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Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government, following recent reports of a restaurant serving a meal containing nuts to a severely allergic customer in Stoke-on-Trent, what plans they have to promote information on allergens in England and Wales.
My Lords, the Food Standards Agency works with businesses and consumers across England, Wales and Northern Ireland to improve allergen management and information, including offering free training and running awareness campaigns. It has recently published new guidance to help people with allergies eat out safely. The guidance sets out how businesses can provide clear allergen information, encourage communication about allergens between staff and consumers, and ensure that a consumer with allergies receives the right meal.
Too many food-allergic customers are still being put at risk when eating out or ordering food from an online platform. New research by the Natasha Allergy Research Foundation has found that more than a quarter—26%—of young adults have had, or know someone who has had, an allergic reaction to takeaway food. I understand that the Food Standards Agency has produced much-welcomed guidelines asking businesses to ensure they provide written and verbal allergen information to customers, but they are just guidelines. I therefore ask my noble friend: do the Government agree with me and the FSA that its new guidelines should be mandatory? Will she meet me and Natasha’s foundation, for which I am a parliamentary ambassador, to discuss this and its new research into the issues faced by those with food allergies when using food delivery apps?
I applaud my noble friend for her dedication and passionate advocacy on this issue. As she said, we published the best practice guidance in March this year and, as noble Lords will appreciate, any new guidance requires time to embed and be adopted by businesses. We hope to carry out an evaluation one year after the implementation of the guidance to assess both its uptake and its impact, and to better inform Ministers on the need for any potential legislation. This means that our evaluation work is likely to begin in spring 2026, and the gap between the launch and when the impact of the guidance can be meaningfully assessed ensures that our evaluation is based on a representative and reliable picture of how the guidance is actually working in practice. This will be very helpful in our understanding of the need for and any potential impact of any future legislative options. We very much welcome the opportunity to meet and to review the new research, which we have not yet had sight of. It would be invaluable to examine these findings alongside the FSA’s research in this area.
My Lords, although the guidelines are very welcome, and I applaud the Food Standards Agency’s work in this area, does the Minister share my concern about whether local authorities have the resources to do the necessary work to visit the establishments concerned to ensure that the guidelines are being applied? I think most restaurants in my area ask whether you are allergic. Does she also share my concern about the increasing amount of passing off of one food substance as another? We had the horsemeat scandal some 12 years ago, and we do not want to see a repeat of that.
I agree with the noble Baroness that we absolutely do not want to see a repeat of that. As she says, local authorities enforce allergen rules, typically via trading standards and environmental health officers. The number of trading standards officers has dropped, although staffing rose slightly in 2023, so we are looking at how we can improve that. The FSA has backed a level 6 trading standards apprenticeship, for example, and is training over 100 new officers in one year. The FSA will continue to monitor that, and will continue to support training guidance and the food law code of practice with local authorities.
If the FSA has pushed for compulsory written allergen information on menus, as it appears to have, is this not too long a wait for the Government to carry out an assessment? Also, will the Minister give us some sense of how it is possible to help smaller establishments in particular to access decent staff training in order to fulfil some of the requirements of having compulsory written information?
Of course, the law states that you have to state allergens. In the guidance, the preference is that that should be written first, verbal secondary. We will assess how that is working, as I just said. Regarding smaller businesses, the guidance has been designed with business to ensure that it is fit for purpose no matter what size your business is, because it is really important that every business can implement this effectively. The FSA has also created free tools, such as allergen icons, signage templates and a matrix, which are all available on its website. They are designed to be both flexible and low cost, because we need to ensure that all businesses, no matter their size, have proper access to the information and can ensure that customers and consumers understand what is being sold in that business.
My Lords, one in three people lives with allergic disease, which affects so many aspects of everyday living, not just in accessing healthcare but in ensuring a safe education and employment environment and, as this Question shows, better understanding in the hospitality industry. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that this requires cross-departmental action and that the appointment of an allergy tsar could be a way to achieve that?
My noble friend is right that this requires cross-departmental work. My taking this Question today from Defra, when a lot of people assumed that it would be a health question, demonstrates that there is cross-departmental work between labelling and health issues. Regarding the allergy tsar, the Department for Health and Social Care continues to discuss this, and how allergy support and care can be improved, with NHS England and shareholders. There is an Expert Advisory Group for Allergy, which the DHSC jointly chairs, that brings stakeholders together to inform policy-making and identify any priorities in improving outcomes with people. I spoke to my noble friend Lady Merron from the DHSC about this earlier and I understand there will be a response in due course on whether an allergy tsar is the appropriate way forward.
My Lords, the House will know that the previous Government passed Natasha’s law on pre-packaged food. Also, detailed ingredient listing has been in place since 2021. Does the Minister accept the concerns of Anaphylaxis UK and Allergy UK that the excessive use of precautionary allergy listing might be depriving customers of safe food?
The critical thing is the last thing that the noble Lord said: safe food. It is important that we work with industry, across government and with the different campaign groups. Natasha’s law was a very important piece of legislation. We know that Owen’s law is proposed as well. We have heard about the health tsar. We know that there are other incidents, such as the recent one in Stoke-on-Trent. It is important that we move forward together to ensure that any legislation or guidance that comes forward improves things and makes people feel safe when they go out to eat.
Is it not the case that retailers, particularly the smaller ones, would be more likely to take guidance seriously if there was a mandatory requirement to list the food hygiene scores on the premises? Why is England the only one of the four countries where this is not mandatory? It does not cost a penny in public funds. They already have the labels; they ought to be required to promote them. Those who are not doing so now would then take other guidance more seriously.
My noble friend raises a serious question. We need to ensure that the information is readily available and clear. We spent some time pulling the guidance together to address a lot of the issues that he raised while ensuring that it was accessible and flexible to businesses to ensure that they had the facilities to implement it in a way that was effective for their business. I hear the points that he made and will take them back to the department when we review the efficacy of the guidance that we have produced.
My Lords, is the Minister aware of studies showing that exposure to trace amounts of potential allergens builds resilience? I think specifically of the Learning Early About Peanut Allergy study, which tracked a number of children who were thought to be vulnerable because they had intolerances to other things, eczema or other indicators. Only 3% of those exposed to trace amounts of peanuts in infancy developed the intolerance, as opposed to 17% of those who were completely denied them. We in the public eye must be careful not to send out a message in the aftermath of cases such the one that the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsey, refers to that we should clear our shelves of all potential allergens. That may be behind the increase in the number of cases that we have seen over the past 20 years.
Clearly, there has been an increase in hospitalisation, which is why this is such an important issue. I think the noble Lord was referring to Palforzia, where people take a tiny trace of the allergen every morning and slowly build it up in order to have a resilience to it. It is an incredibly interesting piece of research. I saw a programme on it and was fascinated at this new approach to tackling allergy. However, any new treatments must go through NICE to be approved for the NHS. We need to make sure that they work for everybody because this is a very sensitive, complex area.
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Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to promote joint training programmes and opportunities for joint working for staff who are separately employed by the NHS and social care agencies to encourage integration between the two services.
My Lords, the Government are committed to developing an integrated health and care workforce which is skilled and well supported and has opportunities for high-quality learning, to enable staff to develop and progress their careers across an integrated system. We are also implementing joint induction for all health and care staff, a mid-career management programme and, during 2025-26, the introduction of new management standards and unified core leadership and management standards for managers.
I thank my noble friend for that positive reply. Does she agree that one of the main barriers to integration between health and social care is the lack of knowledge of the skills and experience of other professionals? Should the importance of integration therefore be included in initial clinical training, and should clinicians of all kinds be encouraged to understand the work of others by job rotation, so that they can be helped to appreciate the role of other colleagues and the importance of all professionals to patient care, no matter which agency employs them?
I very much agree with my noble friend about the importance of integration. As she explained, it is not necessarily about training to be joint, but about the approach. I will feed back her particular suggestion about job rotation to Minister Karin Smyth, who is responsible for developing the workforce plan. I will also share her view—again, I am sure she will see this reflected in the workforce plan when it is published following on from the 10-year plan—on the importance of multidisciplinary teams in many areas. The one that we are talking about, health and social care, is a prime example.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her previous very positive answers, but one of the biggest barriers to working together is different terms and conditions for care and health workers: in particular, the lack of pay for care workers who have to go between different visits in rural areas and have significant dead time. If we are really to move this forward, should we not put pressure on councils to ensure that the contracts they let allow for the time travelling between people who are being cared for?
The noble Baroness raises a practical and realistic point that many care workers speak about. She will know that we are implementing a new fair pay agreement that, for the first time ever, will reflect what people actually do. Also, for the first time, there will be a universal career structure for adult social care that supports care workers. The approach that the Government are now taking shows a line of movement that takes seriously the pay, terms and conditions of care workers. I should also add that the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, will have free range to decide how she wishes to conduct her review of social care. Perhaps the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, will ensure that she speaks to the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, about that.
My Lords, does the Minister agree that sometimes the most effective integration of care is around the decisions and choices of the care recipient themselves? To that purpose, would she agree that the NHS should be pursuing personal health budgets that can be combined with direct payments from social care entitlements, so that recipients of care can design their care, which will sometimes include the appointment of staff who are able to meet both purposes?
I certainly agree with the noble Lord about the importance of the individual needs of the person at the centre. For too long—and part of this is a lack of integration—the needs of the person who receives, wants and needs that care and support have not been at the front. On his suggestion, I would just counsel waiting for the 10-year plan. It may not do exactly what the noble Lord says, but it will set out a way forward on how we will resolve such matters. I am sure that he will participate in further discussions about how we can get to the place that we all want.
My Lords, I was very pleased to hear the Minister’s words on the progress and planning for this NHS 10-year plan. I was looking through, well, everything that I could find, really, and I could not find that any progress had been made, so I wonder whether the Minister could update the House on what is happening now and when she thinks we might start implementing this programme.
I am not entirely sure, but I think that the noble Baroness is referring to my first Answer.
Good—thank you. This derives from the review by Sir Gordon Messenger. The first review was in 2022 and Sir Gordon came up with seven recommendations to strengthen leadership and management. To build on that, in November, Secretary of State Wes Streeting asked Sir Gordon to deliver further recommendations. That is why we now have a new national entry-level induction for new staff. As of 25 April this year, for example, it is being used by nearly 70% of trusts and ICBs to support staff enrolment. That shows how much it was needed and how much change it will make.
My Lords, the Archbishops’ Commission on Reimagining Care identified a number of solutions to tackle the workforce challenges in adult social care. These included better pay, improved career progression and role redesign. Could the Minister outline some of the steps that the Government are taking to address low pay, and to develop better training and development programmes and a more strategic approach to career progression in the sector?
I very much welcome that report and am pleased that the Government have been responsive to identifying what we need to do. I never tire of saying that, to support the workforce in the way that my noble friend said, we are introducing a new fair pay agreement for adult social care and implementing the first universal career structure for adult social care. That will—and I know noble Lords are concerned about this—lift the status and attraction of work in social care. I believe that, alongside, for example, the apprenticeships that we are now making available and many other measures, we will get to a place where those in the workforce are doing the job we would like them to do and are being properly recognised on all counts for it.
In the light of the 2023 Hewitt review into integrated care systems, how are the Government building greater awareness of adult social care in the NHS workforce in order to enable greater collaboration?
Well, it is absolutely part of training, and the movement towards that integration of understanding across both sectors has been continuing for some while. The right reverend Prelate gives me the chance to say that we also have a digital platform that allows skills to be recognised across. The more we can do in that way, both technically and with people, the more success we will have in being integrated and building care around the person who requires it.
My Lords, as I understand it, one of the principal issues about the integration of healthcare and community social care is the lack of data integration. Many hospitals still rely on manual processes to send discharge letters to GPs and social care providers. Would the Minister be good enough to tell us what the Government are doing to drive forward automation of discharge letters and similar clinical information?
The noble Baroness is quite right in her observations on the need to move to much better services here. First, on her point about discharge letters, appointment letters and so on, the Government have already committed funding and direct support to local areas that are not currently providing what we might call 2025-standard communication. Noble Lords will see a considerable change; some trusts are already doing that and doing it excellently, but we want to bring that up. On the noble Baroness’s specific point, I can tell her that we are continuing to encourage the use of digital social care records to make sure that the individual’s medical record is there. Over 85% of people who draw on registered care now have a digital social care record. I hope that I have gone a bit further than the noble Baroness was asking.
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Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government whether their forthcoming 10 Year Health Plan will reflect the priorities set out in Diabetes UK’s 10 Year Vision for improved prevention, early diagnosis and access to care and technology for people with diabetes.
My Lords, the 10-year plan is not focused on specific diseases and conditions but will instead set out the changes that our NHS needs to be fit for the future—from hospital to community, from analogue to digital and from sickness to prevention—all of which closely align with the priorities in Diabetes UK’s 10 Year Vision.
I thank the Minister for that positive Answer. More than 12 million people in the UK now have diabetes or prediabetes, with research showing a staggering 51% increase in the last eight years in the prevalence of type 2 diabetes among under-40s in England, at an age when the condition is more aggressive and the risk of complications is higher. To help reverse this trend, will the Government embed suggestions from Diabetes UK’s 10 Year Vision into their 10-year plan, including the creation of a healthier food environment, with a ban on TV advertising of unhealthy food and an extension of the soft drinks industry levy?
I can say yes to both of those because we have already committed to do that. The advertising restrictions were a manifesto commitment and will be implemented from 6 January. I can also tell the noble Baroness that from October this year, as the result of a consultation, the industry has already voluntarily agreed to abide by those restrictions. We had to make changes to make it more workable and I am glad we did that to get the right approach. I am also glad that we worked to get the voluntary agreement. I also said yes to the noble Baroness in respect of Diabetes UK’s 10 Year Vision, which we are very grateful for. I am also grateful for Diabetes UK’s interaction, which has been considerable, in the consultation on our 10-year plan. I thank Diabetes UK and I am sure the noble Baroness will join me in that.
My Lords, following the report from the charity Breakthrough T1D, which found that people in lower socioeconomic groups and those over 65 were least likely to be aware of new technologies such as the hybrid closed loop systems, what plans do HMG and NHSE have to raise awareness of the latest technologies available to type 1 diabetics of all ages and socioeconomic groups?
The matter of health inequalities is, obviously, one we are very concerned about. A national review is currently under way to update on monitoring, including of various groups. NHS England supports ICBs in improving diabetes care, including through the use of the medical technologies that the noble Baroness referred to, and, importantly, in reducing the variation in care that we still see across the country. It does that by using national data and insights, funding local clinical needs and addressing health inequalities through the national diabetes prevention programme. I certainly agree with the noble Baroness about the importance of raising awareness and the incredible contribution that new technology is playing. It has to be available for all and I hope we will establish that in the way I have mentioned.
My Lords, I declare an interest as a patron of the South Asian Health Foundation. The south Asian population has a very high incidence of diabetes, particularly type 1, which is probably related to a strong gene marker. Some 50% of people with type 1 diabetes have some kind of gene marker. Those who have a strong gene marker in a particular region, the HLA region of chromosome 6, have a very high incidence. My point is that, if we screen people, particularly those with a family history of diabetes, for genetic markers, we will identify them much earlier, even in childhood. The prevention that is therefore required—changing their environment and diet—becomes more effective. This ought to be one of the preventive strategies for diabetes in high-risk populations.
The noble Lord is quite right in his observations, which play to the point of the NHS that we want to see not just now but in the future. Noble Lords may have heard the announcement earlier this week that the Government are committing the necessary funding to screen babies early in their lives through the use of genomics, in order to, as the noble Lord said, identify underlying conditions that can be dealt with early on. There are some that cannot be prevented, but if they are diagnosed and anticipated, their management will be much better.
My Lords, continuous glucose monitoring and Mounjaro have helped me to come off insulin after 20 years of daily injections and have greatly improved my diabetic control. Such innovations are undoubtedly a cost saving to the NHS in the long run. Does the Minister think we are looking far enough into the future when we consider the cost-benefit analysis of their use? How can NHS spending plans take into account their long-term benefits to the economy by keeping people in work and getting many people back to work?
The noble Lord, Lord Rennard, knows that it is always good that we hear about his own experience, because he epitomises the changes that are possible. I believe there is an understanding—not least because, as noble Lords will know, the Chancellor very recently gave the department a settlement that was, in large part, because of not just immediate need but looking to the future and the kind of NHS that is fit for the future we will see identified in the 10-year plan when it is published. Technology is certainly a huge part of that, which is why CGM and the hybrid closed loop system—the latter of which began to be rolled out in April 2024—are so important. There have been huge advances and they will be part of that NHS of the future that we seek to build.
My Lords, I am delighted that the Government are producing their 10-year plan, and we look forward to seeing it. Following on from the question from the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, about protecting the labour force, can the Minister say something about fracture liaison clinics being rolled out across the country, to follow up on commitments made in the past that these clinics will be available across the country? These clinics can help boost productivity in the workforce; help older people, especially women, stay in the labour force; and prevent the fractures that so often force them out of work or cause accidents for older people.
Fracture liaison services do an incredible job. I refer the noble Baroness to the words of the Secretary of State—I will not quote them because I do not have them to hand and there is nothing worse than misquoting somebody, particularly the Secretary of State—who has made his intentions quite clear on fracture liaison services. We certainly appreciate their value and the need to make that kind of provision available across the country.
With regard to what the Minister said about the DNA database of children with diabetes and other conditions, what are the mechanisms in place if a child, at the time they reach Gillick competence, no longer wishes to have their data on that DNA database? Will there be mechanisms so that the child can at that point withdraw their data and prevent it being used?
All the usual provisions will apply, but, as we develop the system, all that detail will be confirmed. I will ensure that the point the noble Lord raises is fed into that consideration.
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Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to prepare for, and mitigate, the increasing likelihood of prolonged periods of extreme heat in the United Kingdom.
My Lords, this Government are taking action to strengthen the UK’s resilience, including against environmental threats such as the recent heatwave. The national risk register details the wide-ranging impacts of extreme heat to ensure that comprehensive contingency plans are in place. In response to the heatwave last week, the Cabinet Office convened the summer resilience network to ensure that departments were alert to the impending weather and were satisfied that the sectors they represent had effective plans in place. While I am here, I want to put on record our thanks to all the professionals working to keep us safe during extreme weather periods, from the LRFs to agencies including the Met Office, the Environment Agency and government departments.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her Answer. Prolonged extreme heat is now 100 times more likely because of climate change, a new Met Office report has found. Inescapable heat is a silent mass human killer. Our systems and infrastructure are not prepared. The recent adaptation report found that many of our plans could not even be evaluated. Will the Minister initiate better communications with our climate scientists, put heat resilience at the heart of policy with a Cabinet position and offer better climate services and advice to society and industry?
My Lords, the Cabinet Office works very closely with experts in the Met Office and the UK Health Security Agency to plan for and respond to extreme heat events well in advance of the summer months. Their advice is central to communicating the risk of extreme heat to the public. We understand how extreme heat affects all of society. This is why our preparedness, as part of the national risk register, focuses on the potential impacts of heat across sectors such as health, transport, water supply and vulnerable groups. To reassure the noble Earl, COBRA speaks to our climate scientists daily. This morning’s 8 am call focused on our immediate challenges related to extreme heat at the end of this week and the beginning of next week. All this work is overseen at the Cabinet Office by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
My Lords, I do not know whether my noble friend the Minister has had a chance to read the report by the Physiological Society entitled Red Alert: Developing a Human-centred National Heat Resilience Strategy. As the House may appreciate, there is growing scientific interest in the effect of heat on human beings, which makes this Question so well timed. The report recommends that the Cabinet Office lead a task force, so my original question was going to be about whether that is happening. But, in the light of the earlier Answer, am I right in thinking that there is now a proper task force established in the Cabinet Office to tackle these issues government-wide?
I hate to disappoint my noble friend by saying that I have not read the report he references, but I will make sure I get a copy this afternoon—it is my birthday this weekend, so that will give me something to do. I referenced the summer resilience network, which is convened by COBRA as a cross-government network that brings together all relevant agencies and our devolved Governments to make sure that we are ready. With regard to this period of extreme heat, the first guidance was issued before Easter to make sure that local resilience forums were getting ready. The Cabinet Office takes this extraordinarily seriously and it will be part of our resilience strategy, which we will publish soon. As we are about to discuss the national security strategy, I reassure noble Lords that climate change and its impact as a security feature are referenced 12 times. This is something that the Government take seriously.
My Lords, I wish the noble Baroness a very happy birthday at the weekend. We should not take climate change in any way lightly nor, indeed, the rise in heat, but I think we should also remember that, during those wicked days of Empire, we all went to India and Africa and people managed to survive—and they still survive in India and Africa and places—so I do not think we should take this overseriously. Does the Minister agree that we should just take sensible precautions?
I think that is the most House of Lords question I have had so far. I think we need to remember what happened in 2022 when we had extreme heat in the UK. That was the first time ever that 40 degrees heat was registered in the UK—registered at RAF Coningsby—and there were nearly 3,000 excess deaths, 20,000 hectares were burnt, 14 major incidents were declared and 4 million birds died in 48 hours. The impact of heat in the UK is something we are going to have to deal with. The noble Lord makes an important point about heat overseas. We also have to make sure that British nationals have support when they travel, which is why we have issued guidance only this week about excessive heat in Spain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. We need to make sure that people look after themselves when they travel, wherever they are.
My Lords, many other countries have the advantage of a maximum working temperature in statute. That has the advantage of being simple and easily understood by workers and employers, especially small employers. Will my noble friend the Minister consider asking colleagues to commission the Health and Safety Executive to conduct a fresh review of the evidence and assess whether it is time for a maximum working temperature in the UK?
I thank my noble friend. As a former trade union officer, this is something that I have discussed every summer in my adult life. My noble friend is aware of the current situation with regard to the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations, which require employers to provide a reasonable indoor temperature in the workplace. Obviously, what is reasonable depends on what work you are doing and where you work, which is why in the Moses Room yesterday we had to have the doors open and the fans on. I think it is appropriate that appropriate mitigations are made, but my noble friend will be aware that these conversations are ongoing, and the very nature of this Question ensures that I had yet another conversation about it yesterday.
I declare my interest as a director of Peers for the Planet. Should we not be aware, in discussing this Question, that extreme heat affects us in certain ways, but extreme heat overseas can have devastating effects on crops, with drought, famine and population changes and movements, so we should not treat this lightly? Alongside the need for mitigation, resilience measures and everything that the Minister has said, is not the proof of the increased likelihood of these sorts of episodes an absolute clarion call for this country not to withdraw or retreat from our commitment to domestic progress and international leadership on fighting further climate change?
The noble Baroness raises excellent points about why we are having to have these conversations in the first place. It is clear that the chance of 40-degree days in the UK is now 20 times higher than it was in the 1960s, and we have a 50:50 chance of a 40-degree day within the next 12 years. This is changing within the UK, and obviously that has a knock-on effect on climate elsewhere, which is why we need to take this extremely seriously in terms of our impact on the environment and why I was so pleased to see in our industrial strategy, which we published on Monday as part of our plan for change, that we made commitments to green jobs, investment in green energy, embedding net zero and challenges to climate change within our plans for government across every department.
My Lords, I, too, wish the Minister a very happy birthday for the weekend and hope she enjoys her cheerful reading time. During a recent debate in Grand Committee on wildfires, the noble Lord, Lord Khan of Burnley, recognised the problem the Government have with accurate data collection on wildfires and referred to
“the introduction of the new fire and rescue data platform—a new incident reporting tool used by fire and rescue services”.—[Official Report, 12/6/25; col. GC 321.]
Given the higher risk of wildfires during prolonged periods of hot weather, can the Minister commit that the Government will move quickly on this and confirm when this new platform will be up and running?
I thank the noble Baroness for the birthday wishes. It is wonderful to hear her cite my noble friend the Minister who is responsible for this. Obviously, MHCLG took responsibility for fire and rescue services only on 1 April, but we are very clear that we will be bringing forward the tool and the wildfire strategy imminently, and I look forward to discussing it with her, undoubtedly at the Dispatch Box, in due course.
My Lords, heatwaves can significantly disrupt transport such as by causing rails to buckle overhead, wires to fail and roads to crack, so what specific investment are the Government making to ensure that transport infrastructure is fit for extreme weather?
As many of us will be using trains this weekend, this is a key question, especially because I alert all noble Lords to the fact that an amber heat alert has now been issued for this weekend, so people should be careful. The April 2025 Climate Change Committee adaptation progress report rated the policies and plans of the rail and strategic road network as “Good”. DfT’s upcoming adaptation strategy will address the recommendations to empower the sector to take further action.
On the specifics of rail, Network Rail is mindful that extreme heat events such as those we saw in 2022 are difficult to predict but it needs to invest for them, so it is investing in hazard forecasting and in revising its engineering and maintenance standards to keep the railway ready for such events so far as is reasonably practicable. With regard to recognising that passengers will also experience extreme heat in stations and on trains, not just through line disruptions, DfT has tasked the 14 contracted train operating companies to each produce weather resilience and climate change adaptation strategies. Those are not due until January 2026, but that is a step to make sure that policies and procedures are in place. With that, everyone keep safe this weekend, my Lords.
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Lords ChamberMy Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. The Statement is as follows:
“Today, the Prime Minister attends the opening day of the NATO summit. That summit is expected to agree a new commitment to grow spending on national security to 5% of GDP by 2035, to be made up by a projected split of 3.5% on core defence spending and 1.5% on broader resilience and security spending. This will mark a new resolve among NATO members to make our countries stronger and, as we have always done before, the United Kingdom will play our part.
NATO’s member countries meet at a time when the security situation is more in flux than at any time in a generation—a time when Ukraine is in its fourth year of resisting Russian invasion; a time when we in Europe have been asked to do more to secure our own defences; and a time when security can no longer be thought of as just the traditional realms of air, sea and land but as technology, cyber and the strength of our democratic society.
As we have seen in recent days, it has been a time of renewed military action in the Middle East, with Israel and the United States acting to try to stop Iran developing a nuclear bomb. News of a ceasefire is welcome, but, as we have seen even in recent hours, the situation remains fragile. The focus must now be on a credible plan to stop Iran developing nuclear weapons.
It is of great pride to my party that NATO was founded in the aftermath of the Second World War with the strong support of the post-war Labour Government. Ernest Bevin, the Labour Foreign Secretary at the time, said
‘we must face the facts as they are’.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/1/1948; col. 386.]
Today, in this very different age, we too must face the facts as they are. The generation that founded NATO saw it as a powerful expression of collective security and solidarity: alliances abroad matched by capacity at home. Our national security strategy, published today and made for these very different times, is inspired by those same values and aims.
Every Member of this House understands that the first duty of any Government is to keep the country safe. That is and always will be our number one priority, and the national security strategy sets out how we will do that. The world has changed fundamentally and continues to change before our eyes. This is indeed an age of radical uncertainty, and the leadership challenge in times of such change is to understand, respond and explain. The British people understand that. They recognise that we are living in a world that is more confrontational, turbulent and unpredictable than most of us have experienced in our lifetimes.
When the Prime Minister spoke to the House in February, he promised to produce a national security strategy that would match the scale of the task ahead, and the published strategy does that with a plan that is both clear-eyed and hard-edged about the challenges we face. It sets out a long-term vision about how we will do three crucial things. First, we will protect security at home by defending our territory, controlling our borders and making the UK a harder target for our enemies, one that is stronger and more resilient to future threats.
Secondly, we will promote strength abroad. This means bolstering our collective security, renewing and refreshing our key alliances and developing new partnerships in strategic locations across the world. It also means a clear-eyed view of how we engage with major powers such as China, where we must protect our national security and promote our economic interests. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary will make a further Statement on the China audit shortly.
Thirdly, we will increase our sovereign and asymmetric capabilities. We are building our defence industries, training our people, focusing investment on our competitive strengths and using our exceptional research and innovation base to build up advantages in new frontier technologies.
All this will make us a stronger and more resilient country, but delivering on each of those commitments will be possible only if all parts of society are pulling in the same direction. Our manufacturing, science and technology industries have to be aligned with national security objectives. Our industrial strategy will help to play to the UK’s strengths and deepen our capabilities. The investments that we announced in the spending review also deepen our resilience and strength as a country.
A health service strong enough to cope, safe and secure energy supplies, modern housing and transport for our people—all these contribute to a strong United Kingdom. That is why it is so important that all parts of the Government and business, big and small, understand that cyber security is national security, and that our core systems and the revenues of business are being targeted by our adversaries. It is why we as legislators have to ensure that our own laws, from borders to trade, fit with national security. That will take a whole-system approach that reflects today’s reality. National security means strong supply chains, controls on immigration, tackling online harm, energy security, economic security and border security. It transcends both foreign and domestic policy, and it all plays a role in how we make Britain a safer, more secure and more sovereign nation.
The document provides the blueprint of how that fits together. The strategy brings together everything we are doing across the full spectrum of national security: the commitment to spend 5% of our domestic economic output on national security by 2035, meeting our NATO commitments once again; the more than £1 billion that we are investing in a new network of national biosecurity centres; how we are stepping up in areas like cyber capabilities; our anti-corruption strategy to counter illicit finance and corruption; the expansion of our legal and law enforcement toolkit; the largest sustained investment in our Armed Forces since the Cold War; our plan to unlock real benefits for working people from this defence investment; how we prioritise NATO explicitly in our defence planning; a vision not only for deepening our alliances with the US and the EU but for growing our relationships with other emerging nations; the money we are investing in our brilliant research and development base over the coming years, such as the £750 million to be invested in a supercomputer at Edinburgh University; and our ambition to gain a competitive advantage in cutting-edge technologies and to embed national security in our agenda for artificial intelligence.
We do not underestimate the size of this task. The world is a more dangerous place than at any time since the end of the Cold War, yet it is also a place where Britain’s values, capabilities and alliances can make a positive difference. Since we came to power, we have taken a step-after-step approach to prepare Britain for what lies ahead: record investment in defence, backing our allies and resisting the false choices put before us that would only have weakened and diminished our country. This strategy represents an important contribution to all that work. It recognises that our long-term growth, prosperity and living standards all depend on national security becoming a way of life for people and businesses in the UK. This is a plan for how we protect the British people. It is a plan for today’s times but rooted in long-held values, and it is a plan to defend our national interests, deepen our international alliances and increase our sovereign capabilities. I commend it to the House”.
My Lords, I thank the Leader of the House for repeating the Statement. It was important that the Prime Minister should, in advance of the NATO summit, signal the priority the Government attach to defence and national security. On these Benches we support that approach, as we do the analysis by the Government of the perceived major threats confronting the United Kingdom. There is much in the strategy with which these Benches can agree. I am aware of the continuity of advice to successive Prime Ministers on defence and security from No. 10 sources. I think that is very helpful, and I pay tribute to that expertise.
Protecting our country and our people from threat is the primary responsibility of the Government, and that was explicitly recognised by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in the other place. But that analysis and that primary obligation of government bring onerous and challenging responsibilities. First, I join my right honourable friend the shadow Home Secretary in the other place in thanking our security and intelligence services, and all our defence personnel, for the extraordinary work they do to keep us all safe.
Secondly, I say to the Leader of the House that over the last few months a pattern has emerged from the Government of a series of important announcements concerning defence and security intentions but with two glaring omissions: no specific detail and no specific funding. These omissions seriously damage credibility, and I shall touch further on these aspects in my questions.
Let me deal first with security and intelligence. The Statement and the strategy refer to the three pillars: security at home, strength abroad and increasing sovereign and asymmetric capabilities. These Benches welcome actions that build on the measures that my party put in place when in government, including the National Security Act 2023, which gives us increased oversight of adversarial action. It also introduced the foreign influence registration scheme. At home, protecting critical national infrastructure is paramount and there has to be a lead body for that. Is that the Home Office or the MoD, or is it a tandem operation? Are strategic discussions taking place as to who is taking the lead? It may be that there is to be a new joint task force, but any further information the Leader of the House can provide on that would be very helpful.
Within the United Kingdom, our citizens and businesses face cyber threats on an unprecedented scale. Given the recent identification by the Government of threats posed by China, may I ask three questions? First, are the Government confident that they have appropriate vetting mechanisms in place to understand whether imported Chinese goods pose security threats, and by whom and how are these mechanisms applied? Secondly, specifically in relation to energy infrastructure, how do the Government monitor whether potential malign activity is taking place, and are they satisfied with the robustness of the monitoring process? Thirdly, I have a very simple question. Will China be placed on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?
On strength abroad, these Benches welcome the strategic defence review but express profound concern about the lack of detail on timing for many of the proposals and the vagueness surrounding money. In relation to the NATO summit, while the commitment to increase what the Government describe as national security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, with 3.5% of that to be spent on core defence, is in principle welcome, there is no funding plan. We have been unable to elicit how the Government will fund even 3%. That omission—that lack of material detail—undermines the credibility of the Government’s intention.
To their credit, the Government understand the urgency of the threat—but not, apparently, the urgency of the money. For example, while the strategy document is in many respects admirable, I had to get to page 27 before I found reference to any specific sum of money, which is £1 billion to establish
“a new network of National Biosecurity Centres”.
On the next page, there is reference to £520 million to be invested
“in UK-based Diagnostic, Therapeutic and Vaccine manufacturing facilities”.
That is what I mean when I say there is a threadbare character about the Government’s funding specification. Can the Leader of the House shed light on when the 3% is to come through, when the extra 0.5% is expected to materialise and what the remaining 1.5% is to cover? If she cannot answer these fundamental questions, the Government are proceeding on a wing and a prayer.
On Monday this House will have a welcome opportunity to debate the Chagos deal. In relation to the defence budget, we understand that the cost of the deal will come out of the defence funding pot, which makes answers on increased defence spending all the more pressing. Promising more on the one hand, while whisking money away with the other, is adding to the opaqueness. That is what is damaging the credibility of what I am sure are the Government’s good intentions on our defence and security.
On these Benches, we shall support the Government’s efforts to strengthen our defence capability, to improve our security and intelligence services and to make our critical national infrastructure more resilient. I commend the Prime Minister on demonstrating maturity and responsibility when dealing with acutely challenging and fast-moving global situations, but these Benches will ask questions and seek clarity when that is what our national security interests demand.
My Lords, I also thank the Leader for repeating the Statement. Most people in our country take for granted the liberties and freedoms we enjoy. In a way, that is a good thing, as they do not need to concern themselves with the need for vigilance against the threats we face. We enjoy our way of life as a result of the tireless work of those who have dedicated their careers to making us safe, and I pay tribute to them. Many distinguished servants of commitment are represented in this House, and I thank them too.
We therefore support a great deal in this strategy—its judgment on the threats we face and the changing security landscape, both in potential conflicts and in the emerging dangers through technological change, and the need to address them across all of government, the economy and society as a whole. There should be, of course, a high level of cross-party support. I hope the Government will bring regular updates with clear action plans of the many workstreams that fed into this strategy so that we can monitor and appraise for progress.
In many ways, the UK has a unique security need. But in many others, we can act as a global, open and interconnected country only if we secure the support and partnership of others. As an island nation, our shipping and data cables keep our economy alive. We were the first country to lay subsea communication cables, 175 years ago. Today we are almost exclusively reliant on them for communications. Shipping contributed to our growth in the Industrial Revolution, and today our consumers are reliant on shipped imports and key sectors on shipped exports.
This is why, for example, I was very happy to see Taiwan mentioned in paragraph 21. Taiwanese security and the openness of the South China Sea are critical to our technology industry and wider trade. I welcome the aircraft carrier task group currently in the region. It is a key shipping route, essential for our economy. I will refer to China a little later, but the Leader of the House may not agree with me on those aspects.
We agree that the way forward comes with the need for increased defence and lethal capability. We support the Government on increased defence expenditure, as the Leader knows. It would be helpful if she could indicate the breakdown of the sources of the 5%. What is the assumed level of growth of the size of the economy to meet the level of expenditure we expect to be necessary?
We do not depart from the level of funding, but we do say, with respect to the Government, that it should not have been transferred from the official development assistance budget. With respect, this is a strategic mistake, and we are seeing considerable reductions in programmes that have been part of the UK national security platform, and successfully so, for many years. It is no surprise to me that, in recent weeks, we have seen public statements from former defence and military leaders and chiefs, diplomats, and heads of the intelligence community of the UK, appealing to the Prime Minister not to cut the very programmes that have been national security focused in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and in supporting allies to build resilient civil society and institutions against malign interference.
The western Balkans is rightly raised in the strategy. Twice in the Chamber I have asked for clarity on the continuation of the western Balkans freedom and resilience programme, funded by ODA. I hope that it is not under threat. If the Leader can provide reassurance on our posture within the western Balkans, that would be appreciated.
The FCDO network and our excellent diplomats were raised, and rightly so. I welcome what was said, but we have to recall that, in the spending review, there are year-on-year cuts to the operational budget of the FCDO going forward.
On other threats, such as biosecurity, I agree that we are less of an island than many might hope. Last night, I looked back at the UK’s first biological security strategy in 2018. DfID and ODA were mentioned on almost every single page—a recognition that biosecurity in the UK is weakened if it is also weak in countries where we have a large diaspora community or travel relationship. There was a reason why, 10 years ago, Ebola did not become Covid: it was because of the UK, through DfID and ODA. But this document makes no mention of it at all. In fact, with regards to official development assistance, there is only the most passing reference in paragraph 30.
We welcome the elements on research and development and the reconnection with Europe to regain the ground that we lost considerably under the previous Government. Page 11 says that we will go
“further than the agreements we have already struck”
with the EU. That is good news. In what areas will new agreements be sought?
We will consider the China audit next week, but the Leader may know that we on these Benches are concerned about the Government’s approach. In January, the Chancellor hailed £600 million of growth to our economy from extra trade with China over the next five years. In June, the Government announced £600 million for security agencies to tackle the threat from China. This is literally a zero-sum relationship this year. We would like to see legislative action on transnational repression suffered by people living here in the UK. The director-general of MI5 has made public warnings that China exploits education agreements and sovereign funds for espionage on an industrial scale. Although we welcome the first scheme, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, has heard me say that we regret both that China is not on the enhanced tier and that education and sovereign funds are exempted.
Finally, I want to look further to the future. The convulsive violence in the Middle East, Sudan and elsewhere will have a lingering effect here in the UK. Community cohesion and reducing tensions will now have to be a critical part of our national security strategy, because we know from previous conflicts that there is a lag, whereby young people affected by it now may well be radicalised in the years to come. Activities such as the Chamberlain Highbury Trust that bring communities together are examples of good work that we are doing in the UK, but, regrettably, as a result of the heightened conflicts that this strategy rightly seeks to address, we may well see further radicalisation within our shores in the future. Investment now is necessary so that we do not pay the price later.
My Lords, I am grateful to both the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their comments. I will do my best to respond to as many as possible in the time available.
Both were right to recognise the work of our security services but also of those in our embassies and diplomats overseas. The noble Lord rightly raised soft power. The soft power embedded in our embassies and the work that they do can never be underestimated; it is an absolutely vital part of keeping the country safe and improving relations across the world.
The noble Baroness was uncharacteristically a little uncharitable to describe this as “a wing and a prayer”. This is a serious strategy document, and it brings together numerous other documents that the Government have been working on—some of which have already been presented to this House. The industrial strategy is part of that, but there are a number of them. This is not a wing and a prayer; it is a serious commitment. Both noble Lords talked about the 5%. The noble Lord’s point at the end of his comments was important. In looking at our national security, what happens here at home—community cohesion but also the resilience of our infrastructure—is equally as important as what we do overseas. This is not a wing and a prayer; it is an absolute commitment to these figures.
The NATO pledge commits to hitting a headline ambition of 5%, and we are talking about the Parliament after next, in 2035-36. Some 1.5% of that is around security and resilience spending and homeland security and resilience, which is an important part of national security, and 3.5% is core defence spending. We estimate that we will get to over 4%—about 4.1%—the year after next, and that information will become clearer. What is important in all this is that it is a collective national enterprise, as I have said, across industry, business, our embassies and the work here. This is an overarching strategy, at home and abroad.
The noble Baroness asked whether the Government are confident and a number of questions about the China audit. That is the reason why we are having the China audit: those are questions that must be addressed. Whether we are talking about energy infrastructure or anything else—I am sure we will have further questions on this—our relationship with China is one of the most complex bilateral relationships we have in the entire world. There have been various ways of looking at this in the past. There was the golden era, where we said, “Yes, we’re going to work very closely with China”, and then, moving back from that, there was a lack of engagement. Neither of those approaches serves the national interest in the way that we wish. That is why we have the China audit. We have to manage the security implications and our concerns about that but also the economic relationship that we have.
I thank the noble Lord for referring to Taiwan. That relationship is a commitment in the document. I admire his ingenuity—each time he speaks about ODA, he picks a different region that he wants a commitment on. He will understand that, as we travel around the world, if he adds all those up he will get to a point where we are committed to completely the same level of ODA. I know that would be his objective, but I cannot satisfy him on that point and I cannot give him some of the details, as they are still being worked out. The noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, is engaged on work on the global health fund as we speak.
I say to the noble Lord that how we work with other countries, improve their resilience and support them is not just about ODA. My noble friend Lord Collins has spoken about this before; he was telling me earlier about meetings that he has with African leaders. What do they want from us? They want our support for economic diversification. They want our support for levering in private funding for business, so that they can grow their economies. They want us to facilitate and enable. All that work continues, and it is vital that it does. Our relationship with the City of London and supporting them on that also makes a real difference. I assure the noble Lord that those things will continue.
The issue of the Middle East was raised. This has been of enormous concern to Members across the House, and we have had a number of debates on the issue. It is clear that Iran cannot be producing nuclear weapons that put the world at risk, and we are absolutely committed to that. But the noble Lord is right that this plays out in what happens in this country: we see conflict abroad playing out on the streets of London and major cities and towns across the UK. That brings a responsibility to government and the whole nation as well, which is why that 1.5% of the 5% funding is so important. I do not think the noble Baroness touched on this point, but resilience happens in a number of ways: it is our food resilience, energy resilience, telecoms resilience and business resilience. Marks & Spencer had a cyberattack—I am sure there are more noble Lords than me who have not been able to use their Sparks card. The most important thing is the damage that that has done to the economy and to that business. The damage to people’s confidence in dealing with the business is considerable. In all these areas, resilience is crucial.
The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, emphasised that we need to know exactly where the money is coming from—what is happening on this pound and that pound. More of this will become available as the spending review information is fed out, but this is a commitment and she should not doubt it in any way. I hope that all noble Lords will recognise that if we want to keep the country safe and secure, the first duty of any Government is the safety and security of their citizens, at home and abroad. I am sorry that she thinks this is, to use her words, on a wing and a prayer; I fail to accept that.
The noble Baroness mentioned the money to be spent on Chagos. Governments do not spend this kind of money lightly. They will do so only if they are absolutely confident that it is in the national interest to do so. We have taken the view, and the evidence supports this, that it is absolutely in our security interests as a nation that we have this deal around the Diego Garcia base. That is why we have done the deal. Some of the figures given out are wildly inaccurate. We will have a longer debate on this on Monday, but we are committed to this for absolutely the right reasons, which are national security and national safety.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, describes Iran, North Korea, China and Russia as “a deadly quartet”, all of which have sanctioned Members of the British Parliament, including Members of your Lordships’ House. China, as we have just heard, continues to intimidate Taiwan, to commit genocide against Uyghurs, to incarcerate pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong, and to use slave labour and transnational repression, both of which subjects are currently under investigation by the Joint Committee on Human Rights of this Parliament. We should not use the deepening of trade as an excuse for diminishing our awareness and response to the threat China poses, which is why Parliament should have been able to see the findings of the China audit and why China should be in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme.
I have two brief questions for the Leader. First, is the planned £600 million investment in the intelligence and security services a direct result of the findings of the audit? If it is, surely that underlines the reasons for serious concern. Secondly, regarding the mega-embassy, the Prime Minister said in his meeting with Xi Jinping during the G20 last year:
“You raised the Chinese embassy building in London when we spoke on the telephone and we have since taken action by calling in that application”.
Will the Leader confirm that the call-in was as a result of the phone call with Xi Jinping?
The noble Lord has great respect in this House for his commitment to these issues. I cannot confirm his final point at all. However, I think that the heart of his question is how seriously we take the threat from China, which is absolutely clear from the document. Indeed, this was raised in the House of Commons this week by David Lammy, the Foreign Secretary, when he spoke on the China audit and referred to a quote, which I will quote as well, on page 28 of the strategic defence review. I do not think that we can see this review alone: as I said, it is an overarching review. It states:
“China: a sophisticated and persistent challenge. China is increasingly leveraging its economic, technological, and military capabilities, seeking to establish dominance in the Indo-Pacific, erode US influence, and put pressure on the rules-based international order”.
I endorse and agree with that statement.
The noble Lord asks if our economic relationship undermines our commitment to security. I give him a categoric assurance that that is not the case. We have to manage both relationships, but security is first and foremost: it is of enormous concern, as he will know. We recognise, and I think it is highlighted in the strategy, that China is increasingly eroding the rules that have governed the international system. I do not think we have had a China audit before, but if we look at the history of our relationship with China, under a previous Government—I think it was in the Cameron era—it was a very close relationship. We then moved to not engaging at all. That is not a satisfactory way to proceed. It comes back to the Ernie Bevin quote: we have to deal with the world as it is and the threats that exist now. I give the noble Lord the assurance that we stand by what is in the strategic defence review and we stand by what is in the national security strategy to protect Taiwan.
My Lords, there are 20 minutes for these questions. We will hear from the Labour Benches.
My Lords, my noble friend the Leader will be aware that the National Risk Register, published in January, classifies a future pandemic as the catastrophic risk with the highest likelihood of happening. The defence review identifies engineering biology and new pathogens as a clear and present risk. The publication of the strategy came on the same day as the Foreign Secretary announced a contribution of £1.25 billion into the resources of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. Thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, we all now know about—or have had our memories refreshed on—the level of investment that the Government have promised to support the new network of national biosecurity centres. I consider all that to be security investment but, in the latter case, over what period will the £1 billion sustain these new centres?
I am grateful to my noble friend for reiterating that security is more than just foreign security; it is also health security. One of the issues with Covid was the lack of preparedness within the NHS. We are working on that at pace. A significant preparedness exercise is about to be undertaken and we will again test the emergency alert system. We inherited a number of laboratories in a very poor condition so that their future was in doubt. That is why the investment in biosecurity is so important. So, there is the new biosecurity centre at Weybridge, with £208 million committed to that work over the next two years, but there has to be a complete network of biosecurity centres around the country. That is about disease, but it is also about health and animal products, our imports, and ensuring that we can foster innovation so we know what is coming next and can work towards it, including productivity. The £1 billion is across the current spending review period, which is three years, and it will be reviewed at the end of that period.
Does the noble Baroness agree that the growing Commonwealth network, with its people involvement at all levels, its unifying soft power—and indeed, increasingly, its hard power, as we have recently seen—and its maritime data integration powers, is a key part of our national security, our influence and our adaptation to a totally changed security world that is going on around us? Can she direct me to the page in the strategy where all this is mentioned? I cannot find it.
I am sure the noble Lord has looked very carefully to find it, so this question of which page might be rhetorical. No, I cannot direct him to a page, but if he looks across the range of documents we have produced he will know how much we value relationships. He is right to emphasise the importance of soft power, including that of the Commonwealth. One of the problems we have had in the past is that our relationship with Europe has had to be reset and renewed. Our relationship with America is one that we value, as, of course, are those across the world, including with the Commonwealth. We must have, build and value those relationships. It is not just soft power; it is actually a harder-edged thing as well. I will find it in some documents at some point, I am sure, but the noble Lord has only to hear Ministers speak to know how much that relationship is valued.
My Lords, I congratulate the Government on the strategy, which is both considered and sobering. It is considered because it strikes all the right balances between reinvesting in the conventional deterrents through NATO—the deterrence of Russia by NATO—and building resilience domestically, on which it is strong. The defining feature of the strategy is that it is a fundamentally grim read. It cuts out any niceties or talk of values and looks as though it has been written to give society an enhanced sense of threat awareness and prepare it for some hard choices.
My first question is: has it been written for that purpose? If so, I further congratulate the Government on it, because the threat awareness of society needs enhancing. Secondly, does the Minister appreciate the degree to which the slowness with which investment is made—with, as the noble Baroness opposite said earlier, very little in the lifetime of this Parliament and most of it in the imagined world of the next—undermines that message? Is it too much for me to hope that somewhere within government there is a hope that this investment might be accelerated?
I am grateful to the noble and gallant Lord. It is interesting to hear the cheers from the party opposite to his last point, because this is a generational increase in defence spending that the previous Government did not match, although their members are calling for us to go faster and further now, which we always want to do. It is worth noting that, under NATO’s new estimate, we think we will get to over 4% by the year after next.
The noble and gallant Lord made an interesting point that I had not thought of because I was not involved in the drafting of the document. The purpose is different, but he is right that we have to not only make this an issue for government but give a real understanding of how the nature of threats is changing and how we have to work across all branches of government, including local government, and society as a whole. He is right in saying that the document draws that out. It is a grim read, but in some ways it is also an encouraging read, because unless you recognise the threats and understand what you are facing, it is very hard to address them.
What came across when I read it was where the linkages are with other actions across government—whether it is the Department of Health looking at resilience or the industrial strategy looking at resilience, they link together. The strategic defence review has been so important to this country, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, and his co-reporters on this. Without that strategic defence review, this document would have been weaker. It has helped to define some of the threats we face and looks at ways to address them. But if assurance is needed, I can give the noble and gallant Lord absolute assurance that we will do everything we can to not only reach these spending levels but, through other avenues of government, enhance the impact they will have.
My Lords, I welcome the wide-ranging nature of this strategy. However, somewhat surprisingly, the National Security Council is not mentioned anywhere, as far as I could see. Can the Leader say what the role of the National Security Council will be in the delivery of the strategy? How will government departments be supported to meet shared security objectives—as she said, it is a collective endeavour—and how will they be held accountable?
The committee that the noble Baroness referred to is a Cabinet committee and is always engaged in these issues. On the question of who is accountable, at the end of the day the Prime Minister is accountable. Through him, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary and the Home Secretary all have a really important role in delivering the strategy. As has been said, this is not for one department or one person to deal with; it is a collective government effort and if we fail to bring them together in the correct way, we will not meet the objectives of the strategy. The noble Baroness is right. I do not know exactly what role the National Security Council will have, but it will be key. We want to be held to account on this document, and we will hold ourselves to account through the Prime Minister.
My Lords, in these dangerous times, will my noble friend the Leader of the House also emphasise the importance of food security to an island nation that produces little more than 60% of its food needs? Can she explain how the Government are redrawing the perception that, as long as cheap food can be accepted and accessed from anywhere in the world, it is to be welcomed, at the expense of the long-term sustainability of home-grown, profitable and healthy food?
I am grateful to my noble friend for that. As a farmer, he will have more experience on these issues. On food security for the nation, we talk about cheap food, but I think that most people going to the supermarket these days are seeing prices rise significantly. In earlier questions, climate change was debunked as being something that we just have to deal with, but it has a huge impact on our food security, and that it why it is also part of the strategy.
Supporting farmers on this is key in two ways, the first of which is through our trade agreements. Some of the trade agreements under the previous Government, in particular those with Australia and New Zealand, undermined some of the work being done by farmers in this country. For us, in our agreements with the US and the EU, the welfare standards in which our farmers in this country have invested have been a red line in doing trade deals. My noble friend will also be aware that the noble Baroness, Lady Batters, is leading a new farming profitability unit, tasked with recommending to us how we can reform to increase productivity and work with farmers on that.
It would be remiss of me not to mention the SPS—sanitary and phytosanitary—agreement with the EU, which is making imports and particularly exports much easier and better for our farmers, again increasing their profitability. It is a shame that was not agreed sooner after Brexit.
I could mention other things that I think would be helpful in looking at the profitability of our farmers and ensuring our food stability, including a £110 million investment in new technologies to help farmers increase the profitability and produce of their farms and to help them with seasonal workers. There are a number of ways to address this, but to reflect again on the theme of wider government engagement, the work going on in flood defences and flood protection and the work we are doing to bring down the price of energy should all help our food production and national security issues.
My Lords, I declare my interest as a member of the Army Board. A recent sobering poll showed that fewer than one in three Britons would be prepared to fight for their country. What specific steps are the Government taking to ensure a whole-society approach to national security?
The noble Lord is right to raise this. There has been quite a fall-off in recruitment to the Armed Forces. I remember the days when the Army had a town-centre presence, where people could go to be recruited. That has been lost, and we are bringing together that recruitment as a whole. As the noble Lord opposite said earlier, most people today do not think about what the threats are, because we feel safe and we have got used to that feeling. There needs to be a resetting so that people understand that there are threats and want to play their part in protecting and serving the nation. I like to talk about people not wanting to fight for their country but wanting to serve and protect their country. We need to provide greater opportunities for people to want to play a part in that, but also show them what can be done. A lot of the work in the Armed Forces brings a whole load of issues around the skills they need and their resilience for the country, all of which will be crucial. We are committed to improving the recruitment levels that we have seen over past years.
My Lords, this is an important and wide-ranging approach and deserves both cross-party and national support. I congratulate the authors. It takes a 10-year-plus view, but success will materialise only if intermediate goals are set. How do the Government perceive that the aims of this strategy will be tracked and achieved? At present, the problems associated with illegal immigration are slipping things back alarmingly. Will regular progress reports to Parliament across the piece be made?
The flip side to this coin should be what soft power and de-escalation measures achieve. I am sorry that there appears to be rather less about what influence the Commonwealth might have here, though some such countries are highlighted, or how closer relations with the Republic of Ireland might be to our mutual benefit. Well handled, could not such ideas bring further substantial security gains to the UK?
The noble and gallant Lord raises an important point about relations with other countries. Our relationship with the Republic of Ireland is solid and welcome; indeed, I saw the Irish ambassador earlier this week and many Members of this House have a very strong relationship with Ireland. The noble and gallant Lord’s point about relationships, including with the Commonwealth, is extremely valid and the Government are committed to that. The issue around soft power and de-escalation is crucial. At the heart of a lot of what we are doing, including in the document, is de-escalation. Part of being resilient and having a strong diplomatic presence across the world is so that you can de-escalate.
The role that the Prime Minister has played recently, the visits he has made across the world and the bilateral and multilateral meetings he has had have been imperative to having the kinds of discussions that are needed to de-escalate. Very early on, I made a Statement on a similar issue and there were criticisms from some that the Prime Minister had made a number of overseas visits. When you visit and have meetings with other countries when relations are good, it helps you to have difficult discussions when things get more difficult and there are important international issues to be considered. The noble and gallant Lord is absolutely right. At the end of the day, this is overseen by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary all have an important role as well.
My Lords, in the foreword to the strategy, the Prime Minister talked about strength on the international stage, which other noble Lords have raised. I make a plea to my noble friend that, as well as their strong support for NATO set out in the document, the Government should be clear that they want to strengthen the role of other international bodies such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. We can use those links with important international bodies and dialogue with other countries to improve our collective international security as well as our national security.
The noble Baroness makes an important point. A number of Members of this House are members of the OSCE, as she is, the Council of Europe and others, where those relationships at both individual and national level are hugely important. Earlier this week, an official spoke to the OSCE about our commitment to Ukraine, showing how important it is to be part of these organisations and to work together. So she is absolutely right; she has been quite an advocate for the OSCE in the House, as others have been for the Council of Europe and other organisations.
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to open this first day of Committee. I will speak also to my Amendments 2, 26 and 27 in this first group. At Second Reading, a number of noble Lords raised the issue that the commander will essentially be a civil servant with co-ordination functions: a commander with nothing to command. I have tabled these amendments and a number of others to seek to rectify the situation and probe the Government’s full intentions for the new role.
Amendment 1 seeks to replace the words
“designate a civil servant as the”
with “appoint a”, thereby specifying that the commander does not have to be a civil servant. Nothing here serves as a critique of the current border security commander, Martin Hewitt, coming as he does from a law enforcement background; rather, it is a critique of the Government’s limited ambition for this new role.
That is not just my view but that of Tony Smith, the former director-general of UK Border Force. He said in evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place that
“the first thing that struck me is that the Border Security Commander will be another civil servant. I think it will be a director general post in the Home Office. I was a director general, and we already have quite a lot of them. I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 27/2/25; col. 40.]
Those were the words of the person whose job it was to lead the agency that polices our borders. As he stated, there are already enough civil servants co-ordinating activities within the Home Office. The Small Boats Operational Command already exists, so can the Minister tell the House how it will work with the commander? How will their roles differ, and what degree of interoperability will exist?
As Tony Smith made very clear to the committee in the other place, if the Government wish to achieve their stated goals, Border Security Command needs to have expanded powers, for example to arrest and detain in the same manner as Border Force, the NCA and Immigration Enforcement. If the powers of the commander and his team remain as they are instituted in this Bill, they will be essentially toothless in their ability to tackle illegal migration. This is a role that, by the Government’s own admission, is meant to help secure our borders, disrupt criminal networks and co-ordinate multiple agencies in the face of complex cross-border threats. Surely, we can all agree that this is not a job for a generalist administrator or a nameless Whitehall official; it demands specialist knowledge, strategic leadership and operational credibility.
Amendments 26 and 27 are essentially consequential. They amend Clause 7, which relates to delegation of the commander’s functions, and Clause 8, which permits the designation of an interim commander. Just as I am concerned by the first clause, I am potentially even more concerned about the possibility of delegation. This commander might be well qualified for the task, but who will he delegate to? As the Bill stands, this will be a civil servant. We must ask whether this is appropriate for the task at hand. My amendment would ensure that only a person of appropriate rank—a similar rank to the commander—would be able to undertake any of the functions bestowed on the commander under the Bill. These amendments would therefore introduce a vital safeguard: that the commander may appoint only a person of appropriate rank and qualifications to fulfil delegated functions, not just anyone who happens to be on the departmental payroll. They would help ensure that we do not fall into the trap of creating yet another abstract, symbolic post—another title without substance, which I am afraid is what the Bill proposes.
I had the pleasure of meeting and spending an evening with the honourable Scott Morrison a few weeks ago. He explained that, when Australia began Operation Sovereign Borders, it instituted a structure that, on the surface at least, appears somewhat similar to this Government’s Border Security Command. Its job was to co-ordinate and lead the 16 agencies that had border security functions. However, there are two crucial differences: first, the Australian system came with far more robust powers than are in this Government’s plan; and, secondly—this is the crucial difference—the Australians appointed a senior military commander, Deputy Chief of Army Major General Angus Campbell, to lead their border security efforts.
This leads on to my Amendment 2, a probing amendment which seeks to gauge the type of background that the Government think most appropriate for the role of commander. I have specified that the commander should be only a former or current officer of the National Police Chiefs’ Council—meaning assistant chief constable or above—commander or above in the Metropolitan Police, a senior officer in Border Force or Immigration Enforcement or a senior military officer of at least brigadier-general, commodore or air commodore rank in the Royal Air Force. This amendment would therefore specify that the commander should be a senior police, immigration or military officer, which I believe would put the office on a stronger footing.
If we are serious about this role having teeth and want it to be a powerful, directive position that can genuinely drive change, then the least we can do is to require that the person filling it has the experience to do so effectively. We cannot afford to build this office on vague criteria and wishful thinking. The public deserve confidence that this position is not just another bureaucratic appointment but one that is fit for purpose from day one. I urge the Committee to support this, and I beg to move.
My Lords, I should explain that I have not usurped the position of my noble friend Lord German, who is in Strasbourg at the Council of Europe. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for not being physically on the Front Bench; from this position, I can be propped up.
Although Martin Hewitt has, as the noble Lord, said, a law enforcement and—I believe—Army background, I do not think it is necessary for the commander to have “rank”, to use the term in his Amendment 26. If the border command and the commander prove effective—in other words, if the institution lasts—I hope that the Secretary of State would be imaginative enough to think outside the box of people to whom the rank might be applied and consider those who might usefully carry on the function.
I do not want to speak too long at this point, but the noble Lord picked up the issue of delegation. It struck me—I understand it is not possible to amendment it—that the heading to Clause 7 really does not describe what is in the clause. The clause is right; it spells out where responsibility lies—that is not delegation. The responsibility remains with the commander, and I think that is correct. I do not know whether anyone can pick that up somewhere behind the scenes, at a later point.
My Lords, I support the thrust of my noble friend’s amendments in this first group. Chapter 1 puts the commander role and organisation on a statutory footing but, as we heard, we already have a commander in place and the Bill provides very few—if any—real powers beyond the ability to facilitate co-operation between other public agencies. Given that those agencies are already arms of government and come under the responsibility of Ministers, who could presumably direct them to co-operate in the way the Government intend, I have a slightly broader question for the Minister: why is Chapter 1 necessary? Why do we need to put the commander on a statutory footing? This leads directly to the group of amendments that my noble friend has proposed.
We always need to be very careful about legislating just to make a public statement or point. Can the Minister tell us what the commander will be able to do under Chapter 1 that he is not able to do presently under the current arrangements? Who could argue with greater co-ordination between agencies, but do we really need the provisions of Chapter 1 to achieve that?
I am sure the Minister is grateful to my noble friend for trying to flesh out the role a little bit more. It is written in five or so pages, an awful lot of which has to do with the appointment, the board, potential removal terms and so forth. There is really very little—only a few lines—about the office’s real function and responsibilities.
Looking more specifically at Amendment 2 and my noble friend’s list in proposed new subsection (5)(a), (b) and (c), he might also consider adding someone with a background in the broader security apparatus of the country.
My Lords, I had not meant to take part in this debate, but I wonder whether I am the only Member of your Lordships’ Committee who is finding it rather surreal—mainly the lack of urgency, although I am not blaming the Minister for that. However, even as we speak in here today, dozens—probably hundreds—of illegal migrants are wandering up the beaches of Kent and disappearing into our country. This Bill cannot become law for some considerable time; surely a greater sense of urgency is necessary.
I say in response to the noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, that there is a great sense of urgency from this Government on the issue that he raises. The people are not “wandering up the beaches” of Dover. They are being collected by boats in the channel when the criminal gangs bring them across, and then they are taken for identification and processing. It has been a long while since people walked up the beaches of Dover—it was under a previous Government that they put their feet in that Kent sand. They are now being dealt with in an effective way.
The purpose of the border commander and the clauses before us today is not to have the limited ambition that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, indicated he thought was behind the Bill; it is to maximise the ambition and ensure that we put it in place strongly and effectively. That goes to the heart of the noble Viscount’s comments as well, because we are very clear that the border commander has a number of key roles to play. The border commander has been put in place to co-ordinate and organise—yes—but he has a significant budget of £150 million this year and in the recent spending review has been given by the Chancellor an additional significant budget for the three years hence.
The purpose of that co-ordinating role is to do what I think is appropriate, which is to co-ordinate and bring together agencies in the UK. The commander will also, on behalf of the Home Secretary and the Government, take part in further negotiations with our partner colleagues in Europe and the Middle East, as has been seen today, to ensure that we put in place mechanisms to reduce the flow that the noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, rightly highlighted as an important issue for us to take forward.
I am grateful to the Minister. Before he moves on from the points that I made, can he answer the question about what the commander will be able to do under the provisions of the Bill that his office cannot do currently, on a non-statutory footing? We do not need new legislative provisions to achieve co-ordination, advice and budgetary management—witness the fact that there is already a commander in place who is busy co-ordinating.
I appreciate the noble Viscount’s comments, but the clauses in Chapter 1—for example, “Duty to prepare annual reports”, “Duties of cooperation etc” and “The Board” overseeing all that—underpinned by statutory function give this House the confidence that there is a legislative background to those requirements on the Border Security Commander. The noble Viscount is right that the current Border Security Commander, appointed by the Home Secretary, is undertaking those roles as a civil servant, but it is important that we underpin that with a legislative framework so that this House, the House of Commons, the Government and the people are clear about what the roles and responsibilities are. We have taken that view, and the noble Viscount may disagree or want further clarification, but that is the purpose of the first 12 clauses of the Bill.
My Lords, far be it from me to be helping the Minister out at this point, but I want to be friendly. Exactly the same issues occurred to me, particularly that the commander is in post now and has been for months, as the noble Viscount said. Presumably it would not be possible, without a statutory basis, to require, for instance, co-operation with other statutory agencies. So, at the very least, the Bill would be needed for that.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who, acting as super sub today, continues to make very valid points on this issue. Let me go to the heart of the amendments, if I may. The group contains various amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron. First, they seek to remove the requirement that the Border Security Commander is a civil servant. Given that the role sits within the Home Office and that the commander leads a directorate within the department, it is logical that the role sits within the Civil Service.
This does not mean that the post of Border Security Commander is reserved solely for existing civil servants. Indeed, the current officeholder was recruited externally. Any future recruitment exercises would seek to identify the most suitable candidate, irrespective of their background. Ultimately, they are acting in a Civil Service role, accountable to the Home Secretary. That is the important point, and I hope the noble Lord will reflect on that.
The noble Lord also raised the very important point about the prior experience required to be eligible to be appointed as Border Security Commander. As Members have recognised, the current Border Security Commander served previously as an officer of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. I do not believe it is prudent to limit the pool of candidates eligible to serve in this important position, and we believe that any future recruitment exercise would have the scope to identify the best talent, without limitation, ensuring that we bring the effectiveness of the role to its maximum potential.
The Government have been very clear that the Border Security Commander is responsible for requiring the step change in the UK’s approach to border security—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, addressed. We want to provide a clear and long-term vision for border security, to bring together and provide leadership to all parts of the system, to work to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems domestically and internationally. The significance of this role and this work is reflected in the Bill, which puts this office on a statutory footing, for the very reasons that I hope I have outlined. It creates legal requirements on the officeholder in fulfilling their duty.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the issue of the background of an individual. We want to have as wide a pool as possible—I hope that addresses her point.
The commander has already used his post and the associated capabilities to deploy key functions to date across government on the border security system. He has also helped support the Home Secretary in signing a landmark agreement with the Iraqi Government. We have struck a new anti-smuggling action plan with the G7; we are hosting an international summit on organised immigration crime; and we have meetings early next month with colleague nations in the European community to look at how we can work on this issue. Those are important roles and tasks. They add value to the work we are trying to do in very difficult circumstances to smash the criminal gangs and to stem the flow across the channel.
The House can have confidence that those roles being exercised currently will be in future on a statutory basis, and issues to do with reporting and accountability have been set down in law. Therefore, it is not for today, but I hope the noble Lord will reflect on what I have said and, at a later date, not push the amendments to a vote.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lords who contributed to this debate.
We have heard the words from the Government Benches about co-ordination, structure and strategic intent, but let us not lose sight of what this role is supposed to be: a commander. That word carries meaning. It is not simply a metaphor or a piece of Civil Service terminology. I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, when she says it is not about rank. Rank implies leadership, authority and the ability to direct. Without that, the title is misleading at best and meaningless at worst.
What we are being offered in the Bill is a model that risks falling flat. The important point is that it risks creating an official with no clear mandate, no operational standing and no public visibility—in short, a co-ordinator with a title that suggests much more than they are empowered to deliver.
If we fail to define this role properly now, we risk embedding a model that lacks clarity, ambition and—crucially—the power to deliver the very outcomes the Government claim to seek. We cannot risk this position becoming yet another layer of the Whitehall machine, held by a nameless bureaucrat with no real responsibilities.
The amendments we have tabled do not ask for the impossible. They do not tie the Secretary of State’s hands. They simply ensure that the commander is someone of appropriate rank, experience and credibility—someone who can command confidence not just within government but with operational partners and the public alike.
We have seen what can be achieved when such roles are taken seriously. I referenced the Australian example earlier, where a senior military figure led a co-ordinated, multi-agency border response, which shows what is possible with the right leadership and mandate.
We can do the same, but we will not get there by default or by quiet delegation within the Home Office. We must decide now whether we want this to be a genuinely powerful and directive post, or just another name in a long line of forgotten titles.
These amendments are a simple safeguard against mediocrity and a clear statement of intent that this House expects better than business as usual. We will look at this as the Bill progresses but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the amendments in this group are designed to extract some more information from the Government about who is going to be entrusted with the position of Border Security Commander. The Bill sets out that the Secretary of State can determine the terms and conditions of a designation as the commander. Our Amendment 3 seeks to tie the Government to publish these terms and conditions once they have been defined.
Crucially, our amendment also clarifies that the Government must define the KPIs that will be used to measure the performance of a commander in their role. This will allow not only the Government but these Houses and the wider public to review how effectively the commander is undertaking these duties.
The Border Security Commander is a big part of the Government’s offering on this question. We need to make sure that the person appointed is delivering a solution to the problem we are discussing, and how the Government are working to define parameters and conditions which will ensure that this is the case. If the Government are convinced that their policy will indeed tackle this issue effectively, I am sure that they will have no hesitation in welcoming the principle of these amendments as an opportunity for them to show the public how well their new policy is working, and to show their ambition in setting high standards for their new commander.
Furthermore, our Amendment 5 to Clause 2 seeks to incorporate greater oversight into the termination process for the Border Security Commander. The Government are creating a role which will be politically sensitive and upon which there will be a great deal of pressure, without necessarily the powers or duties to fulfil these demands. It is a post that demands public trust—and where public trust is concerned, silence is not an option.
To remove someone from that role without any explanation, transparency, accountability or scrutiny risks breeding, confusion, suspicion and the perception that something has gone wrong behind closed doors. That is precisely what undermines confidence in public institutions.
There is also precedent, as we know. When high-profile public officials are dismissed or step down, it is customary—indeed, expected—that a Ministerial Statement is made, and we have seen that with senior civil servants and the heads of public bodies. Unfortunately, the Government have been far too unwilling to come to Parliament to outline the reasons why they have chosen to terminate senior officials. We saw that only recently when the Government ousted the head of the Competition and Markets Authority, Marcus Bokkerink. The Secretary of State for Business and Trade issued a Written Ministerial Statement, but it took an Urgent Question from my honourable friend Andrew Griffiths for a Government Minister to come to the Dispatch Box in the other place to update Parliament. That should not be the case.
On a matter as important as this, we cannot afford to construct roles that can be managed and changed in the dark. We need to appreciate and understand the fact that the public have lost trust in the Government on this, and we need to make sure that the next steps we take command trust and regain the confidence that the public must have in us. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower. It is a pleasure to participate in your Lordships’ Committee on this very important Bill.
Noble Lords will be aware that voter salience on the issue of immigration and border control is extremely high, and it is probably the second most important issue, behind the cost of living. That said, the Bill, as currently drafted, does a reasonable job, and we broadly welcome many of its measures, as the Minister will know. He started off as a bruiser, but he is now much more emollient in his reaction and in his Dispatch Box performance, and we agree on many things.
The Bill is very good on the accountability from civil servants, the Home Office and other key stakeholders to Ministers but less strong on that between Ministers and the outside world. When one looks at the level of scrutiny and oversight in, for instance, the Bundestag, the United States Senate or other legislative bodies that are performing a very vital scrutiny and oversight role of the border issue—which is, naturally, a very live issue now in the United States—one will see that there is nothing to lose by us having the opportunity to be open and transparent in seeing what the commander is actually doing.
It is vital that we put in primary legislation the ability of a parliamentary committee to bring the border commander to Parliament to answer questions at least once a year, to measure the efficacy of their policies and whether success is happening in line with what the elected politicians and your Lordships’ House require and to keep that bond of trust with the voters. There is a very low level of trust among the voters of all parties to deal, in the long term, with the issue of border control and the safety and security of the people of this country. It would be a very good idea for the Minister to at least consider that in relation to Amendment 3.
We also need clarity and openness about what the commander is doing. The worst thing about a closed system, where you have accountability only between one part of government and another, is that conspiracy theories and cynicism grow, and people cannot see that the Government are achieving their objectives. It would therefore be very useful to have the explicit terms and conditions to be laid down before Parliament included in Bill. I agree very much with my noble friend on that.
Finally, this is not an issue about the Labour Government; all Governments fall out with senior officials. It happened under the Blair Government, certainly under the Brown Government, and under the coalition Government. It is not ignoble to think that the person you have appointed no longer has the same priorities and imperatives that they should have in carrying out their role. Therefore, you have to do what they say in HR now and “dis-board” them—the opposite of onboarding and the equivalent of getting rid of them. We could say “giving them a new career trajectory”—let us be charitable. That should be the disinfectant of transparency. Bagehot once said, I think, that openness is needed to see what Governments are actually doing. The Government should therefore explain to the voters why that person did not fit in and was not able to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. That is the essence of Amendment 5.
On that basis, I ask the Minister to think about these things. As I often say, it would not invalidate the central premise of the Bill—it is very good in many respects, especially the first chapter—but it would be certainly improved by accepting the amendments. It would be a very powerful message from this Government and future Governments that they are serious about this topic, they are accountable and they are getting things done on behalf of the people who elected them.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has answered the first question that I had intended to ask on Amendment 3: whether what he was seeking was the opportunity for scrutiny and debate or a confirmation hearing of an appointment. I do not think that it is the latter.
I will just ask the noble Lord a question about Amendment 4. Would it be normal to publish such detail about a civil servant’s contract of employment? Would one really put the KPIs into the public domain in that sort of detail? What is important in this context is that determining “effectiveness”—the term used in the amendment—remains the responsibility of the Secretary of State. That will continue to lie with her. It must not be shuffled off or denied by having somebody in the role of commander.
In terms of the amendments, I am very doubtful about publishing the KPIs. But I am absolutely clear about the structure of this role and about where the responsibility for implementing policy must remain.
I am again grateful to noble Lords for tabling these amendments and for giving us the opportunity to discuss them.
I am slightly disappointed that I have moved from being a bruiser to being emollient—but there we go. I will take that as a potential compliment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough. I just remind him that I reserve my right to bruise, if it is needed, but I hope it will not be on these issues.
This group contains various amendments relating to the appointment of the Border Security Commander, again tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron. The key issue in the amendments is about how the Border Security Commander will engage with Parliament. The amendments state:
“The Secretary of State must make a statement to Parliament”
when an individual is designated as the Border Security Commander and to ensure that the Border Security Commander appears before any parliamentary committees when invited, and to make a Statement to Parliament in the event that the designation of the Border Security Commander is terminated, setting out the reasons for that termination.
If and when an individual is designated as the Border Security Commander—as well as the event of their ultimate termination—that would be announced in the usual way for senior officials in the Civil Service. We would make a Statement on that, and there would be the ability for a Private Notice Question or an Urgent Question to be tabled, depending on the House. There would be opportunities for the Government to table WMSs, and for Questions to be asked, on a daily basis in this House and on a regular basis in the House of Commons, about the reasons behind those decisions. The Government will certainly be transparent on these matters.
We also value the role that parliamentary committees play. If requests are made to attend committees, every effort will be made for the border commander to attend. There are already opportunities for officials across the Home Office and other government departments, who are at the level of the border commander, to appear, either independent of Ministers or in support of Ministers on key issues.
The final amendment in the group would require that the terms and conditions of the Border Security Commander and the key performance indicators used to determine their effectiveness are published. I draw the attention of noble Lords to Clause 2, which sets out the terms and conditions of the designation of the Border Security Commander. Although it would not be appropriate to disclose the detailed terms and conditions of an individual civil servant, the Border Security Commander is a director-general-level position in the Home Office and has the terms and conditions in line with that appointment.
The Government have been very clear that the Border Security Commander is responsible for leading the required step change in the UK’s approach to border security, providing a clear and long-term vision for border security, bringing together and providing leadership, and working to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems, both domestically and internationally. The significance of this role and its work is reflected in the Bill, which puts this office on the statutory footing we talked about earlier and creates legal requirements on the officeholder in fulfilling their duties.
The key performance indicators are the ones that the Government are setting themselves. We want to smash the gangs, reduce crossings made on an illegal basis, reduce and speed up asylum claims, and make sure that we reduce the number of hotel accommodations being used. Those are performance indicators which the Government have put in place. The Border Security Commander’s role is to help the Government co-ordinate those activities, with the budget and the staffing that they have, and to help deliver on those objectives. There is transparency and clarity on these issues. I hope that that will reassure the noble Lord on the amendments that he has brought forward.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his response. I point out to noble Lords that these amendments are not about creating additional bureaucracy. They are very much about reinforcing something far more fundamental, which is trust—trust in the effectiveness of the new Border Security Commander, trust in the process by which they are appointed, assessed and, if necessary, removed; and trust in the Government’s commitment to openness and transparency on a matter of genuine public concern.
I just ask the noble Lord this question. Does he feel that the Home Secretary in the House of Commons and me, as the Minister in the Lords for the Home Office, would not be held to account for both the appointment and any removal of the Border Security Commander and their performance—by which I mean also the Government’s performance—as regards the issues which are of great concern to both sides of this House? That is where I think we are. This is the place to hold us to account on performance.
I fully accept what the Minister says. He can rest assured that he will be held to account in the House of Lords, and I am sure my friends in the other place will be holding the Home Secretary to account.
The Government have chosen to elevate this role, presenting it as central to their response to illegal migration and cross-border criminality, yet, as it stands, the Bill offers almost no insight into how that role will be structured, what standards of performance will apply, or what transparency will be in place if the arrangements break down. If the Government believe that this new position will be effective, and if they believe in the strength of their policy, then publishing the terms and conditions, setting the key performance indicators and offering transparency around dismissal should be welcome. These amendments would give Ministers the opportunity to prove they are serious about making this role deliver real results.
We cannot tackle this issue with platitudes and meaningless positions. The public need to know what sort of deal they are getting through this Bill. With that, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the explanation of the amendment makes its intention clear, and so I will not take very long.
I do not say that this amendment is a leftover—far from it—but, back in May, the NFU operated a very successful campaign on the need for greater biosecurity in the country, and there was an attempt to put this issue when the Bill was in the Commons. I think it simply was not selected and so there was no opportunity for it to be debated. I offered to do the necessary to get it raised here.
For an island nation like us, biosecurity is national security—it is as simple as that. We are in the same position as New Zealand, if one is looking for a comparable need for biosecurity. Our exports at the moment amount to about £9 billion of animal and plant products, and that very much relies on our reputation. We have had a few problems in the past, but our reputation is very good. The recent foot and mouth outbreak in Germany, Hungary and Slovakia is a stark reminder that it has not gone away. The consequences of failure at the border would be catastrophic for UK food producers, not just the 44,000 farmers.
Using the Bill to clarify that biosecurity is an element of border security—which is what I am asking my noble friend to do—is quite important. We look to strengthen the deterrence against and penalties for those engaged in border criminality, and to ensure, importantly, that all the agencies—the Border Force and the port health authorities—have the resources, legal powers, intelligence and political backing that they need. This is not a trivial issue, but it is not high in the political importance of colleagues in both Houses, particularly in the Government. We need to get it raised. We need to evaluate whether the current customs and inspection functions are fit for purpose. This is much needed.
I want to give a couple of examples. Since October 2022, more than 240 tonnes of illegal meat products have been seized at the Port of Dover alone. During the week commencing 6 January this year, 10 tonnes of illegal meat were intercepted and removed from the food chain. These volumes are not trivial. This will be meat that has probably not gone through official controls and has not had the hygiene care that is required. It is an ongoing threat.
Of particular concern is African swine fever—a disease with no cure or vaccine—which would cost the UK economy between £10 million and £100 million. The pig sector alone is worth £8 billion and would be severely impacted, with exports currently valued at £600 million facing greater restrictions. I have already mentioned the foot and mouth disease outbreak—the big outbreak in 2001, as opposed to the 2006 self-inflicted outbreak from the laboratory. The 2001 outbreak cost to the public sector was more than £3 billion and more than £5 billion to the private sector, including the culling of over 6 million animals. An outbreak today would devastate UK agriculture. In 2025, both African swine fever and foot and mouth disease have been detected in multiple countries across Europe.
Illegal meat is big money. The meat industry is a huge industry. It has been some years since I did any individual checking on it. Then, it was worth £6 billion—it is huge. In my experience in MAFF, Defra and the Food Standards Agency, it was one part of the food industry where there was always a willingness among certain sectors to cut corners. I had no problem with colleagues tightening up official controls. I know people complain about it, but there are plenty of people looking to make extra money with illegal meat.
My Lords, I added my name to this amendment because I completely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has said.
In my time at Defra, there was a weekly biosecurity meeting covering a variety of things, such as invasive species. In particular, the risks of African swine fever and Xylella fastidiosa were probably our biggest concerns. Those concerns continue to rise, which is why the extra investment has gone in to support Border Force. There is a bit of a debate about Dover and Sevington—or, more accurately, Bastion Point—but nevertheless, officials recommended that Sevington be the principal gateway and that it be reinforced by the Border Force at Dover.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, set out quite extensively, this matters because it was often a challenge in government to try to get other departments to realise the impact of having something like African swine fever in this country. It would entirely wipe out our pig industry. Xylella fastidiosa would wipe out species after species of flora. This is why it matters for our national biosecurity. It was great to see particular reference to investment going into Weybridge in the security strategy.
Your Lordships should not underestimate what can be done by malicious actors trying to bring in this sort of element to disrupt our country. Although I know there is collaboration between the Border Force and port health in Dover and around the country, having this issue in the priorities of this new commander would give it the prominence it desperately needs—not just among officials but across Cabinet and Ministers.
As a slight aside, I welcome the investment in Weybridge, and I pay tribute to Dame Tamara Finkelstein. She is stepping down as Permanent Secretary at Defra and is leaving the Civil Service. Candidly, I think this will be the main legacy of her time at Defra. It has taken quite a few years and money has gone along the way, but having world-class facilities is vital to recognise the importance of this to our nation.
On how this could work as a priority, a lot of effort is going into the transition from the European Union and more on the border between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Of course, there is no border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. I fear a lot of effort is going into that at times, and I genuinely believe it has been completely and utterly unnecessary. We need to keep our focus right around the country.
The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, is particularly focused on Dover, and I understand why. Candidly, a lot of stuff coming in through the classic white van is going to different parts of the country. I also pay tribute to trading standards around the country, which has been tackling this issue. It is a limited resource in local government and is trying to do many other things as well, such as tackling illegal vaping and similar things. By bringing this into the Home Office as an issue of importance, that should then extend to it becoming a priority for our local police forces around the country too.
A lot of this is seen as quite low-level organised crime, but the impact could become truly devastating. I am very conscious that the Government want to make this Border Security Commander principally about the boats, people and illegal immigration, but we have the opportunity to consider a more strategic approach. Even if this is lower down in the priorities—not that I think it should be—at least it would be a shared agenda for one of the most important posts, which this Government are creating through the Bill.
I hope the Government will consider this. Defra works exceptionally hard on this and tries to work with other parts of government. This is an opportunity to stress how big this risk is and how malicious actors can do little things to massively disrupt this country. Just think back to 20 or 25 years ago and what happened with foot and mouth: it brought the country to a standstill, so much so that a general election was delayed. That is the sort of thing we need to think about. I hope this amendment will go through.
My Lords, I remind the Committee that I am a small organic farmer and therefore have an interest in this. I also was the Secretary of State and Minister of Agriculture in the key area when we were trying to deal with BSE.
Looking back, it is amazing how we got through that period. Part of the reason was that we had a real reputation for protecting biosecurity here, so it was possible to get other countries to believe us when we said what we were doing and how we were doing it. As the person absolutely in the spotlight on this, I owed my predecessors enormously, because they created the circumstances in which it was possible to fight that battle.
It is very important, and I hope the Minister will accept this, because I honour him considerably and I think the Committee recognises what a considerable role he is playing. He can usually convince us that what he needs us to do is the right thing. I say to him personally: there is a problem if you have a Cabinet in which none of the people is a countryman or has a country constituency.
There are 9 million people who live in the countryside, and agriculture is one of our crucially important industries. Therefore, I hope the Minister will understand why we are very concerned that this should be in this Bill, because it covers a much wider range than doing the things that we might otherwise do in agriculture Bills and the like.
The truth is that, although the noble Lord and my noble friend have concentrated on the gangs and the people who make a lot of money out of it, one problem with biosecurity is that it is sometimes breached almost accidentally by individuals. You can bring really serious diseases in by bringing in a ham sandwich in the wrong circumstances and dropping it. I would just be frank about that end of it. We also know that there is considerable activity in bushmeats—in other words, meat which itself is illegal, as a matter of fact, but therefore has gone through no protective system at all—and the effects of that are really serious. We do not have to go into the details of some of the human diseases which have been spread by the use of bushmeats.
I recently had to spend a lot of time trying to get the Government of the time, a Conservative Government, to take seriously the problem of the growth in the number of wild boars in our forests and the fact that African pig diseases can get into that whole community and then threaten the entire British pig industry. I can tell the Committee why it was so difficult: it was because you were talking to people who did not appear to understand, first, that pigs have two litters and produce an awful lot of piglets, which can very soon get out of hand. They did not understand how close these wild boars were to the pig industry, and they had never really seen a wild boar—as somebody who had most of the lawn dug up by one, not all that time ago, I am quite strongly affected. I say merely that I found it difficult to explain to people how serious this was, why it mattered and what the effects were if we did not get it right, so I beg the Committee to support this change.
I know that the Minister wants to control the Bill, and one does not want to expand it, and I know that the Government are very concerned about that, but it is our only chance to remind everybody of the importance of biosecurity. The challenge is getting worse and worse. It is not just animals but, as my noble friend remarked, it is also about plants, invasive species and huge costs, and I end on that issue.
If we let this get out of hand, the cost to the national Exchequer will be enormous. We need only look at what we are trying to do about Japanese knotweed and all kinds of invasive species—we know what the monster wasp is likely to do, and we think of the American crayfish. I could go through a whole series of things that we would then have to deal with. Many people will know what we had to deal with with the escape of mink, for example. The control of our borders is crucial for biosecurity reasons, but it is crucial also to the Treasury—and, if I may say so, I have never found a department less understanding of how crucial it is to them. They ought to remember the cost of foot and mouth and the cost of BSE and all those diseases. Just think of what bird flu is doing to us at this moment. Therefore, I beg the Minister to take this very seriously.
My Lords, I confess to being irredeemably urban—or perhaps suburban—but “The Archers” does have a function in reminding us about pig breeding and the sizes of litters. Listening to noble Lords’ comments has made me think of a number of related issues. I think it is found in a number of parts of life that people who commit one type of crime often commit another type of crime as well. We are well aware of the flexibility, if that is the right term, of the smuggling gangs. It is entirely possible that there is some sort of read across, or at least something that we should be being flagged about.
This also made me think about health, because I believe that somebody came back from Morocco with rabies very recently. It particularly made me think about the competition for facilities at ports, certainly at Dover and, I dare say, at others as well. When I was a member of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, it was made quite clear, particularly by the Port of Dover, that the issue of space to undertake immigration controls was a really big issue.
The answer may be for these relationships to be governed by other authorities falling within the category of partner authorities. However, as well as the points that previous speakers have made very powerfully, there are relationships that need to be thought about very carefully, and the competition for resources of all sorts which are raised by these arrangements.
We have Amendment 19 in this group, which probes whether cybersecurity is an element of border security; it is clearly an element of security. GCHQ is not a partner authority in the Bill, so it is not within the functions of Clause 3, nor is there a general duty to co-operate as applies under Clause 5—there are to be special arrangements. I do not have a solution to this, but it is a genuine question about where cybersecurity falls within the responsibilities and how the border commander is to take account of cybersecurity.
My Lords, my Amendment 18 seeks to introduce another criterion to the definition of what constitutes a threat to border security. We believe it addresses a crucial and glaringly absent dimension from the definition of threats to border security—harm to the economic interests of the United Kingdom.
As drafted, the clause defines relevant threats as those involving criminality, risk of offence, or harm to persons or property. All that is right and necessary, but to leave out the economic dimension is to ignore one of the most significant consequences of border insecurity in the modern age. Illegal entry, organised immigration crime and abuse of our immigration system come at a cost, not just to public safety or border integrity but of real and measurable economic harm. This includes the burden placed on housing, healthcare and social services, and extends to the impact on wages, labour market distortions, the exploitation of workers and loss of public confidence in our immigration system.
These are some of the effects of illegal immigration which people across this country feel most keenly. We must ensure that we reflect this in our assessment of the threat which illegal immigration poses to us. If individuals are entering the UK unlawfully in ways that undermine legal labour markets, displace lawful employment or distort local economies through illicit practices, surely that is a matter of national interest. Surely that is as much of a threat to border security as any physical or legal risk. If our legal framework cannot even acknowledge that reality, how can it ever be expected to address it? This amendment would ensure that this important consideration is included in the Bill, in recognition of economic harm being one of the most serious effects of this issue.
I take this opportunity to speak to some of the other amendments in this group. Amendments 6 and 14, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, address an important and often overlooked issue. Illegal meat imports present a genuine risk to our agricultural sector, as we have heard, and affect our food supply chains and public health. The potential introduction of diseases such as African swine fever or foot and mouth through contaminated meat would be catastrophic, economically and environmentally. Biosecurity is a key part of our national security. The Government need to take action to ensure that this threat is addressed.
The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raises a matter that I hope the Government will clear up in their response. Cybersecurity is an important responsibility of the Government. I am not quite sure how it relates to border security and asylum, but this is none the less a probing amendment that I hope that the Government respond to. I share the noble Baroness’s concerns about cybersecurity. We have seen a number of high-profile and extremely damaging cyberattacks in recent months. Ministers will be aware of the urgent need to tackle this. The noble Baroness is right to raise this issue. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.
My Lords, I will add a couple of points to the excellent points that have been made by previous speakers. My noble friend Lady Hamwee’s point about the opportunism that is evident in the kinds of product that criminals can switch between was well made: they might one day smuggle people and another day smuggle contaminated food products, including meat.
The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, concerning the impact on the economic interests of the UK very much ties up with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, in particular, and with trying to persuade the Treasury that the costs of foot and mouth, BSE and bird flu are important. You would think that this was self-evident, even to the Treasury. I would like to say that I was surprised at hearing that it was not, but maybe I was not.
You do not have to be a countryman to think that. I admit that you could not get a lot more metropolitan than I am, but like my noble friend I listen to “The Archers” and care about the countryside. It is not true that all of us who live in cities do not care about the countryside, but we must care about biosecurity as consumers, as well as about the impact on farmers. I absolutely support that idea, but I look forward to the Minister’s response on whether it should be part of the functions of border commander. It certainly needs to go much higher—I was going to say “up the food chain”, but that would be a bad pun—up the profile of government priorities to protect the country from biosecurity threats.
There has been a lot of concern about whether post-Brexit controls are being implemented. I am not a world expert, but the can has been kicked down the road time after time on those controls. There is also concern about whether Border Force and port health authorities are being given enough resources to stamp out illegal meat and other contaminated food imports. The Minister’s colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, was given a grilling by the EFRA Select Committee in the other place early last month; I do not know whether there has been any product from its evidence sessions, chaired by my friend in the other place Alistair Carmichael, but that committee is showing how importantly it takes these issues. We have noble Lords with experience of senior government posts in this area—the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Deben, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey—so I hope the Minister will give us a positive response.
Lastly, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, mentioned the role of trading standards, which has been so underfunded, sadly. We know what pressure council budgets are under. As a consumer, trading standards is not even on my radar, these days. Where do you go if you have a consumer complaint? I have no idea. Was it not batted off to Citizens Advice a long time ago? Anyway, we know about this function: you have the border and then you have the inside the country attention to these matters. Probably we ought to be aware that they all seem to be quite underfunded and a bit fragile in places. We know that there are so many issues that the police are unable to deal with these days, in this whole area.
There is a lot of press coverage of things such as illegal meat imports, so it would be good to hear from the Minister that the Government—not only Defra but across government—understand and will take action on the very real threats that have been raised by the amendments tabled and discussed in this group.
I am grateful to all contributors to the debate. I begin by saying, straightforwardly, that the importance of biosecurity and of securing our borders on biosecurity is vital. The Government make the commitment to ensure that we prevent contaminated goods entering this country, for the very reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and my noble friend Lord Rooker mentioned—as indeed did the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Ludford.
I will start with the amendments that seek to ensure that the Border Security Commander has regard to specific threats, namely those posed to UK biosecurity by illegal meat imports, as tabled by my noble friend Lord Rooker. It is absolutely right that that will be a key issue for the Border Security Commander. I reassure my noble friend that the threats posed to UK biosecurity by illegal meat imports are implicitly included within the definition of threats to border security in Clause 3. The commander will and does work closely with colleagues in Defra and Border Force through his board to ensure that the strategic priorities for border security are tackled.
I remember the foot and mouth outbreak of 2001. In fact, I am old enough to remember the foot and mouth outbreak of 1967, when I was a child. I also remember—who can forget?—the BSE issues that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, dealt with as Agriculture Minister. My noble friend was the Minister for Agriculture in Northern Ireland and I know, from sharing time with him, that he put a great emphasis on the issue of bushmeat and on biosecurity generally, for the very reasons that noble Members have raised: it has a financial cost, a health cost and a border security cost. Criminals will get involved in this if they see profit but, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, also mentioned, people may bring back something from their holidays that they think is appropriate or they may have dropped a sandwich. We therefore need concerted efforts on organised biosecurity issues, but need also to be aware of the individual who breaches regulations.
I know that the National Farmers’ Union has recently written to the Border Security Commander, Martin Hewitt, asking for an increased focus on biosecurity issues, and he has been able to reassure them in some ways, including that sniffer dogs are operational at certain ports in the United Kingdom and that X-ray scanners at Dover are consistently used to scan vehicles that are selected as part of an intelligence-led model. There will continue to be a central focus on biosecurity by the Border Security Commander, working closely with Defra and Border Force colleagues, to ensure that we tackle the strategic priorities that noble Lords have mentioned.
I will just come back on that—I do not mean that in any aggressive way. I certainly do not doubt the Government’s commitment on these issues. It is a matter of what is within the functions of the commander. The definition in Clause 3,
“‘border security’ means the security of the United Kingdom’s borders”,
does not take us a lot further—it is a bit circular. The Minister talked about “people”. I think that he said a “person” crossing the border. I am still not quite clear whether the security issues that are not about the physical crossing of the border come within the commander’s functions. That might be something we can discuss outside the Chamber to consider whether any further amendment would be worth tabling.
I am not yet clear about where the separations or divisions come—the answer being, of course, that it is all with the Government in some form or other. However, the functions of the commander and the scrutiny of Border Security Command require a clearer answer than the Minister may be able to give today.
Before my noble friend Lord Rooker responds, I again refer the noble Baroness to Clause 3(2). It says very clearly, and this is why it is generic, that:
“The Commander must from time to time issue a document (a ‘strategic priority document’) which sets out what, in the Commander’s view, are—
(a) the principal threats to border security when the document is issued, and
(b) the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard in exercising their functions”.
That is a long-term proposal for a Border Security Commander to determine in the priority document that they are going to produce under this clause the strategic threats to border security. That would include, potentially, at any one time, biosecurity, cybersecurity, economic security and the issues of illegal immigration security that we are facing as a high priority at this moment.
I hope that Clause 3(2)(a) and (b) give the potential for that document to be produced. That document is going to be shared and discussed with the Home Secretary of the day. It will be produced later in an annual plan showing what is happening. That gives an opportunity for Members of both Houses to question, debate and discuss it at any time. If there was, for example, a glaring gap in biosecurity in that strategic document, it would be for Members of this House and the House of Commons to press Ministers on that. I am saying to Members today that it is a priority for the Government. It will be in the work of the Border Security Commander. The generic role set out in Clause 3(2) includes setting a strategic priority document.
My Lords, I am very grateful to those who have contributed. As far as I am concerned, my noble friend has given a positive, clear, on-the-record response for which he can be held to account. That is what it is about. He has been quite clear, and he has not tried to shove it aside.
The amendment is about border security. In my remarks, I missed the opportunity, which I always try to take, to say that the unsung heroes of food safety in this country are environmental health officers. There is no question that they are unsung, and there are fewer of them than there used to be.
I want to close with one example of joined-up government, because it covers my noble friend’s position. My first role in this House was as a Home Office Minister. I had one year. Doing immigration, asylum and nationality was my day job, and the rest of the Home Office was the other bit. During that year, I spent one complete day at Gatwick and one complete day at Heathrow watching the transfer of particular flights that were coming in—they were the bushmeat flights. This was the Home Office in 2001, so we were joined up to that extent. They were both Saturdays. I am not going to mention the country the flights came from, but the result was that we slapped visas on them. The Home Office was aware of the situation because of what was being discovered, and it was thought appropriate that the Minister should have a Saturday there and a Saturday at the other place. I still occasionally read about people with bushmeat. I do not accept the cultural argument, by the way; it is out of bounds, as far as I am concerned. It is about food safety, it is illegal, and it is crucial that it is dealt with. The Home Office in 2001 proved that safety goes across government.
I understand that my noble friend is not even paid for the job he is doing at the moment, so I will not try to force him to spend a Saturday down at the airport, away from his family. He gave a first-class answer. I congratulate the NFU as well; I know that it pushed this issue, having started a campaign back in May to improve biosecurity. The more that we talk about it, the more likely we are to succeed in protecting the country. I therefore beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 7 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, I will speak to the further amendments in this group.
The Prime Minister said during his visit to Italy in September 2024:
“No more gimmicks. This Government will tackle the smuggling gangs who trade the lives of men, women and children across borders”.
I say to the Minister that we must be very careful that the Border Security Commander is not one such gimmick. We are told that the commander
“must have regard to the objectives of … maximising the effectiveness”
and co-ordination of other authorities, but what does that mean in practice? That is not a power of direction, it is not a position of operational command, and it is not even statutory oversight. What is more, the commander is expected to publish from time to time a strategic priority document that merely sets out what the commander thinks the threats are and what the priorities should be—and even that cannot be published without the consent of the Secretary of State and a consultation.
Border security is not an abstract exercise. It is about real threats, people smuggling, trafficking, organised crime, the movement of dangerous goods and hostile actors seeking to exploit our borders. If this role is meant to mean anything at all then the commander must be empowered to act, not just observe. They must be able to co-ordinate, direct and enforce, not simply suggest, advise and hope that someone listens. As it stands, the first few clauses of the Bill grant the commander very little in the way of real powers. Clause 3(1) gives the commander only two objectives, Clause 3(2) states that the commander must issue a so-called strategic priority document, and Clause 4 states that the commander must prepare an annual report.
In the spending review, the Chancellor announced an additional £280 million per year in funding for Border Security Command on top of the £150 million that the Chancellor announced in the Autumn Budget. That gives the commander a total of £430 million in overall budget—that is, £430 million to write two reports and adhere to two objectives. While we on these Benches welcome that extra funding, we must ask what that money will actually fund. How can the operation of the commander’s functions cost that much money? Might it not be better for the money to be funded directly into Border Force, the coastguard or immigration enforcement?
If we are to have a Border Security Commander then surely we should give that office far greater authority in its objectives than what the Bill currently delivers. That is what our amendments attempt to achieve. They seek to add further fundamental objectives to the functions of the Border Security Commander.
Amendment 7 states that the commander must have regard to the objectives of reducing the number of illegal migrant crossings and increasing the prosecutions of criminal organisations that facilitate illegal crossings—or to smash the gangs, in the phrase of the Prime Minister from the general election last year. This amendment is completely in step with the Government’s stated aims. In fact, at Second Reading the Minister said that the key performance indicators for Border Security Command are
“a reduction in the number of migrant crossings, an increase in prosecutions and a disruption of the gangs”.—[Official Report, 2/6/25; col. 588.]
I ask as a direct challenge: if the Minister believes that those are the key indicators for success, as stated to the Committee, then why would he not wish to put them in the Bill?
Amendment 8 would make preventing the boarding of vessels and illegal entry and facilitating the return of those with no right to be here explicit functions of the commander. Again, this goes to the heart of tackling the issue we are discussing. In effect, we want it in black and white in the Bill that the commander will be given the objective of reducing illegal entry to the country. That is what this amendment seeks to achieve. Since 2018, when the figures were first recorded, more than 150,000 people have arrived in small boats. In 2024, 36,816 people were detected making the crossing. I would like to understand why the Government do not think it is worth while to give the Border Security Commander the direct objective of reducing or even ending those arrivals.
My Lords, I think this may be the moment to remind ourselves that “illegal” and “irregular” are not the same thing. Amendment 7 refers to “illegal migrant crossings”. It is not illegal to seek asylum, and a crossing is not the same thing as entry. I ask noble Lords to forgive me for that slightly pompous comment, but I think it is important.
I say again that it is the Secretary of State who holds the responsibility and the liability, if you like. I may be misunderstanding this, but there is a muddling of responsibility by, for instance, including prosecutions within the functions and, similarly, running UKBI casework and returns. I would also say on Clause 8 that one cannot know whether someone does not have leave, or has leave obtained by fraudulent means, and therefore the commander cannot leap straight to making arrangements for the return of such persons.
I have never been known not to support an amendment that requires consultation, and I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Browne, is not here to speak to his amendment, which seems to be in the usual formula. I thought it would be a rather good hook, and I will push it a little by saying that yesterday I received, as no doubt other noble Lords did, a briefing from the Bar Council, which refers to the importance of independent oversight and suggests that the independent inspector—I can never remember the words; the ICIBI—might have a role here. But since the amendment has not been spoken to, I had better not go that far.
We have Amendment 25 in this group. Again, it is a probing amendment. Under the Bill, the board is given a function to assist. But, as the commander’s functions are co-ordinating and setting priorities, perhaps “assist” cannot mean an operational role. My amendment proposing “advise” in place of “assist” probes how the Government envisage that the board will function and seeks to understand whether there is or is not—I assume there is not—any operational role here. Amendment 71 is in this group as well, but I will leave my noble friend to introduce that.
My noble friend Lord Browne of Ladyton is unable to be here and has therefore asked me to speak to his amendment. I tried to add my name, but it was too late for the deadline.
Clause 9 requires the commander to comply with directions and “have regard to guidance” by the Secretary of State about the exercise of the commander’s functions. The amendment requires the Secretary of State to
“consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate before issuing or revising directions or guidance”
under Clause 9. That is fine, but the issue is whether we will ever know what guidance the Secretary of State has given; in other words, the purpose of the amendment is to ensure that, when the Secretary of State issues this guidance, she shall act in a transparent manner and consult appropriate persons before issuing or revising directions or guidance under Clause 9. It is a matter of having some openness in how this thing happens; otherwise, we will never know quite what instructions have come from the Secretary of State.
I understand that the Law Society of Scotland produced a pretty good briefing on this. Although the amendment does not, of course, confine itself to Scotland but covers all parts of the United Kingdom, nevertheless, my noble friend and I are indebted to the briefing from the Law Society of Scotland. This is simply a bid for openness in the way in which the functions are to be exercised.
My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Cameron, which seek to flesh out what the role of this organisation is to be and to put more detail on objectives and functions. If one looks at the functions of the commander, one sees that the meat of this is really in two points made over four and a half lines, so it is very thin indeed. It is an organisation that has already been established, as we know, and there is already an incumbent, so I think it would help the Committee a great deal if the Minister were to explain what the organisation is really going to look like. We talk about the border commander as if it is an individual, and indeed that person is an individual, but then we go on to talk about the command—the organisation.
The Minister has talked in terms of hundreds of millions of pounds, potentially, at the disposal of this organisation, or if not at its disposal, then it would have a high degree of influence over it. These are very considerable sums of money when one considers the overall budget, for example, of the Border Force, so will the Minister set out what the actual border commander’s organisation, the BSC, will look like? On what sort of scale will it be, in terms of staff, for example? A figure of £150 million was mentioned that will, in essence, be put at the disposal of the commander. What does that mean? What is the operating budget of this organisation going to be? Can the noble Lord help us? To look at this as an organisation rather than as an individual, £150 million gets you a lot of co-ordination. Can we hear more about the structure, the functions, the skills of the staff that will be working there, the type of experience, the operating budget and what returns are sought on the budgets that are being put forward?
I welcome the opportunity for the Minister, in response to my noble friend’s amendments, and indeed the others that have been discussed, to come forward and help the Committee establish what type of organisation we are talking about. He might care to illustrate it through an example of how the new organisation will interact with the Border Force. Who is going to be, in a sense, holding the strategic priorities? Which organisation is going to have influence over the other? I am sure it would help the Committee a great deal if the Minister were able to do that.
My Lords, Amendment 71 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord German. I had expected that it would be grouped with my mine and others’ amendments about Europol. Those are in later groups, but this one got bounced up, I guess for understandable reasons because it is about a duty on the border commander, so it makes sense to group it either way, as it were. That means there is going to be a slightly disjointed discussion on Europol, but I am delighted to raise the issue sooner rather than later.
I am hoping for a positive response from the Minister, because when the UK-EU summit on 19 May produced the so-called common understanding—it is a slightly awkward term, but it is the reset result, and a good result it was—there was, in particular, a point on internal security and judicial co-operation, and that referred back to doing better work on Part Three of the trade and co-operation agreement. In case noble Lords do not have the document under their eyes, Article 567 of the TCA is about the scope of co-operation with Europol. It talks about “the exchange of information”, including
“specialist knowledge … general situation reports … results of strategic analysis … information on criminal investigation procedures … information on crime prevention methods … participation in training activities”
and
“the provision of advice and support in individual criminal investigations as well as operational cooperation”.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has given us a foretaste of the consideration we will give to Amendment 206, tabled by her noble friend Lady Hamwee and to which I have added my name, which is about Europol. I agree with what she said. I also agree with the interventions made by other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, who spoke on behalf of his noble friend Lord Browne, about the importance of consultation. Of course, I agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said. She has no reason to fear; no one will ever accuse her of being pompous. She was right to remind us about the importance of the use of words, drawing our attention to “irregular” and “illegal”.
I will speak to Amendment 7, moved very ably by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on his behalf and that of his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which spells out what the duties of the commander should be in
“reducing the number of illegal migrant crossings, and … increasing the prosecutions of criminal organisations who facilitate illegal migrant crossings”.
In some ways it seems almost otiose to include this in the Bill, as those are clearly the main reasons why the Government brought it forward in the first place, but I understand the need sometimes to use Bills as a form of semaphore to send out signals and why the Opposition Front Bench might wish to do that.
As the Minister knows, I apologised for being unable to speak at Second Reading because a group of us from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I chair, were in Strasbourg to talk about, among other things, interpretations of Article 8 of the ECHR, prosecutions, the number of illegal crossings—as referred to in this amendment—and the criminal gangs manipulating and profiteering on the backs of often desperate people. During that visit, we met, among others, Tim Eicke KC, who has been the British judge in the European court for the past nine years. As noble Lords will know, the Government have put forward the names of three others who will take his place. I am glad to say that he has told me that he is willing to come to your Lordships’ House when he returns in September to share with us many of the experiences that he has had over these past nine years.
The European court and the Council of Europe are not our enemies; some of your Lordships were able to participate in the debate that I moved on behalf of the Cross Benches a few weeks ago on the European Convention on Human Rights—its origins, which we have been celebrating as it is its 75th anniversary, and its importance in this day and age. The Council of Europe and the European convention are inextricably linked. I wanted members of our committee to evaluate and understand that, because if one were to leave the convention it would mean also leaving the Council of Europe and disentangling ourselves from many of the things that I believe will help us ensure that the number of illegal crossings will be reduced and the number of prosecutions increased, because we have to do these things across borders and with our neighbours. If we do not, we will certainly not stem the staggering numbers of people leaving their homelands to make these dangerous crossings.
The Council of Europe and the court shared our concerns in all the discussions that we had. These are not our enemies. We discussed the exploitation and displacement of a staggering 122 million people—a number that has nearly doubled in the past decade. The number of refugees and persons in need of international protection reached over 42 million, while the number of internally displaced people rose to around 74 million. More than two-thirds of refugees originated from just six countries: Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine, South Sudan, Sudan and Venezuela. A rough but telling extrapolation from these figures suggests that around one in every 67 people on earth has been forcibly displaced. These people are the shadow which hangs over our debate on this amendment and others today.
On 20 June, the Joint Committee on Human Rights published its report on this Bill. It runs to over 80 pages and I commend it to your Lordships. It is available in the Printed Paper Office. At paragraph 13, we remarked:
“It was not within the scope of this inquiry to look at wider issues such as the root causes of the refugee crisis or proposals for offering safe and legal routes to those in need of protection. Whilst this Bill focuses exclusively on tackling organised immigration crime, we encourage the Government to seek to address the underlying root causes which are fuelling the global refugee crisis”.
We cannot dodge that challenge. I strongly agree with the UNHCR, which, in its recent analysis of global trends, was emphatic that, for meaningful progress to be made,
“we must address the root causes”.
It is a point that I have repeatedly—perhaps some would say tediously—made in your Lordships’ House. Simply blaming international humanitarian law will not be part of the solution.
To be clear, the Joint Committee welcomes the Bill’s overall aims to deter organised crime and prevent loss of life at sea. Of course, we would therefore agree with the terms of this amendment as it is drafted. It is right that the Government do all they can to ensure that a legislative framework is in place to help eradicate this terrible and dangerous criminality, but we will not do that by diminishing our obligations to uphold international conventions and commitments.
The noble Lord, Lord Hanson, does an admirable job in his role at the Home Office and I join others in paying tribute to him. I have been deeply impressed by the work he does and it is good to have got to know him over the distance. The Minister knows as well as I do that, if offences are applied too broadly, refugees, victims of people smuggling and modern slavery are being put at risk of being criminalised rather than the smugglers. We have to help the victims as well as tackle the smugglers; it is not a question of one or the other. The Bill needs to target those who are profiting from organised immigration crime. The people they are exploiting need to be protected, but at present there is a risk that the most vulnerable are caught by some of the new offences. We are united in wishing to reduce the number of illegal crossings, but we are wary of enacting laws which could have unforeseeable consequences.
I will return to some of these points in later groups. I will try not to be repetitive—we have to make progress on this Bill. I welcome the debate we have had so far on this group and the spirit in which it has been conducted. It is admirable, and far better than some of the exchanges that we had in the previous Parliament, both in the Joint Committee on Human Rights and on the Floor of the House. I hope, as we proceed, that we will keep these two objectives in our sights: first, to tackle the illegality of those who are putting lives at risk on a daily basis and, secondly, the importance of protecting those who are so vulnerable.
My Lords, I apologise for not speaking at Second Reading, but I did attend the pre-brief that the Minister kindly gave to Peers.
On Amendment 71, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, I would be surprised if such meetings were not on the agenda of anybody holding the position. I have no difficulty with the concept of putting it in the Bill, but I assume it would be a routine level of co-operation that you would expect. However, if she feels it necessary to insist that it is in the Bill, I personally have no objection to it.
As I said to the Minister, my concern is not with the Bill itself but with what is not in it; that is my biggest worry. We have just heard figures about the international situation and, of course, we require an international negotiation to try to solve an international problem. That is why I am surprised that the Government are refusing even to talk to our allies about the 1951 refugee convention. I asked the Government last August and again a few weeks ago, and they refuse to enter into discussions with our allies on that. I would have thought it was a relatively sensible place to start, because the convention was created after World War Two and the world has changed. The problem is highlighted by what we have just been discussing. International aid is obviously another component and, of course, for economic reasons, we are moving in the opposite direction. There is a contradiction at the core of it all.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend, who makes a really important point about the importance of looking again at the things we committed ourselves to in the circumstances in which those were signed. I reassure him that the Joint Committee takes that view too. While we were in Strasbourg, we discussed a letter which had just been sent by nine different Governments, led by Denmark and Donald Tusk’s Poland—which could hardly be regarded as being anti-international law or on the far right of politics—urging the Council of Europe and the European court to look again at the interpretation of things such as Article 8. I know that is the position of the Government, too. I hope that, as the Bill proceeds, we will hear more from the Government about what it actually is that they would like to see reformed.
I thank the noble Lord for his intervention. The Minister will be aware that, of course, the ECHR has particular connotations for me and Northern Ireland and how we negotiated the Good Friday agreement. Equally, how its terms are being interpreted, within the United Kingdom internally in particular, gives me cause for great concern. No agreement should be unable to be reviewed or looked at with life experience and the passage and flux of time. All I am saying is that the Government need to do both. The refugee convention of 1951 is another component part of it.
Coming back to the point about the powers of the commander, I believe it has to be the Government that set the strategic objectives. If we are not careful, we are also in danger of having too many cooks here. We have Border Force, this new organisation, the Government themselves, the police and all sorts of people involved, indeed including Interpol operating internationally. My anxiety about all of this is that successive Governments and Parliaments—we are all responsible—were all part of the business model of ruthless people who exploit and take money from unfortunate individuals who find themselves in difficult circumstances.
On the other hand, there are our own failings internally about our record-keeping. I do not believe that we really know who is in this country. We do not know how many Governments are putting potential sleeper cells into our country, and we do not really know who leaves and when. Boats are not the only method of irregularly or illegally getting into this country; the old-fashioned back of the lorry and other means are still there and have to be taken into account.
We have a huge task ahead of us, but I say to the Minister that the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and others have substance. I do not see anything wrong with the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Browne; it seems a reasonably sensible thing to do, and I would have no issues with it at all. However, I remind the Minister that, at the end of the day, the buck stops with the Government in setting goals, and it is within that that we should look at how a commander operates, because that person cannot simply exist in splendid isolation.
I am again grateful for the amendments tabled, because they have sparked a discussion on a range of issues.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Empey, I note that the Government will set objectives, will have policies on these areas and will, as they have already done, set out their proposals and plans to deal with these issues. We are establishing the Border Security Commander post to assist the Government in the effective co-ordination and delivery of those points. We have put in £150 million in this financial year to support that post. We have agreed with the SR, through the hard work of the current Border Security Commander, an additional £280 million over the three-year period. That is determined to deliver on the Government’s strategic objectives to secure our borders and to provide the security on all the issues that we discussed in the debate on the previous set of amendments.
There are wider issues, which the noble Lord, Lord Empey, mentioned, and which form part of the Government’s consideration under the immigration White Paper that they produced four or five weeks ago and presented to this House. It has masses of detail about the long-term issues that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, mentioned, including the interpretation of Article 8. Clearly and self-evidently, we will examine the report that the JCHR—the Select Committee of the noble Lord, Lord Alton—has produced on those issues; it is a good, wide-reaching document and the Government will consider it and respond to it in due course.
This is, therefore, not the only tool in the box to address the wider issues and downstream challenges around why people are moving in the first place and seeking asylum through either illegal or irregular means. There are issues to do with the interpretation of Article 8, and there is a constant flow of activity in the Home Office assessing all the issues that the noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Empey, mentioned.
I will turn my focus back to the amendments, which are about the Border Force Commander. The strategic priorities, which the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, mentioned, are very clear. In Clause 3, we are trying to give great scope to the Border Security Commander to produce a plan to deal with the challenges that are discussed with the Home Secretary on a weekly basis and to deliver effective outcomes.
Since being in post, the Border Security Commander has, for example, struck new anti-smuggling action plan agreements with the G7 and bilateral agreements with Italy, Germany, Serbia and the Balkan states. He has increased UK operations with Europol, which the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, mentioned. He has essentially been the driving force behind the Calais group—France, Belgium, Holland, and the United Kingdom—in looking at what measures we need to take.
There are additional resources, and the noble Viscount rightly challenged us on how they are used. They have been used to date to employ additional people under Border Security Command initial direction, to support work on a range of issues. For example, over 200 people are working in a variety of areas on the border security strategy as a whole, and there is support for 100 new officers to deal with Border Security Command as a whole. That has now closed twice as many social media accounts as before, increased the cost of gang and boat engine packages, and supported over 80 ongoing investigations with the National Crime Agency. A whole range of things is going on now, and again, I hope that, with the legal framework in place in the Bill, there will be, as the Bill says, an annual strategy and an annual report to Parliament via the Home Secretary on the outcomes of these proposals and policies.
The group of amendments which was produced by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel—again, they are perfectly legitimate questions to ask—set out effectively issues that are in the functions of the commander in Clause 3, including requirements for the commander to seek to maximise
“the effectiveness of the activities of partner authorities relating to threats to border security”.
The first of these objectives is the very one that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, mentioned. The Government have been clear that preventing dangerous crossings and dismantling organised gangs that are facilitating those journeys is a top priority. Indeed, the work of the Border Security Command and its partners is now delivering results.
Just this month, a suspected organised crime boss and his associates were arrested for facilitating hundreds of individuals entering the UK illegally as part of a surge in law enforcement activity co-ordinated by the Border Security Command. The Government are working to restore order and control of the migration system in the wider ways that we have talked about with the noble Lord, Lord Empey. That is central. I welcome, in a sense, the agreement and understanding from the amendments, but it is central to the core proposals of the Border Security Command.
A further amendment would also allow Border Security Command to issue directions to partner authorities for specified purposes. I just do not think that the power to direct is required. In oral evidence sessions in the House of Commons, we heard from the National Crime Agency and the National Police Chiefs’ Council. They welcomed and supported the role and collaboration to date with the Border Security Commander and the arrangements provided for in the Bill, which will reflect and respect the operational requirements of the various board members.
I know he is not here at the moment, but the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, raised the issue of operational responsibilities at Second Reading. We have to respect that, but there is a role for co-ordination and extra financial support and direction from the Border Security Commander centrally. Under Clause 5, partner authorities have a duty to co-operate with the commander in so far as it is reasonably practical for them to do so, and under Clause 3, partner authorities must have regard to the strategic priorities, which will have been endorsed and consulted on, supported by the Secretary of State and by the board, and in Clause 3(4)(b), the current wording in the Bill ensures that all parts of the system work coherently to tackle the very border security threats that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, has raised in his amendment, while respecting the operational independence of the various partner authorities. The amendment as proposed would potentially undermine that valuable operational independence.
So I understand where the noble Viscount is coming from and the need to press on those matters—and I understand the need for the noble Viscount to intervene, which I will allow him to do.
It is very generous of the Minister to interrupt his afternoon and his peroration to let me do so.
I asked the Minister just to give the Committee a bit more detail. He talked about some teams of people who were undertaking various different tasks. But what is the anticipated annual operating budget of the organisation, and what is the very approximate staff complement that is anticipated for the organisation once it is up and running?
He talked about various initiatives, saying that the Border Force Commander had done this and done that, all of which sounded very positive and laudable. But are we talking about the border commander’s organisation undertaking executive programmes: is it delivering some of these initiatives? The way it is portrayed in the Bill and the way the Minister has described it, the organisation’s individual will be co-ordinating but the actual delivery will be done through other partner agencies. Is that still the case?
The Border Security Commander has a co-ordinating but also a strategic directional role, so, in consultation with the various partners, he will be producing a plan which brings together various partners who are currently operating independently, some of whom are not even within the Home Office’s direct responsibility areas, because there are, as we talked about earlier on, biosecurity elements of Defra and others there, to effect a strategic plan for the three-year period of the SR, for which he has been given £280 million to determine how the plan is used and implemented from the SR settlement.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and all noble Lords who have contributed on this group. Some of the contributions were outside the subject matter of my amendments but made some very important and significant arguments, especially from noble Lords who were not able to be present at Second Reading. I particularly point to the speech of my noble friend Lord Goschen, who asked some very pointed and forensic questions about the nature of the security command. I am not sure that he received an answer that satisfied him, but we will see how this transpires.
We have heard again and again that the Bill, and the creation of the Border Security Commander, are meant to signal a new era in the Government’s approach to illegal migration and organised criminal networks. If that is to be the case, the reality has to live up to the rhetoric. At present, I do not believe that it does. Our amendments seek to give substance to a role that currently lacks it and to ensure that the commander is tasked not with observation but with action. Without clear objectives, real powers and meaningful authority, this role risks becoming the most expensive strategic document writer in the history of Whitehall.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised a question about one of our amendments including prosecutions. We are not suggesting for a minute that the Border Security Commander will be responsible for prosecuting. I was pointing to what the Minister said at Second Reading: that the success of Border Security Command would be measured by a reduction in crossings and an increase in prosecutions. These amendments simply seek to put those objectives in black and white. We do not understand why the Government should be reluctant to define in law as objectives the very outcomes that they claim to be delivering.
With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, we do not believe that this is otiose. We think it is important. The amendments that we have proffered are the opportunity to correct that. They would ensure that the commander’s functions are explicitly tied to the outcomes that the Government say they want. They provide objectives that would lead to urgent decision-making on asylum claims. They would empower the commander to issue binding directions to the partner authorities, et cetera.
The stakes here are very high. The British people are watching. They are right to expect more than well-meaning structures; they expect real enforcement, real deterrence, real co-ordination and, above all, real outcomes. If the Government are serious about regaining control of our borders, they must give the commander the tools to do the job. We think that these amendments are a constructive, credible way forward and that they give the role meaning, direction and power.
If the Minister continues to be emollient, I also encourage him to be reflective and to reflect on these amendments, not just for the sake of the legislation but for the sake of public trust and national credibility. Let us not settle for appearances; let us legislate for results. I hope the Government seriously consider adopting our amendments in the future but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, Amendment 9, alongside the other amendments in this group, seeks to amend the strategic priority document issued by the commander. The Government envisage that this strategic priority document, as outlined in Clause 3, is essential to focusing the Border Security Commander’s priorities and that its contents will outline the principal threats to border security and the strategic priorities to which partner authorities must have regard.
I therefore ask why the Government have decided it must be issued simply “from time to time” rather than annually, as proposed in Amendment 9. If the Government are so confident, should they not issue this document annually? From time to time could mean very rarely. If the role is to be taken seriously, it must come with measurable goals. It goes without saying that a vague timeframe renders the publishing of a document a somewhat arbitrary display of the commander’s responsibility, instead of a fulfilment of his strict duty to protect our borders. I acknowledge that there is an annual reporting duty. That reinforces, in my view, the need for this document to be produced annually too.
There is one point in this clause on which I genuinely seek clarification from the Minister, because it goes to the necessity of the provision as a whole. Subsection (2) requires the commander to assess
“the principal threats to border security”.
This goes to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, on the last group: is the assessment of principal threats to security not properly a function to be undertaken by Ministers, most obviously the Home Secretary, with the Home Office, her 38,000 or so staff, the Border Force, Immigration Enforcement, the Small Boats Operational Command, the Migration Advisory Committee and the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration? In seeking to place this duty to assess principal threats on the commander, I ask the Minister where responsibility lies.
Secondly, the Bill requires a rather slender number of inclusions in the strategic priority document. If the commander is to prepare a statement of strategic priorities, should it not be more comprehensive? My Amendments 10 and 12, and Amendment 11 from my noble friend Lord Goschen, attempt to rectify this.
Amendment 10 would require the commander to include an assessment of the most effective methods for deterring illegal entry, reducing the number of sea crossings and arranging for timely and effective removals, including to a safe third country. The Government have stated that they believe the creation of this new position is essential in deterring migration; if that is so, why not require the commander to consider those factors when drafting his overall assessment of threats to our borders?
I am afraid it is true, given the crossings this spring and early summer, that the Government have not succeeded in their mission. We know that on 21 May, 825 people crossed the channel; on 13 June, 919 made the crossing; and on 31 May, 1,195 people journeyed. The Government have presided over the highest asylum figures recorded in a single quarter—September to December 2024. Given these figures, does the Minister not agree that an explicit requirement relating to reducing illegal crossings should feature in the commander’s strategic priorities?
I welcome my noble friend Viscount Goschen’s amendment to my amendment; I believe it would a crucial addition to the strategic priorities that the commander must consider. We know that all those who choose to make the crossing across the channel have transited through a safe third country. Understanding the reasons why they do not therefore choose to remain in those safe countries is the first step to deterring them effectively. For that same reason, I and my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower have included in Amendment 10 an assessment of removals to safe third countries.
My Lords, my Amendment 11 in this group is an amendment to my noble friend’s Amendment 10.
Before I get into the detail of it, I must support what my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said in the previous group. They put their finger on one of the key issues: namely, that the Secretary of State cannot step back and abrogate her responsibility to set strategic priorities. Surely the Secretary of State is ultimately responsible for setting the strategic priorities. It would be better for the Bill to say that the Secretary of State will publish the strategic priorities for the organisation, having been advised by the border commander and having consulted the commander and other relevant agencies. It seems quite a circular argument for the border commander to be invited to come up with their own strategic priorities and then set out how they intend to address them—there is an element of marking your own homework here. We will listen carefully to what the Minister has to say to the point about the strategic priorities coming from the border commander rather than from the Secretary of State. It may well be something we wish to return to.
The origins of Amendment 11 lie in an exchange I had with the Minister at Second Reading, to which he followed up with a letter. The question I had asked him was this: what is the Government’s understanding of the specific factors that drive desperate people to take their lives and those of their families into their own hands and undertake a sea crossing with, potentially, the peril of death or serious injury? Why would they come from at least one other safe country—generally France—or a series of safe countries they might have passed through? Why would they risk everything, including their lives and those of their families, to come specifically to the UK? What is it about the regulatory, commercial or cultural situation in the UK that causes people to come here?
The Minister was kind enough to provide me with a substantial letter, which I hope he will not mind me paraphrasing by saying that his answer was, “We don’t really know”. It was more complicated than that but that was the thrust of it. I think we should know and should be honest about the factors, whether they are to do with the support provided, the level of control we intend to exert over people who come here irregularly or illegally, or the organised crime gangs—all factors the Minister touched on—or whether it is also to do with the chances of deportation. I wonder whether the Minister can assist the Committee by telling us the average rate of deportation of people who have come here through illegal or irregular means or who have crossed the channel in small boats?
I believe there is another factor as well, which is the opportunity for irregular migrants to take on paid work, whatever the regulations say. I am sure the Minister is very well aware, for example, of the coverage on the front pages of national newspapers yesterday about people coming from government-funded hotels where they have been housed and undertaking work for some big companies—as a contractor, I suspect. We have to grapple with those factors and be honest about them. We need to tackle the demand side as well as the supply side. I appreciate that this Bill is very much about addressing the supply side, and quite rightly so, but it is incredibly important that we look at the specific demand factors that are driving people to risk their lives to come to the UK in preference to other European countries.
I am grateful to noble Lords. I will try to answer the noble Viscount immediately. It was very kind that he paraphrased my reply as “We don’t know”. A tadge unfair, I fear, but an opinion none the less. We do know about the many issues that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, refers to on a regular basis—war, hunger and oppression—that drive people to leave their homes or force people out of their homes. There are many people who are criminally trafficked across Europe. There are many people who attempt to come to the United Kingdom because of simple things such as speaking English as opposed to other foreign languages or because of the nirvana promised to them by criminal gangs. There is a range of pull factors that we know about, and we are consistently assessing those.
The noble Viscount might be interested to know that, under the previous Government, in the years between January 2018 and March 2025, 94% of small boat arrivals had an asylum claim raised, and outcomes from those asylum claims varied. People from Afghanistan had 37% of asylum claims agreed, for people from Syria it was 99%, for people from Eritrea it was 86%, for people from Iran it was 48% and for people from Sudan it was 98%. There is a variety. That is because the factors that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, rightly continually raises in this House are very often push factors rather than pull factors. They are push factors from areas of high levels of poverty, war or other disruptive influences.
Our model has to be to try to smash the criminal gangs and to remove their ability to traffic effectively, for the reasons that we have debated all afternoon. In that, the role of the border commander is critical. The amendments that have been brought forward by His Majesty’s Opposition’s Front Bench look at, first, specifying the frequency with which the Border Security Commander must issue a strategic priority document. The Border Security Commander can issue a strategic priority document to partner authorities setting out the principal threats to border security, but I want the Border Security Commander to have flexibility to update those priorities as and when threats evolve. The very changes that the noble Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, have mentioned might well impact upon that. Under the terms of the amendment, the production of a document annually would not allow that to happen. I want it to be a fluid operation between the Border Security Commander and others.
Members have also asked who is setting the strategic priority. The framework we have set out in the Bill is clear: the Border Security Commander will be setting strategic objectives, having consulted a board that is established under the Bill, having consulted partner agencies which have operational responsibility—as mentioned—under the Bill, having discussed it with the Home Secretary and the Home Secretary, who will themselves have discussed it with other Ministers, and having produced clear evidence of what the pressures on border security are. The plan will then be produced. We are currently looking at the issues that I mentioned earlier—the operational delivery of that and the members of staff, and so on, downstream—about which I will write to the noble Viscount.
We have a £280 million resource for the next three years of the spending review, and we will be looking at how we do that when allocations are made later this year. However, I say to His Majesty’s Opposition Front Bench and other noble Lords who have raised these issues that the flexibility to produce a plan with the Border Security Commander under the strategic objectives set by the Government is critical.
Other amendments set out that additional information should be included in the strategic priority document. The Government are working hard to prevent dangerous sea crossings, to target smuggling gangs, to make sure that they do not put lives at risk and to address the factors that are driving illegal immigration from safe countries. The strategic policy document is issued to partner authorities and sets out the strategic priorities that they must have in exercising those functions. Again, I hope the noble Lord will reflect on the proposals in the Bill in due course because it is not clear how suitable the assessment set out in the amendment would be for such a document.
Amendment 12 aims to ensure that the strategic priority document issued by the Border Security Commander and the UK border strategy are supportive of each other. Again, border security is a fundamental part of the wider strategic approach to the border and strategic priorities for border security, which will help to drive the wider UK Government approach. Indeed, the whole purpose of the Bill is to ensure that we coherently and sensibly convene activity across the whole UK border system. It is therefore not really plausible to imagine a situation whereby the commander’s priorities, setting consultation with the board, would be at odds with wider priorities set by other agencies. The whole purpose of the Bill is to provide the grasp, coherence, drive and strategic forum for the exercise of these measures to deal with the very issues that we have all mentioned in this short debate.
I hope that helps regarding the amendments. We can return to these on Report if need be, but I hope that for the moment I have addressed the issues raised.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and to my noble friend Lord Goschen.
This short debate has brought to light a number of what we say are shortcomings in how the Government currently envisage the role and responsibilities of the commander, particularly with regard to the strategic priority document. We are told that it is central to the commander’s function and that it will help to shape the response to some of the complex and pressing threats to our border, yet it still seems a surprise that it need be issued only “from time to time”.
I listened carefully to the Minister’s response, but I simply do not believe that it is a serious approach to a serious national challenge, when confidence in the system is fragile, to leave the frequency of such an important document so open-ended. For that reason, the clear solution is Amendment 9’s requirement to issue it annually. That is simply a minimum standard of accountability. It would not be excessive or difficult and, if the commander is to be held to their role, it would be a form of regularly reporting on the document.
Frequency is not the only issue, as has been said. As drafted, the document lacks substance. It offers no mandate to assess the effectiveness of the methods being used to deter illegal entry, reduce crossings or facilitate removals. Amendment 10 would address that gap directly. If the Government truly believe that the role will make a difference, they should have no hesitation in embracing clarity, direction and purpose in the remit of the commander.
I just want to add that the Employment Rights Bill is currently going through a lengthy procedure of discussion in this House. It is attempting to put down a whole range of measures which tackle some of the employment issues on illegal working that will potentially—going back to the noble Viscount’s point about pull factors—deal with that in a much more effective and strong way. I hope that, after 10 or 11 days in Committee and with Report to come, the noble Lord can reflect on that and see what support he can give to the measures in that Bill.
I will reflect very carefully on that. The amendments in this group, like the amendments in the previous group, are not about undermining the Government’s intentions; they are about giving them a credible, coherent mechanism to pursue and deliver them. That is the very reason I support Amendment 11, tabled by my noble friend Lord Goschen, and Amendment 12, which would ensure that the commander’s work is not carried out in isolation but is aligned with the UK’s border strategy. The lack of linkage between the commander’s priorities and the border strategy is, in our view, a missed opportunity. Amendment 12 would put that right.
If the Government are serious about border reform and want to be taken seriously on deterring crossings and improving removals, they must demonstrate a willingness to embrace the structure, purpose and accountability offered by the amendments. I simply urge the Government to listen to what we have proposed today and accept these changes in the spirit in which they are intended; that is, to ensure that the commander is not just another headline but a role that delivers real outcomes for the British people. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 15 I will speak also to Amendment 17; both are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower. I will also reflect briefly on Amendment 16, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Amendment 15 is a matter of legal precision. Legal precision, especially in issues as sensitive and complex as immigration enforcement, is a necessity. This amendment would define illegal entry to the United Kingdom with direct reference to Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. That Act has long provided the statutory foundation for offences relating to unlawful entry and overstaying. If we are serious about creating a coherent framework for the commander to operate within, we must be clear about what we mean by “illegal entry”. Without this definition, the term is left open to interpretation and could result in confusion, inconsistency and perhaps even legal challenge. By tying a definition directly to the existing law, we would ensure that there is no ambiguity and no risk of the commander operating under uncertain or shifting interpretations. It is a simple, necessary fix and sets widely accepted parameters, not only for our discussion now but for the law once it comes into force.
Amendment 17 is likewise rooted in common sense. It defines sea crossings as
“journeys by water from another country for the purpose of reaching, and gaining entry into, the United Kingdom”.
That is important because it makes it clear that a sea crossing can be regarded as having occurred from any third country. It is vital that we draft this legislation now in a way that allows our enforcement authorities to take robust action to stop this threat. How we define these core terms is important to ensuring that we can do this successfully.
We note that the Government’s current intention is to include sea crossings that originate only in France, Belgium or the Netherlands, as is stated in the offence of endangering another during sea crossings in Clause 18. We have an amendment to address that in a later group, so I will not dwell on it now, but suffice it to say that we do not think we should be narrowing the scope of the definition only to crossings that begin in these three countries. They might be the countries that illegal migrants cross from now, but we must ensure that the legislation is future-proofed. Given that the strategy—indeed, much of the public discourse—centres on the dangers and deterrence of these crossings, it is only right that the Bill is clear in defining what it actually refers to. Our amendment would close that gap.
I turn briefly to Amendment 16 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which raises an interesting point about whether private bodies carrying out public functions are captured under the definition of “public authority”. I suggest some caution, though: although the intention is to probe and not prescribe, we must be wary of unintentionally expanding the net of liability obligation without fully understanding the operational and legal issues and consequences. If private contractors working at the border are to be brought within the scope of the commander’s influence, that should be considered through a fuller and more deliberative process, and not inserted without clear parameters.
So, although I appreciate the spirit of the amendment, I hope the Government can offer some clarification, perhaps in guidance or regulation rather than in primary legislation at this stage. The two amendments in our names are about clarity, consistency and good legislative practice, and they would support the effectiveness of the commander. I urge the Government to support them, and I beg to move.
We have Amendment 16 in this group. It is indeed a probing amendment. I am a little amused that the noble Lord has just criticised the expansionist tendencies of this amendment, given that that is what some of his earlier amendments have tended to suggest.
Clause 3(5) tells us that “public authority” means
“a person with functions of a public nature”.
Clause 3 makes public authorities “partner authorities” for the purpose of the chapter. Across the public sector—not just this one—private organisations are contracted to provide services, so I am probing whether such organisations are within the definition. Does the commander have authority over them—and, if so, how far?—or is it that, as I have been arguing for the whole of today, the responsibility lies with the Secretary of State for all this work? Of course, we know that the Home Office has contracted private sector organisations—to run asylum hotels, for instance—so my questioning is not totally theoretical.
I often worry that the Government are not always as good at procurement as one might like them to be—or, frankly, at enforcing contracts—so I hope that the private sector will not be put in an even stronger position in the sector. If it is, I for one would like to know. But this is a probing amendment, and I am not seeking to expand the territory.
I am grateful again. I hope I can answer the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, immediately. As she outlined, her amendment seeks to probe whether private bodies carrying out public sector functions are included in the definition of “public authority” in Clause 3(5). I hope the clarification I can give her will be of assistance. It is as follows: private bodies carrying out public sector functions, such as the contractors working with Border Force, would fall under the definition of “public authority”. I hope that meets her probing amendment, but it is on the record that that is the position.
The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, again raised a number of amendments. Amendment 15 would require a definition of
“illegal entry to the United Kingdom”
to be included in Clause 3(5). Amendment 17 would require a definition of “sea crossings”. I say to him—and I hope he will reflect on this—that, in Clause 3(5), in the chapter, we have included the words “border security”, “partner authority” and “public authority”, and they have been explicitly defined due to their presence in other clauses in the chapter. My honourable friend the Minister in the House of Commons was clear that we do not want to put into the Bill issues that will be included in the strategic priority document or the annual report, to ensure that sufficient flexibility is retained to respond to the continually evolving threats to border security. If we were to accept the amendments that the noble Lord has proposed today, we would, by defining these terms, actually water down what is in Clause 3(5). “Border security”, “partner authority” and “public authority” are clearly defined terms in the chapter, giving the Border Security Commander the flexibility to address the issues of the day. I note a little shake of the head from the Opposition Front Bench. If the noble Lord remains unhappy, he should feel free to challenge. If he wants further clarification, I will try to give it to him. If he wants further further clarification, I will write to him, and if he feels that this does not meet the objectives that he has set, then we have the potential to discuss it at further stages of the Bill.
I am grateful to the Minister, and I hope he recognises the constructive spirit in which these amendments have been brought. What we are seeking is legal certainty and legal clarity, and what these amendments show is that language matters. This is a Bill of great significance; it deals with powers of co-ordination, enforcement, and national security. The clarity of our definitions is not just a drafting preference; it is a legal and operational necessity.
I do not want to be repetitive about the two amendments, but we say that Amendment 15 would provide a clear legal anchor for the term “illegal entry” by referencing existing law under Section 24 of the Immigration Act. It is a small change, but it would give certainty to the commander and to those the commander is expected to co-ordinate. Amendment 17 would perform a similar function. It sits at the very heart of the public and policy debate. It is about scope and enforceability: if we are to disrupt these crossings, we must be clear in law as to what constitutes one. Ambiguity here invites confusion, in our view. If Ministers are serious about making the command structure work, then we say that these amendments clarify and improve the Bill. I urge the Government to think again about this, but on the basis of what has been said so far, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the amendments in this group in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower refer to the annual reports clause in the Bill. We are told time and time again that the Government’s priority is to “smash the gangs”. We hear at the Dispatch Box, both here and in the other place, that the immigration policies of the current Government are cracking down on the criminal networks who profit from vulnerable people. We are assured that progress is being made and that enforcement is working, but when it comes to the results, the actual measurable outcomes, we are met with a very different picture. I shall not restate the statistics that I have been over already this afternoon.
Our amendment to Clause 4 simply asks the Government to state in each annual report the number of people-trafficking gangs that that have ceased to operate as a result of enforcement action. That is it: it is not an unreasonable demand; it is not an operational risk; it is just seeking the facts, if the Government have them. If the Government really are dismantling these criminal gangs, they would have no reason to oppose this. If the policy is working, the data should be on hand and should strengthen the case that the Government are so eager to make. Transparency would serve to confirm what is claimed is already happening.
There has so far been a lack of openness around this supposedly central policy objective, and that raises questions about whether the crackdown is as effective as claimed, whether the strategy is working and whether the targets are being measured. If the Government cannot or will not report on how many trafficking gangs have been taken off the streets, how can the public be expected to trust that this is a meaningful priority? This amendment simply seeks transparency and facts, rather than slogans, and if the Government are serious about earning confidence, we gratefully suggest that they should adopt it. They should have nothing to hide and every reason to show us the results.
My Lords, I have two amendments in this group, and I certainly support the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Cameron. The first of my amendments, Amendment 22, is very straightforward in saying that the commander should publish financial accounts. Clause 4 refers to the financial year but not the publication of financial accounts. It is very important that we have discipline around what the purpose of the organisation is and what will be the return on the investment the public are making in it. When the Minister comes to respond on this group, perhaps he will guide the Committee as to whether the £150 million that has been mentioned is, in effect, new money being put into this organisation or whether it represents a reallocation of existing budgets. Perhaps it is a blend of the two.
That brings me on to Amendment 24, which could almost be thought of as post-legislative scrutiny on an ongoing basis for the new structure that is envisaged. It is a new layer—I will not use the word bureaucracy, but it is a new agency essentially—designed to co-ordinate other agencies, rather than necessarily operationally deliver outcomes itself. There is, therefore, undoubtedly a danger, which I am sure the Government recognise, that having another cook in this kitchen could destroy value rather than add value. We need to be clear about what the real outcome is, over a period of years, of the initiatives that the Government have brought forward. We certainly give them credit for doing so for all the right reasons.
Perhaps my drafting was rather inelegant, but this is not about the performance of the individual commander; I am talking about the commander’s organisation—the BSC. It is about asking whether the partner agencies continue to believe that the new agency is adding value and doing things that could not otherwise be done. If it does not work as we all hope it will, there must be an argument that it should be stood down and the co-ordination function perhaps be taken up by another agency or indeed by the Home Office itself.
These are two very straightforward amendments. The first point is that the Government need to be accountable for the money spent, and the second is that the partner agencies that will be the beneficiaries—or otherwise—of this co-ordination should be able to express their views about the efficacy of the structure. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I apologise that I was unable to attend Second Reading. I have put my name to a number of later amendments, but I wanted to say how much I support the spirit of this group. On the issue of boat crossings, there is a feeling in relation to smashing the gangs that there is a huge amount of smoke and mirrors and not enough transparency and understanding. I fear that there is a climate of public distrust in which politicians are just not believed.
These amendments would therefore be really helpful to the Government, because they give assurances that this will be fully accounted for and not just a slogan, as has been indicated. The area around these crossings is a territory for rumour and potential misinformation. All sorts of figures are bandied around and people, because they no longer believe in the official figures, are open to all sorts of untrue figures. These amendments would help pin down exactly what this Bill will have achieved, which is very important.
There was an interesting incident recently where journalists—Patrick Christys and a team from GB News—helped to smash the gangs themselves. They did this by going on Instagram and pretending to be trying to get a crossing; they organised one and had WhatsApp communications, voice messages and so on, partly as a sting operation to show how easy it is to infiltrate the gangs and get this information. They passed on the information to the appropriate authorities. They have chased it up, and nothing has happened. Even though they had the names and phone numbers—because they were WhatsApp messages—of two gang leaders, nothing has happened to those people. Those journalists understandably used this to say, “For all the rhetoric about the gangs and this new piece of legislation saying that it will smash them, will it really?”
The first two amendments in this group will tell the public what they want to know about this Bill—how many gang leaders have been arrested and what exactly has happened. I urge the Government to look at these amendments favourably, as helpful to their cause and to the general atmosphere, so that we do not have public cynicism about political rhetoric without action.
My Lords, I am intrigued by Amendment 20 requiring a statement of
“the number of … gangs that have ceased to operate as a result of enforcement action”.
As I understand it, that is very difficult to know. The characteristic of these gangs is that individual smugglers group and regroup. You have smaller fish who may be better known than the bigger ones. Obviously, the objective that is the subject of this amendment is exactly the right one, but I do not know that there could be any useful or meaningful reporting in quite the way that the amendment suggests. I am sorry not to be supporting it.
On Amendment 21, I note how important it is to have good data, whether or not the six headings here are precisely what the commander should be producing. The more general point—I will go on repeating it—is that the responsibility lies with the Secretary of State, not the commander. It is important to have full and accessible data much more frequently, and more up to date, than in an annual report published some time after the financial year to which the information relates.
I agree with the noble Lord to the extent that this is about accountability, but I do not agree—as he will have gathered rather tediously from me, and I am sorry about that—that the accountability is that of the director. It is that of the Secretary of State.
My Lords, we have had another useful discussion, and I hope that I can address some of the issues that have been put before the Committee today. The amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, would create a requirement for the Border Security Commander to include within the annual report a range of statistics relating to the new offences created by the Bill, and wider relevant statistics in relation to irregular entrants who have arrived via a sea crossing and/or deportations.
The first of these seeks to include statistics on human trafficking in the annual report, while the second seeks to include further information on the number of people charged on a range of new offences included in the Bill. As currently envisaged, the annual report must state how the commander has carried out the functions of their office in the financial year and set out the commander’s views on the performance of the border security system, with particular reference to the strategic priorities that have been set. The Bill makes it clear that, under its structures, a report will be laid before Parliament and published, providing both public and parliamentary accountability for the work of the Border Security Commander across all threats. The strategic priorities may change over time, as the threats evolve, and the commander would need to report against them.
The question at the heart of the amendments is: should we provide further statistics? In line with the statement of compliance with the code of practice for statistics, and as part of the Government’s big commitment to transparency, the Home Office already publishes a vast amount of data on immigration, including the themes within the amendment, in existing regular publications. We already have, over and above any amendment that might have been potentially accepted on this issue, quarterly statistics on people coming to the UK, extensions of stay, citizenship, asylum, detentions and returns. The quarterly immigration statistics release presents final and authoritative statistics on small boat arrivals. The appropriate place for that data is within established Home Office publications.
It is helpful information; the noble Lord should look at it, if he has the opportunity to do so. For example, it tells me that the number of small boat crossings rose from 300 people in 2018 to 36,000 in 2024—a 120-fold increase. I can get those figures from information that is in the public domain already, without it going into the Border Security Commander’s annual report. I can tell the noble Lord from quarterly statistics already produced that 29,867 people were returned between the general election on 5 July last year and 18 May 2025; the statistics tell me this is a 23% increase over the previous Government’s performance. If the noble Lord wants me to go on, I can say that there is a whole range of statistics saying, for example, that since 2018, 94% of the people arriving in the UK on small boats have claimed asylum. Around three-fifths of these have received a substantive decision, but it has taken a long time to get there. One of the reasons that we have cancelled the Rwanda scheme—which will come up later in the Bill—is so that we can put resources into speeding up asylum claims and improving on those statistics.
The noble Lord’s amendment asks us to put those in the Border Security Commander’s annual report. They are in place and are there for all to see. I cited a couple of them now. They are produced quarterly, so I can give him figures for the performance of this Government and the last Government. The two are, dare I say it, incomparable in most areas, because this problem arose and was driven under the previous Government. Those statistics are there and are done in a proper, official way, and the Border Security Commander’s annual report is to show how he performs on that matter.
Through Amendment 23, the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron, intend to reinforce the definition of sea crossings and ensure it is included in the commander’s annual report. I tried to explain on the previous group of amendments that we want to maintain flexibility in the annual report with this chapter, so I do not believe that amendment is necessary. But I want to reassure the noble Lord, in the spirit of the co-operation we self-evidently have in this discussion, that in producing the annual report, the commander will of course consider a range of evidence and data and will comment on how the strategic plan has been implemented with that data.
The noble Viscount raised the financial aspect of the commander’s annual report. The report is meant to be about his performance on and against the targets he has set. There is a place for financial accounts, but it is not in that annual report, in the view of the Government. He looks quizzically at me.
The Minister was doing so well until he decided it would be a great moment to start beating up the Opposition. I think we are all on the same side on this. We share common objectives here and it has been a great, positive debate, so that is really not necessary. In so many of the comments that I make, it does not matter that we are sitting on opposite sides of the Committee.
To say that we are going to just talk about the outcomes without talking about the inputs is crazy. I will definitely come back to press the Minister further if he does not wish to accept my amendment. The noble Lord has come forward with a package of measures. We need to know what the ongoing costing is, and we need to be able to extrapolate as far as we can between the input and the output and whether that money would be better spent, for example, by the agencies that are being co-ordinated.
In the spirit of co-operation and the hand of friendship that the noble Viscount has reached out, I say that it is a valid challenge. There is a place for accounts and there is a place for reports on performance, but it is a valid challenge to which we will return in due course. I will certainly reflect on the points he has mentioned, which is the purpose of our discussion today.
I just wished to put the statistics on record because I did not wish to let down the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, or for him to think I am never going to be a bruiser again on these issues. Therefore, it is important occasionally to put some facts on the record. Those are not my facts; they are government statistics that go to the heart of the amendment brought forward by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, about whether we include them in the annual report or, as we do now, produce them on a quarterly basis on a range of those measures.
I do not wish to let the noble Viscount think I have missed the other point he raised, about the £150 million this year for the cost of the Border Security Commander. I am sure he will be pleased to know that this was new money. Effectively, in being new money, it was savings from the money that was allocated for the Rwanda scheme, which never actually materialised once the current Government came into place. We have reallocated Rwanda resources to the Border Force and the Border Security Command. We have also reallocated it elsewhere to help speed up asylum system claims by recruiting additional staff.
Jumping ahead slightly to future clauses in the Bill, that is essentially part of the recalibration that the current Government undertook on election just after this time last year to make some real changes and to try to improve longer-term performance on the issues on which we both agree: to reduce illegal migration and to respond positively to irregular migration in due course.
The noble Viscount’s second amendment mentions the partner authorities who attend the commander’s board, who would be able to collaborate on the development of the annual reports. The commander will not create this report in isolation; it will be a collaborative effort, but the commander’s job, self-evidently, is to pull together an annual report that shows how they have performed against the objectives that have been set in the strategic priorities. I do not believe that the amendment is necessary, but we will reflect on those matters and we can return to them in due course.
I hope that I have answered those points, and I look forward to hearing the response from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron.
I thank all noble Lords who contributed to this debate. I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her contribution. She said that she was not able to speak at Second Reading, but she made a very pertinent point about the climate of trust—I think that was the phrase she used—and that the Government are just not believed. Confidence and trust in the system are absolutely imperative, and that is the basis of these amendments.
We again heard the Government’s claim that tackling organised immigration crime is a top priority. All we seek is the most basic evidence of that success. It is not about operational compromise, or disclosing sensitive intelligence or tactical information; it is simply about reporting outcomes: how many gangs have been dismantled? How many prosecutions have taken place? How many individuals have been detained or removed?
The Minister read out the subsection in Clause 4 setting out what the annual report must do. It says that the annual report must
“state how the Commander has carried out the functions of the Commander”
and
“set out the Commander’s views on … performance”.
These are absolutely intrinsic issues. It is not unreasonable—it is the bare minimum—simply to ask that data on performance is put into the annual report. The Minister mentioned various items about data that can be accessed, but we seek certain information—for instance, about the number of persons charged or convicted with offences under this very Bill—that does not exist yet. It will exist in due course.
I reassure the noble Lord that we are very keen to put into the public domain in due course the performance data that he is looking for. The question is about whether we put this requirement into the Bill.
I apologise for not mentioning the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, by name in my earlier response. It was an oversight on my part, and I apologise for that. I was trying to address the issues that she and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, had raised as a whole.
I thank the Minister for that. I do not want to repeat myself, but if the Government are confident in this policy, and if they believe that their approach is producing results, what possible reason is there not to publish the data? The Minister mentioned many statistics that put the previous Government in what he described as a poor light. I could also cite statistics from the past year, but I will not do so; I have cited them before in this Chamber.
If the Government truly want to earn trust, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, they should adopt this amendment without hesitation. They should put their money where their mouth is and be honest with us about how well the policy is performing. That is simply what we seek to do. The time for slogans has passed; the time for evidence, scrutiny and measurable success is now. I urge the Committee and the Government to reflect on these points but, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
I appreciate that this group looks rather indigestible, so let me put it in a different way. I will give the amendment numbers so that they are there in the Official Report and it is understood that they have to be read as packages, each relating to a different clause but on the same point. To Clause 13, as well as Amendment 29, I have Amendments 34, 36 and 37. To Clause 14, I have Amendments 40, 43, 45 and 48, and to Clause 16, I have Amendments 52, 54, 58, and 61.
Chapter 2 of this part of the Bill creates various new offences, and these amendments are addressed to what is an offence and what is a defence, and in brief, who has to prove what. As the clauses are constructed, there is an offence if, to take Clause 13, P supplies a relevant article, and P will have a defence if he/she/they show that they had a reasonable excuse. The explanatory statement puts it more elegantly than I could—I credit the Public Bill Office with this; the drafting defeated me, and it was extremely helpful. That is not saying that I do not take responsibility—of course I do. As the explanatory statement says, the amendment
“makes the lack of a reasonable excuse a component part of the offence of supplying articles for use in immigration crime, thus placing the burden of proof upon the prosecution”,
which, of course, is normally the way we do things in this country. If the supply is without reasonable excuse—the prosecution has to show this—P would not be prosecuted if he has a reasonable excuse. One would not start on that journey.
I am very uneasy that the burden is on P. Innocent till proved guilty should be the position, not the equivalent of guilty until proved innocent. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very happy to support this string of amendments, which has been introduced very digestibly by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and deals with the reverse burden of proof and reasonable excuse.
Earlier in our proceedings, I referred to the publication of the report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights last Friday. It deals at some length with these issues that the noble Baroness has laid before your Lordships. These amendments seek to strengthen the safeguards in these new offences. Paragraphs 20 and 25 to 28 of our report—to which I particularly draw to the attention of the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson—deal specifically with defences and the potentially reasonable excuses referred to in this group of amendments.
Clause 16 provides two defences, the first requiring the person to show that the
“action or possession was for the purposes of a journey to be made only by them”.
If it applies simply to the individual—and not, for instance, to couples travelling with children—it would be helpful if the Minister could tell us the estimates, and I accept that they can only be estimates, of how many channel crossings in small boats are made by one person travelling alone, how many by couples and how many by family groups. I understand that we might not be able to have that information in Committee, but if we could have it between now and Report, I would be very grateful.
My Lords, while agreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, on the detail that he has given, I rise to support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee—in particular, Amendments 29, 34, 36 and 37 to Clause 13, although similar arguments apply to her other amendments to Clauses 14 and 16. I apologise for not being available to speak at Second Reading because of other commitments, but that is no excuse to deliver my Second Reading speech now; I will simply address the amendments. I declare my interest, if it is relevant, as a non-executive director of the Metropolitan Police Service.
Generally, in criminal law, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, people are considered to be innocent until they are found guilty in a criminal court. Until fairly recently, instances of reverse burden of proof have been exceptionally rare and, in most cases, the reasons have been self-evident. For example, if someone is in possession of an offensive weapon made or adapted to cause injury, such as a knuckle-duster—something with no other obvious use—the ball is clearly in the accused’s court in terms of their having to prove that they have a reasonable excuse for possession of such an article.
Here we are talking about items that could as easily have a lawful and legitimate use as they might have an unlawful use as the Bill suggests; that is, for use in immigration crime. I am thinking of things such as life jackets and inflatable boats. With the police power to arrest set at a very low standard of “reasonable cause to suspect that someone may be” about to commit a criminal offence, the prospect of innocent people being arrested under this provision is clear. Someone taking an inflatable boat down to the sea containing life jackets could reasonably be suspected to be committing an offence under this provision and therefore may be liable to arrest, even if they were a leisure user of such equipment. They could not argue that they had a reasonable excuse for possession of the boat and the life jackets, because that defence, according to the Bill, is not available to them until after they have been arrested, detained and charged and appeared in court.
That is clearly unreasonable. It should be open to anyone in such circumstances to be able to deploy the “reasonable excuse” explanation for their actions at the time of the incident, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee’s amendments suggest, and I therefore wholeheartedly support her amendments. As the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, has said, the safeguards are low, and the sentences—up to 14 years’ imprisonment—are high
My Lords, I rise to speak to this group of amendments and, with the exception of the amendments in the name of my noble friends on the Front Bench, to oppose them. It is always a pleasure, of course, to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who brings great expertise to our proceedings.
I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for whom I have great respect, but I have to say that I slightly disagree with him. I have read the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and I feel that the committee’s report in respect of precursor offences is less than compelling, if I am quite honest. I know that the Government will be, to a certain extent, circumscribed because they are not required to respond to the report until August; I am sure we would have benefited in this debate had we had the Government’s response. Nevertheless, the Government have made their position clear—and I support them in this respect—that Clauses 13 to 16 will strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to tackle the supply chains for the people-smuggling networks, which I think is what we are all interested in doing.
Although the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, come from the right place and are well-meaning, the real-world impact of them is that they weaken the ability of the Government and the appropriate authorities to tackle people smuggling, because they significantly change the burden of proof in respect of evidence for criminal liability and culpability. That de facto reversal of proof is not in the public interest. So in some respects the result of these amendments being agreed would be pernicious and not in the public interest, and would militate against the strategic priorities of the Government that we support: smashing the gangs and reducing illegal migration.
I do not want to detain the House at this hour with a long discussion on what mens rea means, but it does mean “guilty mind”. There are different aspects—
We will come to those arguments on mens rea. They are in later amendments. Perhaps the noble Lord would not want to jump ahead, because the groups of amendments dealing with that come in the next day in Committee on this Bill.
The noble Lord admonishes me for perhaps jumping slightly ahead, so I will revert to Clause 13 and put a question to the Minister. The honourable Member for the Weald of Kent in the other place, when considering the Bill in Committee, mentioned a potential loophole arising from the draft wording in Clause 13. I accept that, in terms of reasonable excuse, the Bill is caveated in that it is not a definitive position that you have no excuse whatever. It is right that, when you are dealing with individuals, even when they are involved in something as appalling as people trafficking and illegal migration, there should always be some discretion for the criminal justice system to exercise in adjudicating on their alleged offences.
However, there is a question to be asked about Clause 13(3) and the “reasonable excuse” caveat in terms of a loophole. Do the Government see that as problematic in terms of future litigation? I would not use the term “two-tier justice”, but certainly there is an element that speaks to the fact that, if you do not charge for services and you are seeking to rescue a person, that absolves you of criminal responsibility. There is an argument that that sends out a message.
My problem with this group of amendments is that they reduce the push factor and increase the pull factor. Those will be the real-world consequences of making it easier for people to argue that they have a reasonable excuse and did not possess an intent to commit these new offences. So, on this occasion, I will probably agree with the Minister that the House should resist the amendments.
I also pray in aid the example that the Immigration Minister, Angela Eagle, used in the other place. She prayed in aid the case in November 2024 of Amanj Hasan Zada, who organised cross-channel boat crossings from his home in Lancashire. He was jailed for 17 years after being found guilty on people-smuggling charges. It was very much the view of the National Crime Agency and others that, had the proposals contained in the Bill been in place, he would have been brought to justice much earlier, and that it was only because the authorities, particularly the NCA, did not have the ability to use the full force of law in respect of the legislation obtaining at the time that he was not stopped from his abhorrent activities at an earlier juncture.
I finish by saying that we all wish to see fair play and due process. We all want a legal system that does not discriminate on the basis of race, background, ethnicity, religion, and so on, but, equally, we have to be realistic, practical and pragmatic. In the real world, we need to reduce the pull factor and increase the push factor. I think these amendments would do exactly the opposite and, for those reasons, I hope the Committee is not minded to support them.
In reply to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, he seemed to suggest that the amendments from my noble friend Lady Hamwee would somehow be unusual in criminal law. She is obviously saying that, rather than to require the person to prove a reasonable excuse as their defence, the prosecution would have to prove “without reasonable excuse” as a component part of the offence.
I was looking at driving offences. I admit that this appears to be an AI overview, subject to correction by my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but, apparently, careless driving is
“driving without due care and attention”
or
“driving without reasonable consideration for other road users”.
Presumably the prosecution has to prove that you were driving without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other road users. It is not, at least in the first instance, for the driver to have to prove that they were taking due care and attention or that they were showing reasonable consideration for other road users. I forget any criminal law that I learned many moons ago, but I know that there are circumstances in which the burden can shift. But, overall, the prosecution has to prove the component parts of the offence.
What my noble friend is trying to achieve is the normal rule in criminal offences, where the burden lies principally on the prosecution. I query the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that my noble friend somehow wants to be out of line with the normality of the criminal law in what she suggests in her amendment. I think that it is the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, who, not for the first time, wants to be out of line.
I take that in good heart, as the noble Baroness and I are members of a committee of the House in which we share rumbustious debate. I am sorry that noble Lords have stumbled into “immigration law for dummies”, because neither of us is an expert on it. However, I think she is comparing apples and pears, because the example that she uses of dangerous driving is actually a strict liability offence, where mens rea is not an issue; in other words, it is not presumed that you would wilfully desire to get into a car and drive drunk in committing the offence. It is not necessary to prove it.
I am not saying that the noble Baroness is doing or saying anything out of line; I am merely demonstrating that one has to address wider issues in this policy area. For those reasons, the amendment is unhelpful in meeting the Government’s strategic objective to reduce illegal immigration.
My Lords, I have not heard too many debates in which your Lordships have moaned about the lack of lawyers participating, but we have listened to two people who claim not to be experts.
I will touch on Clause 13 in the context of Amendment 36 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This is really a question for the Minister: I do not understand Clause 13(3)(b), which is the “reasonable excuse” related to whether the individual concerned was
“acting on behalf of an organisation which … aims to assist asylum-seekers, and … does not charge for its services”.
That is an extraordinarily widely drawn and unqualified reasonable excuse ground.
It would certainly help me and may even be of assistance to the broader Committee if the Minister could give a couple of examples of the types of scenario envisaged and could provide some reassurance that this is not too broadly drawn as an area to provide a reasonable excuse. I genuinely do not know and do not have a particular view about that, but, on the face of it, without further qualification, it seems to be very broadly drawn. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation.
My Lords, the Opposition Front Bench’s view on this is that we side with my noble friend Lord Jackson on the group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. At their core, as others have said, the amendments would rewrite the structure of the offence in Clause 13 by placing the burden of proof for the test of reasonable excuse squarely on the prosecution. The implications of the change would be significant—I will come back to the law in a moment—as it would dilute the seriousness with which we treat those who are convicted of supplying articles for use in immigration crime.
Let us be absolutely clear about what Clause 13 addresses. It addresses the supply of forged documents, false identity papers and materials designed to facilitate illegal entry into the UK. Those are not minor infractions; they are serious crimes that underpin the business models of trafficking gangs, enable the circumvention of border controls and directly endanger lives. In such cases, it is entirely appropriate that, if an individual is found supplying such items, it should be for them to demonstrate that they had a legitimate reasonable excuse.
I would suggest—it has been some time since I practised criminal law—that that is not some obscure or novel principle. Of course, the usual legal position is that it is for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. But it is not unusual to reverse the burden of proof on to an accused in some circumstances. It reflects well-established frameworks in other serious areas of law, most notably in the Misuse of Drugs Act, in firearms legislation and in the Companies Act, where it is for an accused director to prove that all reasonable steps have been taken to avoid committing an offence.
In legislation on firearms and the misuse of drugs, the burden of establishing a lawful or innocent reason rests with the person accused of being in possession of or supplying the prohibited article. So, this is not an unusual path to take, and to shift the burden back to the prosecution, as these amendments would do, would make it harder to secure convictions, weaken the deterrent effect of the law and send precisely the wrong message at a time when we face record levels of illegal entry and organised criminal facilitation across our borders.
The public expect us to ensure that the law acts as a meaningful deterrent to those who seek to undermine it. This group of amendments would not do that. It would make it easier for those facilitating unlawful entry to escape liability and place an unnecessary an inappropriate burden on prosecutors, who are already contending with highly complex cases. Let us not forget that those convicted of supplying articles for use in immigration crime are not passive actors but deliberate enablers of lawbreaking. To demand that the prosecution proves not only the supply but the absence of any reasonable excuse would be to fundamentally misread the nature of the offence and the damage that it causes.
This goes to the heart of the problem that we have debated all afternoon: the people we are talking about are organised criminals who make money by endangering the lives of those they profess to help. It is not the time to rewrite what is, in my view, a long-standing legal norm in a way that would weaken enforcement. It is time to uphold the seriousness of the crime and ensure that our legal tools are effective in tackling it.
My Lords, this has again been a useful discussion, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling the amendments to allow it. I confess I find myself in a strange position before the Committee where I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, said and much of what the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, said from the Front Bench. In fact, I wondered whether they had a secret leaked copy of some of my notes, because the points they made are extremely important and vital.
I shall start with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. He asked whether someone would be arrested on a beach in France because they rolled up with a dinghy. I assure him, and I hope he will know this from his police experience, that, in practice, these will be intelligence-led, targeted investigations by authorities as a whole of those suspected of being connected with organised crime networks involved in people smuggling and criminal activity. It is not the intention of this Bill that authorities would turn up on a beach in France, find someone paddling in the sea with a recreational leisure facility and arrest them. It would be a targeted approach, which backs up the points that the noble Lords, Lord Jackson and Lord Cameron, made. It is about tackling organised criminals.
I did not understand the extraterritorial provisions in this Bill that would make this British law applicable in France.
We are working in co-operation with the French authorities to look at a range of issues to do with that point. We are having further discussions with the French on the steps that they can take. This is about the supply and handling of articles used for criminal purposes and the collection of information on criminal activities. It will be undertaken in targeted operations. It will not, in the way in which he said, catch individuals who have innocent uses of material that is covered by the Bill.
The noble Lord will note that there is a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses in Clause 13 to ensure that those acting in good faith, such as those carrying out a rescue of a person from danger or serious harm, or those working with humanitarian organisations, are safeguarded. That goes to the very point that the noble Viscount mentioned; I will give him chapter and verse on those issues and some concrete examples after this debate, rather than make them up.
On Clause 13(3)(b)(i) and (ii), there is a clear intention to make sure that those from humanitarian organisations who are supporting people are safeguarded. Adding the further test would shift the burden of proof by requiring the prosecution to disprove any claimed reasonable excuse, which would make it harder to secure convictions against dangerous facilitators. If, as the noble Baroness has suggested, we were to add the “without reasonable excuse” qualification, we would risk weakening the core purpose of the Bill, which is to enable law enforcement officers to detect and disrupt serious offences. I cannot accept the points that she made. By preserving these provisions, we will provide judges and prosecutors with a solid starting point that is aligned with our international obligations. I realise this is difficult, but the existing text of Clauses 13 to 16 achieves the right balance, ensures that legitimate activity is protected, and maintains the strength and support of enforcement as a viable UK policy. I am afraid I cannot accept the amendments for the reasons that I have mentioned.
I had asked the Minister about compliance with Article 31.
The noble Lord’s report has been very helpful. We need to look at that issue, and we will respond to his report in short order. I cannot give him those details today, but I will ensure that they are dealt with in due course.
My Lords, it is a day or two since I did any criminal law, and it was one time, in a magistrate’s court—then I started writing recording contracts.
I thank everyone who has contributed to this debate—although, I have to say, not always directly on the point being made by these amendments, and anticipating quite a lot of what we will come to on the second day of Committee. I do not want to get into discussion about the merits of what I think we will come to. My amendments do not deal with reasonable excuse, other than shifting how it is dealt with. They do not deal with the content of what is reasonable excuse.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for bringing in the JCHR report. I have not read as much of it yet as I should have done; I went straight to the recommended amendments and put a tick beside each of them. The noble Lord asked for a government response before Report. I know the Minister will not be able to give any commitment on that, but it really would be helpful. We have a bit more room and flexibility now, as I understand that days 4 to 6 of Committee are not going to happen until the September sittings of the House, so there is rather more time—not that I want anyone to interrupt their summer holidays to deal with this, but noble Lords will understand.
My noble friend—I am going to call him both noble and a friend—Lord Paddick and I have trod this ground together before, and I am grateful for his expert and informed explanation of the sequence of events when there is a prosecution. He referred to articles that have more than one purpose. If something is, as I understand him to say, very obviously aimed at illegality and cannot be used for anything else, that is not the same as an article that may have more than one purpose.
The first time that he and I were involved in a debate in this territory it related to acid. At that time—this is a good 10 years ago—there was a spate of acid attacks, with people on motorbikes driving past pedestrians and throwing acid in their face. The issues that we were discussing included a domestic product that might well, in the circumstance, be used to clear drains—what if someone had nipped out late to a supermarket and bought a domestic product of that sort? I am not suggesting that this is straightforward, but it is hugely important.
I would say—to use language used by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson—that it is in the public interest. He said that the amendments were not in the public interest, but it is not pernicious to seek to amend the Bill in this way. On the contrary, it is seeking to apply and maintain the rule of law. Almost nothing could be more important for the public interest.
There were issues such as the pull factor, as the noble Lord sees it, a loophole, mens rea and other things. We should come to these fairly early on the next day in Committee. It may well have been that the first set of groupings put those issues into this group, but there was a change quite late yesterday.
It might be harder to get a conviction, but what are we looking for? Are we looking at doing the job properly? I do not mean just getting to an outcome but doing the job properly and acting properly. We should not, as the Minister suggested, be relying on common sense as to whether or not there is a prosecution. As I have said before, that is not the way our law should work, although I accept that the CPS will look at the public interest test and the likelihood of a conviction.
I come back to the rule of law. The Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, is undertaking work on this at the moment. It sounds dry, but it is at the heart everything that we do right. This is not the time to take these amendments further, but clearly we will be thinking about them after this stage. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, the two amendments in this group are to do with expanding two of the offences in the Bill as drafted. The Bill criminalises only the supply or offer to supply articles for use in immigration crime but fails to cover what is often a critical precursor to that act—the possession of such articles with intent to supply. My amendment seeks to address what we say is a clear loophole in the Bill.
If someone is found holding forged documents, counterfeit passports, boat parts or other materials commonly used to facilitate illegal entry with the clear intention of supplying them to others, that is not innocent behaviour; it is preparatory, deliberate and deeply harmful to the integrity of our immigration system. We do not accept this kind of gap in legislation dealing with drug offences or the possession of firearms. Section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, for example, criminalises possession with intent to supply controlled drugs. If we do not accept such gaps in other legislation, we should not accept them here.
The Government have talked up their expansion of border security powers, and the Prime Minister has spoken of providing counterterrorism-style powers. If so, all possible loopholes in these offences should be closed. If we are serious about disrupting organised networks and cracking down on those who profit from unlawful immigration, the law must allow us to intervene before the supply takes place, not simply after the fact. Amendment 30 would therefore simply bring the offence in Clause 13 into alignment with other similar offences. It aims to strengthen the clause and close the loophole.
The other amendment I propose to the offences regarding articles for use in immigration crime is Amendment 39. This amendment is intended to help the Government by strengthening the offence in this clause. It looks to close another loophole that could permit smuggling gangs to escape conviction. The effect of this amendment would be to expand the offence of handling articles for use in immigration crime to cover a crucial additional scenario—namely, where a person arranges for one person to receive a relevant article from a third party. That may seem like a small change, but it would address a significant gap.
The current law targets those who receive, arrange to receive, remove or dispose of such articles themselves, or who assist another person to remove or dispose of relevant articles. They are rightly included in the nature of the offence in the Bill. But, as it stands, were a person to arrange for two other people to exchange a relevant article, the person who organised such an exchange could escape liability. Therefore, they would not be liable for criminal penalty, despite clearly being a at the heart of the offence committed.
This is particularly important given that, in the world of organised immigration crime, individuals often seek to insulate themselves by arranging exchanges between others, keeping their own hands clean while remaining the central co-ordinator, and often beneficiary, of criminal activity. This amendment would simply ensure that those who orchestrate these exchanges are held to account just as much as those who carry them out.
If we are to deter and disrupt the criminal networks profiting from illegal migration, we must be prepared to legislate against the full chain of facilitation and not just the visible ends of it. I respectfully submit that the Minister should think carefully now about these kinds of loopholes that the Government risk creating in the legislation, which can be easily identified if a practical operational perspective is taken. I hope he accepts these amendments, and I beg to move.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for speaking to the amendments tabled by him and the noble Lord, Lord Davies. The purpose behind these two amendments is to ensure that those who possess an item believed or suspected to be used in immigration crime, and those who arrange or facilitate the supply of an article for immigration crime, fall into the scope of the offence.
On Amendment 30, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, made some salient points about other offences currently on the statute book. In a spirit of openness and wanting to listen to noble Lords, the Home Office would be happy to take this issue up with operational partners to scope whether it would be a worthwhile addition to the Bill. We are certainly serious about using this legislation, as my noble friend the Minister said, to crack down on smuggling gangs. This could potentially be a helpful addition to the Bill, but for now I request that the amendment be withdrawn, and we will update the House further on the matter later in the Bill’s passage.
We are sympathetic to the motivation behind Amendment 39, but I can confirm that arranging the supply of an article relevant to the proposed offence would fall under the clause as drafted. It might be described as “brokering” or “offering to supply”. Either Clause 13(1)(a) or 14(1)(a) are considered wide enough to cover this activity since, for example, an offer to supply would have been made in the scenario that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, outlined, as the individual would be supplying or offering to supply an item that they knew or suspected was for use in immigration crime. I hope that is clear and, while thanking the noble Lord for tabling the amendments—and indeed agreeing with the sentiment and motivation behind them—I respectfully reject Amendment 39 as unnecessary and ask him to permit further time for Amendment 30 to be considered.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Katz, for his speech. It has been a long afternoon and I feel that, at the very end of it, I have made a tiny step of progress. I think he agrees that the case is simple, because it is a strong case: we are not asking for anything radical, just for the law to keep pace with the realities of how organised immigration crime actually works. I will say no more about Amendment 30.
On Amendment 39, I just ask the noble Lord, as he has offered, to think about it carefully. It is critical, we say, to cover the organisers, the co-ordinators, those who sit above the exchange itself and arrange for others to carry it out. They often avoid direct handling precisely because they know that the law can be weak when it comes to intermediaries, and we cannot allow them to exploit that weakness. The amendment is grounded in the operational reality of how trafficking and smuggling networks function, but I am very grateful for the indications that he has given and, for those reasons, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.