(15 years, 4 months ago)
Commons Chamber3. What recent discussions he has had with ministerial colleagues on reform of the Act of Settlement.
I have had no recent discussions with ministerial colleagues on reforming the Act of Settlement.
I am no monarchist, but does the hon. Gentleman agree with me that, if we must have a monarchy, women should have equality with men in succession?
Ministers have already accepted that the provision in the Act of Settlement might well be discriminatory, and I have already confirmed at the Dispatch Box when responding to a previous debate, not that we are doing nothing, but that discussions are under way with other countries of which Her Majesty is Queen. She is not just our Queen, but Queen of 15 other realms, and those matters have to be taken forward together in a careful and considered way. It is not as straightforward as the hon. Gentleman would like to pretend it is.
I welcome that response. As the Minister knows, my ten-minute rule Bill on that subject is to be introduced at 3.30 pm today. Will he confirm whether I could perhaps have that response in writing before the Bill is introduced?
I look forward to the right hon. Gentleman’s speech introducing his Bill. Discussions are under way, as has been confirmed in this House and in the other place. He knows that the Statute of Westminster states that those matters must be amended in all the other realms of which Her Majesty is Queen, and it takes only a moment’s thought to see that that is not as straightforward a process as some who would wish to move more quickly might think.
4. What progress he has made on plans to introduce a statutory register for lobbyists.
My hon. Friend should know that the Government plan to carry out a wide-ranging consultation later this year and then to bring forward legislation in the second Session of this Parliament.
Does the Minister agree that for the statutory register to be effective and fit for purpose, it must be robustly transparent?
I do, and that is a very important point. Lobbying is a perfectly reputable industry for making sure that the voices of charities and businesses are heard, but it should be transparent so that people know who is talking to those in Parliament. That is what the Government intend to do—mainly to clean up the dreadful behaviour that we saw last year, which has resulted in some former Members having their passes removed.
Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)
The purpose of lobbying is to give further advantages to the already advantaged. Is the Minister not concerned that already lobbying has taken place between his Department and BSkyB which might have the most damaging consequences for the people of this country? Should not these reforms be brought in quickly by the Tory-Lib Dem junta?
I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman’s characterisation that all lobbying is to benefit the advantaged. Members are lobbied all the time by charitable organisations, charities and, as I found in my previous role in opposition, those who campaign on behalf of disabled people, for example. It is important, however, that such lobbying is transparent and that people know who is talking to Members of Parliament and members of the Government. That is exactly what our statutory register will achieve.
Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (Con)
I applaud the Minister’s efforts, but will he consider proposals to shut the revolving door between big Departments and big business contractors, which leaves taxpayers ripped off and democracy diminished?
Processes are already in place to vet what Ministers and former Ministers do after they leave both ministerial office and this House. My hon. Friend makes a good point, and those matters are being looked into and kept under review. I am sure that he will continue pressing that point in his usual vigorous way.
T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.
(15 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI survived, but I have to say that it is a very disappointing whirlpool, and that is no reflection on either my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) or my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg)—whichever was representing the whirlpool or the many-headed monster. However, if this is an opportunity to put some instability in the Bill, I will certainly support new clause 5 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone. I have my name on it in any case.
I would echo the sentiment that the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) expressed in an interesting speech in response to new clause 3. The question of constitutional Bills is an interesting innovation introduced by Lord Justice Laws, but I would tell my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that Lord Justice Laws was merely including in his judgments something that had been widely understood by constitutional theorists for some time, although it had never been legally expressed in such terms. I entirely agree with my hon. Friend’s sentiment and, indeed, with that of the hon. Member for Rhondda that Parliament should determine which of these laws is constitutional and overrides subsequent Acts of Parliament. Clearly, the European Communities Act 1972 was expressly intended to do that, as has been recognised by the courts, and the 1689 Bill of Rights does that, but Lord Phillips concluded in a recent case that the doctrine of implied repeal applies to the 1689 Act.
Mr Shepherd
The constitutional arrangements of Australia are a matter of written statute there, and I understand that the Governor-General exercised the prerogative power in the case to which the hon. Gentleman refers. However, that is not what I am concerned about; I am concerned about our own constitutional processes. I think that the statement by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary was misjudged, but he has never withdrawn it. He is a representative of the Government, and of the Crown itself, but as a Member of Parliament he has never withdrawn that statement.
My nervousness about the Bill is clear. I am nervous about the idea that two parties can mandate that their existence as a coalition should last for a term of five years. I have expressed that view before, and I think that it is shared by a number of Members. I have no doubt that the Lords will think that measure trivial in some ways, because it is a presumption; how can one mandate something that is formed by human beings with their own policies and parties? They can work together to a certain extent, but the coalition will last as long as the coalition lasts. I am not damning it; I am just saying that I do not think that they should have reached forward with a Bill of this nature. If they want to work in harness they will have the support of a great many Members of this House. We know that the nation is confronted with an economic crisis and difficult decisions have to be made. The people of this country are having to make difficult decisions on how to restore economic competence, balance budgets and all the rest of it.
We have spent a lot of time on the first matter, so I will now come to the real new clause, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone, which I will undoubtedly vote for. His brevity today was extraordinary. [Laughter.] I do not laugh at it, for I think that the expression of great ideas is all the more effective for being expressed in a concentrated and condensed way. I appreciate that there is a drinks party at Downing street for Members from my party who want to attend, so I will bring my remarks to a close, as the great business of the Government must not be delayed by the musings of the House of Commons on such matters as constitutional reform.
I am standing up to support the limitations that are being expressed and the hesitations about the nature of the Bill. If there were one thing that I could argue for and effect, it would be that the Government themselves realise that they have a job. We salute them for that, but, when they fiddle with the constitution in ways that suit only their own purpose and stifle the natural functioning flow of politics, we lose something, and we lose the attention of our constituents. My argument is that we cannot march to a drumbeat like that. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving us the opportunity at least to raise our caveats, and I am grateful to the Labour party for indicating that it will support the new clause. It is important, and I commend it.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) for his generous opening remarks and, as usual, largely excellent speech. I say “largely”, because I do not entirely agree with his characterisation of the other place, given the behaviour not, I hasten to add, of their lordships’ House, but of a small number of former Labour MPs, who are filibustering and abusing every procedure of that House to try to frustrate the will of this elected House of Commons, which passed the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill by a considerable majority. Apart from that, I very much enjoyed my hon. Friend’s speech.
Mr Andrew Turner (Isle of Wight) (Con)
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. Is it in order for the Deputy Prime Minister to have abused the Members of the House of Lords in the form that he chose?
That is most certainly not a point of order for me. I am sure that there are other ways in which the hon. Gentleman can express his views, and I am sure that the Deputy Prime Minister—like the Minister who is present—will be well aware of what has just been said. Please, Mr Harper, continue.
I am grateful, Mr Deputy Speaker. I think that I drew a distinction between certain Members of the other place and the other place in general, about which I have no complaint.
My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset explained very clearly the effect of his new clause 3, and he was concerned about changes to clause 1 being made using powers in the Parliament Act 1911. It is already the case—this is a subject on which I agree with the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant)—that the Parliament Act cannot be used to push through legislation that extends the life of Parliaments. One hon. Member—I think it was my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash)—pointed out that because of the Bill’s provisions allowing the Prime Minister to vary the date of an election by up to two months in an emergency, we cannot use the Parliament Act to push this legislation through against the wishes of the upper House. However, the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset would, as the hon. Member for Rhondda said, also prevent this House from reducing the length of a Parliament without the agreement of the other place. It does not seem desirable to put that provision in place.
Section 2 of the Parliament Act 1911, to which my hon. Friend’s new clause refers, sets out important rules about the relationship between this House and the other place. Those rules have been in place for some time, and the Government certainly do not intend to start changing that relationship. It is already the case that we cannot lengthen a Parliament, and given what I have said, we do not want to start changing the Parliament Act as my hon. Friend’s new clause would.
I presume that the Minister is therefore confirming that the Bill does lengthen a Parliament.
No. It is very clear in the Bill. I do not think that the issue arose in Committee.
The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty) also put his finger on this issue when he correctly drew attention to it in an intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset. If my hon. Friend presses the new clause to a vote I shall ask hon. Members to oppose it.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stone, in speaking to new clause 5, said that the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill was about perpetual coalition arrangements. It is not about fixed-term Governments, but about the length of Parliaments. All it does is take away the Prime Minister’s power to dissolve a Parliament and bring it to an end. It replaces that right with two provisions that establish no-confidence procedures, which we have already, and give Parliament the opportunity to vote for an early Dissolution.
All I can say is that all the amendments and new clauses have been chosen in the right and proper way.
Exactly; it is a very cunning new clause. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone put his finger on the point that an amendment simply to take away clause 2 would have been a wrecking amendment. The power of revival is the cunning disguise in which the new clause is wrapped.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) described clause 2 as a fig leaf. I do not agree with that characterisation, but even if the House agreed with it, I am not sure that hon. Members would be as keen to remove the fig leaf as my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex appeared to be. [Interruption.] No, that is what he said. He said that it was a fig leaf and that he wanted to remove it.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stone seemed to establish a new doctrine in his speech. He seemed to be suggesting that all Acts of Parliament should lapse at the end of a Parliament, just in case the new Parliament is of a different complexion and its Members disagree. He said that the House should not bind its successors. It is perfectly true that the House cannot bind its successors, because each successive Parliament can repeal Acts; that is the normal way. However, it is not the normal procedure for all Acts to lapse at the end of a Parliament, just in case the new Parliament disagrees with them.
The Government hope, although they cannot bind their successors, that the public and future Parliaments will find the arrangements in the Bill acceptable and will keep them in place. Future Parliaments are, of course, at liberty to change them. However, we do not think that there should be what my hon. Friend the Member for Stone described as a sunset clause to remove the powers. If clause 2 were removed as he suggested, it would effectively give back the power to the Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament at will. We have argued throughout the passage of the Bill that that would be undesirable.
Many of us believe that the Prime Minister has that power even under the Bill, because all he has to do is table a motion of no confidence in his own Government, to which the Opposition would almost always agree, and there would be a general election. Be that as it may, I am sure that the Minister argued and voted for sunset clauses in relation to control orders, which, I understand, will expire next Monday. Is the same provision not necessary in this Bill?
No; the Government’s intention is to change the system so that there are fixed-term Parliaments, apart from in the two possible cases set out in the Bill. We think that that is a desirable change. If the public and future politicians agree that it is desirable, it will stand the test of time. That is what we hope for and what we have argued for.
My hon. Friends the Members for Stone and for Harwich and North Essex raised concerns about the two procedures in clause 2—motions of no confidence and motions on early elections—that allow for early elections. However, the House of Lords Constitution Committee was fairly supportive of those measures.
The Committee said that it was
“sensible for the Bill to contain some form of safety valve which would allow for an early election in circumstances such as the government losing the confidence of the Commons or where a political or economic crisis has affected the country”,
and concluded that the safety valves that we had included were appropriate. The Committee also looked at the risk of the courts intervening, which my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex mentioned, and concluded:
“The risk that the courts may intervene in any early dissolution of Parliament by questioning the Speaker’s certificate is very small”,
adding:
“we do not consider the risk to be sufficient to warrant a rejection of clause 2 of the Bill.”
Based on what the House of Lords Constitution Committee has said, I, unlike my hon. Friend the Member for Stone, am confident that when this House approves the Bill, as I hope it will, and it is debated in their lordships’ House, they will give it proper scrutiny, but in the end give it a fair wind and pass it. However, if my hon. Friend presses his new clause 5 to a vote, I will urge all hon. Members to reject it and to keep clause 2 as it stands.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
I suppose it would, but I am not in favour of five-year terms. Political events change at a dramatic pace these days and a five-year term would not meet that requirement. I suspect that such an arrangement would mean that Governments both here and in the devolved Administrations would more regularly be at the fag-end of their sense of having a mandate, and a four-year provision would be much better. I am sure that we shall return to this matter on Third Reading.
I have no desire to delay the House, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I think that I have made my point. In essence, it is that we believe it would be better to have a four-year fixed-term Parliament, because that would help us to avoid the elections for the devolved Administrations coinciding with the general election. We need change only one other measure to make sure that that never happens; we need to provide that we do not start the clock again when there has been an early general election. The Government’s intention is to try to make us fall into the rhythm of fixed-term Parliaments and not have lots of early general elections, and such a provision would give people an added incentive not to seek an early general election because they would know that they would then have only a short Parliament before the next general election, which would fall on the previously arranged date. Without any further do, I shall conclude and I look forward to hearing from the Minister.
The amendments relate to the date of the election and it is worth touching on the points that a number of hon. Members have made about the coincidence of the proposed date of 7 May 2015 with the date of the devolved elections. It is worth saying, as we said in Committee, that it is entirely possible and, indeed, likely that, regardless of whether or not this Bill was introduced, the UK general election could have been held on the same day as those devolved elections if this Parliament had run for five years. In some sense, the Bill provides an opportunity, because it has highlighted and crystallised that fact at an early stage, when we have the chance to debate the consequences and do something about it.
As the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) said, and as we discussed in Committee, I wrote to all the party leaders in the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament proposing to give their Assembly or Parliament the power to extend its term by up to six months. That was to go alongside the existing power to shorten the term by six months to provide a window of a year in which it could vary the date of the election to avoid that once-in-20-year coincidence with the Westminster election.
The Electoral Commission’s letter said that there was a
“need for a comprehensive research study on the implications of combining elections”
and that the Commission was “not aware” that that work had taken place up to the moment of writing. Has that research commenced?
I heard very clearly what the hon. Gentleman said in his intervention on the hon. Member for Rhondda, and I was going to refer to that point anyway. Let me finish this part of my speech and I shall come on to that.
I wrote to the party leaders. They wrote back and I think it is fair to say that they were underwhelmed by the proposal to give the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament the opportunity to extend their term by six months to provide that one-year window. For that reason, the Government did not table an amendment on Report, as we had suggested that we might if the responses were more positive. The party leaders and Presiding Officers raised some other points, some of which the hon. Member for Rhondda has raised today, about alternatives. We are considering them and will write back to the party leaders as well as keeping the Opposition and the House informed. For the benefit of Members, I should say that copies of the letters that I have written have been placed in the Library of the House today.
I am grateful for the tone in which the Minister is responding to this part of the debate. For his information, his office sent me a letter by e-mail today, apparently responding to a letter I sent him on 21 December. It was in fact a letter about something completely different, so if he could arrange for the actual letter to be sent to me, I would be grateful.
I replied to a letter that the hon. Gentleman sent to me. He might find—I can absolutely get him a copy—that the letter about the letter to the party leaders went to the shadow Secretary of State’s office today. I can make sure that the hon. Gentleman gets a copy directly and, as I said, I placed copies of those letters in the Library of the House.
The Electoral Commission’s letter made some sensible points about considering all the issues raised by combination. It seems to me that there are two kinds of issues: first, the practical delivery of elections—how we make the mechanics run—and, secondly, making combination easier. That is not just related to the devolved elections and those for the Westminster Parliament. The fact is that whether or not one agrees with the Government’s proposals, we are proposing elected police commissioners and some elected mayors, so there will be more elections and more of them will take place on the same day. Therefore, we need to make that easier. Another issue that came up in the debate, which is serious and valid, concerns the extent to which media coverage and so on means that two different conversations can be going on at the same time for different elections. That will obviously engage the political parties, broadcasters and people more widely.
The Electoral Commission’s suggestion is very good, but it has not taken place to date. The Government think there is some support for it, but given where we are in the timetable and given that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland wanted to consider the experience of the combined elections in Northern Ireland this year, it might be a good idea to consider what happens with the referendum and elections in May—in only a few months’ time—and use that experience to kick off some project along the lines suggested by the hon. Member for South Antrim (Dr McCrea) once the Government have considered the suggestions from the party leaders. That might give us a possible route forward.
The Minister referred to elected police commissioners and more directly elected mayors. Will he confirm that they will all also be on four-year terms, rather than five-year terms? If he wanted to provide a little more tidiness—I can see him smiling, because he knows how this sentence will end—he could change this five-year fixed-term Parliament to a four-year Parliament, even if he only did it for after 2015.
The Minister has said that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will monitor what happens with the elections that will take place this year. After he has done that, will there be close co-operation and consultation with the parties and the Electoral Commission to find the correct way of proceeding and learning from anything that goes wrong? Is that the suggestion?
Yes, I have discussed this with my right hon. Friend and he intends, as we have discussed in Committee and announced to the House, to consider the experience from this year. We want to work with all the parties in Northern Ireland, just as I have written to all the party leaders in the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament, to reach some agreement on what works well, what does not work and what needs to change. That will be very much on a cross-party basis.
I understand that the Deputy First Minister in Wales would prefer a five-year cycle for the National Assembly for Wales. Is that on the table for the Government?
I will not start picking bits out of individual letters, but, given our debates in the House about preferences for four or five years, it is interesting that there have been suggestions from party leaders about moving the devolved Assemblies on to a five-year cycle. Given what has been said here and that the devolved Assemblies and Parliament were set up after considerable debate and have been on a settled model for some time, that would be a big jump and quite a change to the constitutional settlement.
Naomi Long
The Minister has talked about considering the context of the forthcoming Northern Ireland Assembly elections coinciding with the referendum campaign, but a better comparison would be the impact on the local government election campaign, in which the same range of parties will fight on very different issues. We need to consider this issue in that important context because the referendum campaign will not be party political in that sense and so is not directly comparable to running party political campaigns at the same time. The issue with running a general election campaign alongside an Assembly election campaign in Northern Ireland is that media coverage will focus on the general election campaign in a UK context, looking at parties that do not garner votes in the Northern Ireland context.
The hon. Lady makes a good point. When the Deputy Prime Minister and I introduced the Bill, we said that a UK general election coinciding with a devolved legislature election would be qualitatively different from a referendum campaign coinciding with a devolved legislature election for the very reason that the hon. Lady says—there would be a narrative and a debate going on and there would be questions about whether the media, newspapers and broadcasters would fairly cover both parts of the debate and whether the public could therefore take properly informed decisions in both elections. We need to consider that issue with all the parties and broadcasters and see whether there are ways around it.
Let me address amendment 1, which my hon. Friend the Member for Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire (Simon Hart) moved on behalf of the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform. The intention of the amendment is to clarify that, in the event of an early general election—before 7 May—under subsection (1) or (2) of clause 2, the general election specified in clause 1(2) would not take place, but the Bill already makes it clear that the general election of 7 May 2015 would take place only if no intervening early general elections under the procedures in clause 2 had occurred. Clause 1 sets the date for the first scheduled general election, “subject to” clause 2—those words appear in the first subsection of the Bill’s first clause. If there were an early general election, it would replace the election of 7 May. The Select Committee has been very helpful in scrutinising the Bill and its amendments have brought about some good debates. Amendment 1 is good in that it has enabled this debate, but it is not necessary because the Bill is already clear.
Amendments 10 and 11, which the hon. Member for Rhondda spoke to, would mean that the parliamentary term following an early general election would last only for the remainder of the previously scheduled term. To use a phrase that the Committee used in its report, it would keep the clock ticking on the five years whether there was an early general election or not. There has been quite a lot of speculation among academics and others on whether that would act as a disincentive for a Government or strong Opposition to engineer an early general election because a new Government would get a term of perhaps only a few months. We did think about that, and we debated it in Committee. The flip side to that is that there is an election in which a Government get elected, perhaps with a significant majority, quickly followed by another election. That explains the Government’s choice of wording.
There is a technical problem with the amendments. An early election could take place just before the scheduled election but the scheduled election would still be held. The rules for the devolved assemblies provide a window, so that if the early election takes place very close to the scheduled election, the scheduled election does not take place. If the early election is more than six months before, the scheduled election still takes place. As the amendments are drafted, there could be an election only weeks before the scheduled election, and the scheduled election would still have to be held. That would not make a great deal of sense.
The Minister is right; that would be the eventuality. However, I think that would fly in the face of what in practice would happen politically, because some six to nine months before a general election people would choose not to bother to militate for an early general election—they would just accept that the next general election was coming. I understood that that was what the Minister was trying to achieve—fixed-term Parliaments.
The hon. Gentleman was hypothetically pessimistic earlier. Now he takes the opposite approach: he is being hypothetically optimistic. The Government’s view was that we could have that early general election and the Government could be returned with a large majority, and we think the public would expect that Government to govern.
Interestingly, the Constitution Committee in the other place agreed with the Government’s approach. Its report concludes that a newly elected Government should have a full term of office, and that the Government would present its programme to Parliament through the Queen’s Speech, which, of course, is traditionally considered to be a test of confidence. We think that in that situation the Government should have the right to carry out their programme for the full five years, and it would make little sense to ask the voters to go back to the polls when they had sent out a clear message.
I accept that that is a debatable point—we had a significant debate in Committee—but let us look at it from the public’s end of the telescope rather than our own. If we were to have an early general election, because the Government had lost a confidence vote or because there had been a general sense that we should have an early general election, it would seem a little ridiculous if the public had made a clear choice, sent a Government into office with a significant majority, and then a few months later were back doing it all over again.
I think that, on balance, the Government’s decision and the current drafting of the Bill make sense. I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire, on behalf of the Select Committee, to withdraw his amendment 1 and I urge the hon. Member for Rhondda, just for once, to think about whether he really wants to press amendments 10 and 11 and potentially force the British people to undergo election after election in close succession—something which neither he nor I would want to achieve.
I am much encouraged by the Minister’s comments and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3
Dissolution of Parliament
Amendment proposed: 8, page 2, line 29, leave out ‘17th’ and insert ‘25th’.—(Chris Bryant.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Sadiq Khan
The hon. Gentleman should explain why he has changed his mind in relation to his predecessor’s Bill. He will recall that there was insufficient time to allow the Bill introduced by his predecessor—a very good and honourable man—to receive proper debate in the House of Commons. The question that should be asked is why the hon. Gentleman has done a U-turn on that Bill. [Interruption.] The Whip, the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), heckles me but if he wants to get to his feet, I am happy to take an intervention.
This sort of Westminster arrogance will not go down well in Cardiff, Belfast and Edinburgh. People in those places will remember the arrogant way in which the Deputy Prime Minister’s deputy, after a number of hours of debate on this issue on day one of the Committee, and after a number of Members had spoken, pulled from his pocket an option to allow devolved Assembly elections to be brought forward by up to six months in the event of their being scheduled at the same time as a general election. There was no consultation and no discussion with us or the devolved Administrations before that. We have heard how unhappy they are with this.
The right hon. Gentleman knows, as I made clear at the time, that I announced that option in this House first because I thought it proper for Parliament to hear it first. I then wrote to all the party leaders. During the process, I have kept him informed, have placed copies of the correspondence in the House of Commons and have updated the House. At all stages, I have kept this House informed, as is the proper process.
Sadiq Khan
I am happy for the hon. Gentleman to intervene again. Is it not right that a number of colleagues had taken part in the debate and an amendment had been moved, and that it was only towards the end of the evening that he pulled the option out of his pocket?
I was very keen to do something that the previous Government did not do often: I listened to the debate and to the concerns raised by Members on both sides of the Committee, and then announced to the House what I thought might be a sensible move forward. As I said on Report, colleagues in the devolved Parliament and Assemblies have written back to me to say that they are less than overwhelmed by my proposals. That is why we did not move them on Report. That was a perfectly sensible way to conduct matters.
(15 years, 5 months ago)
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I, too, wish you, Mr Benton, and all Members present a happy new year. I also wish myself a happy birthday, although I note that no one offered that unto me. I congratulate the hon. Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) on securing the debate. It is right that we should have the debate here and, as several Members have said, that there should be a proper debate in the Chamber so that many of the issues can be elaborated at greater length, so I hope that that will happen.
I do not wish to disturb the equilibrium between myself and the Minister, but I must excoriate him slightly, because thus far there have been only written ministerial statements on the matter. The policy should have been announced in the Chamber, not by written ministerial statement, and I say that because the Minister said on 2 November 2010:
“when decisions have been taken they will be announced to the House at the Dispatch Box in the usual way.”—[Official Report, 2 November 2010; Vol. 517, c. 722.]
That is not what happened. A written ministerial statement was snuck out—I never know what the past tense of sneak is—or sneaked out.
Put out is less pejorative, and I want to be pejorative on this point. The statement was snuck out the day before Parliament adjourned for the Christmas recess. That is an inappropriate way to deal with Parliament, let alone with the politics of making a significant constitutional change in this country.
I am afraid that on this occasion I agree with neither my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green), nor our new knight, the hon. Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley), whom I congratulate on his knighthood. I believe that the tradition that prisoners should be unable to vote is older than the Forfeiture Act 1870, because prior to that, the property qualification was so significant that, in practice, prisoners would have been unable to vote anyway. Merely referring to the 1870 Act, although that was the point at which the idea was qualified in statute, is irrelevant. It is an old tradition and a fine one. I think that when one forfeits the right to liberty, one should forfeit the right to vote.
However, I disagree with those who have said that we should leave the European Court of Human Rights. I think that David Maxwell Fyfe was a pretty odious Home Secretary, but I agree with those who argue that he did a good job at Nuremberg in trying to ensure that human rights were protected across Europe. It is difficult for us to argue with Russia that it should comply with the European Court of Human Rights in cases such as that of Sergei Magnitsky if we do not comply ourselves.
I also believe that the Government have been entirely wrong to gold-plate the provisions that are being brought forward. If the cut-off comes at four years, that will mean that people who have committed many very serious crimes, including violent crimes and crimes of a sexual nature, and electoral crimes for that matter, will be able to vote, which I think is inappropriate. That will mean that close to 30,000 people in prison will be able to vote. Notwithstanding the comments that other Members have already made, I think that there will be logistical problems in various areas in the country, which I will move on to in a moment.
The proposals are far more generous than the arrangements in other countries. The hon. Member for Kettering referred to several countries but not to Belgium, where the line is drawn at four months. I wonder whether the Government simply got the words “months” and “years” wrong, because opting for four months would allow them to comply with the Court. In Austria the requirement is one year. In France there is an element of judicial decision making on who gets the franchise—I think that the Government intend to introduce that here—as the court decides whether someone should be deprived of the right to vote as part of the sentencing. The hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) commented earlier on how the French approached the creation of the Court in the first place and that their system arose because the Napoleonic code had always stipulated that. Of course, 13 countries still have complete bans, although it must be said that they are not countries that we would hold up as exemplars of liberal and civilised societies that comply with human rights.
I have 10 questions for the Minister, although I realise that he may be unable to answer all of them. I hope that he will write to me on any that he is unable to answer today, as the deputy Prime Minister has not responded to any of the letters that we have written to him on the subject—it has been quite some time now and I am looking forward to those replies. First, the current prohibition on votes for prisoners was introduced through primary legislation in the Representation of the People Act 1983, and amended by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. Can the Minister confirm that the amendments to statutes to enable prisoner voting will be done though primary legislation, rather than secondary legislation, so that it can be amended on the Floor of the House? Secondly, were we to proceed with a one-year ban, rather than a four-year ban, can he confirm that that would meet the requirements of the Court and that, therefore, the four-year ban is entirely of the Government’s choosing?
Thirdly, can the Minister confirm that more than 28,000 prisoners will be given the vote under the proposals, including around 6,000 who have committed violent crimes and 1,800 who have committed crimes of a sexual nature? Fourthly, the written ministerial statement states that prisoners will be able to vote in an area where they have a local connection. That seems, contrary to the remarks made earlier by several Members, to be a rather loose way of determining where they vote. What will happen if a prisoner wants to be registered in their prison, rather than in their home, or if they are registered in the place where they last lived but someone else is now living there? Frankly, they might not want someone who is serving time in prison to be registered to their home address. What provision have the Government made to ensure that that will not affect householders in their credit rating and in other ways? Will prisoners be entitled to anonymous registration, or will they be included in the electoral register, including details of their last known address, and what provisions will be made for candidates to be able to canvass prisoners?
As I understand it, the Government intend to allow judges to make specific recommendations on depriving people of the vote. On what grounds will a judge be entitled to remove the vote? Following the comments made by other Members, are there particular crimes that, while they might be subject to relatively short sentences of less than four years, should in all cases still see the perpetrator banned from voting? In particular, will the Government ensure that judges receive guidelines on when it will be expected that the vote be removed, and will those guidelines be made available when a Bill comes before the House? Will mentally disordered offenders or prisoners detained in mental health hospitals awaiting sentencing be entitled to vote under the Government’s proposals? I hope that the Minister can answer many of those questions. Many Members are understandably angry about out inaction in the past, but I must say that I prefer our inaction on the matter to the Government’s action thus far.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Benton. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) on securing the debate, particularly on getting it as a kind of reserve option, and thank him for his generous remarks at the beginning of his contribution. As ever, of course, he and I will not fall out, even if we end up disagreeing. I would like to take the opportunity, as everyone else has, to wish all hon. Members a happy new year, although that does seem rather a long time ago.
I shall set out what the Government have announced and then try to deal with as many of the questions as I can. I will respond to questions which I believe are of interest to as many people as possible, and write to hon. Members about those that remain which I can not answer at this point. I will place a copy of the letter in the Library so that Members can see the Government’s responses.
It is worth starting with a bit of background because hon. Members have mentioned it—I will get through this quickly. We have already mentioned that some prisoners—those on remand, for example—have been able to vote for some time. The bar on prisoners who are serving a sentence dates back to 1870, and successive Governments have maintained the position that those who have broken their contract with society by committing an offence and are imprisoned should lose their right to vote.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kettering opened the debate in a perfectly helpful way by quoting my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who made it clear that he does not want to make this change. To be frank, it is not something that I want to do, and I believe that many Government Members would rather not do it, but we do not have a choice. We have a legal obligation. To answer my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies), the proposals are not a sop to anyone. The European Court of Human Rights made a ruling in the Hirst case, and we are legally obliged to comply with it.
It is worth reminding ourselves what the Court actually said in the Hirst case. It said that the existing bar on convicted prisoners—the blanket ban—was contrary to article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European convention on human rights. I believe that my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr Offord) referred to Mr Hirst. Although the ruling was given in his case, under the proposals that we will put before the House, he would not have been entitled to vote when he was in prison because he committed a serious crime and was sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment.
We in this country seem blessed—that is not really the right word. The most odious criminals appear to be the ones who run off to the European Court of Human Rights. Another odious criminal who took the Government to court—the judgment was announced before Christmas—also had been convicted of serious crimes.
The Government are following three principles in their approach. The first goes to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). We have to meet our legal obligations, but we want to go no further than that. Secondly, we want to ensure that the most serious offenders are not given the right to vote. That is why we did not say that there would be no line, that the limit would be entirely up to judges. We want to ensure that there is a line, so that anyone above that length of sentence would not be able to vote. We recognise that the most serious offenders should not be able to vote.
Let me make a little more progress. I am conscious that Members have raised many questions, and I want to try to deal with some of them rather than stack up new ones.
The third principle is to prevent the taxpayer from having to pay successful claims for compensation. One of the problems we have is that even if the compensation in an individual case is not significant, we in this country are blessed—again, that is probably not the right word—with lawyers who are assiduous, if there is money on the table, in running around and getting lots of people to sign up for cases under no win, no fee rules. Various Members have mentioned that there are already 2,500 cases pending. One can be certain that if there were a successful case for compensation, lawyers would quickly go around prisons to sign up prisoners for legal actions on the basis that there might be £1,000 compensation on the table. The Government would be faced with thousands and thousands of cases. We estimate that compensation in an individual case might be around £750 to £1,000, but multiply that by the thousands and thousands of prisoners who would bring cases if there were money on the table, and we would be looking at significant sums for the taxpayer. The one thing that would be worse than making these changes in the law would be giving hard-earned taxpayers’ money to some of those criminals. I shall take my hon. Friend’s question.
I thank the Minister for that explanation, but his argument would carry much more weight if Frodl v. Austria had been the last substantive case in the European Court of Human Rights on this issue. The ruling was very prescriptive and said, in effect, that the majority of prisoners had to have the vote. However, it was not the last case. As I made clear earlier, the last case was Greens and M.T. v. the United Kingdom, and paragraphs 112 to 114 of its ruling specifically made it clear that the Government had a range of options on which they could consult. It is not a question of the Government having to comply with the arbitrary limit of four years; that simply is not true.
My hon. Friend makes a helpful point by referring to the Greens and M.T. judgment. This comes down to what several Members have said about whether we have the option of doing what the previous Government did, which was nothing. I am afraid that we do not. In that judgment, the Court gave the UK Government six months from the date that the judgment becomes final to introduce proposals. I can say to the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) that there are various ways of dealing with it, but the Government will introduce primary legislation in the House. That should deal with questions raised by several Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone), who is a member of the Backbench Business Committee. Proposals for primary legislation will be put before the House, and Members will have an opportunity to debate them fully. We will not try to think of a different way to implement the judgment, but we want to ensure that we have a debate in the House.
In terms of the timetable, we have to introduce proposals, not pass them. The Government’s responsibility is to introduce the proposals before 23 August this year; in other words, before the House rises for the summer recess. The Court has suspended the 2,500 or so cases of people claiming damages on the basis that we will introduce proposals within the time limit. If we fail to do so, the cases will be revived and there will then be a serious risk that the Government will be faced with paying damages.
Let me deal with some other questions. To respond to my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering—this is his debate—the problem would not be fixed by somehow getting rid of the Human Rights Act 1998. Even if we were to sweep it away tomorrow, we would still be a party to the European convention on human rights and the ruling would stand. The debate on the Act is important, but it is not relevant to this matter.
My hon. Friend asked whether the UK was being singled out. We have to act because British prisoners took cases to the Court, on which it has ruled. Some of the other countries that still have a blanket ban have not been put in that position. If no prisoners had brought a case against the UK Government, we would not be acting. We are acting only because of the legal judgment. The hon. Member for Rhondda said that it had been his Government’s preference to do nothing. It is our preference to do nothing, but we face a legal obligation.
I, too, congratulate my newly knighted hon. Friend. He put his case in a measured and thoughtful way, as did the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green). Apart from what she said at the beginning of her remarks—that this is, indeed, a legal judgment and that we are obliged to implement it—I did not agree with her arguments, and I am afraid that the Government and I do not agree with what my hon. Friend said either.
Let me try to answer some of the questions that were raised by several Members, including the hon. Member for Rhondda. He accused the Government of gold-plating the provisions. We absolutely have not done that. We set a limit which we believe is the minimum required to comply with our obligations. Moreover, in contrast with the previous Government, who were proposing to enfranchise prisoners for all elections, we have said that we will make a change only for those elections where we are legally obliged to do so: the Westminster and European elections. We will not do it for local elections or referendums. Importantly, we will not do it for elections for police and crime commissioners, or for mayors. We will do what is legally necessary and no more. That was not what the previous Government were going to do. They proposed enfranchising prisoners for all elections. That would have perhaps had some of the consequences for local elections that Members have mentioned.
Also, we will ensure that prisoners cannot register to vote at the prison. It would clearly be inappropriate to have significant number of voters at prisons able to influence the results of elections. It is also worth saying, as my final point—
Mr Joe Benton (in the Chair)
Order. That concludes the debate. We must move on to the next one.
(15 years, 5 months ago)
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Yes. For some strange reason I seem to have been up in Oldham recently. Oldham East and Saddleworth feels as it if it has been slammed together with no consideration of what constitutes a community.
I do not want to focus too much on that issue; I really want to talk about equalisation of seats. I cannot remember which hon. Member said it, but it is absolutely right that the apparent party political advantage to the Labour party from the fact that it takes more voters to elect a Conservative MP than a Labour one is far more to do with turnout than anything else. The equalisation of seats will make barely any difference, according to calculations done by virtually every academic so far, to the partisan advantage of one political party or another. For that matter, a 5 or 10% leeway would not make a great difference, on a partisan basis, to one or other party. In Labour constituencies there have tended to be smaller majorities, but still safe seats, whereas a Conservative safe seat tends to have a very large majority, because there is a much higher turnout.
I support equalisation to an extent, and certainly as things stand the situation is not right; it is not acceptable and there should be greater equalisation. However, I worry about the Government trying to get 99% of all seats within a very tight band. That is a much tighter band than in any other country, and it is being done on the basis of registered electors, whereas most other countries use population. The hon. Member for St Ives was right when he said it would be a mistake if, because of the Bill, we ended up with—I think these were his words—“antiseptic constituencies” with permanently mobile boundaries. That would not be good for representation of views in Parliament or for ensuring that a full cross-section of British society is here. Nor would it make it easier for people to understand who represents them, and to maintain that continuity.
To give one tiny instance, if a constituent comes to a Member with a case and the Member takes it up, it might take many years, as did many of the miners’ compensation cases that I took up. Someone whose Member stops representing them because of the boundary change must start all over again, from the beginning, because the data protection people have said that MPs cannot hand the file over to another MP. [Interruption.] The Minister is saying something. I do not know whether he wants to intervene; perhaps he will respond later.
On a point of information, international comparisons are often cited regarding the need for greater equalisation. In fact, in the United States of America, if the same equation is made concerning how many voters it takes to get someone elected, Wyoming has nearly 10.5 times the representation, for population, of California. They base their arrangements not on registered or eligible voters, but on population. Sometimes it is good to equalise—but only to an extent.
It is important to recognise the distinctness of various parts of the country when we are drawing up boundaries. Some have already been mentioned. The Isle of Wight was referred to in some of the debates we had in the House of Commons. We believe that the distinctness of the Isle of Wight should be recognised in the statute, and hold a similar belief regarding Cornwall. I note that yesterday was the anniversary of the crossing of the Rubicon. I do not know whether the crossing of the Tamar is still an ambition of the Government. In one sense, Cornwall is only administratively in England. It has a distinctness that should be recognised. If there were a referendum in Cornwall on whether Cornwall should have Cornwall-only seats, there would be an overwhelming majority in favour. I hope the Government will think again on that matter.
Many of the same issues apply to Anglesey, though in that case it goes the other way in being too small, as opposed to the Isle of Wight being too large. The point was made about Argyll and Bute, and, although it did not sound like special pleading, of course it was. However, the point was well made: it is in many ways a sparser constituency than the highland seats. There is a strong argument for the distinctiveness of Argyll and Bute.
Although I understand the issues about Wales—in particular north-west Wales, where there is a high concentration of people with Welsh as their first language—a drive towards equalisation may, and in some academics’ views will, lead to no parliamentary seat having a Welsh-speaking majority. That would be a mistake in terms of how the British Parliament is viewed in Wales, and would incense a greater sense of nationalism. The Government should recognise that.
My final point on specifics that should be recognised concerns estuaries. The hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Mr Reid) referred to sea lochs, but it is important that wide estuaries such as those on the Mersey, the Humber, the Clyde, the Forth and the Thames should not be crossed when creating parliamentary constituencies. Some argue that that should apply to Welsh valleys, because of their peculiarities. It would seem odd if a small part of the top of a valley—even if there was no connecting road—was bunged into another constituency. However, I think most issues in the Welsh valleys can be addressed; there is no specific reason why not.
A 10% rather than a 5% leeway would mean there was no need to cross ward boundaries in the creation of seats. In some of the big city conurbations, that is important. There would be no need to cross county boundaries—all geographical and physical necessities that the land, or God or whoever has given us could be met, and there would be no dramatic harm to the representativeness that the Government seek to achieve in aiming for equalisation. I hope that, in striving towards their measures, the Government will look again at whether 10% might not be a better leeway than 5%.
I want briefly to say a couple of words about the number of seats in Parliament. The hon. Member for Argyll and Bute said that the number has always crept up, except when the Irish Free State was created and we cut the numbers. However, the measure we should think about first is the nature of the job of a Member of Parliament. International comparisons were made by the hon. Member for St Ives. However, to compare the UK with Spain, France or Germany—where Governments are not constituted in the same way—is to compare apples with pears and is therefore mistaken. Similarly, the powers held by parliamentarians in those countries are very different. In France, much more is devolved and done by councillors. We have far fewer councillors—one for every 3,000 voters, whereas in France it is one for every 110. Those comparisons do not bear examination.
As MPs, we create the Government; we are the electoral college, as it were, for the Prime Minister and the whole of the Government. All Ministers have to come out of Parliament, because the amendment in the 1689 Bill of Rights was lost. Dramatic cuts in the number of MPs would be a mistake. The number of constituents has grown and grown over the years, as has the amount of casework we are expected to do.
I have two final points. I wonder how the AV Bill—I cannot remember what it is called—
The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill.
From a sedentary position, the Minister has helped me out. I wonder how the Bill is doing in the House of Lords. As I understand it, the Bill has to be out of the House of Lords in February in order to have the referendum in May. With another 70, 80, 90 sets of amendments, I wonder whether it is now possible for the Bill to have the two weeks between Committee and Report stages in the House of Lords, and come back to the House of Commons. I urge the Minister—indeed, I make him an offer: if he splits the two elements of the Bill, as we urged in the beginning, we could help him get his AV referendum in time for May.
House of Lords reform has been briefly mentioned by several Members. When are we going to have that Bill? It was originally going to be before Christmas, then at the beginning of the year, then in January. We hear rumours of March, April and May. When will we get the Bill?
It is good to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Riordan. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes (Martin Vickers), it is the first time I have done so.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for St Ives (Andrew George) for securing the debate, and giving me and the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) the chance to spend the entire morning in Westminster Hall, debating a fascinating range of topics.
My hon. Friend the Member for St Ives ranged widely across a number of constitutional issues. I hope I will deal with all the points he raised, but I might be a little pressed. I will deal first with the issues he raised, as it is his debate, and then touch on some raised by other Members. He started with the question of why the Government settled on 600 as the right number for the House of Commons. We were frank during the debate on the Bill. There is no magic about it; it is a judgment. The two coalition parties had different views before the election. They both wanted to shrink the size of the House of Commons: the Conservatives to 585, and the Liberal Democrats to 500, albeit with a change to the voting system. We settled on 600, which we thought was the right balance; as several Members have pointed out, constituencies should not be so large in population that Members could not do the job. With 600, most constituencies would be within a range that Members today would recognise, and we do not think it is an enormous leap.
The hon. Member for Rhondda said he would be against a dramatic cut in the number of MPs. The Government would be as well; we are not making a dramatic cut. We are making a modest reduction of about 7%. One can argue about it, but I do not think anyone can say that a reduction of 7% is dramatic.
I was aware of the Bill brought forward by the hon. Member for St Ives. He said that his Bill proposed a reduction to 500, primarily as a result of devolution. Prior to the formation of this Government, people argued that we should treat the parts of the United Kingdom that have a devolved Parliament or Assembly differently from those parts that do not, in terms of entitlement to seats at Westminster. That idea was put forward but the Government decided not to do that. We were keen to treat all parts of the United Kingdom in the same way, so the quota is a United Kingdom quota. Because of where we start from, the impact of the change in the number of seats will differ in different parts of the UK. That is because we want the weight of a constituent’s vote to be equal across the United Kingdom, and that is an important principle.
My hon. Friend the Member for St Ives, supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Argyll and Bute (Mr Reid), wanted to know what principles guided us on the two exceptions. First, we wanted a set of principles that were widely applicable and that gave the boundary commissions the chance to allow it. We made only two exceptions out of the 600 seats for exceptional geographical reasons; the constituencies both have small populations but are large enough to sustain a Member of Parliament, as they do now, because of their dispersed geography.
I know that the matter is debatable. My hon. Friend the Member for Argyll and Bute demonstrated an encyclopaedic knowledge of his constituency, as one would expect from an assiduous Member of Parliament; he certainly taught me something. None the less, I still believe that the Government have made the right judgment about the two exceptional constituencies that he selected. I would not be so churlish as to suggest that he was pleading for anything special. However, the hon. Member for Rhondda did so; he engaged in special pleading for Wales, something about which those who participated in the debate on the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill heard an awful lot. We heard much about the Welsh valleys and Welsh constituencies, as the record will show.
My hon. Friend the Member for St Ives and my hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth (Sarah Newton), who is not in her seat, made some specific points about Cornwall. My hon. Friend the Member for St Ives spoke about what he called—I have to be careful here—the border between Cornwall and England. I think that he raised exactly the same point when we were debating the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill. He referred today to the length of that debate; we had eight days of debate in the House, and he has obviously had the opportunity today to expand on the points that he made then.
In response to that debate, I said that although that view is shared by some in Cornwall, the Government’s position is that Cornwall is part of England and the United Kingdom; we do not recognise that boundary in quite the same constitutional way as does my hon. Friend the Member for St Ives. I understand why my hon. Friend takes that view, but I was surprised that the hon. Member for Rhondda appeared to suggest that the boundary had constitutional significance. I do not know whether the Opposition have changed policy and are trying to separate Cornwall from England, but I do not suggest that my hon. Friend takes that view.
My hon. Friend made some good points, including about the difficulty of getting to London from his constituency. That is something that he and I can both take up with First Great Western. I see that my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) has arrived for the next debate; he, too uses that train service and will concur. That will be the best way to deal with that problem.
My hon. Friend the Member for St Ives accepted in general the strong case for moving towards equal seats. I was most impressed by his novel arguments, which I have not heard before, for claiming significant parts of the Atlantic ocean as part of his constituency. We might get into all sorts of territorial difficulties if we did so, but it was a novel idea.
My hon. Friend and his fellow Members of Parliament for Cornish seats met the Prime Minister and me to make a pitch and to explain why they believe that the nature of Cornwall is unique. I would leave him with this notion. The Government do not subscribe to the view that one cannot represent constituents in Cornwall and other parts of the country, Devon being the most obvious. “We already have Members of the European Parliament who represent the whole of the south-west of England, and so represent constituents in Cornwall, in Devon and, indeed in Gibraltar perfectly ably.” Cornwall and Devon also share a police force. The border is not inviolate.
I do not accept the argument put by my hon. Friend the Member for St Ives, although I know that my hon. Friend the Member for South East Cornwall (Sheryll Murray) shares his view, about a Member of Parliament representing, say, part of Plymouth and part of Cornwall. Of course, some things are more important to one group of constituents than to others, but that is true of many constituencies. I have a fairly large rural constituency, and at one end of it a particular range of matters will be important that have no connection with those at the other end because of the distance. Nevertheless, I have to represent them all and understand all those issues. That is part of the job of being a Member of Parliament. The Government do not share the view that it is impossible to deal with that.
Andrew George
Of course it is not impossible to represent Gibraltar and Cornwall; nor is it impossible to represent places on either side of the Scottish border. However, the Minister has rather inventively twisted some of my evidence on what was so exceptional about the two constituencies that have been preserved. The question that he must address is what is the problem in allowing the Boundary Commission reasonable flexibility to allow constituencies that have a clearly shared view about where their boundaries should lie? That is particularly so as those areas outside them would not be affected and certainly would not be protesting against such a settlement.
The principle that votes should be of more equal weight across the country is important. Several Members have used words and phrases such as straitjacket and the rules being too tight. If we were to say that all constituencies had to be exactly the same size, my hon. Friend’s argument would have some force. However, although we are reducing flexibility there is still a 10% range in the size of constituencies. Based on the 2009 data, constituencies will broadly range from about 73,000 to almost 80,000. There is still a fair bit of flexibility, which allows the independent boundary commissions to take account of issues such as local authority boundaries, community boundaries and the geographic features that we have to contend with.
In evidence to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, the boundary commissions said that they would be perfectly able to deal with the rules proposed in the Bill, and that it would not present them with insuperable problems. We are fortunate that the four boundary commissions are politically independent. Those who pretend that some sort of gerrymandering exercise is going on are simply wrong. That phrase emanates from the USA. As one of my hon. Friends said, it is not that there is just some political interference there; in some parts of the United States, the boundaries are drawn up by the legislatures. It is not that there is interference, but it is a political decision on where the boundaries should be. We do not do that here. Parliament sets the framework, but decisions about where the boundaries should go are taken by boundary commissions.
Andrew George
That is the nub of the debate. The exception argument for the two preserved constituencies that the Minister has advanced this morning does not deal with the question of why that principle was decided upon, and why that reasonable flexibility should not also be applied for other constituencies.
I shall deal briefly with the other two points raised by my hon. Friend, as they were important, particularly so in his part of the country. He was right to draw attention to the need for an accurate and complete electoral register. Our electoral registration system means that 91% or 92% of eligible voters are registered. Internationally, that is pretty good. However, the Government are not complacent and want to do better. That is why I wrote to every local authority in the autumn, inviting them to take part in pilots to consider using public sector databases to improve the accuracy and completeness of the register. We had a good response, and I shall announce which local authorities are to participate in those pilots in due course.
I wrote to my hon. Friend about dual registration, which I know is important in Cornwall. He referred to people who own second homes and who choose to pay business rates because they let those properties. The rules are fairly clear. People who let their property are not entitled to register to vote. There must be a residence qualification, and there is case law on the matter. Electoral registration officers have to make such decisions on individual cases, and they should do so. I have received letters from people who object to not being allowed to register to vote, but one test is for the electoral registration system to be robust with them. Those who own a second home who pop there for only a week every year for a holiday will almost certainly not fulfil the criteria for being resident and entitled to vote. Local authorities could do a lot to help with that.
(15 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsA bar on sentenced, serving prisoners voting was first put in place in 1870. Successive Governments have maintained the position that, when an individual breaks their contract with society by committing an offence that leads to imprisonment, they should lose the right to vote while they are incarcerated.
Five years ago, in a case known as Hirst (No.2), the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the existing statutory bar on convicted prisoners voting was contrary to article 3, protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights—the right to free and fair elections.
The Court ruled that barring convicted prisoners in detention pursued a legitimate aim, but that a blanket ban was not proportionate. In its judgment, the Court acknowledged that the right to vote under the first protocol was not absolute, and that contracting states to the European Convention had to be given a margin of appreciation—a broad discretion—to decide what limitations on that right would be proportionate.
That judgment was handed down in October 2005. The last Government stated clearly and repeatedly that they would implement the judgment, published a timetable for legislation, and issued two consultation papers about how to do so. But they did nothing. The result is that the United Kingdom stands in breach of international law obligations—obligations that we expect others to uphold—and prisoners are bringing compensation claims as a direct result of the last Government’s inaction.
In November 2010, the European Court of Human Rights handed down a further judgment against the UK, Greens and MT. In that judgment, the Court set a deadline for the introduction of legislation of August 2011. There are in the region of 2,500 claims before the European Court of Human Rights which have been suspended pending implementation. We have been given a window to act and it is right that we do so. If we do not, we only increase the risk of damages.
It is plain that there are strong views across Parliament and in the country on the question of whether convicted prisoners should be entitled to vote. However, this is not a choice: it is a legal obligation. So the Government are announcing today that we will act to implement the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. In deciding how to proceed, we have been guided by three principles. First, that we should implement the Hirst judgment in a way that meets our legal obligations, but does not go further than that. Secondly, that the most serious offenders will not be given the right to vote. Thirdly, that we should seek to prevent the taxpayer having to face future claims for compensation.
The Government will therefore bring forward legislation providing that the blanket ban in the existing law will be replaced. Offenders sentenced to a custodial sentence of four years or more will lose the right to vote in all circumstances, which reflects the Government’s clear view that more serious offenders should not retain the right to vote. Offenders sentenced to a custodial sentence of less than four years will retain the right to vote, but legislation will provide that the sentencing judge will be able to remove that right if they consider that appropriate. Four years has in the past been regarded as the distinction between short and long-term prisoners, and the Government consider that permitting prisoners sentenced to less than four years’ imprisonment to vote is sufficient to comply with the judgment.
The right to vote will be restricted to UK Westminster Parliamentary and European Parliament elections only, and not in other elections or referendums. That is the minimum currently required by the law (a case considering whether article 3, protocol 1 applies to elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly is currently before the European Court of Human Rights: the Government’s position is that they do not). Prisoners will vote by post or proxy, and will be entitled to register to vote not at the prison, but at their former address or the area where they have a local connection.
We believe that these proposals can meet the objectives that we have set out of implementing the judgment in a way that is proportionate; ensuring the most serious offenders will not be given the right to vote; and seeking to prevent future claims for compensation. We will bring forward legislation next year for Parliament to debate.
While the franchise is reserved to Westminster, the implementation of this policy will clearly have implications for Scotland and Northern Ireland, where the administration of justice is devolved. The Government will work closely with colleagues in the Scottish and Northern Ireland Administrations before legislation is introduced on the practical implications of the approach.
Governments have an absolute duty to uphold the rule of law. And at this of all times we must avoid risking taxpayers’ money in ways that the public would rightly condemn. In the light of this, and of the legacy left by the last Government, the only responsible course is to implement the judgment, and to do so in a way which ensures the most serious offenders continue to lose the right to vote.
(15 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberBefore I start, I want to thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker, for your kind words about our 2018 bid team, who were dubbed “the three lions” by The Sun. I know that when the Prime Minister returns from Zurich, he will play close attention to this debate. He spoke about this matter earlier and will listen carefully to what Members have said.
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Adam Afriyie), not just on securing the debate, but on the thoughtful tone in which he opened it. That has been reflected by all hon. Members who have spoken. This matter is not about us, but about our ability to do our job—serving our constituents and doing our parliamentary work, as the shadow Leader of the House said.
I want to touch on the story that was in The Times earlier this week, because it has been referred to by a number of right hon. and hon. Members in this debate and it was raised at business questions earlier today. I understand that the story was the result of a freedom of information request, rather than a leak. I do not usually find myself quoting Sir Ian Kennedy, the chairman of IPSA, but it is worth putting on the record his response to the unfair way in which The Times ran that story—he has not always been particularly kind about Members of Parliament. He said:
“We assess that MPs have been thoughtful and proper in making their claims. Where we have queried a claim, it has been the result of misunderstanding as people adapt to the new scheme.”
He made it clear that, unlike the way in which they were reported, the claims were not improper and were examples not of MPs trying to do things that they should not have been doing, but of MPs behaving properly and adapting to the new system.
Bob Russell
Unfortunately, that message has not got into the newspapers. The right hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) made a serious allegation earlier and the Daily Mail today referred to an IPSA leak. Has the Minister received a statement from IPSA responding to the serious allegation that its director of communications is touting around trying to plant stories that are detrimental to Members of Parliament?
The hon. Gentleman is quite right that the message has not got out that MPs have behaved completely properly. That is why I thought it helpful to announce it on the Floor of the House, not that that will get it into the newspapers, as we know. However, I thought it worth putting it on the record that IPSA has acknowledged that MPs have behaved properly.
It is not my job to speak for IPSA, but as the hon. Gentleman has asked me about this point, and as it was raised by the right hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) earlier, it may encourage hon. Members to know that IPSA has been following the progress of this debate very closely. It heard the right hon. Lady’s comments and has categorically denied them. It has confirmed that the information in The Times was obtained through an FOI request, not from a leak.
I, too, have seen what IPSA has said in response, but it did not respond to the point that I made. I said:
“This morning, a colleague told me that they had been talking to a member of the press who had been offered information by somebody at IPSA on certain ‘juicy’ bits that had not yet emerged in the press about what certain Members had claimed for.”
I invited the person whom I named to answer that point. That person has not answered and I suggest that the statement put out by Sir Ian Kennedy does not answer the allegation that I made.
Does the hon. Gentleman think that it would help if IPSA answered parliamentary questions properly? For instance, I asked for a list of meetings that its staff had held with the press and of who was present on each occasion. The IPSA chief executive categorically refuses to answer that question. Would it not increase Members’ confidence in the system if IPSA were as transparent on such issues as it asks us to be when we are dealing with expenses?
The hon. Lady makes a good point. When I am perusing the lists of tabled questions, I frequently see her pertinent questions to IPSA, and I sometimes enjoy seeing the answers. She is right: if transparency is good for us, it is good for IPSA. It can be extremely helpful.
This is a good point at which to refer to the hon. Member for Colchester (Bob Russell), who reminded the House that although IPSA is not accountable to the Government, it is accountable through the Speaker’s Committee for the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, of which the hon. Gentleman is a member. Members look to that Committee to be vigorous in ensuring that IPSA conducts its affairs in an efficient and cost-effective manner.
Mr Winnick
Why has it taken so long for me to get a parliamentary reply about IPSA’s senior management team—who is involved, their salaries and so on? I have not yet received a reply, but surely such information should have been routine and I should have received it in a matter of two or three days.
I can answer only for how Ministers and I deal with parliamentary questions. I endeavour to answer mine promptly and within the time limits, and I would have thought that others should do so too. However, thankfully, the Government are not responsible for IPSA’s ability to answer questions.
I am grateful for that intervention. I shall now try to make some progress, as I want to leave sufficient time for other hon. Members who wish to get in.
I said that the Prime Minister would be listening closely to this debate. In July, during Prime Minister’s questions, he said that:
“what is necessary is a properly transparent system, a system with proper rules and limits which the public would have confidence in, but what we do not need is an overly bureaucratic and very costly system. I think all those in the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority need to get a grip of what they are doing, and get a grip of it very fast.”—[Official Report, 14 July 2010; Vol. 513, c. 946.]
That is what all Members have said today. They want IPSA’s system to be transparent, straightforward, not bureaucratic and not costly. IPSA should get on with that.
Does the Minister agree that, as with the House of Commons, IPSA is unlikely to survive a freedom of information request for evidence of payment to be produced? How can it justify withholding evidence of payment—all the invoices—on grounds of cost? That is part of the cost of the system, and it is going to have to bear it.
That may well be the case, and I think that IPSA has admitted in public that if people apply for receipts through freedom of information requests, it may well have to do that. We will have to see how it gets on. That is the decision that it has made, which the shadow Leader of the House said is a balance between transparency and cost. It may find that the rules of freedom of information affect it as they affected the House.
The hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) was right to point out, as did other Members, what happened in the past and the fact that the House made the decision to have an independent system. That is important, as well as the transparency issue. I listened very carefully, but I do not think that anyone during the debate was urging that we go back on that; in fact, Members made good points about ensuring that we retain both transparency and independence.
Hon. Members gave examples of how they thought the system should move and a number spoke in favour of a flat-rate payment, including my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor. However, a number of Members, including the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy), the hon. Member for Manchester Central (Tony Lloyd) and my hon. Friend the Member for North Thanet (Mr Gale), pointed out that a flat-rate system, which does not take into account the variance in costs across the country, may not be a perfect one and that there needs to be some flexibility. They all suggested ways in which that flexibility may be achieved.
We have heard from several Members about their various experiences. IPSA itself has recognised that in the first few months of running the system it made mistakes; it has been very transparent about that. We know that it made mistakes and that it needs to improve the system. The hon. Member for Bassetlaw and the shadow Leader of the House referred to improvements that have been made in the system. IPSA now makes some direct payments to landlords for constituency office rental, it now pays against invoices, and the travelcard can now be used to pay other bills. Most importantly, it implemented advances to Members to deal with the genuine problem that very many Members do not have significant amounts of money and are not in a position to meet these costs out of their own pocket and then claim money back—costs which, as many Members have said, one would not expect any other person in business, in a position such as ours, to have to pay out of their own pocket, and would reasonably be thought of as proper business expenses.
Having said that, what I have heard does not suggest that the legislation necessarily needs to be reviewed. Under the legislation introduced by this House, the expenses system and the way that it operates is a matter for IPSA. No change in legislation is required to be able to deal with the issues that have been raised in the House. Indeed, in the letter that IPSA recently circulated to Members, it said that it will conduct its annual review of the scheme in the new year and will look at the problems that have been experienced by MPs. It specifically refers to the impact of the scheme on family life, which was raised by Members on both sides of the House, and the impact on Members living in the outer reaches of the London area—indeed, in places that most people in this House probably would not consider were in the London area. IPSA has also said that it will balance its requirements for assurance against the administrative burdens on itself and on Members. That is welcome and shows that it is listening.
Under the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, IPSA is required to consult the Leader of the House as one of its statutory consultees, and the Government are considering how we can use that opportunity to submit evidence to IPSA. As Members will know, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House is very familiar with the issues raised with him by many MPs, either privately or on the Floor of the House at business questions.
The Government strongly support the principles of independence and transparency for IPSA, as does the shadow Leader of the House. The review that IPSA is about to undertake is its opportunity to deliver a system that remains transparent, which is probably the best way of determining that Members behave properly, but is also more efficient and less bureaucratic. I am sure that I speak for Members on both sides of the House in urging IPSA to take that opportunity and deliver a system that improves on what we have today.
(15 years, 6 months ago)
Commons Chamber Being in this position almost persuaded me of the merits of knives, which at least enable us to conclude debates at approximately the point at which everyone else has spoken.
I remind the Committee that the amendments deal with the mechanism providing for an early general election following a vote of no confidence, as set out in clause 2(2). Last week, on the second day of this Committee stage, we engaged in a wide-ranging discussion both of the merits of the various amendments and of the Bill. Before I deal with the amendments, let me respond to some of the questions raised by Members last week.
My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing), who is present and who speaks for the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, asked a number of questions relating to the constitutional consequences of a vote of no confidence under the Bill. She was particularly concerned about the possibility of a Government’s forcing a general election by refusing to act both in accordance with conventions and in the spirit of the Act. She gave the example of a Government who engineered a vote of no confidence in themselves, or who sought to trigger a series of elections close to one another by refusing to resign after an election result.
If a Prime Minister who would presumably be seeking to be re-elected in a subsequent election engaged in such constitutional shenanigans, he or she would first suffer a political penalty at that election. If a Prime Minister behaved in an absolutely unconstitutional fashion, there would always be the ultimate long stop: Her Majesty the Queen could dismiss the said Prime Minister. That is the ultimate check and balance in our system. Clearly it would require an extraordinary set of circumstances, but it is the position that would obtain if our unwritten or other conventions were breached in a really appalling fashion.
Mr Richard Shepherd (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
By what constitutional authority does the Minister cite the extraordinary proposition that the long stop of the constitution is that the Queen may dismiss a Prime Minister?
Mr Shepherd
So that is the Minister’s new interpretation of a constitution, or of defined practice over the years.
I cannot think of an example of such a position since the reign of Queen Victoria, who refused to accept Robert Peel as Prime Minister, and I think it inconceivable that it would arise in a modern constitution.
I did say that there would have to be an extraordinary set of circumstances for the Prime Minister to behave in such a constitutionally outrageous way. They would be circumstances in which a Prime Minister was abusing and stretching the constitution in order to stay in office and avoid the consequences of losing a vote of confidence in Parliament.
I think that that is extraordinarily unlikely. It is theoretically possible that the Queen could refuse assent to a Bill, but that has not happened since the reign of Queen Anne. Such constitutional anomalies remain theoretical, but so theoretical that it is inconceivable that they would arise whatever the emergency. I really feel that to rely on that for the passage of the Bill is most unsatisfactory.
I am not relying on it for the passage of the Bill. I was referring to the issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest, who last week, on behalf of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, raised some potential scenarios with which she was uncomfortable. I believe, and the Government believe, that those scenarios are indeed, as my hon. Friend says, theoretical, and extremely unlikely to happen. My point is that if a Prime Minister behaved unconstitutionally in such a theoretical and extremely unlikely way, a mechanism that already exists would be invoked. However, the Government contend—and I agree with my hon. Friend on this—that both sets of circumstances are highly unlikely. It is our contention that the eventuality to which my hon. Friend has referred would not be necessary, because a Prime Minister would not behave in a way that stretched constitutional convention to breaking point.
I must say that this is the second very worrying route the Minister has gone down. He is saying that if the Prime Minister were to behave unconstitutionally, the monarch would act. How would the monarch know whether the Prime Minister had acted constitutionally or unconstitutionally?
I am not setting out anything that is groundbreaking; this is the position that exists now. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) that there would have to be an extraordinary set of circumstances; indeed, I said as much. I did so because I was referring to a point my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest made last week in raising some concerns of the Select Committee’s concerns. My view is that those concerns are not well founded because the events they address are extremely unlikely to happen and are only really theoretical in nature, but there is a response to them if they were to happen.
Will my hon. Friend reassure the Committee that it is the Government’s intention to fulfil their duty and that of Parliament to protect the Crown from being put in a position where the monarch would ever have to make such an important constitutional decision?
I think it would help the Committee if the Minister could cite an academic paper, some judicial text or something else that bears out this notion that Her Majesty the Queen would interfere in politics in the way he is suggesting she would. Can he quote anything?
The position is that Her Majesty the Queen appoints Prime Ministers and the ultimate constitutional long-stop is that if a Prime Minister behaves in a way that is outwith the constitutional position, the monarch can dismiss the Prime Minister—but that is the long-stop constitutional safeguard in our system.
Let us be absolutely clear: as I understand it, the Minister is saying that if the Prime Minister were “unconstitutionally”—to borrow the Minister’s word—to engineer a motion of no confidence in himself, for instance by tabling a motion of confidence in himself and urging his supporters to abstain, the monarch would sack him.
I am not setting out particular scenarios. I was making the point that we can set out some theoretical propositions that have not happened and that we think are extremely unlikely to happen. I was simply setting out that if such a theoretical and unlikely event, to use the words of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset, were to happen there is a constitutional long-stop. That was all I was saying, and I think the hon. Gentleman is making rather too much of it, as it is not a new point.
Sir Peter Soulsby (Leicester South) (Lab)
Although we may well accept that the scenarios we are talking about are unlikely, they are none the less possible, and while they remain possible would it not be desirable for the Government either to accept the Select Committee’s amendments or, indeed, to bring forward some of their own to make sure that should such unlikely events occur, there is a clear road map for the sovereign to follow?
The fact is that some of these things can happen under our existing constitutional position; they are not triggered by anything we are providing for in this Bill. Our flexible constitution has worked rather well over the years in dealing with events that have not been thought of in advance, and I see no reason to undertake a rather more significant constitutional rewrite.
This Bill is intended to do one specific thing, which is remove from the Prime Minister the power to seek a Dissolution of Parliament. It makes the necessary changes to do that, but it does not seek to make changes that are not necessary to do that; it does not seek to go wider than achieving that particular change, and I think that is very sensible.
My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest also asked last week how the Bill strengthened the power of the House to throw out a Government. Giving statutory effect to the vote that could bring about a general election, rather than simply relying on the conventions, strengthens the power of the House. The Bill transfers from the Prime Minister to this House the power to decide whether there will be an early general election. If I remember rightly, my hon. Friend did, however, say that she is broadly supportive of the measures in the Bill, as, I think, is the Select Committee.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) asked a number of questions last week. He asked whether the Bill should contain a provision to ensure that a motion of no confidence is given precedence so it is debated without delay. He is aware—he mentioned this last week—that there is a convention that the Government find time to debate a motion of no confidence tabled by the official Opposition. That is a long-standing convention, which has been followed by Governments. Also of course, it would always be open to the Opposition to table an amendment to a Government motion, changing it to one of no confidence to ensure that that was debated.
The hon. Gentleman also raised a number of related points about whether particular votes could be considered motions of no confidence and whether it was appropriate for the Speaker to rule on such matters. I think I am right in saying that he was concerned that the Bill would give too much discretion to the Speaker. The Government do not consider that to be the case. We would expect the Speaker by and large to take a fairly literal approach to clause 2(2). We do not think the Speaker would be left with appreciably more discretion in dealing with this sort of question than he already has, for example under the Parliament Act 1911 when he has to certify whether a Bill is a money Bill. That is a decision he makes; it is for him. It seems to me that that is a sensible amount of discretion for the Speaker to have, although I accept it is on a different issue.
The Minister is right, of course. In fact, at present Members of the House of Lords are fiercely contesting the Speaker’s decision on whether certain Bills are money Bills. My point, however, is that all that that determines is whether or not a Bill can be debated in another Chamber, whereas under this measure it would determine whether or not we had a general election and the Government had fallen. That is a very big decision to be placing in the hands of the Speaker, which heretofore has never been in the hands of the Speaker.
There are two issues there. I will not dwell on the money Bill issue to any great extent, because if I were to do so you would rule me out of order, Ms Primarolo, but I have read the account of the debate in the other place to which the hon. Gentleman refers and the other place is not challenging the Speaker’s ability to rule on whether a Bill is a money Bill. It is simply disagreeing with the consequences of that, and arguing that if something is a money Bill it is perfectly appropriate for the upper House to debate it in Committee and pass amendments to it, recognising that legally those amendments will have no effect if the House of Commons chooses not to take them into account. The upper House is therefore not challenging the Speaker’s right to make that decision.
The hon. Gentleman is also not right to say that this is about the Speaker deciding, effectively, whether to bring down the Government. That would be a decision for the House. The Speaker would have to make a decision about certifying something as a vote of confidence. As we debated last week, it would be extraordinary if the House were debating a motion of confidence—which the Speaker would certify as such—with everybody remaining in ignorance of the fact that it was a motion of no confidence in the Government. I simply do not think that would happen. Everyone would be very well aware of the fact that it was a motion of confidence—that it had that import to it. It would be for the House to vote on the matter, and the Speaker would then certify in a way that means the decision is outside the ambit of the courts.
Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)
As the Minister just appeared to touch on, under the Bill the Speaker issues the certificate only after the vote has taken place, not before. Therefore, would not the Labour amendment that specifies what is and what is not a vote of confidence be much better in everybody’s terms?
I shall deal with the specific amendments shortly, when I set out why the Government think that they are unnecessary and that their drafting makes them flawed. If the hon. Gentleman does not think I have adequately dealt with his point, he will be able to intervene on me and I will happily take such an intervention. We have debated the fact that there is also a purpose in the Bill’s not specifying the exact words in legislation, because such an approach gives the House some necessary flexibility. I will return to that in a moment.
Let us consider the amendments in order. Amendment 5 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), who is not able to be here today because he is away on other parliamentary business. He explained that his amendment would remove the 14-day period before an early election was called in the event of the Speaker certifying that the House had passed a vote of no confidence. It is right to say that there would be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to move to an early election when the House determined that we should do so, and the Bill provides for that in clause 2(1). But it is perfectly possible that there may be circumstances within a fixed term in which a legitimate Government could be formed from the composition of the House as it then stood, so it would not be appropriate to insist on an election. Members will have been elected for five years, and they are able to give their approval to a Government formed from within their ranks without the need necessarily to go to the country. The House can decide to do so, because under our proposals if a vote of confidence is lost and no Government can be formed within 14 days who subsequently receive a vote of confidence, a general election would take place. It seems sensible to give the House the opportunity to test whether a Government can be formed.
My hon. Friend’s amendment contained a fundamental misunderstanding about what a Prime Minister should do in the event of a Government losing the confidence of the House. Two things can happen. One possibility, under our current system, is that a Prime Minister remains in office but invites Her Majesty to dissolve the House and call a general election. Thus the Prime Minister does not resign immediately, and that is what happened when the House expressed its lack of confidence in the Government in 1979. Mr Callaghan did not resign when he lost the vote of confidence; he resigned only when he lost the subsequent election. Alternatively, the Prime Minister could resign almost straightaway after losing a vote of confidence, as happened in January 1924 when the Government’s motion for the Loyal Address after the Queen’s Speech was amended: Prime Minister Baldwin resigned and the Labour Opposition formed a Government. This Bill seeks to encapsulate that double-sided convention.
At the moment, if a general election has an unclear outcome, the Prime Minister is able to test his support in the House of Commons. If the House then signalled that it did not have confidence in that Government, that Prime Minister would go and a new one could be appointed. Amendment 5 would insist that another general election took place, and if the result of that general election was unclear, we could end up having a succession of general elections. Amendment 5 would force such elections to be held. In countries that have fixed-term Parliaments it is very common for there to be a period of Government formation after a vote of no confidence before an election is triggered. That is what happens in Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden, so we are proposing an approach that has much precedent, which we think is sensible. We cannot ask my hon. Friend the Member for Stone to withdraw his amendment, because he is not here and thus unable to do so. However, we urge Members who are here not to insist on it being pressed to a Division.
I have been in touch with my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), who makes things complicated because he does not text people. He is in Budapest representing the European Scrutiny Committee, but he has suggested that it would be in the interests of the scrutiny of this Bill to press the amendment to a Division, and one or two of us will attempt to do so.
As I said, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone is away on parliamentary business and, as he has perhaps not reached 21st century methods of communication, my words are unlikely to reach him in a timely way. So I can only urge him not to press his amendment to a vote, but I suspect that the decision on that will be for others, not for him.
As it happens, I agree with the Minister on this amendment. However, the one area that it will be worth considering on Report is whether it would be sensible to have a motion of confidence on the forming of a new Government after a general election, which should be treated in a slightly different way. Such an approach would address the 1924 situation that he suggests.
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, which has been raised by others. I believe I am right in saying that the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform, has said he is keen on the idea of installing Prime Ministers with an explicit vote in the House—he was speaking for himself there, not for the Committee. That would be a further change to our system and, as I said in answer to the hon. Member for Leicester South (Sir Peter Soulsby), we have made the necessary changes in the law to take away the Prime Minister’s right to call an early general election, but we have not gone further. I shall think about what the hon. Member for Rhondda said and see whether we think it has merit.
The hon. Gentleman’s amendment 22 seeks to replace the 14 days that we set out in the Bill for that Government formation period with a period of 10 working days. He is supportive of a Government formation period, because he would not be attempting to keep one through this amendment were he not. I think he was wanting to understand why we chose the period that we did, using calendar days rather than working days. The reason why we did so was because the calendar day period is fixed and certain, whereas working days are not, as they are dependent on things such as bank holidays.
Two legitimate concerns are involved here, and they were touched on last week. There is a concern that the number of business days in the 14-day period would be curtailed or that the date of the no confidence vote could mean that the date for the Government formation vote fell on a non-working day. Our view—I am interested to hear the hon. Gentleman’s—is that discussions on Government formation would not stop on weekends and bank holidays; I suspect that they would continue, given that having a Government is probably the most important thing for the country.
There are two ways around a scenario where the vital 14th day when the vote of confidence is due falls on a day when the House would conventionally not be sitting. The first is to arrange that the no confidence motion be taken on a day that means that the House will be sitting 14 days later. The alternative is for the House simply to sit on what would traditionally have been a non-sitting day. There is nothing to prevent the House from sitting, if it chooses to do so, on a bank holiday, a Saturday or a Sunday. Non-working days are not days when the House cannot sit, even though it does not do so. There are precedents for the House sitting on such days when emergencies have happened. I believe I am right in saying that the House was recalled to sit on a Saturday when the Falkland Islands were invaded by the Argentines. Holding a vote on whether a new Government did or did not have the confidence of the House would be sufficiently important that it would be in order for the House to sit that day, even if it was not a conventional day.
The Minister is right in relation to the Falkland Islands, and I believe that the House has also sat on a Sunday on the demise of the monarch. That is precisely why we did not specify “sitting days” in this amendment; we used the term “working days” because that is the language used throughout the rest of the Bill. We sought to provide a degree of flexibility; otherwise, over Easter, when there are bank holidays on the Friday and the following Monday, there might be a sustained period when the House would find it inconceivable to sit but the Government might, none the less, want to be able to do their business.
For the purposes of this particular set of motions, the only business that we would be talking about the House undertaking would be holding a vote on whether or not a new Government who had been formed had the confidence of the House. Given the things that the Government are responsible for, it would be important to have a clear Government in place for the financial markets and at difficult times. We know from experience and we can see it from what happens in other countries. Therefore, the Government formation negotiations would want to be concluded and it would benefit the country, the Government and the House for the House to vote on that without inordinate delay. If there were a number of bank holidays or other holidays in the way, that could be dealt with. [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman asks about Good Friday. As I have said, the alternative is that we could arrange things by moving the no confidence vote so that it was 14 days before a sitting day.
Conventionally, no confidence motions are given time in the House very soon after they are tabled, but as long as the Government were prepared to table such a motion very soon and agreed that with the Opposition, it would not necessarily have to be tabled the next day. I do not think that it is an inordinate problem. We think that it is sensible for there to be a fixed timetable for a Government to be formed so that everyone has some certainty. That is why we picked the time period that we have.
My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest spoke in support of amendments 36 and 37, which are also tabled in the names of other members of the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform. Amendment 36 would make the 14 days in a period following a Government defeat a period that would not include periods of Prorogation or Adjournment for more than four days. Although I do not think that this is the intention behind the amendment, its effect would be to permit the 14-day period for Government formation to be prolonged potentially indefinitely if the House was prorogued or adjourned. The Government do not think that that is appropriate. We think that the 14-day period strikes the right balance between giving parties in this House time to discuss and see whether a Government can be formed and not allowing things to go on for so long that the country is plunged into a period of uncertainty. We do not think that amendment 36 is acceptable.
Amendment 37 provides that a Prime Minister must resign within seven calendar days of losing a vote of no confidence and recommend to the monarch a successor who appears to them to be the person most likely to be able to command the confidence of the House. I think I am right to say—my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest will correct me if I am wrong—that the purpose of the amendment is to avoid a situation in which a Prime Minister who has lost a no confidence vote wishes to remain in power and asks the monarch to prorogue Parliament to avoid an alternative Government receiving a vote of confidence, thereby forcing a general election.
My hon. Friend says that that is indeed the purpose of the amendment. However, I think amendment 37 is defective, because it rules out the possibility of what happened in 1979 occurring again. As I have said, Prime Minister Callaghan did not resign as a result of the no confidence motion. He remained in office, asked Her Majesty the Queen to dissolve Parliament and resigned when he lost the subsequent general election. That outcome remains a possibility under the Bill. My hon. Friend’s amendment would have meant that he would have been forced to resign before the result of the election was known. I do not think that that would have been a sensible outcome.
I fully appreciate the Minister’s point. Amendments 36 and 37 might well be technically defective—in any case, I have no intention of pressing them to a vote, as I said—but the Select Committee’s purpose was to ensure that this issue was properly discussed and scrutinised on the Floor of the House. Will the Minister reassure the House that he and his colleagues are satisfied that it would not be possible under the Bill’s provisions for the Government to seek indefinite prorogation in order to avoid a vote of confidence and a general election?
I think I have set out why I do not think that that is likely. As we have heard, there are lots of theoretical possibilities that are very outlandish—I do not propose to rehash the conversations that we had at the beginning of this debate—but the Government do not think that they are realistic risks and that is why we do not think that amendments 36 and 37 are acceptable.
Let me turn now to the last amendment in this group, amendment 25, which was also tabled by the Opposition. It specifies the wording of motions of no confidence for the purposes of clause 2(2). It aims to remove the discretion of the House over its wording and that of the Speaker in his certifying of a motion of no confidence. The Government recognise that no confidence motions might take different forms, as they do now, but we do not want to remove the flexibility entirely. That raises an issue, which we will come to in the next group of amendments, to do with the House’s exclusive cognisance.
If we try to set out in statute the precise form of a no confidence motion, that could raise the risks to which the Clerk of the House has alluded. We think it is better for the Speaker’s certificate to be conclusive and for the Speaker to determine the nature of that certification. As I said when we touched on this matter in debating a previous group of amendments, if there were doubt—I think it unlikely that there would be—about whether what the House was discussing was a motion of no confidence, it would seem to be sensible for the Government, the Opposition and the Speaker to ensure that Members were clear on that point when they were debating it. I cannot believe that there could ever be a debate in this House about a motion of no confidence in the Government in which Members were sitting there completely unaware that they were debating the future of the Government of our country.
Of course, the Minister is right about the reality and the politics of the situation. He should remember, however, that we are talking about a situation in which legislation has been introduced and that legislation is always challengeable in the courts. Once things get into the courts, who knows what will happen regarding the interpretation of the provisions? For the sake of clarity and certainty, what is wrong with setting out the precise terms that must be used so that there can be no doubt? That goes to the issue in amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), which sets out provisions for the avoidance of doubt. Surely there is merit in making it absolutely clear and plain.
I shall not attempt to rush forward to the certification procedure, because we will debate it when we discuss the next group of amendments.
Let me turn to the specific amendment before the Committee. I do not think amendment 25 achieves the certainty that the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) suggests would be desirable. It states that a motion of no confidence “shall be”, not “must include”, so it is not clear whether the motion would have to consist exclusively of the specified text or whether that text could be part of a motion, such as if it were added to a Government motion by amendment.
The Opposition’s amendment tries to specify the text of the no confidence motion, but does not try to achieve equivalent clarity as regards the motion of confidence that would have to be passed within 14 days by an alternative Government in order to avoid a general election. The amendment is trying to achieve some certainty—that was what the hon. Member for Rhondda said—but I do not think it does. I also do not think it is desirable or appropriate to try to set out the text of the motions in the Bill.
The Government think that clause 2(2) provides a clear and practical mechanism that gives statutory effect to a vote of no confidence. I have set out the Government’s concerns about the amendments and I hope that hon. Members will not seek to press them to a vote.
Mr Shepherd
I should like to press amendment 5 to a vote, with the consent of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash).
For the avoidance of doubt, the Government’s position is that they are not in favour of moving to what is more accurately said to be a codified constitution. Many of our constitutional principles are, of course, written down, just not in one document. It is not the Government’s position to do so. I hope that cheers my hon. Friend up.
I am grateful for that assurance. The Minister, who in all these debates has shown impeccable manners and tact despite the pressure he is under, should be looking for an alternative way of delivering this part of the coalition agreement, to which the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) alluded.
The Speaker’s decisions will be taken under immense political pressure, as he decides what constitutes a confidence motion, what amendments might be tabled to amend a confidence motion, whether, if carried, that would invalidate the motion, whether the amendment could constitute a motion of confidence, and the consequences of amendments being carried or the motion being carried.
I quote again from the Clerk’s memorandum:
“As these would become justiciable questions, the courts could be drawn into matters of acute political controversy.”
I respect the fact that many in the House think we should have a Supreme Court like the European Court of Justice in the European Union or the Supreme Court of the United States, which is essentially a political court, but that is a very big constitutional change. We ought to have a royal commission about it, there ought to be debates on the Adjournment about it and the implications of drawing the courts into politics, if that is what we are going to do, ought to be properly explored. The way in which the Supreme Court is appointed to make it accountable for its political judgments is another important question.
We are importing continental and American-style jurisprudence into our judicial decision making. Some judges are becoming more and more adventurous about how they interpret statute and where they feel entitled to make judicial interpretations, and the Bill invites them to decide when there might be a general election under particular circumstances.
I am grateful for those kind words from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox).
When Mr Hoyle was in the Chair last week, he made it clear that he did not intend to have a stand part debate on this clause as we will have touched on all parts of it when debating the amendments. Before I move on to considering the amendments, it is worth putting into context the parts of the clause about which Members are concerned.
I think I am right in saying that the concerns expressed about privilege and about whether the courts should intervene have almost exclusively related to clause 2(2), which deals with motions of confidence. Interestingly, the Clerk of the House, in his evidence and in conversations with me, was not concerned about subsection (2), given that it uses a perfectly well-precedented certification procedure. His concern—I think I explain it accurately—was with subsection (1), which covers the certification of an early general election, rather than with the certification procedure in principle. His concern was with the nature of the procedure that had to take place before the Speaker certified. In other words, not only would the House have had to pass a motion on a Division, but a particular number of Members would have had to vote.
At the risk of repeating what I have already read out from the Speaker’s memorandum, I want to ensure that we are not speaking at cross-purposes. In paragraph 16 of the Committee’s report, the Clerk makes it very clear, in discussing clause 2(2), that
“The provisions of this subsection make the Speaker’s consideration of confidence motions and the House’s practices justiciable questions for determination by the ordinary courts.”
I do not think that the Clerk could have been clearer: it is subsection (2) that he is concerned about.
I had a conversation with the Clerk about the certification, with the majority being specified. The Government decided to place the provisions on the early general election in statute rather than relying on Standing Orders because, as I stated in the memorandum I placed in the Library on 13 September, we cannot achieve the policy objective by relying on Standing Orders, which can be changed by a simple majority—
Let me just finish this point, then I will take an intervention from my hon. Friend.
Standing Orders can be changed by a simple majority. The Government’s view was that, if that was the case, the power to dissolve Parliament early would effectively be left with the Prime Minister.
I beg to suggest that, if the Minister had listened carefully to what I said earlier, he would have heard me reading from a letter I had received from Mr Robert Rogers, who made it absolutely clear that it is possible to entrench a Standing Order of this House with its own super-majority. I am astonished that the Government do not understand that, and that the whole basis of this Bill seems to rest once more on the denial of advice given by the Clerks of the House.
My hon. Friend cited in the letter from Robert Rogers a reference to existing Standing Orders, which require a particular majority for an event to take place. I think he mentioned the requirement for 100 Members to vote for a closure motion. There is no precedent for a Standing Order, passed by a simple majority, to entrench itself and require that it cannot be changed, other than by a vote of this House on a different majority. The Government know of no precedent for that, and no Member has given an example of one. If a Standing Order provided that an early general election could be held only after a vote with the specified majority, and if that Standing Order could be changed by a simple majority vote in the House, it would be open to the governing party, at the behest of the Prime Minister, to change the Standing Order and to trigger an early election based on the whim of the Executive. That is exactly what we are trying to remove under the Bill. The Government believe that if the policy objective is to be achieved, the procedure must be specified in statute.
Mr Shepherd
If that is so—and I accept it as such—why does it not apply to the statute itself?
I think we have touched on that before. Once the Bill becomes an Act of Parliament, it cannot be changed purely by a majority vote in the House of Commons. The decision would have to be made by Parliament, which would also engage the other place, in which the Government do not have a majority. Even after—[Interruption.] I anticipated that reaction. Even after the appointment of the new list of working peers, the governing parties together will have only 40% of the peers in the upper House; 60% will be Labour peers, Cross Benchers or Lords Spiritual. The fact that this will be an Act of Parliament makes it impossible for a majority vote of a governing party to bring about an early general election, which is our policy objective.
The Minister is right in saying that the main difference is that the matter would have to be dealt with in the second Chamber. As I understand it, however, the coalition agreement states clearly that the Government’s aspiration is to create enough peers to meet the proportions formed by each of the parties in the general election. That would provide a majority of 56%—quite apart from the fact that, as far as I can see, virtually every remaining Liberal Democrat Member in the country will be a member of the Second Chamber.
I will not dwell on this issue at length, Mr Evans, because if I did so you would rule me out of order, but the coalition agreement does not say that. It says that we want to make the upper House more representative of the result in the general election, not exactly in line with it. The hon. Gentleman simply is not right.
The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) quoted from a judgment. I will not be drawn into the specifics of the Chaytor case—although the Supreme Court has given its judgment, there are ongoing criminal trials—but the flaw in the hon. Gentleman’s argument lies in the fact that the case concerns the administration of the expenses scheme. The House of Commons has never asserted exclusive cognisance of the expenses scheme. It has never said that the scheme, its administration and the matters that flow from it are parliamentary proceedings, which is why that is not a good example. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s judgment recognises the exclusive right of each House of Parliament to manage its own affairs without interference from the other, or from outside Parliament.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) quoted the views of the Clerk of the House. If the Government were alone in their view and the Clerk’s views were shared by everyone else, my hon. Friend would have a stronger case. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee and the Lords Constitution Committee have taken a great deal of evidence, and the weight of independent expert evidence has supported the Government’s view. For example, Professor Robert Blackburn of King’s college London said—and I think that this is in line with the comments of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon—
“In my view, the government's Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill has been technically well-drafted by the Cabinet Office’s parliamentary counsel, particularly in avoiding judicial review of its provisions on early elections by way of Speaker’s certificates”.
The hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), the Chairman of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, said:
“In the very limited time that we had to look at this matter, the Clerk was the only person to raise this question, and the academics who have been referred to—Professor Hazell, Professor Blackburn and others—completely disagreed with the view put forward by the Clerk.”—[Official Report, 13 September 2010; Vol. 515, c. 632-3.]
Tristram Hunt
The point was that we did not have enough time to hear other voices that might have agreed with the Clerk of the House, owing to our having to rush our consideration of the Bill and to the speed with which the Government are pushing it through.
That was also the experience of the Lords Constitution Committee—and, in fact, we have not been rushing the consideration of this Bill. We published it in July, Second Reading was in September, and this is the third day of the Committee stage, in December. We are hardly rushing forward at an enormously swift pace. Months have elapsed. I feel sure that if hundreds of constitutional lawyers and academics agreed with the Clerk and disagreed with the Government, we would have heard from them.
Mr Andrew Turner (Isle of Wight) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend understand that the Committee had to rush through its work on this Bill and the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill at the same time?
I am prepared to accept that consideration of the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill has been proceeding faster than consideration of this Bill, but I cannot accept that this Bill is being considered at a great pace. It was published five months ago, we have reached only the third day of the Committee stage, and the Report stage is still to come. I believe that we have been proceeding at a sensible pace. Indeed, today’s proceedings were added when the Government realised that Members wished to engage in the debate at greater length.
The Minister seems to suggest that all the evidence apart from that of the Clerk of the House falls into the other camp. The Committee listened to the various witnesses and reached a rather different conclusion—that the purpose of the Bill needed to be achieved without the courts being invited to question aspects of the House’s own procedures or the actions of the Speaker—and urged us to move in a rather different direction from the one advocated by the Government.
The Committee was quite right. I agree that we need to ensure that the courts do not question those matters. In a moment I will deal with the amendments and the Government’s reason for believing that the language we have used about the well-precedented use of Speaker’s certificates prevents the courts from questioning the Act.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex observed that judges were not more interventionist. I believe there is evidence that there has been more judicial activism in judicial reviews of Executive decisions, but as far as I am aware there is no evidence that the courts have become more interventionist in challenging parliamentary proceedings. Executive decisions and decisions of Parliament are quite different from each other. Although the Supreme Court has a new name, it has no greater powers than the judicial Committee of the House of Lords that it replaced. I do not think that my hon. Friend’s concerns are well judged.
My hon. Friend also referred to the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Justice can deal with matters related to European Union law; nothing in the Bill would engage it. Similarly, the functions of the Speaker under the Bill do not engage any of the rights conferred by the European Court of Human Rights. I think it was only last week that the Joint Committee on Human Rights agreed with that when it said that the Bill’s provisions did not need to be brought to the attention of either House on human rights grounds.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hereford and South Herefordshire (Jesse Norman)—who is not in the Chamber, as he has had to fulfil a long-standing and important engagement to attend a meeting elsewhere in the House—expressed concern about the European Court of Human Rights. In fact, it has shown the utmost respect for parliamentary privilege. In a 2003 case, A. v. United Kingdom, it was specifically held that article 9 of the Bill of Rights did not violate the convention by preventing an applicant from taking defamation proceedings against an MP for words said in parliamentary proceedings. The European Court of Human Rights strongly supported the contention that courts would not become involved in these matters.
I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon, who said that owing to the very nature of these events—the fact that they would be politically highly charged—judges would not be keen to rush in and engage in questions that are rightly to be resolved by political rather than legal means. I have heard no evidence, apart from assertion, that courts would do anything different.
Mark Durkan
I gave the example from 2001 when, on the third attempt, David Trimble and I were jointly elected as First and Deputy First Minister by the Northern Ireland Assembly. That was taken to the courts. Yes, the courts did not touch on issues connected with the Assembly’s standing orders, but they did entertain the suggestion that the Secretary of State had failed to use the power and duty, given to him under law, to set a date for an election if no First and Deputy First Minister have been elected after six weeks. The Secretary of State did not do so, claiming that because he had notice of the potential to elect us, which had been issued by the end day of the six-week period, he could interpret the deadline differently. The court did not throw out the case and the judges—competent, serious, senior judges—divided on the issue. In the light of that precedent, the assurance of the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) does not stand.
The hon. Gentleman makes my point for me. He accurately sets out the fact that at issue was not a proceeding in Parliament—a decision of this House—but an executive decision by the Secretary of State. As I have said, there is lots of evidence that courts will challenge Ministers’ decisions, and one can argue about whether they will be right to do so; Ministers would probably argue they are not, but everyone else would probably argue that they are. The case the hon. Gentleman raises involved an executive decision; it was not a decision of this House or a proceeding in Parliament, and it is not protected under article 9.
Mark Durkan
But what we are talking about is related to the closest equivalent in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 of the certificate powers being given to the Secretary of State. Sections 31 and 32 of the 1998 Act provide for the early Dissolution of the Assembly and early elections. They are the exact same powers, except that in Northern Ireland the Secretary of State has the powers of an “over-Speaker”, rather than their being vested in the Presiding Officer. They are the equivalent powers, however.
Sorry, but the Minister is using the phrase “proceedings in Parliament” as though it were a self-evidently clear concept, but a great deal of legislation and case law has analysed various different aspects of it and it is nowhere near as clear as he might presume.
No, and that leads to where I was going, which was to turn to amendment 6 and to explain why we are using the language of the device of a Speaker’s certificate. There are precedents that have stood the test of time, which is why Professor Blackburn expressed the feeling in the quotation I read that parliamentary counsel had drafted the Bill well.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) tabled amendment 6 and my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex spoke to it. I can see why they would want to use the wording in the Parliament Act 1911, but the Bill says the Speaker’s certificate is “conclusive for all purposes” and the Government do not think inserting the words
“shall not be…questioned in any court of law”
adds anything. The 1911 wording has, indeed, stood the test of time, but it used the language of the early 20th century. Later legislation used different wording. The House of Lords Act 1999 used exactly the wording we have used, which provides that certificates of the Clerk of the Parliaments on questions of whether an hereditary peer is one of the excepted 92 hereditary peers are conclusive. The provisions have worked well in practice, whereas wording consistent with the Parliament Act 1911 could bring into question whether protections in more recent Acts were meant to be an inferior sort of protection. We think that would be undesirable.
Provided certificates are conclusive for all purposes, it is perfectly adequate to show that it is for the Speaker to decide whether the conditions for an early election have been satisfied, not for the courts or the Executive. The effect and the intention of the drafting are perfectly clear. Although the additional words in amendment 6 might appear attractive, they would not add anything to the protection in the Bill. There is no evidence or reason to think the courts would want to trespass on what would effectively be highly politicised issues or that they would not continue to regard matters relating to the internal operation of the House as “proceedings in Parliament”.
I should also like to deal with the wording in amendment 6 that seeks to prevent a Speaker’s certificate issued under clause 2 from being “presented” to a court. I can see why my hon. Friend the Member for Stone is trying to do that, but it seems to me that that takes a step backwards. Being able to present the certificate to the court is the simplest and easiest way of informing the court that the conditions for an early election exist and the Speaker has made the decision. That stops the court being tempted to dwell on proceedings in Parliament; it has a clear piece of paper that explains that the Speaker has made that determination and the court need go no further.
Let us suppose that the Speaker issued a certificate that omitted one of the matters that the statute required him to certify. Would it not be open to a petitioner to argue in court that there had been a failure to comply with the conditions that made a certificate valid and that the court was entitled to examine whether it was a certificate before obeying the ouster that prevents it from challenging the certificate?
My hon. and learned Friend makes a point that relates to the use of certificates, but what he describes would be perfectly true of the certificate that the Speaker issues on money Bills and the certification that he issues under the Parliament Act. Those are well precedented and have stood the test of time. The courts have been content to hold that the fact that the certificate has been issued by the Speaker is indeed conclusive for all purposes and they have not sought to challenge it.
We are dealing with a fundamentally different sphere here. Whether or not a Bill is a money Bill is the kind of decision that is suitable only for a legislative Assembly, but on this matter the courts would regard themselves as guarding the right to an election, which is a fundamental right of the population of this country. If Parliament had prescribed that an election should take place and a certificate was defective because it did not stipulate one of the requisite terms, the courts may regard that as an area into which they ought to go to safeguard the right to an election.
If a certificate was issued by the Speaker, we would be having an election, not stopping one taking place. I do not think that my hon. and learned Friend’s concern that the courts would hold that the population were being deprived of an election would apply. The language used in the Bill was chosen for exactly the reasons I have suggested. We have used well-precedented, tried and tested language; it has stood the test of time. It is perfectly true to say that people can make groundless applications to courts on all sorts of things, but courts quickly dismiss them and prevent them from proceeding further. We are confident that these proposals are robust and will not have the effect that hon. Members suggest.
In the few minutes remaining, I wish to discuss amendment 23, because the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) suggested that he wanted to ask you, Mr Evans, whether he could press it to a Division. The amendment proposes a 24-hour time limit for the issuing of the Speaker’s certificate. I can superficially see why that might be attractive, but it sets some conditions that might introduce elements casting doubt on the validity of the certificate if it were delayed, even if it were by only a few minutes, or if it were issued close to the time limit. Thus, the amendment would enable people to question the certificate. We should therefore rely on the standard practice, whereby the Speaker’s certificate is the conclusive provision.
Given what I have said, I hope that hon. Members will not seek to press their amendments to a Division and that we are able to proceed with the debate.
I am most grateful, Mr Evans, for the opportunity to reply to the debate.
I regret that I feel compelled to press this matter to a vote, but I feel that the Minister’s response has been wholly unconvincing. We are faced with adamant and clear advice from the Clerk of the House that the Minister has chosen to dismiss as irrelevant. Let me remind the Committee what the Clerk said:
“The provisions of this subsection make the Speaker’s consideration of confidence motions and the House’s practices justiciable questions for determination by the ordinary courts.”
That includes
“what constitutes a confidence motion, the selection of amendments to such Motions and the consequences of their being carried”.
He goes on to say:
“As these would become justiciable questions, the courts could be drawn into matters of acute political controversy.”
The Minister has not responded with anything substantive to defeat that advice.
Moreover, the Minister has rested his justification for the Bill on the assertion that it would not be possible to write these provisions into the Standing Orders, which would be automatically immune. Let me read from the Clerk’s memorandum again. He said that
“a Standing Order regulating the matters in the Bill could provide for its staying in effect unless repealed by a specified majority”,
meaning that it could be entrenched,
“for example by…equal to or greater than two thirds of the number of seats in the House. Not only is the principle of specifying majorities already written into the Standing Orders of the House, but in the past the House has also required a relative majority for reaching decision.”
My hon. Friend the Minister also dismissed the comments that I read from Mr Robert Rogers, the Clerk Assistant and Director General, who made it clear that we can not only write into our Standing Orders provisions requiring super-majorities, but entrench a—[Interruption.] I am rather distressed that the Minister is not even listening to what I am saying. We can entrench a Standing Order with its own super-majority so that it could be removed only by a super-majority, if that is what the House chose to do. The whole basis of the Government’s advice remains contested by the Clerks. The basis of the Bill—that this has to be done through statute—also remains contested by the Clerks.
I doubt that we will win the vote in the Committee this afternoon, but the Minister has failed to give a full response or to acknowledge any of the points that have been made. His subsection refers to a Speaker’s “certificate under this section”, which is very unspecific. At least the amendment states
“Any certificate of the Speaker of the House of Commons given under this section shall be conclusive for all purposes”.
That word “any” and the reference to the Speaker make it clear that whatever the Speaker issues is uncontested, rather than leave it open to the courts to determine whether the certificate presented by the Speaker complies with the legislation. I am afraid that the Minister has not satisfied me and I do not think that he has satisfied a great many of my colleagues on the Government Benches or in the official Opposition. I want to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Committee proceeded to a Division.
(15 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsI am pleased to announce that the Government are today launching UK-wide competitions for a grant of city status and a grant of Lord Mayoralty (or Lord Provostship) to mark Her Majesty the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee in 2012. Local authorities throughout the United Kingdom who believe that their district, borough, town or city deserves consideration for either of these rare honours are invited to apply by the closing date of 27 May 2011.
Entry guidelines have been posted on the Diamond Jubilee section of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s website, www.culture.gov.uk. Copies have also been placed in the Libraries of both Houses, the Vote Office and the Printed Paper Office. The document provides guidance on the contents of applications, as was the case for the competitions held for Her Majesty’s Golden Jubilee, as well as full details on the submission of entries.
In addition, for the first time in such competitions, the entry guidelines specify a standard format for entries. Local authorities are urged to use the standard format, which is intended to limit the costs of entering the competition and to introduce a fair basis for comparison between entries.
The honours will, however, continue to be rare marks of distinction conferred, on ministerial advice, under the royal prerogative, rather than rights to be earned by the meeting of specific criteria. All valid entries will receive individual consideration on their merits and the Government look forward to announcing the results of the competitions in the early months of 2012.
(15 years, 6 months ago)
Commons Chamber
Nick de Bois (Enfield North) (Con)
5. What recent assessment he has made of the accuracy of the electoral register.
The Government have not made such an assessment, but the Electoral Commission found in its March 2010 report “The completeness and accuracy of electoral registers in Great Britain” that
“it is likely that the accuracy of the registers remains broadly similar to past decades”.
It is clear, however, that more can be done to support accuracy. To that end, I have announced that the Government will speed up the implementation of individual voter registration from 2014, which will ensure that only those entitled to vote get on the register, bringing greater protection against electoral fraud.
I thank the Minister for that answer. We hear a great deal from Labour Members about the missing 3.5 million people. Can he explain what was done over the past 13 years to help them? What are our Government going to do to ensure that people entitled to vote can do so?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that, and I congratulate him on being elected to the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform, where he can pursue his interest in these matters. He will know that when in government the Labour party did, to be fair, try a number of things, but the things it tried were not successful. We are going to introduce individual electoral registration and we are going to trial data-matching next year, so that we can see whether there are more effective ways of allowing electoral administrators to get people on the register when they are entitled to be on it.
Does the Minister agree that some individuals deliberately keep themselves off the register because they are partaking in or are aiding and abetting benefit fraud? How does he think we should address that important issue?
One of the things that we will do on individual registration is ensure that people will have to register with a signature and their date of birth and national insurance number details. Those will be checked against Department for Work and Pensions records to ensure that the voting record database is accurate. One of the things that we will be doing when we trial data-matching next year is looking to see what other benefits can be obtained from those public sector databases.
Nick de Bois
What plans does the Minister have to require voters to produce proof of their identity at polling stations?
The Government do not have any current plans to do that, but we keep this area under review. In January, the Electoral Commission and the Association of Chief Police Officers will bring out their report on this year’s general election. We will look at their conclusions to see whether there is evidence of fraud taking place and whether we need to take any further steps to deal with it.
Fiona O'Donnell (East Lothian) (Lab)
My question was for the Deputy Prime Minister. Am I permitted to ask it?
Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
Is the Minister aware of the great efforts made this year by Glasgow city council to increase voter registration? For example, it has worked with minority groups and carried out targeted canvassing. All that work is going to show a big increase in the level of electoral registration tomorrow. Why are his Government not joining good local authorities such as that in Glasgow to get the 3.5 million people not on the electoral register on to the voters roll as soon as possible? Why are they instead rushing to have a boundary review that benefits the coalition?
I congratulate Glasgow city council, if what the hon. Gentleman says is accurate, because the work it has been doing is excellent. He will know that I wrote to the chief executive of every council in the country suggesting that they work with the Government on our data-matching pilots, to which I referred in a previous answer. We want to examine what steps can be taken to enable local government to look at those public sector databases in order to get more people who are eligible to vote on to the electoral register, as Glasgow city council has done.
What does the Minister think is worse: an inaccurate electoral register or gerrymandered constituencies?
I have a great deal of respect for the hon. Lady, but that question really was not worthy of her. The completeness of the electoral register is as important as making sure it is accurate. It is perfectly reasonable to move towards fairer and more equal-sized constituencies, as this House has made a very clear decision to do, and their lordships will start debating the matter this very afternoon.
Mr Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op)
According to research, the level of registration will fall on the introduction of individual registration, and we need only look at the situation that occurred in Northern Ireland to back that up. This was recognised in the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009. Will the hon. Gentleman take into account the advice given by the Electoral Commission? If it decides that things are being done too quickly to improve the register, will he listen to it?
I am pleased to say that I can do better than that. We have already considered the experience in Northern Ireland and the hon. Gentleman will know from my statement to the House that that is exactly why we will not remove anyone from the electoral register before the 2015 general election just because they have failed to register individually. We will leave them on the register to give them an extra chance and to avoid the situation that occurred in Northern Ireland, where there was a sudden drop in the number of voters on the register. I hope that that is helpful.
3. Whether he plans to bring forward legislative proposals to amend the provisions of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 as part of his proposals for House of Lords reform.
(15 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis is not a fancy tactic—I would not know one if I saw one, although if I did I am sure I would have learned it from the right hon. Gentleman. It is very straightforward. We decided that if there were a general view in the House that there should be an early election, the House should have the power to cause one.
The right hon. Gentleman gave the example of Germany. The reason why the Government there engineered a vote of confidence was because there was no other mechanism for an early election. If we were to remove our provision, then if there were a general view in the political classes and in the country that there should be an early election, the only way of having one would be for the Government to engineer a vote of no confidence. That would not be very sensible or very honest.
Mr Straw
We need to speak about possibilities in the real world. The only example in recent times that I can think of when a Prime Minister has wanted to call an election of choice, without any necessity due to his parliamentary majority, is that of Edward Heath in January 1974. There was no way he would have got a two-thirds majority in favour of a Dissolution. In my view, the country as a whole and the Conservative party would have been saved a great deal if there had not been an early Dissolution at that point. I simply say that if we are to have fixed-term Parliaments, which is a good idea but will have consequences, we must ensure that a Government can get booted out only if a motion of no confidence is passed.
Absolutely. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. Furthermore, there was the motion of no confidence in the Callaghan Government in 1979, in which the numbers of votes were 310 against 311. The result of that vote may have been a matter of satisfaction for the Conservative party, but I am sure that it would not have been to others. However, if the two-thirds rule had been in operation, there would not have been a change in Government and that would have been a disaster for the country.
I am listening very carefully to my hon. Friend. I think that he is confusing the two different processes in the Bill. There is provision for having an early election if the Government lose a vote of no confidence. That is by a simple majority, as now, and it is not changed. The other provision is an extra power for the House of Commons, which it does not have today, for two thirds of MPs to vote for an early election. We are not in any way, changing the ability of a Government to be held to account by having to have a simple majority.
It is only because I have not completed my remarks that my hon. Friend’s intervention seems understandable. I do not dispute the fact that a vote of confidence by a majority of one would apply in the circumstances described in the clause, but—this is the other side of that equation—we then get into the question of the 14 days and the shenanigans that would follow with all the Whips and other people manoeuvring around to guarantee that the vote of confidence would be secured. We go back to my main point: it is the power of patronage of the Whips and the determined and ruthless exercise of that power that lies behind this proposal. That is my main objection to the whole thing irrespective of the fact that there is no mandate for these provisions from any political party.
My hon. Friend has mentioned the 1979 example twice now. As I said, the Bill would not change the situation when there is a motion of no confidence in any way. If that position happened now—[Interruption.] If the Government lost a Division on such a motion by one vote, the situation would be the same, but the 14 days for the formation of a Government makes things different. Amendment 4, by removing the two thirds majority rule, would effectively mean that anyone who controls a majority in the House can have an election at will—it would effectively give back to the Prime Minister the power to dissolve the House whenever he chooses to do so in a perfectly open way. If my hon. Friend is happy with that, that is fine, but that is not our proposal.
I understand to a degree where my hon. Friend is coming from, but I am afraid that I am not attacking that constitutional position. I do not believe it necessary to take the power to dissolve from the Prime Minister—that power is based, as it were, on his democratic mandate—and give it to the Whips to engage in their shenanigans in the 14 days following a no confidence motion, as the right hon. Member for Blackburn said.
Will my hon. Friend make that clear? Is he saying that the intention of amendment 4 is to ensure that the Prime Minister retains the power to seek a Dissolution? I ask that because Opposition Members say that they are in favour of fixed-term Parliaments, albeit there is a debate over whether the term should be four or five years. My contention is that the Opposition’s support for amendment 4 effectively drives a coach and horses through their support for fixed-term Parliaments, because it would give the power to dissolve directly back to the Prime Minister.
The Opposition’s thinking is not a matter for me. I happen to believe that our present constitutional arrangement should be sustained. It gives me no pleasure to know that the Opposition will vote with me on amendment 4. Their reasoning does not matter; what matters is the constitutional principle that I am advancing.
I am simply participating in the debate. I cannot agree with the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) on his characterisation of the 1979 situation. The motion in March 1979 was not about giving vent to anything; it was very clearly about whether the House had confidence in Her Majesty’s Government. I assume that everyone who voted for it had a clear idea what would happen if it were carried. It was, and there were consequences. It states:
“That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”,
so I cannot believe that anyone was confused about what they were doing.
I will now move on to the very question that is being discussed, which is motions of no confidence and what they really mean. There are various permutations, which are well described in the Library note, but the issue for me is basically this. In my belief—and according to the House’s tradition and its conventions, which are now to be overtaken by statute—a majority of one should remain. However, in that 14-day period, with shenanigans worthy of Lord Voldemort and the servants of the Dark Lord, an attempt would be made to keep in power a Government who had lost the confidence of the House of Commons—that is, the representatives of the electorate. That attempt would keep the Government on their feet, while the public would be left watching the spectacle of streams of members of the Cabinet and prospective members of the Cabinet from the Opposition parties striding up and down Whitehall, in and out of offices, all under the baleful influence of the Cabinet Secretary, as they tried to hatch yet another coalition agreement, no doubt based on very different principles from those for which the electorate had voted, in accordance with the parties’ respective manifestos or—dare I use the words?—their promises.
As to the question of what confidence motions actually are, they are various. In 1945 it was Churchill versus Attlee, and the Government won. Then there was Attlee against Churchill in 1952, and Gaitskell against Eden in 1956, when the Government won again. There was also Wilson against Heath in 1972, on the European Communities Act, when there was thought to be quite a lot of manoeuvring on the question of whether there had been a free vote or not. I will not go down that route now, but examples of where the Government have lost confidence motions include the Liberal Government of 1895, the Baldwin minority Conservative Government —note: minority Conservative Government—in 1924, the MacDonald Government in 1924, when there was again a Dissolution, and, of course, the famous Callaghan defeat by Thatcher, by 311 votes to 310.
It is a delight to see the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) back in her seat. She introduced a new concept of votes of no consequence. On the Opposition Benches, it often feels as though every vote is one of no consequence, but we hope that with more support in the coming days, we will manage to turn that around.
The hon. Lady said one important thing—[Interruption.] She has doubtless said many important things, as the Minister rightly reminds me. In particular, she said that she disagrees with the amendment she tabled, which was interesting. She also referred to the fact that her Committee had had virtually no time to do what she called pre-legislative scrutiny. In fact, I suggest that a far more sensible procedure for engaging in all legislation, and particularly that on constitutional reform, is to publish the Bill in draft, send it to a Joint Committee of both Houses and provide an opportunity for evidence to be taken, and at the end of that process it can be brought to the House. That is not what has happened in this case. She and others referred to the coalition as something of a matrimony, but the Book of Common Prayer states that holy matrimony should not be enterprised or entered into
“unadvisedly, lightly, wantonly or to satisfy…carnal lusts.”
My fear is that this part of the Bill has been entered into unadvisedly, wantonly and to satisfy the lusts of the coalition partners who want to ensure that they remain in power for as long as possible.
The process has been wrong, and I say gently to the Minister that in our debates last week he referred at the last minute to consultation that he was going to engage in with the devolved Administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. I understand that he has written to one Member of the House about that, but he has not written to me, and he has not written to any other hon. Members who were involved in the Committee stage, so I hope that he will take this opportunity to assure us that he will write to us immediately.
Frankly, the point of order that the hon. Gentleman raised last week was nonsense. He did not give me notice of it, so I was unable to respond. I listened carefully to last week’s debate and responded to it. I then made an announcement of Government policy in this House at the Dispatch Box, which I thought was the usual way of conducting business.
The following day, I wrote to the leaders of parties in each of the devolved Assemblies, as I said I would. I did not put anything in those letters that I had not announced in the debate. I also wrote to the shadow Justice Secretary, who leads on political and constitutional reform for the Opposition, to keep him properly informed. I placed copies of all those letters in the Library.
Order. We should not be rehashing previous points of order. We should be dealing with the amendment. I am sure that Mr Bryant wishes to do so.
I will not get involved in the detail of what is happening in Ireland at the moment. If a similar situation were to happen in this country, people might well turn to their Members of Parliament and say, “Why should we trust this Government to pass another Budget when it has made such a Horlicks of the current arrangements? Why don’t we elect a new Parliament and a new Government to deal with the crisis?”
At first, my hon. Friend said that this Bill would not provide any flexibility. Then he set out two ways in which we could have an early election. Our proposition is that it would be up to this House rather the Prime Minister to call an early election. The Prime Minister could come to this House, put down a motion and then Members could decide whether they wanted an early election to deal with the financial crisis. To give the power to this House and not leave it with the Prime Minister is an improvement.
Order. After such a long debate, may I inform the Committee that I do not propose to allow a debate on clause stand part?
There are several other groups of amendments, and we can expand on these matters further in due course. I shall go only as far as I need to in discussing this group, rather than trying to accelerate the debate. I want to deal briefly with the timetable. I do not think that the Bill has been rushed in any way. It was published in July, it had its Second Reading in September, and the first day of its Committee stage did not start until November. We have another day in Committee today, and the House passed a programme motion earlier that gives us an extra day in Committee on Thursday. I do not think that we are rushing ahead with this. No knives were included in the programme motion, and we are taking the debate at the proper pace that the Committee requires.
I accept what the Minister says about the timetable for the Committee stage on the Floor of the House. A bigger issue, however, is that there was no time for proper pre-legislative scrutiny before the Bill was published and debated. Such scrutiny would have made many of these issues less contentious, or at least it would have had the potential to do so.
I do not pretend that we published a draft Bill. We did not, but we have not rushed ahead. We published the Bill in July and it is now November and we are on our second day of Committee. That is hardly rushing through at a tremendous pace. We have not overly programmed either; we have had no knives and only today we have added extra time for the Bill. I do not accept at all that we have been rushing on.
I would not want the Minister inadvertently to mislead the Committee. He said that extra time has been provided, but he has not allowed any extra time; he has merely allowed the injury time for the three statements that interfered with the debate. [Interruption.] If the Deputy Leader of the House wants to make a speech, I am sure he will be able to catch your eye, Mr Hoyle. [Interruption.]
Order. I would like to stop this bickering between the Front Benchers. Let us move on.
My hon. Friend moved amendment 33, although many members of the Select Committee pretended that they wanted nothing to do with it; to be fair, so did my hon. Friend. She explained why the amendment was tabled—to enable this Committee to debate and test the concerns raised by the Clerk. I shall touch on them briefly. I will not overdo them, as we may have an opportunity to debate them further in a later group of amendments on the Speaker’s certificate. However, I shall deal with the amendment. I know my hon. Friend said that she does not want to press it to a Division, but it is the lead amendment.
The amendment would remove two central provisions—the two mechanisms that provide for an early general election to take place: the vote through which the House can choose to have an early election and the mechanism for having one following the loss of a vote of confidence. Instead, the amendment provides that the early election could take place only on the House’s address to the monarch, which can be made only
“by the Prime Minister acting with the agreement of…the Leader of the Opposition; and…the…leader of a registered party that received more than 20 per cent. of the total votes cast at the previous…general election.”
I have a number of serious issues with the amendment. First, it would prevent the Prime Minister from calling a general election only if he did so for political advantage. It ignores and does not address the circumstances where there is a loss of confidence. It also focuses greatly on Front Benchers, as our debate has made clear. I exempt my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest from this criticism, as she said she did not agree with the amendment, but given their views about the role of Front Benchers, I am surprised that the other signatories to the amendment thought that that was a good idea. The hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) is not in his place, but I do not think he would mind my saying that he is somewhat sceptical about the power of Front Benchers and the usual channels. I am surprised that he supported an amendment that suggests they should have a lot of power. As the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) pointed out, not every registered leader of a party is necessarily a Member of this House.
The amendment also fails to deal with what would happen to a party such as the Liberal Democrats, our coalition partners, part-way through a Parliament. How would we take account of the vote it had received at the previous general election? Indeed, the 20% threshold would leave Northern Ireland parties out of the picture completely. If this measure had been in place following the 1992, 1997 and 2001 elections, only two people would have been required to table the motion—the leader of the Labour party and the leader of the Conservative party. In view of what has been said about the need to remove the power of the Executive and Front Benchers, that does not seem a sensible step forward.
It would thus be fair to say that amendment 33 is not well drafted. From what I heard, it does not sound as if it had enormous support across the Committee, including even from my hon. Friend. Despite the fact that she did not agree with the amendment, she moved it in a way that was very becoming to her parliamentary experience and the Committee enjoyed the opportunity with which it was presented.
Sir Peter Soulsby
With the amendment’s proposers having been at the receiving end of the Minister’s criticism, I hope he will acknowledge that it was tabled by members of the Select Committee to enable the matter properly to be debated, particularly in the light of our concern about the lack of proper time being accorded to pre-legislative scrutiny. We wanted to ensure that this Committee could debate the matter on the Floor of the House at this Committee stage.
I entirely agree. Indeed, I think I acknowledged that that had been the purpose for which the amendment had been tabled.
I can reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest that there is no danger of my accepting her amendment, and that as there is not to be a Division—at least if we have anything to do with it—she will not be forced to vote against it.
Amendment 21, tabled by Opposition Members, simply changes the word “early” in clause 2 to “immediate”. I have two comments to make. First, under our own arrangements—this too emerged earlier in the debate—we do not have immediate general elections anyway. There is always a wash-up period. Before the 1979 election—which seems to have prompted the most discussion—25 Bills were passed during the wash-up period, including a number that completed all their stages during that period. Some of those Bills were very valuable. I spotted among them the Pneumoconiosis Etc. (Workers’ Compensation) Act 1979, which is still helping people today.
Secondly, all that the amendment does is change the language in the clause. It does not, in itself, have any effect. I know that the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) mentioned a later amendment that did introduce a change, but this amendment would not bring an election further forward.
The Minister is right: we are not trying to make an enormous point. I simply wanted to tease out of the Government precisely what they understand by a motion calling for an early general election. I wanted to know, for instance, whether—as suggested by the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan)—he believed that it would be possible to call such an election, and that the Speaker would be able to sign a certificate saying that one had been called, when the House had, say on Wednesday next week, passed a motion calling for a general election in nine months’ time.
I do not think that that is drawn out by the amendment, but I agree with the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) that some flexibility is required. The Speaker will certify that a motion has been passed, but we do not know what all the circumstances will be. The hon. Gentleman gave a good example when he cited the way in which Ireland has arranged for procedures to take place to provide some certainty. I do not think that we want to set all the rules in stone. We want to allow the Speaker to be clear with the House—I am sure that he would be clear with the House before it debated the motion—about whether he is able to certify that the motion would trigger an early general election. It is better to leave such matters to the judgment of the Speaker. I will come to the point about the Clerk’s concern about justiciability, but I do not think that being too specific would be helpful.
What the Minister has said makes me rather more worried, and gives me much greater cause for concern than other elements of the clause. The danger is that if we are not clear enough about the precise moment when a Speaker is required by the House to act, we will be asking the Speaker to break his or her impartiality at a moment that may be very, very politically sensitive.
I do not agree. I think that the Speaker would ensure that the House was clear both about a motion that would trigger an early general election and about a motion of confidence, and about what he would certify, before the debate. I do not think it would be sensible for the House to have a debate when it was not clear about those matters.
We discussed the 1979 debate earlier. The right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) tried to suggest that Members had voted on that motion for other reasons, but the motion was very clear in asking whether the House had confidence in the Government, and I suggested that Members could not have been in any doubt about what they were voting for. I think that the Speaker would always want to ensure that the House understood what it was voting for, and the effect of its vote.
That is even more worrying. The Minister is now saying that the Speaker would decide whether a motion before the House was a motion of confidence in Her Majesty’s Government, which is profoundly worrying. Motions on the Adjournment, motions on all sorts of legislation and motions of censure of individual members of the Government have been determined to be such by the House. If it were for the Speaker to make such a determination, we would have shot the Speaker’s impartiality to pieces.
In a moment; let me first address the question I have just been asked.
Earlier in the debate, we had a conversation about motions that were not specifically in these terms, and several Members on the Government Benches referred to certain votes. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) referred to some votes on Europe and my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) talked about a vote on VAT on fuel. How the Government behaved after the debates on those motions was determined by Ministers, not the House.
Motions of no confidence are an issue to be debated later. Members ought to be speaking to amendment 33.
Excellent; that is an excellent step forward. [Interruption.] I shall take it as one.
Amendment 4 stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone and was also signed by Opposition Members. Effectively, it drives a coach and horses through these entire provisions; the hon. Member for Foyle picked that point up very well. It is because we want to provide for fixed-term Parliaments that the Bill specifies that an early general election can be triggered only if there is a majority of at least two thirds. If it were possible to have an early general election by way of a motion that gains a simple majority, we all know that in most circumstances that would mean that we have given the power back to the Prime Minister. If he felt an early general election was in the interests of the governing party and that view was shared by the governing party, the motion would be passed and we would have a general election, and we would therefore not have fixed-term Parliaments.
I am not surprised that my hon. Friend has tabled this amendment as it is clear from his speech that he does not like the concept of fixed-term Parliaments at all, and that instead he is happy with our current arrangements, which he is entitled to be. However, given that the Opposition have said they are broadly in favour of fixed-term Parliaments—albeit for four years, not five—I cannot understand why they have supported the amendment because, as I have said, it drives a coach and horses through the entire proposition.
This is a great constitutional innovation. In respect of these motions, can the Minister explain why some Members’ votes will have twice the weight of others’?
I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman’s proposition about the weighting of votes. We have set out a straightforward position. We decided on two thirds partly because it is the majority required in the Scottish Parliament under the Scotland Act 1998, and partly because under the requirement for a majority of such a size no Government since the second world war would have been able to trigger an early election on their own. Effectively, the requirement for a majority of two thirds means that there would have to be some cross-party support and a general mood in the House that there should be an early election.
There was talk about the fact that the coalition agreement refers to 55%, and I acknowledge that. The coalition agreement was put together quite quickly however, and we have since reflected on this question. We wanted to be clear that the Government—both parties together—were going to put aside the prospect of being able to trigger an early general election and that, instead, that could happen only if there was a shared view across the House. The reason we alighted on two thirds was that it was the number used in the Scotland Act 1998, which set up the Scottish Parliament.
I understand the objectives. I am cynical about them and the motives behind them, but the numerical fact is that passing this motion will require the support of 400-odd Members, depending on the size of the Commons at that particular time—perhaps the figure will be 420—whereas stopping it will require only half that number. Therefore, someone’s vote against will carry twice the weight of someone’s vote in favour. Can the Minister be clear, not on the objectives, but on why he wants to give some hon. Members more voting power than others?
I just do not agree with the way in which the hon. Gentleman has characterised this. We have said that the support of a significant number of Members is required to have an early election. It is very simple for the House to make a decision. If a simple majority is required to have an early election, we do not have fixed-term Parliaments because if the governing party or parties have a majority in this House, they will simply be able to table a motion, their own side will support it and we will have an election whenever the Prime Minister chooses. If that is what the House wants, fine. However, the House has already decided when it gave this Bill its Second Reading that it wants fixed-term Parliaments, and it did so again when we debated clause 1 last week and decided on the date and the fact that we would have five-year Parliaments. Our proposition is that if we allow an early election on a simple majority, we drive a coach and horses through the Bill.
Just to be topical, what would happen in a situation such as exists in Ireland at the moment, where there is a weak Government, a coalition breaks up, there is a financial crisis and it is clearly essential that the Government renew themselves with an early general election? What would happen in such circumstances if the Bill goes through as drafted? Would we have the absurd situation that two thirds of Members would have to vote to kill off a Parliament that nobody wanted to survive any longer?
There are two parts to clause 2. Importantly—some Members were getting this confused—a motion of no confidence in the Government can still be passed by a simple majority. So if a Government did not command the confidence of the House, the House could express that lack of confidence. I shall not go into that in detail, because we will deal with it when we discuss a later group of amendments—Mr Hoyle is clear about that—but the House can vote in support of a motion of no confidence and the Government will then have the period of examining whether another Government can be formed from within that Parliament.
As the hon. Member for Foyle said earlier, when I do not believe my hon. Friend was present, the Bill also provides the opportunity to renew the Parliament if there is a sense that events mean that it needs to be renewed—I believe that is the view in Ireland at the moment. If a simple majority has lost faith in the Government, a motion of no confidence can be passed. If there is a general sense that there should be an election, we have given the House that opportunity—a power that it does not currently possess. I am surprised, as the hon. Gentleman said he was, that some Members of the House sound as though they do not want a power that is not possessed by the House and has previously been possessed only by the Prime Minister.
What happens if the Government table a motion calling for an early parliamentary general election—I presume only they will be able to do so—and it is carried by 330 votes, but not by the 434 votes necessary? Could the Speaker, or for that matter the Prime Minister, determine that to be a motion of no confidence in the Government?
Order. I am sorry, but I am making a ruling from the Chair. I feel that this is a debate that we are going to have and I am concerned that we are getting drawn into it now. The Minister may answer quickly, if he wishes, but I do not want to let this go any further after that.
Mr Hoyle, you are pointing out that we can discuss this at length when we get on to a later group of amendments. My view on the hon. Gentleman’s example is very clear: if the Prime Minister so wishes, he can cease being Prime Minister whenever he feels like it. The House could then see whether an alternative Government under a different leader could be formed—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Rhondda says not under this provision, but this provision is for an early election. The Prime Minister can cease being Prime Minister whenever the Prime Minister chooses and Her Majesty will then be able to send for an alternative person to form a new Government. That is not what the Bill is about. The Bill is about fixed-term Parliaments, not fixed-term Governments.
Another way that Parliament could do what it wished would be to repeal this legislation by a simple majority.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right, in the sense that this is an Act of Parliament and can be repealed, but the difference is that it will then engage the other place, in which the Government do not have a majority—and in which we will still not have one when the new peers have been introduced. We think that putting the provision in legislation is preferable to putting it in Standing Orders because the Government then have to get the Bill through both Houses of Parliament, in one of which they do not have a majority—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) says that the Government will have a majority, but no. Even when the new list of working peers has been created, the two governing parties together will not have a majority. There are Cross Benchers in the Upper House, which he keeps forgetting.
For those reasons, I think that amendment 4 is flawed. If it is pressed to a vote, I urge my hon. Friends to oppose it. The Government’s position is very clear. We want fixed-term Parliaments but we want there to be two circumstances in which there can be an early general election: when there is a traditional motion of no confidence, in which a simple majority is enough to say that a Government have lost the confidence of the House; and when the House uses its new power to force an early election, which is decided by two thirds of the Members of the House. The same provision is in the Scotland Act 1998 for the Scottish Parliament. I should say that it is the same provision, because in Scotland it is two thirds of all Members, not just those voting. The hon. Member for Rhondda did not get that quite right.
Whichever of the amendments is pressed to a vote, I urge hon. Members to reject it. We can then move on.
It was the Select Committee’s intention to give the House an opportunity to debate these important matters and that has certainly been a success. I am pleased to have given the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) his first opportunity to address the House from the Back Benches for more than 23 years. I am grateful to my colleagues on the Select Committee, the hon. Members for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) and for Leicester South (Sir Peter Soulsby), for their support for—or rather opposition to—the amendment, which none of us wants to see become part of the Bill but which we are all grateful to have had the opportunity to debate this afternoon. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 4, in clause 2, page 2, leave out lines 3 to 7.—(Mr Cash.)