Afghanistan

Lord Hague of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

Mr Speaker, with permission I will present a quarterly review of our progress in Afghanistan since October last year, representing the combined assessment of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development.

As always, I begin by paying tribute to the brave men and women of our armed forces. They have borne the brunt of the immense difficulties and dangers that Afghanistan has presented each and every day of the last 10 years and which it still presents in so many ways today. Three hundred and ninety-seven British service personnel have lost their lives since 2001, and 14 since my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary made the previous statement on 18 October. This House and our nation will never forget the sacrifices they have made to protect Britain’s national security.

Our Government’s objective in Afghanistan is shared by the Afghan Government and all 50 nations that contribute forces to the international security assistance force. We all want an Afghanistan that is able to maintain its own security and prevent the country from being used as a safe haven for international terrorists. Our strategy is to help the Afghan Government to build capable Afghan national security forces; to make progress towards a sustainable political settlement; and to support the building of a viable Afghan state.

Central to that is the gradual handover of security responsibilities from international forces to the Afghan national security forces by the end of 2014, as we agreed at the Lisbon summit in 2010. British and ISAF troops will continue to perform combat roles until the end of 2014. Our commitment in terms of aid, trade, investment and close diplomatic ties will of course last far beyond 2014. It was reflected in the enduring strategic partnership agreement signed by the Prime Minister and President Karzai on 28 January, and will play a crucial part in securing our long-term objectives.

No one in this House should underestimate the scale of the challenges that remain, but we are confident that our strategy in Afghanistan is the right one to maintain our national security, and we are making steady progress towards our goals. In December, the National Security Council reaffirmed that strategy, and agreed our objectives for the year ahead: 2012 will be an important year to consolidate progress in Afghanistan. The NATO conference in Chicago in May and the Tokyo conference on development in July will build on pledges made at the international Afghanistan conference in Bonn last December, with the aim of securing concrete financial, development and security commitments for Afghanistan beyond 2014.

The process of transition made considerable progress last year. The House will know that this is the means by which responsibility for security across Afghanistan is progressively transferred from the international community to Afghan national security forces, up to the end of 2014 when international troops will withdraw from a combat role. Transition is based on conditions on the ground; it is phased, it is gradual and it can take up to 18 months in any one area. In December 2011, transition began in the second group of areas. Approximately half the Afghan population lives in areas now in the process of transition.

The progress made in Helmand by Afghan, UK and ISAF troops is illustrated by the inclusion of Nad Ali, alongside Lashkar Gah, early in the transition process, which began in July. The security situation in these districts is unrecognisable compared with the start of British operations in 2006. Violence levels have fallen dramatically. Afghans have freedom of movement in Lashkar Gah and in all five central Helmand districts. Pupil enrolment for both girls and boys is rising, and the Afghan Government are able to provide services to the province.

British forces continue to conduct operations in Helmand, but are supporting a growing number of Afghan-led operations. In December, more than 280 British service personnel joined forces with 550 Afghan troops on Operation Winter Success. The operation was planned and led by the Afghan national army with ISAF mentoring and support. It succeeded in clearing insurgents from the area where three Helmand districts meet—Nad Ali, Nahri Sarraj and Lashkar Gah—before building new checkpoints, manned by Afghan forces, to increase security and extend the governance and development footprint of the Afghan Government.

The success of such operations allows us gradually to focus our efforts on mentoring and training. We will help to create an Afghan national officer academy to produce the Afghan army officers of the future, and it will open its doors in 2013. It is expected to accept 1,350 recruits annually, and approximately 120 British troops will be based at the academy to provide training and related support.

At the end of December, the Afghan national police were more than 143,000 strong and the Afghan national army numbered more than 170,000. They are deploying in formed units, carrying out their own operations and planning complex security arrangements. Last year, they responded to a series of high-profile attacks promptly, professionally and increasingly independent of ISAF support.

For the first time since 2006, year on year violence levels decreased across Afghanistan in 2011. This is a good indication of progress. However, the regional picture remains varied: in the east in particular the number of security incidents rose. We cannot be complacent, as gains are fragile and not yet irreversible, but we are firmly on track for the ANSF to have lead security responsibility by mid to late 2013. The ANSF will have full security responsibility across Afghanistan by the end of 2014. This means that plans for British combat troop draw-down by the end of 2014 also remain on track. The Prime Minister has indicated that there will be a steady and measured draw-down between now and then, and that British forces will be reduced by 500 to 9,000 by the end of this year. The rate of reduction will be determined by the progress of transition on the ground.

We have also seen progress on the political track. In December, I attended the international conference in Bonn. The conference signalled that our commitment to Afghanistan will continue beyond the completion of security transition and will be reinforced at this year’s Chicago and Tokyo conferences.

The Afghan Government also made commitments at Bonn. They include further efforts to tackle corruption and improve the capacity of Afghan institutions. The Government committed themselves to upholding international human rights obligations and to protecting women’s rights as enshrined in the Afghan constitution. Respect for women’s rights is a fundamental obligation, and is important for Afghanistan’s future. We agree with the Afghan Government, and regularly impress upon them, that the rights of women must not be sacrificed as part of the political process. This was emphasised at Bonn by the Minister for Equalities, the Government’s ministerial champion for tackling violence against women and girls overseas.

Britain supports an Afghan-led political process to help to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. We know that this will take time and will require support. The Afghan Government’s approach received broad endorsement from the Loya Jirga in November 2011 and from the international community at Bonn.

There have been a number of important developments in the political process already this year. Last month, the Taliban expressed their willingness to participate in a political office in Qatar. We welcome any steps towards reconciliation but recognise that they are at an early stage and that more work will be needed to move forward. Nevertheless, the Taliban leadership have accepted the need to engage in a political process, and this is significant. If they are willing to renounce violence, break links with al-Qaeda and respect the Afghan constitution, there can be a place for them in their country’s future. A political office provides an opportunity for all Afghans to work together towards a sustainable peace, for it is only with the engagement of all Afghans that we can hope to see a durable settlement. Britain will continue to support the Afghan Government in these efforts.

In November, the International Monetary Fund agreed a new three-year programme of support with the Afghan Government, which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development helped to secure. This has helped to get back on track the internationally agreed set of Afghan development and governance commitments known as the Kabul process. It also allowed donors, including Britain, to resume support to the Afghanistan reconstruction trust fund, which is helping the Government to deliver vital basic services, including education and health care.

None the less, Afghanistan remains one of the world’s poorest countries and its financial future is uncertain. A World Bank report published in November showed that the Government budget shortfall might still be $7 billion by 2021. At Bonn we agreed in principle to provide long-term financial support in line with the Afghan Government’s priorities. These plans will be discussed further at the Chicago and Tokyo conferences. We will continue to support the Afghan Government’s efforts to increase tax revenue and economic growth in order to reduce the budget shortfall and aid dependency. Our support to their Revenue Department is helping to exceed IMF revenue collection targets. In November, quarterly revenue collections increased to £322 million, an increase of 23% over the same period last year.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development launched a major new civil society programme to strengthen the capacity of Afghan civil society bodies during his visit to Afghanistan in October. This, too, will have a strong focus on women’s rights. The first call for proposals has resulted in over 200 applications, which are now being assessed.

These developments in Afghanistan are essential to the country’s future. So, too, are the actions of Afghanistan’s neighbours. At last November’s regional conference, hosted by our Turkish partners in Istanbul, Afghanistan’s neighbours gave their collective backing to the Afghan Government’s efforts to promote an inclusive political process. They also agreed to work together through a detailed set of confidence-building measures, and a follow-up meeting will be held in Kabul in June. In March, the fifth regional economic co-operation conference on Afghanistan will also take place, aiming to further economic integration. Britain will continue to support these efforts while recognising that they must be led by the region.

Finally, Pakistan has a crucial role and much to gain from improved stability in Afghanistan. It already suffers more casualties from terrorism than any other country in the world. Both countries need to work together to stem the flow of militants, who undermine the sovereignty of both democratic Governments and remain intent on killing their citizens and destabilising the region. The best way to achieve this is through regular, frank and honest dialogue. We welcome Pakistan’s participation in the Istanbul conference and its support for the commitments that were agreed. The recent visit to Kabul by the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, is a positive indication of improving relations between the two countries and signals the resumption of the Afghanistan-Pakistan dialogue. I look forward to receiving the Foreign Minister in London on 21 February, when we will discuss Afghanistan and the region as well as our strong bilateral relations.

Serious challenges remain in Afghanistan. There will undoubtedly be setbacks and difficulties ahead, but we are making steady progress. This will be an important year to consolidate this progress and to strengthen the international commitments to Afghanistan and long-term partnership with its people.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it. Of course, the context of this discussion is the number of British personnel currently serving in Afghanistan—almost 10,000—who are harnessing their professionalism and expertise to the task of securing a stable Afghanistan that will not threaten this country’s security again. Their bravery is rightly and regularly praised in the House, but each time it is a genuine and sincere reflection of the admiration on both sides of this House for the work they do on our behalf.

The Foreign Secretary knows that we supported the mission in Afghanistan in government and continue to do so in opposition. We are keen to discuss these issues in a spirit of shared support for the mission, but it is also the Opposition’s job to scrutinise, and that task is especially important when the lives of our servicemen and women are at stake. I hope that he will see my questions in that spirit.

I will divide my questions between the security situation and the diplomatic effort. On the security situation, the Foreign Secretary has just told the House:

“British and ISAF troops will continue to perform combat roles until the end of 2014.”

How is that consistent with the comments of the American Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta, who only last week said:

“Hopefully by mid- to the latter part of 2013 we’ll be able to make a transition from a combat role to a training, advice and assist role”?

Incidentally, that comment was confirmed by the Prime Minister’s official spokesman, but there was no statement to the House. Given the integrated nature of ISAF’s work, both in Helmand and across Afghanistan, is the Foreign Secretary seriously suggesting that British military personnel will be involved in combat operations for potentially between a year and 18 months after our American allies have transferred from combat operations to providing training, advice and assistance?

What is the Foreign Secretary’s assessment of the military implications of America’s decision to wind down combat operations more than a year before the previously stated deadline for withdrawal? What is his assessment of the impact on the ISAF mission’s timetable for transition of the announcement in January by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, that French troops will now leave Afghanistan by the end of 2013?

The statement comes shortly after the publication of a leaked NATO document cataloguing the depth of links and assistance between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani security services. The report also details widespread collaboration between the insurgents and the Afghan police and military, so what is the Foreign Secretary’s assessment of the findings of the report, and how does he reconcile its bleak findings with his description today that

“we are making steady progress”?

The Foreign Secretary has just told the House:

“For the first time since 2006, year on year violence levels decreased across Afghanistan in 2011.”

How does he reconcile that statement with the report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan only last week that indicated that the number of civilians killed and injured has risen for the fifth year running, with the majority of deaths caused by insurgents? The report documented 3,021 civilian deaths in 2011, compared with 2,790 in 2010 and 2,412 in 2009.

The Foreign Secretary said in his statement that 120 British troops will be based at the Afghan national academy. Will he reassure the House that all necessary force protection measures will be in place for them at that time? He stated that the Afghan national army now numbers 170,000. Will he confirm how large the British Government now expect the Afghan national army to be at the time of transition in 2014 and say a little more about how these force levels are to be financed in the light of the deficits he spoke of?

Let me now turn briefly to the diplomatic effort. We have expressed our concern in the past that there was not an oral statement to the House following the Bonn conference in December and that, despite the intense effort required in these critical months, the Prime Minister has not made a statement on Afghanistan to the House for many months. It is vital that the scale of our military effort is matched by diplomatic efforts. The Foreign Secretary spoke of November’s Istanbul conference, but will he set out for the House what sustained efforts are being made to co-ordinate the regional players, such as China and Pakistan, and bind them into the work of securing a stable and durable peace?

The Foreign Secretary spoke of the Taliban’s willingness to participate in a political office in Qatar. While it is suggested that only talks about talks are now under way, what progress is being made on the broader and more inclusive political settlement needed within Afghanistan for a stable state post-2014? Specifically, will he update the House on what progress has been made by the Afghan High Peace Council, established at the London conference in 2010, on reaching a consensus on constitutional arrangements and how it is ensuring that women have a proper role in Afghanistan’s future?

Finally, given the timetable for transition, will the Foreign Secretary provide the House with the British Government’s assessment of the capacity of the Afghan state to undertake, as is planned, free and fair presidential elections during 2014?

We now have an end date in Afghanistan, but it is through urgent diplomatic work that we can also have an end state worthy of the sacrifice endured during this long decade.

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his questions. He rightly pays tribute to the bravery of our armed forces and reflects how sincere those tributes always are in this House, particularly from those of us on both sides who have travelled in Afghanistan and seen the work of our armed services and what happens in field hospitals. We recognise the extraordinary commitment of all involved. He is quite right to point out again—I am grateful to him for it—from the Opposition Benches that those operations enjoy support across the House, and I certainly take his questions in the spirit in which they are obviously intended.

The right hon. Gentleman asks about reconciling what I have said today with what the US Defence Secretary has said over the past couple of weeks. The US Defence Secretary has stressed that US forces will remain combat-capable and ready in Afghanistan to the end of 2014, and he has also said very clearly:

“We’ve got to stick to the Lisbon strategy. The United States has a very strong commitment to Lisbon and to the strategy that was laid out there.”

That strategy involves withdrawing from a combat role after the end of 2014.

Sometimes, in the reporting of different comments, there is confusion between lead responsibility and full responsibility. As I said in my statement, however, we expect Afghan forces to have lead responsibility throughout Afghanistan in mid to late 2013, and I also reflected on how they have lead responsibility for many operations now in Helmand. Full responsibility—that is, full transition to Afghan security control—is from the end of 2014, so we are not conscious of any difference between the approach of the United States, and its intentions for its armed forces, and ours; nor would we want there to be any difference. The right hon. Gentleman is quite right to express alarm at the idea of such a difference, which is not something that the Government intend or would accept.

The leaked document to which he refers should not have too much importance attributed to it. It was actually a collection of the views and various opinions of Taliban detainees held in custody, and it should not be taken as a necessarily accurate reflection of the overall strategic situation. I do not accept, therefore, that a leaked document of Taliban views contradicts everything I have said in this statement about the steady progress that is being made—steady progress always qualified by my saying how fragile it is in some areas, and how the picture has been varied.

That brings me to the right hon. Gentleman’s next question, because he asks about the number of incidents. It has risen over the past year in Regional Command East and Regional Command South West, but it has gone down in Regional Command South, down particularly sharply in Helmand, our own area of responsibilities, and down on average throughout the country. It is true also, nevertheless, that some of those incidents have been considerable attacks and cost civilian lives. About 80% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan are caused by insurgent activity, and that is why the civilian casualty figures are as he cites—something, therefore, that we cannot at all be complacent about.

The right hon. Gentleman asks about the academy, and I can of course assure him that the necessary protection will be in place. The academy will be on the same site as the United States academy, and full protection will be afforded to it.

On the strength of Afghan national security forces, they will be built up, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, to a total strength of 352,000. Decisions will be made—probably at the NATO summit in Chicago, which the Secretary of State for Defence, the Prime Minister and I will attend—about the strength of Afghan national security forces in later years, and about what the international community’s financial contribution will be. We certainly expect the United Kingdom to make a significant contribution to those forces after 2014.

The right hon. Gentleman asks about oral statements, but I must gently point out that we introduced the quarterly statements on Afghanistan, having called for them for a long time during the previous Parliament, and indeed a monthly report to Parliament. We will always consider requests for further statements, but we have a great deal more statements on the matter than was the case in the previous Parliament.

On regional efforts, the Istanbul meeting was important, and the forthcoming economic co-operation conference that I mentioned will be important also in binding in the partners, but at the Bonn conference it was striking how the regional partners were committed to economic and development co-operation with Afghanistan, as well as all of us who make such a large security contribution.

It would not be fair to say that a consensus on the future, which the right hon. Gentleman quite rightly looks for in Afghanistan on constitutional arrangements, has yet been reached, but the meeting of the Loya Jirga was important progress, as is the establishment of the Taliban’s political office, although that is at an early stage. It does not indicate necessarily that they have signed up to the idea of reconciliation overall, nor that they are united on it, but it is one indication of progress.

The conduct of forthcoming elections, including the presidential one, will be a very important factor in Afghanistan’s political future and in its stability. We saw in the most recent round of elections—the presidential and parliamentary elections in Afghanistan—an improvement in the holding of free and fair elections conducted in an orderly way. We look for another improvement in the next presidential election.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement. I share his approach to the draw-down of troops, which depends on the conditions on the ground, and I note that the cost of the ANSF post-2015 is still to be resolved but will, I hope, emerge after the NATO summit. Will he say a little more about the ongoing negotiations with the Taliban in Qatar? Those discussions are clearly very important. Is there anything that we can do to give them more impetus?

[Mr Hague]

As I just said, it is too early to say very much about those negotiations, but the United Kingdom has, as my hon. Friend knows, for a long time supported the concept of reconciliation in Afghanistan, including the involvement of the Taliban, provided ultimately that the conditions of their breaking with al-Qaeda and accepting the constitution of Afghanistan can be met. The negotiations are at an early stage and do not necessarily indicate that the Taliban are in favour of reconciliation or have decided collectively to pursue it. It is the possible beginning of a process. We will have to see how that goes, but it is too early to say anything more than that about it at the moment.

[Mr David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab)]

Does the Foreign Secretary recognise that, while we pay tribute—I certainly do—to our armed forces, as I have said previously, and to all the innocent victims of war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the overwhelming majority of British people want to see an end to our combat role as quickly as possible and, we hope, before the end of 2014? All the indications are that the sentiment in Britain is shared in the United States, France and Germany.

[Mr Hague]

British people do want their own—our own—national security to be secured, and, yes, they very much support our troops whenever they are sent overseas into combat operations. This country has a very strong tradition of such support, but what we are doing now—setting a clear timetable, whereby by the end of 2014 we will have withdrawn from a combat role, or from having our troops there in anything like their current numbers—is something that meets the approval of the country. But we would not be doing a service to the country or, indeed, to the sacrifices of our forces there over recent years if we indulged in a precipitate withdrawal that left a far more difficult situation than the one that we hope to leave.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

I hope that my right hon. Friend will excuse me if I return to the issue of the attitude of the United States and of the French, but there is a common background. Each country is in the throes of an acrimonious presidential election, and it leads me to the conclusion that statements may be made for political rather than military reasons. If some of the predictions, based on what Mr Panetta has said and has never withdrawn, were to be fulfilled, the military position of British troops would be substantially altered. Can we be satisfied that both my right hon. Friend and the Secretary of State for Defence are aware of that and are ready to take steps if necessary to protect the interests of British forces?

[Mr Hague]

I understand the anxieties in the House on this issue. The US Defence Secretary clarified any doubts, certainly to my satisfaction and that of my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary, in saying, as I quoted earlier:

“We’ve got to stick to the Lisbon strategy.”

The United States has a strong commitment to that. Of course, part of that strategy is that in 2013, Afghans will have lead responsibility across much of Afghanistan, as I indicated in my statement. Increasingly, the role of ISAF is to provide mentoring, training and support. I gave examples of that from Helmand. The United States and the United Kingdom have the same strategy, as do all the ISAF nations.

It is true that France has announced a change in its withdrawal. President Sarkozy has announced the withdrawal of French troops by the end of 2013, rather than 2014. No other ISAF partner, among the 50 nations, has announced accelerated withdrawal plans. The clear consensus at the NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting on 2 and 3 February was that we should stick to the Lisbon time lines, with staged troop draw-down up to the end of 2014.

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

The Foreign Secretary has referred to the crucial role of Pakistan vis-à-vis Afghanistan, and to the fact that Pakistan suffers more from terrorism than any other country. Will he give a detailed assessment of Pakistan’s current commitment in terms of tackling terrorism? What is Pakistan doing with ourselves and others to take forward the situation in Afghanistan?

[Mr Hague]

Pakistani leaders are determined to tackle terrorism. We will have a detailed discussion about that when the Pakistani Foreign Minister comes here in two weeks’ time. I have seen for myself on recent visits to Pakistan how much Pakistanis mourn the loss of tens of thousands of lives to terrorism. We have to accept that Pakistan is in an almost uniquely difficult situation. Its Government are not wholly in control of all their own territory and their writ does not run in all their territory. There is a long history of terrorist activity. This is an enormous challenge for Pakistan. We work with it in many ways, and we use that work to encourage its fight against terrorism. We will continue to do so, but it will remain a difficult struggle.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Unless western forces retain some strategic reserves in one or more strategic bases in Afghanistan after the end of 2014, the highly optimistic portrait that my right hon. Friend has painted will not long survive that date. Will he confirm that America, regardless of pre-election statements, is actively considering retaining some form of significant military presence in one or more strategic bases in Afghanistan?

[Mr Hague]

That is a matter to be concluded between the United States and Afghanistan. It is a pertinent question. The answer will depend on the definition that those countries together have for their future strategic partnership. Of course, the long-term presence of United States forces is a controversial subject in the region. The matter has not been settled. I stress to my hon. Friend the growing size and capability of the Afghan national security forces, which are building up to a total of 352,000. They are equipping themselves extremely well in the current conditions.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

I thank the Secretary of State for his reference to the welfare and rights of women in Afghanistan. However, he will be aware of the growing concerns highlighted in The Guardian last week that improvements for women will see a reversal. Women for Women International has asked that the allies do not pull out without insisting on guarantees for women’s rights in Afghanistan. What specific commitments are the British Government and our allies calling for to ensure that the support for women’s rights is not rhetoric and that women will stay safe in Afghanistan in future?

[Mr Hague]

We are continuing to press the Government of Afghanistan, who made important commitments at the Bonn conference on this matter, to deliver on their human rights commitments, including on the elimination of violence against women law and the implementation of the UN convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. As the hon. Lady will know, we are taking a lot of other action to entrench the concept of women’s rights and women’s involvement in Afghan society and leadership. We have funded a project to provide support to female parliamentary candidates and parliamentarians; supported a women’s legal aid centre in Kabul; and provided funding for the elimination of violence against women special fund and for a five-year women’s empowerment programme, implemented by the non-governmental organisation, Womankind. Across the board, the United Kingdom has a good record on this subject.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

My noble Friend Lord Ashdown has written a highly critical account in the The Times this week of the international community’s record in Afghanistan over more than a decade. He concluded, with typical military bluntness, that only the poor bloody infantry, with all their courage and determination, can expect to march out of Afghanistan with their heads held high. Although I do not expect the Foreign Secretary to endorse that statement precisely, does he agree with my noble Friend that alongside the political process, it is critical that we leave behind an Afghan army that is robust, professional and non-political? Does he agree that that, and not the attempted eradication of the Taliban, is the key security objective from now on?

[Mr Hague]

That is very important, as are all the things that we have talked about, such as building a viable Afghan state and creating a sustainable political process. Those things are important, as well as the security gains. Lord Ashdown is right to draw attention to the extraordinary role of our Army and other armed forces in making it possible to make progress in other areas. It is right that building up the Afghan national security forces, not only in numbers but in quality, is critical. One pleasing thing has been the literacy training programme, which 125,000 members of the security forces have passed through, greatly improving their capabilities. Such work on quality has to continue, as well as building up the size of the forces.

[Mr Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)]

Now more than ever our armed forces need to know that we are supporting them. Will the Secretary of State ensure that soldiers currently serving in Afghanistan will not be made redundant as part of the latest tranche of armed forces job cuts?

[Mr Hague]

Yes. Soldiers will not be made redundant while serving in Afghanistan or within six months of coming back from service in Afghanistan, as my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary has indicated.

[Robert Halfon (Harlow) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend set out the extent of Iranian influence in Afghanistan and the support that Iran is giving to the insurgents?

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend is assiduous in pointing out the malign influence of Iran on its neighbours in several directions. We are concerned about that in Syria at the moment, but it also applies to Afghanistan. There have been clear incidents of practical Iranian support for insurgent activity. We absolutely deplore that. Afghanistan will succeed most effectively if it is free of such influence. We have made that point to the Government of Afghanistan.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Withdrawal in contact with an enemy is most difficult and delicate, and must be extremely well planned. I am mindful that when we went into Helmand in 2006, we had difficulties and stirred up a hornets’ nest. It is possible that the same will happen as we withdraw. I ask the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary to ensure that the generals who are planning our withdrawal are meticulous about the withdrawal plan, so that we minimise the casualties. I hope that there will be none.

[Mr Hague]

Of course my hon. Friend is quite right, and my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary, myself and the whole National Security Council will certainly be very conscious of that. Of course, in this case it is not the withdrawal of all forces that is ensuring that there is space for political and economic development in Afghanistan, since the Afghan national security forces are being built up all the time. That is different from a complete withdrawal, but of course we will be very conscious of his point.

The upside of saying that we will have come to a certain point by 2014 is that it concentrates the minds of all others concerned. Our experience is that when we say to the Afghans that they will take security responsibility in a particular town or province on such a date, it is a forcing mechanism to encourage them to organise themselves to take that responsibility. We have to ensure that it has the same beneficial effect across the country.

[Stephen Gilbert (St Austell and Newquay) (LD)]

Having recently visited Afghanistan, I know that one of the key issues in the transfer of security responsibility to the ANSF is the alarmingly high churn of up to 30% in individual Afghan national army units. What plans does the Foreign Secretary have to address that, for example by ensuring that better leave arrangements are in place for ANA service personnel?

[Mr Hague]

This is still an issue. The attrition rates among the Afghan national army are still too high. The average is 2.6% a month across the army, so let us get it in perspective, but it is still higher than we would like it to be. The target is 1.5%. Afghan national police attrition rates have come down to more or less the 1.5% target, but they are nevertheless still too high. They show the importance of the better training arrangements that are now in place. Better pension arrangements are also being introduced, so a range of measures are being brought forward to deal with that very problem.

Somalia

Lord Hague of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the matter of how to build a stable and peaceful Somalia.

At the encouragement of Mr Speaker I shall say a word about the Maldives, at the other end of the Indian ocean, before I turn to Somalia. I know that some hon. Members have been asking about it, and I am assured by Mr Speaker that I ought to address it since there have been developments there this week and it has not been possible for colleagues to ask questions.

I wish to register our concern about developments in the Maldives, in particular the reports of attacks on members and supporters of the Maldivian Democratic party. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), who is responsible for the middle east, has spoken to both former President Nasheed and the new President and expressed those concerns. It is for the new leadership to establish its legitimacy with its own people and the international community, with an independent review, we hope, of the circumstances that led to what happened earlier this week. We hope that it will demonstrate its respect for the rule of law, including peaceful demonstrations. I welcome the call for calm and order made by former President Nasheed to all his supporters. My hon. Friend will be delighted to discuss with hon. Members the situation in the Maldives, with which he is in close touch, if they wish.

As the House will well know, Somalia today is not stable or peaceful, and that is the matter that we are going to consider today. It presents the most acute symptoms of state failure seen anywhere on the globe, even relative to Afghanistan, which we have just been discussing. It has had no properly functioning central Government for 20 years now, and it is the scene of some of the worst humanitarian suffering that the modern world has known. I will say more about that shortly, but I start with the single heart-rending, staggering and deplorable fact that between 50,000 and 100,000 people starved to death in Somalia last year, half of them children. Somalia’s problems present a growing threat to its own people, its neighbours and the security of Britain and our allies around the world.

[Alun Michael (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

What the Foreign Secretary says about the situation in Somalia is absolutely true, and his interest in it is greatly appreciated not only in this country but, I am sure, worldwide. Will he take the opportunity to clarify the situation with regard to Somaliland, about which there is sometimes misunderstanding? As he said, there has been no effective central Government in the former Somalia for more than 20 years, but there has been a very effective Government in Somaliland, albeit that it has not been recognised as a separate state. Will he take the opportunity to acknowledge that difference between the situation in the north and the south?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

Yes, of course. The right hon. Gentleman has been a great expert on, and friend of, Somaliland for a long time, and we can indeed make that distinction. I spoke to the President of Somaliland last week to encourage him to come to the London conference, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development has visited Somaliland. We give it a lot of assistance in many ways and welcome the fact that it has become a more stable area within Somalia, and we will welcome its participation at the London conference. I will come back to Somaliland later. I have been giving a general introduction to Somalia as a whole, but the right hon. Gentleman is certainly right to make that distinction.

Somalia as a whole not only cries out for compassion but is a point of great weakness in the long-term security and prosperity of the wider world. The people of Somalia deserve their country to be more stable and peaceful, and we in this country need it to be so. For reasons of national interest and our common humanity, we need to help Somalia get on its feet. We need to do so to reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attacks, to maintain the free flow of trade on which our economy depends, to limit our exposure to the effects of uncontrolled migration, to increase the support that we can give to education and economic development in Somalia and to support the stability of a part of Africa where our country has a great many interests and our nationals have been shown to be vulnerable.

Nearly $1 trillion of trade to and from Europe travelled through the gulf of Aden last year. Some 20,000 British nationals live next door to Somalia in Kenya, and a further 200,000 travel there every year. They would be deeply affected if the violence in Somalia spread to its neighbours.

All those interests are undoubtedly threatened by many factors in Somalia, including piracy and terrorism. The House will be familiar with many of the risks, so I will not list them in detail, but just one aspect of the crisis in Somalia brings home the problem dramatically. Large parts of south central Somalia are still controlled by the group known as al-Shabaab, which until recently occupied Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab has publicly declared sympathy for al-Qaeda’s aims and methods, and elements of its leadership welcome foreign fighters and sympathisers from around the world who have swelled its ranks and coffers and used Somalia as a base for terrorism.

Attack planning linked to extremist networks in Somalia has been thwarted from Sweden to Australia, and the Kampala bombings of July 2010, which killed 74 people, were planned and executed by individuals with links to Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s violent tactics inflict suffering on Somalis, including through its known forced recruitment of children, and its embrace of al-Qaeda imposes a concept of global jihad and violent extremism that is alien to most Somalis, highly damaging to their country and dangerous to us.

In the face of such threats, our Government contend, as did the previous Government, that we do not have the option of disengaging from the problems of Somalia. We cannot afford simply to continue to treat the symptoms of those problems without addressing the underlying causes such as the fundamental lack of governance and security across most of Somalia. We believe that a stronger and more united international approach is needed if we are to achieve a stable and peaceful Somalia over time that combines political will with practical measures to boost security and development. We also judge that recent positive developments in Somalia mean that the time is right for a new international effort. This moment of opportunity is why, in two weeks’ time, we will host the London conference on Somalia, bringing together 50 countries and organisations.

[Tony Cunningham (Workington) (Lab)]

I very much welcome the conference on Somalia, but is there a danger that the country’s humanitarian needs will be sidelined if there is too much emphasis on political and security concerns?

[Mr Hague]

There would be such a danger if we constructed the conference in the wrong way. I am talking about security concerns, but the UK makes a huge contribution to addressing humanitarian concerns —we were the second-largest bilateral donor in the recent humanitarian crisis. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development will host, alongside the conference, an event to discuss humanitarian needs. As I will describe, one of the conclusions that we hope for from the conference is to highlight those humanitarian needs.

This is about much more than security, as I will describe.

[Laura Sandys (South Thanet) (Con)]

I very much welcome the conference in London, but how will it differ from the one that is being held in Turkey? What are the differences between the objectives of the Turkish conference and the UK-based one?

[Mr Hague]

They will be integrated. I have discussed that a couple of times with my Turkish counterpart. In recognition of our conference in February, the Turks have moved their conference back a little to later in the year. Both Turkey and the UK hope that that will follow on from the progress we make in London. The conference in London is largely at Head of State level—it will be hosted by the Prime Minister, and many Heads of State and Heads of Government will be coming—and will address the whole range of issues affecting Somalia. It is therefore one of the most ambitious conferences that has been held internationally on Somalia. I believe it will help to establish momentum for all the conferences that will follow, including the one in Istanbul.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary for giving way on that point and I welcome the conference and all discussions that take place on Somalia. It is past time that there was detailed involvement. Can he envisage a day when a conference on the future of Somalia will be held in Somalia, which would show real movement and a real advance?

[Mr Hague]

I can envisage that day, but we are not there yet. As the right hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Alun Michael) said, there are stable areas in Somalia and some stable regional and local Governments. Based on what I saw on my visit last week, I would not say that the conditions are right to hold an international conference there yet, but the improvement has been great in the last year—I could not have visited at all a year ago. I can envisage that time if we do all the things that I shall describe.

It is because of that moment of opportunity that I mentioned that we have appointed a new ambassador to Somalia for the first time since 1991—I took him to present his credentials to the President of Somalia last week—and we are working to reopen our embassy in Mogadishu. All of that is consistent with our interests in Somalia and the increased emphasis that we place on conflict prevention as a priority in British foreign policy.

We do not take on that task lightly or without humility. The international community has not succeeded in turning Somalia around, but that is not for a lack of effort by other Governments and this one in recent years. We supported the important initiatives of the previous Labour Government, but we have not succeeded so far largely because the problems are so vast and complex, and because international policy is fragmented.

We must always be clear-sighted and realistic in setting our expectations for what we can achieve. We cannot transform any of Somalia’s problems overnight or impose a political solution on it. Britain cannot achieve any of the goals I am discussing without working with a broad range of countries across the world and Somalis themselves, but we can aim for the long-term goal of a Somalia that is more stable; that is able to meet the basic needs of its population; that can begin to build its economy with international support; that is able to govern its territory; and that can work with us to prevent terrorism flourishing on its soil. To do that we must try to change the dynamic in Somalia, from the trends of recent years of inexorable decline to an upwards trajectory of gradually increasing stability and security.

To achieve even that is an immense challenge. Our recent experiences of rebuilding states after conflict are that the international community has a tendency to set unrealistic goals that are not fulfilled, disappointing the expectations of the people we are trying to help and weakening the impact of our efforts. We must not make the same mistake with Somalia. We have a responsibility to match ambition with resources, our expectations with a good understanding of realities, and our hopes for quick results with the likely need for patient and long-term engagement.

Somalia today is a nation still at war with itself and without a sustainable peace. Its conflict has taken many forms over the past 20 years, from clan-based regional insurgencies, which overthrew the ruling regime in 1991, through warlordism, to the current violent insurgency of al-Shabaab. There have been 14 peace processes in that time, culminating in the current UN-led Djibouti peace process. Somalia’s problems are compounded and fuelled by geography, such as the fact that it has the longest coastline in Africa—it is more than 3,000 km long—and yet has no functioning coastguard or navy.

The scale of the human suffering is unimaginable and the number of victims so large as to be hard to fathom by people in this country. To put it in terms that would hit home here in Britain, more people in Somalia are dependent on emergency assistance than the entire populations of Edinburgh, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds and Liverpool put together; the number of people displaced in Somalia is seven times the population of Nottingham; and the average life expectancy in the 21st century is 48, which is roughly the same as life expectancy in Britain in 1880. An entire generation of children in Somalia has grown up with guns, not school books, knowing nothing other than insecurity and deprivation.

Even against that sober background, however, we can see a glimmer of hope for Somalia today. There are three compelling reasons why the time is right for a major push on Somalia, the first of which is that Mogadishu has been liberated by African Union Mission in Somalia forces, thanks to the skill and courage of the Ugandan and Burundian troops that form the backbone of the African Union contingent in Somalia. I saw that myself when I visited Mogadishu a week ago today. It was encouraging to see people going to the shops and markets. The road to the airport was crowded and some were looking forward to going to the beach on Friday. Those are semblances of normal life compared with what they have experienced in the past few years.

Nevertheless, it is hard to see many buildings that have no bullet holes in them, or that are not scarred by the effect of war. Today, almost all of Mogadishu is controlled by AMISOM and the transitional federal Government forces, and other regions are more stable, making it possible to make progress on Somali governance. Djibouti has sent troops further to strengthen AMISOM, and Sierra Leone is expected to provide a battalion in July, making further progress a possibility.

The second reason for optimism is that those operations and successful counter-terrorism work are putting pressure on al-Shabaab. We need to seize the opportunity to intensify that pressure and not allow al-Shabaab to regroup. Its guerrilla tactics inflict huge suffering on ordinary Somalis and it harbours foreign extremists, as I have described.

Related to that, the international community has made progress in diminishing the pirate activity that is a symptom of, and contributor to, Somalia’s conflict. There have been no successful hijacks in the gulf of Aden since November 2010. The number of vessels and crews currently held by pirate groups is at its lowest since 2009. Twenty-two ships were hijacked off the coast of Somalia between November 2010 and January 2011, but in the same period in the past year only two ships were hijacked.

The third reason for optimism is that there is an opportunity to create a broader and more representative political arrangement when the transitional federal Government’s mandate expires this summer. That gives an opening to launch a broader political process that embraces all Somalis, and that places emphasis on supporting regional governance as well as better and more representative government from the centre.

I pay tribute to the Governments and parties that have played a part in bringing that about; to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development, who has made two visits to Somalia this year; and to staff from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development, who have all played an important role.

Those changes on the ground give the international community a window of opportunity to unite behind a clear strategy; to support a new political process that has greater legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali people than the current elite does; to help people to return to Mogadishu and rebuild their lives there; to strengthen the African Union forces in Somalia; to put in place a plan to build up Somalia’s own security and justice sectors; to introduce more effective arrangements to tackle piracy and terrorism; and to work better to support the pockets of stability that are now emerging in parts of the country.

That is what the Somalia conference will aim to do. We have invited Government and multilateral organisations that are active and influential on Somalia; representatives from Somalia, including the transitional federal institutions; the Presidents of Puntland and Galmudug; and representatives of Aluh Sunnah wal Jamaah. We welcome the participation of the President of Somaliland, with the experience that Somaliland can provide of peacebuilding in the region.

We have secured senior attendance from the region, including from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, as well as from the United States, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Sweden, the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union. I am delighted to say that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will attend the conference.

We hope to agree practical measures in seven key areas, all of which I discussed on my visit to Mogadishu and Kenya last week, and which are the subject of extensive discussion with our partners all around the world ahead of the conference.

On the political track, the current transitional institutions in Mogadishu run out in August. They must not be extended. The Somali political process must become broader and more representative. That might involve a constitutional assembly drawn from all of Somalia’s communities.

On security, African Union forces have pushed al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu to create political space there, and Kenyan action has put al-Shabaab on the back foot. However, African forces have insufficient funding for UN Security Council-mandated actions. We therefore hope that the conference will consider how funding can be made sustainable for African troops willing to put their lives on the line.

The success stories in Somalia are in the regions. Puntland and Galmudug have established local peace deals and set up administrations. The conference should agree a co-ordinated international package of support to Somalia’s regions that complements work on peace and stability at the national level.

Piracy off the Somali coast is the affront to the rule of international law that I described. We must break the piracy business cycle. We hope the conference will strengthen arrangements to catch, try and imprison pirates, and continue to develop regional maritime capacity in Somalia and across the region.

[Tony Baldry (Banbury) (Con)]

As one knows from the UN court in Sierra Leone, imprisoning people is quite expensive. Does my right hon. Friend or DFID have any suggestions for how the international community can ensure that sufficient prisons are built to hold these pirates and make sure they do not disappear? Secondly, and related to that, one argument put forward to explain this piracy is that too many of the fisheries have been taken. What can we do to enhance fisheries protection off Somalia?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

The United Kingdom is very active on the provision of increased prison places in the country and the region. The Department for International Development is helping to fund the construction of three prisons; in fact, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development has been to see the construction of one of them, so we are involved in that.

My hon. Friend is right about the fishing issue. The Minister for Africa—the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham)—and I have been engaged in encouraging the transitional federal Government in Mogadishu to claim their exclusive economic zone, and we will encourage their successors do the same, because that will give them the necessary rights to the waters off Somalia. They will, of course, then need a coastguard, naval and maritime capability of some kind to enforce those rights, but, as I mentioned earlier, that is one of the issues we also want to address. These things are therefore part of the longer-term solution to piracy, and my hon. Friend is quite right to ask about them.

I was just listing some of the aims of our conference. We intend to make it harder for terrorists to operate in and out of Somalia. We hope the conference will agree the areas we need to develop to disrupt terrorism across the region, including stopping the movement of terrorists to and from Somalia, disrupting the flow of their finances and supporting the Somali criminal justice sector so that it can detain and prosecute terrorists in a human rights-compliant manner.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

There are disturbing reports that about 50 British nationals are involved with al-Shabaab. Has my right hon. Friend heard such reports, and are they justified?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, they are justified. It would, of course, be difficult to put a precise number on these things, but we are concerned about foreign fighters, in general, going to Somalia, and there is certainly evidence that they include British fighters. Wherever that occurs, and wherever we are aware of it, we work in various ways with the authorities in the region, including in neighbouring countries, and with the emerging authorities in Somalia to try to contain that threat. That is why the defeat of terrorism in the area is an important national objective for the United Kingdom.

On the humanitarian front, the conference provides an opportunity to highlight the need for donors to continue to respond generously and on the basis of needs, to invest more in livelihoods and basic social services, to increase the resilience of households in Somalia to future economic shocks and to help reduce the likelihood of future famines.

We want London to be the start, not the end, of a new process—the process I have described. We want the conference to agree on how we handle Somali issues in future, on a revitalised international contact group, on UN and African leadership and on more countries deploying diplomats and staff into Somalia, not just basing themselves in Kenya, as many, including ourselves, have had to do in recent years. Those are all practical but meaningful steps that will have an impact on the ground.

We hope to emerge from the London conference with a stronger common understanding of the way forward and a renewed political commitment for the long haul. Beyond the conference itself, we will continue to be an active member of international groups on Somalia, including the international contact group on Somalia and the contact group on piracy off the coast of Somalia, and we will maintain our strong bilateral engagement.

Through the Department for International Development, Britain is providing substantial development support over the next four years, working on longer-term programmes to address the underlying causes of poverty and conflict and helping Somalis to take control of their lives and rebuild their communities and livelihoods. That involves working with local and regional governments in areas such as Puntland, which the Development Secretary visited last month, where we will help build democratic institutions that can respond to the needs of their citizens, help the police and justice systems work so that people can feel more secure, and increase access to health care, education and jobs, which are absolutely critical to Somalis and to breaking the cycle of piracy.

[Rushanara Ali (Bethnal Green and Bow) (Lab)]

Will the conference look at giving people in Somalia access to humanitarian aid, which has been blocked by al-Shabaab? One million people were being supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross and others. Secondly, what steps have been taken to involve and engage the British Somali diaspora, which has many members in my constituency and elsewhere, as part of the discussions and the build-up to the conference?

[Mr Hague]

Humanitarian access is a critical issue that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development has pursued for a long time. Part of our objective in doing most of the things I have described is to improve humanitarian access and the ability to encourage sound development across parts of Somalia, including those that are currently under the control of al-Shabaab.

The diaspora in this country has an important role to play. Yesterday, Chatham House held an excellent conference with many leading figures from the Somali diaspora in the United Kingdom. I spoke to the conference to set out the objectives of the London conference in two weeks’ time, and my hon. Friend the Minister for Africa spent many hours there. The views expressed at the conference are now being fed into our preparations for the London conference. We look to Somalis in this country to assist as actively as they can with engagement with Somalia. Somalia is partly dependent on the remittances it receives from the diaspora overseas; in fact, those remittances amount to more than $1 billion a year, which is more than the total assistance from foreign Governments. The diaspora therefore plays a crucial role in the future of its country, and we recognise that in the preparations we are making for the conference.

We want to help ensure that last year’s tragic humanitarian crisis is never repeated. Britain has been one of the most generous donors to the relief effort, having provided £128 million to the relief effort across the horn of Africa since July, including £57 million for Somalia alone, in addition to our main development programme and on top of the £72 million raised by the Disasters Emergency Committee from concerned people in this country. British aid has reached more than 1 million vulnerable people, saved the lives of thousands and contributed to lifting 750,000 people out of famine and the risk of imminent death.

We are proud of the role that we play and the example we set to others. The UK also contributes 14% of all European Union spending in and on Somalia, including on development and humanitarian aid, and we actively support all three international naval operations in the waters around Somalia, including by providing the operational commander and the headquarters in Northwood near London for the EU naval mission Operation Atalanta. All that work will continue beyond the London conference on Somalia, because it is only through such a sustained and co-ordinated effort that we can play our part in helping to build a stable and peaceful Somalia.

That will be the Government’s approach. We will pursue a policy that is realistic, based on our national interests as well as our international obligations, conscious of the enormity of the problems and aware that only Somalis can resolve their political differences. It is a policy based on partnership with other nations, because it is only by working with others that we can address the scale and international dimensions of the conflict in Somalia, and it is a policy that is broad and comprehensive, that recognises that it is not enough to treat the symptoms of the problem without addressing its underlying causes, and that encompasses development, human security and the rule of law, human rights and political participation, as well as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. That is the approach that we will urge the international community to maintain, through the London conference, and which I hope will have the full support of the House.

UK-Afghanistan Enduring Strategic Partnership

Lord Hague of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2012 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

I wish to inform the House that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is today publishing the Enduring Strategic Partnership document between the UK and Afghanistan which was signed by the Prime Minister and President Karzai on 28 January, 2012.

The Enduring Strategic Partnership signals our shared vision of a secure, stable and prosperous Afghanistan able to maintain its own security and prevent the country from again being used as a safe haven for international terrorists

Building on the strong message from the Bonn conference last year of the international community’s commitment to Afghanistan post-2014, the Enduring Strategic Partnership demonstrates our long-term partnership with Afghanistan.

The document reaffirms both countries’ commitment to continuing partnership and friendship. It makes clear that we will have a wide-ranging relationship with Afghanistan which will continue beyond transition and the drawdown of international combat troops.

The partnership sets out our agreement to co-operate on political dialogue, security, governance and rule of law, economic and social development, and cultural links.

I am placing the document in the Library of the House. It will also be published on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website (www.fco.gov.uk).

Syria

Lord Hague of Richmond Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

With permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement on Syria. The whole House will be appalled by the bloodshed and repression in Syria, which continues at this very moment. Over the last 11 months, more than 6,000 people have been killed. The Syrian regime has deployed snipers, tanks, artillery and mortars against civilian protestors and population centres, particularly in the cities of Homs, Idlib, Hama and Deraa. Thousands of Syrians have endured imprisonment, torture and sexual violence, including instances of the alleged rape of children, and the humanitarian position is deteriorating. It is an utterly unacceptable situation that demands a united international response.

Last Tuesday I attended the UN Security Council debate in New York, along with Secretary Clinton, the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé and other Ministers. We all spoke in strong support of a draft UN Security Council resolution proposed by the Kingdom of Morocco on behalf of the Arab League. The resolution called for the implementation of the Arab League plan to stop all violence in Syria from all sides and to begin a political transition.

There was nothing in this draft resolution that could not be supported by any country seeking a peaceful end to the tragedy unfolding in Syria. It demanded an end to all violence, called for a Syrian-led political process to allow the Syrians to determine their future, and set out a path to a national unity Government and internationally supervised elections. It did not call for military intervention, and could not have been used to authorise any such action under any circumstances. It did not impose sanctions. It proposed putting the weight and authority of the United Nations Security Council behind a plan to achieve a lasting and sustainable peace in Syria.

As I said at the Security Council, it was the Arab League’s plan, not one imposed by western nations. It was co-sponsored by nations including Turkey, Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Oman. Their leadership, and their strong understanding of their region, deserve our support. I pay particular tribute to the secretary-general of the Arab League and to the Prime Minister of Qatar, who travelled to New York to brief the Council and played a vital role in the extensive negotiations that followed.

On Saturday the resolution was put to the vote. Thirteen of the 15 members of the United Nations Security Council voted in favour. Two did not: Russia and China both exercised their veto, despite extensive efforts to amend the draft resolution to address Russia’s specific concerns, and in the face of repeated appeals from Arab nations. Instead they chose to side with the Syrian regime and, implicitly, to leave the door open to further abuses. They did so while President Assad’s tanks were encircling Homs and shells were pounding the homes of Syrian civilians, killing up to 200 people, and on the 30th anniversary of the massacre in Hama.

We regard the veto as a grave error of judgment by the Governments of China and Russia. There is no need to mince words. Russia and China have twice vetoed reasonable and necessary action by the United Nations Security Council. Such vetoes are a betrayal of the Syrian people. In deploying them, China and Russia have let down the Arab League, increased the likelihood of what they wish to avoid in Syria—civil war—and placed themselves on the wrong side of Arab and international opinion.

By contrast, I thank the other members of the Security Council for the principled stand that they took, particularly the non-permanent members: Morocco, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Germany, Guatemala, India, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa and Togo, all of which voted in favour of the resolution. Pakistan’s representative to the council spoke for all of us when he said:

“This resolution should not die; by being active and engaged, we should give hope to those who are expecting it from us”.

The Syrian regime might have drawn comfort from events at the UN Security Council, but we will do everything we can to make sure that that comfort is short-lived. It is a doomed regime as well as a murdering one. There is no way for it to recover its credibility, internationally or with its own people.

The UN Security Council’s failure to agree a resolution does not signal the end of our efforts to end the violence in Syria. I will set out how we will now proceed. First, we will continue our strong support for the Arab League. Earlier this afternoon I spoke to the secretary-general of the Arab League, Nabil El Araby, as well as the Foreign Minister of Jordan. I welcomed and encouraged the proposal to appoint a special envoy of the Arab League, and I commended the Arab League’s leadership and action so far.

Arab Foreign Ministers will meet this weekend to consider their options. The secretary-general was clear about the urgency of the situation, the Arab world’s continued determination to act, and the need to step up their efforts. I told him that the Arab League would have our complete support.

Secondly, we will seek to widen the international coalition of nations seeking a peaceful and lasting resolution in Syria. We welcome the concept of a new Arab-led group of Friends of Syria, which I discussed with the Prime Minister of Qatar last Tuesday in New York. The aim of such a group will be to demonstrate the strength of international support for the people of Syria and their legitimate demands, to co-ordinate intensified diplomatic and economic pressure on the regime, and to engage with Syrian opposition groups committed to a democratic future for the country. Britain will be a highly active member in setting up such a group with the broadest possible international support.

Thirdly, we will intensify our contact with members of the Syrian opposition. The House will recall that in November I appointed Frances Guy as an ambassador-level envoy to lead our discussions with them. We will continue to urge the Syrian opposition to come together and to agree a common statement of commitment to democracy, human rights and the protection of all Syria’s minorities.

Fourthly, we will maintain our strong focus at the United Nations, undeterred by Saturday’s vote, and we will continue to raise the situation in Syria at the UN Security Council. We will consider with other nations a resolution of the UN General Assembly, and, despite our disagreement with Russia and China, we will continue to discuss with them any possibility of an agreed but meaningful way forward.

Fifthly, we will increase pressure through the European Union, following the discussions that I had in New York with Ministers from France, Portugal and Germany. We have already agreed 11 rounds of EU sanctions, and will hope to agree further measures at the Foreign Affairs Council on 27 February.

Sixthly, we will work with others to ensure that those responsible for crimes in Syria are held to account. At the UN Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva in March we will work to ensure the strongest possible mandate to scrutinise human rights violations in Syria, so that those responsible know that there will be a day of reckoning and that they will be held to account.

Seventhly, we will use our remaining channels to the Syrian regime to make clear our abhorrence of violence that is utterly unacceptable to the civilised world. The Syrian ambassador to London was today summoned to the Foreign Office to receive this message. Despite our deteriorating relations with the Syrian Government, we remain committed to ensuring the safety of its embassy and staff in London, and we expect the Syrian authorities to provide the same protection to our embassy in Damascus.

In parallel, I have today recalled to London our ambassador from Damascus for consultations. He and his team work in extremely difficult conditions to ensure that we have an accurate picture of what is happening in Syria. I hope that the House will join me in paying full tribute to them and their families. Their safety and security is always prominent in our considerations.

The human suffering in Syria is already unimaginable, and is in grave danger of escalating further. The position taken by Russia and China has, regrettably, made this more likely, but the Government, the House, our country and our allies will not forget the people of Syria. We will redouble our efforts to put pressure on this appalling regime and to stop this indefensible violence.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I welcome this opportunity for the House to discuss the situation in Syria, and I am grateful that the Foreign Secretary agreed to make a statement this afternoon. It was made in the dark shadow of the brutal slaughter continuing even today, with news of scores more people murdered in Homs in the last 24 hours alone.

Let us all be clear that responsibility for the deaths of these innocent people lies at the door of President Assad and his murderous regime. There is clear agreement across the House and much of the international community that the regime has no future, and that Assad must go. The tragedy is that, notwithstanding that fact, the slaughter continues. For the international community, condemnation is not enough; comprehensive diplomatic efforts are required, which is why the recent failure to reach agreement in the Security Council, of which the Foreign Secretary has just spoken, is such a stain on the conscience of the world. I therefore welcome the points that he made setting out the next steps that the British Government will take to seek to resolve this grave crisis.

I have not, in recent days, made any criticism of the Government over their actions to date, and I will not do so in this response. Rather, in a spirit of shared abhorrence and determination, I want to ask the Foreign Secretary a few questions. I share his disappointment at the stance taken by Russia and China. Will he set out more fully to the House what steps are now being taken to convince them of the need for international consensus? In particular, will he tell the House what conversations he has had with Sergei Lavrov since the Security Council vote? In advance of the Russian Foreign Minister’s meeting in Damascus tomorrow with President Assad, has the Foreign Secretary sought or received any assurances that in that meeting the Russian Foreign Minister will at least reflect the wider will of the international community that Assad must go?

I welcome the emphasis that the Foreign Secretary has placed on the work of the Arab League in this crisis, and the prospect of a special envoy being appointed, and indeed a Friends of Syria Group being established. Will he now press for a joint Arab League-European Union summit to be held in the weeks ahead, in order to co-ordinate best the vital steps that now need to be taken? Can the Foreign Secretary give any more information about the level of ambition he is aiming for at the meeting on 27 February, where possible further sanctions will be discussed? Separately, will he inform the House how recently he has spoken to his Turkish counterpart about the steps that Turkey could—and we hope would—be taking to increase further peaceful pressure on Assad?

In his statement, the Foreign Secretary mentioned the human suffering now being endured in Syria. There are reports of even more people fleeing across the borders of Syria into neighbouring countries, and refugee camps set up along the borders are struggling to meet the increasing demands. Can the Foreign Secretary say what conversations he has held with the Secretary of State for International Development on this matter, and confirm to the House who in Government is leading on the humanitarian response to the crisis? Have the Government requested a meeting of the Council of EU Development Ministers to ensure a co-ordinated response to the growing threat of a full-blown humanitarian crisis?

I wrote to the Foreign Secretary at the weekend about the attack on the Syrian embassy in London. While we share an undoubted revulsion at the present actions of the Assad regime, I am sure that the Government would agree that the protection of foreign embassies on our soil is a basic principle of international law that must be upheld. Let me take this opportunity to praise the bravery of the officers on duty outside the Syrian embassy this weekend. Our thoughts are with the family and friends of the officers who were hospitalised. We wish them a speedy recovery. Will the Foreign Secretary outline what discussions took place between him, the Home Secretary and the Metropolitan police ahead of 3 February about protecting the Syrian embassy, in the light of reports of expected protests and attack? Were any specific measures taken or contingency plans put in place, in the light of the reports of Syrian opposition forces calling on Syrians living abroad to protest outside their embassies?

Shortly before today’s statement, word reached us that the US had closed its embassy in Damascus and withdrawn all diplomatic staff from Syria. The Foreign Secretary made it clear in his statement that our ambassador in Damascus had been recalled for talks. Will he outline to the House what the British Government’s assessment is of the utility of the existing diplomatic channels, in the light of the continuing violence?

We welcome the steps that the Government have already taken to try to increase the pressure on, and deepen the isolation of, President Assad and the Syrian authorities. However, I fear that this weekend’s Security Council veto has been taken as a green light for sustained slaughter by the Assad regime. That is why efforts must now be redoubled to end the violence and bring a peaceful resolution to the past 11 months of bloodshed.

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who has referred, rightly, to the bloodshed over the last 24 hours and the agreement that exists across the House—and, indeed, across so much of the international community—that the regime in Syria has no future. He has spoken, as I have, of the need for comprehensive diplomatic efforts. He has no criticism of what the Government have done so far, and obviously I am grateful for that.

The right hon. Gentleman asked whether there should be an EU-Arab League summit. That is indeed one of the possibilities for bringing together a wider group of nations to address the crisis, but I think it would be preferable to have a meeting that went beyond the European Union and the Arab League, as there are also African nations that have been supportive at the Security Council, as well as Latin American nations. It is therefore probably best to have as inclusive an international gathering and group as possible, going beyond Europe and the Arab world. That would be my preference, and we are in discussion with the Arab League and others about that.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the level of ambition for the EU meeting on 27 February. Most of the measures that we can take in relation to Syria we have now taken. We have had 11 rounds of sanctions, including a complete oil embargo, which we introduced some months ago. We have placed sanctions on well over 100 individuals and entities. There will be further tightening up of the sanctions that we can introduce, but I stress that most of the sanctions that we can introduce we already have introduced. I do not want to exaggerate what we will be able to do on 27 February,

The right hon. Gentleman asked about contact with some of the other Foreign Ministers whom I did not mention in my statement. I have very regular consultations with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, about this matter. Last Tuesday I spoke to him from New York while I was there; that was my most recent consultation with him. Turkey was a co-sponsor of the resolution, and I expect it to be a very active participant in the new informal international grouping that we expect to be formed.

As for the steps to be taken with Russia and China, we have daily conversations with them at the Security Council, and I have had many discussions with my Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, about the situation in Syria. Although I will not have spoken to him between the Security Council vote and his visit tomorrow, I shall want to speak to him after his visit. He has been speaking to the secretary-general of the Arab League, so I am well in touch with what he has in mind for his visit, but clearly the Russians are on a different track here from the rest of us, so it has been difficult to work with them on such contacts with Syria. My right hon. Friend the International Development Secretary gives regular attention to the matter, and Britain has contributed funds to the International Committee of the Red Cross to help people who have been displaced. My right hon. Friend is, of course, ready to work with other countries on any further developments in that regard.

The right hon. Gentleman correctly praised the Metropolitan police, who have been involved in protecting the Syrian embassy. There are regular meetings, including a monthly review meeting between the Home Office and the Foreign Office, on the protection of all embassies. There are well-laid contingency plans in the case of the Syrian embassy, which were put into operation this weekend. There were about 150 protesters there on Saturday, three of whom, by climbing up scaffolding, managed to enter a first-floor window of the embassy. The police presence was further reinforced, and has continued. It will be reviewed today, but I think that the police did a very good job in protecting the embassy, and the normal channels between the Foreign Office and the Home Office are working well.

The right hon. Gentleman asked for an assessment of the utility of our diplomatic channels. I was discussing that with our ambassador in Damascus on the phone just before I came into the Chamber. He has heard—as the House will have heard—the announcement that the American embassy has been closed. We have been aware for some days that it would close today. That was done primarily on security grounds. Our embassy premises are in a different situation, and their security is slightly easier to maintain. We will review all options. As I have said, we have recalled our ambassador, and clearly we are doing that so that we can review all options.

I should prefer us to act in concert with a wide number of other nations if we make a further change to our diplomatic relations with Syria, so we will stay close to our partners in the Arab world and the European Union. I am not ruling anything out, but the House will understand that there are advantages in maintaining an embassy for as long as we can, such as being able to understand the situation on the ground, being able to discuss the situation with a variety of people in Syria, and being able to impress on some members of the regime the gravity of the situation that they have got themselves into. I am not, at the moment, announcing any closure of our embassy, but we will keep the position under close review.

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

I am certain that the Foreign Secretary needs no point of information from me, but may I nevertheless urge him to bear these facts in mind? Inside Syria—which, as he knows very well, contains an immensely complex ethnic and religious group of people—there has lived for many generations a large Christian community, now estimated to number over 350,000. Its archbishop has publicly said that if the present regime is overthrown and replaced —as it almost certainly would be—by a regime of a different denomination, that community might suffer catastrophe, as the Christian community in Iraq did after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

[Mr Hague]

I cannot imagine ever not needing a point of information from my right hon. Friend. He has a deep knowledge of the region, and he is right to point out that there remains a thriving Christian presence in Syria. We have to consider the fact that the regime there is now doomed, one way or the other. It is a question not of whether, but of how and when, it will fall. That highlights the importance of our work with the Syrian opposition. I have met two opposition groups, and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt) has had many meetings with them. We have impressed on them that if they are to form a future Government in Syria, they must recognise the importance of the protection of minorities, including Christians. We need to look to a future Government to give that protection, as this regime has no future.

[Tony Lloyd (Manchester Central) (Lab)]

During the course of the Foreign Secretary’s conversations in New York, was the subject of the International Criminal Court raised? I understand that it is still necessary to give the present regime an exit strategy, but its crimes now warrant that level of legal sanction.

[Mr Hague]

They are very serious crimes, and that is a wholly legitimate question. The hon. Gentleman will know, however, that when a country is not a signatory to the International Criminal Court—as Syria is not—the United Nations Security Council must put forward a reference to the prosecutor of the ICC. Given the difficulties of passing the moderate and sensible plan put forward by the Arab League, it will be even more difficult—indeed, currently impossible—to pass a resolution seeking a reference to the court. That is why I explained in my statement that we will make strong representations at the meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council, where we will press for the appointment of a special rapporteur and the establishment of special investigations into the human rights situation in Syria, as an alternative track.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Will the Foreign Secretary consider speaking to the Russian Foreign Minister before Mr Lavrov goes to Damascus tomorrow, and reminding him of the serious damage that Russia is doing to its own long-term interests in the middle east? If he does speak to him, will he draw to his attention the statement that has been put out by the opposition Syrian National Council today, in which it accuses Russia and China of being

“responsible for the escalating acts of killing”?

It goes on to say that their use of the veto in the Security Council was

“tantamount to a licence to kill with impunity”.

Will not Russia bear a heavy responsibility if Syria now descends into a bloody and protracted civil war?

[Mr Hague]

I think that that is true; I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. This is why I have used strong language of my own, at the weekend and in my statement today. I believe that the vetoes are a betrayal of the Syrian people: they make Russia and China increasingly responsible for the situation in Syria and for some of the slaughter that is taking place there. They must consider—on the basis of their own national interest, apart from anything else—whether it is a sensible policy to carry on in this way. They are turning their backs on the Arab world, which will reduce their influence in the middle east. It is my belief that they are backing a regime that is, as I have said, doomed in any case. As I said to the shadow Foreign Secretary, the Russians were left in no doubt of our well-expressed views after I had spoken to Mr Lavrov. They will also be conscious of the views being expressed in the House this afternoon.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

With journalists being murdered with impunity and elections being rigged, is not Russia rapidly turning itself into a pariah state, as the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) just said? Would this not be a good opportunity for the Conservative party, which sits in the same grouping as Mr Putin’s party in the European Council, to part company with that grouping?

[Mr Hague]

I do not think that I shall get into party matters during this Government statement. We emphatically disagree with Russia, and we are appalled at the veto in the Security Council. None the less, Russia is a member of the Security Council and it has a veto. We will therefore continue to discuss the way forward with Russia, just as we will with all other nations.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

Is it not clear that the exercise of the veto by any permanent member of the Security Council always comes at a cost? The shameful events of last Saturday will be no exception to this principle. In this case, is not the immediate cost being paid in the broken bodies of children wrapped in burial sheets and the anguish of their parents? My right hon. Friend clearly needs no urging about the urgency with which he should fulfil the objectives he has properly set out, but may I say that he is most well placed when he takes the view that there should be the widest possible coalition of the willing throughout the world—as, indeed, the vote in the Security Council emphasised—so that what the United Nations was unable to do might be achieved on a much broader basis through the maintenance of pressure on Syria?

[Mr Hague]

I absolutely agree with my right hon. and learned Friend, as he could gather from my earlier replies. This is why the international coalition should include nations well beyond Europe and the Arab world. I discussed the matter this morning, for instance, with the Foreign Minister of Australia, which is keen to be a participant. Across the Commonwealth as well as across the Arab and European communities, there will be a demand to be involved in that wide coalition. We will pursue that very energetically in the hours and days ahead.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

One country singularly absent from the Foreign Secretary’s statement was Iran. Will he say a little more about the extent to which he thinks the Assad regime feels supported and receives succour from the Iranians?

[Mr Hague]

The Assad regime certainly feels that. As we have discussed before, Iran has certainly given active support to the Syrian regime in the form of equipment as well as advice on how to deal with civil disorder and rebellion. There may be many other ways, of which we are unaware, in which the Iranian regime supports the Syrian regime. This is a classic piece of hypocrisy. The Iranians have supported revolution elsewhere in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia; they supported disorder in those countries, but they are against it in Syria. I think that the whole Arab world sees through that, which further widens the current widening separation between Iran and its Arab neighbours.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I share the Foreign Secretary’s approach and urge him to maintain the political, economic and diplomatic pressure that he has set out. The third step that he announced was that he would intensify contact with members of the Syrian opposition. Will he elaborate a little on that: is it on a multilateral or bilateral basis, and is there any limit to the level of resources that he is able to commit to helping that opposition in Syria?

[Mr Hague]

That is bilateral and multilateral. I have already mentioned some of the bilateral contact we have had and the fact that we have an ambassador-level representative dealing with the opposition. I also believe that one of the roles for the wider international coalition would be to meet the various groups of the Syrian opposition, which I think would be a catalyst for the opposition to propose their plans, to make clear commitments to a democratic future for their country and to set out their commitment to human rights and, indeed, the protection of minorities. It is also important for them to try to come together, since one of the challenges for the opposition is to develop a single platform and a single agreed body for taking forward their concerns. There is no limit on what resources we can provide. We have already provided training in the documentation of human rights abuses, in strategic communications and so forth. We may be able to do more in the future.

[Mr Denis MacShane (Rotherham) (Lab)]

The Foreign Secretary cannot be faulted in the handling of this crisis and, if I may say so, his Under-Secretary of State, the hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), was very impressive on the BBC yesterday. However, before we go down the road of arming the opposition, should we not recall what happened when the west armed the mujaheddin and they turned into the Taliban and al-Qaeda? More broadly, this is the fourth major intervention in a majority Muslim country—and Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya are not happy examples to follow. Do we not need a broader strategic approach to this region of crisis?

[Mr Hague]

Well, I think that is what we have. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for saying that he could not fault my colleague and me, although there was then a “but.” Let me reassure him further, therefore: we are not contemplating arming anybody. Indeed, one of the things we stressed in our meetings with the Syrian opposition was that they should remain peaceful. We have not been in contact with the Free Syrian Army, which is engaged in a different kind of struggle with the Syrian authorities. I would not classify this as an intervention, therefore. We are supporting the work of the Arab League, we are assembling the widest possible international coalition, and we are not calling for military action or intervention, so I think the right hon. Gentleman can be reassured and continue to be as effusively supportive as he was in the first part of his question.

[Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

I applaud the Foreign Secretary for the vigorous and energetic way in which he and his colleagues are attempting to deal with this matter, and I join in his tribute to the staunchness of our diplomatic staff in Damascus. What does he think animates the Chinese Government to support these butchers?

[Mr Hague]

That is an interesting question. As far as we could see at the Security Council negotiations last Friday, China had no easily identifiable objection to the draft resolution. Indeed, when it came to the vote the Chinese permanent representative was surrounded by Arab representatives urging him therefore to vote for the resolution. As it turned out however, his instructions were evidently to vote to veto the resolution along with Russia. It seemed that the desire to act with Russia on the Security Council outweighed any other consideration. I think that is a mistake on the part of China. We have a regular and full strategic dialogue with China, and I will certainly want to pursue the question of this decision vigorously in our next strategic dialogue, because I do not think it is in the interests of China; nor do I think it is living up to the full responsibilities of permanent membership of the Security Council.

[Ann Clwyd (Cynon Valley) (Lab)]

The Foreign Secretary has talked about the importance of Turkey. In his discussion with the Foreign Secretary of Turkey, was there any talk about setting up safe havens near the Turkish border, which I believe the Syrian opposition have asked for?

[Mr Hague]

This idea has been floated, although I think more in the media than by any of the Governments concerned. It can, of course, be an appealing idea when people are in such distress and suffering so much, but one then has to consider how safe havens would be created and how they would subsequently be policed. We know from experience in the Balkans in the 1990s that safe havens that prove not really to be safe are one of the worst things we can create. The creation of true safe havens inside Syrian territory would, in effect, require military intervention in Syria. That is not authorised by the UN Security Council and would require a massive military operation. The Turkish Foreign Minister was not proposing that, and that was not part of our discussion last week.

[Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

While Assad’s actions are evil and those of the Russians and Chinese are woeful—my right hon. Friend is entirely correct on that—some of us warned during the Libyan intervention that we were in danger of playing into their hands and providing them with an alibi because we did not stick strictly to humanitarian action, such as when we were pursuing Gaddafi in the last hours of his life before he was executed by our allies. We are where we are, however, so where do we go from here? The fact is that the Chinese are impervious to grandstanding. The Foreign Secretary has been rather brief on the quiet diplomacy he is now going to engage in with them to get them to sign up to a resolution that, in terms, prohibits any repetition of the kind of action that took place in Libya.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

I disagree with my hon. Friend, in that I do not think that what happened in Libya provides an alibi; after all, there were countries on the Security Council, such as India, which did not vote for resolution 1973 on Libya, and South Africa, which did vote for it but was then very critical of its implementation, that were perfectly happy to vote on Saturday for this resolution because it is entirely different from what we contemplated and wanted in Libya. We are not calling for military intervention—these are different circumstances—so I do not think that that is an adequate defence for Russia and China.

My hon. Friend said that I was quiet on quiet diplomacy, but it is in the nature of quiet diplomacy that it is not pursued noisily. Of course, as I said in my statement, we will continue to discuss with Russia and China the way forward. We will do so in a rather vigorous way, but we will do so continuing to seek agreement at the UN Security Council. We will be very busy with that over the coming days and weeks.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Tunisia, the first Arab country to be liberated from a despot in the Arab spring, is expelling its Syrian ambassador and de-recognising the murderous and criminal Assad regime. The Syrian National Council has called on other countries to follow suit, so will the British Government be considering that?

[Mr Hague]

As I mentioned, I do not rule that out. If we were to do that, I would like us to act in concert with other nations. Therefore, what other nations do is a factor, and we will keep in close consultation with our European and Arab partners on this. But there are considerations to set against that and reasons to maintain an embassy, if possible, which I also mentioned earlier. So this is about a balance between those considerations.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

A very dear friend of mine and his five-year-old son were butchered by the Assad regime in the days when it controlled Lebanon, so may I both commend everything that my right hon. Friend is doing and urge him to take a particular interest in what is going on in that country, which the Assad regime continues to try to destabilise, both through its own proxies and through Iranian ones, such as Hezbollah and Amal?

[Mr Hague]

Absolutely; we always take a close interest in what is happening in Lebanon, and Syria has indeed been, a great deal of the time, a malign influence in events there. In addition, events in Lebanon and what may happen in the future there are an important consideration in how we handle this crisis in Syria—this is one reason why it is quite different from the Libyan crisis, for instance. So my hon. Friend is right to point out the horrors of what has happened before and I am very conscious of the point that he makes.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)]

I welcome and endorse the Foreign Secretary’s remarks about taking action through the European Union, through the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council and with the Friends of Syria group, but one organisation that he did not mention was NATO. Is it not time to have a discussion in the North Atlantic Council— including Turkey—about having some kind of no-fly zone, comparable with what was put in place to save the Kurds 11 years ago, over the northern part of Syria?

[Mr Hague]

I do not think that it is. I say so, first, because if NATO began planning for different eventualities in Syria, that would weaken rather than unite the international coalition. A no-fly zone would also require authorisation from the UN Security Council, and clearly that would not be obtained at the moment. In addition, although there are reports of Syrian aircraft being involved in the latest events, this is not the prime means of repression, so although a no-fly zone is an easy thing to call for, there is a danger that it would give the illusion of security when the prime means of repression of the civilian population is by tanks and troops on the ground.

[Sir Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)]

I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s warm words about the countries of the Arab League. With the eyes of the world on Syria, will he give me his personal assurance that he will not close his eyes to what is happening next door in Israel, where United Nations resolutions and international law are being breached against the Palestinian people?

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend knows—again, we have discussed this in the House many times—the position on this. We may be getting a little wide of the statement, but of course we have condemned violence in the occupied territories and indeed the expansion of settlements in the occupied territories, which are illegal and on occupied land.

[Mr Speaker]

We are grateful to the Foreign Secretary for dealing with that point. Perhaps we can now keep the statement exchanges to the subject matter. I know that the hon. Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell) is now a Knight, but we must stick to what is right and that is the content of the statement.

[Luciana Berger (Liverpool, Wavertree) (Lab/Co-op)]

What is the Foreign Secretary’s assessment of the prospects of Russia agreeing to impose an arms embargo on Syria, given that Russia remains one of Syria’s principal arms suppliers?

[Mr Hague]

There is not much prospect at the moment of Russia agreeing to an arms embargo—that is the straight answer. Russia continues to sell arms to the regime. Russia has many close interests allied to those of the Assad regime and has a naval base there. Syria has been an important customer for Russian arms, and that is no doubt one of the factors behind Russia’s defence of the Assad regime and its veto at the UN Security Council. So, the prospect of Russia agreeing at the moment is very small.

[Sir Roger Gale (North Thanet) (Con)]

Given the cynicism of Russia’s veto of the draft resolution at the weekend, and the bloodshed since, will my right hon. Friend consider calling in the Russian ambassador and gently suggesting to him that Russia’s failure to support human rights in Syria might be construed by some as incompatible with Russia’s membership of the Council of Europe?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

I will give consideration to all the points that are being raised about Russia—that is, I think, the best thing for me to say—and I will ensure that the force of the views in the House of Commons about Russia’s veto is well understood by the Russian embassy. It will be understood there, anyway. My first preference in how we now conduct our discussions with Russia is for me to do so directly with the Russian Foreign Minister, as well as via any contact we may have with the ambassador.

[Mr David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab)]

Although the action of Russia and China is completely inexcusable, and no one in this House has tried to defend or justify it in any way, may I take the Foreign Secretary back to a point made earlier? Is he aware that the resolution on Libya, which was brought forward to stop slaughter, was so extended to bring about regime change that it has inevitably played right into the hands of Russia and China, who have done what they have done and vetoed the UN Security Council resolution? Both countries have, of course, a pretty poor record when it comes to their own human rights.

[Mr Hague]

In my view, the resolution on Libya—resolution 1973—was faithfully implemented. If I remember rightly, the hon. Gentleman voted, in the end, for our action in Libya.

[Mr Winnick]

indicated assent.

[Mr Hague]

Yes, he did. So, we are united in agreeing with that resolution. I do not think that it provides an excuse for Russia and China, for the reasons I gave earlier to my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh). Many other nations on the Security Council disapproved of what we did in Libya but voted for this resolution on Syria.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

Notwithstanding the Foreign Secretary’s earlier comments on the International Criminal Court, if there is a subsequent UN resolution on referring President Assad and his regime to the UN and the ICC, does he agree that the timing of that will be very important? We know that many dictators, if they feel they have nothing to lose and nowhere to run, are likely to dig in, with more atrocities than there perhaps would have been. The timing is critical.

[Mr Hague]

Yes. My hon. Friend makes a valid and legitimate point. In any case, it is not possible at the moment to refer this to the prosecutor of the ICC. However, I think that the longer this goes on and the greater the atrocities committed, the more determined the world will be to find a way to bring to account and to justice those responsible. That should weigh heavily on those who are now participating in the atrocities of this regime.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Secretary of State update the House on measures being taken to ensure the safety of British citizens in Syria?

[Mr Hague]

For a long time—for many months—we have said that British nationals should not travel to Syria and that those who are there should leave. Also, some weeks ago, when we reduced the staff of our embassy to the minimum level possible to maintain it, we made it clear that we were below the level at which we could conduct an evacuation of any remaining British nationals. We have made the position abundantly clear, and there should not now be British nationals in Syria. Some people who are dual nationals or are married to people in Syria will of course have remained, and whenever they are in difficult circumstances we will do our best to assist them, but we have made the position starkly clear.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Having sat in the middle of a so-called protected area that was totally unprotected, may I re-emphasise to the House something the Foreign Secretary has said? Any protected area requires the presence of people on the ground with the ability to keep it protected, and if this talk of a protected area continues, we will have to think about how that can be done. At the moment, it certainly cannot be done by the British.

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend speaks with deep experience of these matters. Certainly, any future discussion about safe havens or humanitarian corridors must be accompanied by the will, authority and full means to make sure that they truly would be safe and humanitarian, rather than leaving people in a very difficult situation.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

On Friday, I attended a fundraiser in Newcastle at which over £30,000 was raised to provide humanitarian assistance to those terrorised by the regime. Many there expressed real fear about returning to Syria, especially now that they have shown their support for democracy and freedom. Can the Secretary of State assure me that he is working with his colleagues in the Home Office to ensure that no Syrians are forced to return to Syria from the UK at the moment?

[Mr Hague]

I congratulate the hon. Lady and her constituents on the funds they have been raising, and I shall draw her point to the attention of my colleague the Home Secretary. We have rigorous rules on these matters in terms of giving asylum to people and not returning them to countries that are in a state of great disorder. I will check on the point she raises.

[Conor Burns (Bournemouth West) (Con)]

I wish the Foreign Secretary well in his ongoing discussions with China, for if the use of the veto in these circumstances is a foretaste of things to come, it does not bode well for the future effectiveness of the Security Council. Returning to the Russian Foreign Minister’s visit tomorrow, regardless of the position that Russia is taking, does my right hon. Friend agree that if the Russian Foreign Minister is properly to convey the mood of the UN, the international community and the Arab League, he will tell President Assad that his days are numbered and that the only question is how much more blood will be spilled before he goes?

[Mr Hague]

I would love it if that were the message conveyed by Sergei Lavrov when he goes tomorrow, and my hon. Friend is quite right that that is what should be conveyed. However, I think Russia’s approach remains different from that, as we saw with its veto. It is still acting to protect the regime and standing by a long-standing ally despite everything that has happened. As I have said, we will underline to Russia’s representatives, including the Foreign Minister, the depth and strength of opinion in this country, as indeed they will hear from the Arab League and many other nations around the world.

[Paul Goggins (Wythenshawe and Sale East) (Lab)]

What assessment has the Foreign Secretary made of reports over the weekend that Abu Musab al-Suri, who until his capture in 2005 was a dangerously active terrorist, has been freed by the Assad regime in an apparent warning to the United States and the United Kingdom? If that is true, will it not be yet further evidence of the murderous activity of the Syrian Government?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, it would. I am awaiting reliable information about that. Clearly, the announcement was not designed to be helpful in any way and it is further evidence of what the right hon. Gentleman refers to, but if the Syrian regime honestly thinks that we, at the United Nations or anywhere else, are going to change our approach because of such announcements or the release of any reprehensible criminal, it is seriously mistaken.

[Jo Swinson (East Dunbartonshire) (LD)]

Russia is inflicting a double blow on the Syrian people through its UN veto and by continuing the $1.5 billion of arms sales to Assad’s regime, which enables the killing and maiming to continue. If the moral and humanitarian argument cannot get through, will the Foreign Secretary emphasise to his Russian counterpart that it is not in Russia’s strategic and economic interests, with its key trading partners in the middle east such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, to act as a roadblock to the protection of the Syrian people?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, I absolutely agree. This is an important consideration for the Russian authorities and it is not in Russia’s national interests to take the position it has taken. There will be a future Government in Syria who will remember what Russia has done. Its actions are causing outrage in the Arab world, which is deeply frustrated with Russia’s position, as the secretary-general of the Arab League said to me earlier this afternoon, so we will certainly employ the arguments cited by my hon. Friend.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

The killings, murders and disorder in Syria are obviously dreadful and must be condemned. Notwithstanding the Foreign Secretary’s understandable anger with Russia at present, does he not think that it would be appropriate to have further negotiations with the Russian Foreign Minister and the Government of Iran, who are a near neighbour and in whose interests it cannot be for further disorder to spread to their country? Also, is he confident of the democratic and inclusive credentials of all the Syrian opposition? Surely we can learn from the example, given by many colleagues, of what happened in Libya, where in some quarters the abuse of human rights unfortunately continues, despite assurances given by the opposition there before the intervention.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

We shall certainly continue to have discussions with Russia, as I have mentioned many times, but I do not think that discussions with Iran on this subject would be productive at the moment. The views of members of the Syrian opposition vary greatly and, indeed, at least three different organisations could be classified as the Syrian opposition. That is why I stress the need for them to come to international gatherings with a clear statement of democratic and inclusive principles, including the protection of minorities in Syria. I think that they will have greater support in the world if they can articulate those things clearly and set out a clear vision for the future of their country.

[Claire Perry (Devizes) (Con)]

It is always the innocent who suffer in these situations, and anyone who has seen or heard of the collateral damage being inflicted on the innocent women and children in Homs cannot fail to think that this Sino-Russian veto is disgraceful and disgusting. Is there any way that we can use our remaining infrastructure and resources in Syria, or those of our allies, to provide humanitarian or medical assistance to these helpless victims?

[Mr Hague]

We are down to the smallest level of representation we can have that is consistent with diplomatic relations. Our staff are therefore able to maintain an embassy, but it is not easy for them to travel around the country, let alone deliver practical assistance to people, so we cannot do that with the remaining diplomatic staff. We support the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the region,as I have said, so we will have to deliver any assistance that way.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

While the immediate priority must obviously be to maximise pressure to put an end to the slaughter, what longer-term assessments have been made about the likely complexion of any successor regime to the dictatorship?

[Mr Hague]

As I said in answer to the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), there are many shades of opinion among the Syrian opposition. When I met members of the Syrian National Council, they were very clear about their commitment to an open and democratic society and to the protection of minorities. I have no reason to doubt them on that, but there will be many influences at work, so it is very difficult to make a prediction or give an accurate answer to my hon. Friend’s question. All I can say is that we will continue to urge the various opposition groups to adopt the open and democratic principles in which we, too, believe.

[Dan Byles (North Warwickshire) (Con)]

May I press the Foreign Secretary on the issue of UK nationals and those holding dual nationality? What assessment has he made of the number of people falling into those categories, and what discussions has he had with those of our allies who, like us, are maintaining a diplomatic presence with regard to mutual aid for one another’s citizens should the situation deteriorate?

[Mr Hague]

Well, it is in any case the arrangement within the European Union that countries will provide assistance to each others’ citizens if one is unable to do so, but of course the embassies of other nations are also being slimmed down, so it would be wrong for people to rely on that. I think that they should take our advice very seriously. For months we have said, “Do not stay in Syria. Do not go to Syria.” I cannot make it clearer than that. Rather than expect practical assistance, they should leave, and leave now.

[Dr Phillip Lee (Bracknell) (Con)]

I have had the privilege of visiting Syria twice in my life: once in 1998 with a backpack on my back, and last year on a delegation ably led by my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames). I was struck by the stark difference in access to news media within the country between the two visits. Does the Foreign Secretary agree that our foreign policy, and indeed that of all our partners abroad, should reflect that changed media environment and that the sooner the Russian and Chinese Governments understand and respect that, the better?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, I very much agree. People have access to media reports, particularly those carried by Arab satellite television channels, and what we say on our televisions and, indeed, in this House is heard and understood by many people in Syria. That is one reason why it is not possible to say to people in Syria, “There is no problem,” and that the Syrian Government are doing everything they can. The people can see that the Syrian Government are not acting in the interests of a peaceful transition in Syria, so we will continue to communicate, in many ways directly, with the people of Syria and the rest of the Arab world. There is a lesson in that for Russia and China, as my hon. Friend says.

[Mr Stewart Jackson (Peterborough) (Con)]

The actions of this despotic regime are merely the culmination of 30 years of human rights abuses under both Assad regimes, as we know. To return to the question put to the Foreign Secretary by my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), we welcome the appointment of a special envoy to the Syrian opposition, but will it necessarily lead to the establishment of a contact group with the Syrian National Council, the Free Syrian Army and other individuals in lieu of the establishment of a free, democratic Government?

[Mr Hague]

We will have to see how the opposition groups develop. We are urging them to come together, but I stress that our contact has been with those advocating peaceful action. We have not had contact with the Free Syrian Army, which is in a different position and advocates a different course, but we want those groups to come together, and we will want them to be involved and to bring their ideas and future plans to the international grouping—of whatever kind—that is formed among Arab, European and other nations. That will be the forum for the opposition to present their ideas and to seek the support of the rest of the world.

[Stephen Gilbert (St Austell and Newquay) (LD)]

My right hon. Friend mentioned the possibility of securing a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly as a way of tackling the issue. What assessment has been made of the possibility of that, and on what timeline does he expect to operate?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

We are still making an assessment of that. Clearly, it was only on Saturday that the resolution was vetoed in the Security Council. A General Assembly resolution does not have the same weight as a Security Council resolution, but it can illustrate the strength of numbers behind a particular proposition, so we are discussing that now—whether it is a feasible way forward—with the Arab League and with our other partners on the Security Council. I therefore cannot give the hon. Gentleman a timeline yet, but it is a possibility.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

We all wish the Foreign Secretary well in his endeavours, but may I press him by suggesting that the regrettable decision to veto was at least in part caused by Russia and China believing that western powers had exceeded their mandate under UN resolution 1973, when pursuing regime change in Libya, as they made clear at the time?

[Mr Hague]

This is not an excuse for Russia and China, and as I pointed out earlier other nations that were very critical of our actions in Libya voted for the resolution, appreciating that it was put forward on behalf of the Arab League, and that it put forward an entirely different proposition from how we proceeded in Libya, because the situation is entirely different. This should not be advanced as an excuse for what is in my view an indefensible veto.

[Robert Halfon (Harlow) (Con)]

I welcome what my right hon. Friend has done thus far, but, just as we were right to intervene in Libya and to support with weapons and logistics those opposition movements that faced massacre, can he do more to work with other countries to give logistics, weapons and humanitarian aid to the opposition groups in Syria? Further, when will the stage be reached at which we need to expel the Syrian ambassador from the United Kingdom?

[Mr Hague]

I hope that I have covered those points. We are not engaged, and are not planning to engage, in arming the opposition forces in Syria, although we will help with advice and some logistics and practical support in order to ensure their ability to operate. It would not be in their interests in any case to be seen as an arm of western Governments, so there is a limit to what we can do in that regard.

On the question of the embassy, we will work with our partners throughout the world on that, but there are advantages in keeping an embassy, as well as in making the strong diplomatic statement of withdrawing an embassy. It improves our understanding of the situation on the ground to have an embassy there.

[Richard Harrington (Watford) (Con)]

Is the Foreign Secretary aware of reports of chemical weapons and other weaponry being moved by Hezbollah out of Syria? If so, is he concerned about the consequence that that could have for Israel and Jordan, and for the general stability of the region outside Syria?

[Mr Hague]

We keep a very close eye on any reports of the presence of chemical or biological weapons. I have not seen reports of such weapons being moved by Hezbollah, although the Syrian regime’s close connections with Hezbollah may give rise to concerns about what might happen in Lebanon if the situation continues in Syria. My hon. Friend can be assured that we are alert to this issue.

[Andrew Bridgen (North West Leicestershire) (Con)]

The impending elections in Russia and a weakened Mr Putin keen to bolster his domestic opinion polls through a show of strength have been put forward as a possible explanation for the use of the Russian veto. Does the Secretary of State agree with that explanation?

[Mr Hague]

The upcoming elections may be a factor in the Russian veto. I think that a stronger factor is that the Russians have had a long alliance with the Assad regime. As I mentioned, they have a naval base in Syria and have sold large quantities of arms there. They feel committed to supporting the Assad regime. That is something that they should change their mind about, in my view, given that the circumstances have changed. We will continue to work on them, before and after their election on 4 March.

[Joseph Johnson (Orpington) (Con)]

It is clearly welcome news that India came off the fence and supported the resolution, marking an end to three decades of that country’s ties with the Assad family. To what extent did New Delhi seek to dilute the final text so that it made no mention of automatic measures in the event of non-compliance?

[Mr Hague]

Like my hon. Friend, I welcome the fact that India voted for the resolution. It is true that several countries on the Security Council wanted a resolution that did not go beyond the draft resolution as it was put to the vote on Saturday. Certainly, India is one country that would not have wanted a stronger resolution with the authorisation of sanctions or other measures. I stress that the prime negotiations in the Security Council were always with Russia. The objections raised and amendments put forward came from Russia primarily, rather than from India, South Africa or Pakistan.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

I welcome the statement by the Foreign Secretary. He will know that there are more than 30 opposition parties in Syria, including the National Council, the National Co-ordination Committee, the Justice party and the Kurdish party. The work to unite them has been going on for a long time. How close are we to uniting them? Unless the opposition are united, the future for Syria looks bleak.

[Mr Hague]

The answer is that many of those groups have come together under the umbrella of the Syrian National Council. It is in their own interests for all the major groupings to come together under that umbrella. This is a national emergency. As I have put it to them, in this country, which is a thriving democracy, when we face an existential threat, all the parties come together, as with the coalition during the second world war. Syria faces one of the direst emergencies in its history, so they should all be able to come together for this period. We will continue to give that advice, but they have not all managed it yet.

[Sajid Javid (Bromsgrove) (Con)]

May I press the Foreign Secretary on another aspect of dual nationality? Many of the most energetic supporters and members of the barbaric Syrian regime have dual Syrian and British nationality, including members of President Assad’s immediate family. Will the Foreign Secretary make a commitment to consider how we might usefully frustrate this blatant abuse of British nationality and its use as a flag of convenience?

[Mr Hague]

Many people may share my hon. Friend’s view about the views expressed by dual nationals in this country. However, views expressed are no grounds to deprive anyone of their nationality. If I took that suggestion to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, I am sure that she would be very clear about that. I therefore cannot hold out any hope to my hon. Friend that we will be able to act in the way that he would like us to.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

What role can Jordan play in helping to resolve this crisis?

[Mr Hague]

Jordan is playing a strong and constructive role. I discussed the situation a couple of hours ago with Nasser Judeh, the Foreign Minister of Jordan. It supports and is an energetic sponsor of the work of the Arab League, and it co-sponsored the resolution that was put to the UN Security Council. We welcome its active participation.

British Embassy (Liberia)

Lord Hague of Richmond Excerpts

Thursday 2nd February 2012 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

In March 1991, at the outbreak of over a decade of civil war, Britain closed its embassy in Liberia. In 2003, a UK-based political officer began work again in Monrovia, reporting to and supervised by our High Commissioner in Sierra Leone. Today, I am pleased to announce the reopening of our embassy in Liberia.

This follows the successful presidential elections at the end of last year, the inauguration of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in January, and my meeting with her in June 2011.

Reopening a British embassy in Liberia strengthens our voice at a critical time and enables us to support the process of peace-building and national reconciliation in this important African country. Since the closure of our embassy in 1991, our influence in Liberia has been limited. A fully accredited ambassador will be able to work closely with President Johnson Sirleaf’s Government as they work to push forward her programme of reform and national reconciliation.

The resources of a full embassy will enable us to provide more systematic and effective support to British trade and investment. Liberia’s economy is growing at over 6% per annum. The oil, mining and agriculture sectors are all set to expand rapidly over the next few years.

This decision sends a strong signal of British diplomatic re-engagement with Liberia and the wider region. It follows the upgrading of our political office in Côte d'Ivoire to the status of a full embassy.

As I said in Parliament on 11 May 2011, there will be no strategic shrinkage of Britain’s diplomatic influence overseas. I remain committed to extending the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s global reach and building up British diplomatic influence in key regions of the world. Reopening the embassy in Liberia is part of that commitment.

The reopening of the embassy will incur a marginal cost over and above the cost for a political office. This would be around £35,000 in the first year and £15,000 per annum after that. A limited consular service will be offered in Liberia. Our High Commission in Ghana will continue to provide a visa service as well as more substantive consular support when necessary. A fully accredited resident ambassador will take up residence in Liberia in autumn 2012.

Afghanistan Progress Report (December 2011)

Lord Hague of Richmond Excerpts

Tuesday 31st January 2012 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

I wish to inform the House that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, together with the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development, is today publishing the thirteenth progress report on developments in Afghanistan since November 2010.

At the Bonn conference the international community agreed in principle to provide financial support to Afghanistan for the decade after transition in 2014. For their part, the Government of Afghanistan committed to continue to progress with vital economic and governance reform. In support of this, the UK is helping local government deliver better services for local people by assisting provincial governors’ offices with management training, and by supporting the implementation of development projects identified by communities in previously insecure districts. The new DFID funded Afghanistan Business Innovation Fund opened in December, inviting proposals for business ideas that will create sustainable jobs.

Nationwide the security situation in Afghanistan is improving and 2011 marked the first time that year-on-year violence levels decreased since the International Security Assistance Force mission was expanded in 2006. This nationwide view of Afghanistan, while positive and a good indication of overall progress, should not distract our attention from a varied regional picture.

In 2011, recorded violence levels fell significantly in Regional Command South West, the UK’s area of operations. However, these gains have been tempered by a notable increase in security incidents in the east of the country and a smaller rise in violence levels in Regional Command South. The uneven regional picture reminds us that the insurgency remains resilient, but they are also under significant and sustained pressure in the areas where the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF are focusing their efforts. In this context we have seen the insurgency increasingly deploy less conventional methods to execute their campaign: the use of IEDs has increased and they have focused their efforts on a series of high-profile assassinations and ‘spectacular’ attacks intended to undermine local perceptions of security. From a security perspective 2012 is likely to see further challenges as the insurgency attempts to regain its momentum. However, our resolve to achieve our stated aims in Afghanistan endures, and we will continue to work alongside the Afghans to consolidate the gains of 2011.



I am placing the report in the Library of the House. It will also be published on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website (www.fco.gov.uk).

Brazil and the Caribbean (Foreign Secretary Visit)

Lord Hague of Richmond Excerpts

Wednesday 25th January 2012 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

I wish to update the House on my first official visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

In November 2010 I set out in my Canning House lecture the Government’s commitment to reinvigorating important relationships in Latin America. I am pleased to confirm that the Government are turning this vision into concrete results. Last year, 27 Ministers visited Latin America of which 14 visited Brazil. We have reopened our embassy in El Salvador and a new consulate in Recife and we are sending additional diplomats to the region to staff these new missions. As a major emerging political and economic power, Brazil’s role in the world is set to grow. We also want to develop a better understanding between Britain and Brazil in foreign policy. Brazil’s role in international affairs is set to grow significantly this century. This flows naturally from their growing economic weight and the shifting international landscape.

Britain has much of the expertise that Brazil needs as it continues its growth—including financial services, sustainable development, the energy sector, defence, security and sports infrastructure. During my visit I held a strategic dialogue with Foreign Minister Patriota—an upgraded mechanism for foreign policy and bilateral discussions between the two countries, reflecting the new momentum in the relationship. I also explored options for further bilateral defence and security co-operation with Defence Minister, Celso Amorim and the Head of the Brazilian Navy, Admiral Moura Neto. Britain and Brazil have a unique opportunity this decade to further bilateral relations through sport, as adjacent hosts of the Olympic and Paralympic games. My meeting with the Governor of Rio de Janeiro reinforced UK/Brazil political and commercial co-operation on the Olympics and the security issues related to these major sporting events. I also announced the launch of the Great Campaign in Brazil which will take place in March 2012 and HRH Prince Harry’s visit at that time.

In a short visit to Panama on 20 January I met the President, First Lady, Foreign Minister and other member of the Panamanian Cabinet. We discussed Falkland Island issues, co-operation on combating money laundering and the possibility of a double taxation agreement with the UK.

In the Caribbean, I attended the UK/Caribbean ministerial forum, leading the strongest delegation of UK Ministers—the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Taunton Deane (Mr Browne), the Minister of State, Department for International Development, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Mr Duncan) and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire)—and senior officials to visit the Caribbean in recent years. The forum brought together members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic, with the Caribbean Overseas Territories and Cuba, USA, Canada and Australia participating as observers. Together we committed to a revitalised partnership, with stronger co-operation on areas that matter to both Britain and the Caribbean: trade, counter-narcotics, climate change, and key foreign policy issues. In recognition of the private sector’s role as an engine of growth, a broad range of British and Caribbean businesses also participated in the forum. The forum underlined the value we attach to our enduring friendship with the Caribbean and our desire to re-energise the relationship, creating a more modern, dynamic and forward looking affiliation.

The forum concluded with agreement to a new strategic economic partnership, promoting prosperity and economic resilience among the countries of the Caribbean and the United Kingdom. There was also agreement to enhance collaboration and co-ordination in the fight against illegal drug trafficking between the Caribbean, Britain and the Overseas Territories. This will include a new partnership between the UK, US and the Caribbean to develop land-based intelligence sharing and interdiction capability in the region. We also agreed on the importance of working together on further criminal justice reform which provides the essential underpinning for our drugs and crime work in the region. On climate change, we agreed to work together with urgency and vigour to close the ambition gap on emissions, to mobilise climate finance on the necessary scale, and to secure agreement by 2015 on a comprehensive legally binding global framework. Together we will continue to build on the alliance that emerged at COP17 between the members of the Alliance of Small Island States, Least Developed Countries and the EU. Finally, we agreed to work together in international forums, tackling pressing security issues facing the international community and working to strengthen the Commonwealth as a focus for democracy, human rights, development and prosperity. We also agreed a text in the Caribbean action plan to support the principle and right to self-determination for the Falkland Islanders.

It is this Government’s intention to shape a distinctive foreign policy that protects and promotes our national interests, strengthens our economy, makes the most of the opportunities of the 21st century and upholds the highest values of our society. This visit is part of how we achieve that, and represents a step change in British—Latin American and Caribbean relations. I will also lay in the Library of the House a copy of my speech in Brazil and agreed text from the Caribbean forum on the Falkland Islands.

EU Sanctions (Iran)

Lord Hague of Richmond Excerpts

Tuesday 24th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Robert Halfon (Harlow) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Foreign Secretary if he will make a statement on EU sanctions relating to Iran and the threat from Iran to close the strait of Hormuz.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

Yesterday I attended the EU Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels, where member states agreed a new and unprecedented set of sanctions against Iran. These include a phased oil embargo, a partial asset freeze of the central bank of Iran, measures against Iran’s petrochemical sector and a ban on Iranian transactions involving gold. This is a major increase in the peaceful, legitimate pressure on Iran to return to negotiations over its nuclear programme. It follows the financial measures that the United Kingdom imposed on 21 November and the widening of EU measures on 1 December. Sanction measures, often close to those of the EU, have been adopted by the United States, Canada, South Korea, Norway, Switzerland and Japan. These are in addition to the sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council. At our joint press conference this morning, the Australian Foreign Minister announced that his country will replicate these new EU sanctions, and we will urge other nations to do the same.

Iran is in defiance of six United Nations Security Council resolutions, which call on it to suspend its uranium enrichment programme and to enter negotiations. Its recent decision to enrich uranium to 20% at an underground site in Qom demonstrates the urgent need to intensify diplomatic pressure on Iran to return to negotiations. The programme has no plausible civilian use, and Iran tried to keep it secret.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has expressed serious concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, and Iran is now in breach of 11 resolutions of the IAEA board of governors.

Sanctions are a means to an end, not an end in themselves. Our objective remains a diplomatic solution that gives the world the confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is for purely peaceful purposes. We are ready to talk at any point if Iran puts aside its preconditions and returns to negotiations.

Iranian Vice-President Rahimi was reported as saying in December:

“If sanctions are adopted against Iranian oil, not a drop of oil will pass through the Strait of Hormuz.”

It must be borne in mind, however, that 95% of Iran’s oil exports, representing more than 80% of its foreign earnings, transit the strait of Hormuz, so it is very much against Iran’s interests to close the strait to oil exports.

Britain maintains a constant presence in the region as part of our enduring contribution to Gulf security, and the Royal Navy has been conducting such patrols since 1980. At the weekend, HMS Argyll and a French vessel joined a United States carrier group transiting through the strait of Hormuz. This was a routine movement, but it underlined the unwavering international commitment to maintaining rights of passage under international law. Any attempt by Iran to block the strait would be both illegal and unsuccessful.

We call on Iran to answer the questions raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency, to adhere to the UN’s Security Council resolutions, to suspend its enrichment programme and to return to the negotiations that are the only way of reaching a peaceful and long-term settlement in its dispute with the international community.

[Robert Halfon]

I am grateful to you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question, and to the Foreign Secretary.

Iran is at crisis point. It is the new Soviet Union, of the middle east. It supports terrorism, undermines democracy and is trying to stop the Arab spring in Syria, but now we are threatened by an Iranian nuclear bomb, which risks the security of the Gulf states, Israel and the whole region.

Two weeks ago, Iran admitted that it had begun enriching high-grade uranium, and the regime is now threatening to close the strait of Hormuz, which deals with more than 20% of internationally traded oil. The UK Government could not have done more to try to contain the problem, with unprecedented action to isolate Iran’s financial sector by the Chancellor, and the extra EU sanctions imposed this week by the Foreign Secretary, but the question must now be asked: are we facing the prospect of a nuclear dictatorship in the middle east?

In the past, nuclear deterrents worked because of mutually assured destruction, but for MAD to work one has to be sane, and the Iranians have said that they would be happy to use nuclear weapons. Will my right hon. Friend set out to the House what military action Britain and the allies are planning in the strait of Hormuz? Will he explain what will happen if the latest economic sanctions do not work? What more is being done to bring Russia and China to the UN table?

Most people would accept that Britain has shouldered its fair share of the burden in tackling dictators, but it seems clear that the free world must send a message to Iran that, if it continues with its nuclear plans, it will lead to military action. No one wants war, but tragically it is looking increasingly possible. As The Times says today:

“One of the greatest civilisations in history has been superseded for a generation by an extremist regime perpetrating repression at home and aggression beyond its borders.”

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who pointed out at the beginning of his contribution that there are many grounds for quarrels with the Iranian Government, although I stress that this is not a quarrel with the Iranian people. The human rights record and much of the international behaviour of the Iranian Government, such as the recent plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington—in addition to the nuclear programme—give grave cause for concern to the international community. But it is because there is a very serious danger of the wider proliferation of nuclear weapons across the middle east if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons capability, that this issue must be confronted and that we and our European partners, and so many other allies, take the strong stance that we do. I stress that we do so very much in the interests of avoiding conflict; this set of actions is not designed to lead to conflict, but to lead us away from it by increasing the pressure for a peaceful settlement of these disputes.

I say to my hon. Friend that we have contingency plans for many contingencies—including, as my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary said at our press conference this morning, for sending any further naval forces to that area. But we are not planning to take military action in the Gulf. We call on Iran to return to the negotiations that are, at all times, available to it.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

May we welcome the Foreign Secretary’s comments? I apologise for the absence of my right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State, who is in Brussels today. We also welcome the extensive international engagement in this policy—not only from our European partners but, as the Foreign Secretary said, from our long-standing friends and allies from Australia, whose Defence Minister, Stephen Smith, and Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd, are in town today to show their support.

Will the Foreign Secretary outline the reaction from the main oil consuming countries in Asia, which have a higher dependence on Iranian oil, to the policy of a ban on crude oil imports from Iran and, equally importantly, on the export of refined products back to Iran? Given the effect that these necessary sanctions will have on already vulnerable economies in southern Europe, will he indicate what measures are being taken to protect those economies?

In the wider context, will the Foreign Secretary outline how much support this policy has managed to garner at international level—particularly from Russia, China, India and Japan? The ban by Russia and China on supplying military equipment, as well as training and maintenance, is most welcome, but what assurances are they giving that that will be continued and what influence are they exerting on Tehran to ensure a more responsible attitude from the regime?

In that context, on the diplomatic front we have seen reports that, at a meeting in Moscow on 18 January, Russian officials presented the Iranians with a proposed framework for negotiations with the P5 plus one, possibly based on Russian proposals made in August. Will the Foreign Secretary report to us any feedback that he has had from the Russians?

The right hon. Gentleman rightly stressed that we have no quarrel with the Iranian people. Before the Arab spring, there was the green movement in Iran, where we saw huge numbers on the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities seeking reform. Although it was barbarically repressed, it showed the very considerable public alienation from the regime. What assessment has he made of the state of public opinion in Iran and of divisions in the political elite?

What weight do the Government give to the threat by Iran to attempt to close the strait of Hormuz? Do they intend to participate in any international naval taskforce to keep the strait open? Given the defence cuts, can the right hon. Gentleman guarantee that vessels could be made available? What agreement have the Government obtained from other P5 countries for such action, as well as from those in the Gulf?

Finally, although we support the steps being taken to bring pressure to bear on the Iranian regime, all of us recognise the fragility of growth in the European economy at the moment. Given the importance of oil imports to that growth, will the Foreign Secretary assure us that the economic impact of the steps taken have been discussed with the Chancellor and that contingency plans are in place?

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his supportive remarks and welcome for the broader international engagement and endorsement of our policy. He is right to draw attention to the visit of the Australian Foreign and Defence Ministers, which, as in so many ways, has been very helpful in this regard.

I shall not necessarily take the right hon. Gentleman’s questions in the order in which he asked them. On the question about the political situation in Iran, of course that can sometimes be difficult to interpret from the outside. There are many reports of deep divisions within the Iranian Administration—sometimes, of such divisions between the supreme leader and the President, although not necessarily about this issue. As the right hon. Gentleman said, at the time of the last presidential elections in Iran, we saw signs of deep discontent among the ordinary people of Iran. Sadly, such is the repression and the appalling human rights record of the Iranian Government that the people of Iran do not have much opportunity to voice their discontent. The principal opposition leaders are under house arrest. Iran, alongside China, conducts one of the largest numbers of executions in the world, with 50 executions already so far this year. It is an appalling human rights record that does not help anybody in giving voice to their real opinions.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about Asian countries. Japan has indicated over the past few weeks that it would not increase its oil imports from Iran and has mirrored some of the sanctions that the European Union has taken before. China has expressed its concern about recent developments within Iran, including during Premier Wen’s visit to the Gulf in recent days. In Qatar, he particularly remarked on China’s growing concern when he said that it

“adamantly opposes Iran developing and possessing nuclear weapons.”

Indeed, last month China approximately halved its oil imports from Iran, although I must point out that that is not because China necessarily agrees with this approach. Moreover, given its dispute with Iran about credit terms, it is expected to continue its halving of oil imports through February. In general, the demand for Iranian oil from the main Asian economies is down over recent weeks and is not replacing revenue that Iran will lose from the European Union.

On vulnerable economies, it is largely because of Greek concerns and Greece’s importation of large quantities of oil that we are phasing in this embargo, which will come into full effect on 1 July. We and many other countries would have preferred an earlier date, but we were happy to settle for that to give Greece time to adjust. If there are any difficulties for Greece and its energy supplies after that, we will of course all try to assist.

Russia has been promoting what it calls a “step-by-step” approach to negotiation. It is true that it has been pushing Iran hard to return to talks. Like the rest of the E3 plus 3 countries, Russia wants a diplomatic breakthrough. In discussion with us—also one of the E3 plus 3—it has not been able to confirm that Iran is serious about negotiations, but I am sure that Russia and China will continue to press Iran, in a different way from us, to return to negotiations. In the meantime, we, like so many nations of Europe, the United States and, as I have pointed out, many other parts of the world will increase the pressure on Iran to do so.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

I am sure that my right hon. Friend would have no difficulty in agreeing that the environment of the strait of Hormuz is potentially extremely dangerous. Having regard to the nature of our relations with Iran at the moment, what steps has he been taking to enlist the support of countries that have better relations with Iran than ourselves to ensure that it exercises restraint in the strait of Hormuz and does not, to put it rather dramatically, cause a conflagration?

[Mr Hague]

We certainly talk a great deal to countries that have excellent relations with us and better relations with Iran than we have. That is one of the ways we try to understand the Iranians’ position and to make clear to them our position and our resolve on these issues. We do that with countries such as Oman and, in particular, Turkey. I discussed the situation at length with the Turkish Foreign Minister last week. All those countries use their good offices on Iran to say that it should exercise restraint, and I know that they will continue to do so. Moreover, all common sense goes in the direction of exercising restraint because, as I have pointed out, 95% of Iran’s oil exports go through the strait of Hormuz, and it has to factor that into any calculation that it makes about what to do there.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I chair the all-party group on Iran with the hon. Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace).

While I understand the decisions that have been made by the European Union, may I press the Foreign Secretary on what action he is taking to reinvigorate the E3 plus 3 formation, which was absolutely critical in getting the six Security Council resolutions to which he refers? My anxiety about these sanctions is that without China and Russia on board there will be the most substantial leakages.

Secondly, I want to press the Foreign Secretary on the issue of military action. We know that there are strong demands in parts of the Israeli Administration for unilateral action, and that is running into the United States’ presidential election. Does the Foreign Secretary accept that the United Kingdom has to set out a policy on this matter? Does he also agree that we should not in any way, including through Diego Garcia, participate in any kind of military action without the clearest legal basis from the Security Council?

[Mr Hague]

The E3 plus 3 is indeed the basis on which to take forward negotiations and it is still available to do so. Last year, there were negotiations between Baroness Ashton, the EU High Representative, on behalf of the E3 plus 3, and Iranian representatives. Those did not get anywhere because of the preconditions that Iran attaches to any discussion of these matters, which amount to the dropping of all sanctions at the beginning and the recognition of Iran’s right to enrichment at the beginning. That is not much of a basis on which to negotiate about those things. It has not been possible, despite the best efforts of all six countries and the European Union, to have a successful negotiation. The door remains entirely open to that, as Baroness Ashton stressed again and as I stressed yesterday. That remains the framework in which we would like to have these discussions. China and Russia are continuing, rightly, to press Iran on this. That process remains very much alive. It does not require reinvigoration, but it does require Iranian engagement.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about military action. I stress that we are not calling for, or advocating, military action. It is the job of our armed forces to prepare for many contingencies, but we are not calling for that. We have successfully called for and introduced what I hope will be effective sanctions because we do not want a military conflict. He knows that when we became engaged in a conflict under a UN resolution in Libya last year, we came to the House of Commons for the authority to do so. That is how we will approach any conflict anywhere in the world.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s approach. The challenge is how to tighten our grip on the Iranian economy without damaging our own. Has he received assurances from other oil producers, such as Saudi Arabia, that they can up production to replace the oil that will not be coming to Europe?

[Mr Hague]

No. It is a matter for each country to decide whether to change its oil production. This and many other factors affect the oil market. The price of oil is very similar today to what it has been over the past few months. Yesterday, the main benchmark price was $110 per barrel. That is a couple of dollars different from the price in December, which covers the period in which the discussion about sanctions and the strait of Hormuz has been going on. Many other factors affect the oil market. Some countries are increasing their oil production anyway. Iraq is planning huge increases in oil production and some Libyan oil production is coming back on stream. There are many forces at work, both positive and negative, in the oil market. We should not, therefore, exaggerate the effect of this measure.

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

I fully support what the Foreign Secretary has said today. When he last addressed the House on this question, I asked about the effect of this diplomatic crisis on the 75,000 British Iranians who live in this country and on those who wish to visit them from Iran. He said that he would name a third country to which applications could be made. What is the name of that third country?

[Mr Hague]

That issue remains a concern. The right hon. Gentleman is right to suggest that an unwanted side effect of the Iranian invasion of our embassy compound, the closing of our embassy there and the consequent closing of the Iranian embassy here is that it is harder for Iranians to visit this country and to get a visa to visit this country. Of course, British nationals in Iran can seek assistance from other EU embassies in Iran. We do propose to name a third country. We have identified that country and it has, in turn, approached Iran for permission to act. However, Iran has not yet given that country permission to act on behalf of the United Kingdom. The delay is with Tehran, not with London.

[Tony Baldry (Banbury) (Con)]

Given the recent international behaviour of the Iranian Government, is not one of the sad truths that we cannot trust any of the undertakings that they give? We therefore need two things from them—not simply an unconditional return to negotiations but preparedness to give unfettered access to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to go wherever in Iran they want to. That would give them the competence to find out whether Iran was complying with whatever it told the international community it was doing.

[Mr Hague]

Yes, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. The verification of any agreement with Iran would be very important, and the presence of IAEA inspectors there is crucial. I referred earlier to the enrichment of uranium to 20% at the underground facility that Iran has built in Qom, which my hon. Friend will remember Iran kept secret for a long time. It was exposed by western nations including the United Kingdom, and if that had not happened, Iran would probably have kept it secret to this day. The level of trust is not very high.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

Iran remains a member of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and the last review conference called for a nuclear-free middle east. There is, however, one nation in the middle east that does have nuclear weapons, and that is Israel. Does the Foreign Secretary not think that it would be useful if we took up the suggestion of the NPT review conference to convene a denuclearisation conference of all nations in the region, in order that there could be direct talks? Iran would then be in a position to give assurances that it had no intention or wish to develop nuclear weapons.

[Mr Hague]

Indeed, the commitment to have such a conference in 2012 was given at the NPT review conference in 2010, and plans are going ahead for that conference. Of course, it does not help anyone trying to persuade Israel not to have nuclear weapons if Iran continues a nuclear weapons programme that would have the effect, if it were brought to fruition, of many other nations in the middle east pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. That is absolutely the wrong way to go about trying to persuade Israel to adhere to the non-proliferation treaty.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

I, too, declare that I am a co-chairman of the all-party group on Iran.

If an ordinary Iranian looks out from the inside, he will see that he is surrounded by Israel, Pakistan and India, all countries that developed a nuclear weapon illegally without any UN checks and still refuse to sign any UN undertaking. What message does the Foreign Secretary have for ordinary Iranians that the reason for what we are doing is that something different is going on in this case and that the rewards and the outcome are worth it?

[Mr Hague]

That is a very important question. The reason something different is happening is partly because of one of the factors to which I was just referring—we can be fairly confident that if Iran develops a nuclear weapons capability, other nations will seek to do so. That will not help the security of the people of Iran; it will simply mean that the world’s most unstable region starts to have a large number of the world’s most destructive weapons. That is not in the interests of the people of any of the countries there. Secondly, Iran’s record of concealment, which we have just discussed, and statements by the President of Iran that have included his saying at one stage that Iran would like to wipe Israel off the map, create a focus of attention on Iran’s nuclear plans to an even greater degree than on those of any other country.

[Mr Denis MacShane (Rotherham) (Lab)]

The Foreign Secretary referred to our oldest D-class frigate, which was in the flotilla that just went through the strait of Hormuz and displaces less than 5,000 tonnes, but without aircraft carrier power Britain can have no maritime power projection. I wish our Foreign Secretary well, and I do not want him to go into the conference chamber naked, so will he talk to Brazil, Argentina and Thailand, which have had the good sense to keep their aircraft carriers, and see whether we can borrow or sub-let one while the crisis unfolds?

[Mr Hague]

Our frigate sailed through the strait of Hormuz in the company of the USS Abraham Lincoln, one of the most powerful aircraft carriers on earth.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Given that Iran is a state in transition, with multiple centres of authority, I suggest to the Foreign Secretary that the west’s policy of sabre rattling and sanctions has not only been unsuccessful, but serves to reinforce the hardliners in the country at the expense of ordinary Iranians. Has the time not come for a fundamental reappraisal of our relationship with Iran, similar to what President Nixon did with China when he recognised that country’s new status in the 1960s?

[Mr Hague]

If there were a reasonable hope of any such policy succeeding, of course there would be a case for it. In the Foreign Office, I regularly review our overall policy and the alternatives to it. However, at every stage, I and my colleagues on the National Security Council reached the view that this is the right policy—as have the Governments, as my hon. Friend can gather from what I am saying, of the entire western world. We have come to that conclusion because Iran has resisted or rebuffed efforts to create a better relationship. We offered substantive and serious help with the development of civil nuclear power in Iran, provided there was no nuclear weapons programme. I often point out that one of my predecessors, the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), made heroic efforts to improve relations with Iran on several visits there, and attempted the rapprochement for which my hon. Friend calls. None of that has worked, despite the best efforts of all involved. The policy choices are whether to do what I have set out to increase the peaceful pressure on Iran, to leave a situation in which military conflict is more likely, or to do nothing. The latter two options are not very attractive.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

What steps are being taken to prevent third countries from trading on behalf of Iran, thereby circumventing sanctions?

[Mr Hague]

As the hon. Lady can gather, many nations are joining in the measures and similar measures. Of course, we will talk to other nations around the world about their own policies. For instance, we have discussions with the Gulf states, which are also deeply concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme. It is also worth pointing out that the United States Congress has adopted sanctions with extra-territorial effect. They have a major effect on transactions from the financial institutions of other nations and trading in oil by other nations.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

Although we all want diplomacy to work, the nuclear clock is ticking, and if sanctions do not work will the Foreign Secretary put it on the record that all options remain open to stop Iran becoming a nuclear-weaponised state?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, I repeat what I and previous Governments have said: all options remain on the table. However, I also stress that the policy is important and that we are pursuing it because we do not want Iran to be armed with nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation in the middle east, but we also do not want military conflict over that or any other issue in that region. We are pursuing that policy, but of course all options remain on the table for the future.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

It seems likely that ordinary Iranian citizens will suffer from the sanctions, but far less clear that the regime itself will suffer. Indeed, some analysis suggests that sanctions will strengthen the regime. What assessment has been done of the impact of sanctions on ordinary Iranian people? What efforts have been made to ascertain their views?

[Mr Hague]

We are not in a position to conduct a referendum in Iran on the measures. I wish that there could be an open consultation with the people of Iran, or even that the Iranian Government would consult them on domestic issues. As I said earlier, free expression of opinion is not easily permitted in that country. Clearly, it is not possible to consult the Iranian people.

For a long time, the measures that we imposed were directed at the financing of the nuclear programme and the finances of the Iranian state. Of course, the measures that we are discussing are unprecedented and wide ranging, and can have a wider effect. However, I would argue that that is better than the alternatives of doing nothing or making a military conflict more likely. I think that they greatly concern the Iranian regime, and that is why we hear statements such as that from Vice-President Rahimi on 27 December, and why we have seen any flexibility about negotiations from Iran in the past 12 months only on each occasion when we are on the point of imposing additional sanctions. We have been through that several times and learned not to be deterred from imposing additional sanctions. The Iranian Government will now have to try to deal with the situation.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I welcome the European Council’s robust stance, and the confirmation by the Council and the Foreign Secretary of the peaceful objectives of the process—the resumption of talks about the nuclear programme—but what active steps are the British Government or the European Union taking to facilitate the start of the talks and the de-escalation of this dangerous crisis?

[Mr Hague]

We are taking very active steps to facilitate that. Baroness Ashton wrote, I believe, from memory, in October—three months ago—to the Iranian negotiator Mr Jalili setting out the terms of a new round of negotiations and inviting Iran to them. The EU has not received a formal reply. The opportunity has been clearly set out on behalf of the E3 plus 3 and it will remain.

[Mr Frank Roy (Motherwell and Wishaw) (Lab)]

Will the Foreign Secretary give an assurance that he will report to the House before there is any escalation of the conflict—armed or otherwise—with Iran, especially in the strait?

[Mr Hague]

Yes. I stress that the Government are not seeking an escalation of any conflict—we are seeking a resolution—but I will of course come back to the House as necessary.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that more aircraft carrier capacity is not a huge priority in an area with plenty of available land bases? Much more important is the potential threat of terrorists sowing mines along the shallow waters of the western Gulf using fishing vessels, for which Britain’s naval contribution of mine-clearing vessels is pre-eminently central.

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Indeed, our principal military contribution in the Gulf is the minehunters based in Bahrain. They are enormously respected in the region and are extremely expert in what they do. They are a very important part of our presence there.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)]

There have been reports and allegations that covert military operations have already taken place in Iran, with bombings and assassinations. Will the Foreign Secretary confirm that the UK Government and the UK are not involved in the operations and that they do not support such intervention by foreign forces?

[Mr Hague]

We are not involved in, and we do not support, assassinations. Beyond that I do not comment on intelligence matters.

[Nadhim Zahawi (Stratford-on-Avon) (Con)]

As Iran begins to feel the squeeze, it may not be capable of closing the strait of Hormuz, but it is very good at using proxies to destabilise its neighbours—the fragile democracy in Baghdad and the Kurdish region. What steps are we taking to support those institutions and those parties that are working to bolster rather than break up that democracy?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hague]

We very much support democracy in Iraq. It is certainly right that Iran can often be a malign influence there. We also want stability in Lebanon and a resolution to the appalling situation in Syria. In all those situations, Iran has become a malign influence. Our direct leverage to alter events in Iraq is very limited now, but we will use our influence and our strong diplomatic presence to bolster democracy there.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

Given the increased pressure from sanctions and the increased military presence in the strait of Hormuz and the region, has the Foreign Secretary held discussions with the Secretary of State for Defence to satisfy himself that the chiefs of staff and any commanders in charge of our assets in the region are clear on the rules of engagement? I am thinking in particular of the Cornwall incident. What would happen should the Iranians try something like that or worse again?

[Mr Hague]

I believe that all of our vessels in the region are very clear about the rules of engagement and where they should or should not go. Such matters are clearly set out and agreed within government between the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office, so I do not think that there is any lack of clarity for anyone involved.

[Patrick Mercer (Newark) (Con)]

I understand and fully support the economic sanctions that the EU is taking. Can the Foreign Secretary reveal whether anything else can be done directly and specifically to thwart Iran’s nuclear capability and the industry that surrounds it?

[Mr Hague]

I am reporting to the House on the European Union sanctions. As my hon. Friend will gather, I am not advocating military action, and if he is asking about other areas of activity, I cannot go into them in the House.

[Steve McCabe (Birmingham, Selly Oak) (Lab)]

The Government have rightly gained credit for the support that they have shown opposition movements elsewhere during the Arab spring. Why do they set their face so implacably against opposition movements when it comes to Iran?

[Mr Hague]

I am not aware that that is our approach. Indeed, I deplored earlier the house arrest and imprisonment of opposition leaders in Iran, and the brutal and repressive treatment of opposition spokesmen and demonstrations. At the same time, the future of Iran is for the Iranian people—at least, we hope so. It is very important that opposition movements with which anyone in this country associates themselves are credible and likely to represent the Iranian people.

[Dan Byles (North Warwickshire) (Con)]

What assessment has the Foreign Office made of the time frame within which Iran could develop a credible nuclear capability if it is allowed to continue down that path unchecked?

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend will see many estimates and much speculation, and it is best to take all of them with a pinch of salt. Iran is currently enriching uranium to 20%, which is not sufficiently high grade for a nuclear weapon but creates a larger amount of uranium that, at a later stage, could be enriched quite rapidly to 90% and more, which is a faster process. There are many different estimates of how long that could take, depending on the quantity involved and the number of centrifuges available. He will see estimates of numbers of months rather than years for how long it would take go beyond the 20% level to the higher enriched level. What we do know is that this has become a sufficiently urgent problem that we have to address, with the international community showing unity and resolve, and that is what we are doing with these measures.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

I am sure Members on both sides of the House understand the need for a longer lead-in time so that our European neighbours can seek alternative sources of energy, but if they were able to do so quicker than anticipated would the sanctions be brought forward?

[Mr Hague]

I do not anticipate the sanctions being brought forward. This is the result of a long and complex negotiation over the last few weeks. But I do anticipate that purchasers of Iranian oil in the European Union will decline steadily. It is not a continuous amount and then a cliff-edge effect. The effect of the phasing and the coming into force on 1 July is that remaining purchases will be declining long before then.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

Is not the Iranian regime hellbent on developing a nuclear weapon? Nothing will stop it short of a breakdown in the developmental process or the overthrow of the regime either from inside Iran or by military action. If sanctions do not work, would not the response of the Iranian regime be to redouble its efforts to develop a nuclear weapon before effective sanctions bite?

[Mr Hague]

In many ways that is the case for wide-ranging sanctions policies that address the oil industry and the financial sector. If they are worth doing at all, given the gravity of the situation, sanctions are worth doing seriously. That was my argument at the Foreign Affairs Council yesterday. My hon. Friend is right that at the moment the Iranian leaders are clearly determined on the development of nuclear weapons capability. However, I do not think that one can speculate with certainty about what may happen over the coming year—about the effect of sanctions or any flexibility that may be shown in negotiations—so I am not prepared to say that there is no possibility of such a policy working and that one must therefore reach for other solutions. We want sanctions, coupled with negotiations, to work, and this is not the time to speculate about what might happen if they do not.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

The Minister will be aware of the close relations—or perceived close relations—between Iran and Syria. Will he ensure that the sanctions bite, or will he have to consider widening them, perhaps against other countries and even the sanction breakers?

[Mr Hague]

We have already imposed an oil embargo on Syria and a wide range of other measures. Indeed, we widened the sanctions on Syria yesterday to include a further 22 individuals and eight entities. I think that we will be able to make the sanctions regime effective and that it will be well adhered to by members of the European Union and the other countries that are committing themselves to it. We will therefore concentrate on making the sanctions regime work, rather than imposing additional sanctions on people who might not support it.

[Mr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

Will the Foreign Secretary assert that Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon will be a red line issue for the United Kingdom?

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend can gather that it is indeed a red line issue; that is why we are addressing it in this way. The Prime Minister, along with other European leaders—Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy—has said that we will not permit the development of a nuclear capability by Iran. That is why we are adopting this policy.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

To counter the threat from Iran, what steps are we taking to strengthen our strategic relationship with key regional powers such as Saudi Arabia? By way of a declaration, let me say that I am vice-chairman of the all-party parliamentary group on Saudi Arabia.

[Mr Hague]

We have strong relations with the Gulf states, many of which we have intensified over the past year, particularly our relationship with the United Arab Emirates, although we enjoy excellent relations with all those states. My hon. Friend will know about our long and historic relationship with Oman, and about the many difficulties faced in Bahrain, including by the people of Bahrain over the past year. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister visited Saudi Arabia earlier this month. Saudi Arabia is an important ally and an important force for stability and peace in the region, so I salute my hon. Friend’s work with the all-party group.

[Kris Hopkins (Keighley) (Con)]

What efforts have the UK Government and our allies made to communicate directly with the people of Iran? It is important that we demonstrate that our argument is not with them, but with the despotic leadership of that country.

[Mr Hague]

This is very important. Ten days ago I did an interview on BBC Persia to communicate directly with the people of Iran and make clear our arguments, and we have done that on many other occasions. The Under-Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), has done the same on previous occasions, and we will keep up our efforts to communicate with the people of Iran. Needless to say, however, the Iranian authorities often attempt to block our attempts to do so.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Hague of Richmond Excerpts

Tuesday 17th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Jane Ellison (Battersea) (Con)]

1. What recent progress he has made towards securing the release of Shaker Aamer from Guantanamo Bay.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

The British Government remain committed to securing Shaker Aamer’s release and return to the United Kingdom. I raised his case again with Secretary Clinton during my visit to Washington on 12 December. My officials are currently exploring the new US legislation on detainee transfers for the implications for this case.

[Jane Ellison]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for that answer and for the continued efforts of the Government on Mr Aamer’s behalf. Obviously, it has been 10 years so I wonder whether the Foreign Secretary could say more to the House about what he considers to be the roadblocks to release and whether he has given any consideration to asking international bodies, such as the United Nations, to support the British Government in their efforts to release Mr Aamer.

[Mr Hague]

This is a matter for the United States, not for international authorities. My hon. Friend is aware of the difficulties; there have been no transfers out from Guantanamo since the National Defence Authorisation Act, passed in 2010, all but precluded transfers from Guantanamo Bay. The Act has recently been renewed for 2012, with some amendments, which is why we are looking at its implications. We have asked about Mr Aamer’s health and welfare, and have been assured that he is in reasonable health, has access to medical treatment and is not held in solitary confinement.

[Susan Elan Jones (Clwyd South) (Lab)]

3. What assessment he has made of the outcome of the International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn; and if he will make a statement.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

The Bonn conference, which I attended last month, reaffirmed the international community’s long-term commitment to Afghanistan after 2014, through economic support, a plan for funding the Afghan national security forces and a clear set of principles for reconciliation. The Afghan Government committed themselves to progressing their development priorities and upholding their human rights obligations.

[Susan Elan Jones]

I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary for his response. Can he tell us what steps the Government are taking to ensure that women’s human rights are maintained when UK and US troops are drawn down?

[Mr Hague]

We gave a great deal of attention to that at the Bonn conference. The ministerial champion for tackling violence against women and girls overseas attended the civil society events, and I am pleased to say that 50% of the Afghan delegation to the civil society forum were female and a leading female civil society representative presented views at the main conference. The importance of the rights of women and their involvement was centre stage at the Bonn conference, and we assisted in that process.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

The Government’s stated policy objective in Afghanistan is to deny al-Qaeda and other extremists bases from which they can attack the UK and other British interests. In a letter to me of 6 December, copied to the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, referring to the threat from al-Qaeda, said that

“while the threat is not on the scale it once was…it does nevertheless remain a serious concern.”

Does that, which can only be interpreted as a downgrading of the threat in Afghanistan, have any impact on the timetable for withdrawal?

[Mr Hague]

We hope all the time that we are making progress against the threat in Afghanistan, and there is no doubt that in recent times al-Qaeda has suffered very serious damage and setbacks in Afghanistan and its vicinity. That threat is not over, as my hon. Friend was saying, but our efforts to improve security in Afghanistan continue, and it is a combination of our assessment of that threat and the need for continued political progress in Afghanistan to stabilise its regions. It is our assessment of a combination of all those factors that leads to our decisions on troop levels, with a decision for 2012, which we recently announced.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

The developmental teams that will remain after the British military ceases operations in Afghanistan are in danger of becoming top targets for insurgents. Did my right hon. Friend receive any indication from his American counterparts that they envisaged retaining some military capability in strategic bases in Afghanistan after 2014?

[Mr Hague]

The military position after 2014 is under discussion. Indeed, I discussed it this morning with General Allen, commander of the international security assistance force, and important decisions will be made at the NATO summit in Chicago in May next year. We do not envisage that development work in Afghanistan will be without security after 2014. As my hon. Friend knows, we are building up Afghan forces, which are several hundred thousand-strong, in addition to the potential for military co-operation from other states. The position on that will become clearer after the NATO meeting in Chicago.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

The threat from al-Qaeda and the training that takes place in Pakistan is high. What discussions has the Foreign Secretary had with the Pakistani authorities to reduce the threat of al-Qaeda crossing the border into Afghanistan?

[Mr Hague]

We are always in discussion with Pakistan about that subject, and I have many discussions with the Pakistani Foreign Minister about it. We have regular contact at military level, as well as between the Prime Minister of our country and the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Pakistan’s own long struggle against terrorism is always high on that agenda, and we should recognise the efforts that it has made in that regard: huge numbers—perhaps 30,000 people—have died as a result of terrorist activity in Pakistan over the past 10 years. We look to Pakistan to maintain those efforts.

[Mr Peter Bone (Wellingborough) (Con)]

4. What his role would be in a national emergency.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

I would support the Prime Minister and the Government in their response, particularly in an international dimension.

[Mr Bone]

The Foreign Secretary might have a problem with that. Is it true that under Government contingency plans if the Prime Minister were killed in a terrorist attack it would be the Foreign Secretary who took charge of the Government until the Queen could choose a new Prime Minister?

[Mr Hague]

I can assure my hon. Friend that continuity of government plans are in place to deal with any catastrophic destabilising incident. I know that he has asked the same question of my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary, and the answer is the same: we do not consider it appropriate to talk about these plans in public, but I can assure him that arrangements are in place for any such contingency. I cannot guarantee that there will be a place in the bunker for Mrs Bone, I am afraid.

--- Later in debate ---

[Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

7. What recent discussions he has had with representatives of the Palestinian National Authority on rocket attacks on Israel.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

I met the President of the Palestinian Authority yesterday. We are extremely concerned about the recent escalations of violence, including Israeli air strikes on Gaza and rocket attacks by Palestinian groups on Israel. We condemn any actions in which civilians are hurt or killed and have called on all sides to show restraint and avoid a spiral of retaliation.

[Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary for that response. In order to move to a two-state solution in the region, did he stress in his conversations yesterday the importance for Palestinian unity of recognising the Israeli state and bringing an end to the rocket attacks?

[Mr Hague]

Of course, that is extremely important, particularly when one considers the number of rocket attacks—it is reported that 758 rockets were fired from Gaza at Israel in 2011. We certainly discussed Palestinian reconciliation and the fact that any Palestinian Authority constituted as a result must be able to work with Israel towards a two-state solution. I strongly welcomed the initiative of His Majesty the King of Jordan in bringing Palestinians and Israelis together in recent weeks for discussions. That is a positive development that we want to see continue.

[Robert Halfon (Harlow) (Con)]

I welcome my right hon. Friend’s reply to the previous question. With Hamas raining many hundreds of missiles upon Israel, can the Government do more to try to stop weaponry being smuggled through tunnels into Gaza, and does he agree that the more missiles come over, the harder it is to make peace?

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend is absolutely and very evidently right that that does not help peace or the two-state solution that we all so urgently want to see. We call again for such rocket attacks on Israel to end.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I welcome the fact that the Foreign Secretary met the Palestinian President yesterday. In my later discussions with the President, he was at pains to emphasise the urgent need to make substantive progress in the coming days in the negotiations that the Foreign Secretary mentioned are taking place in Jordan. In the light of this urgency, when did the Foreign Secretary last speak with his Israeli counterpart and what steps are the British Government taking to ensure that ongoing Israeli settlement expansion is not allowed to be a reason for these crucial talks to be derailed?

[Mr Hague]

I also spoke yesterday to the Israeli Government, to the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Meridor—I speak sometimes to him and sometimes to my counterpart, Mr Lieberman. On this occasion I called Mr Meridor to stress the need for Israel to respond positively in the negotiations and put forward its own proposals, and I made the case, as I have often done in this House, that Israel needs to make a more decisive and generous offer than we have seen for some years in order to be able to make progress. The Israeli Government are in no doubt about our views and we urge both sides to continue with these talks and not to be so wedded to the 26 January deadline that the opportunity to continue the talks is lost.

[Mr Alexander]

I welcome the tenor of yesterday’s conversation with Deputy Prime Minister Meridor. In an earlier answer the Foreign Secretary mentioned the reconciliation process within the Palestinian community. Alongside the immediate prospects for the latest round of talks, will he give the Government’s assessment of the possible implications of a deal reached between Hamas and Fatah? Given Hamas’s stated position on Israel and the peace process, will he also give an undertaking that any internal political agreement reached within the Palestinian community needs to be assessed in terms of the external political implications on the prospects for peace in the wider region?

[Mr Hague]

I agree with that. As I said in answer to an earlier question, it is very important that the Palestinian Authority are constituted in a way that allows them to conduct negotiations with Israel. That includes, importantly, recognising the previous agreements entered into by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and that is a key point, so we hope that that will be continue to be the position of the Palestinian Authority. Of course, reconciliation is meant to pave the way for elections among Palestinians, and we cannot at this stage pre-judge or predict the outcome of those elections.

[Andrew Percy (Brigg and Goole) (Con)]

The Foreign Secretary is right to call for temperance on all sides, but does he agree that it is unacceptable for senior officials and members of the Palestinian Authority to continue to attend cultural events at which individuals call for the end of the state of Israel, and that it is wrong for those officials to support sporting events named after “martyrs”—people who have murdered innocent Israeli citizens?

[Mr Hague]

We do not support any delegitimisation of the state of Israel. We are friends of Israel, and we support the right of Israel to exist in peace and security, but we believe that that peace and security is best served by urgent moves towards a two-state solution, and that always guides our policy.

[Mrs Linda Riordan (Halifax) (Lab/Co-op)]

8. If he will make representations to the Government of Israel on the increase in demolition of Palestinian homes in the west bank in 2011.

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[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

14. What assessment he has made of his recent visit to Burma; and if he will make a statement.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

I draw the House’s attention to the written statement on my visit to Burma, which was published yesterday. Last week, the Burmese Government and the Karen National Union signed a historic ceasefire. The following day, there was a significant release of political prisoners, which will contribute to greater democratic participation in the parliamentary by-elections. If that momentum can be maintained, we are clearly moving into a new phase in our relations with Burma.

[Mr Gyimah]

As my right hon. Friend says, the release of 651 political prisoners by the Myanmar Government is a major political statement and certainly one that is to be commended. What confidence does he have that all political prisoners will be released in time for the elections in April this year?

[Mr Hague]

The importance of the timing of last week’s announcement is that yesterday—16 January—was the date for any candidates to register to participate in the 1 April elections in Burma. The release of so many prisoners is therefore an important move ahead of those elections.

My hon. Friend is quite right to ask about other political prisoners. Our assessment is that of the 651 prisoners released on Friday, between 270 and 283 could be considered political prisoners. That means that political prisoners remain, although it must be said that there are definitional disputes over what a political prisoner is between the Burma Government and opposition groups. However, we of course look for the release of all political prisoners in Burma while welcoming that move as a major step forward.

[Dr Huppert]

All Members of the House support the release of the political prisoners and share the concern that there are still so many. However, I understand that the released prisoners have not been pardoned, but simply had their sentences suspended. What assurances has the Foreign Secretary had that they will be pardoned and kept out of prison rather than being re-arrested shortly?

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend is quite right about the details, although that seems to be the effective way for the President of Burma to secure the release of the prisoners—the laws allowed him to act decisively to release a large number of prisoners. Of course, let me make it absolutely clear that the improvement in relations between Burma, our country and many other countries would come to a very rapid halt and go into reverse were those prisoners to be taken back into custody, but the President of Burma said to me when I was there 10 days ago that Burma’s progress to democracy is irreversible, and all the Ministers I met said that all political prisoners would be released.

[Meg Munn (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab/Co-op)]

Although I welcome the changes and developments with the Karen people, they are far from the only ethnic minority within Burma with which there have been a lot of tensions and difficulties, as the Foreign Secretary will know. Despite progress in some areas, there has been an increase in attacks on other peoples. What discussions did he have on other ethnic minorities and what pressure is he putting on Burma to ensure that every ethnic grouping is included in the democracy that we hope is developing there?

[Mr Hague]

The hon. Lady is quite right: although what has happened in relation to the Karen people is important, other ethnic conflicts continue. I held a meeting with ethnic representatives from around Burma in Rangoon on my visit there and raised this wider matter with the Government at all the meetings I had with them. I also announced an additional £2 million of humanitarian assistance for displaced people in Kachin state, where fighting continues. It is important for the Government of Burma to understand that resolving the conflicts more widely around the borders and ethnic areas remains important.

[Kerry McCarthy (Bristol East) (Lab)]

The Opposition join the Foreign Secretary in welcoming the release of political prisoners in Burma although, as he has acknowledged, many hundreds of men and women remain in prison there for their political beliefs. Will he tell the House what he did to push the Burmese regime to allow greater access for the world’s media, particularly in the run-up to the elections in April, now that restrictions have started to be lifted?

[Mr Hague]

I made the point to Government Ministers there that part of the essential opening up to the rest of the world is access for media representatives. Indeed, on my visit I was able to facilitate that access for the first time and to ensure that BBC correspondents could go to places or get invited to press conferences to which they would not previously have been invited. Each international visit helps to prise open to a greater extent the media’s access to Burma. We will continue with those efforts.

[Simon Kirby (Brighton, Kemptown) (Con)]

Will the Foreign Secretary join me in extending continued support to the pro-democracy campaigner Aung San Suu Kyi?

[Mr Hague]

I certainly will. I spent the best part of 24 hours with Aung San Suu Kyi during my visit to Rangoon. She is an inspirational figure, a great leader and a great hope for the future of her country.

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[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

This week, I am visiting Brazil as part of our efforts to transform our engagement with emerging powers in Latin America. I will also co-chair the UK-Caribbean ministerial forum, which will reinvigorate our historic ties with those countries.

[Margot James]

Islamic fundamentalist violence has been increasing in Nigeria for more than a decade, and has now erupted beyond the northern region. What does my right hon. Friend think can be done to counteract this threat to Nigeria and to sub-Saharan Africa as a whole?

[Mr Hague]

We are focusing on that threat. We are sharing with Nigeria our expertise on counter-terrorism policy and on legal frameworks. We are also providing assistance with specific capabilities such as managing the consequences of a terrorist attack. In all of this, we are in close touch with our partners in the European Union and the United States. We are also supporting programmes in the north of Nigeria to address the root causes of insecurity, such as poverty and social inequality.

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

Will the Foreign Secretary give the House his assessment of the calls by leading members of the Free Syrian army for the Arab League to refer the issue of Syria to the United Nations Security Council? In the light of the difficulties encountered by the Arab League observer mission, and on the basis of the aforementioned discussions with Foreign Minister Lavrov, does the Foreign Secretary believe that there is any realistic prospect of the Russian Government altering their stance on Syria?

[Mr Hague]

I think that it would be right for the Arab League to bring its concerns and any decision that it makes at its forthcoming meetings—it has two coming up, on the 19th and 22nd—to the UN Secretary-General and UN Security Council. Over recent weeks, I have encouraged the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Mr al-Arabi, to bring Arab concerns directly to the Security Council, because I believe that the time is long overdue for the Security Council to be able to speak on Syria with a united voice. The right hon. Gentleman will recall—his question partly referred to this—that when we last tried to do so, on 4 October, our resolution was vetoed by Russia and China. I am not optimistic that the situation with regard to Russia’s attitude would be different at the moment, but we will continue to discuss the matter with Russia. It would help if the Arab League were to come to the UN directly with its concerns.

[Simon Kirby (Brighton, Kemptown) (Con)]

T2. Will the Foreign Secretary assure the patriotic Falkland Islands that any posturing by the Argentine Government will be met with a very firm response?

[Mr Hague]

I can assure my hon. Friend of that. The view across and in all parts of the House on the Falkland Islands is firm and consistent: we believe in the self-determination of the people of the Falkland Islands, and it is their self-determination, of course, that they wish to remain British.

[Sandra Osborne (Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) (Lab)]

T4. In line with the recent report by the UN rapporteur on torture, will the Minister condemn the practice by Israel of holding children in solitary confinement, and will he make representations for the release of the 106 children who remain detained within the Israeli military prison system?

[Mr Peter Bone (Wellingborough) (Con)]

T3. Under the Government’s excellent new human trafficking strategy, the Foreign Office is required to have country business plans obliging ambassadors and high commissioners to take appropriate local action against human trafficking. What action has been taken?

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend is quite right to raise this matter. We have highlighted to our posts around the world the key commitments in the human trafficking strategy that they can help to deliver. Those include engaging with foreign Governments to ensure that common challenges are identified, and encouraging them to work with us to address those challenges. We have asked each of our posts to identify a single point of contact on human trafficking, and we are working in consultation with colleagues across government and with non-governmental organisations to bring together all the work that is already going on, including on the specific local challenges in each country. He can therefore be assured that our posts across the world are working hard on this.

[Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)]

T5. What assessment have the Government made of recent calls by the Qatari leadership for Arab states to intervene militarily to stop the bloodshed in Syria, and would the Foreign Secretary support such action?

[Mr Hague]

That is one view—and an important view, of course, coming from the leadership of a state such as Qatar. As I mentioned in reply to the right hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), the Arab League is meeting on the 19th and 22nd, so we should not presume that this is the view of the whole Arab League. Although we continue to increase the pressure on the Assad regime and strongly support the Arab League’s work, the hon. Gentleman will be aware that we have not called for military intervention in Syria, the consequences of which would be far more difficult to foresee than in Libya and the legal authority for which does not exist. As things stand, therefore, this is a distinct case from that of Libya.

[Steve Brine (Winchester) (Con)]

T8. The Foreign Secretary’s previously referred to visit to Brazil this week is welcome and continues his much-needed drive to make trade the cutting edge of British diplomacy. As the balance of world economic activity shifts to the east and the south, would he agree that a blinkered approach to trade inside the European Union is not only very last century but painfully lacking in ambition?

[Mr Hague]

We need both actually. Given the flat economies in the eurozone and the fact that exports to the eurozone have fallen over recent years, it is doubly important that we develop our export markets across the rest of the world. However, there is also a strong case for driving growth within Europe, through free trade agreements with the rest of the world, by pushing forward the single market in services and digital services and by removing regulatory barriers to growth. The Prime Minister will very much be pushing that agenda at the European Council on 30 January.

[Susan Elan Jones (Clwyd South) (Lab)]

T6. Will the Secretary of State tell us what steps, if any, are being taken to prepare for the possible implications of Iran’s seeking to close the straits of Hormuz?

[Mr Hague]

As the Defence Secretary pointed out in his speech in Washington a short while ago, any such attempt to close the straits of Hormuz would be illegal and I believe that it would be unsuccessful. It would also be damaging to Iran—to its own economy and its own situation. I think it is important for Iran to desist from statements on this subject and to engage instead with the offer of negotiations with the E3 plus 3 countries. In the meantime, we are working ahead of next week’s Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels to extend sanctions on Iran, including an oil embargo on a phased basis. Work on that is going on now to increase the peaceful pressure on Iran to negotiate.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

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[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

While my right hon. Friend strives to halt the tragic loss of life in Syria, will he also be mindful of Harold Macmillan’s advice that one should never underestimate the capacity of a middle eastern state to replace a bad Government by an even worse one—or, may I add, by no effective Government at all, which could create even greater bloodshed?

[Mr Hague]

It is not only middle eastern states that do this from time to time. I very much take what my right hon. Friend says, but I have to point out that there has been, I think, a better trend than that during the last year, which can be seen if we look at events in Libya and Tunisia and at democratic developments in Morocco and Jordan. Nevertheless, my right hon. Friend’s warning is well taken: we always listen to the words of Harold Macmillan and to his.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

Has the Foreign Secretary had a chance to read the reports from the Carter Centre, the European Union, the United Nations and the Catholic Church of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the recent conduct of the presidential elections there and the barely credible reports of a 100% turnout in some areas, which led to President Kabila being declared the winner and the British ambassador attending his inauguration? What representations is the right hon. Gentleman making to the DRC Government concerning those elections and the future of democratic elections in that country?

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

As we discovered during events surrounding the invasion of Iraq, it is essential for states to act only on hard evidence. In relation to Iran, will the Secretary of State encourage not only Iran itself but the whole international community to listen carefully to the International Atomic Energy Agency this time?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, it is very important to listen carefully to what is said by the International Atomic Energy Authority. As my hon. Friend will know, it was a report from the IAEA which, in November, referred to the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme and the concern that was felt about it. That has fortified our determination—the determination of countries throughout the European Union—to adopt the measures that we will be discussing next week although, as my hon. Friend has said, they must always be based on hard evidence.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)]

What assessment has the Foreign Secretary made of the current crisis in Pakistan and its possible implications for our country?

[Mr Hague]

We have been making a continuous assessment of political events and tensions in Pakistan over recent weeks and days, and we are in close touch with a variety of Pakistani leaders. My noble Friend Baroness Warsi was in Pakistan for several days last week and met many of the leading figures there. We are friends of a democratic Pakistan—across the House we are friends of a democratic Pakistan—and we look to all concerned in both the political and the military leadership to work together to ensure a democratic and constitutional future for their country.

[Andrew Rosindell (Romford) (Con)]

I know that the Foreign Secretary will share my disappointment at the news that the overseas territories have been refused permission to enter a vessel in the diamond jubilee river pageant in June. Will he assure the House that they will be granted full recognition and participation in the diamond jubilee celebrations?

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations can play an important role in encouraging the Burmese to maintain the progress that he described earlier?

[Mr Hague]

Yes. That is particularly true given that Burma will have the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014. One of the points that we made to other ASEAN nations at the United Nations General Assembly last year, before Burma’s appointment, was that the country must be pushed in the right direction—the direction in which it is now moving—if it expected to have the chairmanship, and those nations seem to be working well together.

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

What steps can be taken to limit the shipment of arms and munitions from Iran in particular to militant groups in Palestine?

[Mr Hague]

We are very concerned about the shipment of arms by Iran, and about Iran’s consistent support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, but there has been evidence over time of arms shipments from Iran to other parts of the region as well. We will always express our concern about those actions, and will always encourage other countries in the region to live up to their own legal responsibilities to intercept illicit armed shipments. That is certainly happens, but we will always encourage those countries to ensure that it continues.

[Rushanara Ali (Bethnal Green and Bow) (Lab)]

What assurances did the Foreign Secretary seek and secure from the Burmese Government that there would be free and fair elections in April?

[Mr Hague]

That main assurance I sought was that at least a large tranche of political prisoners, but preferably all of them, would be released before the date on which candidates should register for the elections. I warned the president directly that the elections would not be considered free and fair if most political prisoners were still in prison and unable to stand. That is why I am pleased that so many prisoners were released a few days before the deadline for registration. We will now have to judge the circumstances in which those elections take place—to judge whether there is free debate in the media and out in the country—but I can certainly say on the basis of my meeting with the committee of the Mutual League for Democracy that there is real enthusiasm and determination to ensure that such free debate does take place.

[Mr James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con)]

At this sensitive time in relations with Iran, will the Government still do what they can to encourage Iran to improve its record on religious persecution—for instance, in the case of Pastor Yousef Nadarkhani, who apparently faces a death sentence unless he is prepared to give up his Christian beliefs?

Ministerial Visits (Burma)

Lord Hague of Richmond Excerpts

Monday 16th January 2012 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague)]

I would like to update the House on my visit to Burma on 5-6 January.

This was an historic visit; the first by a British Foreign Secretary since 1955. It was an opportunity to show that we recognise the efforts of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the Government to drive forward important reforms. I also wanted to set out clearly to the Government the changes that we would want to see before we could support lifting EU sanctions.

I met the President, the Foreign Minister and the Speaker of the Lower House. I welcomed progress made so far, including the dialogue between the Government and Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the changes in the law that allowed her party to register for the forthcoming by-elections, the initial releases of political prisoners, and the moves towards greater media freedom. I informed them of the allocation from the Department for International Development of £10 million of existing aid for microfinance for the Burmese people, and announced an additional £2 million of humanitarian aid to benefit people in Kachin State, the site of some of the worst ethnic conflict.

I set out clearly with all my interlocutors the steps which would be needed before a more fundamental shift in our relationship could take place. These are: the release of all political prisoners in time for the by-elections on 1 April; the free and fair conduct of those by-elections; and humanitarian access to conflict areas, particularly in Kachin State, alongside a clear process of reconciliation. I made it clear that if these three conditions were met the UK would support the easing of the EU sanctions.

I was assured by the President that the reforms would continue, that further political prisoner releases would go ahead, and that by-elections would be free and fair. He was confident that the Burmese Government would soon achieve ceasefires nationwide, and acknowledged the need for humanitarian assistance in conflict areas.

I raised with the Foreign Minister the discrimination suffered by the Rohingya community, who have been denied citizenship and access to basic services and rights. We will continue to press the Burmese Government on this issue.

I held two meetings with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and assured her of the UK’s continued support for her efforts to promote reform and democracy in Burma. She repeated her core priorities: the release of all political prisoners and an improvement in the rule of law; and the need for the by-elections to be free and fair as well as progress on the complex ethnic situation.

I met representatives from other opposition groups, including the 88 Generation leaders and former political prisoners. I also met a range of representatives from ethnic communities, including the Kachin, Rohingya, Shan, Rakhine, Chin, Mon, Karen and Karenni to hear more about their concerns and aspirations. We will continue to stay close to these and other ethnic groups to ensure we remain seized of the issues they face.

I am delighted to say that following my visit, there have been significant further developments on some of the issues I raised with the Government.

On 12 January, the Government and the Karen National Union signed a ceasefire after 63 years of conflict. There is still a long way to go to rebuild fully trust between the parties, but this is an important step in the right direction.

I also warmly welcome the release of a significant number of political prisoners on 13 January. Exact numbers are still being verified but those released include Generation 88 and ethnic leaders. This is another positive step on the road to reform in Burma.

The British Government will continue to follow developments in Burma closely. We will support progress, while remaining vigilant on human rights issues, especially in areas affected by ethnic conflict.