Exiting the European Union (Sanctions)

Mike Gapes Excerpts

Tuesday 9th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I perhaps feel a little prime ministerial when I say that I refer the right hon. Lady to the answer I gave some moments ago, but the answer is the same: our intention is to transfer the EU sanctions, but because we have our own autonomous regime, the evidential threshold must be met. Therefore, everything is being studied closely to confirm that it fits within the evidential requirements of the sanctions Act.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Ind)]

indicated dissent.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The hon. Gentleman is shaking his head. He is welcome to intervene and say why, but I can assure him that that is exactly the position as I understand it at the moment.

[Mike Gapes]

I did not seek to intervene, but I am happy to. I am unclear. Is the Minister saying that, where there are currently sanctioned individuals, all of them without exception will continue to be sanctioned in the event of a no-deal Brexit, or that because the evidential requirements of the UK, acting autonomously, may be different from those that apply while we are in the European Union, some of those individuals will no longer, or could no longer, be sanctioned?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

As I said earlier, it is possible that, in exceptional circumstances, a person or an entity might not be transferred, but we do not expect that to be the case often, if at all. The intention is, wherever possible, to transfer the operation of the existing regime into our own autonomous legislation.

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[Sir Alan Duncan]

If we are looking at individual cases such as that, we are straying slightly outside the terms of this debate, which is about the framework for the operation of sanctions in these four areas. We work closely with our European allies on the operation of the joint comprehensive plan of action, and we will continue to do so. However, we will of course look at all sanctions under the terms of the Act that we passed last year.

The four statutory instruments under consideration transfer into UK law the EU sanctions regimes on Burma, Venezuela, Guinea-Bissau and Iran—the human rights element of Iran, rather than the anti-nuclear side. In each case, the instruments seek to substantially mirror the measures in the corresponding EU regime, which include financial, immigration and trade measures.

These SIs were laid on a contingent basis to provide for the continuation of sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. This would ensure that we have the necessary powers to impose sanctions on the countries in question from the date of exit. If we reach a deal, sanctions would continue to apply under EU law during any implementation period, and these SIs would not immediately be needed.

As I said at the beginning, should we leave the EU without a deal, we will publish the list of those sanctioned under these SIs and all our new sanctions SIs on exit day. We will seek to transfer EU designations in each case, but as I said earlier these decisions will be subject to the legal tests contained in the sanctions Act. Any EU listings that do not meet the tests would not then be implemented.

Hon. Members may recall that review and reporting requirements were incorporated into the sanctions Act. Hence, alongside these statutory instruments, we have published reports on the purposes of each regime and the penalties contained in them—these are known respectively as section 2 and section 18 reports. These reports, plus an explanatory memorandum for each SI, are available in the Vote Office should Members wish to read them in detail. The Government will also review each sanctions regime on a regular basis.

I would now like briefly to describe the purposes of each regime. The Burma sanctions regulations seek to encourage the Burmese security forces to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. The corresponding EU sanctions were established in their present form in April 2018, in response to systematic human rights violations by Burmese security forces since the summer of 2017.

The EU sanctions regime designates members of the Burmese security forces who were involved in human rights violations or abuses, or in the obstruction of humanitarian assistance activity or an independent investigation into the atrocities in Burma.

[Mike Gapes]

I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way. Is there any evidence that, since the imposition of those sanctions in 2018, the behaviour of the Burmese military towards the Rohingya or other minorities in the country has in any way improved?

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[Mark Menzies]

Let us move on with the need for sanctions against Venezuela. That regime has not entered hardship as a result of the oil price collapse; it has entered hardship because, not just under Maduro but under Chávez—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) shakes her head, as though it is all down to the oil price collapse. It is not; it is down to the fact that Maduro and Chávez played fast and loose with the constitution. They both abused their positions in order to suppress opposition, including within the press. To suggest that all this misery has been brought about by the oil price collapse is to be economical with the actualité.

[Mike Gapes]

Is it not a fact that the richest person in Venezuela is the daughter of former President Hugo Chávez, a billionaire with about $4 billion US dollars, which has been systematically stolen from the people by this so-called socialist regime?

[Mark Menzies]

The hon. Gentleman is 100% on the money. That is the inconvenient truth that many Opposition Members fail to recognise, because massive abuses were committed well before the collapse in the oil price, and it is one of the reasons why sanctions are needed.

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[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Ind)]

This debate is probably unnecessary, because we have not yet left the European Union and we almost certainly will not leave with no deal if we do leave, so many of the things we are debating will be dealt with over a long period in transitional arrangements, or not at all. However, given that the House is spending a great deal of time at the moment debating things that are not about to happen, that is par for the course.

In January, I asked an urgent question about Venezuela and there was extensive discussion. The situation has got worse since then. There are now serious threats to Juan Guaidó, the president of the National Assembly and the person who is recognised by many countries and Governments, including our own, as the legitimate leader of Venezuela.

I was pleased that the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), used the phrase, “We welcome this sanctions proposal.” I hope she was referring not just to “we” in general but specifically to the shadow Justice Secretary, the shadow Home Secretary, the shadow International Development Secretary—he sits alongside her—the Leader of the Opposition and all those who have been apologists for or supporters of the Chávez and Maduro regimes. I hope she was referring to members of the Venezuela solidarity campaign, members of the Stop the War Coalition and all those organising rallies and events today to say, “Hands off Venezuela.” I hope she was referring to all those who are acting in this country to undermine the sanctions regime and the action being taken by the Bank of England and others against the corrupt, kleptocratic regime in that country. I praise her for what she said—I have no disagreement with her at all—but I hope she was speaking for everybody on the Labour Benches in that respect.

We need to discuss the wider question of the impact of sanctions. What is the purpose of sanctions? Is it to change the behaviour of a regime or to bring about some kind of punishment for bad people? Punishing bad people is a good idea, but a better idea is to change the behaviour of the regime so the people in the country benefit. We know from history that sanctions regimes are often not successful in changing Governments’ behaviour.

It could be argued that the Iranian regime has changed its behaviour and signed up to the JCPOA in respect of its nuclear programme because of the sanctions imposed on it, and that is at least partially true. However, a bigger reason for that change in behaviour might be that the regime has adopted a long-term view and, thinking 10, 15 or 20 years ahead, wants to take the heat off now while secretly doing what it did in the past with covert facilities at Qom and various other programmes to get around those international sanctions.

[Joan Ryan]

Does my hon. Friend agree that Iran’s desire to wipe out the state of Israel is based on an ideological hatred? Iran and Israel are a thousand miles apart. They have no regional material competition, nor does Israel have any significant effect on the lives of Iranian citizens. In the long term, sanctions against an ideological regime are unlikely to succeed.

[Mike Gapes]

Iran was sanctioned not for its generalised foreign policy, or for its abuse of human rights internally, or for the terrible things it has done to support the murderous Assad regime in Syria, or for what it has done in respect of the situation in Lebanon, or for what it is doing to support the Houthis in Yemen, or for its hostility to and visceral hatred of the idea of self-determination for the Jewish people and the state of Israel, but for its nuclear programme. There may be arguments for extending sanctions on Iran, but we have to recognise that, so far, this is about the current sanctions regime.

The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) is right that successive British Governments have played an important role when other Governments wobbled, or when other Governments, such as the Hungarian Orbán Government or the Italian Government—he mentioned Berlusconi, but the current Salvini Government are doing the same thing—have been complicit in being friendly to the aspirations of Putin in weakening sanctions regimes. We have stood firm, and we, France and a few others have led the way on tough sanctions.

Sometimes our EU partners have been divided and we have tipped the scales towards a more robust regime. If we are outside the European Union, that EU regime is likely to be weaker than it would otherwise have been. We would also find ourselves facing all the economic problems that come from being outside the EU, and we would be susceptible to pressure from other countries to go soft on sanctions because we would not have the collective weight of the European Union behind us.