(5 years, 5 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Keighley (John Grogan) for securing the debate and for all the work he and his colleagues do to promote relations between the United Kingdom and Kosovo. I am grateful, too, for the other contributions we have heard.
As we know, the United Kingdom was the first country to recognise the independence of Kosovo 11 years ago, and we are as committed to friendship and partnership with Kosovo now as we were then. Today, Kosovo’s diaspora is a powerful bridge between the UK and Kosovo. As we heard, British pop star Rita Ora, who was born in Pristina, has supported Kosovo’s survivors of sexual violence by sending the clear message that their dignified fight for justice is a source of great pride. Dua Lipa, who is the daughter of Kosovan parents and winner of multiple Grammy and Brit awards, is patron of Kosovo’s Sunny Hill Foundation, which supports some of the most vulnerable people in Kosovo. Leonora Brajshori, the young British Army weightlifter, now competes for Kosovo.
Today, our two nations share a thriving and candid bilateral relationship—a relationship reinforced by our growing programme of technical assistance, which is designed to help the Government of Kosovo to deliver the reforms necessary for the country to make progress towards robust institutions and western standards of governance, and founded on our unequivocal support for Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity, and for its integration into the international community. We are very conscious that Kosovo will struggle to reach its potential if it does not enjoy peaceful and productive relations with its neighbours, so a significant strand of our policy to help Kosovo thrive is to support greater harmony and co-operation in the region.
As the hon. Member for Keighley will have witnessed during his visits to the country, Kosovo has great potential and offers many opportunities for economic development. Kosovo has Europe’s youngest population, widespread foreign language skills and increasing digital literacy. Those assets can help Kosovo to succeed in an era when technology makes it easier than ever for ambitious individuals and companies to access consumers around the globe. That is why, through the British Council, which has been mentioned, the UK is contributing to building vital digital skills in Kosovo and right across the western Balkans with our 21st Century Schools programme. That programme, which will be launched later this month, will provide 1 million schoolchildren with coding and problem-solving skills.
On the point about the Department for International Trade, the DIT staff in Belgrade and Sarajevo cover the whole region. Foreign and Commonwealth Office staff are in close touch with the DIT to help UK companies to exploit the economic opportunities that clearly exist in the region.
However, although we are right to focus on the opportunities in Kosovo, we must also acknowledge important constraining factors. First, although Kosovo has many assets that provide trade and investment potential, there are also risks. That is why, through the embassy in Pristina, we work with the Government of Kosovo to ensure that international businesses have a level playing field and that Kosovo is tackling challenges such as corruption, uneven contract enforcement, arbitration and access to justice or remediation.
Secondly, the opportunities that exist are not equally accessible to all, which is why we and others in the international community are promoting greater inclusion of women and girls and of members of marginalised communities.
Thirdly, organised crime and corruption remain serious challenges, even after almost two decades of international support. We urge Kosovo’s leadership to do more to show that it is a reliable partner, ready to root out crime and corruption, and promote the rule of law. We put those security-related challenges at the heart of the Western Balkans summit, which we hosted last July, for good reason: we have a vested interest in helping Kosovo and the wider region to tackle the problems.
A part of Kosovo’s standing as an independent country is the development of its own armed forces, which is the sovereign right of an independent state. We continue to encourage Kosovo to do that in close consultation with NATO, and expect it to continue to co-operate closely with the Kosovo force—KFOR—as it has done to date.
Unfortunately, regional tensions continue to undermine stability and economic development in the Balkans, and recent months have brought unwelcome friction between the Governments of Serbia and Kosovo. We have seen Serbia urge countries to withdraw their recognition of Kosovo’s independence and we have seen Kosovo impose 100% tariffs on goods from Serbia and from Bosnia and Herzegovina. All that distracts from the EU facilitated dialogue on the normalisation of relations. We look to Kosovo and Serbia to seize the opportunity for an agreement, taking their inspiration from the leadership shown by Greece and what is now North Macedonia in reaching an agreement to resolve a long-standing name issue.
We believe progress between Serbia and Kosovo is possible and urgently needed, but that negotiations should not just be about speed, but should focus on reaching the optimum and most sustainable agreement. We continue to press both sides to de-escalate tensions and to return to negotiations. With our international partners, we have asked Kosovo’s Government to set out the steps they intend to take to suspend the tariffs and enable a return to the dialogue. It is in Kosovo’s interests to maintain momentum towards an agreement.
The United Kingdom believes that a dialogue agreement based on border changes risks endangering stability in Kosovo, Serbia and beyond, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in North Macedonia, as the hon. Member for Keighley said in his opening remarks. Border changes would also risk setting a precedent that could be unhelpfully exploited by third parties in the region and elsewhere. We are at an important juncture in negotiations, with the prospect of making progress this year. A conclusive and sustainable agreement would usher in an era of stability and economic development.
We urge all parties to remain focused on an agreement that strengthens regional security and stability, abides by the European principle of multi-ethnicity, commands the support of democratically elected representatives in both countries, strengthens the rule of law and comprehensively addresses all issues outstanding from previous agreements. Achieving those aims requires all sides to respect Kosovo’s democratic right to determine how and by whom the country is represented in the negotiations. Therefore, we see Kosovo’s formation of a state delegation, which it is working to put on a legal footing, as a positive step forward. A broad-based negotiating team, representing a plurality of voices, will be better equipped to deliver a comprehensive agreement acceptable to Kosovo’s people and Parliament.
The United Kingdom will continue to devote sustained political and diplomatic effort to bring about such an agreement. The United Kingdom’s support for the countries of the western Balkans is in our mutual interest. Instability and insecurity in the region have implications for the United Kingdom and Europe, as we saw at immense human cost during the conflicts of the 1990s. As the Prime Minister made clear at our Western Balkans summit last year, the United Kingdom remains resolute in support of the region’s path towards Euro-Atlantic integration. That includes our efforts to help to resolve legacy issues, such as missing persons and war crimes, and to combat serious and organised crime.
The UK’s commitment to European security will remain steadfast after we leave the EU. To reinforce this, we are doubling our programme funding for the western Balkans to £80 million a year by 2021 and also doubling the number of staff we have in the region working to combat security threats. The UK is Kosovo’s friend. We want the country and its people to thrive, and we will help them to do so. In turn, Kosovo has to be open to dealing with its challenges, as well as celebrating its successes. For that to be effective, Kosovo will need its friends and I am proud to say that we in the United Kingdom can count ourselves among them.
Question put and agreed to.
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Written StatementsMy right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, attended the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 18 February. It was chaired by the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP), Federica Mogherini. The meeting was held in Brussels.
Current Affairs
Foreign Ministers welcomed the entry into force of the Prespa agreement which allows for the change of name of North Macedonia. They briefly discussed the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Horn of Africa
The High Representative informed Ministers about her visit to the region the previous week. Foreign Ministers welcomed the historic Ethiopia-Eritrea peace agreement. They discussed how the EU can support this unprecedented opportunity to accelerate reconciliation and economic integration in the horn of Africa. They reaffirmed the EU’s engagement in the region, which still faces important challenges, not least the security situation in Somalia. They also highlighted the need to keep a strong focus on the respect for human rights, as well as on the situation of migrants who embark on perilous journeys, sometimes at a very young age.
Ukraine
The Council had a comprehensive discussion on Ukraine, covering the reform process as well as the security and humanitarian situation, in particular in eastern Ukraine and the sea of Azov. The Council reiterated its full support for Ukraine’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty and continued condemnation of the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia. Foreign Ministers acknowledged the important progress Ukraine has accomplished in key areas over the past five years and highlighted the need to maintain reform momentum.
The Council also expressed the importance of ensuring that the elections in Ukraine are well conducted. They highlighted the importance of ensuring that the OSCE election observation mission can conduct its work and can observe the elections in full accordance with its usual practice. Ministers exchanged views on how the EU can help, following the developments in the Azov sea and Kerch strait region, particularly through strengthened support in the affected areas, including in sectors such as railway and road connections, training, and support for SMEs. They reiterated the EU’s call for all detained Ukrainian seamen to be released immediately as well as for the return of the seized vessels and free passage of all ships through the Kerch straits.
Syria
The Council discussed the situation in Syria. Foreign Ministers reiterated the EU’s full and continued support for UN special envoy Geir Pedersen’s efforts and the Geneva UN-led peace process for Syria, which remains key to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, citing a credible political transition in Syria as the only sustainable long-term solution to the conflict. Ministers reiterated that the EU will be ready to assist in the reconstruction of Syria only when a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition is firmly under way.
Ministers discussed preparations for the “Brussels III” conference “Supporting the future of Syria and the region”, which will take place on 12 to 14 March, and remains key to continue mobilising the international community behind humanitarian and resilience efforts for the Syrian people and host communities. The High Representative highlighted that the conference would have an even greater focus on the role of civil society and women, and that the issues of accountability and the fight against immunity will feature prominently.
Venezuela
Over lunch, Foreign Ministers discussed the situation in Venezuela, following the first meeting of the international contact group in Montevideo on 7 February and ahead of the technical mission to Caracas led by the EU and Uruguay. The mission will work on assessing the support that can be provided to facilitate a democratic and peaceful outcome to the crisis, and, in particular, the holding of early presidential elections. Foreign ministers also stressed that humanitarian aid should be delivered to the people in need.
Council conclusions
The Council agreed a number of measures without discussion:
The Council adopted conclusions on Yemen.
The Council adopted conclusions on climate diplomacy.
The Council adopted conclusions on EU priorities in UN human rights fora in 2019.
The Council renewed for one year the restrictive measures against Zimbabwe. The sanctions consist of an arms embargo as well as a travel ban and an asset freeze to listed individuals and entities.
The Council added one person to the list of persons and entities targeted by the EU restrictive measures against ISIL (Daesh) and al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, bringing the total number of persons currently on the list to three.
The Council transposed UN-adopted law amendments, related to two individuals subject to restrictive measures, into EU law, in view of the situation in Afghanistan.
The Council approved and authorised the signing of an agreement on a framework for the participation of Jordan in EU crisis management operations.
The Council adopted the updated the EU’s common military list in line with the provisions of common position 2008/944/CFSP on arms exports.
The Council approved a joint civil-military concept of operations on regionalisation of CSDP action in the Sahel. The process of regionalisation will now enter its second phase.
The Council authorised the Commission to intervene on behalf of the EU before US courts regarding the recognition and enforcement of intra-EU investment arbitration awards.
The Council endorsed a framework for a comprehensive dialogue between the EU and Iran on migration and refugee issues (5983/19).
The Council adopted a decision on the UK opt-out from the recast of the regulation on the creation of an immigration liaison officers network (5979/19).
The Council approved an information note containing recommended EU positions for the ICAO Council meeting on 18 February to 15 March 2019, so that the information note can be used as the basis for the interventions of the representatives of the ICAO Council EU members.
The Council adopted a decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the EU in the ICAO Council, in respect of the adoption of amendment 17 to annex 13.
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Commons ChamberThe UK works closely with Europe and the US to promote a strong transatlantic partnership. It is vital for our security and prosperity that we work with the Trump Administration to promote transatlantic unity through NATO. Since July’s NATO summit, we have urged allies to increase defence spending and have encouraged the US to recognise the significant allied progress.
May I welcome the efforts my right hon. Friend has made in his role to strengthen those ties and ask in particular what assessment he has made of the security and intelligence co-operation between our two countries on which so much of our peace and security depends?
The intelligence co-operation between our two countries is enormously valuable. It proceeds regularly on a basis of complete trust and adds importantly to the security of the wider world.
Later this year, the UK will host a NATO summit that will mark the 70th anniversary of the organisation’s founding. Does my right hon. Friend agree that, as America’s closest ally in Europe, we need to be willing to make the argument to our European partners that the financial burden of defending our continent needs to be shared fairly and that other countries need to follow the UK’s example by meeting the NATO defence spending pledge?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right—indeed, that is exactly what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has been doing over the past week in his travels around the capitals of Europe—and I fully agree with her, as do Her Majesty’s Government, that burden sharing is important. We have been making that point with European partners—NATO partners in Europe —and I am pleased to say that there is progress, but there is still more to be done.
A strengthened transatlantic alliance could lead to more action in Sri Lanka to tackle human rights abuses. Will the Minister of State urge the Trump Administration to join him and the Foreign Secretary in putting pressure on the Sri Lankan Government to tackle human rights abuses and to respect international calls for a war crimes inquiry?
As the hon. Gentleman appreciates, I do not personally cover Sri Lanka. However, I am confident that, across the world, we work very closely together on all issues of human rights, and we will continue to do so in countries as appropriate.
The Minister knows that, after two world wars, we set up the United Nations, we set up NATO and we set up the European Community in an early form to stop our ever having wars again. Is he not concerned about some of the words and some of the actions coming out of the White House under President Trump at the moment?
It is a strong pillar of our foreign policy that we believe in multilateral organisations and participate in them fully. Obviously, we will soon be leaving one of them, but that will not diminish our co-operation with the EU27 thereafter.
What assessment has my right hon. Friend made of the impact on the transatlantic alliance of the recent talks in Vietnam between North Korea and America? Does this have the potential to strengthen our security in the west?
My understanding is that those talks are happening today, so it is not easy for me to comment on something that has not quite yet taken place. However, my skills of foresight are well recognised in this House, as I well appreciate. I hope that these conversations and discussions will lead to a more peaceful world and are as successful as we would wish.
Yesterday, the International Court of Justice found that the UK’s control of the Chagos islands is illegal and wrong. This damning verdict deals a huge blow to the UK’s global reputation. Will the Government therefore heed the call of the ICJ to hand back the islands to Mauritius, or will they continue to pander to the United States military?
The hon. Lady is labouring under a serious misapprehension: yesterday’s hearing provided an advisory opinion, not a judgment. We will of course consider the detail of the opinion carefully, but this is a bilateral dispute, and for the General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion by the ICJ was therefore a misuse of powers that sets a dangerous precedent for other bilateral disputes. The defence facilities in the British Indian Ocean Territory help to keep people in Britain and around the world safe, and we will continue to seek a bilateral solution to what is a bilateral dispute with Mauritius.
I am hearing a lot of chuntering from my left, as I have two DFID Ministers beside me—
And a former DFID Minister, too.
I agree with the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg), and this is a matter not just of soft power, but of hard power. There is little doubt that the 0.7% commitment has an important part to play. I see it in all parts of Asia, not least in Pakistan and Bangladesh, which have the two single biggest DFID budgets. It is important for aid and development and, indeed, for the prosperity fund, which will allow British companies to prosper in the years to come.
As pioneers of the first marine protected area in the Southern ocean, the UK is working actively to see new designations in the Weddell sea, the east Antarctic and around the Antarctic peninsula. Ascension Island intends to designate a marine protected area this year, and a consultation is under way.
The people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are in an invidious position in that they have the temporary peace and stability that they desperately want and need but a new President for whom they did not vote. Does the Secretary of State agree that we cannot simply shrug our shoulders and say this is a trade-off that we accept but that, instead, the people of the DRC deserve both peace and democracy?
We are working closely with the Colombian Government in defending the continuation of the peace process. They have borne a massive burden of people who have left Venezuela, and we are at the forefront of European efforts to make sure that we can find a solution in Venezuela, in response to the absolutely unacceptable conduct of Mr Maduro.
As I set out to the Foreign Affairs Committee last September, the Government’s assessment is that border changes in the western Balkans would risk instability and contagion in the region and beyond. We support efforts to reach a normalisation agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, one that is deliverable and sustainable, and enjoys wide domestic support in both countries. We would support such an agreement.
Russia’s action against Ukrainian vessels near the Kerch straits on 25 November was not in conformity with international law. Continued Russian restrictions on access to the sea of Azov should be ended immediately. We have worked with our partners to support Ukraine, including through securing political agreement in the EU for new sanctions listings, targeted on those responsible for the attacks on the Ukrainian vessels.
EU observers saw that
“violence has marred the election day, and significant obstacles to a level playing field remained in place throughout the…electoral campaign”.
What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the rights of minorities during election time in Bangladesh?
My right hon. Friend will have been as shocked as I was to see the appalling scenes of Venezuelan troops using violence and intimidation to prevent vital aid from entering their country, which has been ravaged by socialism for decades. Will my right hon. Friend join me in calling on all parties around the world, and in particular the Labour leadership in this House, to condemn utterly Maduro’s actions and his illegitimate regime in Venezuela?
Any and every decent person in this House utterly condemns the barring of much needed humanitarian aid from getting into Venezuela. We all stand together in condemning those who are preventing that much needed source of supplies.
Several British overseas territories are still refusing to implement full transparency and to have public registers of ownership. Why are the Government refusing to obey the command of this House, which was to introduce legislation swiftly? Why are they refusing to do it until 2023?
We are fully adhering to the obligations and requirements of the Act that was passed. The hon. Gentleman is quite right that 2023 is the date by which we hope every requirement will be met in respect of public registers.
Will the Minister update us on what steps are being taken to support recently liberated areas in Iraq?
I have a wonderful Chagossian community in Wythenshawe. In the light of yesterday’s International Court of Justice decision, what does the Minister have to say to that community?
I repeat what I said earlier: the court decision yesterday was an advisory opinion, not a judgment. We will continue to uphold our commitments, as we have frequently stated in this House.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsHer Majesty’s Government have received by note verbale a formal notice from the Government in Skopje that the Republic of Macedonia has changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia. This follows the entering into force of the Prespa agreement. The UK body that deals with geographical names, the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names (PCGN), recommended that we endorse the change. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs agreed.
The name issue
The name issue had been a matter of dispute between Macedonia and Greece since 1991, when Greece refused to recognise the new state as the “Republic of Macedonia” owing to sensitivities over use of the term Macedonia. The Republic of Macedonia became the 181st member of the United Nations, but under the provisional term, the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Until the Prespa agreement came into force, this was the designation used by the country in all international fora. In bilateral communications, the United Kingdom referred to the country by its constitutional name, the ‘Republic of Macedonia’.
The Prespa agreement
Under the auspices of the United Nations, negotiating teams from both countries reached a settlement. The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Macedonia signed the Prespa agreement on 17 June 2018. The entering into force of the Prespa agreement earlier this month resolves the dispute. Under Article 1 (3) of the agreement, the Republic of Macedonia is henceforth the Republic of North Macedonia.
NATO Accession
NATO Allies, including the United Kingdom, signed North Macedonia’s Accession protocol on 6 February. Greece’s Parliament ratified North Macedonia’s NATO Accession Protocol on 8 February. The Greek Government then confirmed to the Macedonian Government that all necessary steps to ratify the Prespa agreement were complete. Her Majesty’s Government are taking forward the process for UK ratification of North Macedonia’s NATO Accession Protocol. This will involve laying the Accession Protocol before Parliament for 21 sitting days for scrutiny (as stipulated in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010). Once this process is complete, and provided Parliament has no objections, Her Majesty’s Government will deposit their instrument of ratification.
[HCWS1360]
(5 years, 6 months ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) (Amendment) (EU Exit) 2019 (S.R. (N.I.) 2019, No. 8).
With this it will be convenient to consider the Civil Procedure (Amendment) (EU Exit) Rules 2019 (S.I. 2019, No. 147).
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McDonagh.
Colleagues will recall that the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 provides the UK with the legal powers to impose, update and lift sanctions regulations, and to update our anti-money laundering framework after we leave the EU. An important feature of the sanctions Act, which was discussed in detail during its passage, is the right provided to designated persons to challenge their designation. Chapter 2 of the Act provides a route for the designated person to request that the Minister carry out an administrative review of their designation.
The Sanctions Review Procedure (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 came into force on 7 January and set out the process to be applied in relation to such reviews. A review could be requested for various reasons, including when a designated person believes that the reasons for their designation are incorrect or that particular information associated with the designation is not correct. If, following the review, the Minster’s decision is to uphold the designation, the designated person has the right, under section 38 of the sanctions Act, to apply to the High Court in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland, and to the Court of Session in Scotland, to have the decision made against them set aside.
The statutory instruments set out the process that is applicable to such court challenges. They are a technical step in the establishment of the new autonomous UK sanctions regimes. They make technical amendments to the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 for England and Wales, and to the Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) 1980. They do not make any new substantive provisions. The instruments provide the procedure that will apply when challenges to sanctions decisions are brought before the courts of England and Wales and of Northern Ireland under the 2018 Act.
Will the Minister give way?
I would rather complete my remarks and answer questions later, if I may.
The instruments allow the Government to apply to the courts to use the closed material procedure where appropriate in relation to such challenges. That enables the Government to defend legal challenges against sanctions decisions that may be underpinned by sensitive information. I should make it clear that the UK will use public unclassified material wherever possible in maintaining and pursuing sanctions listings. In a minority of cases, classified material may be necessary to support or sustain certain listings. The rules of court therefore provide for closed sessions for those exceptional circumstances in which the Government have used classified information to support a listing that is then challenged in court.
As I alluded to earlier in my speech, the mechanism for considering such information is an extension of tried and tested procedure that allows us the full consideration of the facts and protects the rights of entities. Under section 40 of the sanctions Act, we would apply sections 66 to 68 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 to any such challenges against sanctions decisions made under the sanctions Act. Rules of court made under the 2008 Act, and amended in a similar way to these instruments by the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010, allow the Treasury to ask for closed material procedures to apply to proceedings involving challenges to financial restrictions directions made under that Act.
The statutory instruments make technical amendments to part 79 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 and to order 116B of the Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) 1980 to extend the existing procedures to challenges against decisions made under the sanctions Act. They will ensure that challenges against sanctions decisions under the sanctions Act are treated in the same way as challenges against financial restrictions decisions made under the Counter-Terrorism Act.
Any failure to have the instruments in place by the day we leave the EU would represent a significant risk. There would be no closed material procedure set out for court reviews against designation decisions under the sanctions Act, including the availability of the closed material procedure, so the Government would not defend legal challenges to sanctions where sensitive information underpins a sanctions designation. That could result in a designation being revoked, which could have a significant impact on our meeting key foreign policy objectives. It could reduce our ability to co-ordinate sanction actions with close allies and could allow individuals involved in dangerous activities to travel to or invest in the UK.
Before making the rules of court, the Lord Chancellor consulted the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland in January this year, and they raised no concerns. I welcome this opportunity to discuss the statutory instruments and to answer questions. I commend the rules to the Committee.
I am grateful to hon. Members for their pertinent questions. Let me first address the general point on the right to challenge that the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland made at the beginning of her comments.
When we were preparing the 2018 Act, I sought ardently to ensure that there were initially easy ways of challenging a designation. If we get the wrong Igor or the wrong Ahmed, for instance, it is right that someone should be able to walk straight into the government system—I am exaggerating, but hon. Members know what I mean—and say, “Oi, you’ve got the wrong bloke here,” without having to go to court. I thought it was very important for the 2018 Act to contain a process that allowed someone inexpensively, and simply by presenting the facts, to point out where a mistake might have been made, rather than having to spend a lot of money with lawyers. One of the reasons I felt so strongly about that is that 15 years ago, a company in my constituency was sanctioned because someone got the wrong company of the same name. I therefore thought it was very important to embody that early stage of redress in the process.
However, inevitably, in this world of sanctions, where we are dealing with people who may be very rich or corporately very clever and sneaky, we must also have a proper court process. [Interruption.] Excuse me—say something!
The Minister is making an important point about redress. We share information about sanctions and those who are sanctioned with our Five Eyes partners and others. Perhaps he will confirm, after he has enjoyed a drink of water, the importance of having redress numbers and other identifiers so people are not caught up in the US electronic system for travel authorisation, for example.
May I express my deep gratitude to the hon. Gentleman for his learned and well-timed intervention?
Does the Minister expect that the Government will make a habit of being bailed out by the Opposition?
No, because at the last count there were not many of them left.
The statutory instruments lay down the procedure for sanctions designation appeals where cases go to court. The vast majority of those cases will be based on open source material, but, as with terrorism legislation, the statutory instruments provide for the closed process to be used where necessary. Most material will be open source, but, given that we are dealing with some pretty dodgy people, information from intelligence sources may have led to the decision to designate someone. Therefore, as with terrorism—the parallels may get quite close—the SIs provide for a closed process that allows that material to be discussed. I say to the hon. Lady and to all other hon. Members that there is nothing sinister about that. It replicates what happens elsewhere. It is tried and tested, and I would argue that it is very straightforward.
The hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth asked, “Why not Scotland?” The 2018 Act provides that Scotland will make its own rules of court. That follows the existing precedent in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010. The Scottish Government have been consulted, and are aware of the need to do that.
The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland asked about special advocates. A special advocate is a specifically appointed lawyer, whose functions are set out under rule 79.19 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Their role is to consider sensitive material and to ensure that the proceedings are fair. They will represent the interests of the designated person.
I was asked whether there are closed proceedings in the EU. There are some similar, but not identical, processes in the EU. Owing to the need to safeguard sensitive member state evidence, those procedures have not been used regularly to date. The use of them for UK sanctions will appropriately safeguard our information.
I hope that I have answered the questions that were raised. The statutory instruments are straightforward. They broadly replicate what happens elsewhere in similar court proceedings, and I urge the Committee to accept them. I commend the rules to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Civil Procedure (amendment) (EU Exit) Rules 2019
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the Civil Procedure (Amendment) (EU Exit) Rules 2019 (S.I. 2019, No. 147).—(Sir Alan Duncan.)
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Government have decided to opt in to the European Commission’s proposals for Council decisions authorising the acceptance by certain member states of the accession of named countries to the 1980 Hague Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, in the interests of the EU. The acceptances are as follows:
Austria, Cyprus, Croatia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania and the United Kingdom to accept Dominican Republic;
Austria, Luxembourg and Romania to accept Belarus and Uzbekistan;
Austria to accept Ecuador and Ukraine;
Austria and Romania to accept Honduras.
The UK has already accepted Belarus, Uzbekistan, Ecuador, Ukraine and Honduras and therefore these Council decisions do not instruct the UK to take any action.
All EU member states are party to the 1980 Hague Convention, the primary civil law international instrument which provides a mechanism to seek the prompt return of wrongfully removed or retained children to their country of habitual residence.
When a country wishes to accede to the convention, it is necessary for an existing contracting state to accept that country’s accession before the convention can apply between them. It is the European Commission’s view that there is exclusive competence on the EU for all matters relating to the 1980 convention and that therefore member states must be authorised by the EU to accept accessions by third countries and must do so collectively through Council decisions.
Although not anticipated in the proposals, the Government believe that the UK opt in under the protocol to title V of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union applies and it has therefore asserted its right to choose whether to opt in and have decided that it is in the UK’s best interests to do so.
The Government believe that the wider significance of these proposals for external competence mean that it is in the UK’s interests to participate fully in these negotiations, including having the ability to vote. These proposals must be agreed by unanimity within the EU Council.
[HCWS1339]
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsMy right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will attend the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 18 February. It will be chaired by the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP), Federica Mogherini and will take place in Brussels.
Ukraine
Ministers will discuss the EU’s response to the Russian attack on Ukrainian vessels in the Black sea and look ahead to what is likely to be a challenging election year for Ukraine. Ministers will take stock of Ukraine’s reform efforts and consider how the EU can provide socioeconomic support to the sea of Azov region. The UK will welcome the EU’s readiness to provide economic and humanitarian support to those regions most affected by the ongoing conflict. It will also reiterate the need for a collective and high-profile response to Russia’s malign influence in Ukraine.
Syria
This discussion will focus on preparations for the upcoming Brussels III conference, ”Supporting the future of Syria and the region”, taking place on 13 and 14 March. The conference will aim to improve humanitarian access and the protection of civilians in Syria, as well as mobilise humanitarian assistance, including for refugee-hosting countries.
Horn of Africa
Ministers will discuss the political and security situation in the horn of Africa, including changing regional dynamics following reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The UK supports the EU proposal to review future engagement. The Council will also discuss mutual concerns about the Sudanese Government’s use of violent tactics in response to protests, and the need for wider reforms; as well as the political situation in Somalia, where the EU is urging the Somali Government to translate their commitment to progress into tangible results.
Council conclusions
The Council is expected to adopt conclusions on Yemen, EU human rights guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, EU priorities in UN human rights forums in 2019, climate change diplomacy, and in response to the recent European Court of Auditors report on the implementation of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT).
[HCWS1332]
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsMy right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs attended the Informal Foreign Affairs Council (Gymnich) on 31 January and 1 February. It was chaired by the High Representative and Vice President of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP), Federica Mogherini. The meeting was held in Bucharest, Romania.
Eastern Partnership
The discussion of the Eastern Partnership confirmed the importance of the partnership and how much it had achieved in the last 10 years with a need to keep focusing on anti-corruption, rule of law, freedom of movement and values; with cyber, stratcomms, energy security, P2P, CSDP and connectivity all cited as newer areas for future attention.
Venezuela
Foreign Ministers expressed concern about the situation in Venezuela, and agreed the importance of holding elections. Foreign Ministers recalled their Council conclusions in May 2018, which stated that the elections were neither free nor fair, and reiterated the need for free and transparent elections respecting the constitutional rules of Venezuela. The HRVP announced the formation of an International Contact Group for Venezuela, with the first meeting due to take place on 7 February in Montevideo.
China
Foreign Ministers had a broad discussion about China’s growing role in the world including EU—China co-operation on the JCPoA and climate change. There was agreement that the EU’s 2016 China strategy remained relevant and calls for greater EU unity on shared areas of interest. Foreign Ministers also held a discussion on China with candidate countries (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey).
[HCWS1318]
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe House will now be familiar with the plight of Venezuela. It is suffering from economic devastation, starvation and malnutrition. The flight of more than 3 million Venezuelans to neighbouring countries is the largest migration crisis in Latin American history. The systematic dismantling of freedom, liberty and justice by the kleptocratic regime of Nicolás Maduro has marked it out as a country where people’s rights have been stolen.
In the past few weeks, the overwhelming majority of us in this House have condemned the political repression and electoral malpractice of a regime that is increasingly desperate to cling on to power. On Monday, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary announced that the UK will now recognise Juan Guaidó, the president of the National Assembly, as the constitutional interim President of Venezuela. The UK is one of 19 EU member states to have done so after the deadline for new elections to be called passed on Sunday.
It is worth reminding ourselves how events have rapidly changed the situation in Venezuela and have led the UK and our international partners to take action. Last May, Nicolás Maduro claimed a victory in a presidential election that was widely considered to have been deeply flawed. In January, a day after his so-called presidential inauguration, which was boycotted by the international community, the Venezuelan National Assembly declared Maduro’s tenure illegitimate. The Venezuelan people have shown their discontent in massive protests across the country. They have been demonstrating against the continued trashing of their country by the grossly incompetent, criminal and corrupt governance caused by Maduro’s warped version of socialism.
On 23 January, the president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, announced, with constitutional authority, that he will act as interim President of the country until free and fair elections take place. He spoke with the full backing of the National Assembly which, as an institution, is the sole legitimate survivor of Maduro’s systematic dismantling of the country’s democracy. This moment saw Venezuela’s democratic leaders taking courageous steps to set things right and to put the needs of the people before themselves. It was legal and gave the international community a responsibility to act immediately, as the US, Canada and the Lima Group countries did by supporting Juan Guaidó and Venezuela’s legitimate representatives.
For our part, the UK worked closely with our EU partners shortly after Juan Guaidó’s announcement. On 24 January, the Foreign Secretary said that Nicolás Maduro was no longer the legitimate leader of Venezuela. Two days later at the UN Security Council, where I represented the UK, I set out our position, which is shared by France, Spain, Germany and others, that if new presidential elections were not called within eight days, the UK would also recognise Juan Guaidó as the constitutional interim President.
The arrogance of Nicolás Maduro is such that those calls have not been answered. He has instead called for early new elections for the last remaining democratic institution, the National Assembly, supposedly so as to “bring peace”, which we can assume actually means to snuff out the remaining source of challenge to his grip on power, so this was a false promise. The National Assembly has already been duly elected and Maduro wants it to be overseen by the Constituent Assembly, which is his imposter alternative and which has no equivalent legitimacy.
The international community has taken significant steps in response to these events. As I said, I represented the United Kingdom at the UN Security Council when I set out the UK’s call for elections and made clear the responsibility of Council members to demonstrate the UN’s leadership on this issue. We look forward to further discussions there. On Monday, I went to Ottawa at the invitation of the Canadian Foreign Minister to join the meeting of the Lima Group countries, where I discussed the situation with Foreign Ministers from across the region. We also discussed the importance of getting humanitarian aid into Venezuela and also to the neighbouring countries which are bearing the brunt of receiving over 3 million migrants. It was during my trip to Ottawa on Monday that the Foreign Secretary formally announced that the UK recognises Juan Guaidó as interim President of Venezuela, in accordance with the Venezuelan constitution. The UK was one of 19 EU member states, including France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, to take similar simultaneous action. So we are not alone in our views of the Maduro regime. We continue to work in concert with the Organisation of American States, the Lima Group, the United States and like-minded European and international partners.
Our thoughts now turn to the next steps. First, we remain clear that Maduro is illegitimate and that we now recognise the National Assembly president Juan Guaidó as constitutional interim President of Venezuela until credible, free and fair elections are held. We are providing support to multilateral organisations such as the UN, the EU and the Red Cross Movement through our existing contributions. Last year, the UK was the largest donor to the UN’s central emergency response fund, which has allocated $26 million to the region, including $9 million for emergency health and nutrition support.
We must also keep up the pressure on Maduro with one united voice. The UK has taken a lead in the EU by calling for a tougher response to the regime in the light of the failure to call new elections. This may include further targeted sanctions, in co-ordination with recent steps taken by the United States. The UK also stands closely alongside our Lima Group partners. Outside Venezuela, they have borne the brunt of this crisis, and earlier this week their Ministers made clear to me in no uncertain terms the severity of the situation for them.
In speaking with one voice, I sincerely hope that this House proves united in expressing its condemnation of Nicolàs Maduro and in asserting its support for the Lima Group’s determination to design a better future for Venezuela by working with Juan Guaidó and the National Assembly. I commend this statement to the House.
I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement.
I hope that the Minister will today rule out the prospect of military intervention or some other form of outside interference, whether from the United States or anyone else, in Venezuela. I agree with him that the economic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela is all the more unacceptable because it has been so utterly avoidable. The United States has enforced devastating economic sanctions on the country and has constantly intervened to support opposition forces. The former UN rapporteur Alfred-Maurice de Zayas called these sanctions “crimes against humanity”.
None of this means blind support for the Maduro Government. It is true that between 2012 and 2016, the oil price collapsed. That was clearly a problem. Mis- management by the Government has totally compounded it, leading to hyperinflation, the collapse of the currency and desperate shortages of food, medicine and other essentials. As a result, there is malnutrition and more than half a million cases of malaria, and refugees in their millions are leaving the country—more than 1 million have gone to Colombia, which puts at risk that country’s peace process.
If the Maduro Government’s response to all that was to work tirelessly to resolve the problems with assistance from the international community, they might have our sympathy and support, but instead their response has been to answer rising public anger at the crisis with increased repression, violence and abuse of human rights. Amnesty reports the widespread excessive use of force against demonstrators and the torture of detainees.
So, it seems clear to us on this side that the essential starting points in resolving the crisis in Venezuela, and in restoring peace, democracy and stability, must be: first, for all parties to engage in dialogue to overcome the crisis; secondly, in the interim, for all parties to respect the rule of law, human rights and democratic processes; and ultimately, in due course, to allow the Venezuelan people themselves to decide the way forward through free and fair elections. As I have said, the way forward for Venezuela must not be military intervention or some other form of outside interference, whether from the United States or anyone else. The future of Venezuela must be a matter for Venezuelans.
We have all heard Donald Trump say repeatedly that all options are on the table when it comes to Venezuela. Indeed, the Minister of State used similar language himself in October, so can he give us some clarity today? Do the UK and the President of the United States include in their list of all options the possibility of military intervention in Venezuela? Has that been discussed with the Trump Administration, and has the UK promised any support in the event that the US takes action? I hope and trust that the answer will be no, but it would be useful to hear that directly from the Minister of State.
May I ask four further questions? First, we all appreciate the huge challenges for neighbouring countries in dealing with the influx of refugees from Venezuela, especially in Colombia, so will the Minister tell us what efforts are being made to ensure that those refugees receive the humanitarian support they need? Secondly, can he tell us what plans he has to use the Magnitsky powers that we gave him several months ago and impose targeted sanctions against those who are abusing human rights in Venezuela? Thirdly, in our recent proceedings on an urgent question about Venezuela, the Minister of State gave a somewhat blithe answer to the question from my right hon. Friend the Member for Warley (John Spellar) about the need for a Marshall plan for Venezuela in any post-Maduro era. The Minister said it would not be necessary because Venezuela is sitting on such large oil reserves, but does he accept that it is not oil it need reserves of, but foreign currency, which has been the main cause of the food shortages and hyperinflation that has left the Venezuelan economy so crippled? If, as he says in his statement, he wants to see a new Government in place in Caracas, can he say again what economic and humanitarian support there would be from the international community to help to resolve the current crisis? [Interruption.] I am glad the hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) finds this so amusing.
Finally, it was also interesting when we considered the recent urgent question that the shadow Foreign Secretary asked the Minister of State why he was speaking out against human rights abuses, rigged elections and repression of political protests in Venezuela, but had absolutely nothing to say about exactly the same issues in Honduras, where the British Government are selling arms and surveillance equipment to the Honduran Government and sending them trade delegations. The Minister failed to answer the shadow Foreign Secretary’s question then, so may I ask him now to explain that double-standard between Venezuela and Honduras? Why are the Government not consistent, as we are on this side of the House, in condemning all Governments that abuse human rights?
I can only say to the hon. Lady that when she sits down and reads the record of the response that she has just offered the House, she will look upon it with a high degree of embarrassment. She has been given the words to speak by her party, but those words are, to a large extent, not shared by most Members of her party. Let me just go through what she said and answer her comments.
First, the hon. Lady said, in a rather weak turn of phrase, that this was not just avoidable. No, it was avoidable; but, more than that, it was actually created by one man and his cronies who have destroyed the prosperity and wellbeing of an entire country and its people.
Secondly, let me turn to the question of sanctions. The hon. Lady may wish to be aware that, as a former oil trader, I do know a little bit about oil. Anyone who does not will know enough to know that what she has been saying this morning simply does not hold together. US sanctions on oil cannot be blamed for destroying the country when they have only just been announced, so blaming the collapse of Venezuela on US sanctions is absurd and wrong. The person to blame for the collapse of the Venezuelan oil industry is Nicolás Maduro himself. He has destroyed the greatest foreign currency-earning resource, which the country could be benefiting from had he not completely destroyed it.
Yesterday, the shadow Foreign Secretary endeavoured to make a wide-ranging speech about her party’s approach to foreign policy generally, within which she said that she was a great believer in sanctions. Yet, not only does the shadow Minister seem to disagree with that, but the Leader of the Opposition also seems to disagree with that policy statement.
This is not about outside influence, although the supportive pressure from the Lima Group is welcomed by all Venezuelans. This is about empowering the legitimacy of Venezuelans themselves inside Venezuela. We want to empower Venezuelans, not tell them what to do from outside. Help, yes—instruction, no.
I am also rather perturbed that the hon. Lady appeared very weak and feeble in her support for the Lima Group. This group of neighbouring countries, led by the previous and current Foreign Ministers of Peru, have been very courageous and thoughtful in designing their support collectively for the legitimate forces of Venezuela. We should give them our full support, and that is what the United Kingdom has been doing in the United Nations and in Ottawa on Monday.
There are many countries around, including the United Kingdom, who are doing their utmost to supply humanitarian aid into Venezuela. But what could be more disgusting than what we saw yesterday—pictures of the Maduro regime having blockaded the way into Venezuela, and streets within it, in order to stop humanitarian aid getting into the country? That man is in denial about aid even being needed, even though he has driven that country to total destitution.
On the question of the Marshall plan, I fully understand the concept behind the idea. Very honestly, it is too early to say whether that is appropriate for the country or able to be pieced together. I was part of many pledging conferences for Yemen and for Syria when I was the Minister for International Development, and I have no doubt that there will be a high degree of international support for Venezuela. But one of the great advantages of Venezuela compared with the other two countries that I have mentioned is that those millions who have fled will want and, we hope, be able to go back. The country also has the largest oil reserves in the world, which—if they are properly organised and managed—can give a massive inflow of the foreign exchange and resources that the country so desperately needs.
Some of us will remember a Venezuelan MP at November’s Women MPs of the World conference who spoke in this very Chamber about her battle for her country, and specifically for the rights of women and transgender people there. Her words are very much in my mind as I ask my right hon. Friend this question. Will he give us his view on the prospects for a peaceful transition to a new democratically legitimate and economically literate regime in Venezuela?
Perhaps I can answer my hon. Friend with the words used by a female Venezuelan politician, María Corina Machado, this morning on BBC Radio 4. She said:
“On behalf of the Venezuelan people, I ask and demand every single democrat around the world to understand that this chaos and tragedy we are living in in Venezuela stopped being an ideological discussion between left and right a long time ago. It’s between life and death. It’s between a criminal state and justice. It’s between oppression and freedom. Being indifferent amounts to being part of the regime that wants to impose silence, death and violence in Venezuela.”
With those words in our minds, I totally agree with my hon. Friend that we want to see the return of legitimate government, and women are going to play a very important part in taking Venezuela on that new journey.
I thank the Minister for providing an advance copy of his statement.
The situation is deeply concerning, and I want to make it clear that we condemn the violence and the regime that is carrying out the violence. The political and economic crisis gripping the country is spiralling into a regional humanitarian disaster, and we are at risk of allowing a lost generation of Venezuelans. I am pleased that the Minister discussed the importance of getting humanitarian aid into Venezuela and the neighbouring countries when he was in Ottawa. Will he please give us some more information around the specific measures that are in place to ensure that the aid does reach the right places? As he says, 3 million people have had to flee, and many of them have had to flee on foot—over 1 million to Colombia, for example. It would be helpful if he could give us some more information on that.
The right to self-determination is one owed to people in every country in the world. In the end, it will be for the Venezuelan people to choose their own political future, and there is a need for there to be free and fair elections in that regard. Will the Minister tell us what steps he has taken to support the Venezuelan people in strengthening their democratic institutions, so that they can have a democracy that is actually a democracy in reality, not just in name?
I am very happy to say that I agree with the hon. Lady in all respects. On humanitarian aid, while I was in Ottawa I spoke at some length to my right hon. Friend the Secretary State for International Development, and I will be meeting her again next week. We are discussing how we can anticipate the way in which aid might be delivered once the country is, as we hope, again opened up. We are planning to try to work with multilateral organisations for when Venezuela can be properly assisted. I rather think that, although we know there is a humanitarian problem, when we lift the lid and look more deeply into what has been wrought upon the Venezuelan people, we are likely to find out that it is far more severe than we even contemplate at the moment. We need to be ready for that eventuality, and I know that the International Development Secretary and the whole Department for International Development apparatus are now looking at this very deeply.
On the question of helping Venezuela to get up and running in a legitimate way, I would make one simple point, which is that the country does have a constitution. The problem is not the constitution, but that Maduro has not upheld the constitution. He holds up the little book and then bends all the rules that are written inside it. All we need is to uphold the proper process and principles of that constitution. That is exactly what Juan Guaidó and the National Assembly are doing, and they are now the foundation for reasserting the proper workings of the constitution through free, fair and effective legitimate elections.
I thank my right hon. Friend the Minister for his statement, which is extremely welcome. It stands in stark contrast to the contribution by the hon. Member for Heywood and Middleton (Liz McInnes), which was regrettably, I am afraid, ill-judged in both its tone and content. Will he assure me that we are doing everything we can to condemn the persecution and intimidation being meted out by this socialist regime to opposition activists?
In particular, can we also ensure that we are doing everything we can to secure the safety of journalists, who need to have the freedom to report what is happening there safely and securely?
I am sure the House will hope that I do not get into a semantic argument about the use of the words “Marxist”, “socialist”, “Leninist” or “Trotskyist”. I am not as great an expert on such words as some Opposition Members are. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The freedom of journalists who are getting in is absolutely essential. We will do our utmost to uphold human rights there, but also to bring to account those who have abused them.
Let me say two things. First, on the use of the Magnitsky clause, I apologise to the hon. Member for Heywood and Middleton (Liz McInnes) for not answering her question about that, but let me do so now. We would like to be able to do this now, but the process of getting the application of the Magnitsky clause workable within the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 will take a few more stages of parliamentary approval. It needs to go through certain statutory instruments and things like that, so it is not yet up and running, but we would like it to be. We would obviously like to do that as soon as we can, within the broader snowstorm of Brexit SIs.
Secondly, the Lima Group countries have referred Venezuela—the state and not just individuals within in it—to the International Criminal Court, citing some 18,000 extra-judicial killings and many other such instances that they believe create a very strong case against Maduro and his entire regime under the rules of the ICC.
I very much welcome the Minister’s and the UK Government’s recognition of Juan Guaidó as the interim President of Venezuela. I think that the response by the shadow Minister was frankly astonishing in almost seeking to absolve the Maduro regime of the responsibility that it should have for this crisis in the country that is causing misery to millions.
Will the Minister tell the House a little more about how further sanctions might be invoked, both in making sure that they are so finely targeted as not to have a negative impact on the people who are already suffering, and in using them to put pressure on individuals, particularly senior members of the military, to stop their backing for the corrupt and illegitimate Maduro regime, as that is what is enabling it to maintain its stranglehold on the country?
I welcome the hon. Lady’s welcome, if I may put it that way. I am glad that so many in this House find themselves in agreement. She is absolutely right. If we can apply some more targeted sanctions against individuals at the top in a way that does not undermine the wellbeing, such as it is, of the people themselves, we will of course want to pursue that. At the moment, that still requires EU sanctions. We do not yet have our autonomous ability to impose sanctions in that way. I hope that we will discuss further EU sanctions. We are not quite there yet because there are one or two elements within the EU who are resisting such pressures, but I hope we can overcome that.
The other respect in which we might be able to be more effective is to try to make sure that the money dries up. At the moment, the ever more isolated Maduro regime is held together by the support, primarily, of the military. In order to maintain that, he needs the money with which to pay them. I hope that in the coming weeks we will see the gradual erosion of support within the military for this increasingly isolated President. I hope that they will peel off and that we can help them to do so by making sure that the money flows that allow him to buy their support disappear as quickly as possible.
The economic collapse in Venezuela has left 90% of its population in poverty. Will my right hon. Friend join me in condemning those in this House who have actually praised the Venezuelan regime for conquering poverty?
I totally agree with my hon. Friend. This goes back a long way. Indeed, the Leader of the Opposition was an enormous fan of Maduro’s predecessor, Mr Chávez. He went out of his way to praise him for his inspiring leadership and
“for showing that the poor matter and wealth can be shared.”
That sharing of wealth allowed Chávez to amass a fortune of over $1 billion while his people pretty well had to go and lick the streets in order to feed themselves. This allows me to point out, I hope very clearly, that anyone who says that Venezuela’s plight is down to the action of the Americans and their sanctions ought to read my Chatham House speech from last November, which maps out in great detail the steps that Chávez and Maduro took, over many years, that have led to the complete collapse of the Venezuelan economy, almost all of which had nothing whatsoever to do with the United States.
Does the Minister understand that the problem with those on the political extremes of the spectrum is that they tend, in an ideological way, to see the world in terms of black and white, oppressor and oppressed? There is a real problem in seeing Maduro and his regime as the victim of others—America or whoever it may be. The truth is that the direct cause of the mass starvation and the 3 million refugees is the Chávez-Maduro corrupt communism that has been pursued in that country. A better illustration we could not get than the picture of the blockaded bridge that is still leading to starvation in the country. The doctors, by the way, are not allowed to designate people who die from malnutrition as having done so because they are banned from putting that on the death certificates.
What can we do to influence and put pressure on the regime? Can we get the Russian Administration to do more, or the Chinese or the Cubans? Are there individuals, perhaps even the leader of the Labour party, who have a close relationship with Maduro who could at this stage pick up the telephone and implore him—beg him—to stop this appalling approach and to leave government immediately?
If that were to work, we would all absolutely welcome it. Any influence that can be brought to bear should be used, out of basic human decency. This is not an ideological conflict, although some who seem to be more inclined to support Maduro than is the rest of the world have been accused of guilt on a number of counts—of supporting economic insanity, of indifference to intense human suffering, of a refusal to accept any measures to alleviate it, of an adherence to an ideology and a hatred for any leadership that is offered by the United States and the western world. Those attitudes have to be set aside. If there can be a practical course of action along the lines that the hon. Gentleman describes, we should encourage it. That is what is needed. We need this man to hand over power to the legitimate authorities in Venezuela so that his people can be rescued.
The Minister mentioned the fact that food aid is being blockaded. Are there any alternative plans to get the food aid through to the Venezuelan people? There is also the issue of Venezuela’s gold reserves in Turkey that has been mentioned in press reports. What is the position in relation to that?
I hope that pressure from neighbouring countries can have some effect in getting humanitarian aid in. Looking at the pictures we saw on our screens yesterday, I think it inevitable that there will be ever-deepening popular outrage in Venezuela itself that is likely to express itself increasingly strongly if Maduro remains in denial about humanitarian aid to the point of blocking it and forcing his people to starve in front of the world’s television cameras at the border.
On gold, there are gold reserves held by the Bank of England. It holds them under a contract; it is entirely down to the Bank, as an independent Bank of England. It is nothing to do with this Government. We are not empowered to, nor should we in any way attempt to, influence the decision of the Bank of England. I am sure that the Bank will be looking at unfolding events in Venezuela to work out who is legitimate and who is not.
I start by distancing myself from the remarks from the Labour Front Bench in relation to the blame for the crisis that Venezuela is suffering, which is destroying the fabric of the country. The responsibility for that does absolutely lie with Maduro and his predecessor, Chavez; most of us in this House are certain about that.
What worries me at the moment is the blockade on the border between Venezuela and Colombia. The people of Venezuela need that aid urgently, so what are the UK Government doing to bring pressure to bear to ensure that it can get through? Will the Minister convey a message from the vast majority of the Members of this House that we will not tolerate efforts by the Venezuelan regime to stop aid getting through to its people? It is deplorable.
I absolutely and totally agree with the hon. Lady, and totally share her decent human concern for the plight of Venezuelans, who are being denied the offer of desperately needed aid. May I make it absolutely clear that I, and I think all on the Government side of the House, are actually far less interested in pointing out the absurdity of some of the views held by those on Labour’s Front Bench than we are in wanting to find unity across the House in a way that can make the United Kingdom’s voice strong and loud in trying to help the people of Venezuela at this critical time. I therefore applaud what the hon. Lady and very many—indeed, the majority—of her colleagues have said, and are continuing to say, on this issue. When it comes to aid, we will do all we can. We have limited muscle, if you like, but the best way to do our best is to work with other countries, such as the Lima Group, which are there, as a strong neighbouring presence, to keep up the pressure on Maduro and Venezuela.
I thank the Minister for coming to the House today to make a statement. This is the second time that the House has debated the issue in the last 10 days. Really, we are talking about two different things here. First, this is being used as a subject to beat the Leader of the Opposition with for his defence of a Marxist regime. Secondly, it is being used by the Government side to increase the Government’s influence on the world stage. The Leader of the Opposition is not here to defend his Marxist views, and that is fine, but I would like to hear what the Minister has to say—where does he really think the role of the United Kingdom is upon the international stage—because anything we say about dialogue, empowerment and recognition of opponents will have no tangible benefit for the people of Venezuela, who are genuinely suffering.
I do not wholly agree with my hon. Friend’s suggestion that our influence and efforts amount to so little. I actually think that the UK has managed to establish itself as a very strong voice within the European Union, and as the head of the “EU pack”, on this. I have been working with the Lima Group since it was led by the previous Peruvian Foreign Minister; it is now led by new Foreign Minister Popolizio. I think that has helped to galvanise world opinion in a way that is making a difference. The one thing it may show itself to have done is to have given Juan Guaidó the confidence to make the stand that he has in asserting the workings of the constitution and declaring himself the interim President. If that then leads to elections, we will look back and say that it has made a difference.
I urge my hon. Friend to be a little more optimistic about how effective international diplomacy can be when it is wrestling with an issue such as this.
Is the Minister as concerned as I am about some of the displacement rhetoric and nonsense that has been put about on TV stations in the past few days? It is simply anti-American. Does that not cause us a more significant problem when we look at Maduro using that anti-American nonsense and rhetoric—sanctions that do not exist, military invasion that is not happening; there are no troops there—as an excuse to stop US aid going in across the Colombian border to help those poor Venezuelans? Does the Minister agree that that nonsense rhetoric is damaging the poor people of Venezuela, and that we should be concerned and should be welcoming the United States’ aid getting in to help those Venezuelan people? That should be our priority—not anti-western, anti-American bashing.
I echo the cries behind me and around the House of “Well said.” The hon. Gentleman speaks enormous sense because under the guise of anti- imperialism, those on the far left have made themselves useful for actual imperialists, as long as they are not American. They have used the spectre of western intervention to ignore or downplay real interventions on the part of other powerful imperial nations. “Displacement rhetoric”, as the hon. Gentleman puts it, is a good way of describing it, and it is culpable because it displaces the focus that we need to have on what positively can and must be done to rescue that poor beleaguered country.
I would certainly have hoped that Andrew Neil’s recent demolition of Ken Livingstone had put to bed any claims that there had been general sanctions on Venezuela, rather than targeted ones on regime individuals. So I welcome Britain’s recognition of Juan Guaidó as the lawful President of Venezuela, and I welcome the announcement of the current aid effort. My hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Middleton (Liz McInnes) kindly referred to my call for a Marshall plan for Venezuela, so may I again urge imaginative and detailed plans for the rapid subsequent reconstruction of Venezuela’s economy and infrastructure? Are the Minister’s Department and the Department for International Development getting on with that work, and if not, why not?
I fully acknowledge the right hon. Gentleman’s point. He is very wise to be thinking ahead in this way, because the inevitable need for rapid delivery of resources can suddenly become apparent, and it is important that the world is ready to leap straightaway into action. As I said earlier, I have seen this through pledging conferences in various countries, and I have no doubt that there will have to be extensive multilateral assistance to help Venezuela to rebuild, after which I think they will be able to rebuild themselves; but a bit of pump-priming and basic food and medicine and the addressing of disease and malnutrition needs to start as soon as possible. As I said, first that will be multilateral; there will need to be a lot of UN effort, to which we are a major contributor. I am due to see my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development next week, having spoken to her on Monday, and I will convey, as strongly as I possibly can, the views of the right hon. Gentleman to ensure that she is aware of the sort of plan that may be necessary.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Evans.
During the 1990s, the trade in conflict diamonds was a significant cause of instability, particularly in Africa. The Kimberley process certification scheme is an important tool for reducing conflict in Africa and elsewhere. Great strides have been made since its inception in 2002. Today, more than 99% of the global supply chain of rough diamonds is certified as conflict-free.
From the beginning of the Kimberley process, the UK has been represented by the European Union. Together with our European partners and other participants, the UK has been active in support of the Kimberley process and its principles: increasing transparency, ensuring that trade is limited to Kimberley process participants, and applying effective controls.
The Kimberley process is not a treaty and has no basis in international law. It is simply a grouping of interested states known as the “participants”, which have decided to enact domestically the same process for verifying the trade in rough diamonds at their borders. They then made the political decision to permit the trade in rough diamonds only with similarly minded states within the Kimberley process. Its legal effect, therefore, comes from domestic legislation. Hence, if we are to continue to participate in the process after we leave the EU, as we intend, the draft regulations are essential.
As Members will be aware, until 29 March 2019 the UK remains a full member state and is subject to all the rights and obligations of EU membership. Those include trade arrangements that fall within the EU’s common commercial policy, such as the Kimberley process. Under the terms of the withdrawal agreement, we have agreed with the EU that it will notify international partners that the UK is to be treated as a member state during the implementation period. That would mean that the UK continues to participate, represented by the EU, and that the UK trade in Kimberley process-compliant rough diamonds would continue.
In the event that we are unable to enter an implementation period, our participation through the EU would end. UK trade would be frozen until our application for participation was approved by the other participants in the Kimberley process. In either case, this draft legislation will ensure that we continue to comply with the requirements of the Kimberley process. It will secure our borders, prevent any non-compliant rough diamonds entering the UK supply chain and send a strong message to would-be smugglers that the UK is not a recipient of conflict diamonds.
May I first explain the logic fully? Perhaps my hon. Friend will save his comments for later in the Committee sitting, when I shall be happy to answer.
The draft regulations will also reassure the Kimberley process bodies of the UK’s commitment to the scheme ahead of our application for independent participation. The instrument does not undermine the wider EU withdrawal negotiations, nor does it assume no deal. Instead, it lays the groundwork for our future relationship with, and independent participation in, the Kimberley process. That matters because maintaining our relationship with the process is an intrinsic element of our international commitment to conflict prevention. It is also pivotal to how we support UK business to operate responsibly in post-conflict and difficult environments.
In 2017, the UK’s exports in rough diamonds outside the EU were valued at £67 million. We expect that to continue. The Government Diamond Office implements the Kimberley process in the UK and works closely with Border Force to ensure that we meet the minimum standards set by the process.
As an EU member state, we are a well-respected participant in the Kimberley process, and we expect to remain so as an independent participant. We have already informed the EU of our intention to initiate our application. Demonstrating that we have appropriate legislation in place is a fundamental part of that application process. That is the purpose of the instrument, which, once passed, will apply even if we are not a participant immediately at the point that the UK leaves the European Union or after any implementation period.
I welcome the opportunity to hear any comments. The regulations are essential to the process I have described and I commend them to the Committee.
I am grateful to hon. Members for their comments and questions. Let me endeavour to answer them in turn.
I will respond first to the hon. Member for Heywood and Middleton, on the Opposition Front Bench. Among other things, if we were not a participant, others would not trade in rough diamonds with us, so we would be out of the trading system that has emerged on the back of the Kimberley process. Potentially, that could lead to a weakness in the policing of the trade in rough diamonds.
The cost would be the same as now. Likewise, the impact is unchanged, hence the absence of a need for an impact assessment. The point that I would make is that the draft regulations are simply the transposition of the EU-based regime to an autonomous UK one, so that we can participate autonomously. I suppose the parallel is with the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018: we used to do all sanctions with the EU, but now we will be able to do them on our own. The regulations are one of the changes necessary to adjust to us leaving the European Union.
In response to the hon. Member for Vauxhall, 82 countries are members, which include Zimbabwe. We are confident that our existing participant status will be embraced by the 81 as we reapply on a slightly different footing.
My hon. Friend the Member for Braintree is absolutely right to emphasise again the importance of this regime in addressing some of the worst aspects of conflict and rapacious behaviour in war-torn areas. My hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham is also right that this is not a perfect regime, but it has been a successful and improving one, given what was there before, which was quite simply nothing.
The hon. Member for Glenrothes asked about influencing direction. We would remain a full participant, and would be so on our own, so inasmuch as we could influence direction in the past, we will still be able to do so in future. The draft regulations are a transposition of the regime—that is what such statutory instruments are for—which does not open up immediately any scope for adjusting, improving or amending, because that is not what the changes before us are intended to do.
I thank my right hon. Friend for allowing me to intervene again. May I ask whether, on 30 March—assuming that we leave on 29 March, as we will—Hatton Garden, say, will be able to import legal diamonds into the country? Is that what this is all about?
So this is about a particular category of diamond. The draft regulations mean that if we were a participant, anything legal in the Kimberley process would include us in that process; if we do not pass them today, it would not.
Let me answer one more question put to me about the powers. The Kimberley process requires participating Governments to certify the origin of rough diamonds and to put in place effective controls to prevent conflict diamonds entering the supply chain. That is done through the Kimberley process certification scheme, of which we would be a part if the draft regulations go through. In the process, each international shipment of rough diamonds must be accompanied by a Kimberley process certificate relating to that specific shipment. In other words, the certificate is valid for one specific journey only. The certificates are issued by the exporting country’s Kimberley process authority, which has controls in place to verify that the shipments are conflict-free.
As I outlined in my opening speech, the draft regulations are crucial to our participation in the Kimberley process and, in turn, to our conflict prevention objectives and obligations. The instrument is fully consistent with the Prime Minister’s commitment to be a supportive member of the European Union until we leave, and it will ensure the UK’s continuous compliance with the scheme. It has the added advantage, Mr Evans, of making me a greater expert in rough trade than even you, sir. I commend the regulations to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.