Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

As has been said, this part of the Bill provides for “interpretation” of the refugee convention. It includes some entirely new provisions and replicates or amends some existing provisions.

On existing provisions, this part of the Bill repeals the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006. These regulations transposed a key EU directive on standards for asylum systems, the qualification directive, into UK law. The Bill repeals the regulations and puts versions of the provisions into primary legislation instead.

The UNHCR noted with concern the Government’s approach to interpreting the refugee convention. I will read an extract from its legal observations on the Bill in full. It said:

“We note with concern the Government’s approach to interpreting the Refugee Convention. Any treaty must be ‘interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ In the case of the Refugee Convention, as the UK Supreme Court has noted on more than one occasion, ‘There is no doubt that the Convention should be given a generous and purposive interpretation, bearing in mind its humanitarian objects and the broad aims reflected in its preamble.’ In addition, the Vienna Convention specified a range of sources that ‘shall be taken into account’ in interpreting a treaty; these all reflect the agreement of the parties, and include other agreements and instruments from the time the treaty was concluded, as well subsequent agreements, State practice and international law. In other words, States cannot, under international law, unilaterally announce their own interpretation of the terms of the agreements they have made with other States. This, too, has been repeatedly recognised by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court of the UK.”


I do not want to repeat what has already been said, but I just ask: do the Government agree with that extract from the UNHCR’s legal observations on the Bill? If they do agree with it, do they believe that they are still abiding by it?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.

The starting point is that we are no longer members of the European Union and, by extension, the Common European Asylum System. In response to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, these provisions are not a direct response to the case of AH (Algeria). They are about having an opportunity to define clearly and unscramble refugee convention terms following our exit from the EU. It is right that, at this time of legal change, we take the opportunity to reassess the operation of our asylum system and reconsider our approach not only to fundamental policies but to processes, so that we can create a clearer and more accessible system.

The fact is that the development of the asylum system through international conventions, European law, domestic legislation, Immigration Rules and case law has created a complex legal web that can be difficult to understand and apply; that goes for claimants, decision-makers and the courts. I do not propose to use props—I understand that that is not permitted—but, for my own assistance on a later group, I brought a book called, rather laughingly, The Immigration Law Handbook. We consider it a desirable law reform to define clearly key elements of the refugee convention in UK domestic law. In response to my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, that is exactly what we are doing. We want to make the position clearer for everyone, including decision-makers and the courts.

A lot has been said that touches on the same point but, with great respect, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, perhaps put it most forcefully. She used a number of metaphors. Let me respond to them. This is not about tripping anybody up. It is not a sleight of hand; it is difficult to do one of those on the Floor of your Lordships’ House. This is about bringing clear definitions before Parliament and having them all in one place. The central point is this: there is nothing wrong—indeed, I suggest that there is everything right—with the UK, through this Parliament, interpreting its obligations under the refugee convention. That is entirely lawful. I use “lawful” in both its narrow and wide senses. It is lawful in the sense that it is in accordance with the law; it is also lawful in the broader sense of being in accordance with the political or constitutional principle that we call the rule of law. Further, it is in accordance with the Vienna convention. Everything we are doing complies fully with all our international obligations, including the refugee convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. I will come back to the question that the noble Baroness asked me in that regard a little later.

With respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, it is not perverse to use domestic legislation to give effect to and interpret international treaties. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that I am not in the business of appeasing the far right; nor am I in the business of deleting obligations under international law. Many of the definitions, which repay careful reading, are very similar to those already used in the UK—for example, those contained in the 2004 qualification directive, which was transposed into UK law via the 2006 regulations.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his kind words. I assure him that I of course give proper consideration to international reputational impacts, but surely there can be no adverse impact by complying with international law and interpreting treaties in accordance with the Vienna convention.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I am sorry, I missed my moment; I should have spoken as soon as the Minister spoke to me. I did not accuse him of trying to appease the far right. I hope I did not say that—I certainly did not mean to—but I do accuse the Government of it. I know that the Minister did not write this Bill, but that is something I see the Government as guilty of.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I did not take it personally. I agree that I did not write the Bill. It would be a far worse Bill, and the noble Baroness would like it even less, if I had written it. But I replied in that way because I take the view that if I am standing here defending government policy, then I will stand here and defend government policy. I certainly would not defend a government policy which was simply appeasing the far right. So, that is why I replied in those terms. I know that the noble Baroness was not making a personal attack; I did not take it that way.

To finish my point to the noble Lord, Lord Alton—

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, can we have a little less talk about the far right? Some 70% of the population think that the present Government’s policy on asylum is a failure.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I do not want to get into the question of whether the Bill is going too far or not far enough, and whether our policy is good, bad or indifferent, on this group of amendments. If I may say so, those are Second Reading-type questions. I was simply responding to the point put by the noble Baroness.

To return to the point on Turkey, whether its acts are in accordance with the refugee convention is really a separate issue. I do not mean to diminish or demean this, but what we are talking about here are not acts, so to speak. We are talking about the fundamental question of whether it is proper—because the charge put against me is that it is not—for this Parliament to set out its interpretation, the UK’s interpretation, of the international obligations we have under the refugee convention.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

Before the Minister leaves that point, I was not specifically asking him to respond to Turkey’s actions. I was saying that it diminishes our ability to speak to countries such as Turkey or China—which I also referenced—if we are ourselves een to diminish our responsibilities under the 1951 convention. That comes to the question that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, put about how this is seen beyond our shores by international institutions that have examined what we are trying to do. I hope the Minister will address that point as we proceed.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I was going to come to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Let me just say a sentence about it now: the UNHCR is not the interpretive body of the refugee convention. Each state under the convention is there to interpret its obligations, in accordance with the Vienna convention. That is the system which the state parties have set up. When we have a phrase—we will get to one a little later—such as “serious non-political crime”, the state parties have to interpret it. We will get to an example in the next group—this is a little cliffhanger—of where different countries have approached the question differently. There is nothing wrong with that, provided that they are all acting in accordance with the Vienna convention in good faith in seeking to interpret their obligations.

Respectfully, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, essentially accepted that basic proposition under the Vienna convention, and he was obviously right to do so. He sought characteristically carefully—if I might say so—to seek disclosure of the legal advice on which the Government are relying, while recognising the conventions which apply to that. I listened carefully to what he said. I will read Hansard to see whether there is anything more I can say in writing to him; I do not want to rush from the Dispatch Box. There may or may not be anything more I can say, but I will read that point carefully. I think he recognised that there are conventions in this area which do apply.

However, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it is not a question of having to agree with all the other signatories. This is not about amending the refugee convention; it is about interpreting it. That is a very different thing. If you want to amend a contract, you need the other party’s agreement, but interpreting a convention is for each state party.

I will say a few words about the substantive clauses, although I think it is fair to say that those were not really the Committee’s focus. Clause 29 sets out how key terms which are defined in the following clauses will be applied; they are the key components of the refugee convention. Clause 29 also revokes the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006. Those are the regulations through which we transposed our obligations under the EU qualification directive 2004. Because we are out of the EU, we need to do that in a different way.

However, we will continue to grant humanitarian protection to eligible individuals who cannot be removed from the UK to their country of origin if their removal would breach the UK’s obligations under Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR. It is important to clarify—I am sure Members of the Committee know this—that these are not individuals protected under the refugee convention. However, we will make further changes to align the entitlements of permission to stay granted on the basis of humanitarian protection to that provided to group 2 refugees.

In response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, we believe that Clause 33 provides a system of effective protection from persecution. Clause 34 deals with relocation, but I do not think any noble Lords spoke to it directly, so I will just refer to it and move on.

On Clause 35, of course we have a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, but that should not apply to those who commit serious crimes, putting the communities that host them at risk and endangering national security. We believe we are right to define and legislate in this area. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that that is a good example of serious non-political crime. That is a phrase in the refugee convention, but it is not further defined in it. Each state has to look at it and define it, in accordance—always—with the Vienna convention.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

The Minister keeps saying that each state will define the refugee convention, and he alluded to the EU qualification directive; there is also the procedures directive. I declare an interest, as I worked on both directives as an MEP. Of course, that was an attempt not for each state in the EU to do its own thing but to have a collective set of laws which interpreted the refugee convention in detail and, as far as I know, complied with it. That prevented each country doing its own thing in a potentially destructive way.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I have an associated point, to save the Minister bobbing up and down too much. I entirely take the point about non-political crime. I just wanted to make it clear that I was referring only to that bit of the Bill when I mentioned the case. I was not suggesting that it was the prompt for the whole of this part. But can the Minister explain more about the impact of our leaving the EU? Does that give us a legal opportunity, or is this happening because it is a convenient political point in the calendar, as it were?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

On the first point, of course the EU sought to interpret the refugee convention for all its members. But that actually makes my point, because it is only for the members of the EU. All the other states will interpret it in their own way. If you want to hand over your interpreting power to the EU, that is fine if you are a member—but I suggest that that does not cut across my basic point.

As to the effect of leaving the EU, if we have hitherto signed up to various interpretations through EU regulations, we now have an opportunity to look at the matter afresh, as I said when I began. To go further into that point would go way beyond the scope of this group.

Finally, I come back to the question put to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, about “scrapping” —I think that was the word she used last night as well—the Human Rights Act. I said last night, and I will give the same answer now, that the Human Rights Act brings into English domestic law the European Convention on Human Rights. We have reaffirmed— I did it yesterday; I will do it again now—that this Government will stay in as a signatory to the convention.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for that, but will he answer my question a bit more specifically? Has he instructed parliamentary counsel to begin the drafting process for the Bill that will replace, repeal or reinterpret the Human Rights Act and/or the convention on human rights?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

As a matter of policy, I am afraid I am not going to get into the discussions I have with government law officers and parliamentary counsel. The Government’s legislative programme has been set out. The Lord Chancellor, the Deputy Prime Minister and I have given evidence on this. We have made it clear that we will be staying in the European Convention on Human Rights. In so far as the burden of the noble Baroness’s challenge was that we have to be careful, because the Government are watering down rights, we are staying in the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore—

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I was going to wait until the Minister had finished his sentence but, before he sits down, I revert to the question of the Government’s legal case. The Minister is reticent to disclose government legal advice, which I entirely understand but, before the Committee and others can reach a fully formed opinion on this, they need a worked version of the Government’s legal position. It may be that that takes the form of a position paper or submission, rather than the replication of advice already given. But, until we see in detail what Raza Husain and the UNHCR got wrong, and why these interpretations are fully consistent with the Vienna and refugee conventions, the evidence is all one way. I am sure that I speak for many other noble Lords when I say that I would be very much assisted by seeing something of that nature.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I hope the noble Lord does not take it amiss if I say, with respect, that he makes the same point as he made earlier. and I understood it. I need to be very careful that I do not get inadvertently drawn into disclosing legal advice, but I hear the point from the noble Lord that he and others would like to see a greater fleshing out of the Government’s legal position. I have said that I will see what I can do to assist in that.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Very diffidently, am I entirely wrong in thinking that, under Article 35 of the convention, some heed is required to be paid to the UNHCR’s expression of its approach to the convention? My recollection is that Lord Bingham said as much in one of the cases I mentioned last week, Asfaw. Is that not right?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Respectfully, what I said earlier is that it is not the arbiter of the interpretation of the convention. I do not think that is inconsistent with the point the noble and learned Lord just made.

I was proposing to sit down, after suggesting to the Committee that we should keep these various clauses in the Bill.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I was wondering whether he would explain some of the changes that are being made or cover them in a subsequent letter. As I understand it, Clause 33 replaces Regulation 4 in the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006, which is repealed by Clause 29. The wording is largely the same but, as I understand it—and I may be wrong—the existing regulations reference

“protection from persecution or serious harm”,

whereas Clause 33 references only “protection from persecution”. Why has that change to the language been made and what will its practical effects be?

There are changes of language in other areas, such as from a “may” to a “must” in Clause 34. What problem is that intended to solve? Is it not the Government’s intention to explain the reasons for the changes they have made where they have made them?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The “may” and “must” point, to which the noble Lord referred, will come up in a later group because, from memory, there is a specific amendment on it. I was proposing to deal with that when I respond to that amendment. I think we are going to come to the persecution and serious harm point later but, if I am wrong, I will write to the noble Lord and explain it. However, we are coming to “may” and “must” on a later group.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure whether it is the time of the evening that prompted that reference to dinner; otherwise, it is not immediately apparent to me what the relevance of it was. I will come back to that rather less substantive point—if I may say so, respectfully—at the end.

Let me deal first with Clause 31. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. He is right that there are points of principle that underlie these amendments; they underlay the last group as well. I too will try not to repeat the points that I have made. There are points of principle that are at issue between us, and we have set out our respective positions. We believe that the test set out in Clause 31 is compliant with our international obligations. More specifically, we believe that it will provide, and lead to, better decision-making, because it sets out a clear test, with steps for decision-makers, including the courts, to follow. That will lead to greater consistency.

Turning to Amendments 103 and 104, although I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and I agree with the importance of us carefully assessing whether asylum seekers have a well-founded fear of persecution, as required under Article 1(A)(2) of the convention, we do not agree with these amendments because, taken together, they will essentially maintain the current standard of proof system. In so far as my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering said that it was, to a certain extent, a probing amendment, let me try to explain.

First, this is not about setting aside decisions of the court. The courts are there to interpret the legislation as it stands—that is what they do. Parliament is entitled to change the legislative background, in so far as it is consistent with our treaty obligations. Clause 31 sets out a clear, step-by-step process. I hear the point made by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, that it should be—so far as legislation can be—in simple language and a clear test. The problem at the moment is that there is no clearly outlined test as such. There is case law, there is policy and there is guidance in this area, but the current approach leads to a number of different elements being considered as part of one overall decision. What we seek to do here is to introduce distinct stages that a decision-maker must go through, with clearly articulated standards of proof for each. We believe that this will lead to better and more consistent decision-making.

At its core, in Clause 31(2) we are asking claimants to establish that they are who they say they are and that they fear what they say they fear to a balance of probabilities standard. That is the ordinary civil standard of proof for establishing facts, and those are facts in Clause 31(2); namely, more likely than not. It is reasonable, I suggest, that claimants who are asking the UK for protection are able to answer those questions. We have looked carefully, of course, at the often difficult situations that claimants might come from and the impact that might have on the kinds of evidence that they can provide. However, we consider that our overall approach to making decisions, which includes a detailed and sensitive approach to interviewing, allows all genuine claimants an opportunity to explain their story and satisfy the test.

There is international precedent that supports our decision to raise the threshold for assessing the facts that a claimant presents to us to the balance of probabilities standard. Both Canada and Switzerland—highly respected democratic countries, dare I say it—have systems which examine at least some elements of a claimant’s claim to this higher standard. Respectfully and rhetorically, let me ask this of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said that this was confusing and complex. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, said that she had horror at it. The higher standard is used in Switzerland. Does the horror extend to Canada and Switzerland as well? There is nothing wrong in principle with adopting the higher test for some parts—I will come to it in more detail—of the decision-making tree.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Does the Minister recall that I did not just say that it is about the higher standard? It is about having different limbs and different requirements under those different limbs, and switching from “reasonable likelihood” to “balance of probabilities” as part of the composite test, which is not holistic but is in different parts. That is what is confusing, not just a change in the standard of proof.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, with the greatest respect, it is not confusing at all, because Clause 31(2) establishes the facts, and that is all a balance of probabilities. Then, in Clause 31(4), the decision-maker turns to questions of the future. It is at that stage that the reasonable likelihood test is the appropriate test, because the decision-maker is looking to assess what might happen in the future. That is why we have a lower test at that stage. It is quite usual in law to have different stages of a test and different levels of probability at each.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Could the Minister answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser? What is the problem that we are trying to solve here? Who is pressing for this change? The Law Societies have advised against it. It seems to me that the only purpose it serves is to make the task of determining whether the fear exists and is well-founded more complicated and more likely to result in the answer, “No, let’s send him back.” That seems to be what is driving this. I remind him that, in late July and early August, Hazaras from Afghanistan—asylum seekers here—were still receiving letters of rejection, telling them that they were not at risk if they were sent back to Kabul.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the question. What is driving it, as I said a few moments ago, is the attempt to have a consistent and clear approach to decision-making. When you have a single test with different elements, and it is all under “a reasonable likelihood”, it is then that you are more likely to have inconsistent decision-making—I will not use the word “mishmash”. What you are doing here is really two things, and Clause 31 sets them out clearly. You are first saying, “Are you who you say you are?” and “Did you, in fact, fear such persecution?” Those are factual questions, decided on the balance of probabilities. Then the question is: “Is there a reasonable likelihood that, if you were returned, you would be persecuted?” That is a question of reasonable likelihood.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My noble friend is, in fact, rewriting the law. I am not an immigration lawyer, but if I were, I think I would be a little confused at the moment. In the case that was decided in 2021, Kaderli v Chief Public Prosecutors Office of Gebze in Turkey, it was clearly said that

“The true test involved the application of a lower standard”


than the balance of probabilities. So now no immigration lawyer could plead the application of the lower standard because my noble friend is raising the bar in this Bill.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I thought I made it absolutely clear when I said earlier that the court in that case made its decision against the legislative background at the time. Parliament is entitled to change the legislative background. We will want to make sure that we remain consistent with the refugee convention, and, as I said earlier, we believe that we are. There is nothing wrong with doing that. It is simply not the case that we are somehow bound as a Parliament by what the Court of Appeal said in the case referred to by my noble friend. Therefore, with great respect, I disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, where he said that a single holistic question was better and that the higher standard was objectionable. With respect, I disagree on both points.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Does the Minister agree that, if, under this clause in future, somebody were to fail—they could prove only 45% of the relevant limb of the clause—they nevertheless could not be refouled? Certainly, under Article 3 of the ECHR the test is “reasonable likelihood” and not “balance of probabilities”.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

With respect, refoulement is a separate issue and, with greater respect, I will deal with it separately. What we are establishing here is what you need to do to establish your “well-founded fear”. If you cannot establish, on the balance of probabilities, that you are who you say you are, then yes, under this test, you will not satisfy Clause 31(2)(a).

I will now turn to Clause 32, because otherwise I will start to repeat myself. Article 1(A)(2) of the refugee convention states that a refugee is an individual who has a

“well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”,

and Clause 32 lays out precisely what is meant by each of those characteristics, which are sometimes called “convention reasons”. Again, the purpose here is to make sure that all decision-makers, including both the Home Office and the courts, understand and operate to the same definitions. That is, I suggest, a desirable law reform.

On Amendment 105, there is a mismatch between how the concept of a “particular social group” is defined in current legislation, government policy and some tribunal judgments, and also in how the definition has been interpreted by some courts. There is no authoritative or universally agreed definition of “particular social group” among state parties to the convention and, in particular, there is no universal agreement as to whether the test set out in Article 1(A)(2) of the refugee convention should be applied cumulatively. The UNHCR has issued guidance supporting the view that the cumulative approach is a misapplication of the refugee convention, but, as I said in the last group, that guidance is neither legally binding nor determinative as a matter of international law.

Article 1(A)(2) of the convention does not elaborate on what is meant by

“membership of a particular social group”;

there is no supranational body with authority to give a determinative ruling and, therefore, each state party, including the UK, has to interpret it. We believe that the definition in Clause 32 captures what is meant in the convention by a “particular social group”. We have looked at the broad wording in the convention, the travaux préparatoires—excuse my French—the approach of a number of other jurisdictions, and Article 31 of the Vienna convention, and we believe that setting it out in this way will make it clearer.

The amendment would mean that you would have to satisfy only one of the conditions to be considered a member of a “particular social group”, and that would erode the concept that people deserve and need protection based on fundamental characteristics that go to the core of who they are, such as their faith or sexuality. It would broaden the definition to cover potentially transient factors that could perhaps be changed, such as an individual’s occupation. That is the first point. The second is that our proposed definition accords with the widely used and accepted interpretation of the “particular social group” concept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, noted. It is an EU interpretation; it comes from the approach in the EU qualification directive, which underpins the Common European Asylum System. We are very happy to look at EU interpretations; we do not have a closed mind—when they get it right, they get it right, and being independent means that we can look more broadly. However, with great respect, it is difficult to attack this as something utterly wrong if, in fact, this is the interpretation in that legislation.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am not a lawyer, so I rise with some trepidation, but it seems to me that it suits the Government’s purpose to interpret it in this way, because it means that fewer vulnerable groups—particularly women—fleeing violence will receive refugee protection as a result. It is no clearer than the interpretation that it is overruling, and it seems odd. It is quite rare for the Government to pray in aid an EU interpretation over that of their own courts. Maybe one of the lawyers opposite will be able to give a better response than I can, but I am afraid I am not convinced, because it seems as though that is why this is being done—it is nothing to do with clarity. If this legislation had clearly put in law Lord Bingham’s interpretation, that would be clear. So why the EU interpretation, which is, as numbers of authorities have said, likely to mean fewer vulnerable people—particularly women—receiving the refugee protection to which they are entitled under the convention?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I set out why we think this interpretation is correct. I am certainly not saying that we are using this interpretation because it is the EU one; I was referring to the EU to make the point that, with respect, it is very difficult to challenge this as somehow an unfair, unworkable or inapt interpretation when it is actually reflected in the EU jurisprudence. I absolutely take, with respect, the noble Baroness’s comments about the importance of the equality impact assessment for the policies being taken forward through the Bill. The public sector equality duty is not a one-off duty; it is ongoing, and I want to provide reassurance now that we will be monitoring equality impacts as we put the Bill into operation and as we evaluate its measures and, indeed, those in the wider new plan for immigration.

I assure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester that we are well aware of the particular issues facing women and survivors of gender-based persecution and, indeed, the asylum system is sensitive to them. The interview guidance contains clear instructions to interviewers in this area. We seek to offer a safe and supportive environment for individuals to establish their claims. Despite references to the decision of this House in its judicial capacity, in Fornah, those comments were obiter. I underline that there is no authoritative definition in case law of what is a “particular social group”, and that is why it is absolutely right for this Parliament to define it in this clause.

Clause 37 amends the definition of a “particularly serious crime” from one which is punished by imprisonment of two years or more to one which is punished by imprisonment of 12 months or more. To be clear, imprisonment means an immediate custodial sentence—I am not sure that any noble Lord made that point, but it is important. Indeed, it is why I brought the handbook: if you receive a suspended sentence, you are not caught by its provisions—going back to the underlying legislation. Furthermore, not only does it have to be an immediate custodial sentence of 12 months or more but the second limb has to apply—namely, whether the individual is a danger to the community—and that is rebuttable.

We cannot accept Amendment 111 because it would potentially allow dangerous foreign national offenders to remain here, putting the public at risk. If somebody has been sentenced to a year or more in prison, we should not enable them to second guess the verdict of the jury or the decision of the court by allowing them to bring into play again whether they were such an offender. We seek to allow only the second bit of it to be rebuttable; namely, whether they pose the relevant danger.

I think I have answered all the questions that have been asked. On the last point put by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, at the heart of this lies not some dinner party conversation but a lack of clarity in the current case law and standards, which make it harder for decision-makers to make accurate and efficient decisions; that is it.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

That may be the case, but all I asked of the Minister was to tell the Committee who has been making representations for these changes.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I have not been here as long as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, but, with respect, I do not think it fair to ask me that question as I stand here. The Government receive representations on this issue all the time. One might say that we receive representations from millions and millions of people who voted for this Government at the last election when immigration reform was full square in our manifesto. I say with great respect to noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that we are having a very interesting debate on some important legal points. If he wants to make political points, I am happy to respond in a political context.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Since when has it been making a political point to ask where the pressure has come from to make these changes? Since when has that been a political point?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The pressure has come from the people of the United Kingdom, who elected this Government with an overwhelming majority.

[Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)]

In that case, will the Minister accept that, in a way, and given what we have heard from other noble Lords, particularly my noble and learned friend Lord Brown, it is part of the Government’s strategy to toughen up on migration and immigration? That is really what this is about.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Absolutely, we want to toughen up on illegal migration. We want to make sure that people who have a right to come in are able to do so, and to make sure that people who do not have that right cannot come in. We want consistent and better decision-making. It is really as simple as that.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. In a previous group, the noble Baroness the Minister—I was very grateful to her—sought to make distinctions between immigration and asylum protection; I think that was quite important. To be now almost resiling from that and suggesting, in answer to a previous intervention, that we are going to reinterpret the refugee convention—to respond to the millions of people who voted for Mr Johnson’s Government on the basis of controlling immigration—is a little troubling. I do not think I am alone in the Committee in being so troubled.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am surprised that anyone in a democracy is troubled by a Government listening to the people and putting forward legislation which, first, delivers on a manifesto commitment, and, secondly—as I have said and I repeat —is entirely consistent with our international law obligations. There is nothing wrong and everything right with each signatory to the refugee convention interpreting its obligations under it; we have now been around that point on several occasions.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am sorry to keep bobbing up, and I appreciate what the Minister said about monitoring the equality impact of this legislation, but does he accept that Clause 32 means that a woman fleeing gender-based violence with good grounds for being accepted as a refugee is less likely to be so accepted? I do not believe that that is what the British people voted for.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am not trying to be difficult here. What it means is that a woman, like anybody else, who has a proper claim under the refugee convention will find refuge in the UK. That is what we are seeking to do. By having a clearer set of definitions, we are trying to make sure that it will not depend on the happenstance of who the decision-maker is and the way the test is applied.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I do not wish to prolong the Minister’s agony but can he clarify something for me? I think he said that, in the face of court judgments, the Government were entitled to change the legislative background. Does changing the legislative background mean that the Government are raising the standard of proof, thereby making it more difficult for claims for asylum to be accepted—this is in Clause 31—and in so doing, overturning the judgments of the UK’s highest courts? That is the first question.

The second question relates to Clause 37. The Minister says that “particularly serious crime” is not defined in the refugee convention and that it is up to each country to define what it means. My understanding is that the definition is being changed from two years’ imprisonment to 12 months. So, particularly serious crime was defined by this country as entailing two years’ imprisonment and now the Government are changing it to 12 months. That is not about seeking to define or a lack of clarity but a deliberate change. Why is that?

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

On the first point, the position at the moment is that you have a reasonable likelihood test; what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, called the holistic test. What is going on here—and what should be going on—is that we have sought to identify a number of discrete questions and we have applied the appropriate standard of proof to each of them. On the second point, the noble Lord is absolutely right in that a serious crime was defined as one that meant 24 months’ imprisonment and we are now defining it as 12 months. We believe that that is appropriate and remains consistent with our refugee convention obligations.

I am not sure whether I should formally have said that I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

I thought we were going to have more Q&A. I am grateful to the Minister for his fairly clear explanation of why the Government are doing what they are doing. I am not totally satisfied that we have heard the full reason. Over the years, we have not had any arguments put to us that the 1951 convention was not working; the arguments have been elsewhere. Suddenly, we are given these different considerations for why we should pass this. However, we will be back on Report, having listened to what the Minister has said. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I begin with Amendment 107, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, whose analysis I listened to very carefully. It seeks to reflect the position in the Adimi case by defining the requirement to “come direct” to include having passed through intermediate countries on the refugee’s way to the UK. I assure the noble and learned Lord that this is something we have carefully considered. Where, for example, a person has taken a connecting flight to the UK, due regard will be paid to the individual’s circumstances in determining whether they came direct. The powers in the Bill enable us to exercise that flexibility, which will be reflected in guidance provided to the caseworkers and decision-makers.

It follows that if a refugee cites a particular protected characteristic as a reason for being unable to comply with the standards set out in the Bill, including to come direct, that will be carefully considered by caseworkers in determining the entitlements attached to their leave. As I said on earlier groups, we will be sensitive to those cases. Flexible powers in the Bill allow it, and that will be set out in guidance in any event.

I will come back to Amendment 106 in a moment, but Amendment 108 links closely with Amendment 107 and seeks to ensure that determination of both “reasonably expected” and “reasonably practicable”, which are relevant standards in determining “come direct” and “without delay” respectively, are interpreted with due regard to protected characteristics. Essentially, this point is answered by the point that I have just made: the Bill has flexibility built into it to take individual circumstances into account. A person may be deemed to have come direct if they could not have been reasonably expected to claim asylum in a first safe country. Similarly, they will be deemed to have claimed asylum without delay if it occurred as soon as was “reasonably practicable”. Therefore, if a refugee cites a particular protected characteristic as a reason for being unable to comply with the standards in the Bill, that will be considered by the caseworker. The Bill is perfectly flexible enough to enable us to do so.

Turning to Amendments 106, 109 and 110, we again tread over the ground of interpreting obligations under the convention. I recognise the importance of taking a sensitive approach to how “come direct” is interpreted and I have already talked about the example of a connecting flight. However, I cannot accept that the definition should be amended as proposed, to enable a refugee to have been in another country “for a substantial period” and still be determined to have come directly. Those in need of protection must claim in the first safe country that they reach, because that is the fastest route to safety. That is an internationally recognised concept. It underpins, for example, the Common European Asylum System, and there are safeguards in the current provision in Clause 36(1). Even if a person stopped in another country outside the UK, they could still say that they came direct to the UK if they can show that they could not reasonably have been expected to seek protection under the refugee convention—for example, because they were under the control of traffickers—although every case would have to be considered on its own merits. Therefore, with respect, and without opening up the wider issue, there are some good underlying points in what we heard from my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts.

Amendment 109 requires a little unpacking. I should be clear that differentiation does not constitute a penalty for the purposes of Article 31. However, I disagree with the analysis that protection under Article 31 of the convention should extend to those who have tried to exit the UK without first seeking asylum, because we must interpret the “first safe country” principle consistently. Therefore, the defence under Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 should no longer be available to those who transit out of the UK.

Finally, turning to Clause 36, the refugee convention is clear that refugees should be protected from penalties for their illegal entry or illegal presence when they have come directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened, they presented themselves without delay to the authorities, and they showed good cause for their illegal entry or presence. This will now be familiar ground. However, the refugee convention does not define what is meant by the terms

“coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened”

or

“present themselves without delay to the authorities”.

This clause sets out how these phrases should be interpreted in the UK. This is the same point that I made in the previous two groups.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, asked me whether we were overturning the judgments in Adimi and Asfaw and, if so, why? I hope I have that question down fairly. With the greatest respect, the courts in Adimi and Asfaw interpreted “come directly” in Article 31(1) more generously than the original intention of Parliament. The Explanatory Note to Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 says:

“This defence, which is modelled on Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention, does not apply if the refugee stopped in a third country outside the United Kingdom unless he can show that he could not reasonably have been expected to be given protection under the Convention in that country.”


What we are doing here is consistent with the refugee convention. There is sufficient flexibility in the proposed powers and the overall policy to enable an individual to demonstrate that during the stopover they could not reasonably have been expected to seek protection under the refugee convention or, where appropriate, to show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.

Turning finally to the point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who said that someone arriving by aeroplane would be arriving illegally, some joys await us in group 8, when we will come to this point. As a taster before the short dinner break, I point out that there is a statutory defence recourse under Section 31 of the 1999 Act if they are genuine refugees and used fraud or deception to get a forged or false entry clearance. We will no doubt come back to this in more detail in group 8.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

If every country interpreted Article 31 as the Government want it interpreted by means of the Bill, what would be the consequences for dealing with the refugee crisis that the world faces?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I really do not mean to be flippant. The consequence would be that every country would be interpreting the refugee convention in accordance with its terms. As a country, we are interpreting our legal obligations in the way that we ought to and are allowed to. We are going back—

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

The Joint Committee on Human Rights recommended that this be amended. There must be good reasons for explaining why the Government do not want it amended and I have not heard them.

This is a true story; I can meet the Minister in camera and show him the evidence. A young man aged 17, whom we found in Kenya—

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

I am giving an example of why Article 31, without the amendment, does not work.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am almost as new, I think, as the noble and right reverend Lord, but my understanding of procedure is that that is meant to be for questions. If the noble and right reverend Lord will write to me or meet me to discuss that particular case, I will certainly discuss it with him. If the case raises a point of principle, I will deal with it. If it raises a point of principle that I think will be helpful for the Committee to hear, I will write to him and provide a copy of the letter. I hope that is helpful for this evening.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, may I just say that this is Committee? This is not Report. Any noble Lord is entitled to speak after the Minister in Committee.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I really do not want to get into a procedural battle. I was trying to be both helpful to the Committee, given the time and pressure, and respectful, I hope, to the noble and right reverend Lord. I reiterate the offer, which I think is appropriate.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Could the Minister answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick? It was rather a flippant answer that he gave—that everybody would be interpreting the convention according to their rights. I think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, meant: what would be the practical effect? What would happen to the 26 million refugees in the world, three-quarters of whom are in countries contiguous to the one in which they had their citizenship? Would all countries agree, if they introduced this “first safe country” rule, that all refugees had to stay in these contiguous countries—in these encampments in Jordan, Syria, Turkey and so on—and that nobody could move on, under the refugee convention, to another country?

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am certainly not trying to be flippant. What I am saying is that we have a refugee convention that sets out our international obligations. We are abiding by those international obligations. It may—I underline “may”—be that a convention entered into in 1951 is not absolutely suitable for the world of 2022. That might be the answer. At the moment, however, my focus as a Justice Minister is on making sure that this country abides by its international obligations, and that is what we are doing. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My answer to that last point is that if that is what the UK Government feel, they should convene a conference to renegotiate the refugee convention, but they are not doing that. A large number of noble Lords in this Committee believe that the Government are riding roughshod over the refugee convention in a way that demeans this country and sets an extremely poor example, not least to those countries on the front line, which are taking the overwhelming majority of people seeking protection. We have bandied around the statistics in the last few days in Committee, but we are not in the top category of countries in terms of the numbers, which are manageable. They would be particularly manageable if the Home Office got its act together in the way it decides asylum cases initially—if it invested in the initial consideration of the claims and did not make the law ever more complex, with ever more delays and ever more prospects of litigation. It seems we are banging our heads against a brick wall somewhat, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.