13:17 - The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 498 - Question accordingly negatived.
13:35 - The Committee divided: - Ayes: 202 / Noes: 297 - Question accordingly negatived.
15:42 - The Committee having divided: - Ayes: 231 / Noes: 295 - Question accordingly negatived.
15:56 - The Committee divided: - Ayes: 229 / Noes: 302 - Question accordingly negatived.
16:08 - The Committee divided: - Ayes: 229 / Noes: 298 - Question accordingly negatived.
16:21 - The Committee divided: - Ayes: 306 / Noes: 218 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
Being in this position almost persuaded me of the merits of knives, which at least enable us to conclude debates at approximately the point at which everyone else has spoken.
I remind the Committee that the amendments deal with the mechanism providing for an early general election following a vote of no confidence, as set out in clause 2(2). Last week, on the second day of this Committee stage, we engaged in a wide-ranging discussion both of the merits of the various amendments and of the Bill. Before I deal with the amendments, let me respond to some of the questions raised by Members last week.
My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing), who is present and who speaks for the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, asked a number of questions relating to the constitutional consequences of a vote of no confidence under the Bill. She was particularly concerned about the possibility of a Government’s forcing a general election by refusing to act both in accordance with conventions and in the spirit of the Act. She gave the example of a Government who engineered a vote of no confidence in themselves, or who sought to trigger a series of elections close to one another by refusing to resign after an election result.
If a Prime Minister who would presumably be seeking to be re-elected in a subsequent election engaged in such constitutional shenanigans, he or she would first suffer a political penalty at that election. If a Prime Minister behaved in an absolutely unconstitutional fashion, there would always be the ultimate long stop: Her Majesty the Queen could dismiss the said Prime Minister. That is the ultimate check and balance in our system. Clearly it would require an extraordinary set of circumstances, but it is the position that would obtain if our unwritten or other conventions were breached in a really appalling fashion.
Mr Richard Shepherd (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
By what constitutional authority does the Minister cite the extraordinary proposition that the long stop of the constitution is that the Queen may dismiss a Prime Minister?
Mr Shepherd
So that is the Minister’s new interpretation of a constitution, or of defined practice over the years.
Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)
I cannot think of an example of such a position since the reign of Queen Victoria, who refused to accept Robert Peel as Prime Minister, and I think it inconceivable that it would arise in a modern constitution.
Mr Harper
I did say that there would have to be an extraordinary set of circumstances for the Prime Minister to behave in such a constitutionally outrageous way. They would be circumstances in which a Prime Minister was abusing and stretching the constitution in order to stay in office and avoid the consequences of losing a vote of confidence in Parliament.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
I think that that is extraordinarily unlikely. It is theoretically possible that the Queen could refuse assent to a Bill, but that has not happened since the reign of Queen Anne. Such constitutional anomalies remain theoretical, but so theoretical that it is inconceivable that they would arise whatever the emergency. I really feel that to rely on that for the passage of the Bill is most unsatisfactory.
Mr Harper
I am not relying on it for the passage of the Bill. I was referring to the issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest, who last week, on behalf of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, raised some potential scenarios with which she was uncomfortable. I believe, and the Government believe, that those scenarios are indeed, as my hon. Friend says, theoretical, and extremely unlikely to happen. My point is that if a Prime Minister behaved unconstitutionally in such a theoretical and extremely unlikely way, a mechanism that already exists would be invoked. However, the Government contend—and I agree with my hon. Friend on this—that both sets of circumstances are highly unlikely. It is our contention that the eventuality to which my hon. Friend has referred would not be necessary, because a Prime Minister would not behave in a way that stretched constitutional convention to breaking point.
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
I must say that this is the second very worrying route the Minister has gone down. He is saying that if the Prime Minister were to behave unconstitutionally, the monarch would act. How would the monarch know whether the Prime Minister had acted constitutionally or unconstitutionally?
Mr Harper
I am not setting out anything that is groundbreaking; this is the position that exists now. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) that there would have to be an extraordinary set of circumstances; indeed, I said as much. I did so because I was referring to a point my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest made last week in raising some concerns of the Select Committee’s concerns. My view is that those concerns are not well founded because the events they address are extremely unlikely to happen and are only really theoretical in nature, but there is a response to them if they were to happen.
Mrs Eleanor Laing (Epping Forest) (Con)
Will my hon. Friend reassure the Committee that it is the Government’s intention to fulfil their duty and that of Parliament to protect the Crown from being put in a position where the monarch would ever have to make such an important constitutional decision?
Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)
I think it would help the Committee if the Minister could cite an academic paper, some judicial text or something else that bears out this notion that Her Majesty the Queen would interfere in politics in the way he is suggesting she would. Can he quote anything?
Mr Harper
The position is that Her Majesty the Queen appoints Prime Ministers and the ultimate constitutional long-stop is that if a Prime Minister behaves in a way that is outwith the constitutional position, the monarch can dismiss the Prime Minister—but that is the long-stop constitutional safeguard in our system.
Chris Bryant
Let us be absolutely clear: as I understand it, the Minister is saying that if the Prime Minister were “unconstitutionally”—to borrow the Minister’s word—to engineer a motion of no confidence in himself, for instance by tabling a motion of confidence in himself and urging his supporters to abstain, the monarch would sack him.
Mr Harper
I am not setting out particular scenarios. I was making the point that we can set out some theoretical propositions that have not happened and that we think are extremely unlikely to happen. I was simply setting out that if such a theoretical and unlikely event, to use the words of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset, were to happen there is a constitutional long-stop. That was all I was saying, and I think the hon. Gentleman is making rather too much of it, as it is not a new point.
Sir Peter Soulsby (Leicester South) (Lab)
Although we may well accept that the scenarios we are talking about are unlikely, they are none the less possible, and while they remain possible would it not be desirable for the Government either to accept the Select Committee’s amendments or, indeed, to bring forward some of their own to make sure that should such unlikely events occur, there is a clear road map for the sovereign to follow?
Mr Harper
The fact is that some of these things can happen under our existing constitutional position; they are not triggered by anything we are providing for in this Bill. Our flexible constitution has worked rather well over the years in dealing with events that have not been thought of in advance, and I see no reason to undertake a rather more significant constitutional rewrite.
This Bill is intended to do one specific thing, which is remove from the Prime Minister the power to seek a Dissolution of Parliament. It makes the necessary changes to do that, but it does not seek to make changes that are not necessary to do that; it does not seek to go wider than achieving that particular change, and I think that is very sensible.
My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest also asked last week how the Bill strengthened the power of the House to throw out a Government. Giving statutory effect to the vote that could bring about a general election, rather than simply relying on the conventions, strengthens the power of the House. The Bill transfers from the Prime Minister to this House the power to decide whether there will be an early general election. If I remember rightly, my hon. Friend did, however, say that she is broadly supportive of the measures in the Bill, as, I think, is the Select Committee.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) asked a number of questions last week. He asked whether the Bill should contain a provision to ensure that a motion of no confidence is given precedence so it is debated without delay. He is aware—he mentioned this last week—that there is a convention that the Government find time to debate a motion of no confidence tabled by the official Opposition. That is a long-standing convention, which has been followed by Governments. Also of course, it would always be open to the Opposition to table an amendment to a Government motion, changing it to one of no confidence to ensure that that was debated.
The hon. Gentleman also raised a number of related points about whether particular votes could be considered motions of no confidence and whether it was appropriate for the Speaker to rule on such matters. I think I am right in saying that he was concerned that the Bill would give too much discretion to the Speaker. The Government do not consider that to be the case. We would expect the Speaker by and large to take a fairly literal approach to clause 2(2). We do not think the Speaker would be left with appreciably more discretion in dealing with this sort of question than he already has, for example under the Parliament Act 1911 when he has to certify whether a Bill is a money Bill. That is a decision he makes; it is for him. It seems to me that that is a sensible amount of discretion for the Speaker to have, although I accept it is on a different issue.
Chris Bryant
The Minister is right, of course. In fact, at present Members of the House of Lords are fiercely contesting the Speaker’s decision on whether certain Bills are money Bills. My point, however, is that all that that determines is whether or not a Bill can be debated in another Chamber, whereas under this measure it would determine whether or not we had a general election and the Government had fallen. That is a very big decision to be placing in the hands of the Speaker, which heretofore has never been in the hands of the Speaker.
Mr Harper
There are two issues there. I will not dwell on the money Bill issue to any great extent, because if I were to do so you would rule me out of order, Ms Primarolo, but I have read the account of the debate in the other place to which the hon. Gentleman refers and the other place is not challenging the Speaker’s ability to rule on whether a Bill is a money Bill. It is simply disagreeing with the consequences of that, and arguing that if something is a money Bill it is perfectly appropriate for the upper House to debate it in Committee and pass amendments to it, recognising that legally those amendments will have no effect if the House of Commons chooses not to take them into account. The upper House is therefore not challenging the Speaker’s right to make that decision.
The hon. Gentleman is also not right to say that this is about the Speaker deciding, effectively, whether to bring down the Government. That would be a decision for the House. The Speaker would have to make a decision about certifying something as a vote of confidence. As we debated last week, it would be extraordinary if the House were debating a motion of confidence—which the Speaker would certify as such—with everybody remaining in ignorance of the fact that it was a motion of no confidence in the Government. I simply do not think that would happen. Everyone would be very well aware of the fact that it was a motion of confidence—that it had that import to it. It would be for the House to vote on the matter, and the Speaker would then certify in a way that means the decision is outside the ambit of the courts.
Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)
As the Minister just appeared to touch on, under the Bill the Speaker issues the certificate only after the vote has taken place, not before. Therefore, would not the Labour amendment that specifies what is and what is not a vote of confidence be much better in everybody’s terms?
Mr Harper
I shall deal with the specific amendments shortly, when I set out why the Government think that they are unnecessary and that their drafting makes them flawed. If the hon. Gentleman does not think I have adequately dealt with his point, he will be able to intervene on me and I will happily take such an intervention. We have debated the fact that there is also a purpose in the Bill’s not specifying the exact words in legislation, because such an approach gives the House some necessary flexibility. I will return to that in a moment.
Let us consider the amendments in order. Amendment 5 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), who is not able to be here today because he is away on other parliamentary business. He explained that his amendment would remove the 14-day period before an early election was called in the event of the Speaker certifying that the House had passed a vote of no confidence. It is right to say that there would be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to move to an early election when the House determined that we should do so, and the Bill provides for that in clause 2(1). But it is perfectly possible that there may be circumstances within a fixed term in which a legitimate Government could be formed from the composition of the House as it then stood, so it would not be appropriate to insist on an election. Members will have been elected for five years, and they are able to give their approval to a Government formed from within their ranks without the need necessarily to go to the country. The House can decide to do so, because under our proposals if a vote of confidence is lost and no Government can be formed within 14 days who subsequently receive a vote of confidence, a general election would take place. It seems sensible to give the House the opportunity to test whether a Government can be formed.
My hon. Friend’s amendment contained a fundamental misunderstanding about what a Prime Minister should do in the event of a Government losing the confidence of the House. Two things can happen. One possibility, under our current system, is that a Prime Minister remains in office but invites Her Majesty to dissolve the House and call a general election. Thus the Prime Minister does not resign immediately, and that is what happened when the House expressed its lack of confidence in the Government in 1979. Mr Callaghan did not resign when he lost the vote of confidence; he resigned only when he lost the subsequent election. Alternatively, the Prime Minister could resign almost straightaway after losing a vote of confidence, as happened in January 1924 when the Government’s motion for the Loyal Address after the Queen’s Speech was amended: Prime Minister Baldwin resigned and the Labour Opposition formed a Government. This Bill seeks to encapsulate that double-sided convention.
At the moment, if a general election has an unclear outcome, the Prime Minister is able to test his support in the House of Commons. If the House then signalled that it did not have confidence in that Government, that Prime Minister would go and a new one could be appointed. Amendment 5 would insist that another general election took place, and if the result of that general election was unclear, we could end up having a succession of general elections. Amendment 5 would force such elections to be held. In countries that have fixed-term Parliaments it is very common for there to be a period of Government formation after a vote of no confidence before an election is triggered. That is what happens in Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden, so we are proposing an approach that has much precedent, which we think is sensible. We cannot ask my hon. Friend the Member for Stone to withdraw his amendment, because he is not here and thus unable to do so. However, we urge Members who are here not to insist on it being pressed to a Division.
Mr Jenkin
I have been in touch with my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), who makes things complicated because he does not text people. He is in Budapest representing the European Scrutiny Committee, but he has suggested that it would be in the interests of the scrutiny of this Bill to press the amendment to a Division, and one or two of us will attempt to do so.
Mr Harper
As I said, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone is away on parliamentary business and, as he has perhaps not reached 21st century methods of communication, my words are unlikely to reach him in a timely way. So I can only urge him not to press his amendment to a vote, but I suspect that the decision on that will be for others, not for him.
Chris Bryant
As it happens, I agree with the Minister on this amendment. However, the one area that it will be worth considering on Report is whether it would be sensible to have a motion of confidence on the forming of a new Government after a general election, which should be treated in a slightly different way. Such an approach would address the 1924 situation that he suggests.
Mr Harper
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, which has been raised by others. I believe I am right in saying that the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform, has said he is keen on the idea of installing Prime Ministers with an explicit vote in the House—he was speaking for himself there, not for the Committee. That would be a further change to our system and, as I said in answer to the hon. Member for Leicester South (Sir Peter Soulsby), we have made the necessary changes in the law to take away the Prime Minister’s right to call an early general election, but we have not gone further. I shall think about what the hon. Member for Rhondda said and see whether we think it has merit.
The hon. Gentleman’s amendment 22 seeks to replace the 14 days that we set out in the Bill for that Government formation period with a period of 10 working days. He is supportive of a Government formation period, because he would not be attempting to keep one through this amendment were he not. I think he was wanting to understand why we chose the period that we did, using calendar days rather than working days. The reason why we did so was because the calendar day period is fixed and certain, whereas working days are not, as they are dependent on things such as bank holidays.
Two legitimate concerns are involved here, and they were touched on last week. There is a concern that the number of business days in the 14-day period would be curtailed or that the date of the no confidence vote could mean that the date for the Government formation vote fell on a non-working day. Our view—I am interested to hear the hon. Gentleman’s—is that discussions on Government formation would not stop on weekends and bank holidays; I suspect that they would continue, given that having a Government is probably the most important thing for the country.
There are two ways around a scenario where the vital 14th day when the vote of confidence is due falls on a day when the House would conventionally not be sitting. The first is to arrange that the no confidence motion be taken on a day that means that the House will be sitting 14 days later. The alternative is for the House simply to sit on what would traditionally have been a non-sitting day. There is nothing to prevent the House from sitting, if it chooses to do so, on a bank holiday, a Saturday or a Sunday. Non-working days are not days when the House cannot sit, even though it does not do so. There are precedents for the House sitting on such days when emergencies have happened. I believe I am right in saying that the House was recalled to sit on a Saturday when the Falkland Islands were invaded by the Argentines. Holding a vote on whether a new Government did or did not have the confidence of the House would be sufficiently important that it would be in order for the House to sit that day, even if it was not a conventional day.
Chris Bryant
The Minister is right in relation to the Falkland Islands, and I believe that the House has also sat on a Sunday on the demise of the monarch. That is precisely why we did not specify “sitting days” in this amendment; we used the term “working days” because that is the language used throughout the rest of the Bill. We sought to provide a degree of flexibility; otherwise, over Easter, when there are bank holidays on the Friday and the following Monday, there might be a sustained period when the House would find it inconceivable to sit but the Government might, none the less, want to be able to do their business.
Mr Harper
For the purposes of this particular set of motions, the only business that we would be talking about the House undertaking would be holding a vote on whether or not a new Government who had been formed had the confidence of the House. Given the things that the Government are responsible for, it would be important to have a clear Government in place for the financial markets and at difficult times. We know from experience and we can see it from what happens in other countries. Therefore, the Government formation negotiations would want to be concluded and it would benefit the country, the Government and the House for the House to vote on that without inordinate delay. If there were a number of bank holidays or other holidays in the way, that could be dealt with. [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman asks about Good Friday. As I have said, the alternative is that we could arrange things by moving the no confidence vote so that it was 14 days before a sitting day.
Conventionally, no confidence motions are given time in the House very soon after they are tabled, but as long as the Government were prepared to table such a motion very soon and agreed that with the Opposition, it would not necessarily have to be tabled the next day. I do not think that it is an inordinate problem. We think that it is sensible for there to be a fixed timetable for a Government to be formed so that everyone has some certainty. That is why we picked the time period that we have.
My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest spoke in support of amendments 36 and 37, which are also tabled in the names of other members of the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform. Amendment 36 would make the 14 days in a period following a Government defeat a period that would not include periods of Prorogation or Adjournment for more than four days. Although I do not think that this is the intention behind the amendment, its effect would be to permit the 14-day period for Government formation to be prolonged potentially indefinitely if the House was prorogued or adjourned. The Government do not think that that is appropriate. We think that the 14-day period strikes the right balance between giving parties in this House time to discuss and see whether a Government can be formed and not allowing things to go on for so long that the country is plunged into a period of uncertainty. We do not think that amendment 36 is acceptable.
Amendment 37 provides that a Prime Minister must resign within seven calendar days of losing a vote of no confidence and recommend to the monarch a successor who appears to them to be the person most likely to be able to command the confidence of the House. I think I am right to say—my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest will correct me if I am wrong—that the purpose of the amendment is to avoid a situation in which a Prime Minister who has lost a no confidence vote wishes to remain in power and asks the monarch to prorogue Parliament to avoid an alternative Government receiving a vote of confidence, thereby forcing a general election.
Mr Harper
My hon. Friend says that that is indeed the purpose of the amendment. However, I think amendment 37 is defective, because it rules out the possibility of what happened in 1979 occurring again. As I have said, Prime Minister Callaghan did not resign as a result of the no confidence motion. He remained in office, asked Her Majesty the Queen to dissolve Parliament and resigned when he lost the subsequent general election. That outcome remains a possibility under the Bill. My hon. Friend’s amendment would have meant that he would have been forced to resign before the result of the election was known. I do not think that that would have been a sensible outcome.
Mrs Laing
I fully appreciate the Minister’s point. Amendments 36 and 37 might well be technically defective—in any case, I have no intention of pressing them to a vote, as I said—but the Select Committee’s purpose was to ensure that this issue was properly discussed and scrutinised on the Floor of the House. Will the Minister reassure the House that he and his colleagues are satisfied that it would not be possible under the Bill’s provisions for the Government to seek indefinite prorogation in order to avoid a vote of confidence and a general election?
Mr Harper
I think I have set out why I do not think that that is likely. As we have heard, there are lots of theoretical possibilities that are very outlandish—I do not propose to rehash the conversations that we had at the beginning of this debate—but the Government do not think that they are realistic risks and that is why we do not think that amendments 36 and 37 are acceptable.
Let me turn now to the last amendment in this group, amendment 25, which was also tabled by the Opposition. It specifies the wording of motions of no confidence for the purposes of clause 2(2). It aims to remove the discretion of the House over its wording and that of the Speaker in his certifying of a motion of no confidence. The Government recognise that no confidence motions might take different forms, as they do now, but we do not want to remove the flexibility entirely. That raises an issue, which we will come to in the next group of amendments, to do with the House’s exclusive cognisance.
If we try to set out in statute the precise form of a no confidence motion, that could raise the risks to which the Clerk of the House has alluded. We think it is better for the Speaker’s certificate to be conclusive and for the Speaker to determine the nature of that certification. As I said when we touched on this matter in debating a previous group of amendments, if there were doubt—I think it unlikely that there would be—about whether what the House was discussing was a motion of no confidence, it would seem to be sensible for the Government, the Opposition and the Speaker to ensure that Members were clear on that point when they were debating it. I cannot believe that there could ever be a debate in this House about a motion of no confidence in the Government in which Members were sitting there completely unaware that they were debating the future of the Government of our country.
Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)
Of course, the Minister is right about the reality and the politics of the situation. He should remember, however, that we are talking about a situation in which legislation has been introduced and that legislation is always challengeable in the courts. Once things get into the courts, who knows what will happen regarding the interpretation of the provisions? For the sake of clarity and certainty, what is wrong with setting out the precise terms that must be used so that there can be no doubt? That goes to the issue in amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), which sets out provisions for the avoidance of doubt. Surely there is merit in making it absolutely clear and plain.
Mr Harper
I shall not attempt to rush forward to the certification procedure, because we will debate it when we discuss the next group of amendments.
Let me turn to the specific amendment before the Committee. I do not think amendment 25 achieves the certainty that the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) suggests would be desirable. It states that a motion of no confidence “shall be”, not “must include”, so it is not clear whether the motion would have to consist exclusively of the specified text or whether that text could be part of a motion, such as if it were added to a Government motion by amendment.
The Opposition’s amendment tries to specify the text of the no confidence motion, but does not try to achieve equivalent clarity as regards the motion of confidence that would have to be passed within 14 days by an alternative Government in order to avoid a general election. The amendment is trying to achieve some certainty—that was what the hon. Member for Rhondda said—but I do not think it does. I also do not think it is desirable or appropriate to try to set out the text of the motions in the Bill.
The Government think that clause 2(2) provides a clear and practical mechanism that gives statutory effect to a vote of no confidence. I have set out the Government’s concerns about the amendments and I hope that hon. Members will not seek to press them to a vote.
Mr Shepherd
I should like to press amendment 5 to a vote, with the consent of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash).
The Second Deputy Chairman
When, after voting, Members remain in the Lobby behind the Speaker’s Chair, they need to be quiet; otherwise it is impossible to hear the vote in the Chamber.
Amendment proposed: 36, page 2, line 14, at end insert—
‘(2A) In reckoning for the purposes of subsection 2(b), no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is prorogued or during which the House of Commons is adjourned for more than four days.’.—(Sir Peter Soulsby.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr Jenkin
I beg to move amendment 6, page 2, line 15, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
‘(3) Any certificate of the Speaker of the House of Commons given under this section shall be conclusive for all purposes and shall not be presented to or questioned in any court of law whatsoever.’.
Mr Harper
For the avoidance of doubt, the Government’s position is that they are not in favour of moving to what is more accurately said to be a codified constitution. Many of our constitutional principles are, of course, written down, just not in one document. It is not the Government’s position to do so. I hope that cheers my hon. Friend up.
Mr Jenkin
I am grateful for that assurance. The Minister, who in all these debates has shown impeccable manners and tact despite the pressure he is under, should be looking for an alternative way of delivering this part of the coalition agreement, to which the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) alluded.
The Speaker’s decisions will be taken under immense political pressure, as he decides what constitutes a confidence motion, what amendments might be tabled to amend a confidence motion, whether, if carried, that would invalidate the motion, whether the amendment could constitute a motion of confidence, and the consequences of amendments being carried or the motion being carried.
I quote again from the Clerk’s memorandum:
“As these would become justiciable questions, the courts could be drawn into matters of acute political controversy.”
I respect the fact that many in the House think we should have a Supreme Court like the European Court of Justice in the European Union or the Supreme Court of the United States, which is essentially a political court, but that is a very big constitutional change. We ought to have a royal commission about it, there ought to be debates on the Adjournment about it and the implications of drawing the courts into politics, if that is what we are going to do, ought to be properly explored. The way in which the Supreme Court is appointed to make it accountable for its political judgments is another important question.
We are importing continental and American-style jurisprudence into our judicial decision making. Some judges are becoming more and more adventurous about how they interpret statute and where they feel entitled to make judicial interpretations, and the Bill invites them to decide when there might be a general election under particular circumstances.
Mr Cox
I had not intended to speak, and I shall be extremely brief. Most of my remarks will be addressed to the Minister in the hope that he can provide the clarification in substance to the questions asked by my hon. Friends and Opposition Members, which I should like to reinforce.
My first question is precisely that which my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) just asked. Why not add the proposed words? If clause 2(3) is intended to be an instruction to the courts that a certificate shall not be challenged, on the face of it there could be no real reason, unless the Minister has thought of something that others have not thought of or been advised otherwise, why the injunction of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), which is more expressive, explicit and detailed, should not be added. Will the Minister elucidate the purpose of stopping short at the word “purposes” and not going on to be as explicit as possible?
I ask that because historically, ouster clauses in administrative law have not been conspicuously successful. The courts have not paid very much attention to interpreting their duty to examine such issues, and often even where the ouster clause has been passed. [Interruption.] I see from the sedentary reaction of my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr Heath)—the Deputy Leader of the House—that the reason may be that such provisions are so pointless that there is no point in going any further. If that is the reason, it would be helpful if the Government made that clear, so that Members could consider that. I have to tell him that I do not consider the provision to be pointless—I would not imagine that the Government would do anything that was pointless in drafting the legislation.
The Parliamentary Secretary, Office of the Leader of the House of Commons (Mr David Heath)
indicated assent.
Mr Harper
I am grateful for those kind words from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox).
When Mr Hoyle was in the Chair last week, he made it clear that he did not intend to have a stand part debate on this clause as we will have touched on all parts of it when debating the amendments. Before I move on to considering the amendments, it is worth putting into context the parts of the clause about which Members are concerned.
I think I am right in saying that the concerns expressed about privilege and about whether the courts should intervene have almost exclusively related to clause 2(2), which deals with motions of confidence. Interestingly, the Clerk of the House, in his evidence and in conversations with me, was not concerned about subsection (2), given that it uses a perfectly well-precedented certification procedure. His concern—I think I explain it accurately—was with subsection (1), which covers the certification of an early general election, rather than with the certification procedure in principle. His concern was with the nature of the procedure that had to take place before the Speaker certified. In other words, not only would the House have had to pass a motion on a Division, but a particular number of Members would have had to vote.
Mr Jenkin
At the risk of repeating what I have already read out from the Speaker’s memorandum, I want to ensure that we are not speaking at cross-purposes. In paragraph 16 of the Committee’s report, the Clerk makes it very clear, in discussing clause 2(2), that
“The provisions of this subsection make the Speaker’s consideration of confidence motions and the House’s practices justiciable questions for determination by the ordinary courts.”
I do not think that the Clerk could have been clearer: it is subsection (2) that he is concerned about.
Mr Harper
I had a conversation with the Clerk about the certification, with the majority being specified. The Government decided to place the provisions on the early general election in statute rather than relying on Standing Orders because, as I stated in the memorandum I placed in the Library on 13 September, we cannot achieve the policy objective by relying on Standing Orders, which can be changed by a simple majority—
Mr Harper
Let me just finish this point, then I will take an intervention from my hon. Friend.
Standing Orders can be changed by a simple majority. The Government’s view was that, if that was the case, the power to dissolve Parliament early would effectively be left with the Prime Minister.
Mr Jenkin
I beg to suggest that, if the Minister had listened carefully to what I said earlier, he would have heard me reading from a letter I had received from Mr Robert Rogers, who made it absolutely clear that it is possible to entrench a Standing Order of this House with its own super-majority. I am astonished that the Government do not understand that, and that the whole basis of this Bill seems to rest once more on the denial of advice given by the Clerks of the House.
Mr Harper
My hon. Friend cited in the letter from Robert Rogers a reference to existing Standing Orders, which require a particular majority for an event to take place. I think he mentioned the requirement for 100 Members to vote for a closure motion. There is no precedent for a Standing Order, passed by a simple majority, to entrench itself and require that it cannot be changed, other than by a vote of this House on a different majority. The Government know of no precedent for that, and no Member has given an example of one. If a Standing Order provided that an early general election could be held only after a vote with the specified majority, and if that Standing Order could be changed by a simple majority vote in the House, it would be open to the governing party, at the behest of the Prime Minister, to change the Standing Order and to trigger an early election based on the whim of the Executive. That is exactly what we are trying to remove under the Bill. The Government believe that if the policy objective is to be achieved, the procedure must be specified in statute.
Mr Shepherd
If that is so—and I accept it as such—why does it not apply to the statute itself?
Mr Harper
I think we have touched on that before. Once the Bill becomes an Act of Parliament, it cannot be changed purely by a majority vote in the House of Commons. The decision would have to be made by Parliament, which would also engage the other place, in which the Government do not have a majority. Even after—[Interruption.] I anticipated that reaction. Even after the appointment of the new list of working peers, the governing parties together will have only 40% of the peers in the upper House; 60% will be Labour peers, Cross Benchers or Lords Spiritual. The fact that this will be an Act of Parliament makes it impossible for a majority vote of a governing party to bring about an early general election, which is our policy objective.
Chris Bryant
The Minister is right in saying that the main difference is that the matter would have to be dealt with in the second Chamber. As I understand it, however, the coalition agreement states clearly that the Government’s aspiration is to create enough peers to meet the proportions formed by each of the parties in the general election. That would provide a majority of 56%—quite apart from the fact that, as far as I can see, virtually every remaining Liberal Democrat Member in the country will be a member of the Second Chamber.
Mr Harper
I will not dwell on this issue at length, Mr Evans, because if I did so you would rule me out of order, but the coalition agreement does not say that. It says that we want to make the upper House more representative of the result in the general election, not exactly in line with it. The hon. Gentleman simply is not right.
The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) quoted from a judgment. I will not be drawn into the specifics of the Chaytor case—although the Supreme Court has given its judgment, there are ongoing criminal trials—but the flaw in the hon. Gentleman’s argument lies in the fact that the case concerns the administration of the expenses scheme. The House of Commons has never asserted exclusive cognisance of the expenses scheme. It has never said that the scheme, its administration and the matters that flow from it are parliamentary proceedings, which is why that is not a good example. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s judgment recognises the exclusive right of each House of Parliament to manage its own affairs without interference from the other, or from outside Parliament.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) quoted the views of the Clerk of the House. If the Government were alone in their view and the Clerk’s views were shared by everyone else, my hon. Friend would have a stronger case. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee and the Lords Constitution Committee have taken a great deal of evidence, and the weight of independent expert evidence has supported the Government’s view. For example, Professor Robert Blackburn of King’s college London said—and I think that this is in line with the comments of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon—
“In my view, the government's Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill has been technically well-drafted by the Cabinet Office’s parliamentary counsel, particularly in avoiding judicial review of its provisions on early elections by way of Speaker’s certificates”.
The hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), the Chairman of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, said:
“In the very limited time that we had to look at this matter, the Clerk was the only person to raise this question, and the academics who have been referred to—Professor Hazell, Professor Blackburn and others—completely disagreed with the view put forward by the Clerk.”—[Official Report, 13 September 2010; Vol. 515, c. 632-3.]
Tristram Hunt
The point was that we did not have enough time to hear other voices that might have agreed with the Clerk of the House, owing to our having to rush our consideration of the Bill and to the speed with which the Government are pushing it through.
Mr Harper
That was also the experience of the Lords Constitution Committee—and, in fact, we have not been rushing the consideration of this Bill. We published it in July, Second Reading was in September, and this is the third day of the Committee stage, in December. We are hardly rushing forward at an enormously swift pace. Months have elapsed. I feel sure that if hundreds of constitutional lawyers and academics agreed with the Clerk and disagreed with the Government, we would have heard from them.
Mr Andrew Turner (Isle of Wight) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend understand that the Committee had to rush through its work on this Bill and the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill at the same time?
Mr Harper
I am prepared to accept that consideration of the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill has been proceeding faster than consideration of this Bill, but I cannot accept that this Bill is being considered at a great pace. It was published five months ago, we have reached only the third day of the Committee stage, and the Report stage is still to come. I believe that we have been proceeding at a sensible pace. Indeed, today’s proceedings were added when the Government realised that Members wished to engage in the debate at greater length.
Chris Bryant
The Minister seems to suggest that all the evidence apart from that of the Clerk of the House falls into the other camp. The Committee listened to the various witnesses and reached a rather different conclusion—that the purpose of the Bill needed to be achieved without the courts being invited to question aspects of the House’s own procedures or the actions of the Speaker—and urged us to move in a rather different direction from the one advocated by the Government.
Mr Harper
The Committee was quite right. I agree that we need to ensure that the courts do not question those matters. In a moment I will deal with the amendments and the Government’s reason for believing that the language we have used about the well-precedented use of Speaker’s certificates prevents the courts from questioning the Act.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex observed that judges were not more interventionist. I believe there is evidence that there has been more judicial activism in judicial reviews of Executive decisions, but as far as I am aware there is no evidence that the courts have become more interventionist in challenging parliamentary proceedings. Executive decisions and decisions of Parliament are quite different from each other. Although the Supreme Court has a new name, it has no greater powers than the judicial Committee of the House of Lords that it replaced. I do not think that my hon. Friend’s concerns are well judged.
My hon. Friend also referred to the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Justice can deal with matters related to European Union law; nothing in the Bill would engage it. Similarly, the functions of the Speaker under the Bill do not engage any of the rights conferred by the European Court of Human Rights. I think it was only last week that the Joint Committee on Human Rights agreed with that when it said that the Bill’s provisions did not need to be brought to the attention of either House on human rights grounds.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hereford and South Herefordshire (Jesse Norman)—who is not in the Chamber, as he has had to fulfil a long-standing and important engagement to attend a meeting elsewhere in the House—expressed concern about the European Court of Human Rights. In fact, it has shown the utmost respect for parliamentary privilege. In a 2003 case, A. v. United Kingdom, it was specifically held that article 9 of the Bill of Rights did not violate the convention by preventing an applicant from taking defamation proceedings against an MP for words said in parliamentary proceedings. The European Court of Human Rights strongly supported the contention that courts would not become involved in these matters.
I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon, who said that owing to the very nature of these events—the fact that they would be politically highly charged—judges would not be keen to rush in and engage in questions that are rightly to be resolved by political rather than legal means. I have heard no evidence, apart from assertion, that courts would do anything different.
Mark Durkan
I gave the example from 2001 when, on the third attempt, David Trimble and I were jointly elected as First and Deputy First Minister by the Northern Ireland Assembly. That was taken to the courts. Yes, the courts did not touch on issues connected with the Assembly’s standing orders, but they did entertain the suggestion that the Secretary of State had failed to use the power and duty, given to him under law, to set a date for an election if no First and Deputy First Minister have been elected after six weeks. The Secretary of State did not do so, claiming that because he had notice of the potential to elect us, which had been issued by the end day of the six-week period, he could interpret the deadline differently. The court did not throw out the case and the judges—competent, serious, senior judges—divided on the issue. In the light of that precedent, the assurance of the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) does not stand.
Mr Harper
The hon. Gentleman makes my point for me. He accurately sets out the fact that at issue was not a proceeding in Parliament—a decision of this House—but an executive decision by the Secretary of State. As I have said, there is lots of evidence that courts will challenge Ministers’ decisions, and one can argue about whether they will be right to do so; Ministers would probably argue they are not, but everyone else would probably argue that they are. The case the hon. Gentleman raises involved an executive decision; it was not a decision of this House or a proceeding in Parliament, and it is not protected under article 9.
Mark Durkan
But what we are talking about is related to the closest equivalent in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 of the certificate powers being given to the Secretary of State. Sections 31 and 32 of the 1998 Act provide for the early Dissolution of the Assembly and early elections. They are the exact same powers, except that in Northern Ireland the Secretary of State has the powers of an “over-Speaker”, rather than their being vested in the Presiding Officer. They are the equivalent powers, however.
Chris Bryant
Sorry, but the Minister is using the phrase “proceedings in Parliament” as though it were a self-evidently clear concept, but a great deal of legislation and case law has analysed various different aspects of it and it is nowhere near as clear as he might presume.
Mr Harper
No, and that leads to where I was going, which was to turn to amendment 6 and to explain why we are using the language of the device of a Speaker’s certificate. There are precedents that have stood the test of time, which is why Professor Blackburn expressed the feeling in the quotation I read that parliamentary counsel had drafted the Bill well.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) tabled amendment 6 and my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex spoke to it. I can see why they would want to use the wording in the Parliament Act 1911, but the Bill says the Speaker’s certificate is “conclusive for all purposes” and the Government do not think inserting the words
“shall not be…questioned in any court of law”
adds anything. The 1911 wording has, indeed, stood the test of time, but it used the language of the early 20th century. Later legislation used different wording. The House of Lords Act 1999 used exactly the wording we have used, which provides that certificates of the Clerk of the Parliaments on questions of whether an hereditary peer is one of the excepted 92 hereditary peers are conclusive. The provisions have worked well in practice, whereas wording consistent with the Parliament Act 1911 could bring into question whether protections in more recent Acts were meant to be an inferior sort of protection. We think that would be undesirable.
Provided certificates are conclusive for all purposes, it is perfectly adequate to show that it is for the Speaker to decide whether the conditions for an early election have been satisfied, not for the courts or the Executive. The effect and the intention of the drafting are perfectly clear. Although the additional words in amendment 6 might appear attractive, they would not add anything to the protection in the Bill. There is no evidence or reason to think the courts would want to trespass on what would effectively be highly politicised issues or that they would not continue to regard matters relating to the internal operation of the House as “proceedings in Parliament”.
I should also like to deal with the wording in amendment 6 that seeks to prevent a Speaker’s certificate issued under clause 2 from being “presented” to a court. I can see why my hon. Friend the Member for Stone is trying to do that, but it seems to me that that takes a step backwards. Being able to present the certificate to the court is the simplest and easiest way of informing the court that the conditions for an early election exist and the Speaker has made the decision. That stops the court being tempted to dwell on proceedings in Parliament; it has a clear piece of paper that explains that the Speaker has made that determination and the court need go no further.
Mr Cox
Let us suppose that the Speaker issued a certificate that omitted one of the matters that the statute required him to certify. Would it not be open to a petitioner to argue in court that there had been a failure to comply with the conditions that made a certificate valid and that the court was entitled to examine whether it was a certificate before obeying the ouster that prevents it from challenging the certificate?
Mr Harper
My hon. and learned Friend makes a point that relates to the use of certificates, but what he describes would be perfectly true of the certificate that the Speaker issues on money Bills and the certification that he issues under the Parliament Act. Those are well precedented and have stood the test of time. The courts have been content to hold that the fact that the certificate has been issued by the Speaker is indeed conclusive for all purposes and they have not sought to challenge it.
Mr Cox
We are dealing with a fundamentally different sphere here. Whether or not a Bill is a money Bill is the kind of decision that is suitable only for a legislative Assembly, but on this matter the courts would regard themselves as guarding the right to an election, which is a fundamental right of the population of this country. If Parliament had prescribed that an election should take place and a certificate was defective because it did not stipulate one of the requisite terms, the courts may regard that as an area into which they ought to go to safeguard the right to an election.
Mr Harper
If a certificate was issued by the Speaker, we would be having an election, not stopping one taking place. I do not think that my hon. and learned Friend’s concern that the courts would hold that the population were being deprived of an election would apply. The language used in the Bill was chosen for exactly the reasons I have suggested. We have used well-precedented, tried and tested language; it has stood the test of time. It is perfectly true to say that people can make groundless applications to courts on all sorts of things, but courts quickly dismiss them and prevent them from proceeding further. We are confident that these proposals are robust and will not have the effect that hon. Members suggest.
In the few minutes remaining, I wish to discuss amendment 23, because the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) suggested that he wanted to ask you, Mr Evans, whether he could press it to a Division. The amendment proposes a 24-hour time limit for the issuing of the Speaker’s certificate. I can superficially see why that might be attractive, but it sets some conditions that might introduce elements casting doubt on the validity of the certificate if it were delayed, even if it were by only a few minutes, or if it were issued close to the time limit. Thus, the amendment would enable people to question the certificate. We should therefore rely on the standard practice, whereby the Speaker’s certificate is the conclusive provision.
Given what I have said, I hope that hon. Members will not seek to press their amendments to a Division and that we are able to proceed with the debate.
Mr Jenkin
I am most grateful, Mr Evans, for the opportunity to reply to the debate.
I regret that I feel compelled to press this matter to a vote, but I feel that the Minister’s response has been wholly unconvincing. We are faced with adamant and clear advice from the Clerk of the House that the Minister has chosen to dismiss as irrelevant. Let me remind the Committee what the Clerk said:
“The provisions of this subsection make the Speaker’s consideration of confidence motions and the House’s practices justiciable questions for determination by the ordinary courts.”
That includes
“what constitutes a confidence motion, the selection of amendments to such Motions and the consequences of their being carried”.
He goes on to say:
“As these would become justiciable questions, the courts could be drawn into matters of acute political controversy.”
The Minister has not responded with anything substantive to defeat that advice.
Moreover, the Minister has rested his justification for the Bill on the assertion that it would not be possible to write these provisions into the Standing Orders, which would be automatically immune. Let me read from the Clerk’s memorandum again. He said that
“a Standing Order regulating the matters in the Bill could provide for its staying in effect unless repealed by a specified majority”,
meaning that it could be entrenched,
“for example by…equal to or greater than two thirds of the number of seats in the House. Not only is the principle of specifying majorities already written into the Standing Orders of the House, but in the past the House has also required a relative majority for reaching decision.”
My hon. Friend the Minister also dismissed the comments that I read from Mr Robert Rogers, the Clerk Assistant and Director General, who made it clear that we can not only write into our Standing Orders provisions requiring super-majorities, but entrench a—[Interruption.] I am rather distressed that the Minister is not even listening to what I am saying. We can entrench a Standing Order with its own super-majority so that it could be removed only by a super-majority, if that is what the House chose to do. The whole basis of the Government’s advice remains contested by the Clerks. The basis of the Bill—that this has to be done through statute—also remains contested by the Clerks.
I doubt that we will win the vote in the Committee this afternoon, but the Minister has failed to give a full response or to acknowledge any of the points that have been made. His subsection refers to a Speaker’s “certificate under this section”, which is very unspecific. At least the amendment states
“Any certificate of the Speaker of the House of Commons given under this section shall be conclusive for all purposes”.
That word “any” and the reference to the Speaker make it clear that whatever the Speaker issues is uncontested, rather than leave it open to the courts to determine whether the certificate presented by the Speaker complies with the legislation. I am afraid that the Minister has not satisfied me and I do not think that he has satisfied a great many of my colleagues on the Government Benches or in the official Opposition. I want to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Committee proceeded to a Division.