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Public Bill Committees
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.
We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting showing how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group will be called first. For debates on clause stand part, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate that they wish to speak in the debate by bobbing—please bob on each occasion you wish to speak during the proceedings.
At the end of a debate on a group of amendments and new clauses, I will call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate if they wish to withdraw the amendment or new clause or to seek a decision. If someone wants to withdraw an amendment, I will look to the Whips for confirmation that they are in agreement with that. If they are not, we will go to a Division. If a Member wishes to press another amendment—this includes grouped new clauses—to a vote, that is at the Chair’s discretion. Any Divisions on amendments and new clauses will take place in the order they appear on the amendment paper.
As today is the first sitting, I will give an opportunity now for anybody to make any declarations they feel are relevant to this Bill.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Alec. I would like to declare that I live in leasehold property with cladding.
Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)
I am a chartered member of the Royal Institute of British Architects.
I live in a leasehold property, although it does not have any cladding.
Sagal Abdi-Wali (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)
I am still a councillor in a local authority.
Clause 1
In-scope buildings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 2, in clause 40, page 22, line 19, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) For the purposes of this Part, a ‘relevant building’ includes any building to which Requirement B4(1) of Schedule 1 of the Building Regulations 2010 applies.”
This amendment would define relevant buildings as any building to which B4(1) of Building Regulations applies.
Clauses 40 to 44 stand part.
New clause 1—Meaning of “properly remediated”—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall by regulations specify the circumstances in which the external walls of buildings of different purpose groups and heights are ‘properly remediated’ to satisfy Requirement B4(1) in Schedule 1 of the Building Regulations 2010.
(2) Regulations made under this section must ensure that—
(a) Fire Risk Appraisals of the External Wall (FRAEW) are based on the requirements set out in Requirement B4(1) in Schedule 1 of the Building Regulations 2010; and
(b) Regulation 7(2) of the Building Regulations 2010, rather than PAS 9980: 2026, forms the basis of any FRAEW conducted following this Act receiving Royal Assent.”
This new clause replaces the "tolerable risk" standard in clause 44 with an objective statutory requirement anchored in Requirement B4(1) in Schedule 1 of the Building Regulations 2010; and Building Regulation 7(2).
New clause 2—Building Regulations: relevant building for the purposes of materials and workmanship—
“(1) Regulation 7(4) of the Building Regulations 2010 (materials and workmanship) is amended as follows.
(2) For paragraph (a) substitute—
‘(a) a “relevant building” means an occupied building to which requirement B4(1) of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations 2010 (external fire spread) applies.’”
This new clause extends the definition of “relevant buildings” for the purposes of material and workmanship to cover occupied buildings other than those exempt from Building Regulations.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship for the first time, Sir Alec. I thank the witnesses who gave evidence in our sittings last week. I hope that Committee members found the sessions useful. I think it was a positive and engaging discussion of topics raised by all interested parties.
I continue to believe that we agree on the core principles of this Bill: the building safety crisis must be resolved, homes must be made safe, residents must be allowed to move on with their lives, and a tragedy like Grenfell must never be allowed to happen again. The Government’s mission is to ensure that everyone has a safe, decent and affordable home. This Bill is one step towards achieving that. The Bill has four objectives: to identify all buildings requiring remediation, to make it clear who is responsible for remediation, to make those responsible for the crisis pay to put it right and to ensure that no building is left behind.
We will begin by discussing some of the core definitions that establish what the Bill is designed to achieve. Clause 1 is essential in that endeavour, as it makes clear which buildings are included under part 1 remediation duties. Residents and responsible entities need certainty about which buildings are in scope of the regime. The clause provides that by clearly establishing that the chapter 1 regime applies to relevant buildings completed before 28 June 2022. The June 2022 cut-off ensures that the regime remains focused on addressing historical fire safety defects in existing building stock.
Buildings completed after that date are not within the scope of the Government’s remediation programme because they are not associated with the cladding and building safety issues that the programme was established to address. The date also aligns the regime with the leaseholder protections introduced by the Building Safety Act 2022. That ensures that any relevant costs arising from those measures fall within scope of these protections.
Clause 40 defines relevant buildings as multi-occupied residential buildings in England that are at least 11 metres high or have at least five storeys. The clause also makes it clear how connected developments are treated. A whole building is self-contained if it is structurally detached. Clause 41 supports that definition by defining how building height and storeys should be counted. Clear measurement rules are needed to determine whether a building is in scope of part 1. Without them, features such as sloping ground, basements, mezzanines and rooftop plant areas could lead to different conclusions about whether a building is covered. Together, those provisions give responsible entities and regulators a consistent basis for identifying buildings within scope and applying the regime.
Clear duties need clear accountability. Clause 42 provides clarity by identifying who is the responsible entity for the purpose of part 1. Put simply, the responsible entity is the party with the relevant repairing obligation of the external walls, as they are the party with the right to carry out the works at the building. Depending on the building’s ownership and management arrangements, that could be a freeholder, head lessee, sub-lessee, right-to-manage company or resident management company. Responsibility therefore follows the relevant repairing or maintenance obligation, rather than ownership alone. Where responsibility is shared for the same walls, the duty applies jointly and individually, so each responsible entity is responsible for compliance, not just an agreed share. Those provisions sit alongside the duty to co-operate in clause 29, requiring those with shared or divided responsibilities to work together.
Clause 43 provides clarity on what forms part of a building’s external walls for the purpose of part 1. External fire safety risks do not arise from cladding alone; they can arise from different parts of the external wall system and how those parts interact. The definition therefore covers the external wall as a whole, so assessments and remediation are not limited to the primary wall structure or cladding alone. The clause sets out that the external wall system includes doors and windows, cladding systems and their components, balconies and other external attachments, materials within the wall spaces and external finishes. That gives responsible entities and regulators a clear, consistent basis for identifying what must be assessed and remediated and reduces uncertainty or disputes about the scope of their duties.
Clause 44 provides a clear end point for the remediation under part 1 of the Bill. It sets the standards of work and risk reduction required before a building’s external walls can be considered properly remediated. The principle is simple: fire safety risk relating to the external walls must be either eliminated or reduced to a tolerable level on a permanent basis. That is a proportionate, risk-based approach. It will ensure that fire safety risks relating to the external walls have been permanently reduced to a level at which residents can safely leave their homes without relying on temporary measures for their protection. That is consistent with the approach already used in the Government’s remediation programmes.
“Permanent” means permanent. A building cannot be considered properly remediated simply because residents have been moved out or a waking watch is in place. Those measures may keep residents safe while remediation is under way, but they do not address the underlying external wall risk. This clause also allows Government to set out in regulations further detail about when a risk can be considered tolerable. That will provide greater clarity for responsible entities and regulators about when a building has been properly remediated.
This package of clauses sets out the core definitions that underpin the policy within part 1 of the Bill. While this is an area of lively discussion, I believe the Government have struck the right balance to ensure we achieve the objectives set out for this Bill. I therefore commend clauses 1, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 to the Committee.
Gideon Amos
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the chair, Sir Alec, and to serve again with colleagues from across the House in this Committee.
This is a very serious Bill and it is important we get it right. Our amendments, and the group as a whole, go to the heart of the Bill and what is meant by an acceptable standard to reach in remediation. Clause 44 suggests that a definition of tolerability will arise from the application of publicly available specification—PAS—9980. We have serious concerns about the application of a standard which, as witnesses said in the oral evidence sessions, includes significant subjectivity in its application. What is needed is a clear and unequivocal standard to which to remediate buildings that are part of this regime. Our amendment 2 would define relevant buildings as
“any building to which Requirement B4(1) of Schedule 1 of the Building Regulations 2010 applies.”
That means that regulations would be applied in the same way that other building regulations are.
For example, if one was to take on a large commercial building and convert it into flats, the 2010 building regulations would apply because one is carrying out material building works, so one must bring the building up to scratch. The same standard should be required under the remediation scheme under this Bill. What is proposed in the Bill would limit the standard’s application. By the way, it is common practice to bring such buildings up to scratch in that way in relation to not just fire safety, but ventilation, heat and sanitary provision. In the case of conversion and material change of use, the building regulations must be met as a whole. The proposed standard is very different and applies by virtue of clause 40 only to buildings over 11 metres. We propose straightforward application of the regulations in the same way that building regulations apply to any building in which builders and owners are engaging in substantive works. That is the appropriate approach.
New clauses 1 and 2 are related to that point. New clause 1 would replace the “tolerable” risk standard in clause 44 with an objective statutory requirement anchored in paragraph B4(1) of schedule 1 to the Building Regulations 2010. In 2018, post-Grenfell, building regulations were tightened to set a standard that all new buildings have since needed to reach, which is logical and reassuring for people living in those new homes. However, that is not the remediation standard at the heart of the Bill; that is a very different standard, so we are entering a two-tier housing market in which buildings built according to the building regulations meet one standard but buildings remediated under the Bill will meet a lower, inferior standard.
The problems of the people living in such buildings are well known: they cannot get insurance even after remediation. I visited a block of apartments where remediation has been carried out but the flammable cladding remains on the exterior of the building. The risk is considered tolerable because—I think the Minister mentioned this—there is enough time to leave the building while it is on fire. That is not the standard that is expected of people building homes: a new and much higher standard is required and that standard should be applied to remediating buildings.
The witnesses raised those issues. The Opposition spokesperson asked Dame Judith Hackitt,
“Do you believe that we are missing a trick by not imposing similar conditions here?”
He meant a standard, objective requirement set in legislation. Dame Judith replied:
“Yes, I do. Defining tolerable risk in statute and getting buy-in from residents and other stakeholders, including investors and insurers, is key to making progress.”––[Official Report, Building Safety (Remediation of Unsafe Cladding etc) Public Bill Committee, 12 November 2026; c. 66-67, Q105.]
Ian Abley, an expert in building inspection, said, referring to the Building Regulations 2010:
“As Giles Grover said, you need a technical standard that is the legally minimum adequate of what is requirement B4(1).”––[Official Report, Building Safety (Remediation of Unsafe Cladding etc) Public Bill Committee, 12 November 2026; c. 64, Q101.]
Fundamentally, we need the same safety standard as we expect builders of new buildings to meet. Our new clause 2 would, by changing the scope of the buildings to which the Building Regulations 2010 apply, ensure that they embrace all buildings on which works are being carried out, in the same way that other buildings engage building regulations. The same definition would be applied.
We need to match the standard for new buildings. The Liberal Democrats are seriously concerned about a standard that has been described as “subjective” and relies on the decisions of building safety assessors who are employed by the building owner and may have an interest in suggesting that as little work as possible is carried out. Although I am sure that most building safety assessors do a very professional job, it is a concern that they are in the pay of the building owners, as is the use of what has been described in the witness evidence sessions as a “subjective” standard. We should replace it with a defined standard, as in the building regulations applied to new homes built today.
Building regulations are important but they are not right for testing decisions that remediation is complete. I hope that the hon. Gentleman accepts that the purpose of the building regulations is to set standards for new building works, rather than to determine whether the fire safety risk that prompted remediation in an existing building has been addressed.
Sarah Gibson (Chippenham) (LD)
As the Minister will be aware, one issue in planning is that a case-by-case approach causes massive amounts of delay, additional cost and concern to both parties. The use of “tolerable” was raised repeatedly in the evidence session. It will place that same level of ambiguity on something that is incredibly important and that needs to be resolved quickly and clearly. While we have a lack of assessors and, to an extent, a lack of control over the decision-making processes and, perhaps, quality of some of the assessors, increased clarity as to what standards they are trying to apply is incredibly important. We are in danger of having a situation that will just favour the legal profession.
I thank the hon. Member for that comment and share some of the concerns that she outlined. The issue of capacity is key. This is scalable and has a strong track record. Our analysis indicates that there is currently sufficient assessor capacity to meet expected demand. However, supply and demand are finely balanced, so responsible entities would plan ahead. We will continue to monitor the situation closely and to take action to help mitigate any risks.
To come back to the issue outlined by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, the Bill provides a specific endpoint for remediation. External wall fire safety risks must be eliminated or reduced to a tolerable level on a permanent basis. This keeps the focus on addressing the actual risk to buildings and residents, while ensuring that remediation work continues to comply with building regulations.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Duty to carry out assessment of risks
Gideon Amos
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 2, page 2, line 9, at end insert—
“(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) a person is a ‘suitable professional’ only if they are—
(a) a building inspector registered with the Building Safety Regulator; and
(b) not connected with the responsible entity or a body corporate associated with the responsible entity.
(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A)(b), a person is connected with the responsible entity or a body corporate associated with the responsible entity if—
(a) the person is employed by, receiving direct remuneration from, or contracted to other than for the purposes of carrying out an assessment under subsection (1)(a), the responsible entity or a body corporate associated with the responsible entity, or
(b) there exists any other commercial conflict of interest between the person and the responsible entity or a body corporate associated with the responsible entity.”
This amendment prohibits responsible entities (building owners/landlords) from appointing or directly paying assessors where a conflict of interest exists. It requires external wall assessments to be conducted by independent assessors registered with the Building Safety Regulator.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 21, in clause 2, page 2, line 15, leave out from “which” to end and insert
“the Secretary of State has published an assessment of assessor capacity which demonstrates evidence that enough suitably qualified assessors exist to allow the deadline to be met.”
This amendment would amend the deadline for carrying out risk assessments until 10 months after the Secretary of State published an assessment of assessor capacity which demonstrates evidence that enough suitably qualified assessors exist to allow the deadline to be met.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 1, in clause 3, page 2, line 23, leave out lines 23 to 26 and insert—
“(i) containing a statement to the effect that the external walls already comply with Regulation 7(2) of the Building Regulations 2010 as if the building were a ‘relevant building’ for the purposes of Regulation 7(4), or
(ii) where the walls do not comply with Regulation 7(2) of the Building Regulations 2010 as if the building were a ‘relevant building’ for the purposes of Regulation 7(4), making recommendations for remediation within subsection (2).”
This amendment removes the subjective “intolerable risk” assessment threshold in Clause 3(1)(b). It requires external wall assessors to certify whether external walls meet the objective combustibility standards of Building Regulation 7(2), regardless of height limitations in Regulation 7(4), or otherwise recommend remediation to achieve that standard.
Clauses 3 and 4 stand part.
Gideon Amos
Amendment 5 would prohibit responsible entities—building owners and landlords—from appointing or directly paying assessors where a conflict of interest exists. It would require external wall assessments to be conducted by independent assessors registered with the Building Safety Regulator. This would be an important amendment in addressing the potential conflict of interest that I identified in relation to the previous group. We need assessors who are independently appointed and not chosen and paid by the building owners.
The report of the Grenfell Tower statutory inquiry, chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, recommended that the Government consider whether building safety assessors should be part of a national body, a national service, independent of those being appointed by building owners. The subsequent review carried out by the Government concluded that there are ways in which the existing system can continue, but we contend that a different approach is required post Grenfell. The risk was highlighted in the Grenfell Tower report. We need assessors who are not paid by the building owners and are free of potential conflicts of interest. This is a straightforward amendment, and I propose it on that basis.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Alec. Amendment 21 stands in my name. Building safety work is critical work. It is vital not only that an effort is made to see all dangerous buildings fully remediated, but that such efforts are properly staffed, resourced and supported. Unfortunately, that is not currently the case. Remediation is a slow and complicated task and an undertaking that requires specialist assessments, trained engineers and skilled assessors. Those are in short supply, and the training needed to perform those roles is long and detailed. We must not give people trapped inside unsafe homes the false hope of a swift and straightforward end to their anxieties when we know that the manpower to undertake the task simply is not there. That would be poor legislating and damaging to what little trust remains in a system still reeling from the wider impacts of the tragic Grenfell Tower fire.
That is why I tabled amendment 21, which seeks to amend the deadline for carrying out risk assessments to 10 months after the Secretary of State has published an assessment of assessor capacity that demonstrates evidence that enough suitably qualified assessors exist to allow the deadline to be met. Without the knowledge that there are enough trained professionals to start and complete the work, we cannot offer residents the certainty that vital work can proceed. Without that certainty, it would be remiss of the Government to progress and it would be another failure that the system and residents cannot afford.
I thank the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington for amendment 5. The Government agree that fire risk assessments must be robust and subject to appropriate independent assurances, but requiring assessments to be carried out by registered building inspectors is not the right approach to achieve that. Building inspectors and fire risk professionals perform different roles and require different skillsets. Building inspectors assess compliance with the building regulations. Fire risk assessors and fire engineers have specialist expertise in assessing fire risks. Registration as a building inspector is therefore not the right test of whether someone has the expertise needed to carry out these assessments.
The amendment would also significantly restrict the pool of professionals able to undertake this work. Excluding suitably qualified fire risk assessors and fire engineers because they do not also register as building inspectors would place further pressure on assessor capacity, slowing assessments and ultimately delaying the remediation of unsafe buildings. The Government are separately taking forward reforms following the Grenfell Tower inquiry to strengthen the competence and regulation of fire risk assessors and fire engineers.
The Bill will also provide independent assurances over the quality of assessments. Homes England will audit all external wall assessments, recommending mitigation or remediation, and it can also audit those where no work is recommended. That will provide an important safeguard against poor-quality assessments and conflicts of interest, ensuring that recommendations are independently tested, properly evidenced and proportionate. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 21, tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, would make the 10-month assessment deadline dependent on the Government first demonstrating that there is sufficient assessor capacity. I share and understand the concerns about capacity, but I do not agree that the assessment deadline should be delayed. This is not a new requirement. Responsible persons have long been required under the fire safety order to regularly assess and manage fire safety risks. The Fire Safety Act 2021 clarified that that includes risks associated with external walls. We therefore expect the majority of buildings to have already been assessed. The Bill will not create a new assessment exercise across the whole building stock. It will set a final deadline for the remaining buildings to be assessed, so that any necessary remediation will progress.
Our analysis indicates that there is enough assessor capacity to meet the remaining demand. Making the deadline dependent on an assessment of capacity would create uncertainty and risks, and delay assessments, ultimately slowing remediation.
Peter Fortune (Bromley and Biggin Hill) (Con)
Does the Minister agree that some of that uncertainty is caused by residents of these blocks not being communicated with effectively?
I share the hon. Member’s concern. That is a big feature that has come out during this, and it is why we have to be very clear in legislation on the legal duty to remediate and on who is responsible. We also need to be clear that, if no one takes responsibility, the Secretary of State will come in and instruct people to remediate those buildings. It is important that that is communicated clearly.
Amendment 21 would not support the Bill’s objective to drive the pace of remediation forward. It could leave residents facing a longer wait for risks to be identified and necessary works to begin. The Bill already provides a safeguard where genuine capacity constraints prevent the deadline from being met. They may amount to a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. I hope that that explanation will go some way to assuring the hon. Member for Orpington, and I ask him not to press the amendment.
I turn to amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington. The safety of residents is paramount, but making a building safe does not always require all cladding to be removed. The amendment would replace the Bill’s risk-based approach with a requirement to remediate external walls wherever they do not meet the restrictions on combustible materials in the building regulations. That would be a significant departure from the established approach to remediation.
Building regulations and fire risk assessments have different purposes. Remediation work has to comply with current building regulations when it involves building work, but that does not mean that the whole building must be brought up to new-build standards. Instead, we will use secondary legislation to require fire risk appraisals of external walls to follow PAS 9980. This will provide a single, consistent approach to assessing external walls.
Sarah Gibson
As the Minister will remember, during last Thursday’s evidence sessions, the majority of the witnesses expressed significant concern about the lack of clarity in PAS 9980. The amendment addresses the same problem that I raised then and earlier: the word “tolerable” is so open and ambiguous. Through the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Taunton and Wellington, we seek clarity for assessors, residents and those carrying out the works. If someone owns a building and wishes to get insurance on it, or wants their residents to be able to mortgage it, they need something that is clear. At the end of the day, our building regulations control building safety.
I have heard the concerns raised by witnesses and right hon. and hon. Members. PAS 9980 already underpins the Government’s remediation programmes, and we are confident that it provides a robust and proportionate way of assessing external wall fire safety risks and identifying what is needed to keep residents safe.
Returning to a less proportionate approach would be a step backwards: remediation would take longer, cost more and cause more inconvenience to residents. It would also undermine the remediation work being carried out under Government funds and the developer remediation contract, to the significant detriment of insurance, mortgages and housing markets. There is no better alternative currently available. Although PAS 9980 is being embedded in the legislation, I hope the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington will see that, should a new and improved standard arrive, it can be updated relatively simply using secondary legislation. His amendment 1 would replace that with a more prescriptive approach, which could lead to unnecessary and prolonged disruption without necessarily making residents safer. For those reasons, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.
I turn to clauses 2 to 4. Clause 2 is an essential building block for the wider duties in the Bill. All relevant buildings should already have been assessed. Where they have not, clause 2 sets out a clear deadline by which responsible entities must act or face severe and escalating penalties. This ensures that buildings requiring mitigation or remediation are put on a clear path to action. We are concerned that some buildings with unsafe external walls may not yet have been identified, leaving residents unknowingly exposed to fire safety risk. Assessment is the crucial first step in the remediation process: unsafe external wall defects cannot be mitigated or remediated unless they are first identified through a compliant fire risk assessment carried out by a suitable professional.
We are drawing a clear line. Every building covered by the Bill must be assessed for fire safety risks within a fixed period, from 16 May 2022 to 10 months after the clause comes into force. The introduction of a clear legal deadline for assessing external walls aims to deter delay and avoidance. Where a fire risk assessment of external walls recommends remediation or mitigation, it must also be provided to Homes England by the statutory deadline. This allows Homes England to independently audit relevant assessments and check that recommendations are robust, proportionate and evidence-based.
Robust fire risk assessments of external walls form the foundation of the part 1 regime. They determine the level of external wall fire safety risk and the action needed to address it. They also inform the wider fire risk assessments, helping to build a complete picture of fire risk across the building. We need a clear and consistent approach to these assessments so that there is certainty about how external walls should be assessed and what action should follow.
Gideon Amos
The Minister has responded to amendments 5 and 1, both of which I tabled—although I spoke mainly to amendment 5. I do not believe that anyone on the Committee doubts the sincerity with which the Minister brings forward this legislation—we know that she cares deeply about these issues—but, although much of the process in the Bill is acceptable, we have a fundamental issue with the standard of remediation.
Amendment 5 is in two parts. In her response, the Minister dwelt mainly on the part setting out that assessments must be carried out by a building inspector registered with the Building Safety Regulator. She highlighted the distinction between building safety assessors and building inspectors, and she was quite right to do so. It would be possible, of course, to ensure via secondary legislation that building safety assessors were included under the umbrella of “building inspectors” in that part of the amendment, so I do not believe that that is a significant obstacle to passing the amendment.
The Bill goes further by putting independent audits on a statutory footing. Homes England will audit those FRAEWs, recommending any mitigation or remediation, and will have the power to audit assessments that conclude that no work is required. Does the hon. Member agree that that is a positive step forward in addressing some of the concerns that many Members have raised?
Gideon Amos
I do accept that, and I very much support the concept of the audits. I think that is a positive part of what the Government are doing. It will strengthen the regime and is a valuable step towards assuring the quality of assessments—although only from a sample of FRAEWs. We need a more robust approach at the beginning of the process, rather than relying on an audit at the end of the process.
As I was saying, the Minister responded mainly to the amendment in relation to what was included under “building inspector”, and I believe that I have dealt with that. The more important part of the amendment sets out that the assessor should not be connected with the responsible entity or a body corporate associated with the responsible entity. An associated person would mean a person employed by, receiving direct remuneration from or contracted to that building owner.
That is the key part of the amendment. It demonstrates the importance of ensuring that fire risk assessors should not be directly employed or remunerated by those who have an interest in the amount of work carried out in that building. We believe that there needs to be an independent national service, fully in line with the conclusions of the Grenfell Tower inquiry report. We will press the amendment to a vote.
I share the hon. Member’s concerns. Another way we are hoping to strengthen this area is by committing to introducing mandatory accreditation to certify the competence of all fire risk assessors, as well as regulating fire engineers. Preventing anyone who is employed or paid by the responsible entity from carrying out the assessment could restrict who can carry out the assessments without necessarily providing the reassurance or capacity that we need. Does he not agree?
Gideon Amos
I am grateful to the Minister for her intervention. Of course, any additional safeguards are valuable, and we will not oppose any of those additional measures, but the fundamental point is that our building safety assessors should not be in the pay of building owners, who have an interest in whether those works are carried out.
Sarah Gibson
An important point to make here is that fire engineers tend to be involved in new buildings and fire assessors in remediation. Fire engineers are already well regulated, but fire assessors are not. There is no control over their qualifications and there is no accountability. My hon. Friend is trying to ensure that we have accountability. Auditing after the problem is commendable, but if we can avoid it to start with, that is so much better.
Gideon Amos
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who has considerable experience in the industry. She is absolutely right in what she says. The important factor here is the independence of building safety assessors. How can someone in the pay of the owners—who have an interest in the outcome—be considered a suitable professional?
The distinction between building safety assessors and building inspectors is an accurate one. That is why we have another amendment that would address—[Interruption.] I hear some interesting off-stage effects.
Gideon Amos
Well, if we had had a registered one, we would not have heard that off-stage noise.
We need is a national body. We regard planning decisions outside the building control envelope as so contested, so important and so open to people’s interest that we need a national service of building inspectors. [Interruption.] I will allow the noise effects to—
The Chair
Order. We are checking out what that noise is. Try to battle through, Mr Amos.
Gideon Amos
I am happy to project, but I apologise to Members if they think I am shouting at them.
The other aspect is that, as well as having inspectors who are part of a—[Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. The Committee is being broadcast and it is exceptionally hard to hear, so I am suspending the sitting until we can establish what the situation is.
The Chair
Colleagues, it may be helpful to say that we are waiting for the maintenance team to get back to us. I intend to press on, but if we come across the same situation again, I will suspend until the problem has been resolved. I call Gideon Amos to continue where we left off.
Gideon Amos
Thank you, Sir Alec. I confess that that was the most unusual intervention I have taken since I was elected. Thank you for your forbearance and for giving us all a break.
I was coming to the end of my remarks on amendment 5. The amendment prohibits responsible entities, building owners and landlords from appointing or directly paying assessors where a conflict of interest exists. That is a straightforward test, a straightforward ask and a straightforward and important amendment. We need to completely eject conflicts of interest in this area from the system, and that is what the amendment would do.
The Minister also responded to amendment 1, which would remove the subjective intolerable risk assessment threshold in clause 3(1) and require external assessors to certify whether external walls meet the objective combustibility standards in the building regulations. As I explained in my remarks on the previous group, the objective standard in the building regulations is the key test that we should be applying, as it applies to new buildings.
In response, the Minister asked whether that would be a proportionate or disproportionate approach, implying issues of cost and so forth. I fundamentally disagree. If the work is considered disproportionate, why would it be required for new builds? Are new buildings required to meet a disproportionate safety standard? I do not think they are. So how can such a standard be disproportionate for existing homes? Indeed, it might take a little longer to carry out deeper remediation to a higher standard. There could be a staged approach—there are different ways of going about it.
The Government have an army of civil servants working on this. My approach, as an Opposition MP and spokesperson, is to put forward the standard that should be applied. The Government have ample resources to establish how that standard could be met, by what timescale and through what processes. The important thing is that we need this fundamentally objective standard to be met.
The other objection is that such works might not be necessary. Again, I disagree. If works are not necessary, why are they required in new build homes? Why do we give those who live in new build homes a standard that we will not afford those living in homes that need remediation? My amendments 5 and 1 are both vital to putting right what we see as omissions in the Bill. I will press the amendment 5 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 5, page 4, line 1, leave out subsection (4).
This amendment removes the reversal of the burden of proof, so that the responsible entity is not presumed guilty of committing an offence unless the contrary is show.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 24, in clause 5, page 4, line 7, at end insert—
“(7) It is a reasonable excuse for a person charged under this section to demonstrate that they were unable to engage a qualified assessor before the deadline.”
This amendment would confirm that it is a reasonable excuse for a person charged under this section if they can demonstrate that the reason they were unable to meet the deadline was their inability to engage a qualified assessor.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 25, in clause 6, page 4, line 29, at end insert—
“(6) A relevant enforcement authority may not impose a financial penalty on a responsible entity under this section where the responsible entity is a resident-owned company, and the failure can be demonstrated to have been outside of their control.”
This amendment would prevent penalties being imposed under this section on resident-owned companies, where the failure is outside their control.
Clause 6 stand part.
Amendment 32, in clause 13, page 7, line 22, leave out “A relevant enforcement authority” and insert “The First-Tier Tribunal”.
Amendment 33, in clause 13, page 7, line 27, leave out “A relevant enforcement authority” and insert “The First-Tier Tribunal”.
This amendment would require financial penalties to be imposed by the First-Tier Tribunal.
The English legal system is clear: one who is accused of a crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Indeed, in a landmark case heard in the other place in 1935, former Lord Chancellor Viscount Sankey described this as the “one golden thread” running through English criminal law. We therefore believe that it is wholly wrong of the Government to seek to change that ancient practice by presuming that an offence has been committed unless the contrary is shown. The burden of proof has long laid—and must always lie—with the prosecution, not the defence. Of course, Parliament is sovereign and can deviate from established practice as it chooses, but that must be the last resort.
Is clause 5 really the precedent that we wish to set? Will it speed up the process by which homes are remediated? Will it guarantee safety for more homeowners and tenants? The Opposition do not think so. That is why I have tabled amendment 23, which would remove the reversal of the burden of proof so that the responsible entity is not presumed guilty of committing an offence unless the contrary is shown. I hope that the Minister and other hon. Members will support the amendment.
I turn to amendment 24, which also stands in my name. It is right that more is done to ensure that those responsible for remediation work are held accountable, including by enforcing timelines for essential remediation work to ensure not only that work gets done, but that it comes to completion as quickly as possible.
I share the shadow Minister’s concerns, but does he not agree that, although financial penalties are an important tool, criminal sanctions are an important way of reflecting the seriousness of failing to act where residents’ safety may be at risk? We never again want to find ourselves in a situation like Grenfell Tower, where 72 innocent people died. They raised concerns on multiple occasions, but those responsible failed to take any responsibility whatsoever.
Of course, I agree with the Minister’s point, and as I proceed I will outline my concern with clause 5 and the reason I have tabled amendment 24. I think there is unanimity across the House on the point that the Minister has just made, but the question is how we get to where we want to be, and that is what we will discuss in Committee.
If someone misses those targets, intervention is the right answer, but it must come with limits. It is an abuse of industry and a severe misjudgment to set targets based on a need but without considering the means available to meet such goals. That is the point of amendment 24, as that is especially true of those responsible for fire risk assessments. Simply legislating for targets does not make something achievable, as I know the Minister is aware.
A law does not create the extra fire assessors, fire engineers or trained professionals needed to help responsible people meet a deadline. That is why I have tabled amendment 24, which would confirm that it is a reasonable excuse for a person charged under the Bill if they can demonstrate that the reason they could not meet the deadline was their inability to engage a qualified assessor. We cannot simply set deadlines without ensuring the means to reach them. Nor can we hold responsible people to account for failing to fulfil obligations without the means to do so.
Darren Paffey (Southampton Itchen) (Lab)
The Bill already lets a responsible entity prove a reasonable excuse, so is amendment 24 not simply writing “could not find an assessor” into statute? I am afraid the experience in Southampton shows that that would simply be handing every reluctant freeholder a ready-made defence.
I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman’s assessment, because the amendment says that they must demonstrate that they could not “engage a qualified assessor”. We know there is a shortage of such assessors. Although we support the Bill’s overall aim of forcing people to do this work, if there are no qualified professionals—or insufficient numbers of qualified professionals—to carry it out, we are effectively setting people up to fail. What we are trying to do is show people that we care about something by legislating for it, all while knowing that there is no means of making it happen. That core point will run through many Opposition amendments.
Lewis Cocking
I completely agree with what the shadow Minister is saying. Does he agree that in tandem with the Bill the Government should have come forward with a programme to get more qualified people trained? As he has so eloquently outlined, we could have the best legislation in the world when it comes to resolving the issue of cladding and to remediating and reducing fire risks—we all want to work towards that—but we will not achieve anything if we do not have the people to make the assessments when the Bill becomes statute.
Yes, I agree. The central thing is that we support the aims of the Bill, but we need the people to make it happen. If we do not have the people, we are legislating almost with no purpose—we are showing that we care about something, but we are not producing a Bill that will deliver what we all want. Whether it is up to the Government to produce fire risk assessors or they come from somewhere else, we are trying to make the point that, unless we have the people, we are setting the whole thing up to fail.
The greatest tragedy of an unsafe building, other than when it leads to injury or worse, is the fear and anxiety that residents and families must endure because they are surrounded by flammable or dangerous materials. We owe it to anyone living in an unsafe home to speed up remediation work, which is obviously what the Government are attempting to do. We also owe it those managing buildings to give them a clear pathway and established targets for remediation work. In some cases, those are the same people, such as in homes managed by resident-owned companies. We must ensure that those people are helped as both residents and managers, not selectively as one or the other. That includes recognising the additional barriers that resident-owned companies may face to organising remedial works and meeting deadlines.
Resident-owned companies are not multinational corporations packed with highly skilled assessors and engineers; they often need additional support and expertise, which is less readily available to them than large private organisations. That is why I have tabled amendment 25, which seeks to prevent penalties from being imposed under this clause on resident-owned companies when the failure is outside their control. Where it is harder to meet a deadline, we must make it easier, rather than punishing residents trying their best in a costly, complex and convoluted system. I hope that the Minister and other hon. Members will support the amendment.
The Bill needs to provide not only clarity but certainty about the next steps for remediation. The Bill must not create a patchwork of differing regulations, punishments and penalties in any of its aspects. As the Minister referred to a moment ago, at present clause 13 allows a relevant enforcement authority to impose penalties of up to £500,000 on a responsible entity that has been deemed “beyond reasonable doubt” to have committed an offence. Given that relevant authorities include all 337 local planning authorities, 44 local fire authorities and the Building Safety Regulator, the Bill risks creating a postcode lottery in which one responsible entity is punished differently from another.
It would be a better and fairer practice to remove the discrepancy by allowing a single, independent expert authority to make that decision. After all, the very authorities the Bill tasks with imposing penalties may well be the same ones carrying out remediation works. That is why I have tabled amendments 32 and 33, which would require financial penalties to be imposed by the first-tier tribunal. The tribunal would separate the two functions and make a neutral decision, while affording the proper time and basis for determining such lofty penalties. It would also provide greater consistency, giving both responsible entities and leaseholders the predictability they should be afforded. I hope that the Minister and hon. Members will support those amendments.
I thank the shadow Minister for his contributions. I should declare that he and I served on the London Assembly, and he was a very able chair of the former fire committee. We were both on the Assembly when the tragic Grenfell fire happened. I know that he cares passionately about this area and also wants to deliver a strong Bill that makes sure that any buildings with unsafe cladding are remediated as soon as possible.
I will speak first to the clauses in this group and then address the amendments that the shadow Minister has tabled. Failure to assess is a serious violation: it delays vital remediation and puts residents at risk. Clause 5 supports clause 2 by making it a criminal offence for a responsible entity to fail to ensure that a compliant fire risk assessment is carried out by the assessment deadline. Clause 5 is intended to drive compliance in most cases. However, where reasonable entities continue to disregard their duties, clause 5 will provide serious consequences, including a significant fine, imprisonment or both. The clause will make it clear that a responsible entity commits a criminal offence if, by the assessment deadline, it has failed to carry out the assessment or to share an assessment recommending work with Homes England for auditing.
The clause will also prevent responsible entities from avoiding enforcement by failing to engage or withhold information from regulators. Where an enforcement authority requests a compliant fire risk assessment and the responsible entity fails to provide it, the offence is presumed to have been committed unless the contrary is shown. The clause is therefore needed to give the assessment duty and deadline meaningful consequences. It will ensure that responsible entities cannot delay, avoid scrutiny or fail to act without any consequences.
Clause 6 will introduce strong and escalating financial penalties to drive compliance with the clause 2 assessment duty. Criminal prosecution is important and remains available in the most serious and egregious cases, reflecting the seriousness of continuing to fail to assess a building. However, criminal proceedings can be lengthy, resource-intensive and place significant demands on enforcement bodies. The purpose of the clause is to provide regulators with a more direct enforcement tool by enabling them to impose financial penalties directly without having to serve a statutory notice or pursue a criminal prosecution. If a responsible entity fails to assess its building by the statutory deadline, it may be fined up to £14,000 by an enforcement authority. However, we do not want responsible entities to pay that fine and continue not to assess their buildings. That is why the clause will allow enforcement authorities to issue further daily penalties of up to £500 where the offence continues.
Criminal prosecution remains an option for the most serious cases, but financial penalties give regulators a proportionate route to secure compliance with the requirements imposed under clause 5. Importantly, regulators must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the responsible entity has committed an offence, and duty holders retain the ability to rely on the statutory reasonable excuse defence where appropriate. Clause 6 will allow for separate financial penalties to be imposed for different time periods.
I turn to amendment 25, also tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington. Under clause 5, if a responsible entity is asked to provide its compliant fire risk assessment and fails to do so, it is presumed to have committed an offence under subsection (1). The amendment would remove that presumption. Fire risk assessments are essential to identify serious fire safety risks and get remediation under way. Failure to assess a building can delay vital remediation and put residents at risk. That is why these duties need effective enforcement. The amendment would make that harder.
Under the Bill, as drafted, where an enforcement authority asks a responsible entity for its assessment and, after a fair opportunity, it fails to provide it, the authority can work on the basis that the assessment has not been completed. Removing the presumption that an offence has been committed could allow a responsible entity simply not to engage, leaving the enforcement authority to undertake a fuller investigation, potentially including inspections and further evidence gathering, to establish whether the assessment was completed. That risks rewarding non-engagement. A responsible entity should not be put in a better position simply because it has withheld the very evidence needed to demonstrate whether it has complied. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept the amendment, and I urge the hon. Member to withdraw it.
Amendment 24, again tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, would make an inability to secure a qualified assessor a specific reasonable excuse for missing the deadline. I hope the hon. Member will agree that the amendment is not necessary. The Bill already provides a reasonable excuse defence, which can take account of genuine difficulties in securing an assessor. We want to make it easier, not harder, for people to come forward with the assessments. The assessment requirement is not new; responsible entities are already required under the fire safety order to regularly assess and manage fire safety risks. We therefore expect the majority of buildings to already have been assessed. The Bill sets a final deadline for those that still remain so that any necessary remediation can progress.
Our analysis indicates that there is enough assessor capacity to meet the remaining demand, although supply and demand are closely balanced. Responsible entities must plan ahead and take reasonable steps to secure an assessor in good time. If genuine capacity constraints prevent compliance, the existing reasonable excuse defence may account for that, but where a reasonable entity could have acted sooner or taken further reasonable steps to secure an alternative assessor, they should remain accountable for missing the assessment deadline. Creating a separate defence for assessor availability risks weakening the deadline by allowing reasonable and responsible entities to rely on availability rather than requiring them to plan ahead and proactively explore reasonable alternatives. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member not to press his amendment.
Amendment 23, again tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, would prevent an enforcing authority from imposing a financial penalty on a resident-owned company for an assessment offence where the failure was outside its control. Both I and the hon. Member are seeking to protect resident-led buildings as much as possible, but the amendment is not needed. The Bill already provides that protection for every reasonable entity through the reasonable excuse defence. If a failure is genuinely outside its control, that can be taken into account as a reasonable excuse. That is a fairer and more consistent approach than creating a separate exemption for one type of responsible entity.
However, practical difficulties alone do not excuse inaction. Responsible entities must still demonstrate that they have acted responsibly and taken the steps they reasonably could to comply. The Bill makes provisions that will enable the particular position of leaseholder-controlled companies to be recognised. Where progress is slow at leaseholder-controlled buildings, regulators must have regard to statutory guidance, steering them towards support, advice or other proportionate action where they can secure progress. I hope that explanation has satisfied the hon. Member. I ask him not to press his amendment.
I understand that the intention behind amendments 32 and 33, tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, is to ensure the independent oversight of financial penalties. However, clause 13 gives enforcement authorities a direct and proportionate way to deal with serious failures to mitigate risks or remediate unsafe buildings without having to pursue civil proceedings or criminal prosecution. Requiring every financial penalty to be imposed by the first-tier tribunal would add a judicial stage, which could slow down enforcement and place additional demands on tribunal capacity.
There are also clear safeguards. Before imposing a financial penalty, the enforcement authority must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the responsible entity has failed to comply with its legal duties. Responsible entities have the opportunity to make representations before a penalty is imposed and can appeal the final decision at the first-tier tribunal. That means that enforcement authorities can take action promptly where needed while independent tribunal oversight remains available where a decision is challenged. I believe that the Bill strikes the right balance between effective and timely enforcement and appropriate independent oversight. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept the amendments. I urge the hon. Member not to press them. I commend clauses 5 and 6 to the Committee.
I thank the Minister for her response and for the warm tribute she gave me; I look back on those days on the London Assembly with a lot of affection. I listened carefully to what she said in response to amendment 23. On the basis of that, I am content to treat it as a probing amendment and will not seek to divide the Committee on it.
Amendment 24 really cuts to the heart of some of the Opposition’s concerns about the Bill, which are really about capacity to make these things happen. I have heard what the Minister said, but I do not feel 100% confident about it so will press the amendment to a Division.
Amendment 25 is about exempting resident-owned companies from penalties. I thought there was quite a lot in what the Minister said but, again, the reasonable excuse part of the Bill is just a bit too vague so I will press that amendment to a Division as well.
On amendments 32 and 33, there is a difference of approach between us and the Government. We very much feel that it should not be the regulators that are imposing financial penalties so we will press both those amendments to a Division as well.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 24, in clause 5, page 4, line 7, at end insert—
“(7) It is a reasonable excuse for a person charged under this section to demonstrate that they were unable to engage a qualified assessor before the deadline.”—(Gareth Bacon.)
This amendment would confirm that it is a reasonable excuse for a person charged under this section if they can demonstrate that the reason they were unable to meet the deadline was their inability to engage a qualified assessor.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 26, in clause 7, page 5, line 10, at end insert—
“(6) For the purposes of this section, ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’ shall be determined by reference to whether there were any shortages of—
(a) qualified, professional assessors,
(b) contractors, or
(c) materials
in the immediate vicinity of the building in question.”.
This amendment would make it clear that “as soon as reasonably practicable” must be see in the context of whether it was possible to obtain the necessary assessors, contractors and materials.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 7 stand part.
Amendment 6, in clause 8, page 5, line 18, leave out “as soon as reasonably practicable” and insert—
“before the end of the period of 24 months beginning with the assessment deadline under section 2(3), unless the condition in subsection (2A) is met.
(2A) The condition for the purposes of subsection (2) is that a majority of tenants of the building confirm in writing to the responsible entity that they are satisfied that a required remediation step may take place during a period greater than 24 months.”.
This amendment replaces the subjective "as soon as reasonably practicable" standard for remediation completion with a fixed deadline of 24 months from the assessment deadline, unless tenants agree otherwise.
Amendment 27, in clause 8, page 5, line 30, at end insert—
“(6) Where a responsible entity is the owner of multiple properties, they may group buildings as a portfolio and undertake remediation as a phased programme of works without breaching the duty for any single building.”.
This amendment would allow responsible entities to tackle their remediation work in batches if this was more efficient and still satisfy the duty.
Clause 8 stand part.
Amendment 34, in clause 14, page 9, line 19, at end insert—
“(9) Where an individual is identified under subsection (5)(a) this does not in itself create a personal liability for that individual in circumstances where the delay can be demonstrated to have been beyond their control.”.
This amendment would clarify that where an individual is named in a remediation compliance plan, this does not in itself make them liable for delays outside their control.
Clauses 14 and 15 stand part.
Amendment 41, in clause 33, page 19, line 16, at end insert—
“(3) Before any guidance issued under this section may be relied on in proceedings—
(a) the Secretary of State must lay the guidance before Parliament, and
(b) the guidance must be approved by both Houses of Parliament.”.
This amendment would require Parliament to approve the guidance relating to the duties to mitigate, remediate, and prepare a remediation plan before such guidance can be relied on in proceedings.
Clause 33 stand part.
The Bill rightly puts a legal duty on responsible entities to remediate, yet it establishes no fixed timescale for that. Instead, the Bill relies on the basis that the work must be completed “as soon as reasonably practicable” with the detail left to future regulations. That is despite the fact that the failure to meet deadlines and properly remediate can mean up to two years in prison or a financial penalty of £500,000. That is a serious weight on the mind of responsible people left waiting for further details.
With such heavy penalties, we believe that those responsible for remediation must be afforded clarity on what the law expects of them. If the work cannot be done, because there is no assessor or contractors or materials to be found, thanks to the recognised shortage, it would be wrong to treat an owner who has done everything they can to solve the issues the same as someone who has dithered and delayed.
That is why we have tabled amendment 26, which seeks to make it clear that “as soon as reasonably practicable” must be seen in the context of whether it was possible to obtain the necessary assessors, contractors and materials. We must have assurances from the Minister about how the constrained supply of trained officials will be treated in guidance and how owners will be expected to show they did all they reasonably could. I hope the Minister and other hon. Members will support amendment 26.
Turning to amendment 27—
I have just moved on, I am afraid. My apologies.
On amendment 27, as we have already discussed, materials, contractors and assessors are finite and supply is short. While every potentially dangerous building, no matter its scale or complexity, needs remediation to be considered urgent, we must ensure that can happen as efficiently as possible. The amendment would allow responsible entities to tackle remediation works in batches if that were more efficient and still satisfy the duty. A responsible entity that can procure once, plan across several sites and sequence works sensibly will deliver remediation at a swifter pace and a lower cost than an entity forced to treat every case in isolation. Moreover, those savings are directly beneficial to taxpayers and to leaseholders.
The phased approach allows for a targeted approach: in allowing a responsible entity to group and phase the works, the most vulnerable residents in the most affected buildings can benefit first rather than finding themselves further down the paperwork pile. None of this serves to dilute the responsibility to remediate, only to make it more efficient, more effective and more accelerated.
On amendment 34, one of the core issues with the cladding crisis is fairness. How can it be right that someone who works hard to afford their mortgage or rent their home is left to find out, once they have purchased it, invested in it or paid, that it is in fact an unsafe dwelling rather than a place to call their sanctuary? It is egregiously unfair and that is why we must ensure remediation work is completed at a much greater pace—I know that is what the Government are seeking to achieve. For that to work, we must also ensure that the process for responsible entities is fair. That means ensuring that such entities are not subject to punishment for the tardiness of others.
Amendment 34 would clarify that where an individual is named in a remediation compliance plan, that does not in itself make them liable for delays outside their control. We need to work with those responsible for accelerating remediation to make it as swift as possible, not punish entities genuinely trying to make right what is wrong when the Government or another organisation is hindering them with uncontrollable delays.
I turn to amendment 41. The provisions in clause 33 have vast legal repercussions. At present, the guidance that courts, responsible entities and residents may rely on in a court of law is set to be decided without democratic approval or parliamentary scrutiny. We believe that this is wrong.
Such high-stakes guidance, with severe legal, financial and reputational consequences attached to it, needs to be judged in Parliament before it can be judged in a courtroom. Amendment 41 would require Parliament to approve the guidance relating to the duties to mitigate, remediate and prepare a remediation plan before such guidance can be relied on in proceedings.
The amendment upholds one simple and unarguable principle: that any guidance that carries the weight in a courtroom is acting as law, and law should be decided in this place. Moreover, the amendment would also ensure that property owners, responsible entities, leaseholders, residents and contractors have clear and well-judged rules in front of them before millions of pounds are committed to remediation works.
By putting the rules to Parliament, we also create a consistent set of rules rather than guidance that the Secretary of State can amend unilaterally. We believe that this is a common-sense amendment. We hope that the Minister and hon. Members will support it.
Sarah Gibson
I will speak to amendment 6, which again intends to replace the subjective “as soon as reasonably practicable” standard for remediation completion with a fixed deadline of 24 months from the assessment deadline, unless the tenants or leaseholders agree otherwise. To a certain extent, it speaks to amendment 26 tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, which highlights the importance of this amendment.
If works can be delayed, they will not happen in a timely manner. We have seen people trying to use the inability to find a contractor as an excuse to delay works. In the same way, the BBC recently highlighted a whole series of extremely high costs to leaseholders due to waking watches, because the building owner had delayed remediation to try to get a Government grant. The leaseholders faced costs of, in some cases, up to £1.5 million for waking watches, when remediation works were considerably cheaper. To stop such prevarication, this amendment tries to bring forward the clarity that I find lacking in this part of the Bill, and tries to ensure that building owners cannot put off works indefinitely.
This has been a wide-ranging and important debate on some of the key duties outlined in the Bill. Several clauses and amendments have been discussed, but I will start with amendment 26, tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington.
We agree that genuine delivery constraints should be taken into account when considering the actions of responsible entities, but amendment 26 places undue weight on a narrow set of circumstances. The concept of “as soon as reasonably practicable” is an established legal test that already requires responsible entities to act quickly, while recognising what is realistically deliverable in the circumstances of each building. We intend to issue statutory guidance to support the application of “as soon as reasonable practicable”, including indicative timescales for particular steps or phases.
The Bill also includes a reasonable excuse defence that will provide further protection where circumstances genuinely prevent compliance. But the test is clear: practical difficulties alone do not excuse inaction. Responsible entities must still show that they have taken reasonable steps to comply. The amendment risks turning genuine constraints into a ready-made excuse for delay. Shortages of assessors, contractors or materials may be relevant, but they should not determine whether action was reasonably practicable.
I thank my hon. Friend for that important point. I think we have to be honest that there will be circumstances in which there may be delays, and genuine exceptions will be taken into account, but we expect every responsible entity to demonstrate that it has taken all reasonable steps to comply. It is important that our legislation does not allow excuses for delay.
Sarah Gibson
I think it is clear in our amendment that it is not a case of waiting until the end of the 24 months before starting remediation; the intention is merely to set a deadline so that elements of delay cannot be used. I think the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington show an interest in delay, whether by saying that there are no local contractors or by phasing works across a large portfolio—which amendment 27 would make easy—so that the most difficult works are put off for years. What we are trying to do with amendment 6 is—
The Chair
Order. Interventions must be short and to the point, and not another part of a speech.
I hope the hon. Lady will agree that, although a fixed deadline may appear to provide greater certainty, a deadline alone will not remediate buildings more quickly. The amendment would not necessarily provide the greater certainty it promises: where a majority of tenants agree to more time, the 24-month deadline would no longer apply and no further deadline would be set. The key is to drive action as soon as delays emerge, rather than waiting for a long-stop deadline to be missed. Our approach keeps the focus on getting buildings remediated as quickly as possible.
A single statutory deadline cannot reflect the circumstances of individual buildings or genuine constraints on delivery. It could mean that a responsible entity facing delays outside its control was penalised, unless it could persuade a majority of residents to agree to more time. This would place an unreasonable responsibility on tenants. They could come under pressure to agree to an extension, even though they might not have the technical skills or information needed to judge whether further delay was justified. It could also create inconsistent outcomes. Two buildings facing the same genuine delivery challenges could be treated differently, simply because the tenants in one building agreed to more time and the tenants in the other building did not.
The proposal would also risk putting enforcing authorities in the difficult position of overseeing resident-agreed exceptions. They could be required to determine whether tenant agreements were valid, who was entitled to agree and whether the required majority was reached. That could create disagreement and dispute, muddy the triggers for enforcement and distract enforcing authorities from the key question: is remediation progressing as quickly as it should?
Whether a delay is genuinely justified is an enforcing authority’s judgment. Residents should have a strong voice in that process, but they should not bear the burden of making that decision. The judgment should sit with independent enforcing authorities, which have the expertise to assess risk, determine whether delays are justified and act where they are not.
That is why the Bill takes a stronger approach. It requires remediation as soon as reasonably practicable, while allowing genuine barriers outside a responsible entity’s control to be taken into account. Statutory guidance will set clear indicative timescales, and remediation compliance plans will give residents certainty about what needs to happen to their building and by when. Together, these measures drive remediation at pace, give residents greater clarity and keep decisions about whether delays are justified with expert enforcing authorities.
For the reasons given, the Government cannot accept amendment 6. I hope that my explanation has encouraged the hon. Member for Chippenham to decide not to press it.
Amendment 27, tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, would allow responsible entities with multiple buildings to group them into a portfolio and carry out remediation as a phased programme, without breaching the duty for an individual building. I understand the intention behind the amendment. Responsible entities with multiple buildings will need to prioritise and sequence works sensibly, and we would expect them to do so. I assure the hon. Member that the Bill already provides for that.
The requirement to act “as soon as reasonably practicable” allows responsible entities to prioritise and sequence works appropriately, including according to risk. The “reasonable excuse” defence is intended to provide further protection where an entity is genuinely progressing at pace while managing the constraints of remediating a large portfolio. Portfolio working should help to deliver remediation, not provide a shield from accountability where an individual building is not being progressed.
For the reasons given, the Government cannot accept this amendment. I urge the hon. Member not to press it.
I now turn to clause 8. Under the current regime, there is no clear statutory duty requiring a prescribed person to carry out remediation works that have been identified through a fire risk assessment of external walls. Parties with repairing obligations under their lease have always had responsibilities to keep their buildings safe. At present, regulators can create legal obligations to remediate only by serving statutory notices or orders to one building at a time, and those responsible will face penalties for inaction only once they have failed to comply with a statutory notice and been prosecuted. The process is slow and costly, often taking many months, which leaves residents in unsafe buildings for too long. To deliver real change, responsible entities need to be required to act before enforcement is needed. From commencement, regulators will be able to act where responsible entities fail to remediate, in particular where residents are facing unreasonable delay.
Clause 8 places a clear legal duty on responsible entities to take the remediation steps necessary to implement recommendations made in a compliant fire risk assessment without any unnecessary delay. A universal duty provides much needed certainty that that work must be done at pace and removes the burden on regulators to create the obligation one building at a time. To provide certainty about which assessment determines the remediation work required, subsection (4) clarifies that, where more than one qualifying pre-commencement fire risk assessment exists, remediation must be carried out in line with the most recent compliant assessment. This is about drawing a line under delay and avoidance: clause 8 makes it clear that responsible entities must act to remediate unsafe buildings as soon as is reasonably practicable.
I understand the motivation behind amendment 34, tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, but it is not needed. Being named in a remediation compliance plan does not make an individual personally liable. Personal liability only arises when the responsible entity commits an offence and that offence is attributable to that individual’s consent, connivance or neglect. The Bill also recognises that responsible entities should not be penalised when a failure is genuinely outside their control. The “reasonable excuse” defence allows those circumstances to be taken into account. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept the amendment. I hope that my explanation has satisfied the hon. Member, and I urge him not to move it.
Clause 14 helps to address this by requiring responsible entities to publish or share a remediation compliance plan, which should set out how they intend to comply with the legal duty to remediate for all relevant buildings that they are responsible for. The plan must set out three things: the interim measures that are in place or required; the steps that the responsible entity will commit to take to remediate their building properly; and the indicative timetable for taking those steps. The plan must be made publicly available where the responsible entity has a website and must be signposted clearly in the building. Responsible entities must also take reasonable steps to provide copies directly to relevant owners, leaseholders and residents.
Clause 14 is intended to drive transparency. It will ensure that residents, enforcement authorities and other parties have access to clear information about who is responsible for remediation, and when and how it will be delivered.
Darren Paffey
Does the Minister agree that so many of the delays that all of us could describe in our constituencies have been due to that lack of transparency? Ask anyone in the Blake building in Southampton, and they will name six companies, including the landowner, the freeholder, the estate manager, the managing agent and so on. I therefore particularly welcome clause 14(5). Does she agree that the Bill cuts through with one plan and one accountable director to end the passing the parcel of responsibility?
My hon. Friend makes a valid point. Many of us will have been inundated with emails from concerned leaseholders who simply do not know who is responsible for their building. When responsibility is identified, the rigmarole of the passing of the buck between freeholder, developer, landowner and, in some cases, council and housing association is tiring and frustrating for many leaseholders. We hope that clause 14 will provide regulators with a clear basis for monitoring progress and, most importantly, clear information about who is responsible for remediation and when it will be delivered. It will also create a public record of the responsible entity’s proposed steps and a clear timetable.
Gideon Amos
The Minister deserves a break, but the length of her speech emphasises the seriousness of these clauses. I wish to say a few words on amendment 6, which was so ably introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Chippenham. The Minister’s response was that the wording providing for remediation works to be carried out
“as soon as reasonably practicable”
is stronger than our proposed alternative wording,
“before the end of…24 months”.
That argument can succeed only if we are dealing with a contingent of building owners and developers the majority of whom are champing at the bit to get that work done. Where that is the case, there is nothing in our amendment that would prevent that from happening. Where it is not the case—for the most recalcitrant—our amendment would provide a backstop of 24 months. The Bill does not currently provide such a backstop, so our amendment would make it far stronger.
The other response to our amendment that could be inferred from what the Minister said is that it would give residents the burden of deciding whether work should go ahead or not. That is not the case. The decision on whether work should go ahead would remain with the regulator. The only decision for residents would be whether they are content for the works to take longer than would otherwise be required.
For all those reasons, our amendment would strengthen the Bill. It would provide the backstop that homeowners and leaseholders deserve on when the works will be carried out, and we will press it to a vote.
Like the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, I congratulate the Minister on her lengthy response—I am sure she is very tired.
Amendment 26 is not intended to be a get-out clause—far from it. The Minister mentioned that there will be statutory guidance on this point. Why not just put it in the Bill and remove any doubt now, rather than waiting until later? As such, we will press amendment 26 to a Division. I listened carefully to what the Minister said on amendment 27, and we are content to withdraw it.
The Minister said that amendment 34, on not creating a personal liability, could be covered by the reasonable excuse defence. The reasonable excuse defence is doing an awful lot of heavy lifting in the Bill, and we are concerned about its vagueness. Amendment 34 is a clarificatory amendment that would put it beyond reasonable doubt that individuals will not be unduly punished for things that are beyond their control, and we will press it to a Division.
I think the Minister knows what I am going to say about amendment 41 because we had a similar conversation yesterday. It is a periodic feature that Oppositions like Parliament to have scrutiny of what the Government are doing and the Government invariably do not want that to happen. This is such a weighty piece of legislation that the guidance should not be made at the whim of the Secretary of State’s pen, but should come to Parliament for approval, which would not hold the process up significantly. We will press amendment 41 to a Division.
I want to make a couple of remarks on amendment 6 tabled by the hon. Member for Chippenham. There is much in its intention that is to be commended, because no one wants to see remediation take any longer than is necessary—
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we continue line-by-line scrutiny I have, as ever, a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch any electronic devices to silent mode. No food or drinks are permitted during sittings, with the exception of the water provided. I remind Members to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate.
The selection list for the sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. I remind Members that although the selection list shows how amendments and new clauses have been arranged for debate, any Divisions take place in the order in which the items appear on the amendment paper.
Clause 71
Restrictions on winding-up orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Good morning, Mr Dowd; it is a pleasure to see you. This is another large group, so I will try to make things as peaceful and painless as possible. There is quite a lot of technical detail, but it is worth going through some of the headlines from the various clauses. The group relates to the special administration regime, which I debated at length with myself on Thursday afternoon.
Clause 71 will protect the special administration regime by restricting the circumstances in which a winding-up order may be made against a licence holder. The clause applies where a petition for the winding up of a company is presented by a person other than the Secretary of State. The court may not make a winding-up order unless notice of the petition has first been served on the Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road, and a period of at least 14 days has elapsed since service. That will give both authorities an opportunity to consider whether a highways administration application should be made.
Clause 72 will restrict a licence holder from passing a resolution for voluntary winding up without the permission of the court. Such permission may be granted only on an application made by the company. The clause provides that the court may not grant permission unless notice has been served on the Secretary of State and the ORR and a period of at least 14 days has elapsed since the service of the last of those notices.
Clause 73 will prevent an ordinary administration order application from displacing the highways administration regime without the appropriate public interest safeguards. The clause applies where an application for ordinary administration is made by someone other than the Secretary of State.
Clause 74 will restrict the appointment of an administrator under the out-of-court procedure for ordinary administration under schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The out-of-court procedure for ordinary administration allows administrators to be appointed by certain creditors, the company or its directors. The clause restricts those parties from taking any step to appoint an administrator if a highways administration order has already been made in relation to the company, or an application for one is outstanding. An out-of-court appointment can take effect quickly. For an ordinary company, that speed can be valuable. For a licence holder responsible for strategic highway functions, it could bypass the safeguards and objectives of the highways administration regime.
The clause will not impose an absolute prohibition on out-of-court appointments. If a highways administration order or application has not yet been made, before an out-of-court appointment may be made, the appointment documents must be served on the Secretary of State and the ORR. The appointment may take effect only after 14 days have passed since serving of the documents.
Clause 75 will restrict the taking of steps by any person to enforce security over the property of a licence holder unless the Secretary of State and the ORR have been given notice and a period of 14 days has passed since the notice was given. The clause will not cancel the security or erase the secured creditor’s claim. It will control enforcement so that action against the company’s assets does not cause disorderly interruption to the operation of a licensed highway or frustrate a highways administration.
Clause 76 will enable the Secretary of State to agree indemnities in connection with the exercise of a special administrator’s powers and duties. It is a backstop that supports a workable SAR so that special administrators can perform their functions with the comfort of an indemnity that will cover them for any liabilities, loss or damage incurred in connection with their functions. It is not a payment to investors or a guarantee of the licence holder’s debts.
Finally, clause 77 provides for interpretation of part 5 of the Bill. I hope the Committee can see that in every potential insolvency situation there is an opportunity for the Secretary of State and the ORR to step in and apply to the court for a special administration order. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Dowd.
I appreciate the technical nature of this group, the interaction with the Companies Act 2006, and that a lot of precedent sits under the clauses. However, I wish to probe the Minister a little on clause 72, on the restrictions on voluntary winding up. In particular, subsection (1) refers explicitly to a
“company which is the holder of a licence”
having
“no power to pass a resolution for voluntary winding up without the permission of the court.”
That seems to me to be an almost chicken and egg scenario. If a company finds itself in the unfortunate position—which I do not think anyone expects under a licence—in which someone wants, for whatever reason, to wind it up, it seems odd to require them to go to the court before they pass that resolution. Something internal, within the company, would have had to make the directors—the principals—come to that conclusion. I gently question whether that is the right way round. Is that strictly necessary when the directors of a company—the licence holders—come to the conclusion that winding up is the only option?
Could there be an additional provision to enable direct communication, probably with the Secretary of State, although I am happy to receive other ideas on that, before things get into the court system? We know about the backlogs in the courts at the moment—I do not seek to litigate the debates on that; I just state that as a matter of fact. Is there not a simpler and easier way, given that the circumstances for any company in this position are going to be so extreme that the involvement of the court would seem almost superfluous?
I will try to put the shadow Minister’s mind at ease. Clause 72 requires the company, before the granting of a special administration order, to notify the Secretary of State and the ORR of its intention to do that. The Secretary of State and the ORR then have a 14-day window to decide, if necessary, to make an application to court for the special administration order. The process is constructed in that way because we do not want services to be disrupted because of administration or another insolvency event. It is a safeguard to enable the ORR or the Secretary of State to step in to ensure that the highway continues to run in those circumstances. I accept that we are talking about a slightly unusual situation, but it is important to protect the continuity of services, which is why we have done it in that way.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 71 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 72 to 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 78
Disclosure of information in relation to a licence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 75, in clause 79, page 52, line 24, at end insert—
“(1A) A requirement imposed under subsection (1) must be reasonable and proportionate to the exercise of the relevant function.
(1B) A notice under subsection (1) must specify the purpose for which the information is required and explain why the authority considers the requirement necessary.”
This amendment requires the licence holder to exercise the powers to require information in a manner which is proportionate and limited to what is necessary.
Clause 79 stand part.
Amendment 76, in clause 80, page 54, line 16, leave out lines 16 to 20 and insert—
“(2) An appropriate authority may disclose information obtained under section 79 to another public authority, or to a person exercising functions connected with this Act, only where the disclosure is necessary and proportionate for the exercise of those functions.”
This amendment would require information sharing to be limited to what is necessary.
Amendment 77, in clause 80, page 54, line 21, leave out “may exclude” and insert
“must exclude, unless its disclosure is necessary and proportionate for the exercise of a relevant statutory function,”.
This amendment would prevent commercially sensitive information being disclosed unless it was necessary.
Clause 80 stand part.
I will deal with the clauses now and respond to the amendments later. Clause 78 provides a clear framework for sharing and publishing information about licences and licence applications. It allows the Secretary of State and the ORR to share relevant information with each other, and to publish information about a licence or an application. This supports informed decision making and transparency in the licensing regime.
The power is, of course, subject to safeguards. Where information has been received under a licence condition, any disclosure or publication must comply with conditions in the licence governing how that information is handled. The Secretary of State must issue a statement of policy on publication, and that duty may be met by approving a statement prepared by the ORR. Before publishing information, both the Secretary of State and the ORR must have regard to that statement. The clause therefore enables appropriate information sharing and publication, while ensuring that publication decisions are guided by a published policy and the requirements of the licence.
Clause 79 gives the Secretary of State, the ORR and a strategic highways company the information-gathering powers they may need to carry out their relevant functions under the licensing regime. The Secretary of State, the ORR and a strategic highways company are referred to as an “appropriate authority” for the purposes of the clause. An appropriate authority may give notice requiring a licence holder, or a person connected with it, to provide information or documents needed for the authority’s relevant functions. The notice may specify when, where and how the material must be provided. The clause therefore provides an effective but controlled means of obtaining the information needed to administer the licensing regime.
Finally, clause 80 governs how information obtained under clause 79 by an appropriate authority may be shared.
I wish to speak to amendments 75 to 77, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton. Amendment 75 would require information requests to be reasonable and proportionate, and notices to state their purpose and why the information is necessary. Amendment 76 would limit onward disclosure to what is necessary and proportionate. Amendment 77 would protect commercially sensitive information, unless disclosure was necessary and proportionate for a relevant statutory function.
The amendments are very much probing amendments and I can confirm, before I say any more about them, that we will not seek to press them to a vote. Instead, we want to probe the Government to see whether this part of the Bill is as strong and robust as possible. The amendments are not designed to trip up the Government or to pull a political fast one—
The Minister suggests that the other amendments are, but they are not at all. Probing amendments are an important part of any Bill Committee.
The core question is why an operator should be required to provide information without the authority explaining why—that word is often so difficult in politics—it is necessary. Information shared with other bodies should not have an open-ended cap. There is an important role for transparency, but not where we are dealing with information that is potentially commercially sensitive, or that might just place an unreasonable administrative burden on any licence holder or commercial entity.
I do not think the necessary safeguards currently exist in the Bill, which is why the Opposition seek to tease the Minister a little to see whether the Bill could be strengthened. We want him to reflect on the clauses before Report, as well as the other stages in this House and in the other place, to make sure that the Bill’s wording is as strong as possible. Commercially sensitive material should certainly not be disclosed casually, and the safeguards in that respect must always be robust.
There is plenty of precedent on commercially sensitive information. I have submitted many written parliamentary questions to the Department for Transport, and other Departments, and I have often received the answer: “That information cannot be disclosed because of commercially sensitive factors.” Although that answer may be frustrating to receive, we all understand why market-sensitive and commercially sensitive information cannot just be passed around willy-nilly. The challenge in the amendments is whether similar safeguarding exists, not only in the full letter of the Bill but in its spirit, when it comes to licence holders.
Our amendments—which I repeat are probing amendments—would not remove transparency or information sharing, but they do seek to introduce proportionality, purpose and confidentiality safeguards. I put it to the Minister that the Bill is currently lacking in that regard.
The shadow Minister is entitled to probe as much as he likes—it is his job. Hopefully, I will respond to his probing in the appropriate manner, which is to assure him that his concerns are already covered in the Bill.
I understand the intention behind amendment 75, but clause 79 already ties the information-gathering powers to the exercise of the appropriate authority’s relevant functions—the key word being “relevant”—so there is not an unrestricted power to obtain information from licence holders or connected persons. Clause 79 also preserves the protection for material that a person could not be compelled to provide in civil proceedings, while clause 80 governs subsequent disclosure. The existing provisions provide an effective but controlled means of obtaining the information needed to administer the licensing regime, without the additional requirements proposed by the amendment.
On amendment 76, clause 80 already links information sharing to the exercise of functions: disclosure must facilitate the appropriate authority’s own functions or the recipient’s statutory functions. It also includes specific protections for commercial interests and national security. The amendment would go further than adding a necessity and proportionality test; it would restrict the gateway to public authorities or persons exercising functions connected with the Bill. The existing functional gateway, with its safeguards, is more than sufficient to ensure that information can support the exercise of relevant statutory functions. Determining the scenarios under which information sharing is “necessary and proportionate” would be a rather clumsy mechanism that would take us beyond what is necessary and already in the Bill.
On amendment 77, clause 80 already recognises the need to protect commercial interests. It allows the authority to exclude material where disclosure would be likely to prejudice any person’s commercial interests. The amendment would replace that discretion with a mandatory exclusion rule, subject to a further statutory test of whether disclosure is “necessary and proportionate”. The existing approach is sufficient: it enables the authority to protect commercially sensitive material while allowing information sharing for the purposes identified in the clause. I therefore invite the shadow Minister not to press his amendments to a vote.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 79 and 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 81
Power to direct proposed highway to be a trunk road
The clause amends the Highways Act 1980 so that a highway to be constructed under a licence may be directed by the Secretary of State to become a trunk road. The change is needed because the licensing regime applies only to trunk roads in England, or roads that are to become trunk roads. A new highway delivered under a licence must therefore be capable of joining the trunk road network.
The clause uses the existing statutory framework for trunk road directions. It adds highways to be constructed under a licence to the categories of proposed highway that may be covered by an order under section 10 of the Highways Act 1980. The clause therefore ensures that a highway delivered through the licensing regime can be incorporated into the trunk road network under the section 10 powers if the Secretary of State considers that appropriate. I commend it to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 82
Appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 82 establishes the main appeals route for specified regulatory decisions made under the Bill. Decisions that can be appealed include important regulatory decisions such as licence refusals, certain licence modifications and penalty decisions. Those decisions are signposted in the relevant sections of the Bill. Appeals will be heard by the Competition Appeal Tribunal as the appropriate body with expertise in economic regulation and competition matters.
Appeal must be brought by submitting a notice to the tribunal setting out the provisions under which the decision being challenged was made and the grounds of appeal. The tribunal may dismiss the appeal or quash all or part of the decision. When a decision is quashed, the tribunal may send the matter back to the decision maker for reconsideration. The clause provides that a penalty decision does not take effect while an appeal is ongoing. Other decisions continue to have effect pending the outcome of the appeal unless the tribunal directs otherwise. Clause 82 therefore provides an important independent mechanism for reviewing important decisions taken under the regime, helping to ensure fairness, accountability and confidence in the framework established by the Bill.
That such appeal routes should exist is an established, fair, perfectly reasonable and supported principle. My brief challenge to the Minister is the delay that could be put into the process by a competition appeal tribunal. We know from other tribunals in other walks of life that it is not what could classically be called a fast-moving process in most circumstances.
Finding a licensee, the Secretary of State or the ORR potentially at odds for any of the reasons set out in part 3—decisions that are based on error of fact, wrong in law or unreasonable—all of which are perfectly reasonable, could severely challenge the timescale of the operation of a licence. It could challenge the ability to get the lower Thames crossing, in the main instance we are talking about, or any other road built under this licence operational in a way that is deemed timely or reasonable by the travelling motorist, haulage firms, or indeed the Minister or Secretary of State and other interested parties. Given that the Minister has cited urgency in getting to points of decision as core to his arguments in debates on previous amendments and clauses, I worry whether this model will deliver the speed he has sought in other parts of the Bill.
The shadow Minister raises a fair question, and one that we would all consider. It is probably fair to say that the judicial process is not at its swiftest at the moment. That is one of the reasons why the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade has begun a review of the regulatory appeals process in the hope of making it swift and more harmonious. I hope that that is the case.
It is worth pointing out subsection (4) because it provides for any decisions, except those that relate to a financial penalty, to stand until an appeal is heard. We do not believe that should lead to any particular disruption of the operation of the licence. Hopefully that gives the shadow Minister some reassurance. No doubt he will come back to the regulatory appeals regime once the consultation response is produced.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 82 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 83
Stakeholder Group
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 38, in clause 84, page 56, line 34, after “Group” insert “local authority representatives, as well as”.
This amendment ensures local authorities have statutory representation on the ORR stakeholder group.
Clause 84 stand part.
Clause 83 is about putting road users at the heart of the new regime. It requires the ORR to establish and maintain a stakeholder group. The purpose of the group is to provide advice to the ORR from the perspective of road users and other interested parties. The group will help ensure that user and stakeholder views are heard as the new regime operates and will be able to advise the ORR on the exercise of its functions under the Bill.
The group is advisory. It does not take regulatory decisions and it does not replace the ORR’s responsibilities as the independent regulator, but the ORR must consider the advice it receives from the group, although it is not required to follow that advice.
The clause also provides for information to be shared with the group where appropriate, enabling it to carry out its role effectively. References to road users include future users, ensuring that the group can take account of the interests of those who will benefit from new infrastructure in the future.
Clause 83 therefore creates a formal mechanism for bringing user and stakeholder perspectives into the operation of the new regime while preserving the ORR’s independence as the regulator.
Clause 84 is about the membership of the stakeholder group. It gives the ORR responsibility for appointing the members of the group and its chair. The appointment of the chair requires the approval of the Secretary of State.
When appointing members and the chair, the ORR must, so far as practicable, ensure that the group is capable of providing informed advice on the interests of road users and local communities. That will help ensure that a broad range of relevant perspectives can be reflected in the group’s work.
Members and the chair are appointed for fixed terms and may be reappointed. The ORR may remove members, but only with the approval of the Secretary of State. To help maintain the group’s independence, members and employees of the ORR cannot serve as the chair or as members of the group. The clause also allows the ORR to pay remuneration and allowances to members and the chair where appropriate.
Clause 84 therefore provides a clear framework for the membership and governance of the stakeholder group while supporting its independence and effectiveness.
The core principle of involving users in anything and ensuring that their voices are heard, whoever they may be—in the case of highways, that might be the private motorist, haulage companies, coach and potentially bus operators—is fundamentally good. None of us should shy away from that. It is indeed the purpose of the Department for Transport to serve the travelling public and, therefore ,why should the travelling public not have their voices heard?
Some confusion starts to creep in around clause 83 because of the vagueness of the details about who will sit on this group. Clause 83(2)(b) says
“persons with an interest in the provision and operation of such highways.”
That could literally run into millions of people. It is almost unlimited and uncapped.
I note that the third party—the Liberal Democrats—have tabled an amendment to put local authorities on a statutory footing, which I would of course support. Local authorities will be important players. They have their own highways network, and will be the highway authority of any part of their own network that intersects with any road built under the Bill’s licence provisions. Likewise, their residents will, in some shape or form, be affected by any new highways construction. I cannot imagine a circumstance in which residents would not be impacted by the operation of any new licence, potentially positively. The local authority is a body that, in theory, has those residents’ backs and should be able to represent them in any stakeholder group.
However, the official Opposition do not agree with adding just local authorities to the statute, because many other groupings sit on an equal footing with local authorities when it comes to those that should sit on such a stakeholder group—for example, the umbrella bodies representing the road haulage sector. Why would they not be included as a statutory member of the stakeholder group? Why would a representative of one of the general motoring organisations not be included? The AA and the RAC gave key evidence in the oral evidence sessions that kicked off this Committee a few weeks ago. Why would they not be on a statutory footing as part of the stakeholder group?
We have sympathy with the third party’s amendment on that front, but we do not think it goes far enough. If we are going to explicitly name one set of organisations—a local authority in this case—it seems unfair not to name other key stakeholder groups or representative groups that would clearly have something to say on this front.
The wider question around clause 83, though, is what the stakeholder group actually adds to the ORR’s existing consultation and engagement duties. What is the additionality? What will this additional group have over and above the powers—indeed, the compulsion—that the ORR has to engage with stakeholders detailed elsewhere in the Bill?
Alison Griffiths (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)
The Bill insists only that “the ORR must consider” the views of the group. That is a very loose definition, which leaves open what its purpose actually is. Quite possibly, it will make important suggestions that the ORR could easily just leave at the door.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. It is almost as if she had leaned over and read the second bullet point in my notes. It is this core point: the public often look at any consultation by any stakeholder body and say, “But what has it really achieved?” Where there is no compulsion to act, follow advice or prove the consideration of any recommendation, the public will rightly ask what precisely the point is of all those hours travelling to meetings—maybe they will be on Zoom or Teams—and the time that good, willing people put into sharing their views. There is nothing, not one provision, that says the recommendations that the actual users—or the representatives of the users of any highway built under the licence regimes put in place by the Bill—make, will take effect.
Douglas Lumsden (Aberdeen South) (Con)
Something else mentioned in this part of the Bill is that the chair
“may at any time be removed from the group by a notice given by the ORR”.
It might be the case that the chair is standing up for local people and road users, and the ORR does like what he is saying and simply removes him.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who has clearly read my third bullet point. His important point is about how the stakeholder group is fully independent of the state—government, quangos and arm’s length bodies such as the ORR. The ability to simply remove and get rid of an appointed chair and members cannot stack up if this is to be a serious consultation and stakeholder exercise. Independence must surely be at the core of any group set up to be properly representative to any arm of the state, be it the ORR, the Department for Transport or any other Department. Of course, there must be provisions to remove anyone appointed to any form of office who is behaving badly, acting criminally or breaking established rules, but clause 83 contains a more summary power to simply remove, potentially, as my hon. Friend argues, for speaking up too loudly for road users over and above other interests. That cannot possibly be right.
Alison Griffiths
To build on my hon. Friend’s point, the Bill could refer to any number of public bodies. It should ensure that the remuneration is comparable with that of similar bodies. Such transparency is critical for the success of the Bill.
I agree. My hon. Friend makes a perfectly good argument. The proliferation of quangos, arm’s length bodies and stakeholder groups across the public sector and local government has led to a huge disparity in the remuneration paid to individuals sitting on different boards. It may be difficult to get a clear answer to that question, but we can take account of proportionality, time taken and actual outcomes. We talk a lot in politics in this country about what things should cost, but we too often forget outcomes. If we lock something around that into the stakeholder group, it will become more palatable to the travelling public, road haulage operators, coach operators, bus operators and others.
With that, I will sit down. Hopefully, the Minister will give us some assurances on that point. Has he reflected on whether the stakeholder group will operate in a good, functional manner, or whether it will become a talking shop, as we have seen all too often under Governments of all political persuasions?
Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Dowd. Our amendment to clause 84 would ensure, as the hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire teaser-trailered, that local authority representatives have a guaranteed statutory seat on the ORR stakeholder group.
Currently, the clause leaves stakeholder group appointments entirely to ORR discretion. It uses vague generalities about user interest without guaranteeing council representation. It is incredibly important that local highways authorities and local planning authorities adjacent to tolled highways represent the communities most directly impacted by the traffic diversions, road wear and infrastructure pressures. The amendment seeks to make their involvement statutory.
The hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire also teaser-trailered the fact that clause 84 fails to mandate statutory representation for other groups, including disabled drivers, local residents groups and commercial road haulage associations. The Government should put the involvement of those groups on a statutory footing. In the evidence sessions, Declan Pang of the Road Haulage Association emphasised that the governance of the stakeholder group must be strengthened in primary law. The stakeholder groups are asking for representation. Similarly, the AA pointed out that if the ORR appoints its own advisory group without explicit statutory membership criteria, the group risks lacking true independence.
Does the Minister recognise our concerns, which led us to table the amendment? Does he recognise the concerns about the membership of the stakeholder group from the RHA and the AA, and the need for them to be on it? Will he commit to resolving that issue on the face of the Bill?
I am grateful to both Opposition spokespeople, the hon. Members for Mid Buckinghamshire and for Guildford, for their comments.
On amendment 38, which was tabled by the Liberal Democrats, clause 84 already requires the ORR to appoint those persons “it considers appropriate” and to ensure, so far as is practicable, that the group can provide informed advice on the interests of highway users and others with an interest in the provision and operation of licensed highways. The ORR will need to appoint members who are appropriate to the particular project and ensure that the stakeholder group properly reflects the interests of users and others affected by that project. That is precisely why we have deliberately not prescribed particular categories of members in the Bill; doing so could constrain the ORR’s ability to establish a balanced and effective group tailored to the circumstances.
That said, I accept the assertion that it is important to have certain groups on the body. I draw Opposition Members’ attention to paragraph 415 in the explanatory notes, which lists a number of different groups that it would be appropriate to include in the stakeholder group. As the hon. Member for Guildford would expect, local authorities are included, as well as freight representatives and other users of the highway. There is a clear steer there on what the Department expects in terms of representation.
I think both Opposition spokespeople were at times conflating the roles of the regulator and of licensees. It is important to remember that the ORR is the independent regulator here; it is its job to ensure that the licence is being operated in the interests of all road users. I think that addresses the point about how we can be confident that the ORR will listen to the voices of the stakeholder group: because its general duties under clause 1 require it to do so. The stakeholder group is the formal mechanism to ensure that the ORR is able to take those views into account.
In that exchange, I think there was a reference to the ORR summarily dismissing the chair of the stakeholder group if they got a little gobby—that is probably the colloquial term. I refer Members to clause 84(5)(c), which requires the approval of the Secretary of State before any such action is taken, so there is a safeguard to prevent that kind of thing.
I accept the argument about the safeguard of the Secretary of State reviewing it, but there is nothing—even with the approval of the Secretary of State of the dismissal of a chair of the stakeholder group—that would prevent a chair from being removed on the grounds of a small p political disagreement. For example, were a chair of the stakeholder group to argue fervently in favour of people being able to choose any form of power for the vehicle they use, such as an internal combustion engine vehicle as opposed to a battery electric or hydrogen vehicle, and the Government and ORR of the day aligned in saying, “No, that is not our political priority; out you go, sunshine,” where would the safeguard be against a dismissal that came down to political grounds?
I am grateful for the shadow Minister’s audition for the role of chair; I think he is already putting forward the arguments he will advance on behalf of the stakeholder group. It is important to say that the stakeholder group advises the ORR, which is the independent regulator of the licence holder. It is in its interest to have challenge and debate, and I am not convinced that the regulator would want to remove a chair because they were asking challenging questions. It may want to do so if the chair did not attend for a number of months or possibly longer; it may decide that they are simply not engaging in the way that was envisaged. That is why the power exists, but of course the safeguard is there of the Secretary of State needing to approve that.
The final point that Opposition Members raised was about the cost of all this. I refer them to clause 86, which enables the ORR to levy the licence holder for those costs. On that note, I commend clauses 83 and 84 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 83 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 84 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 85
Financial assistance
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 86 stand part.
Amendment 73, in clause 103, page 67, line 18, leave out lines 18 to 21 and insert
“after the Secretary of State has published a report setting out the proposed financial model for highways licenced under this Act, including the circumstances where financial assistance may be provided under section 85 including any liabilities falling onto taxpayer.”
This amendment would prevent the Act coming into force until after the Secretary of State has published the proposed financial model for highways licenced under the Act.
Clause 85 allows the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance. Assistance may be provided to enable a licence holder to carry out activities under its licence. It may also be provided where a highways administration order is in force, to help achieve the objective of the highways administration. The assistance may take different forms, including grants, loans, guarantees, indemnities, contracts or investment in a company, and may include acquiring an undertaking or asset, or incurring expenditure for the licence holder’s benefit. The Secretary of State may attach appropriate terms to the assistance, which may include repayment conditions, with or without interest, or another return. The power is additional to, and does not replace or restrict, any other power of a Minister of the Crown to provide financial assistance.
I anticipate the shadow Minister querying the circumstances in which the power could apply—of course, I too asked that question. As a not-so-distant example of when it could apply, if there were another pandemic, we had a lockdown, and vehicles were not allowed to travel, a licence holder would have no income through tolls but might need to continue carrying out essential maintenance. We all hope that we will never again be in that situation, but the Bill should stand the test of time—who knows what will happen in the future? That provision is therefore important. I am happy to put on the record that were any financial assistance given by Government, it would have to be approved by the Treasury in the usual way and be reported to Parliament.
Clause 86 allows the ORR to recover the cost of carrying out its functions under the Bill through a levy, as I referred to in the debate on the previous group. The ORR may require a person authorised to charge tolls on a highway under the Bill to pay the levy. The ORR must issue a notice setting out the charging period, the amount due, and how and when payments must be made. The amount must reflect what the ORR reasonably expects to spend in carrying out its functions under the Bill during that period. The clause ensures that the cost of regulating the regime can be recovered from those authorised to charge tolls, while limiting the levy to covering the reasonably expected costs of the ORR. I commend clauses 85 and 86 to the Committee.
Amendment 73, in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, would delay commencement until the Secretary of State has published the proposed financial model for licensed highways, including when financial assistance under clause 85 may be provided, and any liabilities falling ultimately—that word is very important—on the taxpayer.
Given that clause 85 allows financial assistance of almost any form—grant, loan, guarantee, indemnity, share purchase, acquiring assets—on whatever terms the Secretary of State considers appropriate, it is incumbent on the Minister to give assurances on the public record, in Committee or potentially at the Dispatch Box in the main Chamber on Report, regarding what the limits to that are. That is incredibly important for transparency as we debate the powers introduced under the Bill. If the Minister can, I urge him to give those assurances when he winds up the debate on this group. If not, I urge him to do so in writing or at a later date. That is especially important given that clause 85(1)(a) is not confined to insolvency; it allows assistance to enable a licence holder to carry on an activity under a licence.
I appreciate the Minister’s extreme example of another pandemic, and I share his hope that we will never again face the hell on earth that was lockdown, with all its effects on commercial interests and all of our sanity. However, that is hopefully a once-in-100-years—at least—eventuality. While I accept that example, it is incumbent on the Minister to give us a few more examples of where the DFT considers this power would be used in a more day-to-day setting. If there is no presumption there, or no modelling of a more day-to-day setting, it is important that the Government admit that and are clear as the Bill progresses.
Shivani Raja (Leicester East) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. I will speak specifically to my hon. Friend’s amendment 73. Parliament cannot be expected to wave through a major new road licensing system when the basic financial numbers have not even been published. Right now, we have no clear breakdown of how these licensed highways will actually be funded, or what will happen if the finances do not add up. As CMS warned in its written evidence to the Committee, unlike water or energy customers, drivers can choose whether to use a tolled road, and that creates a real demand risk if traffic falls short. That is alongside unanswered questions about how escalating construction costs will be dealt with.
Before a single provision of the Bill comes into force, the Secretary of State must publish the full financial model and set out exactly what liabilities could fall on the public purse. Taxpayers deserve to see the real cost up front and not discover the risks after the contracts are signed. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts.
Zöe Franklin
We are also concerned about clause 85, because it appears to grant sweeping powers to the Secretary of State to provide direct state financial assistance, including grants, loans, guarantees and indemnities, to private licence holders or special administrators. We are concerned that this creates a moral hazard whereby private operators enjoy commercial profits during good years while taxpayers shoulder the financial risks if traffic revenues fall short or construction costs overrun.
State financial assistance under clause 85 must be strictly restricted to external macroeconomic shocks, and only after private equity investors have absorbed the initial commercial losses. Taxpayers must not be forced to fund corporate bail-outs for private toll road companies while local councils’ road maintenance budgets face a severe squeeze. We all know the state of many local roads due to the ongoing local government finance issues, so do statutory limits exist under clause 85 to prevent taxpayers from bailing out failing private toll operators when commercial traffic projects prove overly optimistic? Does the Minister agree that that represents another example of privatising profit and nationalising debt?
I will turn to amendment 73 tabled by the Opposition. The regulated asset base model being introduced by the Bill is a standard financial model for large infrastructure and has been used in other sectors, such as water and nuclear. It gives private entities a regulated return on their investment, or specifically in the case of roads, allows the investor to charge tolls for the use of the infrastructure that they will build and maintain, with the level of those tolls checked by the regulator to make sure they are fair for road users.
I point hon. Members who have spoken to the funding statement issued by National Highways in February 2025, which gives a more detailed explanation of how those models would work in relation to projects that may be brought under the Bill. I am afraid the request for the full details of the funding settlement and agreement is not appropriate; it is commercially sensitive and publishing it now in a very specific way could damage our ability to get the best deal for the Government when we enter into the final transaction. Given there is already a report in the public domain and that specificities would damage the potential for us to get the best value for the taxpayer, I urge hon. Members not to push the amendment to a vote.
Douglas Lumsden
Can the Minister give an assurance that if a licence holder has more than one licence, they will always be treated individually and there will be no increase of tolls on one licence to offset losses on another? To put it another way, could it be that the Government have to step in for one licence that is not doing very well, while that company still makes huge profits on another licence that it has?
That is a fair question. It is probably worth explaining again the purpose of clause 85. It is about, to use the Liberal Democrat spokesperson’s neat turn of phrase, “external macroeconomic shocks”.
We are not going to specify in the Bill exactly what sort of events we are talking about, but we are not talking about the general financial health of the licence holder because there are already provisions for that with the special administration regime. If one licence was not performing particularly well but another was, those are separate entities and the special administration regime would probably be the right model to kick in at that point. We are talking about something that would, I expect, inevitably affect any licence holder. Of course, at the moment we are only talking about one, but we do not know where we will be in the future.
Clause 85 is about meeting the costs of overseeing the licence. It is about maintenance, not the general day-to-day operations. That is what the special administration regime is concerned with. I can give assurances that any expenditure under the clause will be reported to Parliament. I also point out that the whole purpose of the Bill is to ensure that private investors fund and pay for the maintenance of the licence, so the provision is an in extremis safeguard.
I cannot give the shadow Minister other examples—I could say a zombie apocalypse, but that is probably unlikely. Of course, we cannot predict what will happen in the future, but we have seen in recent years a very unfortunate and dramatic set of circumstances where the economy has effectively ground to a halt. That is the kind of situation where this provision may be needed, but I stress again that it is about funding ongoing maintenance, not propping up the licence holder to carry on with their activities as usual. That is not the intention of the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 85 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 86 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 87
Collection and enforcement of tolls
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss:
Government amendment 20.
Amendment 83, in clause 88, page 60, line 29, at end insert—
“(4) Collection and enforcement regulations which provide for penalty charges must provide that, where the vehicle was at the relevant time let under a hiring or leasing agreement, the charge is payable by the hirer or lessee.”
This amendment would require liability for unpaid toll penalty charges to be transferred from the registered keeper to the hirer or lessee where a vehicle is subject to a hiring or leasing agreement.
Government amendment 89.
Clause 88 stand part.
Mr Dowd, you will be delighted to hear that we are now on part 7 of the Bill.
Was that a cheer in the background?
Part 7 is about existing toll road legislation rather than the new licensed highway regime, which we have been debating at length over previous days. It is about toll legislation made prior to 1999 that assumed that tolls would be collected at toll booths with barriers to prevent non-payment. Of course, as we all know, since the start of the century, remote payment methods, including paying online, by phone, by post or in person at nominated locations, have been successfully used on road user charging schemes around the country. These methods, which I shall refer to as free-flow tolling, have helped to provide smoother and quicker journeys for drivers.
The part aims to provide a route for the operators of tolled roads, bridges and tunnels established using historical legislation to modernise their operations and replace booths and barriers with free-flow tolling should they wish to do so. Most of the clauses in this part replicate provisions in the Transport Act 2000 and regulations made under the Act relating to the collection and enforcement of payments by road user charging schemes. They are also similar to clauses we have already debated in part 3 of the Bill that make these provisions for licensed highway authorities. In doing so, our intention is to ensure that, for the driver, the experience of paying to use a road is the same whatever legislation has been used to implement that toll or charge initially.
Clause 87 gives the Secretary of State the power to make collection and enforcement regulations as the mechanism for setting out how free-flow tolling would work at existing tolled undertakings, and the powers and duties of the toll operator in relation to collecting and enforcing tolls. In particular, the clause provides that such regulations may specify the deadline by which tolls must be paid; provide for how they are to be paid; require documents to be displayed and any equipment to be carried in or fitted to a vehicle for making payment; and provide for the maintenance of any equipment or structures that may need to be done for operating the free-flow tolling system.
Subsections (3) to (5) clarify that collection and enforcement regulations may be made only in relation to statutory tolled undertakings and that that excludes both licensed highway authorities created under the rest of the Bill and road user charging schemes made under the Greater London Authority Act 1999 or the Transport Act 2000. That clarification ensures that there is no opportunity for duplicate or conflicting regulations to be made in relation to the same payment system. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Amendment 20 is fundamentally procedural. It connects with an amendment we will discuss later. Together, the amendments reassign the regulation-making power for notification and enforcement of penalty charges from the Secretary of State to the Lord Chancellor. That is in line with standard practice and represents the appropriate designation of authority.
I now turn to Government amendment 89. Clause 88 provides that collection and enforcement regulations may impose penalty charges for any person who fails to pay a toll, as required when free-flow tolling is introduced at a tolled undertaking. That is essential to ensure that tolls can be properly enforced after the removal of toll booths and barriers. However, there may also be existing offences relating to the non-payment of tolls in the original primary legislation under which the relevant tolling powers are exercised.
It is our intention to ensure that a person should not be subject to sanctions under multiple pieces of legislation for the same infringement. The amendment enables collection and enforcement regulations to set out how penalties imposed under the provisions of the Bill interact with liabilities arising under any other legislation. That could mean that either the imposition of a penalty charge, or the payment of it, switches off liability for the other offence. In short, collection and enforcement regulations could provide that, if a person receives or pays a penalty charge, they cannot be pursued under another legislative regime for the same infringement.
Clause 88 covers the imposition of penalty charges where tolls have not been paid in accordance with the regulations or a range of other actions where people have acted contrary to the requirements of the regulations, which are the subject of succeeding clauses. The clause requires that regulations must specify whether these penalty charges are payable in addition to the toll or instead of it, so there is clarity for drivers about what is owed. In addition, regulations may make provision about the setting of penalty charges, including any discounts, surcharges or administrative fees. The clause also makes clear that it is the registered keeper of the vehicle who is liable to pay for penalty charges unless the regulations specify otherwise. In locations where toll booths and barriers have been removed, those powers are essential to ensure that people who do not pay by the deadline can be pursued to recover the debt. That protects the interests of the majority of people who pay on time.
We heard evidence from M6toll during oral evidence, and on the broad spirit of the clause, the official Opposition are entirely at one with enabling those existing toll roads in the country to migrate to a free-flowing system and away from the model where someone has to stop and reach out with a credit card—thankfully, the coin buckets are long gone from this country—before they can get on their way once payment has been accepted.
We debated earlier in the Committee—on much earlier clauses in the Bill—the powers to remove devices fitted to cars. It remains our position that automatic number plate recognition has to be the preferred technology in free-flowing tolls. Any system that requires devices to be fitted to cars is offering solutions from many decades ago, let alone many years ago. We should really be leaning into that ANPR technology, but that is a debate that we have had much earlier in the hearings of this Committee.
Therefore, through the lens that we support—I repeat, support—that principle of moving to free-flowing toll roads for the roads that already operate on that basis, I have tabled amendment 83, which seeks to clean up the clauses in this grouping. That is because there is a reality out there that not everybody who is driving a car on a toll road is the registered keeper of that car. I will actually declare an interest: my private car is on a private lease. I am not the registered keeper of it. However, as a good, law-abiding motorist in this country, I fully accept that if I, for whatever reason, fail to pay a toll, I should be the one who puts my hands up and accepts that I have failed in that duty and pay whatever penalty charge notice is due to me.
I have not failed to pay a toll, for the record. It should not, as in my case, be Volvo that pays. It seems very unfair that it should bear the duty of me failing to pay a toll on any particular road. That is what amendment 83 is about. It would make the hirer or lessee, rather than the registered keeper, liable for penalty charge notices where a vehicle that is indeed let under a hiring or leasing agreement fails to pay a toll.
Shivani Raja
We already transfer liability to the driver for standard parking and traffic fines. Doing the exact same thing here keeps the rules consistent and makes sure that the right person pays. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need to ensure that there is consistency in our approach towards motorists across the board?
Absolutely. My hon. Friend is right that consistency matters. The experience of the travelling public should be one of consistency and knowing what to expect, be that paying a toll on a road licensed under the provisions of the Bill or on an existing road, such as the Mersey tunnel, the M6 toll, or whatever it might be. That should be the case just as much as it is of contravening parking regulations in those settings that my hon. Friend referred to. It would be a far better world if we had that consistency across the piece for motorists, as well as those seeking to administer schemes from the Department for Transport through to the regulators such as the ORR and so forth.
Under clause 88(3)(a), the default is that the registered keeper pays. That simply does not stack up with the reality for so many road users these days, most of whom have to use finance to get a car on the road. One could probably count on one hand the number of people who can afford to buy a car outright, and leasing is increasingly popular. The British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association gave significant oral evidence on this issue on 29 October. I would be grateful if the Minister reflected on it and gave the Government’s formal response to that evidence. The association is a big player in this market and is responsible for a great many vehicles on the roads of this country, many of which will use existing and future toll roads. It is incumbent on the Government to give the association a straight answer on the evidence it gave.
If the Government are to persist with their model of the registered keeper being the responsible body, it is also incumbent on them to give those who have gone down the leasing route—I repeat my declaration of interest—some regulatory assurance that recharging will not become the wild west, with leasing companies passing those charges on with disproportionate fees, interest rates and whatever else they can levy. If the Government accept our amendment, the matter becomes much more straightforward, because it is always the driver in the moment who is legally responsible, not the registered keeper, who may be many hundreds if not thousands of miles away from wherever the alleged offence was committed.
Ours is a very simple and, I think, fair proposition. I do not think any of us would ever expect anyone who has not committed an offence to be held responsible for it, and that is what our amendment aims to put right in the Bill, while supporting the broad thrust of these clauses, which seek to move to better models of tolling on existing roads.
I am not entirely clear whether the shadow Minister is talking about his own proclivities when it comes to fare evasion. I am sure that you, Mr Dowd, are always keen to ensure that the toll is paid when you go through the Mersey tunnel, and that if the tunnel moved to a free-flow system, you would continue to do so.
The Minister has teased me. May I put on the record that I have never received a fine for not paying a toll in this country?
I never doubted the shadow Minister for a minute, but he is obviously future-proofing himself by seeking to amend the legislation. The shadow Minister spoke as if what we are proposing—that liability should sit with the vehicle keeper—is an entirely novel concept. Of course, that is already the existing provision for tolls, and it is important because the keeper record is the official information about who is responsible for a vehicle. That does not prevent other people from paying a toll or a penalty charge remotely, which is important, but it is even more important that liability remains with the person legally responsible for the vehicle, unless there are very clear reasons to take a different approach.
Alison Griffiths
I think we are in danger of violently agreeing with each other. The point that my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire is trying to make is purely about making sure that the wording in the Bill reflects the intent.
The intent is clear that the liability would remain with the vehicle owner. I take the point that a number of hire and lease companies will technically be the owner, but they already have provisions in their agreements with hirers and lessees to recover penalty charges with appropriate administration fees. I also take the shadow Minister’s point that we do not want those fees to be disproportionate or exploitative, and there is plenty of regulation already in place to protect consumers in those situations.
The amendment would create unreasonable risks by forcibly transferring liability to people whom toll operators could not identify without the co-operation of hire and lease companies. It is unnecessary, because the systems in place can already accommodate the handling of tolls and penalty charges under these circumstances. In my view, the flexibility and balance we have at the moment is right. I therefore invite the shadow Minister not to press the amendment.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 87 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 88
Penalty charges
Amendments made: 20, in clause 88, page 60, line 21, leave out from “fees)” to end of line 23.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 21.
Amendment 89: in clause 88, page 60, line 29, at end insert—
“(4) Collection and enforcement regulations may make provision as to the effect the imposition or payment of a penalty charge has in relation to any liability to conviction for an offence of refusing or failing to pay, or attempting to evade payment of, the toll.”—(Justin Madders.)
This amendment would allow collection and enforcement regulations to provide for imposition or payment of a fixed penalty to replace or discharge liability for criminal offences of non-payment, such as that in section 15(1) of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991.
Clause 88, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 89
Offences relating to tolls and penalty charges
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss that clauses 90 to 94 stand part of the Bill.
Clause 89 makes certain actions an offence when people intentionally seek to avoid paying a toll or penalty charge, or are identified as having failed to do so. This includes interfering with tolling equipment and, crucially for automatic number plate recognition systems, obscuring the registration plate of a vehicle. The clause sets out sanctions for these offences, including a fine, and, for the more serious offences of making false representations and interfering with equipment, the possibility of imprisonment. For clarity’s sake, the references to equipment do include number plates. I hope that Members will understand why it is important that that terminology is used.
Clause 90 provides for authorised persons to examine, enter or search vehicles to ascertain whether anything is being done to hinder or block the payment of tolls due. It also provides for anything that might be used as evidence to be seized. However, this clause restricts this power to vehicles that are on the public highway. There is no provision for anyone to enter private property to examine or enter a vehicle. The clause also provides that anyone intentionally obstructing a person authorised to do these things is committing an offence, and liable to be fined and imprisoned.
Clause 91 enables the immobilisation, removal, sale and destruction of vehicles as part of the enforcement process. However, this clause restricts this power to vehicles that are on the public highway. There is no provision for anyone to enter private property to immobilise or remove the vehicle. The clause also provides that anyone interfering with, removing or attempting to remove an immobilisation notice or device fitted to a vehicle is committing an offence. Intentionally obstructing someone acting under this power to immobilise or remove a vehicle would also be an offence. Anyone committing any of these offences would be liable to a fine.
Clause 92 allows collection and enforcement regulations to amend or repeal any provision of the original legislation governing a toll bridge or tunnel, in so far as it is necessary and desirable to make the new toll collection and enforcement methods operable. This is necessary because some of the historic legislation may include phrasing that expects tolls to be paid at toll booths—for example, that tolls must be paid before crossing or to a person appointed to collect tolls. Neither of these statements would be appropriate in relation to free-flow tolling, where payment may be made after crossing and done remotely, rather than directly to a person. The power to amend the legislation is limited to these matters and could not be used to change, for example, the toll charges or the classes of vehicles that pay tolls.
Clause 93 sets out the procedure for making collection and enforcement regulations. It requires the Secretary of State to publish notice of her intention to make such regulations in a way that brings it to the attention of people in the area of the tolled undertaking. Although the Secretary of State may make such regulations only in response to an application from a toll operator, she may amend or revoke regulations if it appears necessary or desirable. That ensures that if aspects of the free-flow tolling and enforcement operation need to be improved, that can be done without relying on a further application from the toll operator, thereby ensuring that drivers’ interests are protected. Nevertheless, prior to invoking these powers to amend or revoke regulations, the Secretary of State will consult the toll authorities that would be impacted.
The Government recognise that moving to a free-flow tolling system is a point of no return for a toll operator, as it would be hard to reinstate toll plazas, booths and barriers once they have been removed. Consequently, revocation of regulations would either be consensual or used only in extreme cases where the operator is non-compliant with the regulations, such as those made under clause 95 regarding approved standards for tolling equipment.
I do not take particular issue with this, beyond the points I have made—certainly on immobilisation—in previous debates in this Committee. However, as we look at the regulations and provisions that these clauses set out, it strikes me that there are still some unanswered questions. One of them is very topical given the past week, where Microsoft essentially shut down operations for us in Parliament and in many parts of the world; we all saw the impact that that had.
By definition, these clauses are all looking to technological solutions for the free flowing of roads. Nobody plans for the technological failure of a company as large as Microsoft, which I dare say will be involved in some way, shape or form in the technological solutions that will provide the backbone of the enforcement of tolling on these roads; but what if technology fails for a period of the length we saw last week, meaning that none of the ANPR cameras work? I doubt whether this will happen but, if anyone goes down the route of transponders in cars that ping against signals as they pass under, what if they suddenly cannot be read and cannot talk to databases that hold credit card details and so on to charge those vehicles automatically? I do not see an answer in any of these clauses to what would happen there.
The best I can presume is that it would revert to an appeal process that puts the onus on the motorist—because of somebody else’s failure—to prove that they did or did not travel along a road at that moment in time. That seems unfair to me. In the light of the unfolding events we are seeing, there is a risk of technological failure, either because it has just failed and someone has made an error, or—worse—because of a cyber-attack from a hostile state actor, whoever it might be. It needs to be made clearer in the Bill what happens if the technology we are talking about, which all these clauses lean on so heavily, simply fails.
The shadow Minister makes some interesting points. There are a number of different ways for a toll operator to respond. I do not think it is appropriate for us to put that in legislation, because it is effectively an operational matter. If the technology fails, journeys may not have been recorded, and the systems in place will obviously have appeal mechanisms and could allow more time for people to pay. If the internet went down, as in the example last week, and people were not able to log their payment, operators should have a bit of discretion to allow more time to pay. There are a number of ways that a reasonable and sensible operator could deal with that, and there are, of course, avenues to challenge them where they act capriciously. That, however, is not something we want to cater for in the Bill.
The word “could” is doing a lot of heavy lifting in that response—an operator “could” give more time. We are in a world dependent on technology—to read number plates, to ping a signal from a transponder in a vehicle or whatever it might be, and then to talk to a database—but if that all fails, surely the Government do not want to say that an operator “could” give more time. Surely this is a case where the operator “must” give more time, to be fair to the road user.
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his suggestion—he can of course table an amendment on Report, should he want to—but I think it is important to remind ourselves that we are discussing existing operators, who will already have procedures and processes in place to deal with circumstances where it is not possible to register the payment or be recorded as crossing—I am just reading my notes here. There is also an independent appeals process, as one would expect. I understand the point that the shadow Minister makes, but this is about existing operators who already have processes and appeals systems. Therefore, the general point about reliance on technology is dealt with by transposing existing processes into whatever are the causes of failure at some point in the future. It is also important to note that operators are not compelled to move forward with the technology, if they are not comfortable with it or think it is too much of a risk; but our evidence is that most of them want to do so.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 89 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 90 to 94 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 95
Equipment
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 21.
Amendment 84, in clause 96, page 64, line 20, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
Clauses 96 and 97 stand part.
Clauses 95 to 97 complete part 7 of the Bill. Each is quite different, so I shall speak to them separately. The group includes Government amendment 21, which follows on from Government amendment 20, which the Committee considered as part of a previous group.
Clause 95 will help to ensure that tolling equipment meets minimum standards. Clause 96 provides for the independent adjudication of appeals against penalty charges and includes a power for the Lord Chancellor to make regulations to appoint adjudicators and make provision for appeals against their decisions. Clause 97 provides interpretations for important terms used throughout part 7 of the Bill.
Clause 95 creates a mechanism for ensuring that tolling equipment meets minimum standards. That could be important to ensure the interoperability of equipment between free-flow tolling and road-user charging operations.
Douglas Lumsden
This is where I get slightly worried: if equipment is required and we have moved to free tolling, let us say I am going from Aberdeen down to France on my holidays, but do not have a piece of equipment in my car. Does that mean I cannot use the road or that, if I do so, I will get a penalty? I am trying to understand whether I am compelled to have a piece of equipment that I might use only once every two years, or is there another option?
For the journey the hon. Member describes, he probably could it without having to go through any of the toll operators that we are discussing. The equipment will almost certainly be number plates, however, because that is what we envisage for most of the operators. The terminology covers number plates, which I appreciate has created a little confusion about what we are talking about. Also, the clause refers not only to the vehicle equipment, but to the equipment to detect the vehicles in the first place, such as roadside cameras. I think it is important that we keep the terminology as broad as possible to cover potential changes in the future, but at the moment, the equipment will almost certainly be ANPR cameras and number plates.
Government amendment 21 is fundamentally procedural and follows on from amendment 20. It reassigns the regulation-making power for notification and enforcement of penalty charges from the Secretary of State to the Lord Chancellor. That is in line with standard practice and represents the appropriate designation of authority.
Clause 96, as amended, allows the Lord Chancellor to make regulations about the notification and enforcement of penalty charges. It also enables the independent adjudication of appeals against penalty charges. This is an important safeguard for drivers in the operation of free-flow tolling, given that, however good the technology used, there is a greater risk of error—whether on the part of the driver, the operator or, as the shadow Minister said, the underlying technology failing to process the data. There must, therefore, be a fair way for drivers to challenge penalty charges and have the merits of their appeal assessed before enforcement proceeds further.
The clause allows the Lord Chancellor to make regulations appointing adjudicators to determine disputes. Those regulations can also provide for appeals against an adjudicator’s decision, or where a decision has not been made, and for the appointment of people to hear those appeals. Furthermore, the clause allows regulations to provide for electronic or other device-generated records to be used as evidence in proceedings, supported by a certificate explaining the circumstances in which the record was produced. Altogether, this provides for a framework for disputes and appeals, alongside clear arrangements for the use of evidence.
Clause 97 provides interpretation for part 7 of the Bill. This is a standard clause, and I hope that the shadow Minister appreciates that the interpretations are necessary and does not test me too much on particular definitions. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
As if I would test the Minister, as he teases at the end of his speech. Much of this group is straightforward; I agree with the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South about equipment, but we have had that debate on other clauses and amendments. I accept what the Minister has said: that the Government envisage the use of ANPR and number plate technology within that. I cannot foresee a circumstance in which any other technology available on the shelf right now would be used for that, which is why I am perplexed that the Government feel the need to set regulations for older, technologically outdated systems.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South pointed out that somebody travelling once every two years, five years or 10 years along a particular route on holiday would be required to have a particular separate piece of technology in their car. That seems to be completely crackers, when we all have number plates on our cars. I accept that there needs to be a crackdown on ghost plates but, for the vast majority of road users, using number plates seems perfectly legitimate and reasonable.
Amendment 84 in my name follows a similar theme to a number of our amendments. At the moment, clause 96 simply says that the Lord Chancellor “may” by regulations make provision. On something that needs such clarity and certainty as
“the appointment of adjudicators and the determination of disputes relating to qualifying tolls and penalty charge notices”—
I will not read the entire clause, but it is all important stuff—there needs to be absolute clarity. It should not be just that the Lord Chancellor “may”, if they so wish, make these regulations. Our amendment is very simple: it replaces the word “may” with “must”, because “must” means that motorists will have certainty when they use the lower Thames crossing or any other road licensed by the Bill, or existing roads such as the M6 toll or Mersey tunnel affected by the new provisions.
Alison Griffiths
The wording of the clause invites me to imagine what the Government actually have in mind and under what possible circumstances the Lord Chancellor would ever actually act. It is such a loose set of words, using the word “may”, that any rational Lord Chancellor would probably ignore the clause altogether. I know that I am intervening on the shadow Minister rather than the Minister, but what could the Government possibly be thinking?
I suggest and hope—hope is not a strategy, but I hope—that this is a drafting error and that, for the first time in the process of this Bill Committee, the Government will readily accept a straightforward and simple amendment that would give absolute certainty.
I hear what the shadow Minister is saying. If his party, while in government, had used the word “must” instead of “may” in the countless pieces of legislation that they passed in those 14 years, his argument might have more strength. If they had removed the word “may” from the Transport Act 2000, which is effectively the equivalent and the template that we are using, and replaced it with “must”, I might have accepted that he had an argument. Of course, there is a clear intention for us to create regulation; I can give that commitment today. Having the standard wording that we have used in previous legislation, which the previous Government did not change, indicates that this argument is not a serious one.
Sorry; I have finished.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 95 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 96
Disputes, appeals and evidence
Amendment made: 21, in clause 96, page 64, line 19, at end insert—
“(A1) The Lord Chancellor may by regulations make provision for and in connection with the notification and enforcement of penalty charges.”—(Justin Madders.)
This amendment, together with amendment 20, means that the power to make regulations in connection with notification and enforcement of penalty charges provided for by collection and enforcement regulations under clause 87 is exercisable by the Lord Chancellor.
Clause 96, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 97 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Other penalty charges
“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision—
(a) conferring powers on the holder of a licence for or in connection with the imposition of penalty charges in relation to a matter specified in subsection (2);
(b) for or in connection with the rates of penalty charges imposed in accordance with provision within paragraph (a);
(c) about the timing and method of payment of such a penalty charge;
(d) about the person by whom such a penalty charge must be paid;
(e) about the collection or provision of information and evidence in connection with the imposition of such a penalty charge.
(2) The matters referred to in subsection (1)(a) are—
(a) a failure to display a document, or carry or fit equipment, in accordance with a requirement imposed under section 24(3);
(b) the release of a road vehicle from an immobilisation device fitted in accordance with regulations under section 30(1);
(c) the removal and storage of a road vehicle in accordance with regulations under section 30(1);
(d) the release of a road vehicle from storage in accordance with regulations under section 30(1);
(e) the destruction of a road vehicle in accordance with regulations under section 30(1).
(3) Section 27(4) to (6) (provision about rates of penalty charge) applies to provision within subsection (1)(b) as it applies to regulations within section 27(2)(b).
(4) Regulations under subsection (1) which make provision for the imposition of a penalty charge must specify whether the charge is payable in addition to the toll in respect of which the charge is payable or instead of it.
(5) The Lord Chancellor may make regulations about the notification and enforcement of penalty charges imposed in accordance with provision within subsection (1)(a).
(6) If a person does not pay the whole or any part of a penalty charge imposed on the person in accordance with provision within subsection (1)(a) by the time specified for payment, the penalty charge or unpaid part is recoverable by the holder of the licence as a civil debt due to it.
(7) A person commits an offence if the person makes false representations (whether by using a false document or otherwise) with intent—
(a) to avoid payment of a penalty charge imposed in accordance with provision within subsection (1)(a), or
(b) to avoid being identified as having failed to pay such a penalty charge.
(8) A person who commits an offence under subsection (7) is liable on summary conviction to either or both of the following—
(a) imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences;
(b) a fine.
(9) A person commits an offence if the person removes a notice of a penalty charge which has been fixed to a road vehicle in accordance with regulations under subsection (5) unless—
(a) the person is the registered keeper of the vehicle or a person using the vehicle with the registered keeper’s authority, or
(b) the person does so under the authority of the registered keeper or such a person or of the holder of a licence.
(10) A person who commits an offence under subsection (9) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale.”—(Justin Madders.)
This new clause, which would be inserted after clause 30, provides for the imposition of penalty charges in respect of matters other than non-payment of tolls. It also provides for offences in relation to non-payment of such penalty charges.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Airport operators and surface access obligations
“(1) Where the ORR designates a licence holder under this Act who controls access to an airport, the licence holder may not use road user charging under the licence as part of the airport’s strategy to meet its surface access obligations.
(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘surface access obligations’ means any requirement or target to reduce journeys to or from an airport by private car, taxi, or private hire vehicle, or increase the use of alternative transport.”—(Greg Smith.)
This new clause would prevent road user charging by licence holders to enable airports to meet their surface access obligations.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I very much welcome the opportunity to speak to new clause 3, which stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton. The new clause is speculative; it looks at the potential for someone to come forward with an application for a licence under the Bill with a scheme that relates to an access road to any of our airports. The new clause would prohibit the use of tolling on any such road built under licence under the terms of the Bill to enable access to any of our airports, where such tolls are used essentially as drop-off charges or to meet other goals that the airport may have for changing the way its customers travel to it, either in their own vehicle or—to get to the nub of it—where they are being dropped off at the terminal by someone else.
Of course, it would be possible to charge a toll to use a road built under licence under the Bill, but what we are getting at is that the toll must not be inflated or engineered in any way, shape or form for other purposes—in this case, changing the surface access requirements to an airport. The whole concept of drop-off charges has become a bit of a political hot potato in recent weeks. All our constituents are becoming increasingly frustrated about the concept of being charged explicitly to be dropped off at an airport, as opposed to parking there themselves or travelling by any other means.
It would be unreasonable for the Government to enable inflated tolls incorporating drop-off charges and other fees to be shoehorned in via the provisions of the Bill enabling tolls for the pure operation of a road. We may never see an application for such a road, but airport operators, under increasing pressure from the Government and looking down the lens of environmental demands on them, may see that as a way to bend to those demands. That would be very unfair on the travelling public. It would actually end up being detrimental to the airports, as people going on holiday, seeing relatives abroad or travelling for business would look to different airports that do not have such schemes. That would have a negative impact on the wider economy.
Alison Griffiths
These airport drop-off charges disproportionately affect the elderly and disabled. The new clause is therefore absolutely vital.
I agree. The best way I can put it is that tolls should fund and manage the road, not serve as a lever for someone else’s policy targets. New clause 3 seeks to give a clear and unambiguous signal to anyone out there who might be thinking of using the provisions of the Bill for such purposes once it has achieved Royal Assent and is in force, so that we can shut down that temptation. I ask the Government to adopt new clause 3, or, if they will not do so, to give a clear assurance that private car, taxi and private hire drivers will not be charged under Bill to help an airport to meet its other, entirely separate policy goals.
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for speaking to his new clause. I commend his ability to imagine the circumstances in which Machiavellian airport operators might wish to do what he describes. I can give him some reassurance that they would not be able to do so under the Bill: I draw his attention to clause 24(7)(b), which already prohibits the licence holder from using road user charging schemes under part 3 of the Transport Act 2000 on a licensed highway. The Bill’s provisions therefore already prohibit a licence holder from undertaking what the shadow Minister is concerned about.
It is important to explain the difference between tolling and road user charging. Of course, to the average member of the public, they are paying to use the road, but there is an important distinction. Tolling is a way of directly paying for the construction and maintenance of a road, whereas road user charging is a much broader term and can be used to effect changes in behaviour on the part of the road user. For example, a road user charge may be charged to enter an air quality management area, of which we have plenty. In that instance, the road user would not be paying for the construction or maintenance of a road, but would instead be faced with a charge as a deterrent from using the road. The deterrent charge is aimed at asking them not to drive that type of vehicle in that specific place, which is a means of persuading or nudging them to use alternative means of transport. I make that distinction because the new clause uses the term “road user charging” for airport drop-offs, which is about deterring people from using private vehicles to go to an airport.
Of course, if the Opposition were concerned about this issue, they could have used their powers to remove the provisions of the Transport Act 2000 that enable it. I am sure the shadow Minister will concede that that was one of the many reasons why the Conservative party lost the last general election. I reassure him that new clause 3 is not necessary, because the Bill already prohibits the kind of action that concerns him.
I understand the Minister’s arguments. I could probably list a number of things that led to our defeat in 2024, but I am not sure that this was one. However, this point continues to be, at best, a grey area. Notwithstanding the arguments that the Minister has just made, I am not certain that a circumstance could not come to pass in which a licensee, who may well be an airport operator seeking to build new surface access to their airport, would not be able to over-inflate a toll to manipulate the manner in which its customers travel to the airport. Yes, the Minister has rightly pointed to a number of factors that they might find inconvenient, but I do not believe that any of those provisions would fully shut down the ability to manipulate the terms of the Bill. The Opposition feel that it is important to shut it down explicitly via new clause 3.
I think the shadow Minister is talking about an extremely unlikely set of circumstances. The Bill specifically prevents road user charging. If he is now arguing that this might now be an opportunity for an airport to use a regulated asset base model, I point him to the fact that there are already provisions in the Bill to ensure that road charging is not exploited. It must be done in a balanced way that takes into account the interests of the road users. I think that that deals with his concerns.
Given the impact of any such scheme, I do not think that it is a good basis for policymaking to say that it is unlikely; there are lots of things that we have all said were unlikely, but that then came to pass very quickly. There are airports up and down the country right now that are inflating drop-off charges and finding other ways to meet other policy-based targets, away from the construction of new trunk roads and new parts of the strategic road network.
Notwithstanding the Minister’s arguments, I can still see a path. He says that it is unlikely. I say, “Perhaps, it is, but it could happen,” so we should explicitly shut down that route for those airport operators. We will therefore push new clause 3 to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Clause stand part.
Amendment 6, in clause 8, page 5, line 18, leave out
“as soon as reasonably practicable”
and insert
“before the end of the period of 24 months beginning with the assessment deadline under section 2(3), unless the condition in subsection (2A) is met.
(2A) The condition for the purposes of subsection (2) is that a majority of tenants of the building confirm in writing to the responsible entity that they are satisfied that a required remediation step may take place during a period greater than 24 months.”
This amendment replaces the subjective “as soon as reasonably practicable” standard for remediation completion with a fixed deadline of 24 months from the assessment deadline, unless tenants agree otherwise.
Amendment 27, in clause 8, page 5, line 30, at end insert—
“(6) Where a responsible entity is the owner of multiple properties, they may group buildings as a portfolio and undertake remediation as a phased programme of works without breaching the duty for any single building.”
This amendment would allow responsible entities to tackle their remediation work in batches if this was more efficient and still satisfy the duty.
Clause 8 stand part.
Amendment 34, in clause 14, page 9, line 19, at end insert—
“(9) Where an individual is identified under subsection (5)(a) this does not in itself create a personal liability for that individual in circumstances where the delay can be demonstrated to have been beyond their control.”
This amendment would clarify that where an individual is named in a remediation compliance plan, this does not in itself make them liable for delays outside their control.
Clauses 14 and 15 stand part.
Amendment 41, in clause 33, page 19, line 16, at end insert—
“(3) Before any guidance issued under this section may be relied on in proceedings—
(a) the Secretary of State must lay the guidance before Parliament, and
(b) the guidance must be approved by both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment would require Parliament to approve the guidance relating to the duties to mitigate, remediate, and prepare a remediation plan before such guidance can be relied on in proceedings.
Clause 33 stand part.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. When we were interrupted at the end of the last sitting, I was concluding my remarks on amendment 6, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Chippenham.
I understand the intention behind the amendment. There is much in it, and in general I find it agreeable. Contrary to what the Minister said in response to the hon. Lady, I do not believe that it is about delaying work for 24 months. Instead, it is about providing a hard stop at 24 months to stimulate the work so that it is actually done. I do not quite see the threat that the Minister saw.
However, remediation projects are far from uniform. The national picture includes buildings of different heights, materials of different types, and dangers of different natures. Where one building may need repairs that take just a few months or weeks, another building on the very same road could require years of work to achieve the same degree of safety.
Importantly—I keep coming back to this point—there is the question of capacity. Several of our amendments make it clear that we cannot presume to progress without the professionals required to make remediation feasible. Whatever timeframes the law seeks to set, they are redundant if there is nobody to work to meet them. That is why, on balance, the Opposition will not support amendment 6, but I wish to divide the Committee on amendment 26.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 10 and 11 stand part.
New clause 3—Financial assistance scheme for remediation of buildings under 11 metres—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before Parliament a scheme to provide financial assistance for the remediation of external wall systems and fire safety defects in multi-occupied residential buildings under 11 metres in height.
(2) The scheme established under subsection (1) shall apply to any multi-occupied residential building under 11 metres in height where an assessment or inspection determines that the external wall system or fire safety arrangements do not meet the fire safety standards set out in the Building Regulations 2010.
(3) The scheme must make provision to provide for leaseholders and residents of eligible buildings under 11 metres in height to be fully covered for the costs of physical remediation works, external wall repairs and associated interim safety measures required to meet the fire safety standards set out in the Building Regulations 2010.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a financial assistance scheme to cover the cost of remediation works for buildings under 11 metres.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, Mr Stringer.
Clauses 9, 10 and 11 should stand part of the Bill. Clause 9 will introduce a practical mechanism for remediation recommendations to be revised. This power is to be used where a suitable professional or Homes England determines that implementing the original recommendations would not result in the external walls being properly remediated. The clause recognises that in some cases new risks or issues may become apparent only once remediation works have commenced on site. Where that occurs, the original recommendations may no longer be sufficient to achieve proper remediation and will therefore need to be updated.
Importantly, alternative recommendations cannot simply be devised by the responsible entity; they must come from a suitably qualified professional or from Homes England. This will help to ensure that revised recommendations are supported by appropriate expertise and continue to deliver proper remediation. Clause 9 will enable responsible entities to follow revised recommendations where necessary, without requiring the assessment process to be restarted from scratch, which could cause disproportionate delays.
Since 2018, the Government have provided funding for remediation. Many responsible entities are likely to use Government funding to comply with their duty to remediate. Clause 10 will give the Secretary of State the power to provide financial assistance to a responsible entity where that assistance may help the responsible entity to comply with the clause 8 remediation duty. The assistance can be provided through a grant, a loan or another form of support, and it may be provided directly or indirectly. The clause will not create a right to funding, nor will it remove the responsible entity’s duty to remediate. Instead, clause 10 recognises that Government funding is an established and practical route to remediation. It makes it clear how reliance on established funding routes may be taken into account when assessing what steps are reasonably required and reasonably practicable in the circumstances.
Responsible entities need certainty and clarity on exactly how they are expected to comply with their part 1 duties. That is why clause 11 will allow regulations to be made to support the duties in clauses 7 to 10. The power allows technical and operational details to be set out in regulations. The intent is that this power will be used to provide details on what steps are regarded as reasonably necessary to mitigate or remediate fire safety risks. This will support responsible entities to comply with their duties under part 1. It should also support enforcement, as regulators will have clear guidance on what are considered the reasonably necessary steps.
Regulations will also provide for the detailed requirements to be described and updated as building circumstances, identified risks, technical standards and industry practice change over time. Clauses 9, 10 and 11 should all stand part of the Bill; I commend them to the Committee.
Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Stringer. I rise to speak to new clause 3, which stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Chippenham. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a financial assistance scheme to cover the cost of remediation works for buildings under 11 metres. We believe that no leaseholder, tenant or homeowner who has found that their building was built with fire safety defects should have to pay to put those defects right, no matter the height of the building concerned. Cases of homeowners having to find large sums of money are well known across the country.
I recognise that the Government have established some grants for buildings under 11 metres. However, we believe that a comprehensive scheme is needed so that all buildings under 11 metres are tackled and the necessary remediation is provided. The Bill covers buildings of 11 metres to 18 metres, but omits buildings under 11 metres. The new clause would put that right so that all residents can benefit from support where it is needed and where developers and building owners fail to comply with remediation. I commend the new clause to the Committee.
I thank the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington for tabling new clause 3. I recognise the concerns that have prompted it. The Government are committed to supporting residents facing serious cladding fire safety risks, including those in buildings under 11 metres. We have therefore made targeted funding available for eligible multi-occupied residential buildings under 11 metres with unsafe cladding, prioritising those that present high life-critical cladding fire safety risks.
We recognise that residents may face other building safety issues. That is why we continue to explore what further support may be appropriate for leaseholders in buildings under 11 metres. Any further intervention will be evidence-led, proportionate and targeted at the risks identified.
New clause 3 would go significantly further. It would require a scheme covering external wall systems, wider fire safety defects and associated interim safety measures, with eligible leaseholders and residents entitled to have those costs fully covered. We do not consider such a broad funding entitlement to be proportionate. Supporting all defects regardless of the risk that they present could be more regressive and would represent poor value for money, directing public funding towards lower-risk defects rather than towards buildings that present some of the greatest life-critical cladding fire safety risks. Placing those requirements in primary legislation would also restrict the Government’s ability to adapt support as risk, evidence and circumstances change. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept the new clause. I ask the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington not to press it.
Gideon Amos
If no one else wishes to speak, I am happy to make some final comments on new clause 3.
I am grateful to the Minister for her response, as I am for all her responses to our amendments. She asked whether the eligibility would be too broad, but of course it could be defined in regulations made under the new clause. The new clause is targeted at leaseholders and residents, who are the ones who should not be left out of pocket. Self-evidently, they were not responsible for the building defects caused by the developers and the building owners who were at fault in the first place, so they should not be subject to those costs. Although the eligibility of individual cases can be looked at, we need a scheme that applies comprehensively to buildings under 11 metres. That is what the Bill lacks, and that is why we tabled the new clause.
The Minister says that the Government are open to looking at further measures to tackle buildings under 11 metres. We have done everything we can to help the Government: our new clause provides the measures that the Minister requires.
Sarah Gibson (Chippenham) (LD)
My hon. Friend will note that the general opinion of the witnesses who gave evidence on Thursday was that buildings under 11 metres tend to be resident-owned and therefore more likely to suffer financial pressures. The new clause would help them.
Gideon Amos
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for illustrating exactly the point that I was trying to make, albeit not quite as clearly as she did. Residents and leaseholders should not be left with the burden.
I suspect that it is possible that the Government have not been convinced by my remarks. On that basis, we will press new clause 3 to a vote when the time comes.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 10 and 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Offence: sections 7 and 8
I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 12, page 7, line 3, after “they” insert “deliberately or knowingly”.
This amendment would ensure that the offence of failing to comply with the duties to mitigate and remediate would only be committed if the failure was knowing or deliberate.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 14, in clause 12, page 7, line 20, at end insert—
“(6) A delay in applying for, processing, or receiving public financial assistance including, but not limited to, grant funding under the Cladding Safety Scheme or Building Safety Fund does not constitute a reasonable excuse for the purposes of subsection (5).”
This amendment clarifies that awaiting decisions on public funding applications or government grants does not constitute a “reasonable excuse” defence for failing to comply with the legal duties to mitigate or remediate under clauses 7 and 8.
Amendment 31, in clause 12, page 7, line 20, at end insert—
“(6) A reasonable excuse for the failure in question, can include, but is not limited to—
(a) a lack of available assessors or contractors,
(b) the responsible entity awaiting funding from Government,
(c) the responsible entity awaiting a Homes England audit, and
(d) refusal of access by others.”
This amendment would provide a non-exclusive definition of what would count as a reasonable excuse for failing to mitigate or remediate.
Clause stand part.
I rise to speak to amendments 30 and 31, which stand in my name. Those who fail to remediate deserve to be punished for it. It is a total moral failure to knowingly and deliberately allow families to live in homes for which one is responsible and which one knows to be dangerous, and it is right that the Bill makes that fact clear. It is, however, important to ensure that only bad actors are caught by the offences in the Bill and that the Government do not risk imposing punishments on those acting in good faith.
My amendment 30 would therefore ensure that the offence of failing to comply with the duties to mitigate and remediate would be committed only if the failure was knowing and deliberate. Any responsible entity that knowingly and deliberately fails to remediate dangerous external walls must face the full force of the law. However, for the system to be fair, it must specifically target poor practice and criminal acts, rather than putting the whole industry under legal pressure because of the few rotten apples trying to get away with serious breaches of their legal and moral duties.
The duty to remediate is both a moral and a legal one. Responsible entities must be confident that they are on the right side of it so that the duty to remediate is in no way joined by concern about how to get remediation. Responsible entities should be clear about where and how to begin remediation and should feel supported by the Government, if works are to be completed successfully and swiftly. That is why I tabled amendment 31, which would provide a non-exclusive definition of what would count as a reasonable excuse for failing to mitigate or remediate.
When a developer has not successfully completed works, we must of course assess how and why that has happened. If the fault is found to be negligent, knowing or deliberate, the Bill does the right thing by creating an unwavering legal requirement that must be met to forgo punishment. However, where we find legitimate reasons, among the myriad potential reasons, for failing to finish remedial work in time, the responsible actors must have a right to present their defence. Amendment 31 would allow that by providing a non-exclusive definition of “reasonable excuse”, while still allowing action to be taken. I hope that the Minister and other hon. Members will support the amendments.
Sarah Gibson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I rise to speak to Liberal Democrat amendment 14, which would make it clear that delays in applying for or receiving public funding under schemes such as the cladding safety scheme or the building safety scheme are not a reasonable excuse for failing to mitigate or remediate.
The purpose of the Bill is to deal with some of the delays and with the bad actors, as the hon. Member for Orpington mentioned. We have seen time and again—in fact, the BBC has run a series of articles—that waking watch patrols have been taking longer than necessary. It is clear that that is due to the fact that those are paid for by residents, whereas the repairs are paid for by the building owner. It is therefore in the interests of the building owner to delay until they get Government funding.
We need to make sure that building owners address problems in a timely manner and are not waiting. This amendment would send a clear message to those building owners who are attempting to delay that they must make sure that those delays do not adversely affect residents, as we have seen over the last few years, with huge bills for waking watch patrols. I therefore ask the Minister to accept the amendment.
Gideon Amos
I rise to endorse the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for Chippenham and also to briefly respond to the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington. The amendment would insert the defence of not knowing what the law is, which I find extraordinary. I know that he tables amendments sincerely in order to improve the Bill, so will he clarify whether the Conservatives are really saying that someone can just turn around and say, “Oh, sorry, I didn’t know what the law was when I stole your car”?
No, of course that is not what we are saying. The building owner may not know that there is remediation that needs to take place; that is the point we are trying to make. If there is no dispute and remediation needs to take place, that remediation should take place. If they know that the building is unsafe and that remediation is required, but they are not doing it, that should be a criminal offence. It is not about whether they know what the law is; it is about whether they know that there is stuff that needs to be done to their building.
Gideon Amos
I am grateful for that further explanation. I still find it difficult to understand how the abuse of such a provision could be avoided. The remediation orders will surely make it clear where there is a duty to remediate. The fact that anyone could say, “Sorry, I just didn’t know about it,” simply cannot be a defence.
Amendment 31 would provide a non-exclusive definition of what would count as a reasonable excuse. Similarly, I do not think we should be legislating in the Bill for excuses. We need to get remediation done, and it needs to happen in a timely way.
We know that most reasonable entities have taken their existing legal duties seriously and got on with the remediation of historical fire safety defects at their properties. However, too many are still failing to act quickly enough.
Of the 4,724 residential buildings over 11 metres with unsafe cladding that the Department is monitoring, only 1,849 have had work completed on them. Regulators have taken enforcement action on at least 929 buildings because of confirmed or suspected unsafe cladding. Currently, those responsible will face penalties for inaction only once they have failed to comply with a statutory notice and been prosecuted. That process is slow, costly and inefficient. Current enforcement does not provide a sufficiently strong or immediate deterrent against non-compliance, allowing avoidance and delay to persist. To deliver real change, we need clear legal duties requiring responsible entities to act without waiting for enforcement, as well as stronger and faster enforcement tools to hold those who obstruct to account.
Clause 12 delivers that change. It makes it a criminal offence for a responsible entity to fail to take the required interim measures or required remediation steps as soon as reasonably practicable. When a responsible entity fails to act, it may face serious consequences, including a significant fine, imprisonment or both. The prospect of severe sanctions should drive compliance in the majority of cases. Where it does not, we should make sure there are meaningful consequences for the worst actors in the system.
Prosecution or the payment of a penalty do not remove a responsible entity’s duty to make their building safe. A responsible entity will still be required to take interim measures and remediation steps even if it has been convicted or paid a fine. If the responsible entity continues to offend, clause 12 allows it to be prosecuted again for continued non-compliance over a different period of time. That ensures that prosecution cannot be treated as the only cost for not carrying out the remediation work.
Clause 12 is needed to compel responsible entities to act now to make buildings safe; otherwise, they will face the full force of the law.
Darren Paffey (Southampton Itchen) (Lab)
I welcome the strengthened powers these clauses introduce. Can the Minister confirm that a long, drawn-out dispute between a freeholder and a developer over who pays, as has happened at Oceana Boulevard in my constituency, will not in and of itself amount to one of the reasonable excuses for failure to remediate, and that these powers will change the experience that residents have had?
What we are seeking to do is not just about financial penalties; it is about making sure people comply, deal with the root cause and conduct the remediation. These sanctions should drive compliance in the majority of cases, including where residents have been forced to pay for expensive waking watch. This is about making sure the prosecution and payment penalty do not remove the entity’s responsibility and duty to remove the cladding and make its building safe. As I said, clause 12 is needed to compel responsible entities to act now to make buildings safe; otherwise, they will face the full force of the law.
Several amendments have been tabled to the clause. Amendment 30, tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, would limit the offence to cases where a responsible entity deliberately or knowingly failed to comply with its duties to mitigate or remediate. The Bill’s approach is clear: responsible entities must comply with their duties to mitigate or remediate, and should be held accountable for unjustified failures to take the required remediation or mitigation action. The amendment would weaken that approach by limiting the offence to deliberate or knowing failures to comply with their duties to mitigate or remediate. Serious neglect can expose residents to danger, just as deliberate inaction can.
The amendment would also require the prosecution to prove that a failure was deliberate or knowing, as well as proving the failure itself. That additional hurdle could prevent conviction in cases involving serious failure to comply. The result would be weaker accountability and less incentive to comply. Our focus in the Bill must remain on ensuring that responsible entities take the action needed to protect residents, rather than on whether their failure to act was deliberate or knowing. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept amendment 30, and I urge the hon. Member to withdraw it.
Amendment 14, tabled by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, would prevent delays in securing public funding from being considered a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the duty to mitigate or remediate. Government funding is an established and practical route to remediation, and many responsible entities are likely to rely on funding to meet their remediation duties. It would be wrong to penalise a responsible entity that is doing everything expected of it for progress being delayed by funding processes outside its control. That is why the reasonable excuse defence is important.
Peter Fortune (Bromley and Biggin Hill) (Con)
I congratulate the Minister on her Herculean efforts to get through all the statements today; we are grateful for all the details she is giving us. Can she let us know a reasonable timeframe for when that guidance will be issued?
The hon. Gentleman is right: we need to ensure that all developers and responsible entities are able to comply, and I will be happy to update him further on that issue in writing.
The Bill also includes a reasonable excuse defence that provides further protection where circumstances generally prevent compliance. Whether a responsible entity has a reasonable excuse must depend on all the circumstances of the individual case, including what steps it took to overcome the barrier and what action remained available to protect residents. For those reasons, the Government again cannot accept the amendment, and I urge the hon. Member for Orpington not to press it. I commend clause 12 to the Committee.
I have listened to the Minister’s remarks on amendments 30 and 31, and I am afraid that our concerns on both have not been assuaged, so we will seek to press them to a Division.
While I have the floor, I would also like to address amendment 14, tabled by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington. I find myself in broad agreement with the comments the Minister made on it. Although the Bill rightly seeks to ensure that industry plays its role in ending the cladding crisis, we also know, after the tragedy of the Grenfell Tower fire, that the role the state plays in fixing the system must be improved. The amendment would place the onus for delays exclusively on private enterprise, and in some cases local authorities, and absolve the Government of responsibility for delays they might cause themselves. We believe that that is wrong, and it would present a damaging image to the public. Where the Government or bodies associated with them have caused blockages in the pipeline, such as around funding, we cannot expect others to pay the price—literally.
Sarah Gibson
I am sure the hon. Gentleman is aware of the huge cost of waking watch patrols that result from delays in buildings being remediated. Some residents paid upwards of £1.6 million in waking watch fees while waiting for an alarm that cost only £185,000 when it was finally installed. I am sure they would have been happy to help the building owner fund it in the meantime, rather than pay those huge costs. That is the issue the amendment is trying to address, not a blockage.
I am sure the residents would have been entirely delighted to do so. However, if the fault lies with central Government not providing funding to an adequate timescale, it would be wrong to criminalise people for something outside their control. That is why we simply cannot support the amendment, which may disincentivise responsible entities from working quickly to explore new projects and get them started. That is a delay that we cannot afford, and one that residents do not deserve. For that reason, I am afraid we cannot support amendment 14.
My apologies, but I have just finished.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 16 and 17 stand part.
New clause 4—Imposition of financial penalties on individuals—
“No penalties may be imposed as a result of this Act on any individual, unless such a penalty has been ordered by the First-tier Tribunal.”
This new clause would ensure that penalties on individuals are imposed by a tribunal.
Clauses 13, 16 and 17 all address financial penalties. Clause 13 creates financial penalties where the responsible entity has failed to mitigate risk and remediate unsafe external walls, as required under clauses 7 and 8. Enforcement authorities will be able to impose a financial penalty of up to £500,000 where a reasonable entity fails to take the required interim measures or remediation steps as soon as is reasonably practicable.
Clause 13 makes it clear that a reasonable entity cannot treat a single penalty as the price of continued non-compliance. If the failure continues, further penalties can be imposed, provided that they relate to different periods of non-compliance. Prosecution remains available for the most serious and egregious cases, and reflects the seriousness of failing to assess a building.
Clause 16 introduces financial penalties where a responsible entity fails to provide a remediation compliance plan by the deadline, or a revised plan when required. Where a responsible entity misses the initial deadline, or fails to provide a revised plan within three months of alternative recommendations being made, the enforcement authority may issue a financial penalty of up to £14,000.
Clause 17 allows enforcement authorities to impose further daily penalties of up to £500 where the failure continues after the initial penalty was issued under clause 16. These clauses draw a line under delay and avoidance, putting residents’ safety first. Responsible entities must act now or face substantial penalties.
I rise to speak to my new clause 4. In any sound legal practice, it is not the job of the investigator or the prosecution to decide on the sentence for the offence that they have been investigating. As currently drafted, however, the Bill fails to uphold that principle. It is wrong for an individual to face an arm of the state, with its legal teams, insurance, army of civil servants and statutory immunity. That is especially true when the individual has to contend with the joint weight of being up against an opponent that is a regulator, prosecutor and judge—all in one.
By contrast, a tribunal offers a fairer but equally robust alternative. It is independent, led by a judge who is independent and experienced in the field. It acts as a proper court should, hearing evidence from both sides, and makes judgment after hearing evidence, rather than waiting for evidence at a later appeal. New clause 4 would make enforcement fairer, clearer and sounder. It would do nothing to weaken it, and everything to make it better. When the time comes, I hope that the Minister and hon. Members will agree.
Noah Law (St Austell and Newquay) (Lab)
The severity of the penalties aside, I wonder whether new clause 4 would introduce additional delays to the process of ensuring that the penalties are imposed and that justice is served.
That is not the intention of the new clause at all. It is very much about the last part of what the hon. Member just said, which is ensuring that justice is served. Our central contention is that having the same person act as judge, jury and prosecutor will not secure justice. It will speed the situation up, but democracy needs to be done properly, and we think that a first-tier tribunal would be the appropriate place to do it.
New clause 4, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, also addresses the financial penalties that I outlined earlier. I understand the concerns behind the new clause, and financial penalties against individuals must be subject to appropriate safeguards. However, the Bill already provides such safeguards. A person who receives a financial penalty can appeal both the decision to impose it and, where relevant, the amount of the penalty to the first-tier tribunal. Importantly, the final notice of payment is suspended until the appeal concludes. The tribunal therefore already provides independent scrutiny of the enforcement authority’s decision.
New clause 4 would go further and require the tribunal to be involved before any financial penalty could be imposed on an individual, even where the individual did not intend to challenge it. That would add an unnecessary additional stage to the enforcement process, and it could make it harder for enforcement authorities to respond promptly to non-compliance. I hope the hon. Member for Orpington will agree that the Bill strikes the right balance between effective enforcement and appropriate protection for individuals. I therefore ask him not to press the new clause to a vote.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Duty to prepare remediation compliance plan
Amendment proposed: 34, in clause 14, page 9, line 19, at end insert—
“(9) Where an individual is identified under subsection (5)(a) this does not in itself create a personal liability for that individual in circumstances where the delay can be demonstrated to have been beyond their control.”—(Gareth Bacon.)
This amendment would clarify that where an individual is named in a remediation compliance plan, this does not in itself make them liable for delays outside their control.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 35, in clause 19, page 12, line 2, at end insert—
“(4) It is a reasonable excuse for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they had been awaiting an audit.”
This amendment makes an outstanding audit a reasonable excuse to the offence of failing to comply with section 18.
Clause 19 stand part.
Amendment 36, in clause 20, page 12, line 9, leave out from “undertaking” to the end of line 12, and insert
“or where the undertaking is a member of a group, a fixed cap, to be determined by regulations.
(2A) Regulations under subsection (2)(b) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would remove the ability to impose penalties based on worldwide revenue and instead subject them to a fixed cap, to be set by regulations.
Clause 20 stand part.
Amendment 37, in clause 21, page 12, line 28, at end insert—
“(4A) The HCA must lay before Parliament any guidance (including revised guidance) that it prepares under this section.”
This amendment requires the HCA to lay its guidance before Parliament.
Clause 21 stand part.
I will now speak to clauses 18 to 21. Clause 18 puts independent auditing of fire risk assessments of external walls into law. Under part 1 of the Bill, those assessments determine what action is needed to address external fire safety risks. It is critical that their recommendations are robust and properly evidenced, and that residents, responsible entities and regulators can have confidence in the decisions that follow. Homes England will lead the audit process, building on its proven track record of independent oversight across Government remediation programmes.
Every assessment under clause 2 that recommends interim measures or remediation works will be independently audited. Audits will provide a clear view of the remediation that a building needs, reducing uncertainty and supporting more consistent decisions. They will check that the assessment methodology has been properly applied and that conclusions are proportionate, evidence based and clearly justified.
Assessments that conclude that no remediation is necessary are currently not routinely audited, as they generally fall outside Government remediation programmes. Clause 18 closes that assurance gap by giving Homes England a statutory power to audit those assessments. That will provide greater confidence in no-works conclusions and help to ensure that unsafe buildings are identified. This clause also allows Homes England to audit alternative recommendations made once remediation has started, providing an additional safeguard where the original approach changes.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
Will the Minister tell the Committee whether she has confidence that Homes England will be able to do what she has just set out—to audit and provide us with reassurance that fire and remediation works are carried out to the highest possible standards? Can she give us a flavour of how the Department has looked at the capacity within Homes England to be able to deliver that?
I thank the hon. Member for that important intervention. As he will be aware, Homes England already operates an established auditing arrangement for the cladding safety scheme, with experience of reviewing FRAEWs at scale. We are working closely with Homes England to ensure the right capacity and capability are in place to support delivery of the Bill. That is something we will continue to monitor as the Bill progresses.
As I said, clause 18 closes the assurance gap by giving Homes England a statutory power to audit the assessments. That will provide greater confidence in no-works conclusions and help ensure unsafe buildings are identified. The clause also allows Homes England to audit alternative recommendations once remediation has started. If an audit finds that recommendations need to change, the responsible entity will be required to act on the revised recommendations. To make the audit process effective, the responsible entity, assessor and other specified persons in clause 18 must co-operate with Homes England, including by providing information when required.
The Bill extends Homes England’s auditing functions to Greater London. That means Homes England will carry out its role across England, including directly in Greater London, with the agreement of the Mayor of London. That does not affect the mayor’s other responsibilities.
Clause 19 supports the clause 18 requirement for Homes England to audit fire risk assessments of external walls. Homes England’s audits will strengthen confidence in the remediation process and decisions by checking that assessments and recommendations are robust, but the audit process cannot work if relevant persons do not co-operate. Clause 19 gives the duty to co-operate in clause 18(3) and (4) meaningful consequences. It makes it a criminal offence for a specified person to intentionally fail to co-operate with Homes England for the purposes of carrying out, or deciding whether to carry out, an audit. That includes acts such as failing to provide information upon request or making the required changes upon request.
The provision is important because deliberate non-compliance could obstruct an audit, delay proper scrutiny of an assessment, or prevent Homes England from identifying where recommendations need to be amended. The offence applies only to intentional failures to comply and includes the reasonable excuse defence. Clause 19 is important to make sure that audits can be completed in practice, recommendations can be properly tested, and remediation decisions can be taken forward with confidence.
Clause 20 enables enforcing authorities to issue substantial financial penalties where a responsible entity intentionally fails to co-operate with Homes England for auditing purposes, as required under clause 18. Criminal prosecution is important and remains available for the most egregious cases, reflecting the seriousness of failing to co-operate with Homes England for auditing purposes. However, as I have explained, criminal proceedings can be lengthy and resource-intensive, and can place significant demands on enforcement bodies.
The purpose of clause 20 is to give enforcement authorities a more direct alternative to criminal prosecution by enabling them to impose financial penalties without first having to serve a statutory notice or pursue criminal prosecution. Where a relevant person has refused to comply with the requirement to co-operate, the enforcement authority may impose a financial penalty of up to £40,000 on an individual or up to 5% of qualifying worldwide revenue on an undertaking or group.
The clause also contains important safeguards. The enforcement authority must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offence has been committed, and no penalty may be imposed where the person can show, on the balance of probabilities, that they had a reasonable excuse. Criminal prosecution remains an option for the most serious cases. The clause therefore gives enforcement authorities a proportionate alternative route to secure compliance with the requirement imposed under clause 18.
Clause 21 will require Homes England to prepare and publish guidance explaining how it will carry out its audit functions under the Bill. That is important, because responsible entities and assessors need to understand how the audit process will work and what will be expected of them, including what information they may be expected to provide. The guidance must explain how assessments will be selected for audit, what information Homes England will require and how audits will be carried out. I commend clauses 18 to 21 to the Committee.
I rise to speak to amendments 35 to 37, which are in my name.
As with amendment 34, which I spoke to recently, we cannot use reasonable delays as a reason to accuse well-meaning responsible entities of falling short of their statutory duties. Amendment 35 would extend the allowances to include an outstanding audit as a reasonable excuse in respect of the offence of failing to comply with clause 18. As I say, we must work with responsible entities, not against them, to make a speedier and more effective national remediation programme a reality for all affected homes. That means applying fair legal tests and reasonable excuses where good-faith work is ongoing but incomplete.
I turn to amendment 36. Any bad actors—no matter how big or small, how local or international—would be held accountable if they fall short of providing the safe and decent homes that people rightly expect and deserve to live in. That is something we can probably all agree on, but I am sceptical of connecting liability between UK subsidiaries and wider international parent companies.
Construction businesses regularly operate through distinct subsidiaries or special purpose vehicles, as a standard commercial practice designed to ringfence risk and ensure secure and accountable business operations. Piercing the corporate veil to expose entire parent companies on an international basis to risks created by one arm or subsidiary inflates that risk disproportionately. As risk increases, so do premiums, meaning higher costs for leaseholders and home buyers. In the week after new protections have been announced for leaseholders, that seems incongruent at best and irresponsible at worst.
It would be far more proportionate and consistent to base the penalty on a fixed regulatory cap, as clause 13 already establishes. My amendment 36 would therefore remove the ability to impose penalties based on worldwide revenue and would instead subject them to a fixed cap, to be set by regulations. Without the amendment, we could see hugely inconsistent penalties for companies providing homes because of how they operate and profit internationally. That could leave some more culpable bad actors facing a proportionately smaller punishment than other companies, despite a worse offence. We believe that basing the penalty on their domestic actions, subject to a cap, is a far fairer and more consistent approach.
The shadow Minister may be aware of the precedent in competition law of the maximum of 5% of worldwide turnover, including in penalties for breaching commitments or directions under the Competition Act 1988. The penalty we are setting is a maximum, not a fixed penalty. A penalty at or near the maximum level will be reserved for the most serious cases. Does he agree that that is a proportionate measure to have in the Bill?
No, I do not, which is why we tabled amendment 36. We think that it is not proportionate.
No, I am answering the previous point. The fact that a precedent has been established in another piece of legislation applying elsewhere does not automatically mean that we have to follow it in this case. We do not agree, and we will press amendment 36 to a Division when the time comes.
I turn to amendment 37. Clause 21 empowers the Homes and Communities Agency to prepare and revise statutory guidance on how its new auditing framework for remediation functions operates. At present, however, the Bill’s provisions allow for the HCA to issue or amend its guidance without a statutory requirement to bring it to Parliament. As many hon. Members will know, with building safety the devil is almost always in the guidance.
Technical standards, auditing criteria and risk-balancing methodologies are the commandments by which the state ensures that leaseholders are safe, that buildings can be sold and that an entity responsible for wrongdoing can face criminal or financial penalties for non-compliance. That is especially important for the guidance that is to be issued under clause 21: it will carry heavy weight across the sector and will play a fundamental role in shaping how external wall assessments are scrutinised and how enforcement is undertaken. That is why I tabled amendment 37 to ensure that Parliament is not bypassed.
The requirements of amendment 37 are simple: any initial or revised guidance prepared by the HCA under clause 21 must be laid before Parliament. That would not make the HCA’s job harder, nor would it cause any delays. It would simply allow for greater scrutiny of guidance with far-reaching impacts.
I thank the Committee for its consideration of the clauses. I will now address amendments 35 to 37.
Amendment 35, tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, would make waiting for an audit an explicit reasonable excuse for failing to co-operate with the audit process. However, waiting for an audit does not remove the need to co-operate with it. Homes England may need information or other co-operation before an audit can begin or while an audit is under way. Clause 19 will therefore make it an offence to intentionally fail to comply with the requirement to co-operate with an audit. That will prevent someone from deliberately withholding information or refusing to co-operate, which could delay the audit and hold up remediation.
Making an outstanding audit a specific reasonable excuse could create a loophole, allowing someone to withhold the very co-operation needed to progress the audit. There is already protection where someone has a genuine reason for not complying. Clause 19 provides a general reasonable excuse defence. That will allow individual circumstances to be considered without making an outstanding audit itself an excuse for non-compliance. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member not to press amendment 35.
Amendment 36, also tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, would replace the revenue-based maximum financial penalty, for an undertaking that is a member of a group, with a fixed cap to be set in regulations. The Government recognise that financial penalties must be fair and proportionate, but they must also provide a meaningful deterrent for non-compliance. That is why the Bill links the maximum financial penalty to qualifying worldwide revenue. It will ensure that the available sanction reflects the financial resources of the undertaking or the group concerned. A fixed monetary cap would not have the same effect on groups of different sizes. A sum that represents a substantial penalty for a smaller group could have less of an impact for a larger group. Replacing the revenue-based maximum penalty with a fixed cap could therefore weaken the incentive for the largest corporate groups to comply, and the consequences when they do not.
Importantly, the 5% maximum figure is not a fixed penalty. It does not mean that every breach will attract a penalty at that level. Enforcement authorities will determine the appropriate amount to impose as a financial penalty on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the circumstances. They will be required to apply a methodology, to be set out in statutory guidance, to ensure that the penalty is fair and proportionate. A penalty at or near the maximum would be reserved for the most serious cases.
The Bill also provides procedural safeguards. Before a financial penalty is imposed, the person can make a written representation in response to the notice of intent. If a penalty is then imposed, they have the right to appeal to the tribunal, providing independent scrutiny of the penalty where there are grounds to challenge it. Together, these safeguards allow penalties to reflect the seriousness of the breach, while remaining fair and subject to proper process. The approach that the Bill takes is the right balance: a maximum that provides a meaningful deterrent, with the actual penalty determined proportionately in each case. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept amendment 36. I urge the hon. Member not to press it.
Finally, amendment 37, tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, would require Homes England to lay guidance before Parliament ahead of publication. I agree that there should be transparency on how Homes England will carry out audits. That is already provided for in the Bill: clause 21 will require Homes England to publish guidance explaining which assessments it will select for audit, what information it will require and how audits will be carried out. These are practical details about how it will carry out its audit functions. The audit powers themselves are set out in the Bill. There is also oversight of the guidance: before publishing it, Homes England must consult the Secretary of State, and the same applies to any revisions. The guidance and any revisions must also be published. Requiring the guidance to be laid before Parliament would add an extra procedural step without strengthening the safeguards already in place, so I ask the hon. Member not to press amendment 37.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Offences: section 18
Amendment proposed: 35, in clause 19, page 12, line 2, at end insert—
“(4) It is a reasonable excuse for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they had been awaiting an audit.”—(Gareth Bacon.)
This amendment makes an outstanding audit a reasonable excuse to the offence of failing to comply with section 18.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 38, in clause 22, page 13, line 6, at end insert—
“(1A) Each building must have a single lead enforcement authority.”
This amendment would require a single lead enforcement authority for each building.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Amendment 15, in clause 23, page 13, line 25, at end insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State must provide relevant enforcement authorities with ringfenced financial resources and grant funding sufficient to meet the full administrative, technical, and legal costs incurred in exercising their functions under this Chapter, including step-in remediation works under Schedule 1.”
This amendment places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to provide ringfenced funding to local housing authorities and fire authorities so they have the resources required to enforce remediation and exercise step-in powers.
Clause 23 stand part.
At present, clause 22 allows for multiple bodies, including local authorities, local fire authorities and the Building Safety Regulator, to hold overlapping responsibilities over individual cases. This is a regulatory tangle that we cannot risk. Remediation has simply, and worryingly, been far too slow in the nearly 10 years since the tragedy that was the Grenfell Tower fire. All of us present have a duty to ensure that this lag has ended, which is why we must work to iron out any regulatory creases that appear in the Bill.
That is why amendment 38 would introduce a crucial principle of administrative clarity: each building must have a single lead enforcement authority. In designating just one primary agency to have oversight and lead enforcement for every individual case, we eliminate the risk of regulatory delay and impasse. Moreover, a single lead authority also gives residents a clear, unambiguous and consistent point of contact. Amendment 38 is not technical; it is common sense, so I hope that the Minister and other hon. Members will support it.
Sarah Gibson
Amendment 15 would place a duty on the Secretary of State to provide ringfenced funding to enforcement authorities to cover the full cost of enforcement and step-in remediation. Those of us who have had a long career in the building industry will know that a lack of enforcement, not a lack of legislation, is quite often the issue that causes delays, problems and a lack of clarity. The Minister mentioned earlier that the prospect of fines should be a deterrent, but I beg to mention that the prospect of fines would act as such only if enforcement is enacted and properly funded. Residents left without that option can be left with long legal action, which I want to avoid.
Gideon Amos
I have sympathy with the intent behind amendment 38, tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, as it addresses one of the compelling points that came out of the witness sessions. I apologise: I was travelling to a funeral that day, so I could not be there. However, on reading Hansard afterwards, it became increasingly clear that the complex jungle of different responsibilities among regulators was a real cause for concern. Several witnesses pointed out the need to have either a single regulatory body, which is what the hon. Member is proposing, or at least a single framework.
I think it was pointed out that the LACORS agreements between local authorities and regulatory services would have to be rewritten some 147 times to cover all parts of the country, and the agreements and memoranda of understanding between local authorities and regulatory services would come on top of the agreement being shaped for the London area. That cannot be the right approach. I hope that the Minister will say something about how the issue can be better addressed. We cannot leave this Bill without addressing what all the witnesses said was necessary: having a single framework or regulator. Otherwise, we face the prospect of months or years of discussion, in each local authority up and down the land, to decide who will be the lead authority.
I thank the hon. Members for Orpington and for Taunton and Wellington for their engagement on clauses 22 and 23. The clauses provide clarity on which public authorities are enforcement authorities for part 1 of the Bill, placing a clear duty on enforcement authorities to exercise those functions. Clause 22 matters because responsible entities for residents, and residents themselves, need certainty about who is responsible for enforcing the regime, if the responsible entity is failing to comply with its duties to assess, mitigate or remediate external fire safety risks.
The clause makes local housing authorities and fire and rescue authorities the enforcement authorities in respect of chapter 1 buildings in their areas. The Building Safety Regulator is made the enforcement authority for chapter 1 buildings that are considered “higher-risk buildings” under section 65 in part 4 of the Building Safety Act 2022. Those authorities already have duties under existing legislation to regulate and enforce fire safety, so the clause builds on and complements existing expertise and regulatory responsibilities. It also includes a regulation-making power so that the list of enforcement authorities can be updated if needed. That is important for ensuring that part 1 duties and offences can continue to be enforced effectively even if the relevant authorities change over time.
On amendment 38, I agree that there must be clarity about which authority is leading investigation or enforcement activity for a particular building, but the amendment is unnecessary because the Bill’s co-operation arrangements already provide for regulators to agree who should lead, when joint action is needed, and how information should be shared. Local housing authorities, fire and rescue authorities and, for higher-risk buildings, the Building Safety Regulator have distinct but overlapping responsibilities and powers. One authority will lead in many cases, but different authorities may need to lead on different issues or at different stages, and in some cases, joint action may be the most effective response. Requiring in primary legislation a single lead enforcement authority for every building could therefore introduce unnecessary rigidity. The Bill instead provides clarity about lead responsibility while retaining the flexibility needed to reflect different buildings, risks and regulatory functions. For that reason, the Government cannot accept the amendment, and I ask the hon. Member for Orpington not to press it to a vote.
The first purpose of clause 23 is to clarify that enforcement authorities should use all the tools available to them to secure remediation. The new powers in the Bill are intended to complement, not replace, existing powers under the Housing Act 2004, the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and the Building Safety Act. The clause achieves that by requiring enforcing authorities to exercise their existing or new powers to secure compliance with part 1 duties while allowing them to choose the most appropriate enforcement action in each case.
The second purpose is to place it beyond doubt that remediation is an enforcing authority’s responsibility. Clause 23 places a clear duty on enforcement authorities to exercise those functions to secure compliance with the duties to assess, mitigate and remediate, or otherwise secure proper remediation. That provides greater clarity and consistency across enforcing authorities and helps to ensure that all parts of the regulatory system play their role in driving remediation outcomes.
I acknowledge the intention behind amendment 15: relevant authorities must have the capacity and resources they need to carry out their functions under the Bill effectively. However, we do not consider it necessary to impose a statutory requirement to provide ringfenced funding for the full costs incurred by authorities. In accordance with the new burdens doctrine, the Government will undertake a new burdens assessment to assess the additional costs arising from the Bill and determine what additional support, if any, relevant authorities require. Separate Government funding is available to support eligible remediation projects, including those carried out through the remediation backstop. The Bill also allows the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance to remediation authorities carrying out backstop work.
Peter Fortune
On the new burdens assessment, will there be any vehicle or process for appeal if local authorities think that the amount offered will not cover the actual cost?
As with any new burden, the Government will ensure that we carry out a full and proper assessment, in co-operation with local authorities and the Local Government Association.
As I said, the Bill allows the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance to remediation authorities carrying out backstop work. The arrangements provide an appropriate mechanism for assessing and meeting a cost arising from the new regime, without creating an inflexible statutory ringfence. I hope my explanation has given the hon. Member the assurance that he needs. I ask him to withdraw the amendment, and I commend clauses 22 and 23 to the Committee.
I thank the Minister for her response on amendment 38. Unfortunately, we are in the same predicament as when I moved the amendment: we simply do not believe that the Bill makes clear what would happen in the event of an impasse between the various regulators. Obviously, we hope that there will be no impasse, but there might be, and it would very much be a missed opportunity not to untangle that in the Bill. In oral evidence, witnesses were clear that they thought this was one of the weaknesses of the Bill, and would add to the complexity rather than reduce it. We should not miss the opportunity we have to tidy that up now. We will press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Enforcement authorities are central to accelerating remediation and holding responsible entities to account. Enforcement is driving progress, but it can be slow, complex and resource-intensive when regulators cannot easily obtain the evidence they need. That is why the Bill includes clauses 24 to 26.
Clause 24 gives relevant enforcement authorities a targeted power to require a person to answer questions where they hold information relevant to an enforcement investigation. This power will help regulators to establish the facts, identify non-compliance and determine the appropriate enforcement action. The power sits alongside existing information-gathering powers and provides an additional route to obtain the evidence they need. It is intended to support the reliability of evidence and deter false or misleading answers.
Safeguards are in place for those being interviewed. The notice must explain the investigation and the consequences of non-compliance, so that the person understands why the information is being sought and what is required of them. Answers given under this power cannot generally be used against that person in criminal proceedings except in limited and clearly defined circumstances. This is a legal safeguard to protect people from being forced to self-incriminate in relation to other proceedings.
Clause 25 creates offences for failing to comply with an interview notice and for knowingly or recklessly providing false or misleading information in response to that notice. These offences incentivise proper engagement with the information-gathering process and deter conduct that could obstruct or frustrate an investigation. The penalties reflect the seriousness of obstructing an investigation, particularly where false or misleading information may affect decisions about remediation. The clause also protects those with a legitimate reason for non-compliance by providing a reasonable excuse defence.
Clause 26 introduces substantial financial penalties where a person fails to comply with a notice or knowingly or recklessly provides false or misleading information. This is to drive compliance with clause 24. Criminal prosecution is important and remains available for the most egregious cases, but criminal proceedings can be lengthy, resource-intensive and place significant demands on enforcement bodies. Clause 26 gives enforcement authorities more direct alternatives to criminal prosecution by allowing them to impose financial penalties.
Where a person fails to comply with a notice or knowingly or recklessly provides false information, the enforcement authority may impose a financial penalty of up to £40,000 for an individual or up to 5% of qualifying worldwide revenue for an undertaking or group. The distinction between an individual and a group is necessary and is intended to drive compliance by ensuring that the penalty reflects the responsible entity’s means and introduces severe penalties for non-compliance. The penalty framework is designed to be proportionate but effective. Importantly, enforcing authorities must still be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offence has been committed, and duty holders will be able to rely on the statutory reasonable excuse defence where appropriate. Prosecution remains available for the most serious cases.
These clauses are designed to make sure that enforcing authorities obtain the evidence they need to accelerate remediation. I commend clauses 24, 25 and 26 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Directions by the Secretary of State
I beg to move amendment 39, in clause 27, page 16, line 22, at end insert—
“(9) Any direction given under this section must be laid before Parliament.”
This amendment would require any directions given by the Secretary of State to be laid before Parliament.
As we discussed previously, building safety directions are too critical to forgo proper scrutiny; there must be parliamentary oversight, especially of the directions that the clause affords the Secretary of State the power to make. Ministerial direction of the magnitude offered in clause 27 is simply too great to be considered behind closed doors in Marsham Street. That is why I tabled amendment 39, which requires any directions given by the Secretary of State to be laid before Parliament. The amendment would ensure that directions reach clear and transparent conclusions and are subject to much greater public accountability. That is a simple and logical course of action for such powers, and I hope that hon. Members will agree.
Clause 27 gives the Secretary of State the power to issue statutory directions to the regulatory bodies responsible for enforcing part 1 of the remediation of unsafe cladding regime. Local authorities, fire and rescue authorities and the Building Safety Regulator have important but overlapping responsibilities to regulate fire safety, and I commend them for the action they have taken to date.
Local authorities alone have taken enforcement action on at least 929 buildings over 11 metres, while 12 mayoral strategic authorities have published local remediation acceleration plans with a shared aim of using their convening power to accelerate remediation. However, performance can vary and there must be a clear route to act where a new strategic directive emerges, or where an authority needs to take specific steps to improve how it carries out its functions. That is why the clause gives the Secretary of State the power to issue directions to all local authorities, fire and rescue authorities and the Building Safety Regulator, which they must follow.
The intention is that a national direction will be used when the Secretary of State needs to communicate quickly a change in strategic direction and make sure all regulators are aligned to follow it. The clause also allows the Secretary of State to give a targeted direction to one or more local authorities or fire and rescue services to address more localised issues. This could include poor performance, such as two authorities working in the same area failing to work effectively together. A targeted direction could, for example, require an authority to review its procedures, prepare an improvement plan, or co-operate with expert support. The Building Safety Regulator is not in scope of targeted directions as it is a non-departmental Executive agency and is subject to existing accountability arrangements.
As this is a broad power, important safeguards are in place. Before a national or targeted direction is given, the affected authority will have an opportunity to make representations. It is also important that we continue to respect regulators’ operational independence. This is not a power for Ministers to decide individual enforcement cases. The clause expressly prevents a direction from telling an authority what action to take in relation to a particular building. The power is intended to be used where it is necessary to make the remediation enforcement system work effectively. Without it, the Government would have limited means to expediently issue a strategic national direction or to formally require corrective action where informal engagement or guidance has failed to improve an authority’s remediation enforcement performance.
I turn to amendment 39, tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington. The Government agree that the use of statutory directions must be properly defined in legislation. However, requiring every direction under clause 27 to be laid before Parliament would be unnecessary and disproportionate. In the Bill, these directions do not amend the law or create new statutory duties; they ensure that enforcement authorities effectively carry out the functions and duties that Parliament has approved in the Bill.
The clause already contains important safeguards. Directions may address systems, procedures and organisational steps, but they cannot specify the enforcement action that an authority must take in relation to a particular building. Also, before the direction is given to a class of authorities, or to one or more individual authorities, those authorities must be given appropriate time to make representations. Requiring every direction to be laid before Parliament could delay necessary action, including where an individual authority needs to improve its performance. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Orpington to withdraw amendment 39. I commend clause 27, without amendment, to the Committee.
I respectfully decline the Minister’s invitation to withdraw amendment 39. We will press it to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 29 and 30 stand part.
Amendment 40, in clause 31, page 18, line 7, leave out from “undertaking” to the end of line 10 and insert
“or where the undertaking is a member of a group, a fixed cap, to be determined by regulations.
(2A) Regulations under subsection (2)(b) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would remove the ability to impose penalties based on worldwide revenue and instead subject them to a fixed cap, to be set by regulations.
Clause 31 stand part.
Clause 28 will establish co-operation requirements with the Regulator of Social Housing, and clauses 29 to 31 will establish the duty for co-operation where there is more than one responsible entity for a relevant building’s external walls.
Social housing residents deserve the same urgency and protections as residents of privately owned buildings. That is why the Bill places clear legal duties on social landlords to assess and remediate unsafe buildings. At the same time, we recognise the unique pressures within which social landlords operate. Clause 28 therefore provides a proportionate safeguard for social housing providers. It will require enforcement authorities to consult the Regulator of Social Housing before taking specified enforcement action under part 1 against a registered provider. Consultation avoids enforcement decisions being taken in isolation. It allows the enforcement authority to benefit from the Regulator of Social Housing’s wider oversight of the provider, including relevant information about its financial and operational position, when deciding how best to secure remediation.
Rachel Blake (Cities of London and Westminster) (Lab/Co-op)
The clause, I believe, applies to many very complicated buildings that have been built and that fit in with a chapter 1 building; what it is highlighting is that a number of different people might be involved in the responsibility to remediate. Will the Minister elaborate on how far the enforcement authorities might be able to push for co-operation? I am sure that, like me and many other Committee members, she knows from constituency work how significant this issue is.
I thank my hon. Friend for that point. This issue does come up, and many right hon. and hon. Members see it in their casework. I think it is clear that the new duty to co-operate does not transfer any statutory responsibilities between parties. It is important that each person remains responsible for complying with the relevant legislation. The purpose of the clause is to ensure that those separate responsibilities work together effectively where action or information from one party or another is needed for them to effectively support each other.
Clause 30 gives clause 29’s duty to co-operate meaningful consequences by making it a criminal offence to intentionally fail to comply with that duty. The threat of prosecution should drive compliance in most cases. However, where a person deliberately ignores the duty to co-operate, prosecution will be available.
Rachel Blake
It is essential that we have an offence in clause 30. Could the Minister elaborate on how fault might be identified when one party very much believes that it is trying to do the right thing, but the other party is more recalcitrant? I have several examples in my own caseload of more absent parties not coming forward to co-operate. We owe it to the organisations that are trying to do the right thing to ensure that prosecution of this offence is focused on those who are more recalcitrant. Could the Minister make some remarks about how this particular element would play out?
My hon. Friend is right that we need to identify who is responsible for which part, so that residents are not passed from building owner to freeholder to developer to council to housing association and then back to us as Members of Parliament, when they just want a simple answer and the work to be carried out. These clauses will help to identify who is leading on what part of the remediation, and will give enforcement authorities more direct power to distinguish between them. However, where a person deliberately ignores a duty to co-operate, prosecution may be available. A person found guilty may face a fine, imprisonment or both. That reflects the seriousness of deliberately refusing to co-operate when doing so could delay remediation.
Clause 30 provides a defence where a person can prove that they had a reasonable excuse. Clause 31 enables enforcement authorities to issue substantial financial penalties where the relevant person fails to comply with the duty to co-operate under clause 29. That gives enforcement authorities a more direct alternative to criminal prosecution, enabling them to impose a fine without having to go through a longer process. As I have outlined, the maximum penalty is £40,000 for an individual or 5% of qualifying worldwide revenue for an undertaking or group. Those penalties reflect the need for them to be meaningful and to deter responsible entities from treating them as a cost of doing business. The penalty framework is designed to be proportionate but effective.
The clause also contains important safeguards. The enforcement authority must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offence has been committed, and no penalty may be imposed when a person can show, on the balance of probabilities, that they had a reasonable excuse. The principle is simple: where responsibilities overlap, those responsible must work together, so that gaps between legal regimes or ownership arrangements do not delay making buildings safe.
Amendment 40, tabled by the hon. Member for Orpington, would—
On a point of order, Mr Stringer. I am not trying in any way to be difficult, and we can do it this way if that is how it goes, but I have not actually moved amendment 40 yet. Should the Minister talk about amendment 40 before I have moved it? I am not sure.
The Chair
As the hon. Member knows, the first item in the group is moved and we then discuss the rest of the group. If the hon. Member wishes to move the amendment formally, we will vote on it when we get to the appropriate stage in the Bill.
Further to that point of order, Mr Stringer. Just to clarify, I have not set out the reasons for amendment 40 yet. The Minister is about to respond to amendment 40 without having heard my opening remarks, which struck me as slightly unusual. I do not mind; I am just checking the process.
The Chair
Just to be clear, the Minister says what the Minister says; I have no control over that. However, hon. Members can speak more than once in debates, and it will not be difficult to catch my eye. I hope that that is clear.
Thank you, Mr Stringer.
Amendment 40, which the hon. Member for Orpington will speak to, is similar to amendments 36 and 42. It would again replace the revenue-based maximum financial penalty, for an undertaking that is a member of a group, with a fixed cap to be set in regulations. I hope he will defer to my earlier explanation and that it will satisfy him on amendment 40. I commend clauses 28 to 31 to the Committee.
I rise to speak to amendment 40, which is in my name. The Minister has in some ways done my job for me, because she has already outlined what it is about, so I will not detain the Committee very long. She is correct that it is very similar to amendment 36, which I have already spoken to, and to amendment 42, which I will speak to shortly. This is all about proper democratic parliamentary oversight and ensuring that both Houses have the opportunity to scrutinise and approve regulations before they can take effect.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 29 and 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31
Financial penalty: section 29
Amendment proposed: 40, in clause 31, page 18, line 7, leave out from “undertaking” to the end of line 10 and insert
“or where the undertaking is a member of a group, a fixed cap, to be determined by regulations.
(2A) Regulations under subsection (2)(b) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(Gareth Bacon.)
This amendment would remove the ability to impose penalties based on worldwide revenue and instead subject them to a fixed cap, to be set by regulations.
Clause 32 ensures that the chapter 1 duties work coherently alongside existing statutory and contractual routes for remediating external walls. We need clear responsibilities to secure remediation, not overlapping duties or competing enforcement action where another effective route is already in place. The clause therefore disapplies chapter 1 duties in certain circumstances. Importantly, it does not let responsible entities off the hook for earlier non-compliance or prevent regulators from taking enforcement action under other regimes.
Clause 32 disapplies the chapter 1 duties where a section 24 manager has been appointed under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 and becomes liable to carry out the functions of an accountable person under proposed new section 24ZZA(2) of that Act. It also disapplies the duties where a higher-risk building regime special measures manager has been appointed to carry out the relevant functions. We do not want managers who have been brought in to resolve those failures to face overlapping duties or become liable for chapter 1 offences and penalties.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 45, in schedule 1, page 95, line 14, leave out from “grounds” to the end of line 16, and insert
“that there was an error of law, or that the decision was not irrational or disproportionate.”
This amendment would allow connected persons to a full right of appeal on costs notices.
Schedule 1.
The clause and schedule 1 provide for remediation management orders. We expect the majority of responsible entities to comply with the legal duty to remediate. Where they do not, fines and prosecution offer a robust penalty. However, a duty holder may still choose not to remediate their building, continuing to place residents at risk.
Right now, regulators lack an effective way to get buildings remediated where the duty holder is simply unwilling or unable to do so. Existing legislation with step-in rights is designed for smaller interventions, such as fixing broken boilers. It does not give authorities adequate powers to remediate at scale and in buildings with complex management and ownership structures. That means that a small number of buildings may be unremediated indefinitely, which is unacceptable for the residents living in them.
Residents need to know not just that there are penalties for non-compliance, but that their building will be made safe. Creating a mechanism through which public bodies can carry out those works, where necessary, will provide that reassurance. That is why clause 34 introduces remediation management orders, and schedule 1 sets out how they will work.
Paragraph 1 of the schedule sets out the tests to be met before a remediation management order can be granted. That will ensure that there must have been a compliance failure and that it must be just and convenient to make the order. Paragraph 2 provides for Homes England and local authorities to be granted powers to remediate a relevant building’s external walls system. Those organisations have been designated remediation authorities as they have the relevant experience. The Bill extends Homes England’s functions as a remediation authority to Greater London. That means that Homes England will carry out its role across England, including directly in Greater London, with the agreement of the Mayor.
To make sure that that measure is a last resort, paragraph 3 sets out that failure to fulfil the requirements of the statutory notices referenced in it would amount to a compliance failure. Failure to comply with a remediation order or with the legal duty to remediate will also be a compliance failure.
Paragraph 4 describes a duty holder as a person who is expected to have fulfilled the requirements of a statutory notice or order, or to have complied with the legal duty to remediate, or someone who has replaced them in those duties through some other intervention. It is their functions that the remediation authority will take over.
Rachel Blake
The Minister is taking us through a substantial schedule. If we are honest, some of the amendments the Opposition have tabled are on areas that I, too, raised in the evidence session, such as how responsible entities will be required to co-operate and how enforcement authorities will take a lead in their particular areas. Does the Minister agree that remediation orders are an important backstop and that the schedule, particularly in establishing the role of the local authority, will ensure that the principles of co-operation and of the enforcement authority taking the lead where it has the powers create a holistic framework so that we can get the remediation done?
I thank my hon. Friend for raising that important point. She will be aware that some bad landlords are not stepping in to do the internal work. The schedule reflects the findings of the Grenfell inquiry phase 1 report, that cladding on external walls was the principal reason for fire spreading so rapidly through the building. Where a responsible entity is failing to manage wider building safety risks, there are broader and more comprehensive interventions available. The backstop is designed for a specific problem: ensuring that dangerous external wall cladding is remediated and that those responsible have the necessary power to come forward and remedy it.
Paragraph 5 of schedule 1 sets out the content of a remediation management order, including the powers that remediation authorities may be granted by the tribunal. That includes all relevant powers that would normally be exercised by a duty holder. Paragraph 6 supports paragraph 5 by making clear that it is the remediation authority, not the duty holder, that should remediate the external walls. The clarification of powers and duties in paragraphs 5 and 6 is essential for the order to work in practice.
Paragraph 7 details the strict requirements on a remediation authority to notify those who have an interest in the property of the intention to apply for an order and to take into account any representations received. Paragraph 8 contains information to be given to the tribunal on any application for a remediation management order.
Paragraphs 9 to 12 set out how and when a remediation management order may be varied, suspended or discharged, including notification requirements. These provisions are required to ensure that the relevant parties are aware of any proposed changes and have the opportunity to express their views.
To make sure the interests of all relevant parties are appropriately considered, paragraph 13 details that a tribunal must allow certain parties to be heard or to make representations in respect of an application, regardless of whether it is to make, vary, suspend or discharge a remediation management order. The tribunal may also direct when further notices are to be given to facilitate this consideration.
Paragraph 14 sets out the persons who may appeal against a decision to make, vary, suspend or discharge a remediation management order, and is vital for fairness in the decision-making process. Paragraph 15 specifies that there must be a post-works review after completion of the remediation works. The resulting report must be shared with the relevant people. Paragraph 16 ensures that, upon discharge of the order, the building is promptly vacated. These paragraphs provide reassurance for duty holders, residents and leaseholders that their building will not remain in remediation status in perpetuity and that there are definite processes in place to bring the physical works to a satisfactory end.
Part 4 of schedule 1 deals with the costs incurred by remediation authorities. All costs incurred by the remediation authority that are not to be provided for through financial assistance from the Secretary of State should be recoverable; these costs have been incurred only because a duty holder failed to remediate.
To prevent costs from being unfairly claimed for, paragraph 17 sets out how a remediation authority may recover costs from the duty holder, paragraph 18 specifies what recoverable remediation expenses are and paragraph 19 sets out a duty holder’s appeal rights. Subject to appeal, we expect duty holders and any associated persons to promptly pay the costs owing to the remediation authority.
However, where that does not happen, paragraph 20 provides that the sum owed is a recoverable debt. That allows for the costs to be recovered by the remediation authority through the courts or, as set out in paragraph 21, through enforcement.
Sarah Gibson
Does the Minister agree that the decision not to support our amendment earlier means that where the remediation authority is the local authority, which it often will be, and where that local authority is already suffering a lack of funds, there is a disincentive to enter into this process because of the concern that they will have to go to court to recover their costs in some instances?
I share the hon. Member’s concerns. We are very conscious of the high degree of effort and work that will be involved for local authorities in taking these applications forward. We are working with local authorities to ensure that an appropriate level of support is available to them in terms of guidance and the new burdens funding I outlined earlier, as well as specific funding to meet the more direct costs associated with the backstop. I hope that reassures the hon. Member.
Paragraph 22 of the schedule acknowledges that a remediation management order may be made for a building where a management order under section 24 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 already exists, and that the section 24 order may be amended to ensure that both orders are workable.
Duty holders must not be able to pass on to qualifying leaseholders the costs of their failure to remediate. Through paragraph 23, we are amending schedule 8 to the Building Safety Act 2022 so that service charges cannot be used to pay for backstop costs. While a remediation authority must retain discretion over whether and how to pursue the remediation management order, paragraph 24 allows the Secretary of State to give it directions on certain matters.
For efficiency purposes, paragraph 25 allows certain authorities to share information about a relevant building with a remediation authority, and requires them to do so on request by the remediation authority. Remediation authorities, responsible persons and accountable persons must work together to ensure that all their respective regulatory and statutory obligations for a building can be fulfilled, so paragraph 26 places a duty on them all to co-operate with each other.
Paragraph 27 supports the above duty by making it an offence not to comply with the duty to co-operate and any related provisions within the order. Robust penalties are attached to those offences to ensure that the backstop can work—stick with me!
I congratulate the Minister on a marathon performance. We will not oppose clause 34 or the vast majority of schedule 1. However, I will speak to amendment 45, which was tabled in my name.
At present, “connected person” is too broad a term for us to leave such entities without remedy to misplaced or excessive liability. The costs notices we are discussing in schedule 1 can impose millions of pounds in remediation liability, so it is only fair that such financial penalties can be met with judicial checks and balances. That is why I have tabled the amendment, which would allow connected persons a full right of appeal on costs notices.
That is a matter of fair and consistent legal discipline. Decisions must be able to withstand scrutiny on an error of law, irrationality and disproportionality. Otherwise, the decision lacks the effective scrutiny it deserves. Such scrutiny also encourages best legal practice on the part of authorities pursuing notices in the first place, creating a smoother system and encouraging best practice. I therefore hope that the Minister will—
The hon. Member has done it for a third time. Of course I will give way.
We do not believe so, which is why we tabled the amendment. However, I thank the hon. Member, because this is the third time he has intervened when I had literally one word left in my script—it is becoming a regular thing. With that, I commend the amendment.
Amendment 45, which was tabled by the hon. Members for Orpington and for Broxbourne, would broaden the grounds on which a connected person can challenge a costs notice, including where the decision was based on an error of law, or was irrational or disproportionate. However, the Government do not consider the amendment necessary or appropriate.
The Bill contains specific safeguards before liability can be imposed on connected persons. It requires connected persons to be given an opportunity to make representations on whether joint and several liability would be appropriate before a costs notice is served. It also restricts the circumstances in which certain connected persons can be made liable, such as where certain parent undertakings or controlling individuals do not exercise the required degree of control, and where subsidiaries or fellow subsidiaries do not contribute to the relevant compliance failure.
Connected persons are allowed to appeal under schedule 2 if liability is imposed, on the grounds that it was not appropriate for joint and several liability for the costs to be imposed on them. The Bill therefore gives connected persons a tailored right of appeal on the issue that affects them and the appropriateness of imposing joint and several liability on them.
The costs notice stage is concerned with the recovery of remediation costs. It should not provide a further opportunity for connected persons to reopen decisions affecting them that could have been challenged at an earlier stage. That is also the rationale set out in the Bill’s explanatory material.
We should seek to ensure that parties that are liable for cost recovery can be clearly made so, with clear and appropriate legal protections around that process. The amendment would not achieve that goal. For that reason, we cannot accept it, and I ask the hon. Member for Orpington not to press it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
REMEDIATION BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
Amendment proposed: 45, in schedule 1, page 95, line 14, leave out from “grounds” to the end of line 16, and insert “that there was an error of law, or that the decision was not irrational or disproportionate.”—(Gareth Bacon.)
This amendment would allow connected persons to a full right of appeal on costs notices,
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesOn a point of order, Mr Wishart. Fortunately, over lunchtime the lawyers have been dissecting my comments from this morning. I have been advised to make a couple of clarifications. First, clause 72 deals with a company needing to notify the Secretary of State or the ORR before the court issues permission for a voluntary winding up, not giving notice before applying for a highways administration order. I hope that is clear. Secondly, on clause 85, I need to be clear that the special administration regime is not to be used for day-to-day operations. Financial assistance under the power can be used to support the licence holder if necessary and in extraordinary circumstances.
The Chair
I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that on the record. I think that has been appreciated and accepted by the Committee.
New Clause 4
Use of vehicles, machinery and equipment for constructing, maintaining and improving the highway
“A licence holder responsible for constructing, maintaining, or improving a highway under this Act may not prohibit the use of diesel-powered vehicles, machinery or equipment in the said works, or operate a policy that prioritises the use of electric, HVO or hydrogen powered equipment and machinery, or which prohibits the use of diesel vehicles, unless they can demonstrate a compelling value for money and efficiency case to the ORR.”—(Greg Smith.)
This new clause would prevent licence holders from prioritising electric, HVO and hydrogen powered equipment and machinery, or ban diesel vehicles without evidence that this would be more efficient and better value for money.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Wishart. New clause 4, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, is intended to get some sense into a point that we debated in relation to some of the earlier clauses and amendments. We also took considerable evidence on it during the oral evidence sessions. The point is to get to the nub of the value-for-money test: the test of the cost to the ultimate toll payer for the construction of any new highways under the provisions of the Bill.
I mean of course the means by which construction plant are fuelled or powered. I understand that there are some who wish to see the entire world electrified and other means of fuel put in our construction plant, in the laudable and noble aim of environmental and green factors. But the reality is that none of that is cheap and none of it offers value to the ultimate toll payer in this case, or in other applications, the taxpayer or other users.
The presumption, for example, to use hydrotreated vegetable oil as a transitionary sustainable fuel adds between 15p and 20p to a litre price. That is significant when it comes to the overall requirement for fuel for construction plant going forwards, and that is before we get into the debate about battery electric plant. In most cases, that plainly does not exist; lithium ion becomes very unstable under intense vibration, which is why most construction plant cannot use it in the first place. It is why we have seen many companies in this country looking to different modes of powering construction plant, probably the most famous being the development of hydrogen combustion for this sort of plant. But it comes back to the base point I made earlier: it is exceptionally expensive. It blows the budget when it comes to trying to use this equipment, because it is just not mature enough in its development and it has not been refined in the way that those pieces of construction plant that operate on the internal combustion engine have been so far.
What new clause 4 seeks to do is really very straightforward. It would stop licence holders banning diesel plant or prioritising electric, hydrotreated vegetable oil or hydrogen plant unless they can show the ORR compelling value for money and efficiency. That is a key test. When we took oral evidence on this issue, the representative from National Highways essentially said that it does not bother putting to market the different modes of fuelling construction plant; it just accepts whatever the industry puts forward. But the industry is operating under a set of rules that basically says it has to look to things like HVO, and from an economic standpoint that is pure madness right now. New clause 4 simply seeks to put that duty not to ban things, but to prove the economic viability, the test, to the ultimate toll payer under these licences in the long term.
Douglas Lumsden (Aberdeen South) (Con)
In this new clause, we are talking about not just the construction of any highway but its maintenance. I am thinking about gritters, for example. We should not mandate that they need to be on HVO, electric or anything else.
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. There are large parts of the haulage sector, for example, that have voluntarily moved on to HVO power on the grounds that electric is just unaffordable and in parts impractical for the heavier payloads. A gritter starting the night fully laden is a vehicle that would not get very far on a battery and HVO would be more expensive. But new clause 4 is much more about the construction phase of any new highway.
I do not want to re-litigate the points I have made time and again in this Committee, but if the Government are serious about delivering schemes under the Bill that genuinely have value and affordability to the ultimate toll payer, I cannot think of a single argument why new clause 4 would not be adopted and those who get the licences in the regulatory orbit of the ORR would not wish to minimise the cost of construction via every means possible, and therefore deliver the lowest possible toll for users of the lower Thames crossing or any other scheme built under it.
Alison Griffiths (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government are placing a far higher burden on contractors in the Bill than they are on any other part of the country in wider legislation?
Without new clause 4, my hon. Friend would be absolutely right. New clause 4 would be the safeguard against that.
I say this as someone who is actually a huge fan of advanced sustainable fuels, synthetic fuels and other ways of keeping the internal combustion engine alive. I am genuinely excited about the British innovation that goes into these technologies. I think they will be the way that our vehicles, construction plant, road haulage and agricultural vehicles are powered in the future. I think it is the technology that may well be the VHS that wins against the battery electric Betamax. However, right here, right now, it is about cost. These alternative forms of construction are more expensive and the Government should rule them out.
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for raising this issue once again. He is clearly very exercised by the issue, but I refer the Committee to the actual evidence we heard from the chief executive of the project on the lower Thames crossing. There were various references to this not having any impact on the overall cost.
Alison Griffiths
I apologise if I am about to ask a question that the Minister was on the verge of answering, but my understanding from the evidence session was that we heard the lower Thames crossing had not considered any other fuel. I therefore do not think that is completely accurate.
I am about to address the hon. Lady’s point. Let me explain exactly what happened. The construction carbon limit for the lower Thames crossing and the carbon-neutral requirement were included in the development consent order, which I think the shadow Minister is now saying is “pure madness”. He is again traducing his own party’s reputation in government. That is fine—he is entitled to do that, and it saves us a job.
The order did not specify any particular type of fuel. The evidence we heard from Matt Palmer, the chief executive of the lower Thames crossing, is that about two thirds of contractors were coming forward with HVO as their proposal, rather than saying, “We’re mandated to procure a particular type of fuel.” That is what the market was delivering, and those requirements are there to ensure that the lower Thames crossing is consistent with national carbon budgeting during the construction period.
Across the project’s three delivery partners, carbon formed part of the tender evaluation criteria, and tenders were required to meet or exceed a carbon reduction target. The successful delivery partners met or exceeded that requirement without increasing overall construction costs. The tenderers that submitted the lowest-cost bids also had the lowest carbon from construction. As I say, National Highways did not prescribe individual technologies or fuels that delivery partners should use, which is effectively what the new clause would do.
Mike Reader (Northampton South) (Lab)
I am trying to understand the premise of the new clause, because what is really important for construction businesses is certainty. Given the volatility that we have seen in the diesel market, HVO and electricity generated from hydrogen—by British hydrogen businesses based out of Newark—give construction companies certainty of cost over the long term, which enables them to borrow more cheaply and deliver lower costs. Why do the Conservatives want to push up costs and make it riskier for construction businesses to deliver projects such as the lower Thames crossing?
That is probably a question for the shadow Minister, but I can answer for him and say that the Conservatives have absolutely no idea how to run a big construction project, as their 14 years in government showed. The point is that setting it up in this way has allowed delivery partners flexibility and encouraged innovation in how carbon reduction could most effectively and efficiently be achieved. For a long time, a significant proportion of the construction industry has included the use of alternative fuels in its bids as part of its own net zero plans. The new clause is not appropriate: it imposes a level of prescription that is not necessary in what is a framework Bill about a financial model, and it is, of course, based on a completely false premise.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
I do not know whether the Minister is aware, but during the last energy crisis, the previous Government had the opportunity to change His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs excise notice 75, which looks at red diesel pricing. They allowed a certain number of opt-outs for a number of sectors, but not for construction and others. That could have been done, but the industry has since changed and adapted to the use of HVO, so going back would seem counterintuitive. My question for the Minister is this: why was that not proposed in previous energy crises?
Again, an hon. Friend tempts me to answer for the previous Government’s failings, but I do not need to do that. I think my hon. Friend’s question answers itself. It is simply not appropriate for the Bill to make exact provisions about how future licence holders choose to procure for construction and maintenance. It really is not the way to do it, and I therefore ask the hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire to withdraw his new clause.
I have heard the points that the Minister has made. On some of the taunts he makes towards me, if he looks back through the Official Report, he may find a consistency there, certainly from me, because I was making some of the same points when we were in government.
There is a simple, unavoidable point in this debate. White diesel—I accept the points that the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford makes about red diesel—is cheaper than HVO. It always has been. The hon. Member for Northampton South is right that it is a more volatile market, but it has always been, and still is, cheaper—by about 10% to 15% at the moment—than HVO, and that is before we start getting into other fuel types, of which, I repeat, I am a huge fan. It is therefore simply implausible to argue that right now forcing construction down a route of using anything other than white diesel in the construction plant would result in anything other than a significant cost implication for the whole project. The Opposition shall, therefore, push new clause 4 to a Division. We feel that it is an important point to make for value to the ultimate toll payer.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 5, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, would require the Secretary of State to publish a report setting out the differences between the regulatory functions given to the Office of Rail and Road for road and rail separately, and the reasons for those differences.
We have teased this argument out previously in Committee, including in the oral evidence sessions. How is it that in the Railways Bill, the Government seek to play down the ORR, diminish its power base—if I can call it that—and essentially brush it to one side in the rail industry, and yet for road the ORR appears to be the champion of everything and is being given such incredible new regulatory power under this Bill?
Will the Minister—I accept that he is the Roads Minister, not the Rail Minister, but we were promised joined-up Government—explain why there is such disparity in those regulatory arrangements? That is important, because we are asking the public, the ultimate users of highways built under licences provided for in the Bill, to trust the regulatory regime that sits over and guides those licences, and produces all the guidance that we are told we must wait to see until after the Bill receives Royal Assent.
It is a question of trust. If we are being asked to trust the ORR so much on highways, the Government surely have a duty to answer why they themselves trust the ORR less on the rail sector. I ask the Minister: how much direction can the Secretary of State really give the ORR on roads, given that diminution when it comes to rail? That is not a complicated question, but it will raise many eyebrows in the transport sector at large. It will keep the sector guessing for many years to come—whenever the Government come up with another innovation relating to roads or in the railway sector—about exactly where the role of the Office of Rail and Road will sit. That disparity does not make sense to the official Opposition. We therefore tabled new clause 5 to get a report, within six months of Royal Assent, comparing the ORR’s functions and independence on highways with its functions and independence on railways.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship on this Committee for the final time, Mr Wishart.
New clause 5 is a remarkably sensible amendment from the shadow Minister—I have not always felt able to say similar during these proceedings. The hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire raises a very good point: the Government are taking a totally inconsistent approach to the role of the Office of Rail and Road. This Bill is strengthening its role to ensure that things work sensibly and appropriately in relation to private toll roads, but for the railway the Government have significantly denuded the ORR’s powers, presumably because Great British Railways will eventually do more than display a livery of rather dubious, garish colours. I hope the Minister can explain the logic for why the ORR is being treated so differently in those two sectors.
It is wonderful to hear the shadow Minister being such a champion for regulation. That is not something that we have been treated to previously, but we are delighted to hear that he has come onboard, if the Committee will pardon the pun.
In October last year, the Government announced that we were commissioning Dr Richard Judge to undertake an independent review of the Office of Rail and Road, in relation to the significant changes being made in the rail sector, to which both Opposition spokespeople—the hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire and the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage—referred. The Government felt it would be helpful to get ahead of that change with an independent review to help to ensure that the regulator is well placed to deliver the transformation, and to oversee organisational change in the rail sector while continuing to deliver its other roles and functions effectively, particularly those that relate to roads. The review was also intended to allow the development of key learning and insights to support performance improvements for other regulators. Dr Judge spent nearly a year doing the review and published his findings very recently, in September, with 12 recommendations. The review considered the role of the ORR in both rail and road and the Government are, of course, considering those recommendations. We will publish our response in due course.
As the Committee would expect me to say, asking for another report on the duties of the ORR in a slightly different format would not be the best use of taxpayers’ money. The shadow Minister says that his central question—why we are treating rail and road differently—is not complicated, and it does not have a complicated answer. Rail and road are, of course, different modes of transport and therefore require different types of regulatory oversight.
One reason for the change in the ORR’s role in rail is that, of course, many passenger services are moving into the public sector whereas, under this Bill, road will move into the private sector for the first time. Rail also runs differently to road, and has different risks and opportunities. Rail is a closed system, by which I mean people cannot turn up in their own locomotive and get on the tracks, whereas anyone can get in a vehicle and use a road. The rail operator is therefore responsible for every passenger on the train, but a member of the public can drive on the road whenever they wish and the road operator is not responsible in the same way.
Those are fundamental and obvious differences, which is why the answer to why we are treating them differently is not complicated. They are entering into new regimes: one is clearly far more involved in the public sector, as it is far more related to passenger services, and the other is not. In simple terms, that is why they are being treated differently.
That was a noble effort from the Minister to defend another wing of his Department, but a lot of questions are still to be answered. There are a lot of unknowns around the Government’s real attitude towards the ORR, not least because with the railways, although the Government are not particularly keen on it anymore, there is open access and competition. In the private road space, there have been private roads for which a toll has been charged before—we have named multiple, including the Mersey tunnel and the M6 toll, during the Committee’s consideration.
We felt that it was important to put down a marker during the passage of the Bill to encourage the Government to be more joined up and to take a better approach to the ORR. However, on new clause 5 in particular, I am happy to confirm that we believe that the point has now been made. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 6
Support for small businesses and charities affected by roadworks
“(1) This section applies where a person has been licensed to charge tolls under section 3 of this Act in return for securing works specified in the licence.
(2) The licencing authority must make provision for a proportion of toll revenue raised by the licence holder to be used for the purposes of providing—
(a) financial compensation, or
(b) equivalent support,
to any small business or charitable organisation that has incurred a detriment as a result of the undertaking of the works specified in the licence.
(3) This section applies where—
(a) such roadworks or closures have lasted, or are expected to last, for a period of six months or more, and
(b) any small business or charitable organisation suffers a material financial, access or other detriment resulting from the roadworks or closures.”—(Zöe Franklin.)
This new clause would introduce compensation for charities and small businesses when impacted by any medium to long-term infrastructure works resulting from this Act.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Wishart. New clause 6 would provide support for small businesses and charities suffering material harm due to prolonged roadworks associated with schemes licensed under the Bill. Infrastructure investment is, of course, essential, but we must recognise the costs forced on to neighbouring businesses and communities during construction.
In my constituency, the works between junction 10 of the M25 and the A3 have demonstrated the exact consequences of such prolonged disruption. Closures and diversions have restricted access, causing substantial losses for local businesses and charitable organisations. That has included RHS Wisley, which, it has been documented, has since received some compensation for the many millions of pounds it lost over the course of the project. For a small business, months of falling trade can threaten its survival, as rent, wages and utility bills still need to be paid. For a charity, lost income can mean reductions in the services on which people depend, and in the many additional provisions it gives the local community.
New clause 6 would require the licensing the authority to make provision for a proportion of toll revenue to be used for compensation or equivalent support when works last, or are expected to last, at least six months and cause material, financial, access or other detriment. That threshold would focus support on sustained disruption, while allowing it to be planned form the outset. The inclusion of “equivalent support” would also provide flexibility to address different organisational needs, so that support does not always have to be financial.
Could the Minister explain what protections the Bill currently offers for affected businesses and charities, and how support could reach them during construction, when it is needed most? The businesses and charities enduring disruption must have a fair chance of surviving, to share the benefits of the investment that they are being disrupted by. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
I have enormous sympathy with new clause 6. As Members may have heard me reference on many occasions over the last seven years, my Buckinghamshire constituency has seen a lot of significant infrastructure works, including a railway we did want, in East West Rail, and one we did not, in HS2. The construction of both of those had significant impacts on local communities. Under the Bill, construction of any road built under licence would undoubtedly have a similar impact on businesses, charities and, frankly, public services, including hospitals, GP services, libraries and schools, just as the hon. Lady has seen in her constituency. There is a good argument to be made that those who have to bear the brunt of those infrastructure works should at the very least receive due compensation.
I can remember what happened to the Prince of Wales pub in a village called Steeple Claydon in my constituency when HS2 and East West Rail had, between them, shut off three of the four roads in and out of the village. The pub—a wet-led pub with no food—was down some £60,000 in turnover over those four or five months. What was it offered in return? Absolutely nothing. That cannot be an acceptable way forward.
The hon. Members for Mid Buckinghamshire and for Guildford have both expressed some sympathy for businesses experiencing disruption from roadworks. I think that we can all appreciate that. Unfortunately, the new clause would have some difficulty working in practice. For example, what constitutes a small business? The shadow Minister will remember our conversations about his attempts to redefine a small business. Is it as defined in the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, or is it another definition? Does it include the supply chain as well? I think the shadow Minister would say that it should include all businesses.
There is also a lack of clarity about what material detriment means and how we would define local. This is about roads, so it could be anywhere in the country. How do we show that detriment? Who gets to make the final decision? Is there an appeal mechanism? Who gets to decide whether someone has been materially affected by the licence holder, and what happens if the licence holder does not agree? There is no process set out here, and I am afraid that there is a lack of definition. I accept that the new clause is tabled with good intentions, but it does not pass the test for legislation.
It is worth pointing out that the original planning consents will have provisions for compensation for disruption during the construction phase, and that the stakeholder group will be able to reflect views from users of the highway and others with an interest in it. I am sure that they would want to discuss roadworks and reducing the impact for everyone. The fundamental point is that the licence holder is, by definition, incentivised to minimise disruption as much as possible, because they will want to maximise their revenue and be confident that people will use their roads swiftly and efficiently. It is therefore not in their interest to have long periods of six months, or even six weeks, of roadworks that would act as a disincentive to use that particular highway. I therefore do not think that the new clause passes the test of what we are looking for, although I appreciate the good intentions behind it.
Zöe Franklin
I thank the Minister for his response and the hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire for his enthusiastic support, albeit with caveats. I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments, particularly his final point about how minimising disruption should be an incentive for anybody taking on such an infrastructure project. Having experienced the works between the A3 and junction 10 of the M25—which were extended considerably, due to the joys of the British weather and many other challenges—I admire his optimism. Of course those implementing significant infrastructure improvements would like to finish quickly, but the reality is that they often do not, which has serious implications for businesses, charities and others, as has been mentioned.
The Minister outlined quite a significant list of questions that he has, but if those are the key concerns, and if he agrees with me and the hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire in principle, then I suggest he work with me at the next stage of the Bill. It is clear that we have the appetite to support small businesses, other organisations and charities to help to minimise disruption and the financial challenges. I would like to the push the new clause to a vote, but I thank the Minister for his thoughts so far.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I will not detain the Committee; these are the standard clauses that we are all familiar with and love so much.
Clause 98 defines various terms used throughout the Bill; it is a standard interpretation clause. Clause 99 allows for consequential provision to be made by regulations where required. Again, this is standard provision found in most Bills. Clause 100 sets out provisions about regulations under the Bill. Regulations may include consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision, and may make different provision for different purposes. The clause also sets out the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny that applies.
Clause 101 provides that the tolling provisions in parts 3 and 7 apply to Crown servants and Government vehicles in the same way as they apply to other people and vehicles. Clause 102 sets out the territorial extent of the Bill. Clause 103 sets out when the Bill’s provisions will come into force: part 8 comes into force on Royal Assent, while the remaining provisions will commence as set out in this clause. Finally, clause 104 provides that the Bill, once enacted, may be cited as the Highways (Financing) Act 2026.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 100
Regulations
Amendment proposed: 59, in clause 100, page 66, line 32, at end insert—
“(f) regulations under section 27(1) (enforcement of tolls: penalty charges)”.—(Greg Smith.)
This amendment would ensure that regulations about penalty charges were subject to the affirmative procedure.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I want to take the opportunity to thank you, Mr Wishart, for your excellent chairing, and the other Chairs, Mr Dowd and Ms Lewell. We did not need Mr Pritchard, but the will was there. If the Committee proceedings are a sign of the speed and efficiency at which the network will operate, that is a good thing. I thank members of the Committee for participating and assisting with the debate in good humour and in a constructive way. I thank the Clerks, the Doorkeepers and, of course, my officials. There are matters that we may return to on Report, but I put on record my appreciation to everyone in the Committee Room today and to those who have been present previously for making sure that we get our business transacted.
I echo the thanks to you, Mr Wishart, and the other Chairs of this Committee over the last couple of weeks, and to the Clerks of the House, the Doorkeepers, and all Members. We have had perhaps not as lively a debate as I have been used to as a shadow Minister in Bill Committees, but I do not think anything will ever get close to the Bill Committee of what is now the Employment Rights Act 2025. These Bill Committees are where we can genuinely scrutinise legislation, in an era where Second Reading in the House can often be very short, and where Report and Third Reading can be compressed too.
It is a shame that the Government have not accepted a single amendment either from the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats. Some of them were eminently reasonable and would have strengthened a Bill that, as I have said many times, we support the fundamental premise of, but we have had a good debate. I thank all those involved, particularly those who are not members of the Committee but have made it possible and allowed it to run so smoothly.
The Chair
On that note, I think everybody on the Committee and the Clerks are very grateful to the Minister and the shadow Minister.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.