(5 years, 3 months ago)
Written StatementsFurther to my written statement of 26 June 2017 (HCWS10), on 25 February the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos archipelago from Mauritius in 1965. We were disappointed that this matter was referred to the International Court of Justice, contrary to the principle that the Court should not consider bilateral disputes without the consent of both states concerned. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom respects the ICJ and participated fully in the ICJ process at every stage and in good faith. An advisory opinion is advice provided to the United Nations General Assembly at its request; it is not a legally binding judgment. The Government have considered the content of the opinion carefully, however we do not share the Court’s approach.
As outlined in the previous written ministerial statement, we have no doubt about our sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago, which has been under continuous British sovereignty since 1814. Mauritius has never held sovereignty over the archipelago and we do not recognise its claim. We have, however, made a long-standing commitment since 1965 to cede sovereignty of the territory to Mauritius when it is no longer required for defence purposes. We stand by that commitment.
The joint United Kingdom-United States defence facility on Diego Garcia helps to keep people in Britain and around the world safe. For nearly 40 years the facility has helped the United Kingdom, United States, other allies and our regional partners, including Mauritius, combat some of the most challenging threats to international peace and security, including those from terrorism, organised crime and piracy. The facility also remains ready for a rapid and impactful response in times of humanitarian crisis in the region. These functions are only possible under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.
As the Foreign Secretary confirmed to PM Jugnauth on 27 April 2019, Mauritius is a valued friend, trading partner and member of the Commonwealth. We are fully committed to our bilateral relationship and also want to deepen and intensify engagement with Mauritius. With regard to the very important matter of the Chagossians we are continuing our work to design a support package worth approximately £40 million, to improve Chagossian livelihoods in the communities in Mauritius, the Seychelles and the UK where they now live.
I have placed a copy of the advisory opinion in the Libraries of both Houses.
Attachments can also be viewed online at: http://www. parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statement/written-statement/Commons/2019-04-30/HCWS1528.
[HCWS1528]
(5 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move motion 1,
That the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 618), which were laid before this House on 22 March, be approved.
With this we shall consider the following:
Motion 2—Exiting the European Union (Sanctions) (Zimbabwe)—
That the Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 604), which were laid before this House on 20 March, be approved.
Motion 3—Exiting the European Union (Sanctions) (Republic of Belarus)—
That the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 600), which were laid before this House on 20 March, be approved.
Motion 4—Exiting the European Union (Sanctions) (Syria)—
That the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 792), which were laid before this House on 5 April, be approved.
Right hon. and hon. Members will be well aware of the importance of sanctions, which are a key element of our approach to our most important international priorities. They help to defend our national interests, support our foreign policy and protect our national security. They also demonstrate our support for the rules-based international order.
The UK has been a leading contributor to the development of multilateral sanctions in recent years. We have been particularly influential in guiding the EU’s approach, which is why, when we transpose the EU sanctions regimes to the UK, we intend to carry over its policy effect. I will say more about that in a moment.
We are committed to maintaining our sanctions capabilities and leadership role after we leave the EU. Colleagues will recall that the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 provides the UK with the legal powers to impose, update and lift sanctions after we leave the EU. This was the first major legislative step in creating an independent UK sanctions framework.
However, although the Act sets out the framework needed to impose our own independent sanctions, we need statutory instruments to set out the detail of each sanctions regime within that framework. Such statutory instruments set out the purposes of our sanctions regimes, the criteria under which the Secretary of State may designate individuals and entities and the types of restrictive measures imposed. They do not specify which individuals or entities will be sanctioned. The Government will publish the list of those we are sanctioning under UK legislation when the prohibitions come into force. We will seek to transfer EU designations in each case, but those decisions will be subject to the legal tests set out in the Act. Any EU listings that do not meet the tests will not be implemented.
Although we will become “independent”, in that sense of the word, in relation to sanctions, how does the Minister propose to co-operate with other countries? Is there a mechanism for the Government to do that, so that we can control chemical weapons?
If we leave the EU with a deal, there will be a period of transition in which we will retain our sanctions under the existing EU system. If we leave with no deal, which is what we are addressing today, we will need to trigger our autonomous right to have sanctions. Therefore, we need these statutory instruments. I am sure that in the event that we are not part of the EU, our leadership on sanctions and the fact that the City of London is such an important financial centre for money laundering—[Laughter.] For anti-money laundering. It will mean that we retain our pre-eminent role in influencing sanctions, as we have in the past.
The House may recall that review and reporting requirements were incorporated in the 2018 Act. We have therefore published alongside these statutory instruments a report on the purposes of each sanctions regime, and on the penalties contained within each instrument. Those reports are available in the Vote Office, should Members have an interest in them, and the Government will review each sanctions regime on a regular basis. I wish to thank the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments for its close and helpful scrutiny of so many statutory instruments relating to sanctions over recent months.
The four SIs under consideration are those that transfer into UK law the EU sanctions regimes on chemical weapons, Zimbabwe, Belarus and Syria. In each case, the instrument seeks to deliver substantially the same policy effects as the measures in the corresponding EU regime. Hon. Members will note that human rights are a significant focus of some of the sanctions regimes under consideration today. I know that many hon. Members are keen for the UK to develop our own stand-alone human rights sanctions regime under the 2018 Act and may therefore query why we are simply transferring existing EU sanctions regimes.
Obviously the sanctions are there for the purpose of suggesting change, if that can be done, in Zimbabwe, Belarus, Syria and so on. I am conscious of the need to have human rights and a democratic process that actually works. Does the Minister feel that what we are doing now, alongside those who have worked within Europe in the past, will influence change in human rights, including sometimes the rights of those of religious belief?
In general terms, the answer is yes, I very much hope so. That is what sanctions are designed to do. However, as the House will appreciate, we are today just looking at the framework within which specific sanctions regimes can fit, rather than at the actual sanctions regimes or indeed their efficacy and effect in the countries we are discussing. We are looking at a legal framework under these SIs; we are not really looking at the full operation of the sanctions that may form part of the framework we are setting up today.
I assure colleagues that the 2018 Act does indeed provide the necessary powers in UK law to allow us to develop our own regime. However, these SIs were laid on a contingent basis to provide for the continuation of sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. As such, our priority has necessarily been to ensure the transfer of existing EU measures by laying SIs such as these. We will give consideration to new regimes as circumstances suggest and as parliamentary time allows. Approving these regulations would ensure that we have the necessary powers to impose sanctions in respect of Zimbabwe, Belarus and Syria, and in respect of the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, from the date of our EU exit. In the event of a deal, EU sanctions would continue to apply during the implementation period, and these instruments would not immediately be needed. As a member of the EU, or during the implementation period, EU sanctions will apply in the UK. We will look to use the powers provided by the 2018 Act to the fullest extent possible during this period, but there will be some limitations on the measures we can impose autonomously. I wish quickly to describe the purpose of each regime.
The chemical weapons sanctions regulations aim to deter the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, and encourage the effective implementation of the chemical weapons convention, by imposing immigration and financial sanctions on those involved in their use and proliferation.
The Zimbabwe sanctions regulations aim to encourage the Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights, and to deter the repression of civil society. The regulations impose an arms embargo and other financial, immigration and trade restrictions, including on the trade in goods and technology that may be used for internal repression.
The Belarus sanctions regulations aim to address human rights abuses and threats to the rule of law, and to encourage the proper investigation and institution of criminal proceedings against those responsible for the disappearance of four individuals. The measures include an arms embargo, financial and immigration sanctions, and restrictions on goods or technology that may be used for internal repression.
The Syria sanctions regulations aim to deter the Syrian regime from actions, policies or activities that repress the civilian population, and to encourage a negotiated political settlement to end the conflict. The regulations include asset freezes and/or travel bans on designated persons, together with financial, sectoral and aircraft sanctions; and wide-ranging trade restrictions, including on goods and technology that may be used for internal repression and the interception and monitoring of telecommunications, but also in respect of other goods and technology, such as crude oil, jet fuel, luxury goods and items that can contribute to chemical and biological weapons.
These four SIs transfer into UK law well-established EU sanctions regimes that are in line with the UK’s foreign policy priorities. They encourage respect for human rights, the rule of law and security and stability in very difficult environments—
I am about to finish. If the hon. Gentleman would like to catch your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker, he may stand a chance of asking some questions, which I will answer at the end.
Approving these SIs will allow the UK to continue to implement sanctions from the moment we leave the EU, and it will send a strong signal of our intention to continue to play a leading role in the development and implementation of sanctions in the future. I commend them to the House.
I would genuinely like to thank all Members who have contributed to the debate. Many have done so from a position of significant expertise and knowledge of the countries mentioned in the framework sanctions regime we are discussing.
Madam Deputy Speaker, I am mindful of your stricture that we must not stray from the matters on the Order Paper, but inevitably some Members have been drawn into discussing the broader national issues around the framework law we are discussing. I am sure that the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) will appreciate that it would be inappropriate for me to comment on an individual such as the niece of President Assad.
Well, I am indignant. The convention in the House is surely that anything covered in an explanatory memorandum is reasonable to put to the Minister. I am extremely concerned that the niece of President Assad has been allowed to live and study in this country. Surely if the Minister looks at part 2 of the regulations on the designation of persons, he can see that she is a person who has supported or benefited from the Syrian regime and is a prominent person—she falls into the categories included in the documents, as does the question I raised about Daesh and about the white phosphorus incident in Indonesia. It may be inconvenient for the Minister to answer those questions, but it must surely be in order.
I am afraid that the hon. Lady’s indignation is wrong on all counts. First, white phosphorus does not fall under the chemical weapons regime as it is a different sort of weapon, nor does Daesh, which falls under other regimes related to al-Qaeda and Daesh. I think it would be highly inappropriate for me to discuss an individual when we are looking at the framework within which the sort of designations the hon. Lady mentions can take place. These regulations put in place the law within which those designations can happen. We are not specifically looking at the designations themselves.
In respect of what we are able to transfer into the framework we are discussing, the sanctions relating to Belarus, for instance, were agreed in 2004. The EU sanctions regime currently imposes asset freezes and travel bans on four Belarus nationals with links to the Belarus Government who were implicated in the disappearance of two opposition politicians, a businessman and a journalist in 1999 and 2000. The hon. Lady also asked about changing the chemical weapons regime. We are mindful of our and others’ obligations under the chemical weapons convention and, through the regulations, we would have the flexibility to change sanctions should it be thought appropriate.
These regulations are necessary to enable the UK to implement our independent sanctions policy within the framework of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 from the moment we leave the EU. Approving the regulations would in no way prevent the development of an autonomous human rights sanctions regime. The sanctions Act enables sanctions to be imposed for a variety of purposes, including responding to or deterring gross violations of human rights, or otherwise promoting compliance with human rights law or to respect human rights.
Sanctions are an integral part of our response to the most important foreign policy challenges we face. We must be ready to deliver sanctions independently as soon as the UK leaves the EU, and that is why these statutory instruments are so important. Transposing EU sanctions regimes in this way puts the UK on a solid footing to continue to protect our interests, defend our values and maintain the position of leadership that we have built on sanctions over so many years. I commend the regulations to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 618), which were laid before this House on 22 March, be approved.
Exiting the European Union (Sanctions) (Zimbabwe)
Resolved,
That the Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 604), which were laid before this House on 20 March, be approved.—(Sir Alan Duncan.)
Exiting the European Union (Sanctions) (Republic of Belarus)
Resolved,
That the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 600), which were laid before this House on 20 March, be approved.—(Sir Alan Duncan.)
Exiting the European Union (Sanctions) (Syria)
Resolved,
That the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 792), which were laid before this House on 5 April, be approved.—(Sir Alan Duncan.)
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
Resolved,
That Ian Blackford be removed from the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament under Schedule 1 to the Justice and Security Act 2013 and Stewart Hosie be appointed to that Committee under section 1 of that Act.—(Paul Maynard.)
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) for initiating this debate, and for setting out the arguments so clearly and in such a well-informed manner—as did all hon. Members who contributed.
At the outset, I want to comment on the outcome of Ukraine’s presidential election. With the vast majority of votes counted, Volodymyr Zelensky won Sunday’s second round run-off with just over 73% of the vote. It is a testament to the development of Ukraine’s democracy that the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights judged the second round to be peaceful and competitive. Its representative stated that the process respected fundamental freedoms.
I also pay tribute to President Poroshenko, who led Ukraine over the past five years in the face of unprecedented security and foreign policy challenges. He has accepted the choice of the Ukrainian people with great dignity and has offered to work with the President-elect. Our Prime Minister spoke to President-elect Zelensky yesterday. She congratulated him on his clear victory and assured him of the UK’s ongoing support. That important commitment is at the heart of today’s topic. We will debate one aspect of Ukraine’s territorial integrity: Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. The Government’s position is absolutely clear: Crimea and Sevastopol are part of Ukraine. Russia’s illegal annexation and its continuing destabilisation of Ukraine is reprehensible. This Government will never recognise or legitimise Russia’s status in Crimea.
It is now five years since Russia illegally annexed 10,000 square miles of sovereign Ukrainian territory. Russia’s military intervention and subsequent unlawful referendum violated not only the Ukrainian constitution, but international law. As my hon. Friend the Member for Henley clearly outlined, Russia is now using a whole range of strategies to maintain its hold on Ukrainian territory and undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. It uses political manipulation and disinformation to fuel the conflict and interfere with elections; it forcibly moves Ukrainian citizens out of Crimea and moves Russian citizens in, in violation of the Geneva convention; and it persistently fails to meet its commitments under the Minsk agreements. It should withdraw its forces from all of Ukraine.
As we have heard, in November, Russia attacked and seized Ukrainian vessels and 24 servicemen as they sought to enter the sea of Azov through the Kerch strait, as they have every right to do. Those servicemen continue to be detained in Moscow. I call on Russia to release these servicemen immediately and return the vessels to Ukraine.
Russian authorities have overseen the militarisation and the systematic restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms in Crimea, including freedom of expression, of movement and of religion, as well as the right to peaceful assembly. Despite repeated calls in UN General Assembly resolutions, Russia has not permitted the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit to make a full independent assessment of the human rights situation. Even without such an assessment, the weight of evidence is damning. Minority groups, such as Crimean Tatars, face clear and increasing levels of persecution. Twenty-three Tatars were unlawfully detained following raids on their homes on 27 March, for example. Russia continues to ban the Tatars’ representative institution, the Mejlis. That violates a 2017 International Court of Justice order.
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has also documented a catalogue of abuses against political opponents and minorities in Crimea. Those abuses include arbitrary detentions and arrests, enforced disappearances and torture. Those who refuse to recognise Russian-based legislation applicable to Crimea are denied their basic human rights. Ukrainians face pressure to renounce their citizenship in favour of Russian citizenship; if they refuse, they are denied access to basic services. Crimeans are being forcibly conscripted into the Russian military—nearly 15,000 have been conscripted since 2015.
The UK is instrumental in ensuring a robust international response to Russia’s actions. Following the annexation of Crimea, Russia was suspended from the G8. The EU, the US, and partners including Canada and Australia, imposed a robust package of sanctions targeting key sectors of Russia’s economy, and we continue to co-ordinate our response to Russia’s actions.
I bring the Minister back to my earlier point about the Golan Heights. Would it not undermine our position if we opposed annexation in Crimea but endorsed the US position on the annexation of the Golan Heights?
I hope that everyone in this Chamber is in favour of the consistent application of such rules across the world, be it with Israel or with Russia. That consistent application is essential if we are to defend what is widely known as the rules-based international order.
Many of those responsible for the annexation have been sanctioned. We have imposed stringent restrictions on doing business in Crimea, for instance. Importing goods from Crimea is illegal and exports to key sectors are banned. We will not legitimise the annexation by making it easy to do business there.
Following the visit to Odesa in December by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, the UK also extended and deepened our military assistance to Ukraine through the Operation Orbital training mission. NATO measures to enhance allies’ capability and presence in the Black sea will also contribute to an increased regional deterrent.
Is it the Government’s view that the Russian Federation should be expelled from the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe?
When we have something to say, we will choose the time to say it. This is not the forum in which to comment on the Council of Europe, because the debate, as on the Order Paper, is on Crimea.
With respect to the human rights situation, the UK continues to provide funding to Crimean human rights non-governmental organisations and to the UN human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine, to help document and highlight human rights abuses.
It is testament to the bravery and fortitude of Crimean civil society that it continues to speak out in the face of relentless harassment. I know that some hon. Members took the opportunity to meet some remarkable Ukrainian human rights activists in Parliament last month. They were here for the screening of a documentary—partly funded by the UK—that highlights Russia’s human rights record in the peninsula, and the plight of over 70 political prisoners. Among such prisoners is Oleg Sentsov, who has been detained since 2014. The Foreign Secretary and I have consistently voiced our serious concerns about his welfare and deteriorating health. We have also condemned Russia for failing to provide Pavlo Hryb and Edem Bekirov with the urgent medical care that they need. They have been detained since August 2017 and December 2018 respectively.
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, and its continued interference in Ukraine, are illegal under international law. Ukraine chose a Euro-Atlantic future, and Russia must respect Ukraine’s sovereign decision, its independence and its territorial integrity. Until that happens, there can be no return to normal relations with Russia. That is why we will work to strengthen the resolve of the international community to stand firm against behaviour of this sort by Russia, to keep Crimea in the spotlight, and to expose Russia’s human rights violations.
We will continue to work with the Ukrainian Government to support its sovereignty and territorial integrity. We welcome the peaceful conduct of the presidential election on Sunday, and I congratulate Ukraine on holding the elections in an open and transparent manner. I offer my personal congratulations to Volodymyr Zelensky. Not only are the Prime Minister and the President-elect both Jewish, but they are both called Volodymyr. I also express gratitude to President Poroshenko for his leadership over the last five years in the face of the unprecedented security and foreign policy challenges for Ukraine. I welcome the strong partnership that we have built with Ukraine, in which we will continue to invest considerable energy.
In her call with President-elect Zelensky, the Prime Minister reiterated that the UK stands shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine. We will continue to remind the world that Crimea and Sevastopol are Ukrainian, that we will not recognise Russia’s illegal annexation, and that Russia will continue to face costs for its flagrant disregard for international law.
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office if he will make a statement on what representations he has made to the Saudi Government with respect to the mass execution of 37 people yesterday.
We are very concerned by the executions of 37 men in Saudi Arabia, and the Foreign Office is working to establish the full facts. The Foreign Secretary will be raising this matter with the Saudi authorities at the earliest opportunity. The UK Government oppose the death penalty in all circumstances and in every country, including in Saudi Arabia. We regularly raise human rights concerns, including the use of the death penalty, at the highest levels with the Saudi Arabian authorities.
May I ask the Minister specifically what representations were made in respect of the 12 condemned men I referred to the Prime Minister’s attention on 3 December, including Abbas al-Hassan, who was executed yesterday?
Does the Minister recall his predecessor’s statement on 7 March 2018 that the Foreign Office was
“concerned with those cases where minors might have been indicted”—[Official Report, 7 March 2018; Vol. 637, c. 319.]
but that he had received assurances on that matter? Is the Minister now aware of the fact that three of the executed people, and possibly more, were indeed juveniles, and that in most of these cases—again, in flagrant disregard for international law—most appear to have been tortured prior to the extraction of confessions? Does he acknowledge that there have been around 100 executions so far this year and that, according to the campaigning group Reprieve, Saudi Arabia is on track to execute 300 people by the end of this year? Will the Minister agree to meet me and representatives of Reprieve to go through the list of condemned people and see how representations could most effectively be made?
Finally, does he accept that Britain’s moral position on this issue is somewhat compromised by the continued supply of arms, fuelling atrocities in the civil war in Yemen, and that we are in urgent need of a reappraisal of our relationship with Saudi Arabia, given that the continued medieval barbarism of the regime does not constitute the basis for a friendly alliance, and indeed makes it an enemy of our values and our human rights?
I very much agree with the right hon. Gentleman that this situation does raise the gravest imaginable concerns. Executing 37 people is a deeply backwards step, which we deplore. In response to the specific question about representations that have been made in the past, I can confirm that British embassy representatives in Riyadh did make representations regarding specific individuals last November.
The right hon. Gentleman is right to point out that one of the grave concerns about these executions is that they would appear to include minors, or those who were minors at the time that the charges were made. This is of course totally unacceptable and we deplore it. I can advise the House that in just the last few minutes, the European Union—and we have put our name fully to this—has issued a very strong statement of condemnation through the European External Action Service, pointing out that these executions are a regressive step and specifically raising concerns that some of the 37 people executed were minors.
I fully appreciate what the right hon. Gentleman is saying regarding our arms exports. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faces a number of threats; the issue of arms is not just about using arms in Yemen. We ensure that any arms exports fully comply with the consolidated criteria that govern any such sales.
I share the sentiments expressed by my right hon. Friend at the Dispatch Box. The security and stability of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia matters a great deal in the region, and is indeed the basis of our relationship. Notwithstanding our shared concerns with regards to terror, will my right hon. Friend confirm that we do everything we can to use our influence to impress upon the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that that relationship carries with it obligations? When he and the House express themselves in such strong terms, there is usually a very good reason why those concerns are being expressed, and they should be listened to.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for what he has said. He speaks with the utmost authority in this House and was an excellent Minister for the Middle East; I have to say that, at a moment like this, I rather wish that he still was. I can say in all honesty that, despite always being polite, he never held back from telling his counterparts in Saudi Arabia where he thought they were making mistakes and where he thought their record on human rights fell short. It is by having access of that sort and having trusted Ministers on our side that we can best get that message over—and I hope, over time, make a difference.
As we have heard, yesterday saw the largest mass execution in Saudi Arabia since January 2016, in which 37 people were killed. According to the official Saudi press agency, the men were executed:
“for adopting terrorist and extremist thinking and for forming terrorist cells to corrupt and destabilise security”.
They were arrested after four Islamic State gunmen attacked a Saudi security compound in Riyadh, but the Saudi authorities have still not made clear whether those arrested were linked to the attacks.
Publicly pinning one of the headless bodies to a pole as a warning is not only disturbingly barbaric and medieval in nature, but an abhorrent violation of human rights. According to the families of those executed, there was no prior notice that the executions would be carried out. That is a blatant flouting of international standards set out by even the most brutal of regimes that still use the death penalty. We know that some, if not all, of those executed were convicted in Saudi Arabia’s Specialised Criminal Court, which has been widely condemned by human rights groups as secretive, and which has in the past been used to try human rights activists, whom the state often wrongly regards as terrorists.
We also know that at least three of those executed were juveniles—a clear violation of international law, which the Saudi regime appears to care very little about. Abdulkarim al-Hawaj was charged with participating in demonstrations, incitement via social media and preparing banners with anti-state slogans. Reports from human rights watchdogs in the country claim that he was beaten and the so-called confessions extracted from him through various means of torture. Mujtaba al-Sweikat was a student about to begin his studies at Western Michigan University when he was arrested at King Fahd airport, beaten and so-called confessions extracted through torture. Salman Qureish was just 18 when he was executed, but he was convicted of crimes that allegedly took place when he was still a child. The UN has condemned his sentencing and the use of the death penalty against him after he was denied basic legal rights, such as access to a lawyer.
Saudi Arabia has executed more than 100 people already this year. If it continues, the number of executions this year alone will reach over 300. Human rights group Reprieve says that five of the prisoners it supported were executed yesterday. Many were forced to stand in stress positions for hours and deprived of sleep until a confession was extracted.
These executions have caused a breakdown in Saudi Arabia’s relations with Iran and have the potential to destabilise the region further, so what discussions has the Minister had with his Saudi counterpart since the executions took place? Will the Government condemn the use of the death penalty in Saudi Arabia today? Will the Government call for an immediate end to executions in Saudi Arabia? Finally, what plans do the Government have to tackle the use of violence against human rights activists in Saudi Arabia?
I yield to none in my affection and admiration for the hon. Gentleman, but he is fortunate that I am in a generous mood. I note in passing that he was due to speak for two minutes, spoke for a little over three, and the first of his four questions was posed after three minutes and one second. It was a volley of unsurpassable eloquence, but it was a tad too long.
The right hon. Gentleman and I share in common a characteristic of being short, and we have done so for some decades, as he knows.
I will happily confirm that you always win, but I will not say in which direction I am pointing, Mr Speaker.
I do not think anyone in this House would disagree with what the hon. Member for Leeds North East (Fabian Hamilton) has said. All Members want to defend human rights, and we abhor executions of this sort. We really do genuinely disapprove in the strongest possible terms of what has happened, particularly when it is reported that one of those executed was displayed on a cross—something that anyone in this House just a few days after Easter will find more repulsive than anything we could have pictured.
We have to be sure of our facts, however. We need to find out directly what precisely were the supposed crimes and what was the due process used. Although the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can legitimately use its law to bear down on genuine extremist threats, its Government must appreciate that there will be growing international pressure on them to accept that the sort of action we are discussing is utterly unacceptable in the modern world. It does them no credit and it does not support the basis of law that any proper country should be working on.
I have worked with the hon. Members for Stockton South (Dr Williams) and the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran) on a detention review panel of the female human rights activists in Saudi Arabia. Does my right hon. Friend accept that these executions and the accelerating pace of executions in Saudi Arabia cannot be seen in isolation from the wider criminal justice policy—if that is what one should call it—that relates to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and the detention of civil society activists in Saudi Arabia? If Saudi Arabian civil society space is closed down as it has been, the security and stability of the country, which is after all our ally, will be the victim.
My hon. Friend makes a serious point: any country needs to realise that using such methods will eventually backfire. Although I think there are greater arguments for pointing out how unacceptable such methods are, rulers are wise to be mindful of such dangers.
I did not answer the question put by the hon. Member for Leeds North East about human rights defenders. Yes, we will raise the issue of freedom and protection for those who defend human rights. It is not acceptable to attack non-governmental organisations when what they are doing is trying to defend justice.
I thank the right hon. Member for Twickenham (Sir Vince Cable) for securing this urgent question.
We are here to discuss yet more appalling human rights violations. There is huge concern about this latest mass execution. Not only is it reported that a number of those executed were from the Shi’a minority, but, critically, and as has been pointed out, a number of those put to death were minors at the time of the alleged crimes.
We have been here rather frequently to discuss human rights violations, what is happening in Yemen, the murder of Mr Khashoggi, and so on. The issues are raised, and when we talk about arms sales and our relations with Saudi Arabia we are told that we have influence, but it is difficult to see that influence at the moment. Does the Minister agree that we must reassess the relationship with Saudi Arabia? Also, instead of us coming back time after time to discuss more issues of concern, will the right hon. Gentleman commit to returning to the House to tell us what has been done about that reassessment?
I will be discussing this with the Foreign Secretary, and he will be calling his counterpart, the relatively new Foreign Minister in Saudi Arabia. The hon. Gentleman makes a serious point that we should all take on board: the broader picture gives growing cause for concern. We can look at those who have been executed and their number—Shi’a, minors and those whose crimes we do not know, as well as the Khashoggi incident—and I am sure that we will be robust in our embassy and Minister-to-Minister representations. It is important that the regime in Saudi Arabia appreciates that the voice of world opinion can only get louder in its condemnation.
The King of Saudi Arabia is reported as being interested in ensuring that there is prison reform in his kingdom. Will my right hon. Friend reassure me that prison conditions will be on the agenda next time he raises human rights with the Saudis?
This is an important agenda. When I was a Minister at the Department for International Development, I always wanted prison visiting and access to be a condition of any aid that we gave to a country, although I did not exactly succeed in my objective. My hon. Friend illustrates the important point that when people are hidden and no one can get to them, we do not know what is going on. The ability for decent people to inspect prisons and visit prisoners, as is the case in this country, is a very important aspect of any judicial system and the human rights that ought to go alongside it.
Saudi Arabia is now one of the world’s top executioners, behind only China and Iran. Amnesty International called the recent executions
“a chilling demonstration of the Saudi Arabian authorities’ callous disregard for human life. It is also yet another gruesome indication of how the death penalty is being used as a political tool to crush dissent from within the country’s Shi’a minority.”
These Shi’a men apparently were convicted after sham trials that involved torture. We must condemn this in the strongest possible terms and take some kind of action. Words are easy, but the UK must give a direct indication that we will not put up with this kind of thing.
No one can question the right hon. Lady’s track record on defending human rights. We hear loudly what she says. One of the questions we need to ask the Saudi Government is what on earth they think this will achieve. The practical benefit seems entirely negative, and I hope that the rational argument that the death penalty achieves nothing in the modern world will eventually sink in.
Does the Minister feel, as I do, that the feebleness of the response to the Khashoggi murder and the butchering of his body has in some way encouraged the Saudi authorities to think they can get away with anything, no matter how brutal and borderline insane?
I do not quite agree with my right hon. Friend. The international reaction was pretty robust, and a collective voice condemned it, led by Turkey, where it happened. I would like to think that that incident had a dividend and it got through to people that it was unacceptable, and they were taken aback by the fact that the murder of one person counted for so much elsewhere in the world. I hope it will never be repeated.
Three more juveniles who were arrested after the Arab spring for peaceful protest—Dawood al-Marhoon, Ali al-Nimr and Abdullah Hasan al-Zaher—have gone through the same process and are on death row awaiting execution by beheading, which could happen at any time with no notice. Will the Government make specific representations for those three? Otherwise, we will see more executions as the year progresses.
These 37 executions will spur us to take a deep interest in not only the general concept and principle of the death penalty but individual cases. Given the robustness of the statement just issued by the European Union, I am confident that we will not be alone in making our opinions clear.
Can we have a measure of repentance about the enthusiasm with which we sponsored Saudi Arabia for the United Nations Human Rights Council?
I am always happy to be repentant to my right hon. Friend. I am not familiar with the exact details of what he refers to, but I maintain the position that we will make our views on these issues clear in a very robust way to the Saudi Government.
I remind the House that I chair the all-party parliamentary British-Qatar group and am an officer of the all-party group on Kuwait, so I hope the Minister will accept that he does not need to persuade me of the importance of creating good relations with our friends in the Gulf. But when I read about the use of not only capital punishment but torture to obtain confessions, on the basis of which the executions were carried out—including the torture of Munir al-Adam, who was beaten so badly that he lost his hearing in one ear—I find myself asking, why do the Government of my country want to regard these people as our friends? Surely this is the time for a fundamental reappraisal of our relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
We unreservedly condemn torture in all circumstances. I understand what the right hon. Gentleman is asking for. We have to look at the broader picture of the entire Gulf and the dangers around it. That is always taken into consideration when looking at who we work with across the world.
I know how much my right hon. Friend cares and how hard he works on these matters of human rights. The European Union has also condemned what is happening. Can we ensure that this is not just the ritual condemnation that happens immediately after an event and then is forgotten, but that at every opportunity in his dialogue with Saudi counterparts, he stresses the value that this country and our European partners place on freedom, human rights, religious freedom and all those areas that would be of great benefit to Saudi Arabia if it were to embrace them?
My hon. Friend is right. It is no good just having a day’s anger after an event such as this. It has to be persistent and consistent, and the condemnation of executions of this sort and any abuse of human rights has to be built into our policy and actions at all time.
Human rights abuses, executions, airstrikes in Yemen killing 100 in March alone, including 19 children—if the Saudis continue to fail to listen to the Minister’s pleading, why does he extend to them the veneer of respectability?
The hon. Lady mentions Yemen. I have spent many decades taking an interest in Yemen. I hope we will now see some progress towards a political settlement. We have to give our full support to Martin Griffiths, our UN representative. Part of the message we have to send to the Saudi Government is that bombings in Yemen do not achieve any of the objectives they have set out to achieve, and we need a political settlement as a matter of urgency.
Will my right hon. Friend reassure my constituents that this country does not pursue trade at the expense of human rights?
I can give that assurance. We obviously want to defend human rights everywhere, and we want to maximise our trade, but we will not pursue a trade opportunity at the expense of human rights.
It is difficult to fathom the logic of such senseless barbarism in Saudi Arabia’s policies, and this has wider implications, particularly in relation to Iran and the geopolitical stability of the middle east. At what point will this country’s commercial and geopolitical interests come second to the need to demonstrate moral courage and real economic consequences of Saudi Arabia’s continued behaviour?
We value our trade with Saudi Arabia, as we do with all partners in the Gulf, but we have to ensure that such commercial activity goes hand in hand with the robust political messages that we all send in this House today.
As the right hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) said, the vast majority of those executed yesterday were Shi’a Muslims. To what degree do the British Government consider that the Saudi regime is using the death penalty as a means of quashing dissent among a persecuted religious minority within its borders?
I do not think that this is the moment for me to give an extended thesis on such matters, but I understand the hon. Gentleman’s suggestion. In many parts of the middle east, the Sunni-Shi’a conflict is very intensive and creates enormous tension, difficulty and strife. I very much hope that in the years ahead, we will see the temperature settle and good relations between Sunni and Shi’a communities everywhere.
What more could the Government do through the embassy in Saudi Arabia to work with civil society, women’s groups in particular and human rights defenders to ensure that human rights are upheld in the kingdom?
The hon. Lady is absolutely right to raise this point. As a Government, we tend to attend internationally important trials in all countries, where of course it is permitted by the host Government. We have been denied access to trials in certain circumstances in Saudi Arabia. I think that defending human rights activists and NGOs is very important. To that end, our embassy is very active, and some of its engagement with the Government may not be popular with them, but that is what our embassies should be doing. They are defending justice, decency and human rights, and that is what our foreign policy is designed to do.
These men could not have been convicted in any court worthy of the name, because a conviction that relies on evidence obtained through torture is no conviction. In the eyes of any law, these men were innocent: they were not executed; they were murdered for dissenting from the policies of the dictatorship that runs the country.
The Minister has listed a lot of things the Government have done previously that have made no difference. If anything, Saudi Arabia is going in the wrong direction. He has ruled out a fundamental rethink of our relationship with Saudi Arabia, and he has ruled out a fundamental rethink of our multibillion-pound arms trade with Saudi Arabia. Will the Minister tell us what else is left that the Government have not already tried, and which has failed to persuade these people that the regime does not belong in the 21st century?
First, we do have to be certain about establishing the facts in these cases. I know that a lot of suggestions have been made about many things that may have happened with the 37, but before we speak with the authority of Government, we do very much feel obliged to establish all the facts first and to engage with the Saudi Government in doing so. On what can be done, I again go back to the point about growing international pressure. I hope that, by acting in concert with other countries, we can, perhaps on the back of these executions, make a difference to future policy and behaviour in the kingdom.
This is an ally whose behaviour is as bad, if not worse, than most of the regimes around the globe that we would regard as hostile. I guess that ordinary constituents listening to this and reacting to the barbarism will want to know whether there is a bottom line. Is there a point at which this becomes a friendship not worth having?
The hon. Gentleman is right to point out that there is a moral dilemma here. Moral dilemmas are never a choice between black and white; they are a choice between different shades of grey, and there is deep murkiness here that we do not like. I hear exactly what the hon. Gentleman says, and we will continue to make the points and keep up the pressure I have been describing today.
Amnesty International has said that there was a welcome reduction last year in the number of executions worldwide, but clearly what Saudi Arabia is doing is going in the opposite direction. The worst offenders are China with more than 1,000, Iran with several hundred, and then Saudi, Vietnam and Iraq. What steps can we take internationally, in the UN and elsewhere, to get back to the good trend of a reduction in the number of executions?
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to say that the trend has been thrown into reverse gear. That is what the EU statement today says specifically in respect of Saudi Arabia. We do not just want the trajectory to be going downwards; we want it to be down at zero. That is our ambition and I hope, as the hon. Gentleman suggests, that the UN can play its part in making a resounding noise of condemnation in relation to those who use the death penalty in any circumstances.
While it is always a pleasure to see the Minister at the Dispatch Box, it really is nonsense that the Prime Minister has not been able to replace the right hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt) in such a key role for the Government at this time.
These reports are highly distressing. Does the Minister agree, however, that the UK will undermine its efforts to persuade our security allies such as Saudi Arabia to reform this draconian justice system if it does not itself apply the fundamental values of British liberty and fair due process to its own citizens, even those—perhaps particularly those—who have been radicalised in the UK and have gone abroad to commit terrorist acts in other countries? Should they not be brought back here to be tried, rather than be subjected to a judicial process way below the standards we would accept here in the UK?
I accept that we are one Minister down in the Foreign Office at the moment, and that may well be because my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt) is in fact irreplaceable.
On due process, the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that this is straying slightly from the focus of this urgent question, but when someone is subject to the law and the process of the courts in the UK, I think we can be proud of our judicial system and the fairness it contains.
I thank the Minister for his very helpful responses. The Minister will know that Saudi Arabia has a death penalty in law for those who convert from Islam to Christianity. Freedom of religious belief has been very much in the minds of all of us in this House—including the Minister, I know—and of those outside this House as well. The death penalty for someone pursuing their religious belief and conviction is unbelievable in this day and age, especially in the light of the murderous intent of those against Christians in Sri Lanka. What discussions has the Minister had with the Saudi Arabian Government about removing the death penalty for changing religion?
Our objective is for the Saudi Arabian Government to remove the death penalty for absolutely everything. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has made very clear statements in defence of religious freedom everywhere, particularly in defence of Christians, who are increasingly being persecuted across the world. As the hon. Gentleman rightly points out, the atrocities in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday were, to a large extent, against Christians who were worshipping on Easter Day. I hope that the voice of the Foreign Office and the application of our foreign policy will be to defend human rights, religious freedom and—as my right hon. Friend has said as well, and importantly—media freedom.
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That the Burma (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 136), which were laid before this House on 31 January, be approved.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Motion 3—Sanctions—
That the Venezuela (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 135), which were laid before this House on 31 January, be approved.
Motion 4—Sanctions—
That the Iran (Sanctions) (Human Rights) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 134), which were laid before this House on 31 January, be approved.
Motion 5—Exiting the European Union (Sanctions)—
That the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations (S.I., 2019, No. 554), which were laid before this House on 15 March, be approved.
As you have said and with your permission, Mr Speaker, I think the House will appreciate it if I consider the four statutory instruments together. In speaking to the Burma (Sanctions) (EU Exit) regulations, I will also speak to the Venezuela (Sanctions) (EU Exit) regulations, the Iran (Sanctions) (Human Rights) (EU Exit) regulations and the Guinea-Bissau (Sanctions) (EU Exit) regulations. These regulations provide the required details of these four sanctions regimes, but they do not set out which individuals or entities will actually be sanctioned under them. In a no-deal scenario, we will publish on exit day the full list of those we are sanctioning under our UK legislation.
Hon. Members will be well aware of the importance of sanctions. They are a key element of our approach to our most important international priorities. They help to defend our national interests, support our foreign policy and protect our national security. They also demonstrate our support for the rules-based international order. The UK has been a leading contributor to the development of multilateral sanctions in recent years. We have been particularly influential in guiding the EU’s approach and, when we move the EU’s sanctions regimes to the UK in a no-deal scenario, we will carry over their policy effect. I will say more about that in just a moment.
We are committed to maintaining our sanctions capabilities and leadership role after we leave the EU. Hon. Members will recall that the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 provides the UK with the legal powers to impose, update or lift sanctions after we leave the EU. This was the first major legislative step in creating an independent UK sanctions framework.
I am pleased that the Minister has said that the EU sanctions list will, in effect, be rolled over. At this early point in his contribution, notwithstanding that we are talking about sanctions on three specific countries—plus the EU one at the end—will he give the House an assurance that there is no immediate intention to change the sanctions list from the one we will adopt from the EU?
I can confirm that there is no such intention. Indeed, the intention and the expectation is that the existing regimes in the EU sanctions regime will be lifted and shifted, and put into ours. However, having scrutinised the individual elements of these, we will have to make sure that they all meet the threshold of evidence and justification that our own autonomous Act of Parliament requires. It is possible that something may not be carried over, but the expectation is that everything will be.
The Minister mentioned the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill. While we are talking about specific countries, that Bill, which is now an Act, did include the Magnitsky amendment. He referenced a list should the United Kingdom leave without a deal, and that general list would no doubt include other countries as well. In that regard, what is the current position of the Government on individuals named on a sanctions list in relation to the Magnitsky amendment, which is now part of an Act?
I say to my hon. Friend that I will come on to that in just a second. I will answer the question raised in his intervention, but let me complete the introductory logic of what these four statutory instruments are intended to do.
While the Act set out the framework needed to impose our own independent sanctions, we need statutory instruments to set out the detail of each sanctions regime within that independent framework. Such statutory instruments set out the purposes of our regimes, as well as the criteria under which the Secretary of State may designate individuals and entities within the framework, and the types of restrictive measures imposed. I am grateful to the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments for its close and helpful scrutiny of these and other statutory instruments relating to sanctions regimes.
On the Magnitsky element of the Act of Parliament passed last year, that sanctions Act provides powers for the UK to impose sanctions to provide accountability for or to deter gross violations of human rights, and to promote compliance with international human rights law and respect for human rights. These powers are what is colloquially known as the Magnitsky amendment. The Government’s focus so far has been on ensuring that we have the necessary secondary legislation in place to continue to implement existing EU and UN sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. The statutory instruments we are debating today are part of this preparation.
No. Let me just take my hon. Friend through this, and then he can come back again if he wishes. I need to explain quite where the Magnitsky element fits in.
As a member of the EU or during an implementation period, EU sanctions will apply in the UK. We will look to use the powers provided by the sanctions Act to the fullest extent possible during this period, but there will be some limitations on the measures that we can impose autonomously. In order to impose national sanctions for human rights—the Magnitsky element—we will need to design and draft a statutory instrument and ensure the associated processes and structures are in place to be able to implement and manage a sanctions regime.
It is important that we set up a regime correctly to ensure sanctions meet the legal tests set out in the sanctions Act. As soon as the secondary legislation and associated structures are in place to ensure the continuation of EU and UN sanctions in the UK, we will turn to the consideration of UK national sanctions, including for human rights.
The Minister is being very generous. May I ask him why not a single individual Russian is on any sanctions list at the moment? It is rather odd that the Government’s position seems to be that the justification for no Russian being on any list is that we cannot do this until we leave the European Union, despite the fact that all the Baltic states have individual Russians on a sanctions list. If we are going to remain de facto within the European Union, surely the justification for taking action is going to continue.
First, I say to my hon. Friend that this is not just against Russians. If people have violated human rights anywhere in the world, they could come within the scope of the Magnitsky clause I have been describing. I say again that the reason why we have not yet applied the Magnitsky elements of the sanctions Act is that the statutory instrument making it a bespoke part of that Act within UK autonomous law has not yet been made, and it that was done too rapidly—he will appreciate that we have had about 3,000 statutory instruments to get through this House because of EU exit—there would be a high risk of constant legal challenge, which we would like to avoid.
I am a bit confused about the Government’s attitude. The permanent under-secretary gave one reason why we could not have these sanctions in place already, the Foreign Secretary has given three different versions of why it could not happen and now the Minister has given yet another version of why it could not happen thus far. Part of it seems to be that the Government are not yet ready, which feels a bit like foot dragging to me, because I remember that the Government did not want this amendment in the first place, but the House insisted on it. The Government still seem to be arguing that we cannot do this because we are still a member of the European Union. In fact, Estonia and Lithuania have exactly those provisions, and nobody has thought to strike them down. There are 49 Russians listed in both those countries. Why can we not do it?
What the hon. Gentleman says is not consistent with our legal advice. We have to make sure that any application of the Magnitsky legislation fits legally and properly within any implementation period that might exist. It would be easier and quicker, as it happens in this case, if we were to leave with no deal—that is perhaps the only advantage of so doing that I can think of straight off the top of my head, but we will not go down that route.
Can the Minister therefore confirm—this is what I think he is saying—that all the individuals and entities currently sanctioned by the EU will remain sanctioned by the UK under these regulations? Given that the UK has less capacity than the EU collectively, what resources are being put in place to ensure that the UK continues to update the list of sanctioned individuals and groups, or will we simply mirror any updates made by the EU?
I perhaps feel a little prime ministerial when I say that I refer the right hon. Lady to the answer I gave some moments ago, but the answer is the same: our intention is to transfer the EU sanctions, but because we have our own autonomous regime, the evidential threshold must be met. Therefore, everything is being studied closely to confirm that it fits within the evidential requirements of the sanctions Act.
The hon. Gentleman is shaking his head. He is welcome to intervene and say why, but I can assure him that that is exactly the position as I understand it at the moment.
I did not seek to intervene, but I am happy to. I am unclear. Is the Minister saying that, where there are currently sanctioned individuals, all of them without exception will continue to be sanctioned in the event of a no-deal Brexit, or that because the evidential requirements of the UK, acting autonomously, may be different from those that apply while we are in the European Union, some of those individuals will no longer, or could no longer, be sanctioned?
As I said earlier, it is possible that, in exceptional circumstances, a person or an entity might not be transferred, but we do not expect that to be the case often, if at all. The intention is, wherever possible, to transfer the operation of the existing regime into our own autonomous legislation.
I think the Minister is saying that one reason why it will not be possible is that there are so many SIs that it is difficult to get the SI in place to deal with Magnitsky. I just wonder when he hopes the provisions will be available to the House and be able to be implemented.
All I can say is that the timeline of many things at the moment is difficult to forecast, so I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not attempt to say exactly.
Our American allies have a disagreement with our European allies about the extent of sanctions against Iran and how best to handle the difficulties with Iran. What thinking has the Foreign Office given to an independent UK policy on this? Are there any merits in the American approach, or are all the merits with the European approach?
If we are looking at individual cases such as that, we are straying slightly outside the terms of this debate, which is about the framework for the operation of sanctions in these four areas. We work closely with our European allies on the operation of the joint comprehensive plan of action, and we will continue to do so. However, we will of course look at all sanctions under the terms of the Act that we passed last year.
The four statutory instruments under consideration transfer into UK law the EU sanctions regimes on Burma, Venezuela, Guinea-Bissau and Iran—the human rights element of Iran, rather than the anti-nuclear side. In each case, the instruments seek to substantially mirror the measures in the corresponding EU regime, which include financial, immigration and trade measures.
These SIs were laid on a contingent basis to provide for the continuation of sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. This would ensure that we have the necessary powers to impose sanctions on the countries in question from the date of exit. If we reach a deal, sanctions would continue to apply under EU law during any implementation period, and these SIs would not immediately be needed.
As I said at the beginning, should we leave the EU without a deal, we will publish the list of those sanctioned under these SIs and all our new sanctions SIs on exit day. We will seek to transfer EU designations in each case, but as I said earlier these decisions will be subject to the legal tests contained in the sanctions Act. Any EU listings that do not meet the tests would not then be implemented.
Hon. Members may recall that review and reporting requirements were incorporated into the sanctions Act. Hence, alongside these statutory instruments, we have published reports on the purposes of each regime and the penalties contained in them—these are known respectively as section 2 and section 18 reports. These reports, plus an explanatory memorandum for each SI, are available in the Vote Office should Members wish to read them in detail. The Government will also review each sanctions regime on a regular basis.
I would now like briefly to describe the purposes of each regime. The Burma sanctions regulations seek to encourage the Burmese security forces to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. The corresponding EU sanctions were established in their present form in April 2018, in response to systematic human rights violations by Burmese security forces since the summer of 2017.
The EU sanctions regime designates members of the Burmese security forces who were involved in human rights violations or abuses, or in the obstruction of humanitarian assistance activity or an independent investigation into the atrocities in Burma.
I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way. Is there any evidence that, since the imposition of those sanctions in 2018, the behaviour of the Burmese military towards the Rohingya or other minorities in the country has in any way improved?
Again, I think that is straying into detailed analysis of the working of the sanctions, which is not the subject of these statutory instruments.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He will know that, since the implementation of those sanctions, the International Criminal Court has launched an investigation into the Burmese atrocities. What does he know about the status of that investigation? Does he anticipate an increase in the sanctions on Burma when this instrument comes into effect?
Again, the purpose of this debate is not to look at the way the sanctions are working; it is merely to set up the legal framework in which they can be allowed to work under our autonomous regime.
Order. I do not think we are straying too far. I think it will help people to make up their mind and make a good judgment. Just opening the envelope a little does not take anything away from what we are trying to achieve.
I am not as keen as you, Mr Deputy Speaker, to open the envelope quite so far, because I do not actually deal with Burma. However, if the hon. Member for Cardiff Central (Jo Stevens) has a really good question on Venezuela, I can give her chapter and verse. The responsibilities of Ministers are geographical in some respects and thematic in others. As she knows, I am in charge of sanctions law, rather than the operation of all geographical sanctions. I do not want to risk in any way giving the House information that is inaccurate or ill-informed.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Perhaps he could ask his colleague who is in charge of Burma relationships whether he could write to me to let me know the answer to my question.
I would be delighted to put that obligation on him—it causes me no difficulty whatever. Of course I will do that. In Foreign Office questions and in Westminster Hall, we have many discussions about issues of that sort—indeed, I encourage them, and we like to participate in them by giving as much information as we possibly can in response to any motion moved.
In relation to the situation in Venezuela, there has obviously been massive concern on both sides of the House about the massive number of people fleeing from Venezuela to other countries in Latin America. How does the Minister feel that the sanctions regime is working now, and is it likely to produce significant change?
The answer is that we wish there was clearer evidence that they are working. I was at the meeting of European Foreign Ministers yesterday in Luxembourg, where Venezuela was the main topic over lunch. The hon. Gentleman is quite right that 3.6 million people have fled Venezuela. The latest forecast is that the collapse in Venezuela’s economy will exceed that of Zimbabwe’s economic collapse all that time ago and that it will collapse by over 25% this year. We are being very careful to make sure that we target individuals around President Maduro and President Maduro himself, rather than the people who are suffering enough. He will appreciate, as I think the whole House does, that it is a massive challenge to design sanctions that hit the right people and do not hit the wrong people, who are, as I say, suffering enough. Any brilliant ideas he has would be willingly received, but we are working very closely with the EU and the Lima Group to ensure that any properly targeted sanctions we can possibly apply will be applied at the earliest opportunity.
At the risk of turning this into a general debate on Venezuela, I will give way to both hon. Gentlemen.
Given what the Minister has said, does he envisage an increase or a reduction in sanctions in relation to Venezuela when the UK has full autonomy over its sanctions policy?
It is possible that we could do some things on our own and increase sanctions in that way. We have particular focus, through the City of London, on financial matters where we might have, if you like, the lead. However, it would be our wish and our intention to work in close harmony with the EU and the Lima Group of countries, the immediate neighbours of Venezuela, to make sure we all speak with one voice, rather than President Maduro being able to take advantage of there being a number of different voices around the world acting against him or commenting.
The Minister speaks very eloquently about the discussions that are currently under way. How does he feel the UK’s very important traditional leadership role in pressing for sanctions against human rights abusers would be harmed by the prospect of a no-deal Brexit?
It is a very fair question to ask whether, given the influential role we have had within the EU by being part of it, it will have a detrimental effect on the united front that sanctions offer to the world against those who need to be sanctioned. I think that because of our diplomatic network and diplomatic reach, and our dominance of financial markets through the City, instead of wanting to turn their back on us, should we leave the EU in that way members of the EU27 will still want to work with us very closely. I think we will continue to share in common the objectives we hold to bring the worst people to book through the workings of sanctions. We have made it very clear to the EU that we really hope that whatever happens we can continue to work together, hence our wish to fold existing EU sanctions regimes into our own legislation after we have left the EU. I will give way one more time and then I will just rattle on, if I may.
I am not in any way opposing the regulations, but if we are going to continue, and we should, to work closely with the EU—I agree with what the Minister said about a united front on sanctions, otherwise they are pretty useless—we need to be clearer for the EU to understand where we will just be rolling forward its sanctions and where we might be doing something different. The question has been put two or three times, but I do not think the answer is very clear. I am worried that we hear a lot less about the purpose and the way in which they will be applied. I do not see how we can be expected to make a fully informed decision when we cannot have full information about the countries in question.
I think the right hon. Lady may have misunderstood my answers. She is right that the question has been asked three times and I have answered three times, but this is not actually the moment we are announcing individual designations or decisions. What we are looking at today in the four statutory instruments is, in lay language, the framework within which any such designations can fit. I say once again, I think for the fourth or fifth time, that it is our intention to lift the EU sanctions regimes that exist at the moment and put them into our own regime once it is up and running, but we will follow the law to ensure there are no issues where we could unnecessarily be taken to court and be challenged. We will have rigorous standards, but we do not envisage our not transferring EU regimes. We do not envisage that happening very much, if at all. It would be quite rare.
I should just answer one point about whether the Foreign Office will have the resources to manage this regime. I think the answer is yes. We have increased the number of staff working on sanctions quite considerably, and we are confident that we will retain and increase the UK’s capacity and capability after Brexit.
I am very grateful to the Minister. I do not want to flog the issue, but in circumstances where there is an EU sanction proposed and it does not fit with our legislative test—that is quite right, given the framework he outlines—does he envisage those issues being brought before Parliament through a report or a ministerial statement? Will there be parliamentary engagement around that decision to not comply or follow through with the sanction that has been agreed at EU level?
I am not sure it would quite work in that way, but I am very happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with our understanding of what we think the parliamentary engagement would be in any such decision to either list or not to list. Given that this is the early stage of our implementing the Act, I hope he can accept that as my commitment to him for the time being.
Having mentioned the Burma sanctions, the Venezuela sanctions, which we have been debating a bit, will: encourage the Venezuelan Government to abide by democratic principles, if only they would; respect human rights and the rule of law; refrain from the repression of civil society; and bring about a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela. The Iran human rights regulations are designed to encourage the Government of Iran to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. The EU sanctions regime emerged partly in response to the Iranian Government’s treatment of protestors in demonstrations against election fraud in 2009. The EU sanctions regime targets those who have been involved in the commission of serious human rights violations or abuses in Iran. The EU sanctions regime on Guinea-Bissau was established in 2012 and targets those who played a leading role in its 2010 mutiny and 2012 coup. It is designed to curb actions that undermine the country’s peace, security or stability.
Hon. Members will note that human rights are a significant focus of the sanctions regime under consideration today. I hope I have adequately explained how the human rights element of the sanctions Act, the Magnitsky clause, will fit into the statutory instruments before us today. The four statutory instruments transfer into UK law well-established EU sanctions regimes that are in line with the UK’s foreign policy priorities. They encourage human rights compliance, the rule of law, and security and stability in very difficult environments. I re-emphasise the importance of putting them in place. If this does not happen before exit day in a no-deal scenario, the UK would not be able to continue to properly implement the measures they contain. Therefore, Mr Deputy Speaker, I commend the regulations to the House.
I am very grateful to you, Mr Deputy Speaker.
First, why was £80,000-worth of weapons material, which could be used for internal repression, authorised by the Government in 2016-17? That seems to be a breach of the current sanctions regime. [Interruption.] To Venezuela. Secondly, we do not believe that the oil sanctions that have been imposed by the Americans have been helpful in the current situation. This is precisely the point that hon. Members made earlier: the object of the sanctions should be to punish the politicians who are in charge of creating a bad situation and not the whole population.
I also want to ask the Minister about the gold that the Bank of England holds for the central bank of Venezuela. It was reported in November last year, before the Government had recognised Juan Guaidó as the leader of Venezuela, that the Bank of England had frozen 1,125 gold bars. I asked Her Majesty’s Treasury through a written parliamentary question what the legal basis for that was. It told me that it was a matter for the Bank of England, so I wrote to the Governor to ask what the legal basis for the decision was and his response was somewhat opaque. I have read suggestions in the press that the American Government put pressure on the British Government, who leant on the Bank of England directly not to release these gold bars when the bank of Venezuela requested them. I would like to know from the Minister whether that is true.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way, because this deserves an immediate answer. The Foreign Office has not at any stage put any such pressure on the Bank of England. Any decision about whether or not to transfer gold that it holds is entirely a matter for the Bank of England, and it does so without political pressure from us.
I am interested to hear the Minister’s response, because if the Government wish to tighten the sanctions regime, he and the Foreign Office will have the opportunity to do so, and they might well succeed in that. However, what is not acceptable is pursuing a tighter policy without a clear legal base; I suggest that that would not do much for our reputation.
I want to pick up on the point that was made about Iran by the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood). EU sanctions were introduced in the case of Iran in 2011, in response to violent crackdowns against street protests. In view of the continued serious human rights abuses in Iran—notably, extensive use of the death penalty, including for juveniles; torture; the repression of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender activists; and the detention of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe three years ago and the denial to her of access to medical treatment—we believe that these sanctions are justified. They cover in particular goods and technology used for repression, and we believe that that is right.
However, we believe that the American decision to lift the trade sanctions against Iran, which was taken as part of the international community’s joint comprehensive plan of action—JCPOA—nuclear deal, was also right. Sanctions have been an effective tool and they will continue to be effective if we impose them when things go badly and lift them when things go better. The Trump Administration’s decision to reimpose those trade sanctions and to withdraw from the JCPOA is mistaken. The JCPOA does not cover ballistic missiles or regional aggression—the arguments the Trump Administration put forward for reimposing sanctions. The decision further destabilises the region. That is a problem in foreign policy terms—it is unhelpful.
I would also be interested to know what the Government have done about the impact on European and British businesses and banks. Our businesses and banks are in an extremely difficult situation, whereby trade and investment under European law is completely legal, but under American law is completely illegal. There is an extraterritoriality effect of American law. I therefore have two questions for the Minister. First, will he hold to the current position in a post-Brexit scenario and not shift to the American position? Secondly, what has been, is and will be Government action to support British businesses and banks that wish to trade with and invest in Iran?
Finally, I come to Guinea-Bissau. The European Union imposed sanctions, which cover 20 individuals, in 2012 following an attempted coup. Guinea-Bissau is an extremely poor country with a lot of cocaine trafficked through it. There were some elections in March, and I ask the Minister what the Government are doing to improve governance in Guinea-Bissau. What are they doing to reduce drug trafficking via Guinea-Bissau? Does the Minister anticipate the UN Security Council changing its posture on sanctions?
I refer the hon. Gentleman, courteously but firmly, to the speech I made at Chatham House outlining what I believe to have been the real reasons over the past 30 years for the collapse of the Venezuelan economy. It was an attempt to be as impartial and intellectual as possible. I think that he should withdraw the suggestion that we have no concern for the people of Venezuela, as that is what motivates our entire policy, which I am pleased to say is very much a cross-party policy, and it is one that he should support rather than criticise.
I stand absolutely by my statement that there have been occasions in this House when Members on the Government Benches have used the failure of the economic policies of the Chávez Government as a direct jibe against the Leader of the Opposition, and those comments have been welcomed on the Conservative Benches. [Interruption.] I will now move on.
I am grateful to hon. and right hon. Members for their contributions, which spread quite widely but show the passions raised by this topic.
I take my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton South (Andrew Lewer) to task for saying that Venezuela is not a Foreign Office priority, which I find difficult to swallow, to put it politely, when it is very much a priority. I went to the United Nations Security Council, at a few hours’ notice, for an emergency debate, and I went to the Ottawa meeting of the Lima group. I spoke yesterday at the meeting of European Foreign Ministers, and I have given a considered lecture on Venezuela at Chatham House. So I would politely ask him to revise his view of where he thinks our priorities sit.
On the issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Mike Freer), the IRGC is already sanctioned by the EU, but it comes under the EU’s Iran nuclear sanctions, rather than the ones that we are discussing today. When it comes to giving notice of who we might include in any EU sanctions that are transferred—
Very good.
We will do that at the eleventh hour, as it were, to avoid asset flight by not giving prior notice to those who might be affected. As I said, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 enables sanctions to be imposed for a variety of purposes, including responding to or deterring gross violations of human rights, or otherwise promoting compliance with human rights law or respect for human rights. After we transpose existing EU sanctions regimes into UK law—that must be the first priority—the UK will continue to take action against human rights violators and abusers. There is already a strong human rights element in all our sanctions. [Interruption.] Do I take it, Mr Speaker, that you are urging me to speed up?
In which case, having covered so much already, I commend these regulations to the House.
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Written StatementsThe Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) will take place in Luxembourg on 8 April. It will be chaired by the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP), Federica Mogherini.
The FAC will discuss current affairs, Afghanistan, Eastern Partnership and Venezuela.
Current Affairs
We expect HRVP Mogherini to update Ministers following her visits to the G7 Foreign Ministers meeting in Dinard and the League of Arab States summit in Tunis. She will also provide an update on the first round of Ukrainian presidential elections.
Afghanistan
Ministers will discuss developments in Afghanistan, including recent efforts to make progress on peace, and will look ahead to the presidential elections scheduled for later in 2019. They will also discuss the EU’s future role in Afghanistan.
Eastern Partnership
Ministers will discuss preparations for the Eastern Partnership ministerial meeting on 13 May and will reaffirm the EU’s commitment to supporting greater resilience, security and prosperity across the region. They will assess progress against the priorities identified as the “20 deliverables for 2020”: to achieve a stronger economy, governance, connectivity and society. Ministers will also take stock of ongoing work to mark the partnership’s 10th anniversary.
Venezuela
Ministers will receive an update from HRVP Mogherini following the latest meeting of the international contact group on Venezuela and on plans for next steps. Ministers will discuss how to maintain pressure on the Maduro regime including the possibility of further targeted sanctions.
Council Conclusions
The Council is expected to adopt conclusions on Afghanistan, which call for an Afghan-led process and confirm EU support and its future role, as well as the Court of Auditors’ special report on Mali and Niger.
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Ministerial CorrectionsFirst, it was not a ruling; it was an intermediate decision and non-binding. We are of course in discussions with Mauritius, but we fully uphold our right to take the position we have taken over many years.
[Official Report, 2 April 2019, Vol. 657, c. 933.]
Letter of correction from the Minister for Europe and the Americas, the right hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Sir Alan Duncan):
An error has been identified in the response I gave to the hon. Member for Glasgow North (Patrick Grady).
The correct response should have been:
First, it was not a ruling; it was an advisory opinion and non-binding. We are of course in discussions with Mauritius, but we fully uphold our right to take the position we have taken over many years.
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Commons ChamberOn 4 February, I attended a Lima Group meeting in Ottawa at the invitation of the Canadian Foreign Minister. At the meeting I spoke to the Foreign Ministers of Colombia and Brazil about the crisis in Venezuela. I have also spoken recently to Chilean Foreign Minister Ampuero and Peruvian Vice-Foreign Minister de Zela. We continue to work closely with the Lima Group, the Organisation of American States, the United States and like-minded European and international partners to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Venezuela.
The Labour party and its leadership have an unforgivable record of defending the Maduro regime, which is so toxic that people have started leaving the party. Can my right hon. Friend assure the House that this Government condemn the human rights abuses and the regression of democracy, and will continue to promote freedom and democracy and offer support to surrounding countries that are dealing with the refugee crisis as a direct result of this abhorrent regime?
I can give assurance to my hon. Friend on all those things. We are working closely with all international partners to find a resolution to the fact that the Maduro regime has completely bankrupted his country and made it destitute to the point where 3.6 million people have fled to neighbouring countries.
Throughout my visits to the region, it has become abundantly clear that the humanitarian situation in Venezuela is having a huge impact across Latin America. What steps is my right hon. Friend taking to address the consequences of the continued political humanitarian abuse?
May I first congratulate my hon. Friend on all his work in the region as an effective trade envoy? He has built up some very good relationships to our benefit.
We are, of course, working with the Department for International Development to deliver a humanitarian aid package of over £6.5 million, on top of the multilateral activity to which we always contribute in such a significant way.
In its declaration last month, the Lima Group called on the UN high commissioner for human rights to publish a report on human rights abuses in Venezuela. Can the Minister tell us what discussions he has had with the United Nations about this? Although the UN has been vociferous about the impact of sanctions on the regime, it has been strangely silent on the curtailment of the freedom of the press and other human rights abuses in Venezuela.
I am delighted to hear an Opposition Member raise the topics of the abuse of human rights and freedom, on which we have been speaking very loudly and on which we are working very deeply with the Lima Group. The fundamental issue is Venezuela’s poverty. People cannot get basic goods, and the fact that President Maduro is blocking aid from getting into his own country is so contemptible that, on both sides of the House, we should all speak with one voice in condemning it.
Given the continuing humanitarian and political crisis in Venezuela, does the Minister agree that we need to ensure that both the Lima Group and other Government agencies in both North America and South America additionally press President Maduro to ensure that food supplies are delivered to the people of Venezuela?
Yes, indeed. All countries across the world have to do their bit. Canada and the European Union international contact group are doing a lot. We all have to work together, and one of the most concerning developments at the moment is that President Maduro is trying to strip Juan Guaidó of the immunity he enjoys as a member of the National Assembly. We in this House should send out a very clear message today that that would be utterly unacceptable and that Juan Guaidó is the interim President we recognise.
Since 2016, Colombia has made significant progress in its peace process; the FARC is now a political party and the last elections were the safest in decades. I reaffirmed our full support for the peace process with the Colombian Foreign Minister on 4 February in Ottawa. The UK has expressed concern to the Colombian Government over delays in the transitional justice system, which is a critical part of the peace process. We continue to support the process through the conflict stability and security fund.
I understand that there were a couple more paramilitary killings last week. Did the Minister read the report by Michel Forst, the UN special rapporteur, who has said that the national landscape continues to be plagued by violence, particularly gender-based violence? Will the Minister put the problem of the continuing structural gender-based violence in Colombia on the agenda for the November conference on the preventing sexual violence initiative?
Yes, I certainly will, because preventing sexual violence against women is one of the UK’s human rights priorities in Colombia. Indeed, Foreign Office officials recently met the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) to discuss that. I hope that illustrates once again the extent to which we are really working together across the House to tackle these vexed problems at all levels, in every way we can.
Thank you so much, Mr Speaker; I am ever grateful.
As I have previously made clear to the House, the situation in Catalonia is a matter for Spain. We remain clear that questions related to the issue of Catalan independence should be resolved within the proper constitutional and legal channels of Spain.
It is everyone’s responsibility—including this Government’s—to uphold human rights. Far from becoming the major global player that Brexiteers imagine, the UK appears more and more irrelevant on the world stage. Is it the case that the UK Government are not seeking to uphold self-determination for Catalonia because they need Spain’s help in further Brexit negotiations?
No, it is because we uphold the rule of law, as we have discussed earlier in questions. We uphold the rule of law here with Scotland and we uphold it in Spain with regards to Catalonia. Certain accusations that Spain somehow has political prisoners are absurd. It does not have political prisoners; it has prisoners who happen to be political.
How does ignoring or dismissing the International Court of Justice ruling on the Chagos islands enhance the United Kingdom’s reputation as a soft power superpower or uphold the international rules-based order?
First, it was not a ruling; it was an intermediate decision and non-binding. We are of course in discussions with Mauritius, but we fully uphold our right to take the position we have taken over many years.[Official Report, 3 April 2019, Vol. 657, c. 8MC.]
The UK has a duty to prevent under the genocide convention. Mass atrocities are invariably preceded by red flags. Early warning signs, such as the persecution of minorities, happened in Burma against the Rohingya and, indeed, in Rwanda. What is the FCO doing to help identify and act on such red flags?
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Written StatementsMy right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs attended the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 18 March. It was chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP), Federica Mogherini. The meeting was held in Brussels.
Commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the illegal annexation of Crimea
The High Representative and Foreign Ministers marked the fifth anniversary of the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by holding a short livestreamed session. The HRVP reiterated the key elements of the EU position; the EU did not, and would not, recognise this violation of international law, and stood in full solidarity with Ukraine, supporting its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Current affairs
HRVP Mogherini expressed shock and solidarity with New Zealand over the attacks in mosques in Christchurch.
The High Representative and Ministers welcomed the results of the third Brussels conference on supporting the future of Syria and the region, which reaffirmed EU support for the UN-led political process and Syrian people by successfully mobilising aid from the international community
The High Representative briefed Ministers on the international contact group’s ongoing work on Venezuela. Foreign Ministers expressed their concern at the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation. They reiterated the urgent need to find a way towards a political process.
The High Representative and Ministers also noted the signature of the peace agreement in the Central African Republic and the recently announced US measures on the International Criminal Court.
China
The Council held a wide-ranging and comprehensive exchange of views on China and EU-China relations, ahead of its discussion with Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The discussion fed into the 21-22 March European Council meeting and EU-China summit on 9 April, in Brussels.
The discussion was informed by the joint communication by the High Representative and the Commission entitled “EU-China: A strategic outlook” which had been adopted on 12 March. Ministers welcomed the assessment made in the joint communication and the proposed actions. While the 2016 China strategy remains the basis for EU co-operation with China, the joint communication provides useful guidelines on how to refine Europe’s approach to China to be more realistic, assertive and multi-faceted.
Republic of Moldova
The Council discussed the Republic of Moldova following its 24 February Parliamentary elections.
Foreign Ministers agreed that the formation of a Government should be a transparent and credible process that respected the outcome of the election. EU co-operation with Moldova will continue to be based on the implementation of the 2014 association agreement, with financial support conditional upon Moldova’s progress. The Council reaffirmed that the EU would continue to work to provide tangible benefits for the Moldovan people and support for civil society.
Yemen
Ministers recalled that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Yemen and that the only way forward was the full implementation of the Stockholm agreement. They stressed the need to keep up the political momentum and to push the parties to fulfil urgently their commitments, as well as the need to see immediate progress on the ground.
The Council reiterated the EU’s full support for the UN special envoy Martin Griffiths and his efforts in finding a lasting, sustainable, enforceable, inclusive and negotiated political solution within a UN-led framework. Foreign Ministers highlighted in particular the importance of fully involving Yemeni women in the political process, and expressed concern at the lack of improvement in the dire humanitarian situation, especially access for humanitarian aid. The Council reiterated that the EU and its member states would continue their humanitarian assistance efforts and lend political support as necessary.
Lunch with Chinese State Councillor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi
Over lunch, Foreign Ministers held an open and wide-ranging discussion with Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
Council conclusions
The Council agreed a number of measures without discussion:
The Council adopted conclusions on the EU guidelines on non-discrimination in external action.
The Council adopted conclusions on the European Court of Auditors special report 35/2018: “Transparency of EU funds implemented by NGOs: more effort needed”.
The Council adopted conclusions on the first European topical peer review for nuclear safety.
The Council reviewed the sanctions regarding the situation in South Sudan, and agreed to maintain the restrictive measures currently in place against one person.
The Council approved the specifications for the 2019 military crisis management exercise (MILEX 19).
The Council established the EU’s position for the 15th meeting of the EU-Republic of North Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Council, which will take place on 19 March 2019 in Brussels.
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Written StatementsMy right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will attend the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 18 March. It will be chaired by the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) Federica Mogherini, and will take place in Brussels.
China
Ministers will discuss their approach to the upcoming EU-China summit in April and the strategic direction of EU-China relations. The UK will highlight the importance of European co-ordination in engagement with China. The UK is committed to continuing to work closely with European partners on China after we leave the EU.
Republic of Moldova
Ministers will discuss the political situation in Moldova following the 24 February parliamentary elections, in which no political party won an overall majority. In this context, the focus of the FAC will be to take stock of the elections and discuss the EU’s expectations for the next Government, once they are established. The UK supports continued EU engagement with Moldova based on the conditions set out in the 2014 association agreement, which remains the best means to deliver tangible benefits to the Moldovan people.
Yemen
Ministers will discuss the current state of the conflict in Yemen. Following the Stockholm peace talks in December 2018, the EU adopted new FAC conclusions, which set out EU support for the political process. Ministers will focus on the next steps, urging implementation of the Stockholm agreements and support of the wider peace process. The session will include a briefing from the UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths and the UK will reaffirm its support to him and the UN.
Council conclusions
The Council is expected to adopt conclusions on the EU’s human rights guidelines on nondiscrimination, two Court of Auditors’ special reports on EU funding to NGOs and on internal security capacity building in Niger and Mali.
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