s amendment is currently being filled, patchily and inadequately but desperately bravely and with huge effort, by voluntary groups such as SYMAAG, as well as many others like them around the country. They cannot possibly do an adequate job, but they do an amazing job. The point I want to make to the Minister is that, with adequate government provision, those groups could do so many other positive things to build communities and be an active growth force instead of just trying to plug the Government’s gaps.

There is a real long-term cost. If we look at the financial cost of the lack of provision that this amendment provides for, the long-term cost is far greater than the cost of providing care for desperate people who are in our society and are our responsibility.

--- Later in debate ---

I conclude by again asking, to be absolutely clear, what the purpose of these provisions is. Does an individual have to physically enter the United Kingdom on land and disembark, or are the Government now entitled to prosecute purely for entering UK territorial waters? This would be a significant change, and one that I believe needs to be clarified to the Committee this evening.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I strongly support the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in what she had to say, but I would like some clarification. She said clearly that the effect of this clause is to criminalise the act of seeking asylum in the UK, which was the conclusion reached by the JCHR, of which she is a member. Does the Minister agree with the conclusion that this is what Clause 39 means? If she does not agree, what does it mean? If she does agree, I have a conundrum that is a variation of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has twice rehearsed now. He made the point that if an asylum seeker is deemed inadmissible, how do they even get to Clause 11 to be affected by the differential?

I have the same conundrum around criminalisation. If the very act of seeking asylum makes someone a criminal, how do they even get to Clause 11? I do not understand how Clause 11, inadmissibility and criminalisation interact with each other. It is rather late to go into this but, if the Minister cannot do it now, a letter to all the members of the Committee would be very helpful to clarify this interaction.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the fact that I am going to say that I could not agree more with my noble friend Lady Ludford and will not add to that should not be taken to reduce the strength of that view.

I added my name to Amendment 122 from the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for the reasons she explained. After I did, I realised that there is a question to be asked about new subsection (E1), which makes it an offence for someone knowingly to arrive in the UK without an ETA, an electronic travel authorisation; I would say that it would be the same to enter, but I am not sure it would be possible to enter the UK without an ETA.

I feel very uncomfortable about new subsection (E1) which makes it an offence to do something under the ETA rules when we do not have those rules. The ETA is not in effect yet. Your Lordships may think it right, when we see what the scheme is, that an offence be created—but not at this stage.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

My Amendment 183 asks the Government to publish this overdue review in full and, in the light of that report, to reconsider whether this scheme should be ended or restricted and policed more tightly.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes a very strong case, but I rise to strongly support Amendment 174, to which I have added my name. I am grateful to my friend Professor Fiona Williams, an important researcher on this issue, and Kalayaan, to whom I pay tribute for all their work on behalf of migrant domestic workers and for their briefings.

As we have already heard, it is clear that the 2016 reforms are not working. Rather than listening to overseas domestic workers and reinstating the original ODW visa, the 2016 changes ignore the need for workers to be able to exercise their rights before exploitation escalates. Support organisations such as Kalayaan and Voice of Domestic Workers report the bind in which the current situation leaves many such workers. Do they risk leaving before abuse escalates? If this abuse does not equate to trafficking, they could be left destitute, without a reasonable prospect of finding work and without access to public funds or legal aid to challenge mistreatment. The desperate need to remit money to one’s family and pay off debts means that workers may not feel able to risk leaving exploitative labour situations.

Professor Williams argues that key to understanding the problems faced has been the shift from placing ODW protection within an employment and immigration rights frame to a trafficking frame. The problem with the latter is that it puts the onus on the worker to prove that they have been trafficked when their exploitation may come from daily infringements of what should be their rights as workers. It leaves them more vulnerable to these infringements, not less.

Kalayaan has given me a recent case study that exemplifies the problem. I will go into some detail because it makes the case rather well. Jenny—not her real name—is from the Philippines. She comes from a poor family but, having won a scholarship to train as a teacher, she was unable to finish her training for various reasons. She later married and gave birth to a daughter who caught an aggressive form of pneumonia, which needed specialist costly private treatment. Jenny and her husband had to borrow money to pay for it. Their joint income could not cover the loan repayments, which prompted Jenny to look for work abroad.

Jenny moved to Lebanon to work as a cleaner. Her employer gave birth to a third child; Jenny was instructed to look after the baby as well as continue her cleaning duties, which was not in her contract. She worked longer hours than expected and was on the go and on call for much of the day. She had wanted to return home at the end of her first contract but was persuaded to stay when the family relocated to London. She was offered shorter working hours and pay at the national minimum wage.

Jenny arrived in the UK last year on a visa. In contravention of UK published policy, she was issued no information on her rights as a worker in the UK, either during the visa application process or on arrival. She worked the same long hours as before and, although she was paid a little more than in Lebanon, her hourly rate was less than half the national minimum wage. Her employer told her that she would be arrested if she left. Nevertheless, she did leave because she was exhausted from her long working hours for pay less than she had been promised.

Jenny approached Kalayaan when her visa had two weeks before it expired, having only just heard of the organisation. Kalayaan explained to her that her visa was non-renewable and that while she had permission to work in the UK, it would only be while her visa remained valid—for the next two weeks—after which she would be subject to the UK’s hostile/compliant environment for migrants. On the basis of Kalayaan’s assessment, it did not consider Jenny to be a victim of trafficking or slavery, so could not refer her to the NRM.

It is worth noting here that even cases that Kalayaan has judged appropriate for NRM referral are frequently turned down on the grounds that, while the working conditions may have breached employment terms, they do not constitute trafficking or slavery. Yet calls for the reinstatement of the original ODW visa are repeatedly met with the response that workers who have suffered abuse can avail themselves of the NRM.

Despite experiencing labour law violations, Jenny’s right to change employer was in practice of no use to her, given that she was not allowed to renew her visa. Had she entered the UK on the original kind of ODW visa, she would have remained visible to the authorities by renewing her visa annually, while contributing in taxes and visa renewal fees. Jenny’s case underlines how unhelpful it is to require maltreated migrant domestic workers to fit themselves into the slavery or trafficking frame, and how their rights would be better protected through the restoration of the original ODW visa.

Professor Williams also argues that the issue should be seen in an international context, where there have been very important advances in employment rights for domestic workers. In particular, ILO Convention 189 on domestic workers has been ratified by 35 countries—but not the UK. Ironically, when the convention was voted on, the UK Government abstained on the grounds that the UK already had a progressive policy—the OWD visa—which they then went on to withdraw. Will the Government therefore now rethink their position and restore the ODW visa without further delay?

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 183 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, which I am cosponsoring along with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. I do not always agree with the Lib Dems, but I think the noble Lord’s arguments were very powerful and need to be listened to. The effect of this route is to sell permanent residence in the UK, and later even citizenship, to anyone who turns up with a couple of million to spare, with no questions asked about where that money came from. It is an extraordinary outcome. I can see why one might have thought this was a good idea initially, but it has turned into a nonsense.

As the Committee may know, this route is for individuals able to make an investment of £2 million. The applicant does not need a job offer or sponsor, and the visa includes all immediate family members. The tier 1 investor visa is initially granted for three years and four months and can then be extended for another two years by providing evidence of an investment of the required amount. The funds must be invested in UK gilts, bonds and equities only—of course, the money can be taken out of those afterwards, so it is a very convenient little entry for your money.

Currently, if you invest—so called—£2 million, you will get your permanent residence in five years; if you have £5 million to spare, it is three years; and if you have £10 million in your pockets, it is two years. The whole thing is just absolutely absurd, frankly. Indeed, between 2008 and 2020 it has led to a total of more than 12,000 such visas being issued. There is not even any economic benefit to the UK in this. According to Sir David Metcalf, a former chair of the Migration Advisory Committee, in 2014,

“the main beneficiaries are the migrants. Investors benefit from, for example, rule of law, property rights and access to efficient markets. Second, at present, the investment is a loan, not a gift.”

A MAC report from 2015 noted that the main proponents of this type of visas are—guess what—law firms, accountants and consultancies that help organise the affairs of such extraordinarily wealthy investors. There are also speculative concerns around whether this investor visa is being used by criminals. In an October 2015 report, Transparency International UK argued that it was highly likely that substantial amounts of corrupt wealth stolen in China and Russia had been laundered into the UK via this visa programme.

It is not clear what will happen to the tier 1 investor visa under the new points-based system—at least, it is not clear to me—but it seems that it will remain in place. I suggest that a thorough review is in order and, meanwhile, the route should be closed, as set out in this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I thought it might be helpful to slightly unpick the two types of workers—the difference between domestic workers in households and those who work for UK-based diplomats. Obviously they are different groups with different needs, the latter being served by the temporary worker international agreement route, which permits dependants. This is not the only aspect of our domestic immigration system that already provides what the amendment proposes. Both groups of workers are free to change employers; in fact, our existing arrangements already go further than the amendment proposes, and I will outline why.

We do not expect domestic workers to register with the Home Office because we want a worker to be able to leave as soon as their mind is made up to do so, so we must avoid anything that may act as a barrier to exercising that right. Imposing an extra condition now risks undermining changes that have been made for the better. We have already made provisions under which both groups of domestic worker can obtain a two-year extension of stay if they are found to be a victim of modern slavery. I think these arrangements strike the right balance, ensuring that those who find themselves in an abusive employment situation are able to escape it by, first, finding alternative employment and, secondly, encouraging them to report that abuse through the appropriate mechanism.

On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on overseas domestic workers who are not slavery victims, very similar to the case that she has pointed out, but are actually exploited, the Immigration Rules are deliberately designed to prevent the importation of exploitive practices—for example, they set out that they should be paid the national minimum wage. I hope that helps on her point. I appreciate that the case she outlined seemingly falls between the cracks, but the Immigration Rules are very clear on that.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

The fact is that I do not think it is an unusual case; I asked Kalayaan for a recent case study and that is what it came up with. The Immigration Rules are not working in that respect. We have overseas domestic workers who are being exploited but, even when they are referred to the NRM, are told that it is not slavery or trafficking. Would the Minister be willing to look at that again? There is a problem, as she put it, of some people falling through the cracks.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I am not going to look at it again but I will perhaps explore it further and see why what is happening is happening. That is probably fair enough.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

1: After Clause 4, insert the following new Clause—
“Provision for Chagos Islanders to acquire British nationality
(1) Part 2 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (British overseas territories citizenship) is amended as follows.(2) After section 17H (as inserted by section 7), insert—“17I Acquisition by registration: descendants of those born in British Indian Ocean Territory(1) A person is entitled to be registered as a British overseas territories citizen on an application made under this section if they are a direct descendant of a person (“P”) who was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies by virtue of P’s birth in the British Indian Ocean Territory or, prior to 8 November 1965, in those islands designated as the British Indian Ocean Territory on that date.(2) An application under this section must be made before the date specified in subsection (3).(3) The specified date means—(a) in the case of a person aged 18 years or over on the date of coming into force of this section, five years after the date of coming into force of this section, or(b) in the case of a person under the age of 18 years on the date of coming into force of this section or born within 4 years of that date, before they reach the age of 23 years.(4) A person who is being registered as a British overseas territories citizen under this section is also entitled to be registered as a British citizen.(5) No charge or fee may be imposed for registration under this section.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would allow anyone who is descended from a person born before 1983 on the British Indian Ocean Territory to register as a British overseas territories citizen. They may also register as a British citizen at the same time. Both applications would be free of charge. The application must be submitted within 5 years, or in the case of a minor born before the date of coming into force or born within 4 years of that date, before they reach 23 years old.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I am grateful to my fellow signatories; to BIOT Citizens and Chagossian Voices for their assistance; to the APPG on the Chagos Islands, of which I am a member; and to all those noble Lords from across the House who supported a similar amendment in Committee. The breadth and strength of that support reflected the recognition that this amendment is about rectifying a long-standing injustice in citizenship law, just as earlier, welcome clauses in the Bill do.

The injustice that Amendment 1 addresses concerns the descendants of Chagossians, who were all evicted from their homeland by the British Government to make way for a US airbase back in the 1960s and early 1970s, and who remain exiled. Those descendants are now denied the right to register as citizens, which they would have had were they still resident in their homeland. The reason they are denied that right is because they are no longer so resident, but that is because they have been exiled from that homeland by the British Government.

The amendment would simply end the “appalling injustice”, as Conservative MP Henry Smith put it. To allay government concerns about the open-ended nature of his Commons amendment, which received considerable support, this one applies a five-year time limit for registration. The consequences of the injustice include broken families, divided communities, insecurity for those living here who are undocumented, hardship and the aggravation of the trauma associated with exile.

To give one example, provided to me by Chagossian Voices, S, born in Mauritius, is the son of a Chagossian who is British by descent and is now in exile in Crawley. S has lived in the UK since the age of eight. When he turned 18, his mother used her meagre savings from her job as a cleaner to apply for his British citizenship; this was rejected, but he was then granted a limited visa, which has now expired. She cannot afford to reapply and fears that her son could be deported at any time. “I am terrified of my family being split up”, she says. This cannot be right.

What this means to Chagossians has been made painfully clear to me in emails I received following Committee, and I think, too, to the Minister, who very kindly met some of us, including Rosie Lebeck of BIOT Citizens last week. In Committee, the Minister expressed her sympathy and empathy, and I believe that she genuinely understands what is at stake here, but that has not yet been translated into the actions needed to remedy this injustice. Instead, she pointed to how some second-generation Chagossians would benefit from the earlier clauses in the Bill, which address discrimination in nationality law. When questioned, neither she nor her officials could say how many that would be—I suspect not many.

The Minister has also spoken about how the Government are looking at what more can be done to help Chagossian families seeking to settle here, but we have been given no details of what that might mean and, in any case, that is to ignore once again the importance of citizenship—a theme running through many of our debates in Committee. She also talked about a willingness to consider how the £40 million fund set up to support Chagossians settled in the UK might be used, but that fund was announced more than five years ago and, to date, I understand that only £800,000 has been spent. Certainly, some of the fund could be used to defray any costs associated with this amendment, but it is no substitute for it.

We come to the nub of the matter. In Committee, the Minister reiterated the Government’s concern that the amendment would be contrary to long-standing government policy and warned that it goes further than the rights available to many other descendants of British nationals settled elsewhere around the world—but how many of those other descendants are settled elsewhere because they have been forcibly exiled by the British Government? None, I would suggest. As a junior Minister in the Commons acknowledged, the Chagossians’ case is unique, yet the Government appear terrified that to concede on this amendment would create a precedent, despite there being no other group in this situation. Why can they not follow the advice of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine? In Committee, the noble Baroness suggested that the Minister needs to make it clear in the response today—it may not be her response; it may be his response—that he or she

“does not intend this Act—a humanitarian Act—to set a precedent”.—[Official Report, 27/1/22; col. 494.]

In conclusion, no one knows for sure how many Chagossians would avail themselves of the right contained in this amendment, but the best estimate, based on a census carried out by BIOT Citizens, is no more than 1,000. That said, this is not a question of numbers but of finally putting right what everyone accepts is an injustice. I hope that we will take the opportunity provided by the Bill to end this injustice. If the Minister does not accept the proposed new clause or offer to come back with an alternative at Third Reading, I shall beg to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, as vice-chair of the All-Party Group on the Chagos Islands, I will add one brief point to the amendment so persuasively moved by my noble friend. If resettlement had taken place following the High Court ruling of November 2000 that the ordinance banning the Chagossians’ return was unlawful, it would have much reduced the need for an immigration route to the UK. Her Majesty’s Government should lift that ban immediately, in addition to accepting my noble friend’s amendment. The recent Mauritian expedition helpfully showed that there is no reason why the Chagossians should not return to their homeland. Some will probably want to do that rather than come to the UK, which would much diminish the apparent problem that the Government have.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I can only deal with it by extension, which is to say that it would be contrary to long-standing government policy to even deal with it.

I have listened very carefully to this debate. I have taken on board what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham has said about broad agreement—of course I have, and I will take it back to the Home Office. I will also take my noble friend Lord Horam’s suggestion back to the Home Office about dedicated support within the department, which strikes me as a very sensible suggestion. I am afraid that I am going to earn no credit with my noble friend Lord Cormack, because I invite noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I think it is unusual to have more support from the Government Benches than from any other Benches—and very strong support it has been.

The two interventions really put their finger on how the poor Minister—I am afraid he is making a face—did not address the fact that this is a unique case, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said. As the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said, if their grandparents had not been forcibly evicted and kept in exile, these people would probably still be living on the Chagos Islands and be entitled to British citizenship. It is citizenship that they want. Certainly, the Chagossians who have been in touch with me are desperate to be seen as citizens; they do not want to come through some intricate way of dealing with the Immigration Rules—that is not what they are seeking.

I am sorry that the Minister has not addressed the key issues here. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, described successive Governments as demonstrating “disgraceful behaviour”. As the noble Lord, Lord Horam, said, we all, in terms of our political parties—not the Green Party, but all the others—have responsibility here. This is our opportunity to put this injustice right. I wish to seek the opinion of the House.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister has said that he would take it back. It may well be that if he takes it back—

[Noble Lords]

No!

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

The Minister said that he would take it back, but not with a view to bringing it back at Third Reading. Therefore, I must test the opinion of the House.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 29, with the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I declare my interests in relation to RAMP and Reset, as set out in the register.

I have tabled this amendment again because in Committee we did not have as satisfactory a response to our questions as we had hoped on the basic details of what these accommodation centres will look like. We do not know how many or where these will be. We do not know how many people will be accommodated in each one. I am not assured that the previously terrible, and now still wanting, conditions provided at Napier will not be repeated. We are being asked to agree to the use of accommodation centres without any information or reassurances of what they will look like, where they will be, and so on. We can only go on what we see as existing provision on MoD sites. That makes me very concerned—I remind the House that I had the privilege of visiting Napier barracks recently—and gives me strong reason to call for their use to be restricted, so that the vulnerable groups set out in this amendment cannot be accommodated in them. I continue to believe that placing people seeking asylum in housing in communities is much better for everyone.

I therefore ask the Minister for her agreement that we are given opportunities to discuss the design of these centres before the relevant regulations are laid in draft and before contracts are offered. We would like some clarity on when the regulations will be laid, a clear commitment that no unaccompanied children will be placed in such centres, and, although we would prefer no families at all in such centres, if there were to be families with children there, that suitable family accommodation and suitable safety arrangements for them would be provided in them. It is not my intention to press this to a vote. We hope that this debate will give an opportunity for the Minister to place some further reassurances on the record about accommodation.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to support this amendment—

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[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My apologies; it is getting late.

I am very pleased to support this amendment. When we debated it in Committee with regard to children and families, the Minister said that there were no current plans to place them in accommodation centres but that if a child was destitute and there was a place for the night, she could not say that the child would not be so placed. However, she promised to think further on the points made and I hope that she has been able to do so. I have two reflections which build on what the right reverend Prelate has said.

First, the Minister suggested that a child in a family, who was destitute, might have to be placed in a centre, but given that she told us that such centres were only for people who are destitute anyway, I am not sure how much comfort to take from that. Can she elucidate further please? Can she also confirm that it would only be for a night, or possibly two, that a family would be housed in an accommodation centre as an exception, which was what she implied? Can she give us an assurance that no family with children will be placed in a centre for more than the briefest of time in an emergency?

The Minister also reminded us that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children would not be placed in such centres. As the right reverend Prelate said, it would be good to have absolute assurance to that effect. Can she tell us what will be the position of a child who turns 18? Might they be moved into such a centre at that point? It is impossible to consider this group without also taking into account the fears expressed by many organisations that the age assessment clauses, which we will debate later, could mean many more children wrongly being assessed as adults. Therefore, in practice, unaccompanied children might be housed in such accommodation, which clearly the Government rightly consider unsuitable for unaccompanied children. What safeguards can there be against that? In Committee, I also asked the Minister what assurances she could give us that the use of accommodation centres will be accompanied by more robust screening and protection than exists at present, to ensure that those with particular vulnerabilities are not housed in such centres.

However, no such assurances were given, other than the repeated statement that there will be individual assessment before placement in accommodation centres. None the less, it is clear from various sources of evidence that such an assessment does not exist at present nor is it providing effective screening for those with particular vulnerabilities. Indeed, the APPG on Immigration Detention, of which I am a member, has been told that, despite the June 2021 High Court ruling, there does not appear to be any significant improvement in such assessments. Charities report that people with particular vulnerabilities continue to be accommodated in Napier barracks. Therefore, can the Minister tell us what is being done to improve the assessment process?

Finally, as a fellow insomnia sufferer, the Minister said she would take back the point I raised about the impossibility of sleeping in Napier barracks dormitory-style accommodation because of the constant noise at night. I wondered if she had anything to report on that.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I do not make light of the difficulty of providing accommodation. Batting the blame between central and local government, as is sometimes done, is not going to advance the issue at all. As the right reverend Prelate has said, the debate in Committee focused on Napier. I thought it rather conflated accommodation of asylum seekers on arrival with long-term accommodation. Only a decade ago, my honourable friend Sarah Teather MP—as she was then—achieved very significant change, as a Minister, in both the law on, and the attitudes towards, the care of children with families in detention and subject to removal. More recently, we have had Stephen Shaw’s report on the impact on vulnerable people, and so on.

I accept that the Minister will say that the accommodation in question is reception and not detention. In a way, that is my point. The objective must be to receive people thoughtfully, humanely and in a welcoming and supportive way. Accommodation centres must not feel like detention. There was some discussion in Committee about whether people would be able to leave them—not for specific appointments, but because they felt like going out for a walk. The way that they are designed, organised and staffed is absolutely essential to their good working. The Explanatory Notes refer to “efficiency”. I do not think that this is incompatible with the approach that I have outlined, but they also refer to “compliance” and that worries me more. I wonder why that merits a separate mention.

This amendment demonstrates the concerns of the sector which arise from experience over a long period. I missed signing it by a couple of minutes on the day it was tabled by the right reverend Prelate. However, on behalf of these Benches, we support it.

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[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 30 in my name aims to introduce the right to work for asylum seekers who have been resident in the UK for more than six months. The arguments for the right to work have been well articulated in Committee and earlier, but I will summarise them so that we are clear.

I will begin with the economic arguments. The latest figures show that 125,000 people are waiting for an asylum decision. Every study shows that the net benefit to the state would be tens or hundreds of millions of pounds every year in improved tax-take. The UK economy is recovering after Covid and a lot of jobs have been created, but this has, in turn, created labour shortages. It makes no sense that asylum seekers who can drive HGVs or serve in our NHS are forced to sit around doing nothing for more than a year while they await a decision from the Home Office.

The second argument is one of integration. There is considerable evidence that the right to work has a large, positive impact on the integration of asylum seekers. The Government’s Migration Advisory Committee itself recently underlined that shorter waiting times had a large, positive impact on long-term employment outcomes for asylum seekers. Indeed, discussing refugees’ access to the UK labour market, one leading academic in asylum and refugee policy refers to what she calls the

“inherent contradiction between UK refugee integration strategies that focus on employment, and restrictive government policies that negatively affect access to the labour market.”

There is also the argument of public support for this policy. The policy is overwhelmingly popular with the public: 73% of red wall voters support the right to work, according to recent polling. Business leaders back easing the ban on the right to work, with the Survation poll showing that two-thirds of business leaders back it. It is rare to find a policy that has these three characteristics: economically advantageous, socially advantageous and politically advantageous.

There is one final reason why this is an amendment that the Government should accept. There is also a basic human dignity argument for this policy. We believe that every individual should be able to support themselves and their family. In fact, we would go further and say that, as Conservatives, we believe that every family has a personal responsibility to do so where they can. We have repeatedly, as a party, made the argument that work is the best route out of poverty, so the intention of this amendment is to ensure precisely that. Let people support themselves and create their own pathway from poverty to prosperity while they await a decision. The lack of the right to work makes people vulnerable to exploitation, declining mental health, poverty and modern slavery.

If the human dignity arguments do not convince Ministers, this amendment should also be viewed as purely pragmatic. Reforms to the asylum system proposed through the Nationality and Borders Bill will take time to come fully into effect. In the interim, while asylum cases are being processed, the asylum system continues to be under considerable strain. By offering asylum seekers the right to work, the Government will take pressure off themselves. I anticipate, however, that the Minister and other colleagues might be inclined to dismiss this amendment, using the argument that the right to work could be a so-called pull factor. So, before I finish, I want to address the reasons I believe this is not the case.

First, push factors, such as war and famine, as we are seeing in Ukraine, drive refugee flows far more than pull factors do. Secondly, as I have said before in this House, the real pull factors are our language, our culture, the rule of law, democracy, historical ties through the Commonwealth, family connections and liberty—and we are not about to sacrifice any of these, thank goodness. Thirdly, it is worth noting that the UK is currently an outlier in enforcing a 12-month wait period for work and then placing strong restrictions on which employment can be taken up. No other nation, whether any across Europe, the States, Australia or Canada, has such stringent requirements. It is worth asking why they have not considered the right to work to be a pull factor. Finally, this view is backed up by the experts. The Government’s own Migration Advisory Committee underlined that there is no evidence in academic research that people decide to claim asylum based on these kinds of factors. The Home Office itself commissioned a study that showed little evidence of a link between economic rights and the destination choices of those seeking asylum, and, to my knowledge, it has never produced evidence to the contrary.

All of this is to say that I believe that the Government could quite legitimately, without any nervousness and in line with their own poverty strategy of families working their way out of poverty, adopt this amendment that allows asylum seekers to work after six months of being in the UK. I will be listening carefully to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I strongly support Amendment 30. In Committee, the Minister said that the Government’s opposition to the right to work was based less on the pull factor argument than on the impact on the integrity of the labour market. That is just as well. As the noble Baroness said, we have yet to see convincing evidence of the pull factor any better than the selective and somewhat misleading quote from a study that the Minister offered in Committee. She mentioned an impact assessment on that, which I believe is yet to materialise. When can we expect it?

If we consider the numbers involved, it is difficult to see how labour market integrity will be compromised. Indeed, the combination of the effects of the Bill and the welcome promised speeding up of applications, to which Amendment 53 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker should add some teeth, should reduce the numbers affected significantly. I imagine that the Migration Advisory Committee will have considered the integrity of the labour market before recommending the right to work after six months and in any occupation. Yet the Minister did not even mention the MAC report raised by a number of noble Lords in Committee.

Neither did she mention the MAC’s argument, and one central to the case I made, concerning the impact of the ban on working on integration, mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, which supposedly remains a government goal. Nor did she acknowledge the statement I read out from MIN Voices, made up of asylum seekers, who said that not being able to work made them feel less than human and corroded their self-respect and dignity—again, echoing what the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, said. As the chair of Surrey Heath Conservatives pointed out on ConservativeHome —my new favourite reading—this very much chimes with Conservative values, so that in his view the ban is “fundamentally un-Conservative”.

I conclude by repeating the plea of MIN Voices’ plea to

“see us as human beings not a number. Let us build our life and future and not waste our time and skills”.

I should also mention the article by Sarah O’Connor of the Financial Times, who ended her recent analysis of the labour market implications of the ban by saying that

“if people want to work, we should let them”.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I very strongly support this amendment, to which I have added my name.

In Committee, the Minister referred to the integrity of the labour market as a route being one reason to reject this amendment and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, dealt with that very well, so I will not repeat her comments. The only other real argument against reducing the UK’s exceptional period before asylum seekers can apply for permission to work was, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, said, the so-called pull factor encouraging asylum seekers to come to this country. I want to say a bit more about that because it really is very difficult to take seriously under the circumstances. When Germany allows asylum seekers to work after three months, Italy after two months, Portugal after just one week, can our Government really justify the current one-year ban and argue that if we changed it, there would be this serious pull factor problem?

If the Minister accepts this amendment, we will have the same employment restriction as France, Spain, Denmark, Poland, the Netherlands, Ireland and Greece, and we would remain more restrictive than all other western European countries. Ireland was the only other western European outlier until it recently reduced its nine months restriction down to six months in 2021. This amendment would do no more than Ireland did to bring it into line with the list of countries I have already referred to.

The fact is, the UK has a longer employment restriction for asylum seekers than any other comparable country. I just feel ashamed of us, to be honest—I think it is disgraceful. Moreover, it seems the Government have no grounds to argue that enabling asylum seekers to work will, in fact, act as a pull factor. A recent review of 29 academic papers on this subject found that there was no correlation between the right to work and where people seeking asylum chose to seek protection; the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, explained that perfectly clearly so, again, I do not need to repeat her words.

The other very important reform in this amendment is to end the iniquitous limitation on asylum seekers, even after the 12-month ban, to jobs on an extremely limited shortage occupation list—I seem to remember one of them was a ballerina or something. How many asylum seekers can really take up ballet? This renders employment impossible for the vast majority of asylum seekers until their application is finally approved.

The assumption behind this amendment is that asylum seekers would, after six months, become automatically eligible for a work permit, enabling them to become self-employed or to take up any job, to pay taxes and national insurance, and so on. It will be very difficult to justify not accepting this amendment.

In summary, I do not accept the arguments put by the Minister in Committee. I just hope that she and her colleagues have reconsidered their position. On 8 December 2021, I understand that the Home Office said in a Written Statement that it had concluded its review of the current policy. This is surely a perfect moment to introduce reform.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 2nd March 2022 Lords Chamber

I hoped that my inclusion of the words “but not limited to” could overcome that concern, but I shall be interested to hear what the Minister can report from his discussions with the Home Office to see whether we can find an acceptable way forward through new strengthened and updated Home Office guidance rather than an amendment which, I agree, could risk unintended consequences. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly in support of the amendment, which I hope the Minister will be able to respond to positively, given that it has been revised to take account of concerns that he raised in Committee about its wording, as the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, said.

I want to come back to the question of children. I welcome the publication last week of the factsheet on the Bill’s impact on children—better late than never—although it was only by chance that I found out about it, even though I had raised a number of concerns in Committee about the Bill’s failure to protect children. That point was made strongly by children’s organisations such as the Children’s Society. The factsheet, not surprisingly, echoes what the Minister said in Committee about guidance setting out how decision-makers will exercise their discretion with regard to children and more generally on a case-by-case basis.

However, as the Children’s Society warns:

“Assurances that children will be looked after in guidance are not sufficient. Guidance and case-by-case determinations do not provide the legal protection children desperately need. As highlighted in the recent inspection report of Asylum Casework, guidance is often neither followed nor implemented by Home Office caseworkers. Home Office staff themselves stressed ‘they did not have time to consider each case on its own merits, contrary to the guidance they receive’. Leaving decisions that will have a profound impact on a young person’s life to case-by-case determination can trigger further trauma for young and vulnerable claimants.”


Moreover, when the factsheet states:

“The best interests of the child are a primary consideration in every decision taken in respect of the child”,


forgive me if I am sceptical, given that the Court of Appeal last year ruled that the Home Office had failed to take account of the child’s best interests when setting the fee for citizenship registration—an issue to which we will return on day three.

Therefore, I am afraid that I am not reassured by what has been said about guidance and a case-by-case approach. Can the Minister tell us when that guidance will be published? Will organisations working with children seeking asylum be consulted on it? What opportunity will there be for Parliament to consider and provide views on the guidance? I realise that those questions may need to be referred to the Home Office but, if so, I should be grateful if the Minister would undertake to pass them on and request that the Home Office writes to me with the answers.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we support the amendment as far as it goes, particularly the emphasis on those subjected to sex and gender-based violence, abuse or exploitation. However, there are many others, such as those from sexually and gender-diverse communities, who will hesitate to bring forward all the evidence that they rely on in support of their claim. As I said in the last group, and as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, said, officials and tribunals already weigh evidence and credibility but if, in the Bill, the Government insist on leaning on decision-makers in relation to the weight that they should place on late evidence, then this or an expanded amendment should be included; that should also include children.

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I hope I have set out—

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

Just before the noble Lord sits down, can he say whether there will be any consultation on the guidance? Can someone write to me on that point?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I do not have the detail at my fingertips, but I can certainly undertake to write to the noble Baroness. I was just about to sit down after inviting the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, to withdraw the amendment for the reasons that I have set out.

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[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

My Lords, in rising to support Amendment 35 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, to which I have added my name, I declare my interests in relation to both RAMP and Reset and set out in the register. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, for the way she introduced this amendment, and I fully support all her points.

I set out my reasons for supporting this amendment in Committee. However, a significant concern for me now is that the Minister was not able to give assurance that children in families would be excluded from offshoring, nor that families would not be split up in the process. This is deeply concerning. I appreciate that the policy document of 25 February sets out that exemptions will depend on the country where people are being offshored and tat publicising exemptions will fuel the movement of the most vulnerable not subject to offshoring.

However, I would set out that, for children, onward movement to any country after an often traumatic journey to the UK, in addition to the trauma in their country of origin, is simply never in their best interests. All the concerns I set out in my Committee speech regarding the monitoring of the practice of offshoring processing centres are especially true for children.

The Home Office has processes to confirm identity and actual family relationships, which it uses for a range of visas as well as in the asylum process. It would seem that, if this is the concern, there are ways to avoid children being used in this way. Given the deep harm that offshoring would do to everyone, particularly children, I fail to see why the Minister cannot give this commitment.

I am deeply concerned that throughout the Bill, where we have highlighted the deep harm of policies on the most vulnerable, we are told that guidance and discretion can be applied on a case-by-case basis. I understand the logic of that, but what worries me is that it does not speak of any standardised process where everyone can be confident that there is equal treatment.

I further ask whether an economic assessment of the costs of offshoring has been properly made, and, if so, what the outcome of that assessment has been—and if it has not, why not? I ask these questions while fully supporting the need to remove this clause of the Bill in its entirety.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 35. In Committee, I and a number of other noble Lords asked various questions to which the Minister responded that she promised to write to us. Well, I have not received a letter. I contacted her office this morning, checked with our Whips’ office, and—the right reverend Prelate is also shaking his head—there was no letter.

I was going to raise the question of children, but the right reverend Prelate has already dealt with that very well. The fact sheet came out at the end of last week. My reading of it was that, yes, families with children will potentially be offshored—which is, as the right reverend Prelate said, very troubling.

I simply return to a question I raised at the very end of our debate in Committee, when I said that

“a whole range of noble Lords asked a question, in different ways, about what happens to the asylum seekers if they are granted refugee status in the country to which they have been offshored. Are they allowed back into this country or are they just left there? If they are left there, they have, in effect, been deported.”—[Official Report, 8/2/22; col. 1421.]

That seemed to me a rather basic question, and I was rather surprised that the Minister said that she could not answer it. I took her at her word that she would write to us, and she has not—so could she answer that question today, please?

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I have gone as far as I am willing to go by confirming that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children would not be subject to offshoring, but on some of the wider vulnerabilities it would be wrong to be drawn at this point.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I have been trying to read the letter on my phone, but it did not arrive until after 4 pm and the Minister’s office did not have the courtesy to reply to my email. If I had had the letter at 3 pm I would have been able to read it. So I may have missed this, but I am not clear—and I apologise if the Minister explained this right at the very end—what happens to an asylum seeker who has been offshored, a horrible term, and is deemed to have refugee status by whatever country they have been sent to. Will they be sent back to the UK, or not?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, it would depend on the circumstances of the case.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am rationing my interventions on Report to facilitate the early and many necessary Divisions. I know that other critics of this Bill are doing the same; I am grateful for that.

Given the events in the last century that led to the creation of the refugee convention, it is particularly distasteful that so much of the Bill seeks to rewrite the convention and its jurisprudence against the interests of the refugee. The Government protest otherwise, of course, but all the world’s leading scholars, practitioners and custodians disagree. I am glad to say that your Lordships’ House gave its own view on that general proposition very clearly earlier this week.

Clause 31 is a case in point. I support the right reverend Prelate’s amendments to it, not least because, among other things, they seek to delete the cross-referencing to Clause 34, which absolutely denies refuge to those who do not currently face a well-founded fear of persecution in part of their country. If one looks at the end of Clause 34, there is no discretion there at all. Although we are grateful for the Minister’s earlier comments about Ukraine, convention protection is based on international law, not exceptional executive largesse. If these clauses are not amended, a Ukrainian refugee might well be denied refuge on the basis that they could return to, for example, a part of their country that is not currently occupied or being bombarded by Russia. There is no discretion in Clause 34 at all, despite Ministers waxing lyrical about discretion and case-by-case analysis being so important. This is discretion that works against the refugee, with convolutions and contortions, when it would be for the courts to protect the refugee.

Another trick that has been used in Ministers’ speeches at various times during the passage of this Bill is talking about Parliament having the right to rewrite and interpret the convention—“Parliament this, Parliament that”. However, they use “Parliament” as a euphemism for “the Home Office”, and it is not. I believe I know what your Lordships’ House of Parliament thinks about that.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, although I support all these amendments, I will speak only to Amendment 45, to which I have added my name. Once again, I thank Women for Refugee Women for its support with the amendment.

The right reverend Prelate has made the case for returning to Clause 32. I just want to pick up some points made by the Minister in Committee. He argued that it is difficult to attack the definition in Clause 32 as wrong, yet, in effect, that is what the Upper Tribunal did in the 2020 judgment referred to by the right reverend Prelate, when it confirmed that this approach to membership of a particular social group is contrary to the humanitarian objective of the refugee convention. Moreover, in Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, dismissed this approach as a grave mistake that would cause grave injustice. Was he wrong?

Having listened to his less than convincing justification of the definition in Clause 32, I ask the Minister this: does he accept that Clause 32 means that a woman fleeing gender-based violence with good grounds for being accepted as a refugee is less likely to be accepted, as the UNHCR and myriad civil society groups have warned? His answer in Committee—given loyally, if I may say so—was this:

“What it means is that a woman, like anybody else, who has a proper claim under the refugee convention will find refuge in the UK.”—[Official Report, 8/2/22; col. 1452.]


I will repeat the question and ask the Minister to give us a clear “yes” or “no” answer, given that clarity is supposed to be what this clause is all about. Does he accept that Clause 32 means that a woman fleeing gender-based violence with good grounds for being accepted as a refugee is less likely to be accepted—yes or no?

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 8th March 2022 Lords Chamber

The consequences of getting this wrong are severe. Recent media reports have highlighted hundreds of children being placed in hotels and forced to share rooms and even beds with adult men they do not know—and this is children we are talking about. Between July and September last year, the Refugee Council assisted more than 150 young people into local authority care who previously had been sent to adult accommodation following a decision by an immigration officer. This is a disgrace. We can do better than this, and we must do so, and this amendment attempts to do just that.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 64A, to which I have added my name. The noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, has made the case powerfully for the amendment, which aims to introduce protections designed to alleviate the main concerns raised by myriad organisations, as she said, as detailed in Committee.

I shall build on what the noble Baroness said by picking up some arguments that were not adequately addressed by the Minister in Committee. First, he repeatedly tried to justify the use of dental X-rays in age assessment on the ground that they are already

“used as a diagnostic tool in ordinary dentistry”.—[Official Report, 8/2/22; col. 1566.]

He completely ignored my response that age assessment is not about diagnosing something that is wrong with a child—that is, there is no clinical justification for its use in this context. That he did not appear to get the distinction was described as a “cause of great concern” by the British Dental Association, which, as has been said, is totally opposed to the use of dental X-rays for the purpose of determining age.

Secondly, there is the related argument, put forward by the BDA and others, including the British Medical Association, that to use such methods in a non-clinical context is unethical. When I pressed the Minister on this point, he said that he would be going on to deal with the point I raised—but he did not. Nowhere in his response did he address the fundamental question of the unethical nature of such methods in this context. I know it was nearly three in the morning, but nevertheless I would have expected this most important point to have been considered. I am afraid that the subsequent defence of such methods in the factsheet published a couple of weeks ago did not do much to reassure me—nor did its suggestion that

“the UK is one of very few European countries that does not currently employ scientific methods of age assessment—such as X rays”.

A survey by the BDA of European sister organisations found that two-fifths—a significant minority including Germany and the Netherlands—did not use any X-rays for age checks, and my understanding is that some of the others are looking to move away from this method.

Given this, and given the arguments from the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, about consent, can the Minister give us an assurance that refusal to undergo such scientific methods should not affect the credibility of a child seeking asylum? If not, according to the British Association of Social Workers, it will amount to what they describe as “grotesque coercion”. Can he assure us that only methods specified in regulations should be used in age assessments? I urge him once again to close the loophole offered by Clause 51(9), which allows methods deemed either unethical or inaccurate by scientific advice nevertheless to be used for age-assessment practices.

I was also disappointed by the Minister’s response to my request that the Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee should include all the relevant dental, medical and scientific national bodies. He simply said that the committee would include a broad range of experts, but he did not include in his list the bodies that oversee the ethical use of the kind of scientific methods that the Government say that they want to use.

One of the arguments used to justify this part of the Bill is the harm that will be done if adults are able to pass themselves off as children. However, according to the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium, in light of the supervision provided in children’s placements, this creates a much lower risk than when children are incorrectly treated as adults. The latter might be placed in detention or alone in accommodation with adults, with no safeguarding measures and the risk of abuse. Indeed, BASW warns in opposition to Amendment 64 that by treating age-disputed persons as adults there is a large risk that we have endangered children.

I read a heart-breaking example of what can happen in such circumstances just recently in the Guardian. It was a piece about four young asylum seekers from Eritrea who killed themselves after fleeing to the UK. The inquest of one of them, Alex, concluded that he had been wrongly assessed as an adult and that, consequently, instead of being sent to live with a foster family, he was moved to accommodation for adults, where he was violently assaulted and began drinking heavily. Although the mistake was rectified, the inquest noted that it contributed to the “destructive spiral” that lead to his death.

Any reform of age assessment must make such a tragedy less, rather than more, likely. Ideally, I would like to delete this whole part of the Bill but that is not possible. Therefore, this amendment represents a crucial piece of damage limitation. I hope that the Minister will accept it or, failing that, it will receive the support of the House.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, as the mover of the lead amendment in the middle of the night on 9 February, I will speak only briefly to support Amendment 64 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Green. I do not support Amendment 64A, however well intentioned, because I worry about its perverse effects and the huge costs involved.

The background to my concern is that I have been utterly appalled by the number of asylum seekers pretending to be children—1,100 migrants in the 12 months to September 2021, as reported in the Daily Mail. I do not apologise for the fact that it first drew my attention to this dreadful situation. The numbers are growing as the numbers crossing the channel in boats grow, allowing for seasonal variations, although the Home Office is trying to reduce the focus on this by scrapping regular figures. This is the subject of my later amendment.

The incentives to cheating on age are substantial in terms of treatment, housing and support. I am worried about the wider implications: mature boys put alongside vulnerable girls in school can wreck their progress and even lead to abuse. Mixed ages in social care are a recipe for disaster and it can be worse than that: remember the Parsons Green bomber pretending to be 16 when he was much older?

The Government are right, therefore, to introduce new processes for conducting age assessments and to set up a system in support in the Bill. There seems to be agreement on this but, as has been said, much is left for regulation.

I was very glad that my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton acknowledged on 9 February —in the middle of the night—that we had raised a valid safeguarding issue. I thank him for that. I was pleased to hear that the Government are planning to monitor and evaluate the impacts of the policy and to develop the evidence base further. Unfortunately, that does not solve the problem the House of Commons amendments sought to address. We will have missed the boat for clarifying the law and introducing the certainty that authorities need to run a fair and safe system.

I am clear that we must have an effective and rigorous system of age assessment, not one that gives the benefit of the doubt to those saying, without documentation, that they are minors and encouraging the traffickers. The noble Lord, Lord Green, has exposed the problems with the system proposed and I feel that we need a better response.

--- Later in debate ---

Thirdly, I would like a public commitment to a consultation on the successor scheme, so that it is not simply jumped on us by the Government—as this Government like to do—but is one on which the Government consult widely with interested parties as to what the successor scheme, which I understand is intended to attract rich people who are prepared to invest in more productive enterprise in Britain, should look like, what form it will take and what those of us who for different reasons would want to be critical in the way we examine it might think.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 70A. It is a happy coincidence that we return to this issue on International Women’s Day, because it is very much a women’s issue. It was good to meet with some of the women affected who were outside, opposite the Lords, for much of this afternoon. I thank them for coming to meet us.

I was disappointed by the Minister’s response in Committee. She did not really address the fundamental issue I raised of how, by treating this as a trafficking issue rather than as an employment and immigration rights issue, the approach is failing many overseas domestic workers who are being exploited but not trafficked. Given that there is clear evidence that the 2016 changes are not working, as we have already heard, it is simply not good enough to say that reversion to the status quo ante is not the answer, particularly when so many organisations in the sector believe it is the answer. That was very much endorsed by the women I met outside this afternoon.

The Minister said she would not look again at it but would

“perhaps explore it further and see why what is happening is happening.”—[Official Report, 10/2/22; col. 1922.]

I do not think the same Minister is replying, but I wonder whether she has any information to pass on to the Minister who is replying about what she has managed to find out since Committee.

I understand that Kalayaan and some other NGOs in the sector have, at short notice, been invited to a virtual round table tomorrow to discuss how the ODW route can “be shaped going forward”—I hate the term “going forward”. That is welcome news, but, if the discussions are to be fruitful, Kalayaan is clear that the possibility of reverting to the pre-2016 route must be on the table. To rule out this option, or some form of it, in advance is not helpful, to say the least. Can the Minister give us an assurance that officials will approach the discussions with an open mind so that they and the sector can explore whether the answer does indeed lie in reverting to the pre-2016 policy or some form of it?

[The Earl of Sandwich (CB)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Hylton very much regrets that he could not stay for this amendment because he had to leave early. He and I have been involved with the problems of domestic workers over decades, it seems—certainly since the 1990s. I should declare that I was once a council member of Anti-Slavery International, and I well remember meeting domestic workers through Kalayaan and being shocked at their predicament, which continues today in some cases.

This amendment has been very skilfully drafted by the right reverend Prelate. It includes domestic workers in diplomatic missions, where a few cases have come up, and, secondly, it allows workers to change their employer, within the same type of work—but they must register this change. They may renew their visas for 12 months at a time but without having recourse to public funds. Thirdly, they may bring in spouses and children while that visa still applies. After five years of continuous residence, they may apply for indefinite leave to remain, and, if their employer wants to continue that employment, that is all right. Thus the amendment is full of limitations, which should satisfy the Home Office. There is also subsection (2)(c), which favours family reunion and prevents the loneliness that often comes from separation.

In the public perception, the Home Office is moving backwards at the moment, and all I can say is that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said, this amendment is simple, and there seems to be no reason why Her Majesty’s Government should not support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to move Amendment 83. I say at the outset that I shall neither speak to nor move Amendment 84. I take this opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for their support for this amendment.

The attraction of this amendment is that, after this matter was raised in Committee, it marries together two separate ideas—one pressed so eloquently by a long-standing campaigner on these issues, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, and the other by me in a separate amendment. I say how delighted I am that we have the support of the Constitution Committee of this House in its HL paper 149 of January this year. Paragraph 15 states clearly:

“Clause 1 provides that a person is entitled to be registered as a British overseas territories citizen if a number of conditions are met. This clause corrects the historical inability of mothers to transmit citizenship. It is unclear what fees will be charged for registration applications under this clause and similar provisions”


in later clauses. It goes on:

“In a recent case the Court of Appeal held that a fee of £1,012 for certain registration applications by children was so high as to be unlawful.”


In paragraph 16, the Constitution Committee therefore requests:

“The Government should clarify its intentions on the amount of fees to be charged under clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7.”


Amendment 83 deals specifically with Clause 1. In the amendment, we state that no fee can be set above the cost to the Secretary of State of registration and that the cost must be set having regard to the vital importance of rights to citizenship by registration, securing the shared connection of all British persons; can be set only having regard to the specified principles; must not be charged to register the right to citizenship of

“any child who is looked after by a local authority”;

and must not be charged to register the right to citizenship of any person under a statutory provision specifically intended to correct past legislative discrimination or injustice that had wrongly excluded that person from citizenship.

It is clear from the Explanatory Notes—I entirely endorse this—that the purpose of Clause 1 and the whole of Part 1 is to correct a historical wrong, saying:

“This clause creates a registration route for the adult children of British Overseas Territories citizen … mothers to acquire British Overseas Territories citizenship”.


The wrong is that:

“Before 1 January 1983 children could not acquire British nationality through their mother. While registration provisions have since been introduced to rectify this issue for the children of British citizens (section 4C of the British Nationality Act 1981), this was not changed for children of”


British Overseas Territories citizens.

I am sure your Lordships would agree that charging £1,012 for a child and £1,126 for an adult to be registered as a British citizen is prohibitively expensive when the cost to the Home Office of registration, as estimated by the Secretary of State, is only £372. It could lead to many in this position not seeking registration because they cannot afford the fee. I ask my noble friend the Minister to tell us, in summing up the debate, where people—particularly children but also adults—will be expected to find the fee.

The remaining £640 in the case of a child, and more in the case of an adult, is money raised by the Home Office from the process that these British children and adults must go through to secure their citizenship rights. I do not know whether that is an unintended consequence of the way the fees are structured, but it does not seem fair to me.

In the case of PRCBC and others v SSHD, in February 2021, the Court of Appeal emphasised that for many

“children of a single parent on state benefits. it is difficult to see how the fee could be afforded at all.”

In its judgment handed down on 2 February 2022, the Supreme Court emphasised that these findings are not disputed. The court has similarly emphasised the importance of citizenship to a person’s identity and sense of belonging, and to their capacity to fully participate in social and political life. The Supreme Court Justice ruled that this a political decision, and I put it to the House this evening that it is now for us to rise and respond to the challenge and make sure that, as this is a matter of policy that is for political determination, we put it right this evening.

In conclusion, this is a very modest amendment. It seeks simply to remove the power to use the function of registering British people’s citizenship to raise money to pay for the immigration system and to restrict any fee that is charged to cover the estimated costs of registration. It does this by amending the powers in Section 68 of the Immigration Act 2014 to clearly distinguish rights to be registered as a British citizen from the many and diverse Home Office immigration functions to which those powers also apply. These people have lived their whole lives in this country and essentially have nowhere else to go. I do not believe that it is right that this fee should cause a barrier to them obtaining full citizenship, which, in my view, is their right.

As I said earlier, the amendment also precludes registration fees being charged in two specific cases. Local authorities should neither be charged nor discouraged from acting to secure the citizenship rights of British children whom they are looking after. Further, where a right of registration is provided to correct this historic injustice in British nationality legislation, the only fee should be to cover the process of that application.

With those remarks, I hope that this amendment will find the favour of the House and not just of those have who co-sponsored it, thereby correcting a historic injustice and ensuring that those who are entitled to this will actually be able to afford it. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for tabling these amendments. I welcome her to the noble band of terriers who have been snapping at the Home Office’s heels on the issue whenever the occasion arose.

In Committee, the Minister, who to be fair is new to the issue, tried some of the old, discredited arguments. Notably, he referred to the

“sustainability of the system and fairness to the UK taxpayer.”

When challenged, he acknowledged that the system to which he referred was the migration and borders system. Once again the Home Office is conflating citizenship with immigration. We still await a convincing reason as to why children who were born or who have grown up in this country should be subsidising the migration and borders system. Moreover, the distinction between this group and taxpayers is simply not valid, as the children’s parents are already taxpayers and the children will be in future and may already be paying indirect taxes.

The Minister also tried to reassure us that there are a number of exceptions to application fees which protect the most vulnerable, including young people who are in the care of a local authority and applying for limited or indefinite leave to remain. However, the exceptions apply only to leave to remain, and when challenged he accepted the distinction between citizenship and leave to remain, saying:

“There is no arguing about that at all.”—[Official Report, 27/1/22; col. 469.]


When challenged again later, he assured me that he would not try the argument again today. Now that both he and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, have accepted that that argument will not wash in this House, and the importance of citizenship has been a thread running through the debates on the Bill, I hope he will not attempt to use the argument again this evening.

In Committee, the Minister also promised to write in response to a number of questions on the best interests review, for which we have been waiting, like Godot, for a good year since the Court of Appeal ruled that the current fee is unlawful because of the failure to take account of the best interests of children under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act. I am grateful to him for the letter, although I found it a bit confusing. However, as the noble Baroness said, at least we now have the Supreme Court judgment, which did not dispute the best interests finding, and the Minister’s letter confirmed that the best interests Section 55 review will be published. My understanding is that it will be published by early May. Can he confirm that and say whether it will include a race and disability equality assessment? Can he also give an assurance that Parliament will be given an opportunity to debate the review report?

It is difficult to believe that a fee of over £1,000 is in the best interests of any child who has to pay it, given the evidence of the insecurity, alienation, exclusion and isolation it can cause, as noted by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court judgment found that, best interests aside, as the noble Baroness said, it is for political determination to limit the Home Secretary’s discretion in setting the fee level. The Bill gives us the opportunity to so determine politically.

Noble Lords have frequently cited the former Home Secretary Sajid Javid, who described the fee as “huge”. Less well known is that, just shortly before becoming the current Home Secretary, Priti Patel also questioned the level of the fee, according to a Times report, and indeed the Minister accepted that it is “a lot of money”. We have an opportunity this evening—or rather, this morning—to end the long-standing injustice created by this huge fee that has served to exclude thousands of children from their right to register as citizens. I hope we will take it.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to speak at this time of day in favour of this amendment, which was so ably moved by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I have spoken at earlier stages, so I do not need to detain the House for very long this evening. I have spoken not just on earlier stages of the Bill but over the years about the injustice of this extraordinary sum of money being charged in citizenship fees, especially in the case of children, as we have just heard. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I was struck by Sajid Javid’s own remark about the huge cost of placing such a large amount of money on the right to become a British citizen—over £1,000.

I gave a witness statement to the High Court about what the intentions of the 1981 legislation actually were. I served in another place then and I spoke in the debates in the House of Commons at that time. The Government of the day—a Conservative Government—rightly wanted to ensure that every person in this country saw themselves as a British citizen and gave them routes to achieve that status. I think that the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister of the day would be horrified at the idea that we would try to make money out of this process and thereby exclude people who ought to become British citizens from being able to do so. I particularly draw the attention of the House to proposed new subsection (2)(c)(i), as inserted by Amendment 83, which deals with the costs of exercising the function.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Monday 4th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will also speak to Motions B, L, M, T and U.

This is a happy time of the day. I want to return to Lords Amendment 1, which provides for the Chagossians to acquire British citizenship and British Overseas Territories citizenship. We heard some very powerful speeches advocating on behalf of the Chagossians, both in your Lordships’ House and in the other place. I was deeply moved on meeting one of the Chagossians with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. The Government accept that the unique position of the Chagossians means that we can accept a unique solution to provide them and their descendants with a pathway to British nationality. For technical reasons we have been unable to accept the amendment agreed by your Lordships’ House. However, we have tabled, and the other place has accepted, two technically correct amendments in lieu, Amendments 1A and 1B. I hope that these amendments will now also be accepted by your Lordships’ House.

Amendment 4 relates to the deprivation of citizenship. On Report, your Lordships’ House did two things in respect of the clause in question. The first was to agree to amendments to it that were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I thank him for bringing his considerable experience and legal expertise to bear on this very important issue, and for tabling amendments that met with the favour of the House. However, your Lordships also deleted the substantive clause, as amended by the noble Lord, from the Bill.

The Government have now accepted the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and re-tabled the substantive clause, as amended by him, in the other place, which agreed to it. I strongly invite your Lordships’ House to support this course of action by not insisting on Amendment 4, which would delete the substantive clause, and by agreeing to Amendments 4A to 4F, which will restore to the Bill the clause as amended by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

The noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, has moved that subsections (5) to (7) be omitted from this clause, which, of course, in the context makes no sense. These subsections relate to existing “without notice” deprivation orders and ensure that they continue to be valid. Omitting these subsections would cast doubt on the validity of these orders and create an unacceptable risk to our security. I therefore invite the noble Baroness to withdraw this amendment.

Amendments 13 to 19 relate to the offence of illegal arrival in the UK, a key element of the Bill. We want to do everything we can to deter people from making dangerous and, sadly, as we have seen, often fatal journeys. That is why we want to change the law to provide prosecutors with additional flexibility when someone has “arrived in” but not technically “entered” the UK. Your Lordships’ amendments would remove this flexibility. The other place has therefore disagreed to these amendments for their reasons 13A to 19A. There is a need to seek prosecutions when there are aggravating circumstances, and where prosecutors agree that this is in the public interest. However, the list cannot be exhaustive, as we need to be able to respond to unforeseen circumstances. I will set out in more detail what the Government mean when we say that we are seeking prosecutions only in the most egregious cases for this offence.

We will take firm action against migrants who put themselves or others, including rescuers, in danger by their actions—for example, where migrants have been seen dangling children over the side of a boat and threatening to drop them into the channel, or dousing themselves in fuel to prevent them being picked up by French search and rescue services because they did not want to be taken back to France. This would apply to instances such as those which occurred in 2020 with the stowaways on the “Nave Andromeda”, which led to the crew locking themselves in the ship’s citadel in accordance with the ship’s safety manual and making a mayday call.

Additionally, we will be targeting for prosecution migrants who cause severe disruption to services such as shipping routes, or closure of the Channel Tunnel. This happened in 2015 when a group of migrants forced their way into the tunnel despite the attempts of French officials and police to prevent them doing so. The migrants’ actions meant that the power supply to the tunnel had to be shut down and rail traffic suspended.

We will also focus on those who have arrived in the UK without permission in cases where they are criminals who have previously been deported from the UK, persons subject to exclusion decisions or persons who have been repeatedly removed as failed asylum seekers. On this basis, your Lordships’ House should not insist on these amendments.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has tabled Amendment 13B in lieu of Amendment 13, which would make it an offence for persons to knowingly arrive in the UK in breach of a deportation order. Although I welcome the recognition that we need to be able to prosecute criminals who seek to evade immigration controls and return to the UK, we cannot accept this amendment, as it is just too narrow. It would not, for example, allow for the prosecution of someone attempting to arrive in the UK who has previously been excluded from the UK on national security grounds. As I have just set out, there are a number of other aggravating behaviours for which we think prosecutions would be appropriate. I therefore hope that the noble Lord will not press his amendment.

Amendment 20 would reinsert the requirement to prove that a person is acting “for gain” if they are being prosecuted for facilitating the entry of an asylum seeker into the UK. I emphasise that this Government do not prevent and have no intention of preventing humanitarian rescues from taking place, and we have built additional safeguards to this effect into the Bill. But the problem here is that proving that someone acted “for gain” is practically very difficult. It means that prosecutors are limited in the action that they can take against people smugglers. The other place has therefore disagreed with this amendment for their Reason 20A. On that basis, I put it to noble Lords that we should not accept this amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has tabled Amendment 20B, in which he proposes that, instead of reinserting the requirement that a person is acting “for gain”, it should be an offence to act “without reasonable excuse”. We have already set out in detail in the Bill how this offence will work, including statutory defences that would effectively provide reasonable excuses, so we do not think that this amendment is necessary.

Amendment 40 concerns the operation of the electronic travel authorisation—ETA—scheme when

“the individual is travelling to Northern Ireland on a local journey from the Republic of Ireland.”

The other place disagreed with this amendment for its Reason 40A. The amendment could result in an unacceptable gap in UK border security, which would allow persons of interest or risk who would otherwise be refused an ETA to enter the UK legally. It would undermine the very purpose of the ETA scheme, which is to prevent the travel of those who pose a threat to the UK.

Although I understand the sensitivities engaged here, I reassure noble Lords that the Government stress our continuing commitment to the Belfast agreement, as well as the common travel area. An important part of this is our absolute commitment not to have any checks at the Ireland-Northern Ireland border, and British and Irish citizens will not be required to obtain an ETA. Neither will those who already have an immigration status in the UK—for example, those with a frontier worker permit. However, as now, all individuals—except British and Irish citizens—arriving in the UK, including those crossing the land border into Northern Ireland, need to continue to enter, in line with the UK’s immigration framework. This is a well-established principle of the operation of the CTA, and it applies when travelling in all directions. We are simply extending the principle to individuals requiring an ETA.

For those who require an ETA, the process of applying for one will be quick and light-touch. It will be valid for multiple trips over an extended period, so that this is not disruptive to lives or livelihoods, minimising the burden on those making frequent trips, including across the Ireland-Northern Ireland border, while protecting the common travel area from abuse as far as possible.

On the possible impacts on tourism, I assure the House that the Government are committed to working with a wide range of stakeholders, including Tourism Ireland and Tourism Northern Ireland. This will ensure that the ETA requirement is communicated effectively through targeted messaging and a variety of channels. It will also mitigate any risk of increased barriers to cross-border tourism on the island of Ireland. I therefore ask that this House does not insist on this amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, has proposed a further, well-considered amendment, which would exempt residents of the Republic of Ireland. The relationship between the UK and Ireland is an important and unique one, and we are deeply committed to the strongest and closest possible partnership between us. We remain committed to ongoing communication with the Irish Government and other interested stakeholders to navigate their concerns on this matter. I therefore ask that your Lordships’ House does not insist on this amendment.

Finally, Amendment 54 prohibits the use of new maritime powers contained in the part of the schedule to which it applies from being used

“in a manner or in circumstances that could endanger life at sea.”

Noble Lords will know that the Government’s priority is to save and preserve life at sea. Our position has not changed, and as such, as the Government have made clear before, we do not think that we need to put these commitments into the Bill. The other place has disagreed with this amendment for its Reason 54A. I conclude by asking that noble Lords do not insist on this amendment, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, on Motion A, I am very pleased to be able to accept Amendments 1A and 1B in lieu of my original amendment. Together with assurances given on the record in the Commons, they will open up entitlement to British citizenship, which will be subject to neither a fee nor a good character test. They therefore meet the objectives of the original amendment. I thank the Minister for whatever part she may have played in helping achieve this change of heart, following the meetings she had with some of us and Rosy Leveque of BIOT Citizens.

I have two questions. When is it anticipated that applications can begin, and can the Minister confirm that it is still the Government’s intention to use some of the largely unspent £40 million Chagos support fund to help Chagossians settle here, and to help those already here who have welfare needs?

As well as the Government, I thank noble Lords from all Benches who gave such strong support to the amendment, and in particular those on the Government Benches, as I am sure their passionate support was key to encouraging the Government to think again. I thank the APPG on the Chagos Islands for helping to build that support. I also pay tribute to Henry Smith MP, who has long championed this cause in the Commons, and to the late and much-missed Lord Avebury, who first raised the issue in your Lordships’ House over a decade ago. His work to remove this and other citizenship injustices has been energetically continued by the BOT Citizenship campaign, especially David Varney and Trent L Miller.

Last but not least, I pay tribute to the Chagossians themselves, who have helped to spearhead the campaign, in particular Rosy Leveque and Chagossian Voices. The joy felt as a result of the government concession is summed up well in an email sent to me and Henry Smith from a Chagossian on Mauritius, who is longing to be reunited with his family in the UK. I will quote briefly a few lines:

“I am writing to you simply to say that words are not enough to express how thankful and grateful I am. I can’t stop crying with joy and happiness, and trust me when I say that many Chagossians in Mauritius and Seychelles are also overjoyed and overwhelmed by this result. Many of us have been keeping our grandparents’ birth certificates in a folder waiting for this day to come.”


The original injustice that deprived the Chagossians of their homeland and that perpetuates their exile remains and will rightly continue to be contested. However, I believe that all those who have contributed to the ending of the citizenship injustice done to the descendants of those for whom the Chagos Islands were home can feel pride today. I am sure that we all look forward to welcoming to the UK as British citizens the Chagossians who have been the victims of this injustice.

[Lord Horam (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for her leadership on this issue, the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, who has pursued this for many years, and Henry Smith in the other place, who has played a notable part as well. Indeed, I also thank my noble friend the Minister and the Government, who have pursued this and given way on quite an important principle and made a unique situation for the Chagossians in this country. I now hope that the Foreign Office takes the cue from the Home Office and deals with the real problem, which is giving the Chagos Islands back to Mauritius—that is the real issue. We only got four votes in the United Nations on this issue—with 150-odd against us. It is a lasting disgrace, and I hope that the Foreign Office, which is not normally behind the Home Office on these issues, takes the cue accordingly.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have Motion M1, Amendment 20B, in this group but I will speak to the other Motions in order so that I speak only once.

As we have heard, this group deals with Chagos Islanders, stripping a person of their citizenship without notice, criminalising anyone arriving in the UK who claims asylum other than through a safe and legal route, criminalising those who rescue migrants from the sea, electronic travel authorisations in relation to the border on the island of Ireland and pushbacks in the Channel. We support Motion A in relation to the Chagos Islanders, but we are disappointed that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has said, a fee will still be charged before their right to British Overseas Territories citizenship or British Dependent Territories citizenship is officially recognised. Is that wrong?

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I thought I had said it, but in the Commons, it is on the record that no fee will be charged, nor will there be a character test. It will be done through the fees order; that is why it is not in the Bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. It is a shame that it is not in the Bill but, if that undertaking has been given, we can perhaps trust the Government on this occasion.

We are pleased that the Government have adopted the safeguards proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, before someone can be deprived of British citizenship without notice; we believe this will reverse the recent increase in the number of cases and, hopefully, reduce it to almost zero. We agree with Motion B1, Amendment 4G, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, to remove the validation of previous deprivations of citizenship without notice, which the courts have held to be unlawful. As the Government acknowledge, the “Anderson safeguards” are necessary, so the Home Office should go back over existing cases of deprivation of citizenship without notice, applying these safeguards to ensure that they are lawful.

We agree with Motion L1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, as a mechanism for preventing those arriving in but not entering the UK, and then claiming asylum, from being criminalised. For the Government to say that only egregious cases would be prosecuted is not sufficient, as the fact that arriving in the UK and then claiming asylum could be a criminal offence would have a chilling effect on those legitimately seeking refuge in the UK; this is, of course, exactly what the Government intend by their Motion L.

I ask the House to support my Motion M1. The Government want to criminalise those who facilitate those entering the UK without the correct prior authority, even if those doing so are not people smugglers and not acting for their own gain. The perhaps unintended consequence is that those rescuing drowning migrants in the English Channel, for example, commit an offence unless the rescue is co-ordinated by HM Coastguard or an equivalent organisation. The Government propose a defence, once charged, if the rescuers are genuine good Samaritans, and again claim that only the most egregious cases would be prosecuted. This, again, is not sufficient, as it could have a chilling effect on would-be rescuers who knew that they would be committing an offence if they attempted rescue without prior coastguard authority were the House to agree with Motion M. How many might drown before the rescuers were able to contact HM Coastguard and enable them to co-ordinate the rescue?

Instead of a defence once charged, Motion M1 proposes that the offence is committed only if a person facilitates entry to the UK without reasonable excuse. Rescuers would then know that, provided they are acting in good faith, they would not be prosecuted, but people smugglers would not have a reasonable excuse and could be prosecuted. The Government’s suggestion that people smugglers might pretend to be genuine rescuers is, quite frankly, ridiculous, as there are likely to be many witnesses, in the form of the migrants who have paid large sums to the people smugglers, that this is not the case.

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[Lord McColl of Dulwich (Con)]

My Lords, I am speaking to Motion R1, which I will press to a vote because I am extremely disappointed that the progress made in this House on Part 5 has been undone in the other place. We must keep striving to ensure that victims of modern slavery are properly identified and supported. I am grateful for support across the House in passing my original Amendment 26. When Amendment 26 left this House, it would have provided 12 months’ statutory support to confirmed victims in England and Wales and leave to remain for those who needed it across the UK to access long-term support. In that moment, there was a glimmer of hope that victims would finally receive the vital support that evidence has shown they need. Needless to say, the hope that this support will be provided is growing increasingly faint and I am deeply disappointed that the Government have still not taken steps to put it on a statutory footing.

While it is my firm belief that support and leave to remain must go together, your Lordships will see that I have unpackaged my original amendment. I have tabled only one amendment in lieu, Amendment 26B, to provide 12 months’ statutory support to confirmed victims in England and Wales. This is not because issues of leave to remain are not important: quite the opposite. Leave to remain is critical for victims who need it to access support for their recovery. I have unpacked the two only to assist the Government in making good on their commitments to provide support. The Government are already halfway there through the assurance that we have heard reiterated multiple times in both Houses that confirmed victims in England and Wales will receive a minimum of 12 months’ support.

I have said it before; putting this in guidance is not enough. We must finish the job and put this in the Bill. The Government have said that guidance will provide flexibility. This misses the point entirely. The evidence provided by front-line workers on the need to provide at least 12 months’ support to all confirmed victims is falling on deaf ears. Of course support will rightfully be tailored to the individual, but the point stands that victims need a minimum of 12 months to begin to work through their trauma and come to terms with their exploitation.

If we support victims, they will be in a stronger position to support investigations. This will increase convictions of this heinous crime and send out a message to those criminals that they will not get away with this exploitation. The Government have continually said that leave to remain will be considered on a case-by-case basis. I am concerned that they are continuing to wriggle out of their promise to provide support in their arguments for not providing leave to remain.

That is why I have disentangled the two, to ensure that these excuses can no longer be made. Regrettably, in rejecting Amendment 26, the other place has reinstated original Clause 64, in which discretionary leave to remain criteria are narrower than the current guidance. This is truly a case of one step forward, two steps back. I would be grateful if the Minister could make a statement on the recent Court of Appeal ruling and how this will impact future decision-making on leave to remain to ensure that it is in line with the European trafficking convention. Can he also increase transparency by committing to publish statistics on leave to remain decisions for victims of modern slavery?

I will return to issues of leave to remain in the future but, for now, I urge your Lordships and those in the other place to hear what victims need on long-term support and to act accordingly to ensure they receive it by supporting Amendment 26B.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Motion N1. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling Amendments 22B to 22F. I simply seek some assurances from the Minister on behalf of the British Dental Association, the Royal College of Nursing and the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium.

First, when the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, sought the opinion of the House on Report, she noted that

“we need to know more about the ethical response”.—[Official Report, 8/3/22; col. 1285.]

I and others raised concerns voiced by the BMA, the BDA and others that to use dental X-rays in particular where there is no clinical justification is unethical. Yet neither in Committee nor on Report did the Minister really address this concern. Can he please do so now and provide some reassurance to these bodies and to us?

Secondly, following on from what the Minister said, can he provide an assurance that the statutory guidance will continue to make it clear that there must be reason to doubt an age claim before any age assessment is made?

Thirdly, will the Government seek and publish the agreement of the relevant medical bodies before any scientific method is approved for use? I was partially reassured by the meeting the noble Baroness referred to with the interim chair of the Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee, but it is still important that formal agreement is sought from the relevant medical bodies. Can he confirm that the Minister accepts the interim committee’s recommendation that scientific advice should be used to decide whether a claimed age is possible rather than specify what that age is? Will the same principle apply to the holistic decision made in any age assessment?

With reference to the committee—this echoes what the noble Baroness said—in the Commons the Minister agreed to take away the call for it to include a practising dentist. Is the Minister in a position to give a commitment on that point today?

Finally, can the Minister provide some reassurance with regard to the insistence on the use of Home Office social workers? That has caused considerable concern among members of the consortium given their record hitherto, which has been found wanting by the courts. The lack of independence is even more worrying given Wendy Williams’s update on the Windrush Lessons Learned Review, which suggests that progress in reforming Home Office culture has some way to go. Her report says:

“I have seen limited evidence that a compassionate approach is being embedded consistently across the department”—


that is, the Home Office. Is it surprising that there is considerable suspicion of the lack of independence in what is proposed?

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lord, as a trustee of the Arise Foundation, a charity that works with people who are victims of human trafficking or modern-day slavery, I have certainly seen at first hand some of the examples that the noble Lord, Lord McColl, outlined to the House tonight. Indeed, in Committee and on Report I was privileged to be a signatory to the amendments that he laid before your Lordships’ House. This evening I will briefly support Amendment 26B, because I believe that he is right that guidance alone is not enough and that something has to be placed on a statutory basis.

I also agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said in her remarks about Part 5. It has no place in this Bill at all. It should not be in this Bill—it should have been exorcised much earlier. I think all of us have a great sense of regret that it is still there this evening, even more so when we consider that there is a new Act of Parliament waiting in the wings—we are going to get new legislation on this issue. How much better it would be if we did what the noble Lord, Lord Horam, said to us earlier this evening and went through the normal process of consultation with the equivalent of Green Papers and White Papers, and saw the debates we have been having on this part of the legislation as something to prepare us for that legislation when it is laid before your Lordships’ House. It is putting the cart before the horse. The Government have said in their most recent Bill fact sheet on modern-day slavery that they recognise that

“victims of modern slavery may have had periods of high vulnerability and … multiple, complex needs”

or

“experience multiple forms of exploitation at different points in time”.

If that is so—I believe it is—we need the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McColl.

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

With that exhortation from behind me ringing in my ears, I step forward to address the points made by noble Lords from across the House in a further interesting and wide-ranging debate. I will touch first on age assessment.

It is important to stress at the outset that the purpose of setting up a scientific advisory committee is that the Government should receive guidance from it. The consideration of what scientific methods of age assessment should be used, if any, is at the preliminary stage. The Government propose to be guided by the body which has been set up on an interim basis to provide them with advice. The Government are not seeking to compel any member of any profession to take part in any practice which offends that person’s ethical sensibilities, whether individually or as a member of a scientific or professional body. No compulsion can be contemplated as a means of obliging anyone to carry out a particular step.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, raised the issue of the identity of personnel carrying out particular steps, and I assure him from the Dispatch Box that only an appropriately qualified person would be asked to carry out the sort of testing that he discussed which, reflecting his specific area of expertise, related to dentistry.

I do not at this stage give any undertaking as to the constituent members of the committee which, as your Lordships have heard, is set up at the moment on an interim basis. However, it is very much in the way in which such bodies of learned people carry out their work that they will call for additional evidence and support from people skilled in specific disciplines where they feel there is any gap in their expertise which might properly be filled.

Reference was made by two noble Baronesses who participated in this debate to the meeting, in which I participated, with the noble Baroness, Lady Black, the interim head of the interim committee which has been set up. I invite the House to reflect on a number of aspects of the discussion we had with the noble Baroness which, for the benefit of Members who were not present at that electronic discussion, I will now précis. There are anxious discussions being carried out by professionals and academics within the committee, who compass this wide range of academic and professional disciplines, about what may be appropriate to carry out as—I gratefully adopt the phrase used by noble Baroness, Lady Black—a triangulation of methodologies in relation to the critical assessment of the age of a young person, where that is contested or where there is reasonable ground to believe that the age offered is inaccurate.

I interrupt myself to answer a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett. Yes, the parameters within which a decision will be taken are those set out at that meeting. There is no attempt to say that any one method can arrive with any degree of certainty at a specific age, whether expressed in years or months. As the noble Baroness suggested to the House, the matter is whether the scientific expertise can place a person so that the claimed age is possible. I am happy to assure the noble Baroness on that basis.

Noble Lords will also recollect that, in the context of that discussion, the noble Baroness, Lady Black, brought out certain matters which we have discussed in this House at earlier stages. I stress that she pointed out that the very prolongation of testing and interviews under the current regime—perhaps “testing” is the wrong word; “assessment” might be better when referring to Merton-compliant procedures, which your Lordships may well recollect from previous stages and which relate to a series of interviews—and repeated rehearsal of information that might be of a sensitive character and might oblige the person to relate traumatic events, is itself a source of harm. The scientific methodology that the Government have tasked this interim committee to look into is anticipated as serving two functions: to provide for that triangulation of methodologies, and to provide—as I have said on previous occasions to your Lordships—additional information to assist in that difficult process which currently falls exclusively upon the shoulders of social workers. It is not, and has never been argued as being, a means by which some value or accuracy can be ascribed to scientific testing, which we acknowledge it does not have.

None the less, as I have said, these methodologies are used in other places in Europe. Their use is widespread, and the United Kingdom is unusual in not using them. Given the nature of the problems that we face and the nature of the trauma from which people may be escaping—and which may be caused by the mere fact of having to rehearse events earlier in their lives—we consider it incumbent upon us to do what we can to shorten that process, at all times acknowledging the overriding importance of fairness to the persons involved.

I am not in a position to commit to there being a member of any specific profession on the committee, whether in its interim iteration or later on. However, as I said earlier, in the way of these things, it will be for the committee to call for additional expertise to support its working and to allow it to provide conclusions—

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I think that we are going backwards because, in the Commons, the Minister said that he would take away this point and look into it, but now the noble and learned Lord seems to be saying that it is enough to be able to call on expertise from outside. Can he take this away and think a bit further about the membership of the committee, including dentists?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness and was not aware of the remarks to which she referred. If the Minister in the other place has given an undertaking that he will go away and think about it, I will certainly row back from what I said—that it would be more of a matter of leaving it to the committee to say. If an undertaking has been given to revisit the matter, I am happy to depart from what I have said already.

We recognise the strength of feeling in the House about these matters. In particular, we recognise the strength of feeling about the ethical questions that arise out of the application of scientific techniques from which no therapeutic value flows directly—as was said at earlier stages in the debate. However, I repeat that our intention is to be guided by the views of the scientific committee which has been established. For that reason, at this stage, we cannot support the amendments, and we stand by the clauses which we have already tabled for the reasons I have set out.

On the matter of modern slavery, I will consider together Motions P, Q, R and S. I begin by commending to your Lordships’ House the government amendment that will exempt the credibility provisions in this part of the Bill from people who were under 18 at the time when they were most recently served with a slavery or trafficking information notice. But I say again that we cannot accept amendments to other clauses in this part. It is vital, I submit, that we are able to withhold the protections afforded by the national referral mechanism from dangerous individuals. I will not rehearse what I said in my opening submission about the manner in which the amendment as framed restricts too narrowly our scope for investigation. I consider it is not appropriate for me to make any concession to the noble Lord on this point, recognising though I do the principled basis upon which he has addressed the House, at this stage and previously in our deliberations.

With the utmost respect to my noble friend Lord McColl of Dulwich, we consider that the provision of a minimum of 12 months’ appropriate, tailored support to all those who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision and are in need of specific support is appropriate; it is “tailored” in the sense that it is directed to the individual facts and circumstances of the person in question. We do not think his amendment, as with that tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is necessary.

On the verge of resuming my seat, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for doing us the courtesy of contacting us by email and submitting a list of questions, which she went over in the course of her speech. I am greatly obliged to her for taking that step, which has enabled me to curtail my submissions at this stage still further.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 26th April 2022 Lords Chamber

In previous Conservative Administrations—and of course Labour Administrations—the Attorney-General and the Lord Chancellor would have stood up for the rule of law. They would have reminded their colleagues of the obligations of a Government. That was the position under the Thatcher Government, under the John Major Government and under Theresa May’s Administration. There are Members of your Lordships’ House who served in these Administrations. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, served as Lord Chancellor, as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke. They performed their obligations in that respect. Unfortunately, and for many reasons, in the current Administration, the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General have repeatedly been silent on rule-of-law issues—and this is one of them. Since they will not speak out, I suggest that it is the obligation of this House to do so.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, while supporting all the amendments in this group, I speak to Motion D1 in my name, taking up the baton from the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, whom I thank for her persistent commitment on this issue, which remains undimmed. As previously, the amendment would give asylum seekers the right to work in any occupation after six months, but it introduces a review after three years—rather than four, as previously—to assess whether government fears about such a right creating a pull factor are founded.

The Commons reason for not accepting the previous amendment states that

“the Commons consider that asylum-seekers (save in limited circumstances) and their adult dependants should not be permitted to work while a decision on their claim for asylum is pending”.

This is the equivalent of a parent telling a child that they cannot do something “because”. It is not a reason.

During the debate in the Commons—such as it was—the Minister reiterated concerns about undermining the economic migration scheme, and our old friend the pull factor. But there is no reason why a right to work after six months should undermine the economic migration scheme, and, as Sir Robert Buckland pointed out, he and others

“have said on many occasions that there is simply no evidence to suggest that a limited right to work is a pull factor.”—[Official Report, Commons, 20/4/22; col.240.]

In fact, the academic evidence suggests the opposite, and the Migration Advisory Committee has expressed considerable scepticism.

The other argument put by the Minister in the other place, which was repeated by the Minister here, was that the Government want to see claims settled within six months. However, when he was asked by one of his Back-Benchers to confirm that the Bill and other measures

“will mean that there should be no asylum seekers still in a state of limbo, waiting for their asylum status to be determined, after six months”,—[Official Report, Commons, 20/4/22; col.253.]

thereby making the amendment unnecessary, answer came there none. It would be wonderful if the amendment proved to be redundant, so that there were no longer 62,000 people awaiting a decision for more than six months, but the Government’s resistance to it suggests they are not confident that claims will be settled within that timescale. The Minister this afternoon suggested that the amendment would create significant operational costs for the Home Office. I am not quite clear what those costs are, but presumably there are savings from asylum support, and calculations have been done, which I know are contested but suggest a considerable fiscal saving overall from the amendment.

If we believe in integration, for which, according to MAC, the right to work is a key foundation stone, in preventing poverty and in protecting mental health, we should not give up on this amendment. In the Commons, 11 Conservatives, including a number of former Ministers, supported its previous iteration and 53 abstained. Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, in this House, emphasised that, on basic Conservative principles concerning paid work, current policy fails dismally. Public support has been growing steadily to a point where the latest poll last month showed that at least four in five support the reform, regardless of political affiliation.

Once more, I would like to give the final word to asylum seekers themselves. MIN Voices, which I recently had the pleasure of meeting virtually, in its call for the right to work, asks us to

“remember that we are human beings and we have dignity”.

I fear that, in its refusal to countenance change, the Home Office is failing to remember. Let us, at least, accord to asylum seekers their humanity and dignity by asking the Commons to think again.

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment D1, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for her eloquent introduction to the amendment. This is a common-sense change. It would be a boost for the Treasury, for recruiters and, not least, for asylum seekers themselves. They often wait years for a decision on their claim while battling poverty, isolation and mental ill-health. However, the Government appear to want to maintain a ban on employment for asylum seekers, even after the introduction of their offshoring policy. They say that giving people the right to work will still encourage more people to come to the UK.

This pull-factor argument, however, is simply not supported by the facts. Evidence for it remains unclear, unshared or—as many suspect—non-existent. A challenge to Ministers from the Government’s own Migration Advisory Committee to show proof of a link between the employment ban and a pull factor has so far gone unanswered. Publicly available and up-to-date figures show no correlation. If such a correlation, or even causation, existed, asylum migration would look very different from how it does today. Certainly, 28,000 refugees would not have risked their lives crossing the channel in boats in 2021 to come to the UK, where they cannot work; they would have headed to Sweden, which received just 10,000 applications for refugee status, even though asylum seekers can work after day one.

The 62,000 people who claimed asylum in Spain last year, where they must wait for six months to work, would have simply crossed the border into Portugal, whose 1,300 asylum applicants can get a job after one week. The people who applied for asylum in France—over 100,000 of them—where they must wait six months to work, could have just stopped in, or headed to, Italy, where they can work after two months. That some countries with stricter labour access laws often receive more asylum seekers, while, in many cases, fewer refugees go to countries with more relaxed rules around work, shows the lack of link between application numbers and employment rules. As we have repeatedly said in these debates, what the overwhelming evidence does point to as pull factors are those things that make almost all of us feel safe: our families, our friends, our communities, our language, a sense of shared history, and a country with a stable Government and respect for human rights.

We have an environment in which Ministers are nervous of appearing soft: I understand that. They are so nervous that even a widely beneficial, evidence-based, common-sense policy such as the right to work has yet to be accepted because it might make Britain a magnet. But I believe that this is wrong, and, while the negative and costly effects of this ban might not seem obvious, they are real. The ban costs the taxpayer an estimated £210 million a year. It leaves asylum seekers in poverty and institutionally dependent; it leaves businesses up and down the country without extra hands at a time of record job vacancies; it takes a terrible toll on people’s mental health; and it damages any attempt at integration and future employment success.

It should not be so hard to reach agreement on a policy that has so much cross-party support and so many benefits. I spent years at the DWP, as a Conservative special adviser, working to support people into work and off welfare, only to be hindered from advancing the same opportunity to those who have sought the protection of this nation.

The instinct to work, to contribute and to provide for one’s family is universal and integral to who we are as human beings. It is what it means to be human, each one according to their talent, gift, capacity and capability. We damage people when we forbid them to contribute. I urge the Government to keep thinking and to think again.

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Moved by

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

At end insert “and do propose Amendments 7F and 7G in lieu—

7F: After Clause 12, insert the following new Clause—
“Changes to the Immigration Act 1971
(1) The Immigration Act 1971 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 3(2) (general provisions for regulation and control) insert—
“(2A) Regulations under subsection (2) must provide that persons, and adult dependants of persons, who are applying for asylum in the United Kingdom are granted permission by the Secretary of State to take up employment if—
(a) a decision at first instance has not been taken on the applicant’s asylum application within six months of the date on which the application was made, or
(b) a person makes an application or a further application which raises asylum grounds, and a decision on that new application, or a decision on whether to treat such further asylum grounds as a new application, has not been taken within six months of the date on which the further application was made.
(2B) For the purposes of subsection (2A), regulations must ensure that permission granted allowing people applying for asylum in the United Kingdom, and their adult dependants, to take up employment, is on terms no less favourable than the terms granted to a person with recognised refugee status.
(2C) Such permission is to be valid until the claim is determined and all appeal rights have been exhausted and individuals granted permission to work must be issued with physical proof of the right to work.”
(3) The Secretary of State may, by regulations made by statutory instrument, repeal subsection (2) of this section, if the conditions set out in subsections (4) and (5) have been met.
(4) The first condition is that within three years of the coming into force of this section, but no sooner than two years after the coming into force of this section, the Secretary of State has commissioned a review of whether the provisions inserted into the Immigration Act 1971 by subsection (2) have acted in such a way as to encourage persons applying for asylum, and adult dependants of such persons, to travel to the United Kingdom.
(5) The second condition is that the Secretary of State has, within three years of the coming into force of this section, published the outcome of the review under subsection (4).
(6) Regulations under subsection (3) may not be made unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I beg to move.